Zh.zhlkhsnb. lpoeg yufptyy y rpumedoik yuempchel

Today's article will talk about a unique club in Russian football. This club is Khimki near Moscow. At first glance, it is an ordinary FNL club on the balance sheet of the municipality. Let's figure out why I think it's unique.

Soon after relegation from the FNL to the Second Division, ambitious young managers aged 25-35 came to the club. This is how Tazhutdin Kachukaev, who is now the general director, appeared at the club as a sports director. “Khimki”, having not the largest budget in the PFL zone “West”, took first place in 2015/2016, winning a ticket to the FNL. For the 2016/2017 season, a budget of 150,000,000 rubles was formed. And this is where the fun begins. This is the smallest budget in the FNL, at a time when the league’s middle peasants had budgets in the range of 250,000,000 - 350,000,000 rubles, and the clubs competing for the RFPL ranged from 600,000,000 to 1 billion rubles. The management of Khimki decided that they would not be like everyone else. They will not drag traveling players with large salaries from club to club.

The basis for its concept was the model of the middle peasants of the Portuguese championship, which is designed to acquire young promising players and resell them for more money. The club calculated that they can try to earn at least 30-40% of their budget from player transfers. In short, the concept is to form the core of a team of 5-6 experienced players and to join them, acquire young promising players who would progress and become targets for other clubs. The main emphasis was placed on the club's sports department. It was headed by Tazhutdin Kachukaev (who has now been promoted); he has two scouts subordinate to him, one young, the other a gray-haired experienced trainer-selector. As I already said, they did not want to bring players from the FNL to the club with inflated wage demands. They watched matches in the second division, youth championships, and followed young players who do not always make it to the core of FNL clubs. Then they collectively made a decision on one player or another. Another important point is that the head coach is not involved in transfer matters in any way. His task is to train and determine the lineup for the game. The logic is simple: the interests of the club are paramount. The coach may change and the one who came to replace him will not need the players he invited, but will receive a salary on contracts.

Thus, before the start of the FNL season, 17 players were added to the team, and not one of them was listed in the FNL club at the time of transfer. This is mainly the Second Division, as well as the Spatak double, and players from foreign championships. Everyone came as free agents, that is, for free.
Khimki pays great attention to working in the media and social networks. They have an exemplary VK group. Video clips of the best moments of matches, individual statistics of players are posted there, there is a kind of promotion of their players, their promotion. The result of the first season is that, with the smallest budget, the team confidently finished in the middle of the standings, taking 11th place. For comparison, “Sibir”, which has a budget at least 2 times larger, somehow saved itself from relegation in the last match of the season.

The leadership plan also began to be implemented. The first to go for promotion were Yan Kazaev, who moved to Tosno, and Mikhail Gashchenkov, who now confidently performs in Perm Amkar. The amounts paid for the transfer remain unknown. However, in Khimki, each player has a compensation amount specified in their contract, and as far as is known from sources, for players over 24 years old it is 8,000,000 - 12,000,000 rubles. Thus, during the first season, Khimki managed to earn about 20,000,000 rubles from transfers. Plus, we are actively working with sponsors. At the end of the season, the club analyzes the usefulness of the players. And they part with players who have not proven themselves.

The following season, 10 people joined the team. This time it was decided to refuse to sign foreign players. The club was also replenished by Second Division players, backups from Spartak, CSKA, Anzhi and Amkar, and para-players from the FNL who do not always make it to the base of their clubs. Khimki knows how to manage money. And they know the value of player contracts. They are looking for players equal in level to those who have been playing in the FNL for a long time, with lower financial demands. In the autumn part of this Championship, Khimki finished 13th.

And then again difficulties arose for the team - their budget was cut to 130,000,000 rubles. I had to refuse to participate in the FNL Cup and prepare for the spring part at home. But then offers came from Tom, first for Alexei Shumskikh, who refused the transfer, and then for Ilya Kuzmichev. The parties were able to agree on Kuzmichev, shook hands and now “Khimki” will be able to take part in the tournament in Baku with the proceeds. Also unexpected was the transfer of Nikolai Tyunin to Spartak-2. The Moscow club needed an experienced player in the central zone, with a Spartak background, who would become a kind of uncle - a mentor for the young guys. Subsequently, he will have to go to work at the Academy

After the budget was cut, it was time to fall into despair, but not for the Khimki management. Tazhutdin Kachukaev himself said that with such a budget there is a danger of relegation to the PFL. Therefore, he decided to rent players from youth teams of leading clubs, and even on the condition that the club with the player under contract themselves paid his salary. The first such player should be 19-year-old Georgiy Makhatadze from Rubin. Therefore, I personally consider this club unique. Moreover, if other clubs adopt this kind of experience, then the salaries of football players will be reduced, and the clubs will become a little less likely to go bankrupt. Because almost 90% of the budget is the salaries of football players.

The future belongs to such specialists as in Khimki, the more people who sincerely love this game, who understand what they want, who have plans and a development strategy, the better it will be for our football. There are at least two clubs in the FNL that have plans for development in the long term, and do not live from loan to loan, and payments from budgets. These are Khimki and Dynamo St. Petersburg, the St. Petersburg team stands apart - they are a private club. Perhaps next time I’ll tell you in detail about the development strategy of this club.

Photo: official website of FC Khimki

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Both Putin’s rule and ISIS (banned in Russia) are not eternal, but humanity has not yet invented anything better than liberal democracy, said American political scientist, author of “The End of History and the Last Man” Francis Fukuyama in an interview with a correspondent of the Georgian edition of Radio Liberty.

– As you have repeatedly written, modernization does not always imply democracy. If you look at the countries formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the processes in them do not confirm the logic of the inevitability of the transition to liberal democracy. There was at first a moment of general jubilation when Western politicians and analysts spoke of a great transition period from totalitarianism to democracy and from a planned economy to a free market. Now we see that most states, with a few exceptions, have not moved anywhere, authoritarianism is strong in them, the collapse of the USSR led to the growth of nationalism and xenophobia, not liberalism. But some, like Freedom House, still talk about transition, publishing the Nations in Transit report, although the report itself calls some of them “consolidated authoritarian systems.” Do you share this opinion?

“I think that many people's idea that after 1991 the transition would happen quickly was wrong. And of course, a number of authoritarian regimes have since consolidated. But if you look at European history, the process of democratization in Western Europe also takes place over the course of 150 years. So the failure of the last 20 years does not mean that such a movement will never be possible. This has a lot to do with economic development, because in rapidly growing countries with large middle classes and educated populations, there is always a demand for greater political participation. In my opinion, the growth of Putinism in Russia and some countries of Eastern Europe is a failure of modernization, due precisely to the fact that a middle class has not formed in these countries.

– Putin is an interesting example, since under him Russia not only did not democratize, but is even trying to position itself as a cultural or civilizational counterbalance to the West. This has its origins in history - religious messianism and an appeal to Moscow

If Putin thinks he has managed to create some kind of viable alternative to liberal democracy, then, as they say, good luck to him

as to the “Third Rome”, which is in opposition to “heretic Europe”. But this is also part of modern thinking - foreign demons are fighting against holy Russia, the Russian patriarch compares liberalism with global evil, and political elites talk about “sovereign” democracy, then about “managed” democracy, but not about liberal democracy as such. That is, they are trying to build some kind of cultural foundation on which they could conduct an anti-Western policy. Do you think that these models are being created as an attempt to justify a cultural alternative to liberal democracy?

“If Putin thinks that he has managed to create some kind of viable and durable alternative to liberal democracy, then, as they say, good luck to him, because his design is built on a very narrow, energy-dependent economic model that is now falling apart. The same processes occur in other totalitarian regimes in other parts of the world - in Iran and Venezuela, for example. While global energy prices have fallen, the hollowness of this Russian model is beginning to show. So let's see, after ten years of economic failure, whether Russians will still think that this is such a good alternative to the freedom and prosperity that Western Europe lives in.

It also seems to me that Russia’s development over the past 20 years has also been largely determined by foreign policy. The failure of the early stages of the transition, the chaos of the Yeltsin years, the recovery based on rising energy prices in the 2000s under Putin - one can understand how Russians arrived at their current views. But the current situation is historically limited, and I don’t think it shows how the new generation of Russians will evaluate their lives and the system in which they would like to live.

– Some left-wing critics have reproached you for not seeing an alternative to the free market and economic liberalism. Your “end of history” thesis has been compared by many to Margaret Thatcher’s slogan that there is no alternative to the free market. Can Western capitalism be called a fair and superior economic model when, for example, a recent report by the humanitarian organization Oxfam states that 62 billionaires have amassed as much wealth as half the world's population.

– First of all, it seems to me that the economic system that emerges at the end of history is not Thatcherism, it is not a competitive economy. I think the leading model is liberal democracy with a free market. All liberal democracies redistribute income. Yes, if a country simply has a market economy, not supported by a truly democratic system, then only an increase in inequality occurs. This is why every modern capitalist system has social security. In Europe, the social security system consumes 50 percent of GDP, which is redistributed equitably throughout society. The US has a slightly freer economy and we redistribute less than Holland or Sweden, but all states still do it. I am not advocating for unchecked capitalism, but for a system that is built into democracy, where people can vote to rein in market operations. The 2008 crisis in the United States showed that the market had gone too far.

– In your recent works, you propose that Denmark – both its cultural image and a specific country – should be accepted as a goal towards which the world should strive. Does this mean that you are leaning towards the Nordic model, which combines a free market with a strong welfare state? Should the state be so involved in the fair distribution of wealth?

– I have always believed that the state should regulate the market, especially the financial market. This became especially evident during the financial crisis at the end of the first decade of this century. But when I talk about taking Denmark as an example to follow,

The ability of the state to provide services impartially and impersonally is one of the most important aspects of liberal democracy

I don’t mean a social state, I mean corruption, because, from my point of view, the quality of a state is determined by the level of corruption. The ability of the state to provide services impartially and impersonally is one of the most important and also one of the most underrated aspects of liberal democracy. It seems to me that the failure to combat corruption lies behind the failure of many states that have tried to become democratic. And this is exactly what distinguishes Denmark: there political corruption is practically reduced to zero. This is the core around which the world revolves: countries that have managed to create the Danish model, and kleptocracy countries. This is what now distinguishes Western Europe from Russia.

– How do you feel about the growth of xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment in the Western world recently? Liberalism, despite its various forms and manifestations, is based on individual freedom. But isn’t it that in order to gain freedom, people first demand protection of their dignity and basic needs - safety and shelter over their heads? Is it moral for liberal democracies to deny people these basic rights? Why are people in this mood now?

– People have a concern that is quite tied to reality. Of course they want to be open and help those in need, but sometimes the numbers are too high, sometimes they exceed the capacity of society to absorb so many people. Europe has now reached this point. It is no longer clear whether European countries will be able to accommodate such a number of people and provide them with a decent life. I don't think there is a moral responsibility to provide shelter to people at the expense of one's own well-being or the well-being of one's loved ones.

– So these trends do not cause you concern?

- They are, of course, alarming. That is why we need to act politically carefully. After all, you can imagine the negative consequences if you put society in a position where it cannot

There is a certain contradiction between the modernization of the state and the democratic system, but these are not mutually exclusive processes

cope with the problem of hosting so many immigrants. Yes, of course, it’s terrible that there is such an explosion of negative emotions against immigrants, but we need to respond to it with a more realistic approach - we need to think about how to solve the problem, how to constructively stop this process of accepting people into our society.

– Once again about the former USSR. Georgia, for example, recently went through the painful experience of a reformist government first establishing order and then implementing reforms. Issues of democracy have taken a backseat because reform requires a strong executive, while liberal democracy aims to reduce that power as much as possible through checks and balances and the openness of government institutions. How to combine modernization and democratization?

- I don't think there is any consistency here. In Europe, for example, countries such as France, Germany, and Great Britain created modern states before they developed democracy. And in a sense, this was a good sequence of development, since a modern state - and by modern I mean a leaderless, highly productive state - is more difficult to create when every citizen has the right to vote and regularly participates in elections. But it is possible, and Georgia is proof of this. In my opinion, Georgia modernized itself after the Rose Revolution, when it was already a democratic country. The United States also went through a process of modernization in the late 19th century, already a democracy. So there is a certain contradiction between the modernization of the state and the democratic system, but these are not mutually exclusive processes.

1) In theol. and religious-philosophical teachings: an analogue of the “end of the world”, the teaching about which was developed in the so-called. eschatological religions (Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam). The peculiarity of these ideas is that K.i. is thought of not only as a world tragedy, “the end of the things of this world,” but also as a positive accomplishment of good deities. plan, the embodiment of which was violated by the free will of man in the act of the Fall, and the meaning and purpose of world history is the conscious return of humanity (or its chosen part) to the fulfillment of the providential plan. 2) In classic. European systems philosophy of history: the implicitly assumed completion of history. a process understood as a progressive movement from a certain starting point to a certain intelligible goal. For example, in Hegel’s philosophy this is the movement of humanity from total unfreedom to maximum freedom, realized in specific state-political states. and legal systems of the Germanic peoples. 3) In modern social philosophy: a conceptual hypothesis growing out of the awareness of the incompleteness and incompleteness of progressivist projects that grew out of the classical ones. Western-European paradigms social-historical thinking. Enlightenment, Hegelian, positivist, Marxist, technocratic and other similar directions of thought for more than 200 years cultivated the idea of human history as a purposeful linear process, dep. phases (stages, epochs) are connected by a common rational meaning. From this point of view, history is nothing more than a progressive (although not without internal contradictions) development into a definition. history time and sociocult. space of one or another set of universal values (reason, freedom, social justice, technical rationality, etc.). In the last third of the 20th century. social-economic, production-technical, political-legal and other parameters of Western development. about-va raised the question of the implementation of “historical. plan” - if not completely, then in general terms. However, these highest achievements by no means freed civilization from its inherent conflicts and internal conflicts. contradictions, but, on the contrary, gave rise to a whole series of new ones, which stimulated the formulation of the problem of “K.i.” Its essence can be reduced to two aspects: 1) Incomplete or inadequate implementation of perspectives and values, with which classical philosophy connected its development. European civilization raises the question of the formation of a new system of values and the discovery of new prospects. 2) Uneven development and disruptions in the progressive transformation of the phenomenon. attributive properties of history, since it is generally created by people. Both aspects demonstrate the exhaustion of traditions. methodol. and axiological means of social history cognition, on the one hand, and the urgent need to search for relevant tools for understanding the situation of K.I., on the other hand. Statement and development of this problem in philosophy and methodology. plan is connected with research in such European countries. theorists such as Z. Bauman, J. Baudrillard, P. Bourdieu, E. Giddens, J. Deleuze, J.-L. Nancy, J. Habermas; its analysis in the context of social-economic, political. and cult. There are many realities presented. works of Amer. analysts, among whom F. Fukuyama and E. Toffler especially stand out. Lit.: Bauman Z. Fluid modernity. St. Petersburg, 2008; Baudrillard J. In the Shadow of the Silent Majority, or the End of the Social. Ekaterinburg, 2000; Deleuze J., Guattari F. Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and schizophrenia. M., 1990; Nancy J.-L. Existence is singular and plural. Minsk, 2004; Toffler E. Metamorphoses of power. Knowledge, wealth and power on the threshold of the 21st century. M., 2001; Fukuyama F. The Great Divide. M., 2003; It's him. The End of History and The Last Man. M., 2004; It's him. Our posthuman future: Consequences of the biotechnological revolution. M., 2004. E.V.Gutov

Excellent definition

Incomplete definition ↓

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a concept used in philosophy to denote social transformation, during which a number of principles that dominated a given society are abandoned. Initial ideas about this concept can be found in the theological works of early Christian ideologues. By contrasting the hypothesis of directed progress with the ancient ideas of cyclicality, they thereby set the goal of human development and, accordingly, the limit of its evolution. As you know, even St. Augustine believed that “the earthly city will not be eternal, and first of all because its purpose is nothing more than the fulfillment of the number of the righteous destined for salvation” (St. Augustinus. De civitate Dei, XV, 4); later St. Thomas Aquinas pointed out that the completed state of civilization will be a special form of state in which the efforts of people will be aimed at the prosperity of society as a whole and at overcoming inequality (St. Thomas Aquinas. De regimine principum,!,!).

The concept of limited progress, which is the ideological basis of the idea of the end of history, was filled with a different content, remaining throughout the 16th-19th centuries. a tool for justifying the possibility or even desirability of preserving the existing (primarily political) system. And no matter how different the doctrines of N. Machiavelli and T. Libbs were from the Hegelian philosophy of history, in both the first and second cases the end of history was identified with the political system contemporary to their authors. In Hegel's interpretation, the end of history meant the identity of state and society at the political level.

In the 17th century a whole series of historical theories arose, the authors of which depicted the future society as a system where “intellectual and social inequality will be forever eradicated” (Condorcet), the concept of property will be abolished due to the fact that all human desires will be satisfied (Hume). In the 19th century The pinnacle of this understanding of the end of history was the Marxist concept of the communist social formation as an ideal social form that overcomes the “realm of necessity.”

In modern sociology, the concept of the end of history appears in two directions: more generally, as the idea of “post-historicism”, and as the actual preaching of the end of history. The first originates in the concept of the famous French mathematician, philosopher and economist A. O. Cournot. According to Cournot, the end of history is a certain limited segment of the path of civilization, stretching between two relatively stable states - the period of primitive communal forms and the era of the humanistic civilization of the future, in which the process of social evolution will be brought under human control and will lose its spontaneous character, becoming history itself.

In the 20th century the idea of “posthistory” (A. Gehlen’s term) received a significantly different meaning. At the beginning of the century, O. Spengler's famous work “The Decline of Europe” established a connection between posthistory and the crisis of Western civilization. In the 20-30s. Germany remained the center of research on this issue, and the idea of posthistory was increasingly associated with the national context.

In the 60s the concept of “posthistory” has become a tool for understanding the new social reality. German sociologists P. Brückner and E. Nolte associated this idea with going beyond the traditional categories in which Western society was described. French researchers (B. Jouvenel and J. Baudrillard) turned to posthistory from the point of view of the new role of the individual and the loss of previous incorporation into human social processes. The German sociologist H. de Man drew attention to the fact that with the transition from traditional needs to new individualistic and sometimes unpredictable aspirations, the usual concept of the causality of social progress is destroyed, which also takes it beyond the boundaries of history (Man H. de. Vermassung und Kulturverfall. 1953, S. 125). Thus, the idea of posthistory turned out to be closer to the concept of postmodernity; posthistory was replaced by the consideration of a certain new, “supra-historical” time.

In the 80s the opinion that “overcoming history is nothing more than overcoming historicism” (see: Vattimo G. The End of Modernity, 1991, p. 5-6) has become widespread; then attention began to focus not so much on the end of history, but on the end of the social beginning in history (Baudrillard), after which the understanding came that it would be more accurate to talk not about the limit of social development, but only about the rethinking of a number of previous categories (B. Smart). The second direction in understanding the end of history is associated with the concepts of industrial society or the modern era. At the same time, the idea of the end of history was used to revise the prospects opening up for developed industrial societies. Proponents of this approach note the changing role and place of Western civilization in the modern world. The discussion about the end of history in this aspect intensified after the publication of first an article (1989) and then a book (1992) by the American political scientist F. Fukuyama, entitled “The End of History.”

The idea of the end of history has been criticized for its one-dimensional interpretation of social progress, realizing a single principle, which is refuted by the very course of history. For example, D. Bell noted that “in the phrase “end of history” various concepts are randomly mixed; it lacks clarity" that this idea is based on "the Hegelian-Marxist notion of the linear development of a single world Mind towards the telos of a unified social form, which [is] a misinterpretation of the nature of society and history" (Bell D. The Coming Post-Industrial Society, M ., 1998, p. LIX).

Lit.: Bell D. The Coming Post-Industrial Society. M., 1998; Hobbes T. Leviathan. M., 1898; Condorcet J. A. Sketch of a historical picture of the progress of the human mind. M., 1936; Popper K. Poverty of historicism. M., 1993; Spechgler O. Decline of Europe. Essays on the morphology of world history, vol. 1-2. M., 1998; Hume D. Treatise on Human Nature. - In the book: Same. Soch., vol. 1. M., 1965; Baudriltard J., LAn 2000 ne passera pas. - “Traverses”, 1985, N 33/34; Idem. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities or. The End of the Social and Other Essays. N.Y., 1983; Courtnot A.A. Traitu de lenchainement des idnes fondamentales dans les sciences et dans lhistoire. - Idem. Oeuvres compltes, t. 3. P., 1982; GehlenA. Studien zurAntropologie und Soziologie. V., 1963; GehlenA. Moral und Hypermoral. Fr./M., 1970; Fukuyama F. The EndofHistory. - “National Interest”, 1989, N 4; /(fern. The EndofHistory and the Last Man. N.Y., 1992; Idem. The End of Order. L., 1995; Jouvenel B. de. On Power: Its Nature and the History of its Growth. N.Y., 1949; Jwger E. Ander Zeitmauer. Stuttg., 1959; Heller A., Feher F. The Postmodern Political Condition. Cambr, 1988; LefebvreH. La fin de lhistoire. P., 1970; Man H. de. Vermassung und Kulturverfall. Mpsp. , 1953; /Vote E. Wts ist bbrgerlich? Stuttg., 1979; Seidenberg R. Posthistoric Man: An Inquiry. Chapel Hill (NC), 1959; Seidenberg R. Anatomy of the Future. Chapel Hill (NC), 1961; Smart V POstmodernity, L.-N.Y., 1996; Vattimo G. The End of Modernity, Oxf, 1991.

Excellent definition

Incomplete definition ↓

END OF STORY

Expressing the idea that, starting from some key point in time, human life will radically change its course or come to an end. This is only a little younger than the science of history itself, within the framework of which it is periodically revived and acquires a new one, corresponding to its time.
In the Christian worldview, the kingdom of heaven was introduced into history as its limit. It was thought of as absolute bliss, the achievement of an ideal state, requiring as its destruction all that exists and its re-creation on new grounds. History will end, it will be burned by an all-consuming fire, it will end - only then will a completely different life begin, in which there will no longer be evil. Until the end of world history, as Augustine said, the Babylon of the evil and the Jerusalem of the good will march together and inseparably.
In Marxism, the end of history was also associated with the emergence of an ideal society, but no longer in heaven, but on earth. Classes were proclaimed to be the driving force of history; other revolutions were considered the locomotives of history. In a communist society there will be no class struggle and the ground for social revolutions will disappear, due to which, with the construction of such a society, history in the old sense will cease and human history itself will begin. “...The prehistory of human society ends with the bourgeois social formation” (K. Marx). It says as little about what exactly “history proper” will consist of as it does about life in the kingdom of heaven. But it is clear that the historical will change its course and its measure will become millennia or even, as in the kingdom of heaven. The idea of history as dialectical progress with a beginning and an inevitable end was borrowed by Marx from G.W.F. Hegel, who declared back in 1806 that history was coming to an end.
Both in the Christian understanding and in Hegel and Marx, the completion of history was associated with the idea of its goal. Having achieved this goal, history moves into a different direction, the contradictions that drove the old history disappear, and the unhurried course of events, not associated with sharp turns and revolutions, if it is history, then in a completely new sense.
National Socialism saw the completion of history (or “prehistory”) in achieving its main goal - the creation and establishment on a fairly vast territory of a racially pure, Aryan state, which has everything necessary for its cloudless existence for an indefinitely long time (“the thousand-year Reich” ).
Interpretation of the idea of "K.I." how the transition from prehistory to history itself can be called absolute K.I. The idea of absolute K.I. is a necessary element of the ideology of any collectivist society, oriented towards collective values and setting itself a global goal, requiring the mobilization of all its forces. The individualistic (open) does not have any single, overwhelming goal, with the achievement of which one could say that prehistory has ended and history proper begins. The concept of "C.I." was absent, in particular, in ancient Greek. thinking, with t.zr. of which history has no end or purpose beyond it. The ideology of capitalist society also does not contain any idea of a future radical change in the course of history and its transition to a completely normal direction.
The idea of "K.I." is one aspect of the trinity of the problem central to the thinking of collectivist societies - the problem of the transition from the existing imperfect society to the future perfect society, to “paradise in heaven” or “paradise on earth.”
History of the 20th century was primarily a history of confrontation between individualistic societies, called liberal and democratic, and collectivist societies, which had two main forms - communist and national socialist. This confrontation initially led to a “hot” war between National Socialism and individualistic societies, which briefly allied with communism. The military defeat of National Socialism was at the same time the defeat of the National Socialist idea. Then a “cold” war developed between individualistic societies and communism, the core of which was the Soviet Union. TO . 1980s the defeat of communism became obvious.
If history is understood as constant, not leading to any final results, oscillations of societies and their groups between two possible poles - individualistic and collectivistic society - then about “K.I.” one can only speak in a relative sense. History as a confrontation between individualistic and collectivistic societies will come to an end for some historically foreseeable period if (collectivism) triumphs over collectivism (individualism) and significantly displaces it from the historical arena.
There is no viable collectivist idea visible on the historical horizon. Traditional Marxism-Leninism is dying as something capable of mobilizing the masses. The possibilities of religion and nationalism as a basis for the creation of new, sufficiently powerful collectivist societies that influence the course of world history are very limited. What is equally important, there are no deep-seated mass enthusiastic movements capable of demanding one or another form of collectivist ideology in the foreseeable future. All this suggests that history for a certain period ceases to be an arena of confrontation between individualistic and collectivistic societies. This does not mean that it will not return over time to the historical stage in some new form, for example. in the form of a society with collective ownership of the main (and only the main) means of production and a market economy. Predictions concerning collectivism are always somewhat unreliable. Its ideological premises mature slowly, but its emergence as a mass movement always took a few years ( cm. INDIVIDUALISTIC ), ( cm. ERA).

Philosophy: Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M.: Gardariki. Edited by A.A. Ivina. 2004 .

END OF STORY

END OF HISTORY - used in philosophy to denote social transformation, during which a number of principles that dominated in a given society are abandoned. Initial ideas about this concept can be found in the theological works of early Christian ideologues. By contrasting the hypothesis of directed progress with the ancient ideas of cyclicality, they thereby set the goal of human development and, accordingly, the limit of its evolution. As you know, even St. Augustine believed that “the earthly city will not be eternal, and first of all because its purpose is nothing more than the fulfillment of the number of the righteous destined for salvation” (St. Augustinus. De civitate Dei, XV, 4); later St. Thomas Aquinas pointed out that the completed state of civilization will be a special state in which the efforts of people will be aimed at the prosperity of society as a whole and at overcoming inequality (St. Thomas Aquinas. De regimine principum,!,!).

In the 17th century A whole historical theory arose, the authors of which depicted the future society as a system where “intellectual and social inequality will be forever eradicated” (Condorcet), the concept of property will be abolished due to the fact that all human desires will be satisfied (Hume). In the 19th century The pinnacle of this understanding of the end of history was the Marxist communist social formation as an ideal social form that overcomes the “realm of necessity.”

In modern sociology, the concept of the end of history manifests itself in two directions: more generally, as the idea of “post-historicism,” and as the actual end of history. The first originates in the concept of the famous French philosopher and economist A. O. Cournot. According to Cournot, the end of history represents a certain limited segment of the path of civilization, stretching between two relatively stable states - the period of primitive communal forms and the era of the humanistic civilization of the future, in which social evolution will be placed under man and will lose its elemental nature, becoming history itself.

history and crisis of Western civilization. In the 20-30s. Germany remained the center of research on this issue, and the idea of posthistory was increasingly associated with the national context.

In the 60s the concept of “posthistory” became a tool for understanding the new social reality. German sociologists P. Brückner and E. Nolte associated this idea with going beyond the traditional categories in which Western society was described. French researchers (B. Jouvenel and J.) turned to posthistory from the point of view of the new role of the individual and the loss of previous incorporation into human social processes. The German sociologist H. de Man drew attention to the fact that with the transition from traditional needs to new individualistic and sometimes unpredictable aspirations, the usual concept of the causality of social progress is destroyed, which also takes it beyond the boundaries of history (Man H. de. Vermassung und Kulturverfall. 1953, S 125). Thus, the idea of posthistory turned out to be closer to the concept of postmodernity; posthistory was replaced by the consideration of a certain new, “supra-historical” time.

In the 80s that “overcoming history is nothing more than overcoming historicism” (see: Vattimo G. The End of Modernity, 1991, p. 5-6) has become widespread; then attention began to focus not so much on the end of history, but on the end of the social beginning in history (Baudrillard), after which it came to the point that it would be more accurate to talk not about the limit of social development, but only about the rethinking of a number of previous categories (B. Smart). The second direction in understanding the end of history is associated with the concepts of industrial society or the modern era. At the same time, the idea of the end of history was used to revise the prospects opening up for developed industrial societies. Proponents of this approach note the roles and places of Western civilization in the modern world. The discussion about the end of history in this aspect intensified after the publication of first an article (1989) and then a book (1992) by the American political scientist F. Fukuyama, entitled “The End of History.”

The idea of the end of history has been criticized for its one-dimensional interpretation of social progress, realizing a single one, which is refuted by the course of history. For example, D. Bell noted that “in the phrase “end of history” various concepts are randomly mixed; it lacks clarity” that this idea is based on “the Hegelian-Marxist notion of the linear development of a single world Mind towards the telos of a unified social form, which [is] a misinterpretation of the nature of society and history” (D. Bell. The Coming, M., 1998, p. LIX).

Lit.: Bell D. The Coming. M., 1998; Hobbes T. Leviathan. M., 1898; Condorcet J. A. Sketch of a historical picture of the progress of the human mind. M., 1936; Popper K. Poverty of historicism. M., 1993; Spechgler O. Decline of Europe. Essays on the morphology of world history, vol. 1-2. M., 1998; Hume D. Treatise on Human Nature. - In the book: Same. Soch., vol. 1. M., 1965; Baudriltard J., L"An 2000 ne passera pas. - “Traverses”, 1985, N 33/34; Idem. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities or. The End of the Social and Other Essays. N. Y., 1983; Cournot A.A. Traitü de l"enchainement des idnes fondamentales dans les sciences et dans l"histoire. - Idem. Oeuvres complûtes, t. 3. P., 1982; GehlenA. Studien zurAntropologie und Soziologie. V., 1963; GehlenA. Moral und Hypermoral. Fr./M., 1970; Fukuyama F. The EndofHistory. - “National Interest”, 1989, N 4; /(fern. The EndofHistory and the Last Man. N. Y., 1992; Idem. The End of Order. L., 1995; Jouvenel B. de. On Power: it's Nature and the History of it's Growth. N. Y, 1949; Jwger E. Ander Zeitmauer. Stuttg., 1959; Heller A., Feher F. The Postmodern Political Condition. Cambr, 1988; LefebvreH. La fin de l'histoire. P., 1970; Man H. de. Vermassung und Kulturverfall. Mpsp., 1953; /Vote E. Wts ist bbrgerlich? Stuttg., 1979; Seidenberg R. Pösthistoric Man: An Inquiry (Chapel Hill (NC), 1959; Seidenberg R. Anatomy of the Future. Chapel Hill (NC), 1961; Smart V. Postmodernity. L.-N. Y., 1996; VattimoG. The End f Modernity. Oxf„ 1991.

V. L. Inozemtsev

New Philosophical Encyclopedia: In 4 vols. M.: Thought. Edited by V. S. Stepin. 2001 .

See what "END OF STORY" is in other dictionaries:

From English: The End of History. The title of an article published (summer, 1989) by American political scientist of Japanese origin Francis Fukujama (p. 1952) in the magazine “The National Interest” (USA). He wrote that... ... Dictionary of popular words and expressions

"End of History"- The concept of the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama contains the idea of a “complete and final” victory of Western-style liberal democracy as the final, most reasonable form of state after the collapse of the bipolar world order.… … Geoeconomic dictionary-reference book