The war in Chechnya is a black page in the history of Russia. Battles for Grozny (1996) Losses of federal forces

25 years ago, on December 11, 1994, the First Chechen War began. With the issuance of the decree of the President of Russia "On measures to ensure the rule of law, law and order and public security on the territory of the Chechen Republic," the Russian forces of the regular army entered the territory of Chechnya. The reference of the "Caucasian Knot" presents a chronicle of the events that preceded the start of the war, and describes the course of hostilities up to the "New Year's" assault on Grozny on December 31, 1994.

The First Chechen War lasted from December 1994 to August 1996. According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1994-1995, a total of about 26 thousand people died in Chechnya, including 2 thousand people - Russian military personnel, 10-15 thousand - militants, and the rest of the losses - civilians. According to General A. Lebed's estimates, the number of deaths among civilians alone amounted to 70-80 thousand people and military personnel of the federal troops - 6-7 thousand people.

Chechnya's exit from Moscow's control

The turn of the 1980-1990s in the post-Soviet space was marked by a "parade of sovereignties" - the Soviet republics of various levels (both SSR and ASSR) adopted declarations of state sovereignty one after another. On June 12, 1990, the first Republican Congress of People's Deputies adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. On August 6, Boris Yeltsin uttered his famous phrase in Ufa: "Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow."

On November 23-25, 1990, the Chechen National Congress was held in Grozny, which elected the Executive Committee (subsequently transformed into the Executive Committee of the National Congress of the Chechen People (OKCHN). Major General Dzhokhar Dudayev became its chairman. The Congress adopted a declaration on the formation of the Chechen Republic Nokhchi-Cho A few days later, on November 27, 1990, the Supreme Council of the Republic adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty.Later, in July 1991, the second congress of the OKChN announced the withdrawal of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho from the USSR and the RSFSR.

During the August putsch of 1991, the Chechen-Ingush Republican Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet and the government of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In turn, the OKChN, which was in opposition, opposed the GKChP and demanded the resignation of the government and secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. Ultimately, a political split occurred in the republic between the supporters of the OKChN (Dzhokhar Dudayev) and the Supreme Council (Zavgaev).

On November 1, 1991, the elected President of Chechnya, D. Dudayev, issued a decree "On declaring the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic." In response to this, on November 8, 1991, B.N. Yeltsin signed a decree on the introduction of a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia, but practical measures to implement it failed - two planes with special forces that landed at the airfield in Khankala were blocked by supporters of independence. On November 10, 1991, the OKCHN executive committee called for breaking off relations with Russia.

As early as November 1991, supporters of D. Dudayev began seizing military towns, weapons and property of the Armed Forces and Internal Troops on the territory of the Chechen Republic. On November 27, 1991, D. Dudayev issued a decree on the nationalization of weapons and equipment of military units located on the territory of the republic. By June 8, 1992, all federal troops left the territory of Chechnya, leaving a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition.

In the autumn of 1992, the situation in the region sharply worsened again, this time due to the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the Prigorodny district. Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the neutrality of Chechnya, however, during the escalation of the conflict, Russian troops entered the administrative border of Chechnya. On November 10, 1992, Dudayev declared a state of emergency, the creation of a mobilization system and self-defense forces of the Chechen Republic began.

In February 1993, disagreements between the Chechen parliament and D. Dudayev escalated. The disagreements that emerged eventually led to the dispersal of the parliament and the consolidation of Chechen opposition politicians around Umar Avturkhanov, who became the head of the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic. The contradictions between the structures of Dudayev and Avturkhanov escalated into an assault on Grozny by the Chechen opposition.

After an unsuccessful assault, the Security Council of the Russian Federation decided on a military operation against Chechnya. BN Yeltsin issued an ultimatum: either the bloodshed in Chechnya would stop, or Russia would be forced to "go to extreme measures."

Preparing for war

Active hostilities on the territory of Chechnya were conducted from the end of September 1994. In particular, opposition forces carried out pinpoint bombardments of military facilities on the territory of the republic. The armed formations that opposed Dudayev were armed with Mi-24 attack helicopters and Su-24 attack aircraft, which did not have identification marks. According to some reports, Mozdok became the base for the deployment of aviation. However, the press service of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the headquarters of the North Caucasian Military District, the Air Force Command and the Army Aviation Command of the Ground Forces categorically denied that the helicopters and attack aircraft bombing Chechnya belonged to the Russian army.

On November 30, 1994, President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin signed a secret decree No. 2137s "On measures to restore constitutional law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic", which provided for "disarmament and liquidation of armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic" .

According to the text of the decree, from December 1, it was ordered, in particular, "to carry out measures to restore constitutional law and order in the Chechen Republic", to begin disarmament and liquidation of armed formations, to organize negotiations to resolve the armed conflict on the territory of the Chechen Republic by peaceful means.

On November 30, 1994, P. Grachev announced that "an operation has begun to forcibly transfer to the central regions of Russia officers of the Russian army who are fighting against Dudayev on the side of the opposition." On the same day, in a telephone conversation between the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation and Dudayev, an agreement was reached on "the inviolability of Russian citizens captured in Chechnya."

On December 8, 1994, a closed meeting of the State Duma of the Russian Federation took place regarding the Chechen events. The meeting adopted a resolution "On the Situation in the Chechen Republic and Measures for Its Political Settlement", according to which the activity of the executive branch in resolving the conflict was recognized as unsatisfactory. A group of deputies sent a telegram to B.N. Yeltsin, in which they warned him of responsibility for the bloodshed in Chechnya and demanded a public explanation of their position.

On December 9, 1994, the President of the Russian Federation issued Decree No. 2166 "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict." By this decree, the president instructed the Russian government "to use all the means available to the state to ensure state security, the rule of law, the rights and freedoms of citizens, the protection of public order, the fight against crime, and the disarmament of all illegal armed formations." On the same day, the government of the Russian Federation adopted Decree No. 1360 "On ensuring the state security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, the rule of law, the rights and freedoms of citizens, the disarmament of illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic and adjacent regions of the North Caucasus", which assigned a number of ministries and departments the obligation to introduce and maintain a special regime similar to the state of emergency on the territory of Chechnya, without a formal declaration of a state of emergency or martial law.

The documents adopted on December 9 provided for the use of the troops of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the concentration of which continued on the administrative borders of Chechnya. Meanwhile, on December 12, negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides were to begin in Vladikavkaz.

The beginning of a full-scale military campaign

On December 11, 1994, Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On measures to ensure the rule of law, law and order and social activities on the territory of the Chechen Republic", repealing Decree No. 2137c. On the same day, the president addressed the citizens of Russia, in which, in particular, he stated: "Our goal is to find a political solution to the problems of one of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation - the Chechen Republic - to protect its citizens from armed extremism."

On the day the decree was signed, units of the troops of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops advanced in three columns from three directions: Mozdok (from the north through the regions of Chechnya controlled by the anti-Dudaev opposition), Vladikavkaz (from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia) and Kizlyar (from the east, from the territory of Dagestan).

On the same day, December 11, an anti-war rally organized by the Russia's Choice party took place in Moscow. Yegor Gaidar and Grigory Yavlinsky demanded to stop the movement of troops, announced a break with the policy of Boris Yeltsin. A few days later, the communists also came out against the war.

Troops moving from the north passed unhindered through Chechnya to settlements located about 10 kilometers north of Grozny, where they first encountered armed resistance. Here, near the village of Dolinsky, on December 12, Russian troops were fired from the Grad installation by a detachment of field commander Vakha Arsanov. As a result of the shelling, 6 Russian servicemen were killed and 12 wounded, more than 10 armored vehicles were burned. The "Grad" installation was destroyed by return fire.

On the line Dolinsky - the village of Pervomaiskaya, Russian troops stopped and established fortifications. Mutual shelling began. During December 1994, as a result of the shelling of settlements by Russian troops, numerous victims appeared among civilians.

Another column of Russian troops, moving from Dagestan, was stopped on December 11 before crossing the border with Chechnya, in the Khasavyurt region, where Akkin Chechens live mainly. Crowds of local residents blocked the columns of troops, while individual groups of servicemen were captured and then transferred to Grozny.

A column of Russian troops moving from the west through Ingushetia was blocked by local residents and fired upon near the village of Varsuki (Ingushetia). Three APCs and four vehicles were damaged. As a result of return fire, the first civilian casualties appeared. Helicopters fired on the Ingush village of Gazi-Yurt. Using force, Russian troops passed through the territory of Ingushetia. On December 12, this column of federal troops was fired upon from the direction of the village of Assinovskaya in Chechnya. Among the Russian servicemen were killed and wounded, in response, fire was also opened on the village, which led to the death of local residents. Near the village of Novy Sharoy, a crowd of residents of nearby villages blocked the road. The further advance of the Russian troops would have led to the need to shoot at unarmed people, and then to clashes with the militia detachment organized in each of the villages. These detachments were armed with machine guns, machine guns and grenade launchers. In the area located south of the village of Bamut, regular armed formations of the ChRI were based, which had heavy weapons.

As a result, in the west of Chechnya, federal forces entrenched themselves along the line of the conditional border of the Chechen Republic in front of the villages of Samashki - Davydenko - Novy Sharoy - Achkhoy-Martan - Bamut.

On December 15, 1994, against the backdrop of the first setbacks in Chechnya, Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev removed from command and control a group of senior officers who refused to send troops into Chechnya and expressed a desire "before the start of a major military operation that could entail great casualties among the peaceful of the population", receive a written order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The leadership of the operation was entrusted to the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Colonel-General A. Mityukhin.

On December 16, 1994, the Federation Council adopted a resolution in which it proposed that the President of the Russian Federation immediately stop hostilities and the advancement of troops and enter into negotiations. On the same day, Prime Minister of Russia V.S. Chernomyrdin announced his readiness to personally meet with Dzhokhar Dudayev, subject to the disarmament of his formations.

On December 17, 1994, Yeltsin sent a telegram to D. Dudayev, in which the latter was ordered to appear in Mozdok to the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Minister for Nationalities and Regional Policy N.D. Egorov and FSB Director S.V. Stepashin and sign the document for the surrender of weapons and a ceasefire. The text of the telegram, in particular, literally read: "I suggest that you meet without delay with my authorized representatives Egorov and Stepashin in Mozdok." At the same time, the President of the Russian Federation issued Decree No. 2200 "On the Restoration of Federal Territorial Bodies of Executive Power on the Territory of the Chechen Republic."

Siege and assault on Grozny

Starting from December 18, rocket and bomb strikes were repeatedly carried out on Grozny. Bombs and rockets fell mainly on the quarters where residential buildings were located and obviously there were no military installations. As a result, there were great casualties among the civilian population. Despite the statement of the President of Russia on December 27 to stop the bombing of the city, aviation continued to strike at Grozny.

In the second half of December, Russian federal troops advanced on Grozny from the north and west, leaving the southwestern, southern, and southeastern directions practically unblocked. The remaining open corridors connecting Grozny and numerous villages in Chechnya with the outside world allowed the civilian population to leave the zone of shelling, bombing and fighting.

On the night of December 23, federal troops attempted to cut off Grozny from Argun and entrenched themselves in the area of ​​the airport in Khankala, southeast of Grozny.

On December 26, the bombing of settlements in the countryside began: in the next three days alone, about 40 villages were hit.

On December 26, the creation of a government of the national revival of the Chechen Republic headed by S. Khadzhiev was announced for the second time and the readiness of the new government to discuss the issue of creating a confederation with Russia and enter into negotiations with it without putting forward a demand for the withdrawal of troops.

On the same day, at a meeting of the Security Council of Russia, a decision was made to send troops to Grozny. Prior to this, there were no concrete plans for taking the capital of Chechnya.

On December 27, Boris N. Yeltsin made an address on television to the citizens of Russia, in which he explained the need for a forceful solution to the Chechen problem. BN Yeltsin stated that ND Egorov, AV Kvashnin and SV Stepashin were entrusted with negotiating with the Chechen side. On December 28, Sergei Stepashin clarified that it was not about negotiations, but about presenting an ultimatum.

On December 31, 1994, the assault on Grozny began by parts of the Russian army. It was planned to deliver "powerful concentric strikes" by four groups and link up in the city center. For a variety of reasons, the troops immediately suffered heavy losses. The 131st (Maikop) separate motorized rifle brigade and the 81st (Samara) motorized rifle regiment advancing from the north-western direction under the command of General K.B. Pulikovsky were almost completely defeated. More than 100 soldiers were taken prisoner.

As deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation L.A. Ponomarev, G.P. Yakunin and V.L. Sheinis stated that “a large-scale military action was unleashed in Grozny and its environs. On December 31, after fierce bombing and shelling, about 250 units of armored vehicles. Dozens of them broke into the center of the city. The defenders of Grozny cut the armored columns into pieces and began to systematically destroy them. Their crews were killed, captured or scattered around the city. The troops that entered the city suffered a crushing defeat."

The head of the press service of the Russian government admitted that the Russian army suffered losses in manpower and equipment during the New Year offensive on Grozny.

On January 2, 1995, the press service of the Russian government reported that the center of the Chechen capital was "completely controlled by federal troops" and that the "presidential palace" was blocked.

The war in Chechnya continued until August 31, 1996. It was accompanied by terrorist acts outside Chechnya (Budennovsk, Kizlyar). The actual result of the campaign was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements on August 31, 1996. The agreement was signed by Alexander Lebed, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, and Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of Staff of the Chechen rebels. As a result of the Khasavyurt agreements, decisions were made on a "postponed status" (the question of the status of Chechnya had to be resolved by December 31, 2001). Chechnya became a de facto independent state.

Notes

1. Chechnya: old turmoil // Izvestia, 11/27/1995.
2. How many died in Chechnya // Arguments and Facts, 1996.
3. The assault that never happened // Radio Liberty, 10/17/2014.
4. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to restore constitutional legality and law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic".
5. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
6. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On Measures to Suppress the Activities of Illegal Armed Groups on the Territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Zone of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict".
7. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
8. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
9. 1994: War in Chechnya // General newspaper, 12/18.04.2001.
10. 20 years of the Chechen war // Gazeta.ru, 12/11/2014.
11. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
12. Grozny: New Year's Eve's bloody snow // Independent Military Review, 12/10/2004.
13. Chronicle of the armed conflict // HRC "Memorial".
14. The signing of the Khasavyurt agreements in 1996 // RIA Novosti, 08/31/2011.

Exactly 23 years ago, on December 11, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On Measures to Ensure Law, Law and Order and Public Security on the Territory of the Chechen Republic." On the same day, units of the Joint Group of Forces (Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs) began hostilities in Chechnya. Maybe some of the participants in the first clashes were mentally prepared for death, but hardly any of them suspected that they would get stuck in this war for almost two years. And then it will come back again.

I would not like to talk about the causes and consequences of the war, about the behavior of the main actors, about the number of casualties, about whether it was a civil war or an anti-terrorist operation: hundreds of books have already been written about this. But many photographs must be shown so that you never forget how disgusting any war is.

Russian Mi-8 helicopter shot down by Chechens near Grozny. December 1, 1994


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Despite the fact that the Russian army officially began hostilities in December 1994, back in November, the first Russian soldiers were captured by the Chechens.


Photo: AP Photo / Anatoly Maltsev

Dudayev's militants pray in front of the Presidential Palace in Grozny


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

In January 1995, the palace looked like this:


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Dudayev's militant with a handicraft submachine gun in early January 1995. In Chechnya in those years, various types of weapons were collected, including small arms.

Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Padded BMP-2 of the Russian army


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Prayer against the backdrop of a fire caused by shrapnel falling into a gas pipe

Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Action


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Field commander Shamil Basayev rides in a bus with hostages


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Chechen fighters ambushed a column of Russian armored vehicles


Photo: AP PHOTO / ROBERT KING

On the eve of the new year 1995, the clashes in Grozny were especially cruel. The 131st Maykop motorized rifle brigade lost many soldiers.

The militants fire back from the advancing Russian units.


Photo: AP PHOTO / PETER DEJONG

Children play in the suburbs of Grozny


AP PHOTO / EFREM LUKATSKY

Chechen fighters in 1995


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev / AFP

Photo: Christopher Morris

Minutka Square in Grozny. Evacuation of refugees.

Gennady Troshev at the stadium. Ordzhonikidze in 1995. The lieutenant general led the Joint Group of Forces of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, during the Second Chechen War he also commanded Russian troops, then was appointed commander of the North Caucasus Military District. In 2008, he died in a Boeing crash in Perm.

A Russian serviceman plays a piano left in Grozny's central park. February 6, 1995


Photo: Reuters

Intersection of Rosa Luxembourg and Tamanskaya streets


Photo: Christopher Morris

Chechen fighters run for cover


Photo: Christopher Morris

Grozny, view from the Presidential Palace. March 1995


Photo: Christopher Morris

A Chechen sniper who has settled in a destroyed building is aiming at Russian servicemen. 1996


Photo: James Nachtwey

Chechen negotiator enters the neutral zone


Photo: James Nachtwey

Children from the orphanage play on a damaged Russian tank. 1996


Photo: James Nachtwey

An elderly woman makes her way through the ruined center of Grozny. 1996


Photo: Piotr Andrews

Chechen militant holding a machine gun while praying


Photo: Piotr Andrews

A wounded soldier in a hospital in Grozny. 1995


Photo: Piotr Andrews

A woman from the village of Samashki is crying: during the operation of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, helicopters or RZSO shot her cows.


Photo: Piotr Andrews

Russian checkpoint near the Council of Ministers, 1995


Photo: AP Photo

People left homeless after the bombing of Grozny cook on a fire in the middle of the street


Photo: AP Photo / Alexander Zemlianichenko

People are fleeing the war zone


Photo: AP Photo / David Brauchli

The CRI command stated that at the height of the conflict, up to 12 thousand fighters fought for it. Many of them were in fact children who went to war after their relatives.


Photo: AP Photo / Efrem Lukatsky

On the left is a wounded man, on the right is a Chechen teenager in military uniform


Photo: Christopher Morris

By the end of 1995, most of Grozny was a ruin


Photo: AP Photo / Mindaugas Kulbis

Anti-Russian demonstration in the center of Grozny in February 1996


Photo: AP Photo

A Chechen with a portrait of separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, who was killed in a rocket attack on federal troops on April 21, 1996


Photo: AP Photo

Before the 1996 elections, Yeltsin visited Chechnya and in front of the soldiers signed a decree on the reduction of military service.


Photo: AP Photo

Election campaign


Photo: Piotr Andrews

On August 19, 1996, the commander of the grouping of Russian troops in Chechnya, Konstantin Pulikovsky, issued an ultimatum to the militants. He suggested that civilians leave Grozny within 48 hours. After this period, the assault on the city was to begin, but the commander was not supported in Moscow, and his plan was thwarted.

On August 31, 1996, agreements were signed in Khasavyurt under which Russia undertook to withdraw troops from the territory of Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed for 5 and a half years. In the photo, General Lebed, who was then the presidential envoy in Chechnya, and Aslan Maskhadov, field commander of Chechen fighters and the future "president" of the CRI, are shaking hands.

Russian soldiers drink champagne in the center of Grozny

Russian soldiers are preparing to be sent home after the signing of the Khasavyurt Accords

According to human rights activists, up to 35,000 civilians died during the First Chechen War.


Photo: AP PHOTO / ROBERT KING

In Chechnya, the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements was perceived as a victory. In fact, that's what she was.


Photo: AP Photo / Misha Japaridze

The Russian troops left with nothing, losing many soldiers and leaving ruins behind them.

In 1999, the Second Chechen War will begin ...

And the Russian Empire

Fights for Grozny (1996)- the assault on Grozny by detachments of Chechen fighters in August 1996, during which the units of the Armed Forces of Russia located in the city fought heavy battles in Grozny, losing control over most of the city. Chechen detachments attacked simultaneously with Grozny and other largest cities of the republic - Argun and Gudermes. Moreover, if in Argun the federal forces managed to hold only the building of the commandant's office and the territory of the plant, where the 303rd Separate Battalion of the 101st brigade was located, then Gudermes was surrendered by them without a fight at all. After that, the Khasavyurt agreements were concluded between representatives of the Russian Federation and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, which put an end to the first Chechen war.

The number of militants

The total payroll of the units that entered the Chechen capital, according to one source, was only 850 people (according to Maskhadov); according to others - 1.5-2 thousand fighters. The general leadership was carried out by Aslan Maskhadov, who stated that this operation was undertaken in order "to show the whole world and, above all, Russia, the combat potential of the separatists."

Tactics

The accumulation of militants in the suburbs of Grozny began long before August, some of them penetrated the city under the guise of civilians and refugees.

On August 6, at 5:00 am, Chechen detachments began to enter Grozny from Chernorechye, Alda and the Staropromyslovsky district and, skillfully using the shortcomings in the location of checkpoints (many were squeezed between houses, not really controlling anything), began to move along uncontrolled routes. Previously, units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of Chechens, were withdrawn from the city, and Chechen checkpoints were also removed. The enemy did not aim to capture or destroy all urban facilities. Entering Grozny, he blocked the Russian units of internal troops at checkpoints and commandant's offices, isolating them from each other and demoralizing them with constant "harassing" fire. Russian media (TV channel Rossiya) reported as of 12:00 on August 6 about 5 helicopters of federal forces shot down in the first half of the day.

The main blow was dealt to a complex of administrative buildings in the city center (Government House, Ministry of Internal Affairs, FSB, etc.), where, along with the military, several Russian journalists were also blocked. Journalists were not ready for such events, they were scared and lost heart. They were placed in the Coordination Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the basement of a bomb shelter located next to the hotel building (the area of ​​​​the Dynamo stadium, where the most intense battles were fought), a sign “journalists, women and children” was hung over the entrance.

General Pulikovsky ordered assault troops to enter the city to break through the encirclement. But the militants put up fierce resistance - only one of the three detachments broke through. The situation of those surrounded was extremely difficult. Losses grew. But by August 13, according to General G. N. Troshev, then commander of the 58th Army, the situation was rectified - only five of all the encircled checkpoints were not unblocked. The militants themselves suffered heavy losses. The daring but adventurous operation of Maskhadov failed - the huge forces he had drawn to Grozny themselves found themselves in the ring of Russian troops.

“This was the latest attempt by the militants to make themselves known,” Shamanov would later say to Pulikovsky, who then surrounded Grozny with a dead ring. Pulikovsky was resolute (given that on December 14, 1995, his son died near Shatoi) and wanted to destroy the last forces of the Dudayevites in this cauldron.

The militants were given an ultimatum - to surrender within 48 hours, otherwise Pulikovsky promised to inflict a powerful blow on the city, using heavy artillery and aircraft. The population was given a corridor to exit through Staraya Sunzha. This decision was condemned by a number of Russian publicists, in particular the historian Boris Sokolov, who argued in his book "100 Great Wars" that this would have destroyed not only the militants, but also the surrounded Russian soldiers and civilians who were not able to leave the city so quickly. Troshev noted that “the bandits did not doubt the determination of General Pulikovsky, his words really frightened many field commanders who immediately arrived for negotiations. release. Either surrender, or you will be destroyed! A. Maskhadov could not hide his dismay."

Gennady Troshev describes what followed as follows:

On August 20, in the evening, Lieutenant General V. Tikhomirov returned from a short vacation, who again headed the Joint Group of Forces. He told the press that he sees his main task in this post in the complete liberation of the city from militants: "For this we are ready to use all means: both political and force." He also stressed: "I have not yet canceled Pulikovsky's ultimatum, but I can say unequivocally that the most serious measures will be taken against the separatists if they do not leave Grozny."

The militants, as they themselves later admitted in conversations, were in a hopeless situation, they had no reinforcements and were running out of ammunition.

And here the newly-made Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed appeared on the military-political arena, endowed with the same authority as the representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic. Alexander Ivanovich arrived at the moment when, in fact, the fate of the entire Chechen campaign was being decided.

The militants considered this a manifestation of the "Will of Allah". Lebed immediately canceled Pulikovsky's order. He stated that the army was demoralized and unable to fight. Troshev expresses the following opinion:

Well, you saw a murky fighter, moreover, he was shy in front of a high Moscow official. Is he an indicator of combat capability? Alexander Ivanovich, apparently, expected to see a washed and polished guardsman, as in the Kremlin company of the guard of honor ... Yes, I (general!) Sometimes in a war I didn’t wash or shave for several days. It was not always possible, and most importantly - once. You can't even eat. And what do I look like after that? The Moscow patrol would have arrested! I would not believe that the general is some kind of homeless person ... And there is nothing surprising here. War is a dirty business, in the literal sense of the word ...

Lebed wanted the momentary glory of the "peacemaker". Here, they say, no one can solve the problem of Chechnya for almost two years, but he can. In one fell swoop, with one stroke of the pen, with just one look and a Bonapartist swoop. We are all in shit, and he is in white. For the sake of exorbitant ambition, for the sake of creating the image of the “savior of the nation”, he betrayed the warring army, betrayed the fallen in battles and their relatives and friends, betrayed millions of people who were waiting for protection from the state against the lawlessness of bandits ...

Pulikovsky and Tikhomirov tried to defend their position, but to no avail. The oligarch Boris Berezovsky and Alexander Lebed, who came with him, insisted on starting another peace talks with the Chechen forces, which ended on August 31 with the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements.

Losses of federal forces

August 10, 1996 in Russia was declared a day of mourning "in connection with the tragic consequences of the terrorist action against state institutions and residents of the city of Grozny".

Results

Gennady Troshev wrote about the consequences of this operation:

Perhaps never before in Russia have generals been so disenfranchised and helpless in a war because of the pressure of civilians full of amateurs in military matters. The profanation of the Chechen campaign has reached its climax. The militants could not be killed this time either. A few days after his arrival, Lebed signed an agreement with A. Maskhadov in Khasavyurt "On urgent measures to cease fire and hostilities in Grozny and on the territory of the Chechen Republic", which in essence was nothing more than a propaganda bluff and which immediately became rude violate the Chechen side.

And if you evaluate the moral side of the matter, then you won’t find the right words here. Because in Chechnya, a fighter was grimy only on top, but inside he was clean. He realized himself as a defender of the unity and dignity of the Motherland, his enemies were afraid, he beat them near Shatoy, near Bamut, near Shali, in Grozny ... He could hold his grubby nose high with pride. And after fleeing from Chechnya (under the lash of Lebed and Berezovsky) I felt spat on and disgraced. The whole world laughed at him. “Tiny Chechnya defeated great Russia!” - that's what the rumor went around the world. Thanks to the "compassionate general" - he "washed" the soldier (literally and figuratively)! I washed it so much that we still can’t get rid of it!

According to the general, if then it was possible to destroy the militants of the Second Chechen War, "criminal lawlessness in Chechnya",

The first Chechen war 1994-1996: briefly about the causes, events and results. The Chechen wars claimed many lives.

But what caused the conflict in the first place? What happened in those years in the restless southern regions?

Causes of the Chechen conflict

After the collapse of the USSR, General Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. In his hands were large stocks of weapons and property of the Soviet state.

The main goal of the general was the creation of an independent republic of Ichkeria. The means that were used to achieve this goal were not entirely loyal.

The regime established by Dudayev was declared illegal by the federal authorities. Therefore, they considered it their duty to intervene. The struggle for spheres of influence became the main cause of the conflict.

Other reasons coming from the main:

• Chechnya's desire to secede from Russia;
• Dudayev's desire to create a separate Islamic state;
• dissatisfaction of the Chechens with the invasion of Russian troops;
• the source of income for the new government was the slave trade, drug trafficking and oil from the Russian pipeline passing through Chechnya.

The government sought to regain power over the Caucasus and regain lost control.

Chronicle of the first Chechen war

The first Chechen campaign began on December 11, 1994. It lasted almost 2 years.

It was a confrontation between federal troops and the forces of an unrecognized state.

1. December 11, 1994 - the entry of Russian troops. The Russian army advanced from 3 sides. One of the groupings approached the settlements not far from Grozny the very next day.
2. December 31, 1994 - assault on Grozny. The fighting began a few hours before the New Year. But at first luck was not on the side of the Russians. The first assault failed. There were many reasons: the poor preparedness of the Russian army, lack of coordination, lack of coordination, the presence of old maps and photographs of the city. But attempts to take the city continued. Grozny came under full Russian control only on March 6th.
3. Events from April 1995 to 1996 After the capture of Grozny, it was gradually possible to establish control over most of the flat territories. In mid-June 1995, a decision was made to postpone hostilities. However, it has been violated many times. At the end of 1995, elections were held in Chechnya, which were won by a protege from Moscow. In 1996 the Chechens attempted to attack Grozny. All attacks were repelled.
4. April 21, 1996 - death of separatist leader Dudayev.
5. On June 1, 1996, a truce was declared. According to the terms, exchanges of prisoners were to take place, the disarmament of the militants and the withdrawal of Russian troops. But no one wanted to give in, and the fighting began again.
6. August 1996 - the Chechen operation "Jihad", during which the Chechens took Grozny and other significant cities. The Russian authorities decide on the conclusion of a truce and the withdrawal of troops. The first Chechen war ended on August 31, 1996.

Consequences of the first Chechen campaign

Brief results of the war:

1. Following the results of the first Chechen war, Chechnya remained independent, but no one still recognized it as a separate state.
2. Many cities and settlements were destroyed.
3. A significant place began to take the receipt of income by criminal means.
4. Almost all civilians left their homes.

There was also an increase in Wahhabism.

Table "Losses in the Chechen war"

The exact number of casualties in the first Chechen war cannot be named. Opinions, assumptions and calculations are different.

Approximate losses of the parties look like this:

In the column "Federal Forces" the first figure is the calculations immediately after the war, the second is the data contained in the book on the wars of the 20th century, published in 2001.

Heroes of Russia in the Chechen war

According to official figures, 175 soldiers who fought in Chechnya received the title of Hero of Russia.

Most military personnel who participated in the hostilities received the title posthumously.

The most famous heroes of the first Russian-Chechen war and their exploits:

1. Victor Ponomarev. During the fighting in Grozny, he covered the sergeant with himself, which saved his life.
2. Igor Akhpashev. In Grozny, he neutralized the main firing points of the Chechen cutthroats on a tank. Then he was surrounded. The militants blew up the tank, but Akhpashev fought in the burning car to the last. Then there was a detonation and the hero died.
3. Andrey Dneprovskiy. In the spring of 1995, the Dneprovsky unit defeated the Chechen fighters who were on the heights in the fortification. Andrei Dneprovsky was the only one who died in the ensuing battle. All other soldiers of this unit survived all the horrors of the war and returned home.

Federal troops did not achieve the goals set in the first war. This was one of the reasons for the second Chechen war.

War veterans believe that the first war could have been avoided. Opinions about which side unleashed the war differ. Is it true that there was a possibility of a peaceful settlement of the situation? Here the assumptions are also different.

Russia waged numerous wars against the invaders, there were wars as obligations to the allies, but, unfortunately, there were wars, the causes of which were associated with the illiterate activities of the country's leaders.

History of the conflict

Everything began quite peacefully under Mikhail Gorbachev, who, announcing the beginning of perestroika, actually opened the way for the collapse of a huge country. It was at this time that the USSR, which was actively losing its foreign policy allies, received problems within the state as well. First of all, these problems were associated with the awakening of ethnic nationalism. They manifested themselves most clearly in the territories of the Baltic and the Caucasus.

Already at the end of 1990, the National Congress of the Chechen people was convened. It was headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev, Major General of the Soviet Army. The purpose of the congress was to secede from the USSR and create an independent Chechen Republic. Gradually, this decision began to materialize.

Even in the summer of 1991, dual power was observed in Chechnya: the government of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev, continued to work there. But in September 1991, after the unsuccessful actions of the State Emergency Committee, the Chechen separatists felt that the moment had come, and Dudayev's armed guards seized the television center, the Supreme Council and the Radio House. In fact, there was a coup d'état.

Power passed into the hands of the separatists, and on October 27 parliamentary and presidential elections were held in the republic. All power was concentrated in the hands of Dudayev.

Nevertheless, on November 7, Boris Yeltsin considered it necessary to introduce a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic and thereby created the reason for the start of a bloody war. The situation was aggravated by the fact that there were a large number of Soviet weapons in the republic, which they did not have time to take out.

For a while, the situation in the republic was contained. An opposition was created against Dudayev, but the forces were unequal.

The Yeltsin government at that time had neither the strength nor the political will to take any effective measures, and, in fact, Chechnya became practically independent from Russia between 1991 and 1994. It formed its own authorities, its own state symbols. However, in 1994 the Yeltsin administration decided to bring constitutional order to Chechnya. Russian troops were brought into its territory, which was the beginning of a full-scale war.

The course of hostilities

The results of the war

Chechen separatists perceived the Khasavyurt agreements as a victory. Federal troops were forced to leave Chechnya. All power remained in the hands of the self-proclaimed Republic of Ichkeria. Instead of Dzhokhar Dudayev, Aslan Maskhadov took power, who was not much different from his predecessor, but had less authority and was forced to constantly compromise with the militants.

The end of the war left behind a devastated economy. Cities and villages were not restored. As a result of the war and ethnic cleansing, all representatives of other nationalities left Chechnya.

The internal social situation has changed critically. The one who used to fight for independence has slipped into criminal squabbles. The heroes of the republic have turned into ordinary bandits. They hunted not only in Chechnya, but throughout Russia. Kidnapping became a particularly lucrative business. Neighboring regions especially felt it.