81 motorized rifle regiment. The regiment suffered a pogrom near Samara

Mikryakov brothers.

By the end of December 1994, according to intelligence data, Dudayev concentrated in Grozny up to 40 thousand militants, up to 60 guns and mortars, 50 tanks, about 100 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, about 150 anti-aircraft weapons.

Initially, the assault on Grozny was scheduled for January 5, but on December 30 at 19-00 an order was received to be ready to leave at 5 am on December 31 according to the combat plan. The federal forces set out at dawn, around 7 am. The scouts went first. There was no resistance. But the closer to the center, the more often mines, obstacles and fire resistance were encountered. By 14-00 the railway station was taken, units of the 131st motorized rifle battalion were pulled up. At 15-00, the first and second battalions of the 81st motorized rifle regiment and the combined detachment of the 201st MSD blocked the presidential palace, Dudayev sent his best forces to restore the situation. The shelling stopped only at 12 o'clock at night. The new year 1995 has come. For many 18, 19-year-olds, it has not yet arrived.

Our Togliatti compatriots also took part in these battles: guards junior sergeant, commander of the BMP of the first battalion of the 81st Petrakovskiy twice Red Banner orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky motorized rifle regiment Mikryakov Alexander Valerievich and guard private, gunner-operator of the BMP of the first battalion of Petrakovskiy twice Red Banner orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky motorized rifle regiment Mikryakov Alexey Valerievich.

It seemed to me that I said everything

But never cry my heart out...

And the boys, tormented by death,

From someone else's war go to heaven,

And I can’t shout a song to them ...

O my inescapable memory!

Oh Lord, there are only crosses around!

But how many new stars you light up.

Calling them names of the fallen

And you will never forget them

Forgive them, God, my boys,

Without defiling their souls with someone else's sin ...

(Marianna Zakharova)

Sasha and Alyosha were born on the same day, June 24, 1975. Sasha was born a little earlier and was almost a kilogram heavier than his brother. Doctors seriously feared for the life of the weaker Alyosha for a long time. But he survived, and since then the boys have been inseparable. They were not twins, but twins. They could not live without each other. Always and everywhere were together. Sasha was fair-haired, kind and silent by nature, almost a head taller than Alexei. The brother is dark-haired and has a different character - “groovy” and cheerful. He was restless. His beautiful laughter was constantly heard at home. Only Alyosha could laugh like that. His playful eyes always betrayed his kind and cheerful nature. To be able to stand up for themselves. To be strong.

Sometimes my boys would fight with someone, - recalls Iraida Alekseevna, - they will come home scratched, covered in blood, and I will put them out the door and say: “Go and be able to stand up for yourself.” I’ll cry myself, I feel sorry for them, but I don’t show them the look. In general, the guys were not spoiled, did not cause much trouble.

All household chores were assigned in advance. To whom to go for groceries, to whom to tidy up the house. At the family council, all financial issues were resolved - to whom and what to buy first of all. And Iraida Alekseevna also tried to make her sons trust her in everything. And they shared all their problems. It so happened that the boys had no secrets from them. The guys even told about their first cigarette smoked to their mother. True, at the same time, sixth-graders Sasha and Alyosha added that they didn’t like smoking very much. The brothers had in common that they could not live without each other. get in.

I remember, - says Iraida Alekseevna, - in the fifth grade, the boys went to the pioneer camp. As luck would have it, they were separated. The difference in height was too great, no one took them for twins. The next day, the counselors called and asked Alyosha to pick him up, because he had been crying all day. I went and got it sorted. They were together again, and everything fell into place. In a word, it was impossible to separate them.

Their paths parted only after the ninth grade. After graduating from the ninth grade of school No. 37, Alexei entered the Automotive College, where he studied in the specialty “material processing on machine tools and automatic lines” as a technician-technologist. After the technical school, he got a job at the KVTs VAZ milling machine operator. And Alexander graduated from 11 classes of secondary school, and from September 1992 he began to master the profession of a car repairman at vocational school-36. After vocational school-36, he worked at SME VAZ as an operator of automatic lines. , so Sasha was drafted into the army earlier too, but their mother Iraida Alekseevna, with difficulty, but still, begged to wait with the call of one of the brothers and not to separate them even in the army. Until the beginning of December 1994, Alexander and Alexei managed to serve 9 months near Samara, in Chernorechye, in the 81st regiment. Both brothers served on the same BMP (infantry fighting vehicle). True, Sasha was in the position of a vehicle commander and in the rank of sergeant, and Alexei was a gunner-gunner. On December 12, Iraida Alekseevna visited them in the unit. No one assumed that this was their last meeting. On the 13th they were sent to Mozdok. And on the 29th they were already near Grozny. A few days before that, a letter had been sent home from the guys. As it turned out - the latter. Iraida Alekseevna was excited by Sasha’s strange words in the letter “... I don’t know, to be honest, I’ll have to see you again or not, well, don’t worry, take care of yourself, don’t get sick ...”, as well as footage from Grozny, shown on television in the first days of the new 1995 She called the information center in the PriVO, where she was told that her children were not on the lists of those killed, and a few days later, they were told that they were not on the lists of the living either. She called all the authorities, up to Moscow, but no one could give her the exact information about her children. By hook or by crook, Iraida Alekseevna flew to Mozdok. At departure, they tried to remove her from the plane. The pilot helped, having already seen enough of the tears of mothers and hid her in a safe place. Iraida Alekseevna did not have a pass, and this made the search very difficult. In Mozdok, I had to conduct a real investigation of my own. There was a rumor that one nurse was bandaging some guy, and he kept saying that he needed to go back, and not to the hospital. It's like he had a brother. According to the description, the guy looked like Sasha ... They didn’t let her in Mozdok. At the next post, kneeling in sticky mud, she begged the colonel to let her go further. The power of maternal love won - and the search for sons continued. Continued, despite the fact that the commandant of Mozdok wanted to force her out of the city. Iraida Alekseevna bit by bit collected information about her sons. Then a nurse was found who was bandaging the boy. But it turned out not to be Sasha. Iraida Alekseevna left with nothing. Only the tents standing in the mud, and the mutilated soldiers groaning in pain, remained in my memory. Later, in the February truce, colleagues from the first company, who came to the Rostov hospital for identification, first found Sasha, then Alyosha. On February 12, it became known about the death of Sasha, and she immediately flew to Rostov. Alexander was buried on February 18. Soon Alyosha was also brought from the Rostov hospital. Mothers reported this on February 22. Aleshun was buried the next day - February 23. Only God knows how Iraida Alekseevna was able to endure the death of her sons and not go crazy. Life faded for her. The sun stopped shining for her. She simply did not notice him. Yes, she didn't notice anything. A deadly cold blew over her from everywhere. Her sons are not. They are not at all. No, and it won't. No one will ever laugh so loudly and beautifully in her house, as Alyosha did. No one will play the guitar and sing like Sasha loved to do. Your heart “sets” and “takes your breath away” when you unravel this tangle of pain for a thin thread of narrative, continuing the story of two brothers who died honestly fulfilling their military duty, defending the constitutional rights of Russia, and remaining faithful to this oath to the end.

Information about the last hours of Sasha and Alyosha's life was collected by Iraida Alekseevna from eyewitnesses of those events, from witnesses of random meetings and from fellow soldiers, from those who were shoulder to shoulder with her sons in those tragic events that unfolded on the eve of the new year 1995 in the city of Grozny. One of them were Ivoshin Igor and Kuptsov Sergey from Togliatti. And here's what she found out. At the entrance to Grozny, the brothers were separated. Sasha with an infantry platoon went to capture the railway station and railway station. And Alyosha, on his BMP, as part of an assault group, advanced towards the presidential palace. Thrown by staff generals into an unprepared attack, 18-year-olds fell into a real hell. Without maps, reconnaissance, combat training, medical support, heavy tanks and infantry fighting vehicles drove into the streets and cramped quarters of a completely unfamiliar city. And the tanks in the city were completely deprived of the ability to maneuver. According to them they beat me point-blank - from basements, entrances, from windows. Deadly fire seemed to be "spewing" from everywhere. Hell began: tanks were burning, there were only explosions all around, cries for help, groans of the wounded, blood and more and more shooting at the “targets” put up on the streets. , in which Alyosha was, was hit and caught fire. One of the crew members died. Alexei himself, who was wounded in the thigh, was pulled out of the burning car by his countryman Igor Ivoshin. He gave Alexei an injection and, having bandaged the wounded man, carried him to the fountain. Immediately after that, it was muffled by the explosion. He woke up already among the militants, as he was captured. It was released from captivity only after 9 months. At that time, Alexander fought at the railway station. The guys stayed for a day surrounded by "Dudaevites". When the militants began to throw grenades and mines at their vehicles, Captain D. Arkhangelov made a decision: to break through the encirclement on the three remaining "on the go" infantry fighting vehicles and withdraw the remaining soldiers, among whom there were many wounded. Standing under cover of the wall of the building, with their backs to each other, Sergeant Alexander Mikryakov and Captain Arkhangelov covered the loading of the wounded on armor with their fire. When the encirclement broke through, one of the vehicles was hit. According to those who were in those three cars, Sasha was not among them. Someone said that he was told by radio that Alexei was wounded. Of course, Sasha could not leave his brother. He, having sent cars with the wounded, went to look for his brother. Most likely, he ran into an ambush and was killed point-blank. According to the assumptions of Iraida Alekseevna, Alexei, who remained lying by the fountain, most likely was finished off by militants, and possibly even blown up. Because there is such information that the militants dragged the wounded soldiers into a pile and threw a grenade at them. Apparently this was the case, because there were many bullet and shrapnel wounds on Alexei's body. And Sasha's body was pierced through with bullets. Vidnov fired the entire clip at point-blank range. His military ID was also broken. Now this document is stored in the museum of the engineering college. And mother Iraida Alekseevna keeps two Orders of Courage, which Sasha and Alyosha were awarded posthumously, their letters, tender letters that the brothers sent home, and the memory of almost two inseparable bloods.

A letter-memo from the Mikryakov brothers dated July 9, 1995 (handed over by one of the Togliatti residents who were demobilized on that day):

“Mom, come July 9 for us. We're fine, we're not sick. We were transferred to the 90th division in the 81st regiment in the 1st battalion, 1st company. You can come a little later, as we will speak at this oath. Come see us and pick us up."

Despite the fact that at one time the Chechen war did not leave the TV screens and newspaper pages, the military operations of the Russian army, internal troops and special forces in the Caucasus still remain largely unknown, a “secret” war. Its main operations are still waiting for serious research, its analytical history has not been written to this day. By the end of 1994, Dzhokhar Dudayev, who imagined himself the president of a large Islamic state in the North Caucasus, managed to create his own fairly combat-ready armed forces numbering up to 40 thousand people, some of whose personnel underwent not only military training in specially created camps, but also fought in Afghanistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Transnistria. Among the Chechen soldiers there were a large number of mercenaries and repeat offenders hiding from Russian justice. The republic was well-armed, only after the Soviet Army, more than 40 thousand small arms were captured, in addition, there were many foreign-made weapons, hunting rifles. In Grozny, the production of the Boriz (Wolf) machine gun was launched. There were 130 units of armored vehicles, about 200 artillery systems, including 18 Grad installations. This weapon could stop an army of up to 60 thousand people. Its formation was located not only in Grozny, but also in Shali, Argun, Gudermes, Petropavlovsk. In other settlements, there were local armed groups, which were created under the guise of self-defense units. Thus, the Chechen Republic was ready for resistance and a long guerrilla war, which the Russian command did not take into account in its plans. Therefore, first-hand information, unique photos and diagrams of combat clashes are invaluable material for history.

From a letter from the captain of the 81st regiment D. Arkhangelov:

“Dear Iraida Alekseevna! The former deputy commander of the first company, Captain Arkhangelov, is writing to you. I personally knew and served with Alexei and Alexander. I would like to say a lot of warm words of gratitude to you for your sons.

I was in battle at the railway station in Grozny with Sasha on December 31, January 1 and 2, when we broke through the encirclement. You can be proud of your sons. They did not hide behind other people's backs. Yalichno with Sasha bandaged the wounded in the station building.

The last two of us left the building, covering the landing of fighters, including the wounded, on the BMP. Those were the last minutes when I saw Sasha. We stood under the wall of the station building - back to back. I covered his back, he - mine. When they put all the wounded, Sasha ran to get on one BMP, and I on another. Then we went on a breakthrough ...

He was a great man. There would be more of these on earth! Of course, nothing can calm your aching mother's heart. I understand all your pain. Thank you for the wonderful guys and courageous soldiers. May the earth rest in peace for them!

Sorry if that's not right. With great respect for you, Captain D. Arkhangelov, 81st Regiment.

the Russian Federation

City Hall of Togliatti

Department of Education

07/08/2002 No. 1739

Committee Chairman

Togliatti city

public organization,

whose children died in

Chechen Republic

R.N. Shalyganova

Dear Raisa Nikolaevna!

The answer to your appeal about naming professional lyceum No. 36 after the brothers Alexander and Alexei Mikryakov, who died in the Chechen Republic, the Department of Education of the Mayor's Office of Togliatti reports the following.

The joint work of the teaching staff of this lyceum and the Togliatti city public organization of parents whose children died in the Chechen Republic on the patriotic education of young people deserves attention.

Taking into account the opinion of the administration of professional lyceum No. 36 and the consent of I.A. Mikryakova, the mother of the Mikryakov brothers, the Department of Education of the Mayor's Office of Togliatti supports the initiative to assign the name of Alexander and Alexei Mikryakov to the Togliatti professional lyceum No. 36.

Deputy director S.A. Punchenko

Samara Region

81 motorized rifle regiment, military unit 465349

The 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, the successor to the 210th Rifle Regiment, was formed in 1939. He began his combat biography at Khalkin Gol. During the Great Patriotic War, he participated in the defense of Moscow, liberated Orel, Lvov, cities of Eastern Europe. During the existence of the unit, 30 servicemen of the regiment became Heroes of the Soviet Union and 2 Heroes of Russia. On the battle banner of the unit there are 5 orders - two Red Banners, the orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky. After the Great Patriotic War, the regiment was stationed on the territory of the GDR (GSVG), and in 1993, in connection with the liquidation of the GSVG, it was withdrawn to the territory of the Russian Federation and deployed in the village of Roshinsky, Volzhsky district, Samara region, becoming part of the Second Guards Tank Army.

From December 14, 1994 to April 9, 1995, the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment took part in fulfilling the task of the Government of the Russian Federation to disarm illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic. The personnel of the regiment participated in the military operation to capture the city of Grozny from December 31, 1994. to January 20, 1995

Materials from the press based on the stories of Alexander Yaroslavtsev, commander of the 81st regiment, about the regiment's combat operations in Grozny from 12/31/1994 to 01/01/1995.

... Events unfolded like this. On December 8, the regiment was alerted and began to urgently recruit in order to complete the recruitment by December 15, and then begin combat training. Of the 1,300 people, about half came from the "schools". The regiment arrived in Mozdok on 20 December. On December 21, Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev began to lead the battalions to firing. By December 24, everyone had shot back. It turned out that some of the guns on the armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were out of order. From Mozdok, the regiment advanced to the Grozny airport area. Here the regimental commander ordered once again to shoot five or six shells and not to discharge the guns, only to put the safety on. “We thought that they would not send us further than the airport,” says the regiment commander. “We thought that we would stand behind the airport on the defensive ... But things turned out quite differently.”

On December 30, 1994, the regiment was given the task of entering Grozny on the morning of December 31. The day before, the commander of the regiment, Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev, was asked how much time he needed to prepare the regiment for the assault. He replied that 10-15 days were needed. They didn’t give time for preparation. They didn’t even give a written order for the assault (general Kvashnin gave the oral order ...).

The regiment was supposed to go to Grozny in the flank of the federal forces. They promised to give infantry, but they never did. Intelligence was very bad. However, with the tactics of the “Dudaevites”, which they then used, no intelligence would have helped.

At dawn on December 31, the regiment began to move from the airport towards Grozny. When 81 SMEs approached Mayakovsky Street, tanks appeared ahead. It turned out that these were “Rokhlintsy”. We agreed on interaction - they went to the left of Pervomaiskaya so as not to interfere with the advance of the regiment. The real battle began on Ordzhonikidze Square, but not immediately. it turned out later - he got into a "mousetrap".

From the story of A. Yaroslavtsev: “Now, I think, I’ll move closer and pull the second battalion on myself. Well, then I’ll surround the palace. They were already hitting thoroughly ... It was difficult to figure out where how much, where they were hitting from? .. It was impossible to calculate the options, because there was no infantry. until they burn you…”

At the corner of Pobeda and Ordzhonikidze avenues, the regiment commander, Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev, was seriously wounded ... A radio operator and communications chief turned out to be next to him. He asked the radio operator to bandage him, he was scared, but ... they provided first aid to the commander. Yaroslavtsev told the fighter: "Come on, tell me that I'm wounded ... Burlakov's command."

Burlakov will again have to transfer command, this time to Lieutenant Colonel Aidarov, the future commander of 81 SMEs. First, Semyon Burlakov is wounded in the leg at the station, and then, during the evacuation of the wounded on the BMP, the Chechens will shoot everyone, but Burlakov will be mistaken for the deceased ...

On the morning of January 1, 1995, regiment commander Alexander Yaroslavtsev was transferred to a hospital in Vladikavkaz ...

Captain Arkhangelov's group. Little is known about this group, it is only clear that they covered the evacuation from the station to the last, after which they went to the freight station, where they found 3 surviving infantry fighting vehicles 81 MSP. Of the three cars, only one got out. And one of the wrecked could be BMP No. 61822.

Assigning the name of the brothers Alexander and Alexei Mikryakov to the engineering college

February 18, 2004 Mechanical Engineering College. Time: 14-00. The assembly hall is full to capacity. Chairs are lined up along the aisles. In the gallery are graduate students. There are many of them. They also came to the event, but there were not enough seats in the hall for them. Flashlights. Carnations. Tears of mothers whose children died in hot spots. On the stage are portraits of Alexander and Alexei Mikryakov. The solemn part of the event on the occasion of conferring the title of the Mikryakov brothers to the educational institution where Sasha studied is coming. The twins Alexander and Alexei died in the New Year's assault on the city of Grozny in the first Chechen campaign. They were always together: in life and in death. Only they were buried at different times: Sasha was buried on February 18, Alyosha was buried on February 23. Exactly 9 years have passed. The memory of brother soldiers immortalized their "alma mater".

Friends spoke: some studied with their brothers at school, others at a technical school. The soul of the company, a good athlete, a person with a twist - these were the brothers in the memory of friends. Fellow soldiers said that on December 14, 1994, the 81st regiment, where the brothers served, was sent to Chechnya. There were 1,300 soldiers in the echelon. All of them took part in the storming of Grozny. On the first day of the battle, more than 100 people died. There were 7 times more defending militants than Russian soldiers. This is contrary to any rules of military science. There were many wounded, killed and missing. The most difficult thing was to remove the bodies of Russian soldiers from the basements with signs of torture. But ... there is such a profession - to defend the Motherland ...

In the opinion of the military who spoke, history will judge who became a hero in the Chechen company, and who - quite the contrary. The Russian state has always had two pillars - the army and the navy. Dmitry Chugunkov, commander of the reconnaissance platoon, fellow soldier of the Mikryakov brothers, was laconic. He said that the guys were on the most dangerous part of the New Year's assault on Grozny. Whatever trials befall the current recruits, they must be worthy of the memory of their countrymen.

Then they talked about the importance of patriotic education and the basic educational institution of AvtoVAZ. The mother of the brothers, Iraida Alekseevna, cried, giving Sasha's military ID to the museum of the educational institution for eternal storage. I read a poem of my own.

December 31, 1994-January 1, 1995. "New Year's assault" on Grozny. 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (GvMSP) from Samara. This year is 20 years old. Dedicated to the heroes.....

“Yes, our regiment suffered tangible losses in Grozny: both in personnel and in equipment,” says Igor Stankevich, the former deputy commander of the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, who was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation." "But we were at the forefront of the main blow, and the first, as you know, is always the hardest. In all battles, those who are put in the vanguard risk more than others. I responsibly declare: our regiment has completed the task assigned to it. And I will say more: the general plan of the entire operation in Grozny was realized, among other things, thanks to the courage and courage of our soldiers and officers, who were the first to enter the battle and fought heroically all these difficult January days. "(Igor Stankevich, former deputy commander of the 81st Guards motorized rifle regiment, Hero of the Russian Federation)

On the last photo - CHECHNYA, 1995. SOLDIERS OF THE 81st REGIMENT IN THE AREA OF THE COUNTRY CHERVLENAYA.

The 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment was formed in 1939 in the Perm Region. The baptism of fire for his personnel was participation in the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol River from June 7 to September 15, 1939. During the Great Patriotic War, the regiment took part in the battles near Moscow, took part in the Orel, Kamenetz-Podolsk, Lvov, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and Prague operations, ending the hostilities in Czechoslovakia. 29 of its servicemen during the war years were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

For merits in battles during the Great Patriotic War, the regiment was awarded awards and distinctions: the Order of Suvorov, 2nd degree, for the capture of the city of Petrakow (Poland), gratitude was announced and the honorary name "Petrakowsky" was awarded, for the capture of the cities of Ratibor and Biskau was awarded the Order of Kutuzov 2 th degree, for mastering the cities of Cottbus, Luben, Ussen, Beshtlin, Lukenwalde was awarded the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 2nd degree, for mastering the capital of Germany, the city of Berlin, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

In the post-war period, the regiment was stationed in the German Democratic Republic in the city of Karlhorst. In 1993, the regiment was withdrawn from Germany to the territory of the Russian Federation and deployed in the village of Roschinsky, Samara Region.

By the fall of 1994, the 81st was staffed by the state of the so-called mobile forces. Then in the Armed Forces they just began to create such units. It was assumed that they could be deployed on the first command to any region of the country to solve various problems - from eliminating the consequences of natural disasters to repelling attacks by gangs.
With the special status given to the regiment, combat training became noticeably more active, and recruitment issues began to be resolved more efficiently. The officers began to allocate the first apartments in a residential town built at the expense of the German authorities in Chernorechye. In the same 94th year, the regiment successfully passed the inspection of the Ministry of Defense. For the first time after all the troubles associated with the withdrawal and arrangement in a new place, the 81st showed that it had become a full-blooded part of the Russian army, combat-ready, capable of performing any tasks.

A number of servicemen who received good training became eager to serve in hot spots, in the same peacekeeping forces. As a result, about two hundred servicemen were transferred from the regiment in a short period. Moreover, the most popular specialties are drivers, gunners, snipers.
In the 81st, they believed that this was not a problem, the vacancies that had formed could be filled, new people could be trained ...

In early December 1994, the commander of the regiment, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, and I arrived on official business at the headquarters of our 2nd Army, - recalls Igor Stankevich. Someone from high-ranking military leaders called. “That's right,” the general answered the subscriber to one of his questions, “the commander and deputy of the 81st regiment is just with me. I'll get the information to them right now."
After the general hung up the phone, he asked everyone present to leave. In a tete-a-tete atmosphere, it was announced to us that the regiment would soon receive a combat mission, that “we had to prepare.” The region of application is the North Caucasus. Everything else - later.

In the photo Igor Stankevich (January 1995, Grozny)

According to the then Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, the meeting of the Russian Security Council on November 29, 1994 was decisive. The speaker was the late Minister for Nationalities Nikolai Yegorov. According to Grachev, “he said that 70 percent of Chechens are just waiting for the Russian army to enter them. And they will be happy, as he put it, to sprinkle our soldiers with flour. The remaining 30 percent of Chechens, according to Yegorov, were neutral.” And at five o'clock in the morning on December 11, our troops moved to Chechnya in three large groups.

Someone at the top confused flour with gunpowder ....

The 81st motorized rifle regiment of the PriVO, which was to go to war in December 1994, was quickly staffed with servicemen from 48 parts of the district. For all fees - a week. I had to select commanders. A third of the primary-level officers were "two-year students", having behind them only the military departments of civilian universities.

On December 14, 1994, the regiment was alerted and began to be transferred to Mozdok. The transfer was carried out by six echelons. By December 20, the regiment was fully concentrated on the training ground in Mozdok. In the regiment, by the time they arrived at the Mozdok station, out of 54 platoon commanders, 49 had just graduated from civilian universities. Most of them did not fire a single shot from a machine gun, let alone fire a standard projectile from their tanks. In total, 31 tanks arrived in Mozdok (of which 7 were out of order), 96 infantry fighting vehicles (out of 27 out of order), 24 armored personnel carriers (5 out of order), 38 self-propelled guns (12 out of order), 159 vehicles (28 out of order). In addition, there were no elements of dynamic protection on the tanks. More than half of the batteries were discharged (cars were started from a tow). Faulty means of communication were stored literally in piles.

The task of the commanders of the troops of the groupings for operations in the city and the preparation of assault detachments was set on December 25. The regiment, which was partly concentrated on the southern slopes of the Tersky Range, and partly (by one battalion) was located in the area of ​​​​a dairy farm 5 km north of Alkhan-Churtsky, was assigned two tasks: the immediate and subsequent. The nearest one was planned to occupy the Severny airport by 10 am on December 31. The next - by 16 o'clock to take possession of the intersection of Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets. Personally, the commander of the United Group, Lieutenant General A. Kvashnin, with the commander, chief of staff and battalion commanders of the 81st Guards. SMEs operating in the main direction, classes were held on the organization of interaction in the performance of a combat mission in Grozny.

On December 27, the regiment began to advance and settled on the northern outskirts of Grozny, not far from the airport ...

From an investigation by journalist Vladimir Voronov ("Top Secret", No.12/247, 2009):

“But the parents are firmly convinced that no one was engaged in combat training in the regiment. Because from March to December 1994, Andrei held a machine gun in his hands only three times: on the oath and twice more at the shooting range - the father commanders became generous as much as nine rounds And in the sergeant's training, in fact, they didn’t teach him anything, although they gave him badges. The son honestly told his parents what he was doing in Chernorechye: from morning till night he built cottages and garages for gentlemen officers, nothing more. He described in detail how they equipped some kind of dacha, general's or colonel's: planks were polished to a mirror shine, one to the other was adjusted to a seventh sweat.Already after, I met with Andrey's colleagues in Chernorech: they confirm, it was so, all the "combat" training - the construction of dachas and maintenance officers' families. A week before they were sent to Chechnya, the radio was turned off in the barracks, the TVs were taken out. Parents who managed to attend the dispatch of their children claimed that military tickets were taken away from the soldiers. The guards saw Andrey just before the regiment was sent to Chechnya. Everyone already knew that they were going to war, but they drove gloomy thoughts away from themselves.

By the beginning of the war in Chechnya, the once elite regiment was a pitiful sight. Almost none of the regular officers who served in Germany remained, and 66 officers of the regiment were not regular officers at all - “two-year students” from civilian universities with military departments! For example, Lieutenant Valery Gubarev, commander of a motorized rifle platoon, a graduate of the Novosibirsk Metallurgical Institute: he was drafted into the army in the spring of 1994. He was already in the hospital telling how grenade launchers and a sniper were sent to him at the last moment before the battle. "The sniper says, 'Show me how to shoot.' And grenade launchers - about the same ... Already build a column, and I train all grenade launchers ... "

The commander of the 81st regiment Alexander Yaroslavtsev later admitted: “People, to be honest, were poorly trained, who drove the BMP a little, who shot a little. And from such specific types of weapons as an underbarrel grenade launcher and a flamethrower, the soldiers did not shoot at all. Lieutenant Sergei Terekhin, commander of a tank platoon, wounded during the assault, claimed that only two weeks before the first (and last) battle, his platoon was completed with people. And in the 81st regiment itself, half of the personnel were missing. This was confirmed by the chief of staff of the regiment Semyon Burlakov: “We concentrated in Mozdok. We were given two days to regroup, after which we marched under Grozny. At all levels, we reported that the regiment in this composition is not ready for combat operations. We were considered a mobile unit, but we were staffed according to the state of peace: we had only 50 percent of the personnel. But the most important thing is that there were no infantry in the motorized rifle squads, only the crews of combat vehicles. There were no direct shooters, those who should ensure the safety of combat vehicles. Therefore, we walked, as they say, "bare armor." And, again, the vast majority of the platoons were two-year-old guys who had no idea about the conduct of hostilities. Drivers only knew how to start the car and move off. Gunners-operators could not shoot from combat vehicles at all.

Neither the battalion commanders, nor the company and platoon commanders had maps of Grozny: they did not know how to navigate in a foreign city! The commander of the communications company of the regiment .. Captain Stanislav Spiridonov said in an interview with Samara journalists: “Maps? There were maps, but everyone had different ones, different years, they didn’t fit together, even the street names are different.” However, the two-year-old platoon officers could not read maps at all. “Here, the chief of staff of the division himself got in touch with us,” Gubarev recalled, “and personally set the task: the 5th company along Chekhov - to the left, and to us, the 6th company, to the right. That's what he said, to the right. Just to the right." When the offensive began, the regiment's combat mission changed every three hours, so we can safely assume that it did not exist.

Later, the regiment commander .. could not .. explain who set him the task and what. First they had to take the airport, moved out - a new order, turned around - again an order to go to the airport, then another introductory one. And on the morning of December 31, 1995, about 200 combat vehicles of the 81st regiment (according to other sources - about 150) moved to Grozny: tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles ... They didn’t know anything about the enemy: no one provided the regiment with intelligence, and they themselves did not conduct reconnaissance. The 1st battalion, marching in the first echelon, entered the city .., and the 2nd battalion entered the city with a gap of five hours ..! By this time, little was left of the first battalion, the second was going to its death ... "

The driver of the T-80 tank, junior sergeant Andrey Yurin, when he was in the Samara hospital, recalled: “No, no one set a task, they just stood in a column and went. True, the company commander warned: “Just a little - shoot! Child on the road - push.

In the photo, Lieutenant General L.Ya. Rokhlin

Initially, the role of commander of the forces introduced into the city was assigned to General Lev Rokhlin. Here is how Lev Yakovlevich himself describes it (quote from the book "The Life and Death of a General"): "Before the storming of the city," says Rokhlin, "I decided to clarify my tasks. Based on the positions we occupied, I believed that the Eastern group, to command which it was suggested that I should be headed by another general. And it would be expedient to appoint me to command the Northern grouping. On this topic, I had a conversation with Kvashnin. He appointed General Staskov to command the Eastern grouping. "Who will command the Northern one?" - I ask. Kvashnin answers: "I . We will set up a forward command post in Tolstoy-Yurt. You know what a powerful group this is: T-80 tanks, BMP-3. (Then there were almost no such people in the troops.) "-" And what is my task? "- I ask. "Go to the palace, take it, and we will come up." I say: "Did you watch the speech of the Minister of Defense on television? He said that the city is not attacked by tanks. "This task was removed from me. But I insist:" What is my task anyway? "-" You will be in the reserve, - they answer. - You will cover the left flank of the main grouping. And they assigned a route of movement. After this conversation with Rokhlin, Kvashnin began to give orders to units directly. So, the 81st regiment was given the task of blocking the Reskom. At the same time, the tasks were brought to the units at the very last moment.

Secrecy was held by Colonel General Anatoly Kvashnin as a separate line, apparently, it was some kind of Kvashnin's "know-how", everything was hidden, and the task was set directly in the direction of movement of the units, the trouble is that the units acted independently, separately, prepared for one thing, but were forced to do something completely different. Inconsistency, lack of interconnection - this is another distinguishing feature of this operation. Apparently, the whole operation was based on the belief that there would be no resistance. It only says that the leadership of the operation was out of touch with reality.

Until December 30, the commanders of units and battalions did not know either about their routes or about the tasks in the city. No documents were processed. Until the last moment, the officers of the 81st regiment believed that the task of the day was the Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky crossroads. Before the regiment entered the city, its command was asked how long it would take to bring it to combat readiness? The command reported: at least two weeks and replenishment of people, because. the regiment is now "naked armor". To solve the problem with the lack of people, the 81st regiment was promised 196 reinforcements for the landing of infantry fighting vehicles, as well as 2 regiments of the Internal Troops to clean up the quarters passed by the regiment.

Regiment commander Yaroslavtsev: “When Kvashnin assigned us the task, he sent us to the GRU colonel to get information about the enemy, but he didn’t say anything specific. I tell him, wait, what is the northwest, southeast, I’m drawing a route for you, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, so I’m walking along it, tell me what I can meet there.He answers me, here, according to our data, there are sandbags in windows, here there may or may not be a strong point. He didn’t even know if the streets were blocked there or not, so they gave me these fools (UR-77 "Meteorite") to blow up the barricades, but nothing is blocked there In short, there was no intelligence, either in terms of the number or location of the militants."

After a meeting on December 30, Colonel General Kvashnin ordered an officer to be sent for replenishment, but due to bad weather, people could not be delivered on time. Then it was proposed to take two battalions of explosives as a landing force, the chief of the regiment Martynychev was sent for them, but the command of the Internal Troops did not give up the battalions. That is why it turned out that the 81st regiment went to the city of Grozny with "bare armor", having at best 2 people in the BMP landing force, and often not having it at all!

At the same time, the regiment received a strange order: one battalion had to, bypassing Resk, go to the station, and then behind its back the second battalion had to block Resk, that is, without securing the occupation of one line, it was necessary to go to the next, which contradicts the charter, methods . In fact, this separated the first battalion from the main forces of the regiment. Why the station was needed, one can only guess - apparently, this is also part of the "know-how".

The regiment commander Yaroslavtsev recalls these days in the following way: “I ... worked with the battalion commanders, but we didn’t have time to outline, of course, it’s supposed to, not only to the company, you need to go down to the platoon to show where to get what. But due to the fact that like this - go ahead, let's go, the first battalion ... take the station and surround, take possession of it, and the second battalion advance and surround Dudayev's palace ... they didn’t paint where and what, the battalion commander already made the decision where to send, according to the situation. ... The immediate task was get to the crossroads ... Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky, then the next one - the station, the other - Dudayev's palace ... but it was not described in detail, because there was no time, nothing, but in theory each platoon needs to be painted where it should approximately become, where to get out, until what time and what to do. As far as I understood, the commanders thought like this: with bare armor and surround, stand, point the barrels there, and partially, for example, if there is no one there, with infantry, report that he is surrounded ... And then they will say - we will pull some about there a negotiating team, or there are scouts, and they will go forward!

Chronology of the last day of 1994: at 7 am on December 31, the forward detachment of the 81st regiment, including a reconnaissance company, attacked the Severny airport. With the advance detachment was the chief of staff of the 81st, Lieutenant Colonel Semyon Burlakov. By 9 o'clock, his group completed the immediate task, having captured the airport and cleared two bridges across the Neftyanka River on the way to the city.
Following the advance detachment, the 1st Motor Rifle Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel Eduard Perepelkin moved in a column. To the west, through the state farm "Rodina", was the 2nd MSB. Fighting vehicles moved in columns: tanks were ahead, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns were on the flanks.
From the Severny airport, the 81st MSP went to Khmelnitsky Street. At 0917, motorized riflemen met the first enemy forces here: an ambush from the Dudayev detachment with attached tanks, an armored personnel carrier and two Urals. The reconnaissance entered the battle. The militants managed to knock out a tank and one of the Urals, but the scouts also lost one BMP and several people were wounded. The regiment commander, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, decided to delay reconnaissance to the main forces and stop the advance for a while.
Then the advance resumed. Already by 11.00 the columns of the 81st regiment reached Mayakovsky Street. The advance of the previously approved schedule was almost 5 hours. Yaroslavtsev reported this to the command and received an order to move to block the presidential palace, to the city center. The regiment began advancing to Dzerzhinsky Square. By 12.30, the advanced units were already near the station, and the headquarters of the group confirmed the previously given order to surround the presidential palace.

All parts were controlled by the "come on, come on" method. The commanders who ruled from afar did not know how the situation in the city was developing. To force the troops to move forward, they blamed the commanders: "everyone has already reached the city center and is about to take the palace, and you are marking time ...". As the commander of the 81st regiment, Colonel Alexander Yaroslavtsev, later testified, to his request regarding the position of the neighbor on the left, the 129th regiment of the Leningrad Military District, he received an answer that the regiment was already on Mayakovsky Street. “This is the pace,” the colonel thought then (“Red Star”, 01/25/1995). It could not have occurred to him that this was far from the case ... Moreover, the closest neighbor on the left of the 81st regiment was the consolidated detachment 8 Corps, and not the 129th regiment, which was advancing from the Khankala region. Although it is on the left, it is very far away. On Mayakovsky Street, judging by the map, this regiment could only be bypassing the city center and passing by the presidential palace.

On the photo is a RETIRED COLONEL, PARTICIPANT IN THE BATTLE ACTIONS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE DRA AND THE CHR, CAVALIER OF SEVERAL BATTLE ORDERS, COMMANDER OF 81 SMES IN THE EARLY 90s - YAROSLAVTSEV ALEKSANDR ALEKSEEVICH.

From the memoirs of a tanker: "I was in front with the tanks of the company, our infantry retreated back. The regiment commander gives the command -" forward!
I clarified - where to go, the task of the day is completed, there are no infantry to cover the tanks ...
He says - "Rink", this is Pulikovsky's order, understand correctly, you go to the station ...
The premonition of an unkind adventure did not deceive me. In the observation devices, I saw tightly "stoned" militants who slowly moved along the houses, but did not enter into confrontation. Even then I realized that they were letting us into the "New Year's carousel". I understood that if something went wrong, it would be difficult to get out of the station. But it never occurred to me that there would be no our posts on the entry route after the passage of the assault groups .... "

At 13.00, the main forces of the regiment passed the station and along Ordzhonikidze Street rushed to the complex of government buildings. And then the Dudaevites began a powerful fire resistance. A fierce battle broke out near the palace. Colonel Yaroslavtsev was wounded and transferred command to the chief of staff of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov.

At 16.10, the chief of staff received confirmation of the task of blockading the palace. But the motorized riflemen were given the most severe fire resistance. Dudayev's grenade launchers, dispersed throughout the buildings in the city center, began to shoot our combat vehicles literally point-blank. The columns of the regiment began to gradually break up into separate groups. By 5 p.m., Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov was also wounded, and about a hundred soldiers and sergeants were out of action. The intensity of the fire impact can be judged by at least one fact: only from 18.30 to 18.40, that is, in just 10 minutes, the militants knocked out 3 tanks of the 81st regiment at once!

Units of the 81st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade that broke into the city were surrounded. The Dudaevites unleashed a flurry of fire on them. The fighters under the cover of the BMP took up all-round defense. The main part of the personnel and equipment was concentrated on the forecourt, in the station itself and in the surrounding buildings. The 1st MSB of the 81st Regiment was located in the station building, the 2nd MSB - at the station's goods yard.

The 1st MSR under the command of Captain Bezrutsky occupied the building of the road administration. The infantry fighting vehicles of the company were placed in the yard, at the gates and on the exit tracks to the railway track. At dusk, the onslaught of the enemy intensified. Losses have increased. Especially in equipment that was very tight, sometimes literally caterpillar to caterpillar. The initiative passed into the hands of the enemy.
Relative calm came only at 23.00. At night, the shooting continued, and in the morning the commander of the 131st brigade, Colonel Savin, asked for permission from the higher command to leave the station. A breakthrough was approved to the Lenin Park, where units of the 693rd MSP of the West group were defending. At 15:00 on January 1, the remnants of units of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 81st Motorized Rifle Brigade began to break through from the railway station and the goods station. Under the incessant fire of the Dudayevites, the columns suffered losses and gradually disintegrated.

28 people from the 1st MSR of the 81st MSR broke through on three infantry fighting vehicles along the railway. Having reached the House of Printing, the motorized riflemen got lost in the dark unfamiliar streets and were ambushed by militants. As a result, two BMPs were shot down. Only one vehicle under the command of Captain Arkhangelov made it to the location of the federal troops.

... Today it is known that only a small part of the people left the encirclement from the units of the 81st SME and 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, which were at the forefront of the main attack. The personnel lost their commanders, equipment (only in one day on December 31, the 81st regiment lost 13 tanks and 7 infantry fighting vehicles), dispersed around the city and went out to their own - one at a time or in small groups.

The consolidated detachment of the 81st SME, formed from units that remained outside the "station" ring, managed to gain a foothold at the intersection of Bogdan Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets. The command of the detachment was taken over by the deputy commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Igor Stankevich. For two days, his group, being in a semi-encirclement, remaining in fact on a bare and shot through place - the intersection of two main city streets, held this strategically important area.

From the recollections of an eyewitness: "And then it began ... From the basements and from the upper floors of buildings, grenade launchers and machine guns hit columns of Russian armored vehicles squeezed in narrow streets. The militants fought as if they, and not our generals, studied at military academies. The rest, without haste, were shot as if in a shooting range. Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that managed to break out of the traps by breaking fences, without the cover of motorized riflemen, also became easy prey for the enemy. By 18.00, the 693rd motorized rifle regiment was surrounded in the Lenin Park area "Zapad" grouping. Communication with it was lost. Dense fire stopped the combined parachute regiments of the 76th division and the 21st separate airborne brigade on the southern outskirts. At nightfall, 3.5 thousand militants with 50 guns and tanks near the railway station suddenly attacked the 81st Regiment and the 131st Brigade, which were carelessly standing in columns along the streets.Around midnight, the remnants of these units, supported by two surviving tanks, began to withdraw, but were surrounded and almost completely destroyed.

And at the same time, champagne corks clapped all over the country at New Year's tables and Alla Pugacheva sang from the TV screen: “Hey, you are up there! Again, there is no escape from you ... "

Neither on December 31, nor on January 1, nor in the following days did the 81st Regiment leave the cities, remained at the forefront and continued to participate in hostilities. The battles in Grozny were led by Igor Stankevich's detachment, as well as the 4th motorized rifle company of Captain Yarovitsky, who was in the hospital complex.
For the first two days, there were virtually no other organized forces in the center of Grozny. There was another small group from the headquarters of General Rokhlin, it kept nearby.

The former commander of the North-East grouping, Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin, eloquently recalled the morale of our troops these days: “I set the commanders the task of holding the most important objects, promised to present them for awards and higher positions. In response, the deputy brigade commander replies that he is ready to quit, but will not command. And then he writes a report. I propose to the battalion commander: “Come on…” “No,” he answers, “I also refuse.” It was the hardest blow for me.”

From the description of the battle: “The consolidated detachment of the 81st SME, formed from units that remained outside the “station” ring, managed to gain a foothold at the intersection of Bogdan Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets. The command of the detachment was taken over by the deputy regiment commander for work with personnel, Lieutenant Colonel Igor Stankevich ."one

- tank commander
- driver [?] private TB 6 guards. tp Evgeny Germanovich Efimov (military unit 71432)2
- gunner

From the memoirs of Efimov's mother E.G.: "According to colleagues who accompanied my son Yevgeny Germanovich Efimov to the burial place, my son died in Grozny on Mayakovsky Street on the night of January 31-1, 1995. His tank was hit from grenade launcher with a blow to the side armor, under the turret. The tank caught fire. Zhenya, shell-shocked or wounded, but already burning, crawled out of the burning car onto the armor, where he was shot from small arms. His crew remained in the tank. "3

I believe that the tank was at a checkpoint and was hit, and according to Vladislav Belogrud's version4, the tank was part of the column.

Column formation

The commander of the rs obs 90 td captain S. Spiridonov: “On January 1, in the morning, a new column was formed.<...>And on the first day, when we went, we were met at the very beginning. True, the Chechens did not burn fuel trucks, they wanted to seize them. They fired at armored vehicles. The killed drivers of fuel trucks were replaced by warrant officers and they were taken out of the shelling. "5

A moment that is not entirely clear: 200 paratroopers6, presumably from the 104th Airborne Division, were attached to 81 SMEs. There is information that on January 1 they were transferred from the airport to the city7, but there is no information about their participation in hostilities yet.

According to Vladislav Belogrud's version8, the column consisted of "70 soldiers and four officers".

BMP №435

- BMP commander senior lieutenant Igor Vladimirovich Bodnya
- gunner-operator private Igor Sergeevich Komissarkin (from military unit 738749)

Guards Major A. Fomin: “On January 1, the combined detachment of the regiment entered Grozny to support the units entrenched in the city center. The convoy included vehicles with ammunition, fuel, and vehicles for the removal of the wounded. The crew of the BMP-2 No. 435 had the task of providing the passage of the column, covering it with their fire.<...>As soon as the lead vehicle entered Ordzhonikidze Square, the column of the regiment's combined detachment was fired upon. She was taken into the "fire bag", knocking out cars in the "head" and "tail" of the column. The decision was made to move back. BMP-2 No. 435 took an advantageous firing position and began to cover the withdrawal of the column with its fire. Having brought down all the firepower on the militants, the crew waited for the last car of the column to pass. Ammunition was used up. The enemy immediately concentrated fire on the BMP. After several hits, the crew began to get out of the car. Private I.S. Komissarkin was seriously wounded and his comrades-in-arms pulled him out. They continued to fight with personal weapons from the ground, but the forces were unequal ...
Their bodies were found by colleagues not far from the burned-out car. The crew of the BMP-2 No. 435 fulfilled their military duty to the end as befits real men, warriors. "11

Return to checkpoint

From the description of the battle: “For two days, his group, being in a semi-encirclement, remaining in a bare place - an open and wide intersection of two main city streets, held this strategically important area and constantly attacked the enemy. Stankevich competently placed his firepower. He placed the BMP (he had 9 of them), organized the "binding" of the fire of attached mortars in the most threatening areas. When organizing the defense of the line, even non-standard measures were taken. So, in order to protect the BMP from the fire of enemy grenade launchers, the lieutenant colonel ordered ... steel gates and cover them with military vehicles on the sides and front. Stankevich's "know-how" turned out to be successful: an RPG shot "slid" over a sheet of metal without hitting the car. After the bloody New Year's Eve, people gradually began to come to their senses. Stankevich's detachment fighters escaping from the encirclement gradually pulled together. "12

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

1 Semyonov D. The 81st regiment completed its task in Grozny!
2 Unknown soldier of the Caucasian war. M., 1997. S. 82.
3 Remember and bow down. Yekaterinburg, 2000, p. 158.
4 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front illustration. 2007. No. 9. S. 42.
5 Galaktionov V. How it was // Samara newspaper. 2000. January 11. (

The Russian army, as a military entity that inherits the traditions of the Soviet Army, has many heroes, both among people and among entire units. One of these units is the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment (MSP), called Petrakuvsky. The full name of the regiment consists of a list of many military awards, which are real evidence of its valor and glory, and looks like this - the 81st Guards Petrakuvsky twice Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky Motorized Rifle Regiment.
The history of the Petrakuvsky Regiment can be divided into several stages, which, smoothly flowing one into another, stretch to our days. In this article, we will try to consider the regiment's combat path, focusing on the last heroic and at the same time inglorious battle, which is still fresh in people's memory - the assault on Grozny in the first Chechen campaign of 1994-95.
BEGINNING: THE PRE-WAR YEARS
The time leading up to World War II was a period of high-profile political transformation in Europe, saber-rattling by two European predators, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Be that as it may, either the Union was preparing for aggression, or it was preparing to repel aggression from other countries (read Germany), but in any case, the army was urgently reorganized. This reorganization affected both the equipping of existing units with new types of weapons, and the creation of new units, formations and even armies.
Against the background of such a process in the army, the 81st motorized rifle regiment Petrakuvsky was created. True, at the time of creation it had a different serial number. It was the 210th Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Division. The regiment was formed in the late spring of 1939, the regiment was registered in the Urals military district. This year for the Soviet Union was characterized by military operations in Manchuria, so the 81st Petrakuvsky Regiment (we will call it that, a more familiar name) was hastily transferred to Khalkhin Gol, along with the native 82nd Infantry Division.
Here, the Petrakuvsky regiment received its first baptism of fire, while receiving gratitude from the command. The tension in the region did not subside even after the end of hostilities, and it was decided to leave the units that fought in Manchuria in a new place. So the 81st Petrakuvsky regiment moved from the Urals to Mongolia, to the city of Choibalsan.
START: WAR
The 81st (210th) motorized rifle regiment met the beginning of the Great Patriotic War at the place of permanent deployment in Mongolia. And only in the autumn of 1941, when the situation on the Western Front was very tense, the 81st regiment, as part of its native division, received an order to go into the thick of things - to fight for Moscow. The 81st motorized rifle regiment fought its first battle with the German invaders on October 25, 1941 in the area of ​​the station village of Dorohovo. The battles for Moscow were long and bloody, only in the spring of 1942 significant success was achieved. Many parts have received government awards. Among these units was the 210th Motorized Rifle Regiment, which for courage and heroism in the battles for Moscow received the right to be called Guards. At the same time, the regiment received a new serial number, from March 18, 1942, it was called the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment. A little later, the regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
On June 17, 1942, the 6th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment was reorganized into the 17th Guards Mechanized Brigade. The brigade was part of the 6th mechanized corps of the 4th tank army. The further battle path was no less glorious than its beginning in this bloody war. The brigade participated in many iconic battles of the Great Patriotic War. The end of the war was partly caught in Czechoslovakia. For special courage in battles, the brigade was awarded the Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky. And for the capture of the town of Petrakow, the brigade received the title of Petrakow, this happened in January 1945.
MATURE YEARS: POST-WAR
In the post-war period, the 17th mechanized brigade was again reorganized into a mechanized regiment, which received all the rights to the awards of its predecessors, and became known as the 17th Guards Mechanized Petrakuvsky Regiment twice Red Banner Orders of Kutuzov, Suvorov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky. At some point, the regiment was even turned into a separate mechanized battalion, this happened against the background of the post-war reduction in the army.
However, with the beginning of the Cold War, the battalion was again transformed into a mechanized regiment, and in 1957 it received a modern serial number and began to bear the name of the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment. The regiment was in the Western Group of Forces in the town of Karlhost. The 81st regiment managed to take part in the so-called liberation campaign in Czechoslovakia, this was in 1968.
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 81st regiment was part of the Western Group of Forces in Germany. During this time, it was reorganized and transferred to new states several times. In 1993, the ZGV was liquidated, and the 81st regiment was withdrawn from Germany to a new location, which was located in the Samara region.
MODERN HISTORY: BLOODY TIME
With the collapse of the Union, the centrifugal forces, having broken ties between the once fraternal republics, continued to tear apart the Russian Federation as well. These forces were multiplied many times over by separatist sentiments fueled from outside in some Caucasian republics. In addition, the country's leadership was worried about the rather large oil reserves in the region, as well as oil and gas communications. All together, this first provoked a conflict with the Chechen Republic, which later grew into a full-scale war.
Serious hostilities in Chechnya began at the end of 1994. From the first days, the 81st regiment, which was part of the NORTH group, also took part in this. While participating in the disarmament of illegal military formations (as this operation was officially called), the regiment was commanded by Colonel Yaroslavtsev (who was seriously wounded during the storming of Grozny), the chief of staff was Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov (also wounded in Grozny).
The most serious and significant event for the personnel of the regiment in the post-war years is a military operation called the assault on the capital of the Chechen Republic, the city of Grozny. The purpose of the operation was to capture the capital of the rebellious republic, in which the main forces were located, as well as the leadership of the self-proclaimed Ichkeria. For this task, several groups were formed, one of which included the Petrakov regiment. At that time, the regiment consisted of more than 1300 personnel, 96 infantry fighting vehicles, 31 tanks and more than 20 pieces of artillery and mortars.
It is worth noting that, compared even with the times of 5 years ago, the regiment made a depressing impression. Many of the officers who were still serving in Germany quit, they were replaced by graduate students of military departments. In addition, the personnel of the regiment's units were completely untrained. The soldiers had only records in military cards about their positions, there was no real knowledge and skills in sight. Mechanics of infantry fighting vehicles and tanks had little driving experience, the shooters practically did not carry out live firing from small arms, not to mention grenade launchers and mortars. In addition, immediately before being sent to Chechnya, the most trained and trained specialists left (transferred) the regiment, the lack of which subsequently cost the units dearly.
There was no preparation for the entry of troops into Chechnya, as such, the personnel were simply loaded onto a train and taken away. According to the surviving participants of those events, combat training took place even during the journey, right in the cars. Upon arrival in Mozdok, the regiment received 2 days to prepare, and two days later made a march to Grozny. At that time, the 81st regiment was staffed according to the peacetime staff, which was only 50% of the war staff. Most importantly, motorized rifle units were not equipped with simple infantry, there were only BMP crews. This fact was one of the main factors in the death of the regiment's units that stormed Grozny. Roughly speaking, the equipment entered the city without infantry cover, which is tantamount to death. This was understood by the commanders on the ground, for example, the chief of staff of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov, spoke about this. But no one listened to the words of the command of the units sent to Chechnya.
STORM OF GROZNY
The decision to storm the city was made at a meeting of the Security Council on December 26, 1994. The assault on the city was preceded by artillery preparation. 8 days before the start of the operation, artillery units began a massive shelling of Grozny. As it turned out later, this was not enough, in general, as such, there was no preparation for the military operation, the troops marched at random.
The Petrakuvsky regiment marched along with the 131st Maikop motorized rifle brigade from the northern part, as part of the NORTH group. Contrary to the original plan, according to which the troops of the Russian army were to enter the city from three sides, two groups remained in place, and only the NORTH group entered the center.
It is worth noting that the forces for the assault were clearly not enough, according to some reports, the troops of the Russian Army around Grozny numbered about 14 thousand people, without even having a two-fold advantage. This was clearly not enough for an attack, and even more so in the conditions of the city, and even understaffed units. In addition, there was an acute shortage of maps and clear controls. The regiment's tasks changed every few hours, many did not know where to simply move. The Chechens easily wedged into the radio communications of the Russian troops, disorienting them. Even elementary reconnaissance of the enemy forces was not carried out, so the battalion and company commanders did not know who was opposing them.
The start of the assault on the capital of the rebellious republic was scheduled for the last day of 1994. This, according to the plan of the command of the Joint Forces, was to play into the hands of the attackers. In principle, the tactics of surprise worked 100%, subsequently playing a negative role. None of the defenders of Grozny simply expected an assault on New Year's Eve. That is why the units of the 81st regiment and the 131st brigade managed to quickly reach the city center and just as quickly ... die there.
Later, some sources began to actively promote such an opinion, according to which the Chechens themselves allowed Russian troops to reach the city center unhindered, luring them into a trap. However, such a claim is unlikely.
The first of the divisions of the Petrakov regiment entered the advance detachment, which included a reconnaissance company, led by the regiment's chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov. They had the task of taking possession of the airport and clearing the bridges on the way to Grozny. The forward detachment coped with its task brilliantly, and after it two motorized rifle battalions entered the city under the command of lieutenant colonels Perepelkin and Shilovsky.
The units marched in columns, tanks were in front, the flanks of the columns were covered by the Tunguska ZSU. As the surviving participants of those events later said, the tanks did not even have cartridges for machine guns, which made them useless in the conditions of the city.
The first clash took place near the advance detachment already at the entrance to the city, on Khmelnitsky Street. During the battle, it was possible to inflict serious damage on the enemy, but 1 infantry fighting vehicle had to be lost, and the first wounded appeared.
The regiment's units were rapidly advancing towards the center of the city, practically without encountering resistance. Already at 12.00, after only 5 hours, the railway station was reached, about which the regiment commander reported to the command. Further orders were received to advance towards the palace of the Government of the Republic.
However, the fulfillment of this task was greatly hampered by the increased activity of the militants who came to their senses. A fierce battle ensued in the area of ​​the government palace, during which Colonel Yaroslavtsev (regiment commander) was wounded. The command passed to the chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov.
The swift offensive quickly bogged down in the fierce opposition of the defenders, who fired grenade-launchers at the equipment of the federal troops. The combat vehicles were knocked out one after another, the columns of the regiment's subunits were cut off from each other and divided into separate groups. A big obstacle was created by their own set fire to the car. The dead and wounded already numbered more than a hundred people, Burlakov was among the wounded.
Only by nightfall did the units of the 81st Regiment and the 131st Brigade receive a long-awaited respite. However, immediately after the New Year, the intensity of fire from the militants increased. In agreement with the command of the unit of the NORTH group, they left the station and began to break out of the city. The retreat was not coordinated, they broke through one by one and in small groups. So there were more chances ...
From the encirclement, the advanced units of the Maykop brigade and the Petrakuvsky regiment emerged significantly thinned, with huge losses in manpower and equipment. According to official information, the regiment lost 63 people killed during the assault, in addition, there were still 75 missing and about 150 wounded.
In addition to two motorized rifle battalions and an advanced detachment, there were also other units of the 81st regiment in Grozny, brought together in one group under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Stankevich. They took up defense on the streets of Mayakovsky and Khmelnitsky. Properly organized defense made it possible to create an island of resistance, which successfully fought for several days. This group served as a rescue for many soldiers of the advanced detachment breaking through from the encirclement.
Among other things, the 81st Petrakuvsky regiment participated not only in the storming of Grozny on New Year's Eve 1994. The entire January of the new year, 1995, was spent in battles for the regiment. Thanks to the dedication of the guys, Dudayev's palace, an arms factory, and a printing house were taken - an important center of resistance.
For several more months, the regiment was on the territory of Chechnya, and only in April 1995, the unit was withdrawn to the place of permanent deployment.
Now one of the most famous regiments of our time is part of the motorized rifle brigade under the same number.

The events of 13 years ago are moving further and further away from us. New Year's assault on Grozny. The soldiers who were at the forefront of the fighting were labeled almost "lambs thrown to the slaughter." The names of the units that suffered the greatest losses also became household names: the 131st brigade, the 81st regiment ...

Meanwhile, in those first days of the Grozny operation, the servicemen showed unparalleled courage. The units that entered that "terrible" city in every sense, stood to the end, to death.

Chechen "abscess"

On November 30, 1994, the President signed the Decree "On measures to restore constitutional legality and law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic." It was decided to "cut open" the Chechen "abscess" by force.

To carry out the operation, a Joint Group of Forces was created, including the forces and means of various ministries and departments.

Igor Stankevich (January 1995, Grozny)

In early December 1994, the commander of the regiment, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, and I arrived on official business at the headquarters of our 2nd Army, ”recalls Igor Stankevich, the former deputy commander of the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, who was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation for the January battles in Grozny. - In the midst of a meeting at the chief of staff of the association, General Krotov, a bell rang. Someone from high-ranking military leaders called. “That's right,” the general answered the subscriber to one of his questions, “the commander and deputy of the 81st regiment is just with me. I'll get the information to them right now."

After the general hung up the phone, he asked everyone present to leave. In a tete-a-tete atmosphere, it was announced to us that the regiment would soon receive a combat mission, that “we had to prepare.” The region of application is the North Caucasus. Everything else - later.

OUR REFERENCE. The 81st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment, the successor to the 210th Rifle Regiment, was formed in 1939. Combat biography began at Khalkhin Gol. During the Great Patriotic War, he participated in the defense of Moscow, liberated Orel, Lvov, cities of Eastern Europe from the Nazis. 30 servicemen of the regiment became Heroes of the Soviet Union. There are five orders on the Battle Banner of the unit - two Red Banners, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. After the war, he was stationed on the territory of the GDR. It is currently part of the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the Volga-Urals Military District, is part of the constant combat readiness.

In mid-1993, the 81st regiment, which was then part of the 90th tank division of the 2nd army, was withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces and deployed 40 kilometers from Samara, in the village of Chernorechye. And the regiment, and the division, and the army became part of the Volga Military District. At the time of arrival at the new place of deployment, not a single soldier remained in the regiment. With the conclusion, many officers and ensigns were also “confused”. Most issues, primarily organizational ones, had to be resolved by the remaining small backbone of the regiment.
By the fall of 1994, the 81st was staffed by the state of the so-called mobile forces. Then in the Armed Forces they just began to create such units. It was assumed that they could be deployed on the first command to any region of the country to solve various problems - from the aftermath of natural disasters to the repulse of an attack by gangs (the word "terrorism" was not yet in use).

With the special status given to the regiment, combat training became noticeably more active, and recruitment issues began to be resolved more efficiently. The officers began to allocate the first apartments in a residential town built at the expense of the German authorities in Chernorechye. In the same 94th year, the regiment successfully passed the inspection of the Ministry of Defense. For the first time after all the troubles associated with the withdrawal and arrangement in a new place, the 81st showed that it had become a full-blooded part of the Russian army, combat-ready, capable of performing any tasks.
True, this inspection did the regiment a disservice.

A number of servicemen, who received good training, were eager to serve in hot spots, in the same peacekeeping forces. Trained specialists were taken there with pleasure. As a result, about two hundred servicemen were transferred from the regiment in a short period. Moreover, the most popular specialties are drivers, gunners, snipers.

In the 81st, they believed that this was not a problem, the vacancies that had formed could be filled, new people could be trained ...

Echelons to the Caucasus

The 81st motorized rifle regiment of the PriVO, which was to go to war in December 1994, was quickly staffed with servicemen from 48 parts of the district. For all fees - a week. I had to select commanders. A third of the primary-level officers were "two-year students", having behind them only the military departments of civilian universities.

On December 14, military equipment began to be loaded onto the trains (in total, the regiment was transferred to Mozdok in five echelons). The mood of the people was not depressed. On the contrary, many were sure that it would be a short business trip, that they would be able to return by the New Year holidays.

Due to the lack of time, classes with personnel were organized even on the train, along the route of the echelons. The material part, the order of aiming, the combat regulations were studied, especially the sections relating to hostilities in the city.

Another week was given to the regiment for training already upon arrival in Mozdok. Shooting, coordinating units. And now, years later, it is clear: the regiment was not ready for combat operations. There was a shortage of personnel, especially in motorized rifle units.

About 200 paratroopers were given to the regiment as reinforcements. The same young, unfired soldiers. I had to learn to fight already under enemy fire ...

The enemy was not conditional ...

At the time of the beginning of the assault on Grozny, about 14,000 federal troops were concentrated around the Chechen capital. 164 tanks, 305 infantry fighting vehicles, 250 armored personnel carriers, 114 infantry fighting vehicles were ready to enter the city, blocked from the northeast, north, northwest and west. Fire support was provided by 208 guns and mortars.
In military equipment, the federals had an obvious superiority. However, in personnel, the advantage was not even up to two to one. The classical theory of battle requires the advancing advantage by about three times, and taking into account urban development, this figure should be even greater.

And what did Dudayev have at that time? According to data that later fell into the hands of our security forces, the size of the Chechen army reached 15 thousand people in regular troops and up to 30-40 thousand armed militias. The regular army units of Chechnya consisted of a tank regiment, a mountain rifle brigade, an artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, a Muslim fighter regiment, and 2 training aviation regiments. The republic had its own special forces - the national guard (about 2,000 people), a separate special forces regiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a border and customs service regiment of the state security department, as well as personal protection units of Chechen leaders.

Serious forces were represented by the formations of the so-called "confederation of the peoples of the Caucasus" - the "Borz" and "Warriors of the Righteous Caliphs" battalions of Aslan Maskhadov, the "Abd-el-Kader" battalion of Shamil Basayev, the "Islamic Renaissance Party" detachment of Salman Raduev, the "Islamic Community" detachment Khattab. In addition, more than five thousand mercenaries from 14 states fought on the side of Dudayev.

According to documents seized in 1995, Dudayev, in addition to regular forces, had at least 300 thousand (!) Reservists. The law “On the Defense of the Chechen Republic” adopted in the region on December 24, 1991 introduced compulsory military service for all male citizens from 19 to 26 years old. Naturally, the service took place in Chechnya, in local paramilitary formations. There was a system of regular collections of reserve reserves: in the period 1991-1994, six full-fledged mobilization exercises were held. Parts of the Chechen army were replenished even with deserters: on the basis of Dudayev's decree No. 29 of February 17, 1992, Chechen military personnel who arbitrarily left military units on the territory of the USSR and expressed a desire to serve in the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic were rehabilitated, and the criminal cases initiated against them were terminated.

Another Dudayev Decree No. 2 of November 8, 1991 established a military ministry in Chechnya. All military formations on the territory of the republic, along with equipment and weapons, passed to him. According to operational data, at the end of 1994 Chechnya had 2 launchers of operational-tactical missiles, 111 L-39 and 149 L-29 aircraft (training, but converted into light attack aircraft), 5 MiG-17 and MiG-15 fighters, 6 aircraft An-2, 243 aircraft missiles, 7 thousand air shells.

The Chechen "ground forces" were armed with 42 T-72 and T-62 tanks, 34 infantry fighting vehicles, 30 armored personnel carriers and armored personnel carriers, 18 Grad MLRS and more than 1000 shells for them, 139 artillery systems, including 30 122-mm D-ZO howitzers and 24 thousand shells for them. Dudayev's formations had 5 stationary and 88 portable air defense systems, as well as 25 anti-aircraft guns of various types, 590 anti-tank weapons, almost 50,000 small arms and 150,000 grenades.

For the defense of Grozny, the Chechen command created three defensive lines. The inner one had a radius of 1 to 1.5 km around the presidential palace. The defense here was based on the created solid nodes of resistance around the palace using capital stone buildings. The lower and upper floors of the buildings were adapted for firing small arms and anti-tank weapons. Along the avenues of Ordzhonikidze, Pobeda and Pervomaiskaya Street, prepared positions were created for direct fire with artillery and tanks.

The middle boundary was located at a distance of up to 1 km from the boundaries of the inner boundary in the northwestern part of the city and up to 5 km in its southwestern and southeastern parts. The basis of this frontier was made up of strongholds at the beginning of the Staropromyslovsky Highway, nodes of resistance near bridges across the Sunzha River, in the Minutka microdistrict, on Saykhanov Street. Oilfields, oil refineries named after Lenin and Sheripov, as well as a chemical plant were prepared for undermining or arson.

The outer border passed mainly along the outskirts of the city and consisted of strong points on the Grozny-Mozdok, Dolinsky-Katayama-Tashkala highways, Neftyanka, Khankala and Staraya Sunzha strong points in the east and Chernorechye in the south of the city.

"Virtual" topography

The troops practically did not have clear data about the enemy at the beginning of the assault, and there was also no reliable intelligence and intelligence information. There were no cards either. The deputy commander of the regiment had a hand-drawn diagram of where he was supposed to go approximately with his units. Later, the map nevertheless appeared: it was removed from our killed tank captain.

A few days before the assault, Anatoly Kvashnin set the tasks for the group commanders for actions in the city. The main task fell to the 81st regiment, which was supposed to operate as part of the North group under the command of Major General Konstantin Pulikovsky.

The regiment, which was partly concentrated on the southern slopes of the Tersky Range, and partly (by one battalion) was located in the area of ​​​​a dairy farm 5 km north of Alkhan-Churtsky, was assigned two tasks: the immediate and subsequent. The nearest one was planned to occupy the Severny airport by 10 am on December 31. The next - by 16 o'clock to take possession of the intersection of Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets.

The beginning of hostilities on December 31, as expected, was supposed to be a factor of surprise. That is why the columns of the federals were able to reach the city center almost without hindrance, and not, as was later stated, they fell into a prepared trap of bandits who intended to draw our columns into a kind of "fire bag". Only by the end of the day the militants were able to organize resistance. The Dudaevites concentrated all their efforts on the units that ended up in the city center. It was these troops who suffered the greatest losses ...

Encirclement, breakthrough ...

The chronology of the last day of 1994 has now been restored not only by the hour, but by the minute. At 7 am on December 31, the advance detachment of the 81st regiment, which included a reconnaissance company, attacked the Severny airport. With the advance detachment was the chief of staff of the 81st, Lieutenant Colonel Semyon Burlakov. By 9 o'clock, his group completed the immediate task, having captured the airport and cleared two bridges across the Neftyanka River on the way to the city.
Following the advance detachment, the 1st Motor Rifle Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel Eduard Perepelkin moved in a column. To the west, through the state farm "Rodina", was the 2nd MSB. Fighting vehicles moved in columns: tanks were ahead, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns were on the flanks.

From the Severny airport, the 81st MSP went to Khmelnitsky Street. At 0917, motorized riflemen met the first enemy forces here: an ambush from the Dudayev detachment with attached tanks, an armored personnel carrier and two Urals. The reconnaissance entered the battle. The militants managed to knock out a tank and one of the Urals, but the scouts also lost one BMP and several people were wounded. The regiment commander, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, decided to delay reconnaissance to the main forces and stop the advance for a while.

Then the advance resumed. Already by 11.00 the columns of the 81st regiment reached Mayakovsky Street. The advance of the previously approved schedule was almost 5 hours. Yaroslavtsev reported this to the command and received an order to move to block the presidential palace, to the city center. The regiment began advancing to Dzerzhinsky Square. By 12.30, the advanced units were already near the station, and the headquarters of the group confirmed the previously given order to surround the presidential palace. At 13.00 the main forces of the regiment passed the station and along Ordzhonikidze Street rushed to the complex of government buildings.

But the Dudaevites gradually came to their senses. From their side began a powerful fire resistance. A fierce battle broke out at the palace. Here, the advanced aircraft controller, Captain Kiryanov, covered the regiment commander with himself. Colonel Yaroslavtsev was wounded and handed over command to the chief of staff of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov.

At 16.10, the chief of staff received confirmation of the task of blockading the palace. But the motorized riflemen were given the most severe fire resistance. Dudayev's grenade launchers, dispersed throughout the buildings in the city center, began to shoot our combat vehicles literally point-blank. The columns of the regiment began to gradually break up into separate groups. By 5 p.m., Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov was also wounded, and about a hundred soldiers and sergeants were out of action. The intensity of the fire impact can be judged by at least one fact: only from 18.30 to 18.40, that is, in just 10 minutes, the militants knocked out 3 tanks of the 81st regiment at once!

Units of the 81st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade that broke into the city were surrounded. The Dudaevites unleashed a flurry of fire on them. The fighters under the cover of the BMP took up all-round defense. The main part of the personnel and equipment was concentrated on the forecourt, in the station itself and in the surrounding buildings. The 1st MSB of the 81st Regiment was located in the station building, the 2nd MSB - at the station's goods yard.

The 1st MSR under the command of Captain Bezrutsky occupied the building of the road administration. The infantry fighting vehicles of the company were placed in the yard, at the gates and on the exit tracks to the railway track. At dusk, the onslaught of the enemy intensified. Losses increased Especially in the equipment, which was very tight, sometimes literally caterpillar to caterpillar. The initiative passed into the hands of the enemy.

Relative calm came only at 23.00. At night, the shooting continued, and in the morning the commander of the 131st brigade, Colonel Savin, asked for permission from the higher command to leave the station. A breakthrough was approved to the Lenin Park, where units of the 693rd MSP of the West group were defending. At 15:00 on January 1, the remnants of units of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 81st Motorized Rifle Brigade began to break through from the railway station and the goods station. Under the incessant fire of the Dudayevites, the columns suffered losses and gradually disintegrated.

28 people from the 1st MSR of the 81st MSR broke through on three infantry fighting vehicles along the railway. Having reached the House of Printing, the motorized riflemen got lost in the dark unfamiliar streets and were ambushed by militants. As a result, two BMPs were shot down. Only one vehicle under the command of Captain Arkhangelov made it to the location of the federal troops.

... Today it is known that only a small part of the people left the encirclement from the units of the 81st SME and 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, which were at the forefront of the main attack. The personnel lost their commanders, equipment (only in one day on December 31, the 81st regiment lost 13 tanks and 7 infantry fighting vehicles), dispersed around the city and went out to their own - one at a time or in small groups. According to official data, on January 10, 1995, the 81st SME lost 63 servicemen in Grozny killed, 75 missing, 135 wounded ...

Let the mother of the enemy cry first

The consolidated detachment of the 81st SME, formed from units that remained outside the "station" ring, managed to gain a foothold at the intersection of Bogdan Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets. The command of the detachment was taken over by the deputy commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Igor Stankevich. For two days, his group, being in a semi-encirclement, remaining in fact on a bare and shot through place - the intersection of two main city streets, held this strategically important area.

Stankevich competently placed 9 infantry fighting vehicles, organized the "binding" of the fire of attached mortars in the most threatening areas. When organizing the defense, non-standard measures were taken. Steel gates were removed from the surrounding Grozny courtyards and covered with them on the sides and front of the combat vehicles. The "know-how" turned out to be successful: the RPG shot "slid" along the sheet of metal without hitting the car. People after the bloody New Year's Eve gradually began to recover. The fighters who escaped from the encirclement were gradually drawn into the detachment. They settled down as best they could, organized rest in the interval between enemy attacks.

Neither on December 31, nor on January 1, nor in the following days did the 81st Regiment leave the cities, remained at the forefront and continued to participate in hostilities. The battles in Grozny were led by Igor Stankevich's detachment, as well as the 4th motorized rifle company of Captain Yarovitsky, who was in the hospital complex.

For the first two days, there were virtually no other organized forces in the center of Grozny. There was another small group from the headquarters of General Rokhlin, it kept nearby. If the bandits knew this for sure, they would certainly have thrown all their reserves to crush a handful of daredevils. The bandits would have destroyed them in the same way as those units that were in the ring of fire in the station area.

But the detachment was not going to surrender to the mercy of the enemy. The surrounding courtyards were promptly cleared, and possible positions of enemy grenade launchers were eliminated. Here, the motorized riflemen began to discover the brutal truth about what the city they entered really was.

Thus, equipped openings were found in the brick fences and walls of most houses at the Khmelnitsky-Mayakovsky intersection, near which shots for grenade launchers were stored. Carefully prepared bottles with "Molotov cocktails" - an incendiary mixture - stood in the yards. And in one of the garages, dozens of empty boxes from grenade launchers were found: apparently, one of the supply points was located here.

Already on January 3, checkpoints began to be set up along Lermontov Street in cooperation with the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The posts allowed at least to slip along Lermontov Street, otherwise everything was shot on the go.
The regiment survived. He survived in spite of those who tried to destroy him in Grozny. He rose from the ashes in spite of those who at that time in absentia "buried" him and other Russian units that were at the epicenter of the Grozny battles.
For almost the whole of January, "shot", "torn apart" by evil tongues, the 81st regiment participated in the battles for Grozny. Again, very few people know about this. It was the tankers of the 81st who provided support for the marines storming Dudayev's palace. It was the infantry of the regiment that captured the Krasny Molot plant, which the Dudayevites turned from a peaceful Soviet enterprise into a full-scale arms production. Engineer and sapper units of the unit cleared the bridge across the Sunzha, through which fresh forces were then drawn into the city. Units of the 81st took part in the assault on the Press House, which was one of the strongholds of the separatist resistance.

I pay tribute to all the comrades with whom we fought together in those days, - says Igor Stankevich. - These are the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were led by General Vorobyov, who later died heroically in Grozny. These are detachments of internal troops, and groups of special forces of the GRU. These are employees of the special services, whose work, probably, cannot be said much today. Courageous, heroic people, brilliant professionals that any country would be proud of. And I am proud that I was with them on that front line.

Heroes become

The author of these lines in the first days of January had a chance to visit the warring Grozny, just at the location of the 81st regiment, which had just relocated to the territory of the canning factory, having strengthened the checkpoint at the Khmelnitsky-Mayakovsky crossroads. A journalistic notebook is full of notes: the names of people who heroically proved themselves in battles, numerous examples of courage and courage. For these soldiers and officers, it was just a job. None of them dared to call what happened on December 31 a tragedy.
Here are just some of the facts:
“... Senior Warrant Officer Grigory Kirichenko. Under enemy fire, he made several walkers to the epicenter of the battle, taking out the wounded soldiers in the compartments of the BMP, behind the levers of which he himself was sitting, to the evacuation center. (Later awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation).

"...Senior Lieutenant Seldar Mamedorazov ("non-combat" of the chief of the club) broke through on one of the BMPs to the battle area, took out several wounded servicemen."

“...Major of the medical service Oleg Pastushenko. In battle, he provided assistance to personnel.
“... The commander of the tank battalion, Major Yuri Zakhryapin. Heroically acted in battle, personally hit enemy firing points.

And also the names of the soldiers, officers, meetings with which then, on that Grozny front line, remained at least an entry in the field notebook. As a maximum - a memory for life. Majors of the Medical Service Vladimir Sinkevich, Sergei Danilov, Viktor Minaev, Vyacheslav Antonov, Captains Alexander Fomin, Vladimir Nazarenko, Igor Voznyuk, Lieutenant Vitaly Afanasiev, Ensigns of the Medical Service Lidia Andryukhina, Lyudmila Spivakova, Junior Sergeant Alexander Litvinov, Privates Alik Salikhanov, Vladimir Ishcherikov, Alexander Vladimirov, Andrey Savchenko... Where are you now, those young front-line soldiers of the 90s, soldiers and officers of the heroic, illustrious regiment? Warriors scorched in battles, but not burned to the ground, but survived in this hellish flame to spite all deaths of the 81st Guards? ..

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