Church of the Life-Giving Trinity on Sparrow Hills. Retreat of Russian troops As a result of the retreat of Russian troops

Fierce battle in August 1914 boiled and in Galicia between Russian and Austro-Hungarian units. 21 day in the space between Dniestrom And Vistula it was going on grandiosely Galician battle. More than a million people took part in it on both sides. At the beginning, the Russian armies had difficulty withstanding the powerful onslaught of the enemy. But then a turning point occurred in the battles.

Russian troops went on the offensive, relying on powerful artillery support. the guns fired so often that they became red hot. If a soldier dropped his cap on a gun, it would immediately burst into flames, as if in a hot oven. Such shooting, of course, consumed a lot of shells.

The Austro-Hungarian army retreated in disarray, abandoning weapons, convoys and artillery. Thousands of Austrian soldiers surrendered. August 21 Russian troops occupied the area abandoned by the enemy Lviv and moved further west. The Austrians lost 226 thousand people wounded and killed and about 100 thousand prisoners. Russian losses amounted to 230 thousand prisoners, killed and wounded. The Russians lost 94 of their guns and captured 400 enemy ones. Thus, "greatGalician battle", as it was called, ended in the complete defeat of the Austro-Hungarian army. It lost more than a third of its personnel and was unable to recover from this blow until the end of the war.

The advancing Russian armies besieged the fortress Przemysl, A March 9, 1915 took her. At the same time, 9 enemy generals, 2.5 thousand officers, 120 thousand soldiers were captured; 900 guns and many other spoils of war were taken. During the siege Przemysl, As in Galician battle, Russian troops spent a huge amount of shells.

"The Great Retreat"

In the winter of 1914-1915. Russian troops fought difficult, bloody battles in the foothills Carpathians. Despite heavy losses, they managed to push back the enemy. In severe frosts, the Russians overcame icy mountain slopes and made their way through snowdrifts. As a result, they managed to take possession of a significant part Carpathian ridge.

But in April 1915 The German army of General came to the aid of the Austrians August Mackensen. By this time, the Russians had almost exhausted their supply of artillery shells, designed for a short war. The consumption of shells in the first months of the war turned out to be unexpectedly high. In front of superbly armed soldiers Mackensen Russian soldiers found themselves almost unarmed. April 19, 1915 began "great retreat" Russian armies. Suddenly it became clear that they were sorely lacking the most necessary things - shells, cartridges, guns, even boots. Often recruits ended up in the active army without shoes, and they had to fight barefoot...

Not all fighters had rifles; many had to wait until their comrades were killed or wounded to receive their weapons. The command gave orders “don’t waste bullets in vain”, “take cartridges from the wounded and dead.” Once upon a time the headquarters Southwestern front sent out a telegram about the creation of infantry companies armed "halberds"...

But the worst was the strongest "shell hunger". The Russians could respond to the enemy’s hurricane fire only with rare single shots. For one shell fired by the Russians there were approximately 300 army gun shots Mackensen. General Nikolay Ivanov wrote with bitterness on one of his superiors’ telegrams about the impossibility of sending shells: "It's a sad message. There would be no need to get involved in a war with such preparation."

“The spring of 1915 will remain in my memory forever,” the general recalled Anton Denikin. - The great tragedy of the Russian army - the retreat fromGalicia . No cartridges, no shells. Day after day there are bloody battles, day after day difficult marches, endless fatigue - physical and moral, sometimes timid hopes, sometimes hopeless horror.

The Battle of Przemysl in mid-May. Eleven terrible roar of German artillery, literally tearing down entire rows of trenches along with their defenders... And the silence of my batteries... We could not respond, there was nothing to do. Even a limited number of cartridges for guns were issued. The regiments, exhausted to the last degree, repelled one attack after another with bayonets or, in extreme cases, shooting at point-blank range. I felt despair and a sense of absurd helplessness... And when, after three days of silence from our battery, 50 shells were delivered to it, all regiments, all companies were informed about this by telephone, and all the riflemen sighed with joy and relief.”

All that was left was to retreat to save the army from complete destruction. Russian troops left Przemysl, Lviv... - almost all Galicia. They suffered huge losses - the total number of killed and wounded during "great retreat" amounted to 1 million 410 thousand people. At the same time, the retreat was not chaotic; it almost always took place in an organized manner. "Our front, devoid of shells, - noticed later A. Denikin, - slowly retreated step by step, preventing the encirclement and capture of corps and armies, as happened in 1941, during the first period of World War II." The advancing enemy also lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers captured, killed and wounded.

IN July German troops went on the offensive Poland. "The Great Retreat" Russian armies began on this front as well. IN January 1915 The Germans also used chemical weapons here. Since the Russian soldiers did not have gas masks, gas attacks each time claimed many lives. A. Denikin wrote : “We countered the murderous technology of the Germans with courage... and blood.” TO autumn 1915 Vast territories remained behind the Russian armies - Poland, Lithuania, Galicia, part of Belarus.

Of course, news of defeats and retreat caused Russia anxiety and indignation. There were even isolated outbreaks of unrest. May 29, 1915 M. Paleolog recorded :"Over the past few daysMoscow I was worried, serious disorders arose yesterday and continue today. On the famous Red Square, which had seen so many historical scenes, the crowd scolded the royal persons, demanding that the empress be tonsured as a nun, the abdication of the emperor, and hanging Rasputin ..." Rumors about treason, traitors, etc. circulated everywhere. Hostility towards the Germans intensified. Meanwhile, on the lists of the Russian generals there were about 10% of people of German origin from among the Russified Germans. Now they, and any minister or dignitary with a German surname, were seen as a possible spy.

Only to spring 1916 Thanks to the intensive work of the military industry, the Russian armies managed to make up for the lack of cartridges and shells.

The retreat of the Russian army in 1915, which lasted almost six months, from May to September, was described as “Great”. Great were the scale of the military operation for the coordinated maneuver of millions of armies, and the territorial losses to save the army, and the work of evacuating a large number of enterprises and institutions (it was carried out very effectively), and the heroism of thousands of Russian soldiers and officers who, at the cost of their lives, saved most of the retreating army from encirclement, defeat and shame.

In addition, the “Great Retreat” became a strong destabilizing factor: the authorities, wanting to provoke a popular uprising following the example of 1812, initiated a mass exodus of the population from the abandoned territories, which led to a sharp increase in social tension in the empire. Millions of destitute, sick, often illiterate refugees who, like most other subjects of the empire, did not understand what Russia was fighting for, or the causes of their problems, seriously strengthened the social base of the revolutionaries.

Russian refugees

"Polish bag"

Even during a military meeting at Ples Castle with the participation of the Kaiser and the high command of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the German eastern command demanded continued pressure in the East. Ludendorff and Hindenburg voiced a grandiose plan to encircle the Russians between Kovno and Grodno. Ludendorff demanded large new reinforcements that would allow a major offensive to be launched along the Baltic coast and decide the outcome of the war in favor of the Central Powers. At the end of June, Ludendorff again tried to push the idea of ​​​​encircling Russian troops, proposing to strike to the south and, closing the ring at Brest-Litovsk and the Pripyat marshes, destroy all the main combat formations of the Russian army.

The German high command, after the capture of Lvov on June 22, was deciding what to do next: to advance further to the east, to Volyn, or to sharply turn the operational direction to the north. The first decision led to the fact that German troops were bogged down for a long time on the Russian Front, and it was considered secondary in Berlin. The head of the German General Staff, General Erich von Falkenhayn, was, in principle, extremely wary of the idea of ​​a strategic offensive deep into the Russian Empire. In general, he was always internally skeptical about victories in the Russian theater of war: they decided little, Russia was huge, and Russian troops could retreat deep into the territory: “The Russians can retreat into the vast depths of their country, and we cannot pursue them endlessly.”

Therefore, Falkenhayn settled on a different solution. At the beginning of July 1915, he decided to carry out an operation with a limited purpose - to attempt to arrange “Cannes” for the Russian troops located in Poland between pp. Vistula and Bug. For this purpose, a strike group of 3 armies was formed. Mackensen's 11th Army and the Austrian 4th Army were reinforced by several German and Austrian divisions and aimed to move north. At the same time, from the expanded 11th Army, an independent group was separated on its right wing, which formed the Bug Army of General Linsingen. To support the right wing of the Bug Army, the 1st Austrian Army was transferred to the Sokal area from the Upper Vistula, and on the left bank of the river. Vistula left only Woyrsch's army group. To hide the preparations for a strike to the north, the Southern Army and the 2nd Austrian Army had to conduct an auxiliary operation.

Galwitz's 12th Army was supposed to advance towards Mackensen's group from Prussia. Three armies were supposed to converge near Warsaw and encircle 4 Russian armies in Poland (1st, 2nd, 4th and 3rd armies). However, with this formulation of the main idea of ​​​​the operation, sharp disagreement emerged between Falkenhayn and the eastern command. The armies under Hindenburg were: the newly formed Army of the Niemen under the command of General Scholz, which operated through northern Lithuania against Courland; 10th Army of General Eichhorn in the Middle Neman; 8th Army of General von Below - between pp. Lyk and Shkva; army group of General Galvits - from the river. Shkva to the right bank of the river. Vistula (reformed into the 12th Army); 9th Army of Leopold of Bavaria - on the left bank of the river. Vistula (below Novogeorgievsk) and to the river. Pilica.

To Falkenhayn's proposal to support Mackensen's strike group with a decisive attack from the Lower Narev sector or from the Vistula sector, Hindenburg and Ludendorff objected. They had a bridgehead in the Baltic States and wanted to use it, believing that only on the northern wing of the Hindenburg front, in the area of ​​the Neman Army, with a simultaneous attack on Kovno, was it possible to achieve decisive success by introducing additional forces. With this development of events, Mackensen’s army group had to strike from Lvov to the north, bypassing east of Warsaw, and Hindenburg’s troops would break through not to Warsaw, but to Vilna and Minsk, encircling not 4, but 7 Russian armies at once. The outflanking maneuver was deeper; it was more difficult for Russian troops to escape. The chief of staff of the German Eastern Front, General Erich von Ludendorff, was confident that Russian troops, relying on their fortresses in Novogeorgievsk, Kovno, Grodno, Osovets and Brest, would try to hold their “Polish salient” for as long as possible, which would ultimately allow the German army to commit strategic encirclement of all Russian armies in Poland. The military-political catastrophe of Russia in such a scenario would be obvious; it would have to surrender to the mercy of the victors.

Paul von Hindenburg (left) and Erich Ludendorff (right) at headquarters

Erich von Falkenhayn

However, the Chief of the German General Staff, Falkenhayn, considered the plan of the Eastern Command a gamble. The German army simply did not have enough strength for such an operation. He believed that it was better to set goals more modestly, but more accurately. The Chief of the General Staff noted that the left wing of the Hindenburg front would, at best, lead only to local tactical success of the 10th or Neman Army, and not to the defeat of Russian troops in Poland.

On July 2, a military meeting was held in Poznan. Kaiser Wilhelm II listened to both sides and supported Falkenhayn. The Hindenburg plan was rejected. He received a directive to send Galwitz's troops to break through Russian positions on the Lower Narew on July 12 on both sides of Prasnysh in order to further cut off the Russian troops located at the Vistula and in front of Mackensen's group. The right wing of Belov's 8th Army was supposed to join Galwitz's offensive, attacking between pp. Shkva and Pissa in the direction of Lomza. The troops of Mackensen and Galwitz were supposed to unite in the Sedlec area. But the eastern command carried out the directive only partially. They began to prepare for Galwitz’s offensive, and in addition they decided to attack from the Baltic states. Since the political weight of Hindenburg, “the savior of East Prussia from the wild Russians,” was enormous, his plan was not canceled.

Thus, Hindenburg’s troops launched two main attacks: with the Galwitz group on Pultusk-Siedlce to meet Mackensen’s armies and with Eichhorn’s 10th Army on Kovno-Vilno-Minsk. This scattered the forces of the northern “claw” of the German army and ultimately became one of the prerequisites for the failure of the German command, since it was not possible to create a “Polish bag”. “The enemy scattered his efforts,” noted military historian A. Kersnovsky, “the Russian armies received two strong blows, but it was better than receiving one fatal blow.”

Source: Zayonchkovsky A. M. World War 1914-1918

Plans of the Russian command. State of the Army

At the meeting of the Russian command in Kholm on June 17, all attention was focused on Galicia. They believed that nothing serious would happen in the North. Alekseev had enough strength to repel the enemy offensive. The commander of the Northwestern Front had 7 armies (10th, 12th, 1st, 2nd, 5th, 4th and 3rd), 43 infantry and 13 cavalry divisions (out of a total of 116 infantry and 35 cavalry divisions on the entire Eastern Front). True, the idea of ​​leaving Russian Poland was voiced. It was proposed to leave the “Polish salient”, shorten the front line and strengthen the defense. However, political considerations turned out to be higher: leaving Poland, especially after the loss of Galicia, dealt a blow to Russia’s foreign policy prestige.

In addition, they did not want to leave the fortresses, on which huge amounts of money and resources had been spent. Powerful fortresses - Ivan-Gorod, Novogeorgievsk, Kovno, Grodno, Osovets, Brest - built in the previous era, although they had lost some of their former significance, were still strong strongholds, especially with the support of field troops. Ivan-Gorod and Osovets played a positive role in the spring-summer of 1915. However, the development of military equipment and assault methods sharply reduced their importance. As the 1914 campaign on the Western Front showed, the Germans easily crushed Belgian and French strongholds. It was difficult for the Russians to bring siege weapons to the Austrian Przemysl, and its siege dragged on. The Germans had no such problems. As a result, the fortresses ceased to be impregnable, they were forced to keep large garrisons in them, which were doomed to capitulation and tied down a large amount of artillery and shells that the field troops needed so much. For example, in the great fortress of Novogeorgievsk, considered the key to Warsaw, there were 1680 cannons with a million shells. And in all the fortresses there were 5,200 old guns and 3,148 new guns, plus 880 heavy guns.

For the Russian high command, the main task was clear - to preserve the heavily damaged army until the autumn thaw, which would leave the activity of the Austro-German troops and would allow the armies to be restored to full combat capability and the defense strengthened. At a meeting on June 24, it was decided to gradually withdraw Russian troops to the Riga - Middle Neman line with the fortresses of Kovno and Grodno - r. Svisloch - Upper Narev - Brest-Litovsk - upper reaches of the Bug - river. Dniester and to Romania. The problem was that the enemy was not going to wait, and the bulk of the Russian troops were stationed west of the specified line in the so-called. "Polish bag".

The combat effectiveness of the Russian army during this period had already decreased significantly. According to the states, there should have been 1.5 million soldiers in the Russian corps, but in fact there were barely about 1 million bayonets and sabers. The shortage reached half a million people. At the same time, arriving reinforcements often did not have rifles, turning into ballast that only constrained the combat-ready core of the units. The quality of replenishments has dropped sharply. So the recruits, due to a shortage of rifles, were not trained in shooting. There weren't enough officers. The collapse of the previous army structure, which maintained the unity of the empire, began. The pre-war professional officer corps was largely eliminated. Officer schools produced 35 thousand officers a year, but there were not enough of them. For every 3 thousand soldiers there were now 10-15 officers, and their experience and qualifications fell sharply. Representatives of the intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia, in which opposition sentiments often prevailed, entered the officer ranks en masse. The gap between the officer caste and the rank and file widened sharply. A Russian army captain noted in the fall of 1915: “The officers have lost faith in their men.” Unable to raise the cultural level of the soldier, part of the officers sharply became bitter, not stopping at the most severe punishments. This angered the soldier (essentially peasant) masses even more. For comparison, it is worth remembering that the Germans recruited more than 80% of their army from townspeople, from skilled workers, educated and disciplined. That is, in this regard, the quality of the German army was much higher.

The military material part of the Russian army was either lost during the long retreat from Galicia or was severely worn out. There was a huge shortage of ammunition. Thus, the mobile reserves of the armies of the Southwestern Front contained no more than 40% of the required combat kits. The defeat, retreat and heavy losses led to a serious drop in the morale of the soldiers. The decomposition began to be felt especially strongly in the rear. The recruits did not want to die, they were afraid to go to the front line. The command even decided to build military barracks in small towns - the units stationed in large industrial centers were quickly decomposing. In the advanced, shelled units, the spirit was still preserved.

The beginning of the German offensive. Mackensen kick

Mackensen's group began to turn north. On June 26, 1915, the commander of the southern group of the Austro-German armies, August von Mackensen, launched an offensive against Russian positions on the Tanev-Rava-Russkaya river section. The German command began to implement the first part of the plan to encircle Russian troops in Poland.

The Germans attacked the 3rd Army, which had been badly damaged in previous battles. Mackensen directed the main attack on the left flank of the Russian army in the zone of responsibility of the Russian 24th Corps. The Germans had a serious advantage in the sector of the 3rd Army: 10 Russian divisions, heavily drained of blood, with a total number of 40 thousand people, had to stop the onslaught of 8 German divisions, numbering more than 60 thousand soldiers. The predominance of German artillery was complete. The enemy hoped to defeat the Russian army on the move. However, General Leonid Lesh skillfully organized the defense on the Tanev River and maneuvered the available forces well. Therefore, the Germans were unable to break through the Russian defenses on the move. Heavy fighting ensued at Tomashov.

Front commander Alekseev quickly responded and sent the 31st Army Corps and other units from the front reserve. General Olokhov's group managed to effectively counterattack Mackensen's advancing units and struck his right flank. In a four-day stubborn battle, the Germans were driven back. Olokhov's group was transformed into the 13th Army and strengthened the front's defenses.

The German command was forced to suspend the offensive and regroup forces. On July 4, 1915, Mackensen's group again went on the offensive. Now the Germans tried to break through the defenses of the 3rd Army on the right flank, at the junction of the 3rd and 4th armies, in the Krasnik area. Our troops had a very difficult time. The Russian artillery was generally silent, there were no shells. The German artillerymen became insolent to such an extent that they went to open positions and fired from 1-2 km. Lesh responded by ordering the creation of mobile machine-gun groups in the regiments, moving them to a dangerous area and shooting German batteries.

The Austro-German troops suffered heavy losses and were driven back. In the four-day Battle of Tanev (from July 4 to July 7), the enemy was defeated. The Austro-Hungarian troops suffered especially heavy losses. Russian troops captured more than 20 thousand people. This was a serious success, especially against the backdrop of previous defeats from Mackensen’s phalanx and an acute shortage of ammunition.

This time the Russian command took modern measures. From the Stavka reserve, the 2nd and 6th Siberian Corps and the Guards Corps were transferred to the dangerous area. The 3rd Army was seriously strengthened. As a result, the German command lost hope of a quick breakthrough. In addition, on the Southwestern Front, the Russian 11th Army launched a counterattack near the town of Zhuravno on the Dniester. The Southern Army was defeated. The Austro-German command was forced to stop the offensive and began to gather additional troops.

To be continued…

“It pains and shames me that the cause is the cowardice of the troops.”

By 4 p.m. it was all over. (825) “Crushed” by the fire of French artillery (as one of the studies on the history of foot rangers says), the troops of the Russian left flank and center retreated: the Minsk, Moscow infantry, Borodino ranger regiments. This made it possible for the British to finish their game. (826)

This is not to say that success was easy for the allies. Many soldiers collapsed from fatigue, aggravated by thirst. The surviving officers congratulated each other on their victory. Lord Raglan rode up to Brigadier Colin Campbell and greeted him warmly. The commander of the Scottish brigade asked the commander-in-chief, as a sign of appreciation of the contribution of the Scottish infantry to the success of the battle, the right from now on in battle to wear the traditional headdress of the Scottish infantry instead of the statutory general's hat with feathers, which he was graciously allowed to do.

Four companies of the 2nd battalion of the Rifle Brigade received orders to pursue the retreating Russians. They left everything unnecessary in place and prepared for a long march along the path of the retreating Russian army. The companies had not gone even a mile before they were recalled. (827)

The reason was the hysteria that occurred in Raglan, caused by the fact that English military leaders at all times caused hysteria - initiative. The inactive cavalrymen of the Light Brigade, without a command, moved around the right flank of the Russian position, while the 8th Hussars captured 60–70 Russian soldiers (probably from among the stragglers from the Suzdal regiment, possibly riflemen or skirmishers) prisoners, but in a fit of joyful emotion, the British officers allowed them to leave.

According to the memoirs of Captain Shakespeare, the movement of the cavalrymen once again caused the incredible anger of Lord Raglan, who in the most categorical form ordered, through one of his adjutants, to immediately return the Light Brigade to its place. By the way, the fact of captivity and liberation is not fiction. General Bogdanovich mentions this.

“The Allied troops, approaching the position occupied by our rearguard, stopped and stopped pursuing. Lord Cardigan's cavalry was first advanced and captured several prisoners; but Raglan, wanting to preserve his small cavalry, ordered it to turn back and cover the foot batteries. Having received this order, Lord Lucan withdrew to the artillery, releasing all the prisoners he had captured.” (828)

Along the way, the commander-in-chief stopped Lawrence and his riflemen out of harm's way - what if they wanted to take Sevastopol alone?

The withdrawal of the most affected Russian regiments, which had honestly fulfilled their duty, took place in an organized manner, although they continued to be under artillery fire all this time. The disorder began already during the retreat of the Russian army from the line of the Kacha River.

“...Prince Menshikov, seeing that the key to his positions is in the hands of the French army, orders the beginning of a retreat, and the huge mass of infantry and cavalry located at this point of the battlefield maneuvers in order, and the artillery covers the territory to the right and left with fire. towers." (829) The retreat of the bulk of the Russian troops, and most military researchers are inclined to believe this, was poorly organized and carried out “in a disorderly manner.” (830)

It's hard for me to say this, but anyone with a reasonable military education will tell you that there is no such thing as a "poorly managed retreat." A poorly organized offensive means heaps of corpses in front of enemy trenches. A poorly organized retreat implies a single concept - flight. And these are not necessarily people running in different directions. Most often these are poorly organized units, sometimes without commanders, sometimes with them, abandoned property, lack of a plan, etc.

Let's not pretend this time either - that's how it was. There is nothing extraordinary about this. Four decades before Alma, at Austerlitz, the Russian linear infantry fled, but the Guards infantry and Guards cavalry saved the honor of both the Guard and the Russian army.

So it was in the Battle of Alma - if some fled, others saved their honor. There was the Uglitsky regiment, which fled with music and songs and had negligible overall losses in some battalions of 200 people without officers, but there was the Vladimir regiment - torn to pieces, but snarling, showing its back, but preserving the honor of the Russian infantry. There was a Tarutinsky regiment that fled in one direction, and its commander fled in another. But there was a Minsky regiment that did not lose order for a minute.

The hussar brigade of General Khaletsky, continuing to remain a spectator, instead of covering the retreat of the infantry, did not budge. For this type of troops, the Crimean War both began and ended, despite the large number of cavalry, with an “insignificant and unfamous” role. (831) Although Kangil still had more than a year before the battle, his ghost was already looming over the Almin Heights.

The three (832) least damaged batteries, by order of General Kishinsky, took up positions on the heights, ensuring a retreat: 24 guns of the horse-light battery No. 12, light batteries No. 3 and No. 4 of the 14th artillery brigade.

This measure turned out to be timely. Although the Allies initially refused to pursue the Russian army, they clearly decided to "gut" its tail with gunfire - and the French artillery moved forward with all its batteries. (833) At the heights behind the former left Russian flank, reserve batteries deployed and one of them, captain Boussiniere, immediately opened fire, covering the Volyn infantry regiment with the first shots. The British cavalry battery also continued to fire, but unable to withstand the competition with the Russian 12-pounder guns, it soon ceased fire. (834)

The Volyn regiment, which was in reserve, let past the retreating regiments, the last of which was Minsky, withdrew from its position and began a retreat to the Kache River to the village of Efendi-Koy. Colonel Khrushchev, having received the command to begin the general withdrawal of the army to Kacha, transmitted to him by the adjutant Isakov, first of all took, as was prescribed to the main reserve during the retreat, measures to cover other regiments and artillery batteries leaving the battle.

“During the general retreat, the Volyn regiment began to gradually move back to the Ulukkul road, where Colonel Khrushchev, letting units of the 16th division pass by, took with him two batteries of the 14th brigade and took up the position established by the chief of artillery, Major General Kishinsky, on the heights behind the Ulukkul road." (835)

Historians say little about Khrushchev and his Volynites, this is unfair. There is no doubt that solely the actions of the Volyn regiment and artillery forced the allies, in this case the French, to stop their battalions and limit themselves to artillery shelling. It was from this fire that the Volyn infantry regiment suffered its losses, although small compared to others.

“My regiment, being in reserve, did not engage in battle, although it was under severe fire for some time; I have up to 25 people killed and wounded,” the commander of the Volyn Infantry Regiment wrote in his letter to his brother on September 10 (22), 1854. By this time, the Volyn residents had camped at Kamysheva Bay, in the same place from where they advanced to Alma. (836)

The very first cannonball flew into the ranks of the first battalion and, whistling past the regiment commander, killed and wounded several people from the banner ranks.

“Do not bow and stand still,” Colonel Khrushchev said loudly and calmly. And from that moment on, the Volynians never greeted enemy shells with bows.” (837)

You can have different attitudes to these words from the “Collection of Memoirs of Sevastopol Residents...”. For some, they may seem like a military epic, a toast to the commander, for others - an unsubstantiated episode of the battle, quoted in order to somehow sweeten the bitter pill of defeat. No difference. The fact remains: the French officers, who saw the last deployed battalion columns of the Volyn Regiment withdrawing, called the retreat of the Russian army “beautiful” (belle retraite) for a reason. Thus, the inevitable disorder of the retreat was covered. (838) The batteries of the 14th brigade, longer-range than the French, quickly drowned out the enemy fire - and no one else stopped the Russian army from retreating to the Kachin position.

By the end of the day, “... when all the retreating units moved towards the Kache River, then Colonel Khrushchev and his detachment began to slowly retreat, being ready to meet the enemy every minute if he began to pursue us. It was already dusk when our detachment descended into the valley of the Kachi River near the village of Efendi-Koy.” (839)

As the captain of the Uglitsky regiment Yenisherlov recalled: “... The convoys were not allowed to know about the retreat of the detachment, and therefore, when they saw the retreating (primarily, of course, dressing carts and the wounded), they raised a terrible commotion. Not subordinate to one person, the convoys of all regiments, and especially the officers’ carts, hastily harnessed their horses and rushed to the river crossing, without observing order or queue.” (840)

The “terrible disorder” that reigned during the retreat is also described by the commander of the Volyn regiment, Colonel Khrushchev, who can be trusted if only because his regiment, covering the retreat of the Russian army, was the last to leave the Alma position. General A.N. also calls the organization of the army’s retreat from Alma “disorderly.” Kuropatkin, in his study of the Russo-Japanese War, drew parallels between the events of these two campaigns. (841)

Lieutenant Commander D.V. Ilyinsky mentions in his notes the chaos that reigned during the withdrawal from the Alma position.

“It is difficult to imagine anything similar to our retreat after our loss of an insignificant avant-garde case at Alma. As we moved away from the enemy and dusk set in, the remnants of the center and right flank regiments that survived in disarray became more and more mixed up and, without receiving any orders, remaining in complete ignorance of where to go and what to do, formed heaps of various uniforms and came up to us to inquire , where we are going and in what direction are the headquarters of such and such regiments so that it is possible to join them. We replied that we had received orders from the commander-in-chief, having crossed the Kacha River, to spend the night on the heights of Kacha, but we knew nothing about the regiments. With the onset of darkness and continued general uncertainty, panic spread through the troops: approaching groups of soldiers reported that the enemy had warned us, dropped troops and occupied the heights of the mountains along the Kacha River, that we were cut off from Sevastopol and tomorrow at dawn we would have to storm the fortified positions on Kacha. In a word, if a small detachment of the enemy appeared, armed not with guns, but simply with sticks, they would drive everyone away like a herd of sheep. At the bridge over the river. The crowding of all kinds of weapons, the crush, haste and jostling reached complete disgrace. As darkness fell, curses were heard, and at times groans from the crowded wounded. Everything was covered with the general roar of the horse drivers and the clatter of the carriage wheels.

Having appointed a place for a general assembly point on the opposite bank of the river, we, without any formation, one by one, crossed the bridge as best we could, checking our ranks, moved to the top of the hill closest to the road, lit fires and settled down for the night, and all around, under the supervision of one officer , pickets were set up for safety. We took with us enough bread for dinner; but the poor soldiers, not knowing the locations of their regiments, were left hand to mouth; We did not refuse our help only to the slightly wounded.” (842)

Not only Ilyinsky was upset by the disorder during the retreat of most of the rear units of the Russian troops. This was seen by the soldiers of the infantry regiments passing by.

“...we retreated in order all the way to the Kachi River. And above the river there is a Tatar village called Efendi-Koy; Opposite it is a bridge across the river and a shallow place, a ford. We approach the village, and there is such turmoil that God forbid; the convoy of all the regiments crowded together: vans, hospital wagons, officer carts, several batteries of artillery clearing their way; and everyone is trying to get to the bridge, but the street leading to it is narrow. Scream, noise..." (843)

Soon, the remnants of the Vladimir Infantry Regiment, which had previously stayed together, scattered without any order throughout the surrounding area and, having slipped through Kacha, were able to gather together only the next day when they reached Sevastopol.

“It was already evening, and we were moving forward and forward, without a road, not knowing either the path or the purpose of our movement: we followed the tracks of corpses, fragments of weapons and ammunition that came along the road for luck, and the next morning we reached Sevastopol. At night on the way we came across a bunch of people in the dark; Having spoken to them, we learned that they were fellows from our own regiment. Considering me killed, my riding horse, as they saw, was racing without a rider, the good soldiers were very happy to see me unharmed.” (844)

What reached Sevastopol was only a pitiful ghost, a shadow of an infantry regiment that had recently reached full strength. Some of his units wandered around the area for several days, not knowing where to go or what to do. Lieutenant Winter arrived only on the third day with the remnants of his company, numbering 15 people. (845)

For almost a day there was no order at the only ford across the Kacha. The convoys mixed together and the approaching artillery practically blocked it. One can only imagine the horror of this picture, based only on knowledge of the consequences that appeared before the eyes of the allies who came to Kacha a few days later.

The turmoil (or rather, panic) was such that their advanced units discovered a large amount of provisions, ammunition and, most shamefully, ammunition abandoned at the crossing.

The wounded soldiers were mostly left to their fate, although three regiments (Uglitsky, Volynsky and Tarutinsky), which were almost never under fire, could take on this task. But no one gave them this very task.

“The second crippled army was trailing behind the retreating ones - a huge crowd of wounded. Their situation was completely bleak. Scattered over a huge area between Simferopol, Bakhchisarai and Sevastopol and not knowing where the army had retreated, the shell-shocked and wounded wandered to their luck, not knowing where they would find shelter and relief for their suffering. Some managed to get to Simferopol, others came to Bakhchisarai, and finally, others, moving towards Sevastopol, reached Kacha and were greeted by the care of their surviving comrades. The entire path from the Alma River right up to Kachi itself was covered with wounded. The sanitary unit was in the worst condition; there were almost no supplies. There was a significant shortage of lint and bandages; their small supply in the hospital wagons was worth its weight in gold, and the soldiers had to tear their own shirts to bandage them... Until September 14, the entire road from Belbek to the northern fortification of Sevastopol was littered with the wounded.” (846)

There was not enough basic equipment to care for the wounded. “...There was a terrible shortage of bandages for dressings, despite the fact that at that time all the warehouses of the Simferopol post office were bursting with them, sent from all over Russia. Bandages were only found in hospital carts and were considered precious. No one among the soldiers had them...” (847) This led to the most unfortunate consequences. A wounded soldier from Vladimir experienced this himself: “... while they found the ford, while I was dragging along, the blood kept flowing and flowing from my hand, and it began to darken in my eyes. Again, thank you, the soldier helped me somehow bandage my hand - I had a paper handkerchief with me, yes, unfortunately, it was worn out; Then it turned out that it was not at all good for the wound.” (848) As a result of infection, the soldier eventually lost his arm, of which only a piece above the elbow remained, called a “lanyard” in soldier’s jargon.

“My sinful hand, which under Alma annoyed me, I see - again hangs like a whip. And it hung and dangled until, after the doctor’s brief deliberation, they cut it off completely. Farewell, service!..” (849)

I feel sorry for the fighter, and I also feel sorry for his hand, but he was lucky. Others, less fortunate, suffered a more tragic fate.

“...The whole path from Alma to Kachi was strewn with corpses. No one thought about helping them (the wounded),” the author of “The History of the Moscow Regiment” described the army’s retreat.

The physical pain was intensified by the mental pain. The soldiers and officers of Prince Menshikov's army were in an extremely difficult moral and psychological state. They were not demoralized, but the picture of the troops in the bivouac was grim. “No talking or noise could be heard anywhere; the camp fires were not turned on at all. Gloomy faces and hidden anger testified to a recently lost battle...” (850) Even the soldiers saw how heavy the echo of defeat was in the souls of their comrades.

“In our company, too, they have already woken up; some are fussing about their knapsack, some are talking, and most of them silently stared at one point...” (851)

What happened in the battalions and described by Pogossky from the words of the soldiers is nothing more than classic sketches from life of what modern military doctors call BPT - combat psychotrauma.

“...I see the captain standing and saying something to himself, very loudly; in front of him lies a soldier on the ground under an overcoat, his face is covered with a scarf, and a naked cleaver is placed on the overcoat.

“What kind of parable?” - I ask my friend. - Who is this?". And he answers me: “It’s Selishchev lying dead, and the captain keeps saying unknown words over him - he’s shell-shocked in the head and doesn’t remember what he’s saying.” - “Lord, your will!”

...I look around, and Ermolaich - his face is darker than Mother Earth - the kettle is heating and grumbling, but he just keeps looking like a wolf at someone... and the captain keeps talking and talking, and there is no end to his speeches”... (852)

The retreat continued throughout the next day. The Volyn regiment, “preserving complete order during the retreat,” (853) with two batteries continued to move in the rearguard of the army, but the enemy did not try to disturb it. Entering Sevastopol, General Khrushchev received orders to take his former position at Kamysheva Bay. Everyone was worried about the question: whether the enemy had cut the road to Simferopol. (854)

Within a day, wounded soldiers of the Russian army who had lagged behind their units appeared on the streets of Sevastopol: “...Sevastopol was in great trouble.” (855)

The Allies followed the path of the retreating Russian army to the Kachi River, after which they stopped any attempts to pursue it.

The last success of the French artillery was the capture of the carriage of the Russian commander-in-chief, in which they discovered a briefcase with documents of Prince A.S. Menshikov.

This is how Bazancourt describes what was happening: “The Russian army was retreating. Our two reserve batteries, standing on the ridge of the hill on the side from which the British attacked the Russian right flank, moved forward in order to counter the likely attacks of the cavalry covering the retreat of the Russian troops. The battery commander, Businier, saw a carriage appear at a distance of 600 meters from him, led by three horses, rushing at full speed towards the battery. As soon as the Russians noticed the French gunners, the crew changed direction, but Businier, along with a servant of 20 people, began pursuit. He managed to overtake the crew 100 meters from the positions of the Russian squadrons. The gunners delivered five people and the contents of the crew to the main headquarters. The crew belonged to Prince Menshikov and contained important documents.” (856)

The centenary anniversary of the beginning of the First World War in Russia was solemnly celebrated in August last year. Since then, that war has somehow been forgotten. But it, nicknamed the Patriotic War, ended only in November 1918. Not only cities, but also entire powers collapsed in its flames. If the First World War had not happened, perhaps the Russian Empire would have remained on the world map. However, we won’t dream. Let's move on to reality, the one that developed 100 years ago.

Heavy rearguard action

The throne of the Russian Tsar began to rock in 1915, largely due to a failed military campaign. Troops Kaiser Wilhelm- by the way, cousin Nicholas II, having eased the pressure on the Western Front and transferred reserves to the Eastern Front, went on the offensive everywhere.

In the Carpathian region, the Russians had to surrender the Przemysl fortress, which had recently been recaptured from the Austro-Hungarian army. It was necessary to leave the Radom and Kielce provinces in the Kingdom of Poland, as well as most of Galicia.

Russian troops, significantly inferior in numbers to the Germans, were forced to retreat from Lvov. But even then heavy rearguard battles continued. This mass retreat on an endless front was called the Great. Maybe because it was not a chaotic, disorderly flight, but an organized retreat.

The Germans broke into Warsaw, then successively took the fortresses of Ivangorod and Novogeorgievsk. Soon, after an almost six-month siege, another fortress fell - Osovets. We will return to this episode of the First World War later...

And then almost every day brought sad news. Imperial troops left Brest-Litovsk, then Grodno. This meant that the fighting spread to the territory of Belarus.

The Germans, having pushed the Russian army beyond the Neman, entered Courland and came close to Riga. Frightened townsfolk started talking about how the hour was uneven, German dragoons would appear on the outskirts of Petrograd, and airplanes with crosses on their wings would begin to circle over Moscow.

Candle on a barrel of gunpowder

Fermentation began at the top. Military failures, perhaps rightly in many respects, were blamed on the commander-in-chief of the Russian army Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the emperor's uncle.

In August 1915, Nicholas II replaced his relative as Supreme. However, voices of protest were heard loudly. Foreign Secretary Sergey Sazonov erupted a cry of despair: “This is so terrible that there is complete chaos in my mind. Russia is being pushed to the edge of the abyss.” He was echoed by a member of the State Council Alexander Krivoshein: “Russia has experienced more difficult times, but there has never been a time when everything possible was done to complicate an already impossible situation... We are sitting on a keg of gunpowder. A single spark is needed for everything to fly into the air... The emperor’s taking command of the army is not a spark, but a whole candle thrown into the cannon arsenal.”

Ambassador of France to Russia Maurice Palaiologue was also pessimistic. Here are the lines from his report to Paris: “Until very recently, one could believe that revolutionary unrest should not be expected before the end of the war. I couldn't say that now."

Previously, Nicholas II removed from the post of Minister of War, Prince Vladimir Sukhomlinov, who was considered the main culprit of the poor, and in fact, criminal supply of the Russian army. The army needed not only weapons, but also telephones, gas masks, tunics, boots...

An investigation was ordered. Sukhomlinov was dismissed from military service, arrested and transported to the Peter and Paul Fortress. However, he managed to avoid trial.

Main traitors

Failures at the front echoed painfully in the rear. In Moscow and St. Petersburg there was fierce, angry talk about sabotage and betrayal, with the “old man” being named as the main culprits. Grigory Rasputin and the empress Alexandra Fedorovna. Rumors spread that the creator of the Marfinsk monastery, Grand Duchess Elizaveta Feodorovna, who was popularly called Lizka, had a secret telephone number for contacting the Germans.

Tension increases and in May explodes with violent anti-German protests. First, the pogromists destroy and burn foreign factories and shops, deal with their owners, and later everyone who falls under their crazy hands becomes their victims. At the Skorokhod factory, they are trying to reason with a large, frantic crowd: “Where are you going, brothers? The factory is Russian!” To this the rioters respond in drunken voices: “We know, the shoes are painfully good!”

...In the summer, endless lines of people loaded with household goods stretched from west to east - from areas occupied by the Germans. “Of all the trials of war, the exodus of refugees is the most serious and difficult to cure,” wrote Krivoshein. — Diseases, sadness and poverty are moving along with refugees to Russia. They create panic and destroy everything that remains from the rush of the first days of the war. The next migration will lead Russia into the darkness of revolution.”

Indeed, many consider the events of 1915 to be a harbinger of the February Revolution. Then, at the height of the anti-German protests, demonstrators appeared on Red Square demanding the abdication of the emperor. Two years later, in 1917, these slogans entered the agenda with new, already inevitable force.

Marshal's Commendation

What about the allies? They, after transferring German reserves to the east, tried to seize the strategic initiative. However, they failed to achieve serious success.

At the end of April 1915, the Germans attacked the Allied armies in the area of ​​the Ypres River, using poison gas for the first time. The Anglo-French formations, who did not expect such treachery, retreated, suffering heavy losses. But the Germans did not have enough strength for a massive attack.

The Entente tried to respond with its own, more powerful offensive in Artois. But they failed to suppress the German positions. Moreover, the Anglo-French armies noticeably thinned out after the enemy's retaliatory actions. In six weeks of fighting, the Entente troops lost more than 130 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded. And they advanced a distance of three to four kilometers.

The Allied autumn offensive, which took place on a wider section of the Western Front, also did not lead to success. Fierce positional battles in northern France, which took place in September-October, were marked by huge losses of both attackers and defenders. The Anglo-French formations lost 200 thousand people killed and wounded, the Germans - 140 thousand.

As a result, the Western Front froze. But one can only guess whether the Allies would have withstood the onslaught of the Germans if they had not decided to transfer the brunt of the blow to the east. However, this rhetorical question was answered by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, Marshal Ferdinand Foch: “If France was not erased from the face of Europe, then, first of all, we owe this to Russia.”

At the cost of terrible sacrifices

Only at the end of 1915 did the Russian army manage to stabilize the front. The offensive potential of the Kaiser's troops, which had been constantly moving forward for almost six months, was exhausted. Russia, having received a long-awaited respite, began to restore its battered units and build new defensive lines.

The Great Retreat brought enormous sacrifices. On average, the Russian army lost more than 200 thousand people killed, captured and wounded per month! Thus, during the five months of the Great Retreat, the troops of Nicholas II lost over a million (!) soldiers and officers. But this number does not include civilian casualties.

General Anton Denikin in his memoirs “Essays on Russian Troubles” he wrote: “The spring of 1915 will remain in my memory forever. The great tragedy of the Russian army is the retreat from Galicia. No cartridges, no shells. Day after day bloody battles, day after day difficult marches, endless fatigue - physical and moral; now timid hopes, now hopeless horror...”

One could at least take comfort in the fact that the enemy’s losses during the second year of the war turned out to be, although much less than those of the Russians, quite significant. The total damage to the German army - killed, wounded, captured and missing - amounted to more than 650 thousand people.

The blows of the cruel "Frau"

Let's return to the battles for the Osowiec fortress in what is now Poland. This powerful fortification was in the path of the advancing Germans - it was from here that the shortest route to Russia lay. It was impossible to get around it, because all around there were impassable and even swampy places.

The Germans launched their first offensive in September 1914. However, despite the furious bombardment, the fortress garrison gave a worthy rebuff.

After this, a long siege began. The Germans brought their fearsome "Big Berthas" - 420-mm caliber siege weapons - to the front lines. Almost one-ton shells from this “Frau” broke through two-meter steel and concrete floors.

Four “Big Berthas” and several dozen guns, with increasing fury, day after day, ironed the positions of the Russian army. German airplanes attacked the fortress from the sky.

Huge flames flared up in one place or another. The earth groaned and trembled, and it seemed that nothing living could withstand this hurricane onslaught.

At first, the Russian command asked the defenders of the fortress to hold out for at least two days. However, Osovets remained an unshakable stronghold for six months! Every day, bravura military marches were heard from the Russians, which infuriated the Germans.

"Attack of the Dead"

On August 6, 1915, the Germans used poison gases. Early in the morning, a dark green stream - a mixture of chlorine and bromine - crawled towards the Russian positions. The defenders of the fortress did not have gas masks...

After powerful artillery bombardment, several thousand German infantry moved in for the assault. They believed that they could easily capture the fortress. Or rather, what’s left of it...

And suddenly Russian soldiers rushed towards them. Their appearance was terrible - their eyes were burning, their faces were wrapped in bloody rags. They coughed, spat, cursed, but no one turned back. “I cannot describe the bitterness and rage with which our soldiers marched against the German poisoners,” recalled an eyewitness to the battle on the pages of Russian Word. “Strong rifle and machine-gun fire and densely exploding shrapnel could not stop the onslaught of enraged soldiers. Exhausted, poisoned, they fled with the sole purpose of crushing the Germans. There were no lagging behind, there was no need to rush anyone. There were no individual heroes here, the companies marched as one person, animated by only one goal, one thought: to die, but to take revenge on the vile poisoners.”

And what? The Germans, well-fed and healthy, did not accept the battle and fled. And then what seemed to be already destroyed Russian artillery thundered at them.

Imagine, several dozen Russian infantrymen, barely alive at that, put three German infantry regiments to flight! This unprecedented battle went down in history as the “attack of the dead.”

Alas, a few days later the evacuation of the garrison began. Before leaving, the defenders of the fortress destroyed everything they could. The Germans did not get a single cartridge, not a single can of canned food...

The defense of the Osovets fortress became a “rehearsal” for the defense of another fortress - in Brest, in the summer of '41. And again, as in 1915, our soldiers and officers fought to the death.

Do you remember: the army followed the army...

A.S. Pushkin

From Neman to Smolensk.

And so, in three groups of corps, the “Great Army” rushed from the Neman to the east. The main group - the road to Vilna against the army of M.B. Barclay de Tolly - was led by Napoleon himself. “They destroy everything, they turn everything into dust...” - This is what A.S. wrote about those days. Pushkin.

The Russian armies did not immediately respond. On June 27, Alexander I ordered Bagration to retreat to Minsk. Literally an hour after the Russian rearguard left Vilna, the French vanguard entered the city. On June 28, Napoleon could already sum up the results of the Vilna operation. In 3 days he advanced 100 km. On June 29, Napoleon sent forward cavalry corps under the command of Murat, infantry corps and two divisions from Davout's corps. These troops were supposed to overtake Barclay's army and fetter its actions with their activity until Napoleon's main forces arrived. At the same time, Davout with three infantry divisions and the cavalry corps of E. Grushi received an order to march on Minsk, blocking Bagration’s path from the north to join Barclay, and Jerome Bonaparte with the corps of Y. Poniatovsky, J.-L. Rainier and D. Vandam were supposed to attack Bagration from the south and thus take his army in a pincer movement.

On July 11, the Russian 1st Army concentrated in the Dris camp. Troubles emerged in its leadership. The king behaved ambivalently:

“introduced Barclay as commander-in-chief, entrusting him to “make all orders on his own behalf,” but in cases of “urgency,” he gave orders himself. On July 14, the 1st Army left Drissa and in a very timely manner. Napoleon was preparing to approach her left flank from Polotsk and force her to fight with an inverted front, but did not have time to carry out this maneuver.

In Drissa, with the participation of Barclay, the pressing issue of how to escort Alexander I out of the army (of course, delicately and loyal subjects) was actually resolved. A letter was written to him, the meaning of which was that the tsar would be more useful to the fatherland as a ruler in the capital than as military leader on a campaign. From Polotsk the tsar went to Moscow, and Barclay led the 1st Army to Vitebsk to unite with Bagration. Meanwhile, Bagration found himself in a critical situation. On July 7, he received the tsar’s order: to go through Minsk to Vitebsk.

But already on July 8, Marshal Davout took Minsk and cut off Bagration’s path to the north. From the south, crossing Bagration was Jerome Bonaparte, who was supposed to close the encirclement ring around the 2nd Army near the city of Nesvizh. The Westphalian king Jerome Bonaparte was “the most mediocre of all Napoleon’s mediocre brothers.” As a result, Jerome, although he had an advantage over Bagration on the way to Nesvizh in two marches, was late to close the French pincers around the Russian army. Bagration left. Napoleon was furious. Out of annoyance, he subordinated King Jerome to Marshal Davout, who was “only a duke.” Jerome, offended by this, stopped his troops and left for Westphalia on July 16. The position of the 2nd Army still remained dangerous. It marched through Nesvizha and Bobruisk to Mogilev. Latour-Maubourg's 4th Cavalry Corps persistently pursued it from the rear, but the main danger to the 2nd Army came from Davout, on the left flank.

Bagration, having learned from his Cossack scouts that not the entire Davout corps was in Mogilev, but only some part of it, decided to make a breakthrough. On the morning of July 23, N.N.’s 7th Corps launched an attack. Raevsky. Davout took a position 11 km away. south of Mogilev, near the village of Saltykovka. So far he had 20 thousand bayonets and sabers and 60 guns against Raevsky’s 16.5 thousand soldiers and 108 guns. But his intelligence informed him that Bagration’s entire army, numbering 50 thousand people, was marching towards Mogilev, and Davout was already pulling all his forces towards him (41.T.2. p.107). There has not been such a fierce battle as at Saltykovka since the beginning of the war. Russian soldiers rushed forward without fear or doubt. The officers did not step on them in heroism.

Davout repulsed all of Raevsky’s attacks and continued to pull the troops of his corps towards him. On July 24, the main forces of the 2nd Army and the convoy crossed the Dnieper and moved towards Smolensk. On July 25, Ranevsky’s corps left behind him. From now on it could be considered that the 2nd Army was saved.

After the tsar’s departure, Barclay de Tolly “remained the sole controller of the fate of the 1st Army. Despite all the difficulties, he satisfactorily ensured its food supply. Barclay tried to maintain iron discipline in the army. Barclay de Tolly did not succeed in everything.

He was unable, in particular, to put the medical support of the troops on par with the food supply, although he was helped by the most authoritative military doctor in Russia at that time, J. V. Willie. Be that as it may, all of Barclay’s concerns were subordinated to one main task - to ensure the army’s retreat in the greatest order and with the least losses. Nevertheless, with every day of forced retreat, discontent against Barclay de Tolly grew in his own army, as well as in Bagration’s army and throughout the country. Its primary source was the unfavorable course of the war for Russia, which hurt national pride. In such a situation, Barclay de Tolly withdrew the 1st Army from Polotsk to Vitebsk. He understood that if he retreated to Moscow, Napoleon would follow him, and not to St. Petersburg. But just in case, on July 17, Barclay allocated an entire corps from his army (1st, under the command of Lieutenant General P.H. Wittgenstein) to protect the St. Petersburg direction. On July 23, the 1st Army, having covered 118 km in three days, approached Vitebsk. In order to delay the French until the 2nd Army arrived, Barclay de Tolly on the night of July 24-25 advanced the 4th Infantry Corps of A.I. to Beshenkovichi. Osterman-Tolstoy, who took the battle with the 1st Cavalry Corps of General E.-M. Nansouty (20 km from Vitebsk). The battle at Ostrovno was even bloodier than Saltykovka. For several hours, Nansouty's cavalry units unsuccessfully attacked Ostermann's infantry squares. In the middle of the day on July 25, Murat arrived at the battlefield and personally led the attacks of Nansouty’s corps. He also received reinforcements - the division of A. Delzon from the Beauharnais corps, which gave him an almost double superiority in strength. Murat shot the Russian squares with cannons, and then alternately threw cavalry and infantry into the attack against them. When Osterman was informed that the corps was suffering enormous losses and they inquired what they would be ordered to do. Osterman replied: “Do nothing, stand there and die!” By the morning of July 26, reinforcements from Barclay arrived at Osterman - the 3rd exemplary

Konovnitsyn's division. She fought all day on the 26th as heroically as Osterman's corps had done the day before. The Russians lost only 376,448 “lower ranks” in Ostrovno, but detained the French for two days. On the morning of July 27, Barclay learned that Bagration had failed to break through Mogilev and that he had learned about the movement of Davout's troops towards Smolensk. Now the situation has changed dramatically. Barclay could no longer count on Bagration at Vitebsk. Napoleon, barely approaching

to Vitebsk, I immediately realized that Barclay had decided on a general battle.

But Barclay quietly led his army to Smolensk at night in three columns. Napoleon was simply disappointed. For the first time since the beginning of the war, he doubted that he could win it without going deep into Russia.

Here in Vitebsk, Napoleon summed up the results of the first month of the war and thought: isn’t it time for him to stop? During this month, he encountered such difficulties that he had never encountered anywhere else, and others he could not have foreseen, no matter how much he prepared for the invasion. From the first day of the war, the Grand Army, pursuing the Russians, was forced to make unusually large marches. The hardships of the endless marches were aggravated by the worse Russian roads, worse than which the French had never seen. The worst misfortune for the French was that they felt a hostile environment around them every day. True, they began to encounter widespread popular resistance mainly after Smolensk, when they entered the original Russian lands. But even before Vitebsk they had to suffer due to the fact that Russian troops destroyed local food supplies behind them, if they did not have time to withdraw them. The population - Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lithuanian peasants and townspeople - resisted the invaders.

As the French approached, masses of people left their homes, taking with them all living things. The richest warehouses that Napoleon had prepared for the start of the war could not keep up with the “Great Army” in its unprecedentedly large marches along unprecedentedly bad roads. Everything that is said here led to an increase in diseases that decimated the ranks of the “Great Army” more than all types of enemy battles. A.N. Popov calculated that from the Neman to Vitebsk, Napoleon lost more than 150 thousand people. The combat effectiveness of the French army decreased with each new move into the depths of the “country of which there is no end.” Suffering from hunger and thirst, and annoyed by the disobedience of the local population, the soldiers of the “Great Army” (mainly non-French units) committed robbery and violence, and looted.

Barclay de Tolly's war plan gradually brought results. But

Napoleonic army was still a formidable force. She was approaching Smolensk, a city that was called “the key to Russia.”

BATTLE OF SMOLENSK.

On July 22, the 1st and 2nd Russian armies united. The soldiers of the Russian army enthusiastically greeted Barclay and Bagration. Everyone was convinced that the war should now go differently, that the retreat would end. Under the pressure of such sentiments, even the cautious Barclay, contrary to his own convictions, admitted the possibility of more decisive actions. Russian soldiers considered it their duty to protect Smolensk. Napoleon knew this and therefore also expected the battle of Smolensk.

Barclay soon realized that it was impossible to organize a battle now. Napoleon had 250 thousand people concentrated near Smolensk, while in both Russian armies there were only 120 thousand soldiers. Napoleon decided to quickly approach Smolensk and occupy it and thus cut off the Russian troops' retreat to Moscow.

And indeed, the French managed to get ahead of the regiments of Bagration and Barclay for some time. The road to Smolensk was covered by the 27th Infantry Division of Dmitry Petrovich Neverovsky (1771 - 1813), which consisted mainly of recruits. It seemed that this obstacle would be easily overcome by the “Grand Army,” especially since in its vanguard was the famous cavalry of Marshal Murat, which could cope with a more serious enemy. Murat managed to dislodge Neverovsky's 27th Division from the position it occupied. But the Russian soldiers did not flee. They retreated in perfect order to the Smolensk road and settled down in the forest. The trees made the actions of the enemy cavalry extremely difficult. Unfired recruits, yesterday's peasants, led by General Neverovsky, who skillfully led the defense, repelled one after another the fierce attacks of Murat's three corps.

But even now Smolensk was in danger. He was defended by about 15 thousand soldiers of Raevsky. And the main forces of Napoleon's army were getting closer.

An experienced military leader, Raevsky understood that Smolensk, if turned

It is a fortress in the city; it can be defended for a long time even with small forces. The city was fortified with a powerful stone wall, in front of which the inhabitants dug ditches. The corps of the most successful French Marshal Ney was sent to storm Smolensk. At the same time, French artillery began heavy shelling of urban

fortifications However, Raevsky held out all day. At night, the main forces of the Russian army approached Smolensk. The advanced positions in the city were occupied by the corps of General Dmitry Sergeevich Dokhturov (1756 - 1816). The artillery operated brilliantly under the command of 28-year-old General Alexander Ivanovich Kutaisov (1784 - 1812). The artillerymen stood until the last. Russian artillery inflicted significant damage on the enemy.

The next day Smolensk was surrounded by the strongest enemy

corps of Marshals Davout, Ney and Murat. The French began a general assault. The city was burning, its inhabitants were leaving. Despite the fact that this assault was repulsed, Barclay de Tolly, after some hesitation, ordered the Russian army to begin a retreat to Moscow. He reasoned as follows: firstly, the French have a significant numerical advantage, and the Russian army is not sufficiently prepared for a decisive battle, and secondly, Napoleon can bypass Smolensk from the east and block the Russian troops. Then they will find themselves in a burning city, as if trapped, and will be destroyed. Historians still debate whether Barclay was right to order a retreat. But I think it was justified.

The troops retreated in perfect order. General Konovnitsyn, who was covering their retreat, ordered the soldiers to burn the bridge across the Dnieper, which made it difficult for the enemy to advance.

Napoleon entered the burning Smolensk. In this battle he lost about 20 thousand soldiers (the Russian army was almost half that size) and did not achieve a decisive victory. Russian troops were not defeated. They continued to retreat to Moscow, replenished with fresh forces. The “Great Army” was melting before our eyes. Many close associates advised Napoleon to stop further offensive to the east, retreat to Belarus and take up winter quarters there. But Napoleon needed victory in the “general battle” and the defeat of the Russian army at all costs. Therefore, he ordered the troops to move on to Moscow.

The position of the Russian army was difficult. She retreated from the western borders of Russia. Moscow is just over 200 miles away. The murmur grew louder: how long will the retreat continue? The soldiers were eager to fight. Many unfairly blamed Barclay for what was happening, who had neither connections at court nor sufficient popularity among the troops. The differences between the cautious Barclay de Tolly and the decisive Bagration, who insisted on an immediate transition to hostilities, intensified again.

And then only Alexander I, who was following the unfolding of events from St. Petersburg, realized that the situation required the appointment of another commander in chief.

He must have the necessary experience in leading large-scale military operations and enjoy great authority among the people and the army. Only Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov could be such a commander. On August 17, 67-year-old General Kutuzov arrived at the location of Russian troops. The soldiers enthusiastically greeted the new commander-in-chief, glorified in many battles and campaigns.