Is there truth in the Russian media? The marvelous information world Mummers as an instrument of total control of the Russian media.

They offer fakes, falsified information, which is already common in the world. But it is not clear what reason there is to fabricate something that does not threaten the regime? And is there even an information plane left in this country that is not filtered by “experts”?

Journalist, radio host and popular blogger Alexander Plyushchev tried to find answers to these questions in a material published in Deutsche Welle.

What the Russian media does not pay attention to.

In recent days, the number of fake and staged events has increased significantly in Russia, even where they are not required. And the sharp increase in this kind of actions, rallies, speeches, talk shows and the like began with a provocative action on April 2, to which people were invited to come through social networks. Few citizens came to Manezhnaya Square, which were immediately shown on Russian federal television channels. Although events really worth attention, the journalist writes, did not happen there.

In contrast to the rallies against corruption that took place on March 26 in many large cities of Russia, which in total attracted tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people. But TV ignored them. How they ignored the “work” of the riot police, who grabbed peaceful participants of the event, beat them, and then “packed” them into paddy wagons.

This was followed by a terrorist attack in the St. Petersburg metro. Information about the event in the Russian media was contradictory and confusing. Moreover, to such an extent that it created the impression of receiving misinformation. Against this background, the conspiracy theories that flashed several times looked, as Alexander Plyushchev writes, “no less plausible than the official point of view.”

What's wrong with flowers?

The blogger goes on to say that perhaps all this information swirl would have calmed down if he had not accidentally seen the first reports from Moscow about the rallies in memory of the victims of the terrorist attack, noting that all the participants carried the same carnations. The author says that, having visited many spontaneous memorials on the days of tragedies, he noticed that people bring different flowers because they do not buy them in the same place.

– Even Putin came to Tekhnolozhka with roses on the day of the tragedy. And if my tweet about identical colors had not caused an inexplicably violent reaction, both on Twitter itself and in the state media, including the most popular TV channel in the country, I would hardly have come to surprising, although quite expected, discoveries, says the journalist.

Taking a closer look at the Moscow participants in the events in memory of the victims of the terrorist attack in St. Petersburg, the author of the material discovered that not only the flowers were the same, but also the people. In particular, there were pro-Kremlin activists who are regulars at such events, and their faces constantly appear in the reports of all federal television channels.

Another “inconsistency” in the production of official news was discovered by the journalist when a group of Alexei Navalny’s protesters met at the temporary detention center. The official media presented these guys as schoolchildren. It turned out that they were activists of the United Russia youth movement.

And here is an example with a religious connotation - an event with a high-profile court case against Jehovah's Witnesses (the court banned the organization's activities in Russia). As the publication “Lapshesnimaloschnaya” found out, the people who pretended to be members of this organization, those who stood at the courthouse in which the verdict on the ban was announced, were also “sent Cossack women”, not who they pretended to be.

Based on all the above facts, the conclusion suggests itself: if the Russian authorities need extras, they will be there. For any event. And the official media will present the “event” as significant, worthy of broadcasting, even live reporting.

Mummers as a tool for total control of the Russian media.

But in this case, a logical question arises: is there anything in Russia that is filmed without the participation of dummies? And why is it necessary to falsify news that does not pose a threat to the authorities? Perhaps the fact is that “the country is rapidly approaching a state in which it is simply impossible not to lie in any line of a television news broadcast, and this is done literally automatically,” the blogger argues.

And the reason for this is the desire to control everything that happens in Russia, and, accordingly, to produce the desired picture. As a result, federal channels have sunk to the level where, instead of objective information, they offer the viewer more or less staged stories. Such reports are characterized by “approved” experts, “ordinary people” from the people, saying what the boss of the TV channel wants to hear, the “correct” extras.

– At this rate, soon TV crews will travel to villages with their milkmaids, and perhaps even cows, to “news from the fields.”, - the journalist sneers.

However, why is all this being done? Based on recommendations from political consultants? An initiative of TV channel managers who need the “correct” picture? Why all this masquerade with mummers, if sociologists assure that trust in Vladimir Putin in Russia is still very high and the majority of the electorate is ready to vote for him in the upcoming presidential elections?

Maybe this is all because ordinary Moscow residents themselves will not bring flowers to the memorial and will not say the “correct” words in front of the camera? Or will they not go to a rally of solidarity with St. Petersburg residents, even if Sobyanin or Putin calls for it? Or maybe, Alexander Plyushchev asks, all this “great trust” in the authorities is as much a fiction as schoolchildren and mourners with carnations?

Every year the list of “banned” journalists grows. Nowadays you can break the law without even knowing it; you just need to publish a photo from social networks or indicate the popular name of a particular monument. The good news: most likely, violators will only be issued a fine. But there is also a bad thing: if you don’t learn from your own mistakes and step on the same rake three times, Roskomnadzor may close the media. Primorskaya Gazeta looked into what should not be published on the pages of newspapers and on the Internet.

BY THE WAY

Seminar “Legal regulation in the media industry” Experts and speakers: representatives of the Roskomnadzor Office for the Primorsky Territory, the Office of the Federal Antimonopoly Service for the Primorsky Territory. Moderator: Galina Antonets, media lawyer. Auditorium 501 FEFU. June 9 from 12.30 to 14.00.

Prohibited: writing about children without the consent of their legal representatives

The requirements of Russian legislation are now extremely harsh: the right to privacy, protection of personal data, the right to image, protection of minors...

As Primorye media lawyer, lawyer Galina Antonets says, when you look at seminars about what the law allows you to write about, it turns out that you can’t write anything - or you have to build a defensive wall from a pile of papers.

Consider, for example, the situation with the publication of a photograph of a child in the media. Here, both the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Civil Code are unanimous: publication of photographs is possible only with the permission of the person himself or, if we are talking about a minor, with the permission of his parents or legal representatives. However, there is one exception.

If a child is missing, then you can publish his photograph without permission, since this case falls under the clause of the law on the use of the image in state, public or other public interests, says Galina Antonets.

But as soon as the child is found, and, pardon the cynicism, alive or dead, the publication of any image is prohibited. Only if there is permission from parents, legal representatives and the hero of the publication himself.

Prohibited: writing about suicide and describing the method

It is even more difficult to talk about tragedies when it comes to child suicide.

Now the media only has the right to write that a certain girl committed suicide, without disclosing either the method (this is regarded as incitement) or the name, without the written consent of one of the parents. It is prohibited to post photographs, even those posted on social networks,” noted Galina Antonets.

So far, the expert says, it is difficult to create a single clear algorithm for how to write about suicide correctly, without breaking the law. The supervisory authorities have a clear opinion on this matter - it’s impossible, almost impossible at all.

Well-known media lawyer Galina Arapova is scheduled to come to the Media Summit. She promised to tell us about innovations on this particular topic, and I will also be happy to listen to her,” noted Galina Antonets.

Prohibited: displaying images of public figures

According to the law, it is impossible to publish a photograph of a person without his consent. There are three main exceptions to this general rule. The first is if you use a person’s image in the state, public interests. But this interest will have to be proven every time a dispute arises. You can use images taken in a public place, at an event, but there is a very important and significant limitation: the person depicted in the photograph should not be the main subject of the image.

If the image can be classified as “story” then there are no restrictions. That is, it is clear that this person was not photographed purposefully, that there is still some action around him, that he is part of the composition, and so on. But if you crop the picture even a little, so that the person becomes the center of the image, then it becomes a portrait and can only be posted with permission,” notes Galina Antonets.

You need to be equally sensitive to photographs posted on social networks. That is, if their publication is reposted, then there is no violation. And if the image is simply saved and posted, then you can safely go to court and demand removal and compensation for moral damages.

Prohibited: showing scenes of smoking without warning

Another complex and controversial topic is the demonstration of smoking, says Galina Antonets.

If we are talking about broadcasting films or newsreels containing scenes of smoking, the media must necessarily precede the broadcast with a special warning.

Newspapers and news agencies do not have the right to publish photographs of people smoking - violation is punishable by a fine.

In 2016, one of the regional media outlets was punished with a very large fine for broadcasting a war newsreel in which a man was seen holding a cigarette. This was the norm at the time, but the media did not include a warning that the material “contains smoking scenes.” For a small regional media outlet, a fine of more than 100 thousand rubles is a lot of money.

Prohibited: writing about banned organizations without mentioning their “banned status” in Russia

There are currently 25 terrorist and 47 extremist organizations in Russia. The full list is posted on the FSB website: www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd.

The difficulty of working with this topic is that there is no clear definition of what “extremism” is. But the law clearly states what awaits violators if any violations are committed. This is both a significant fine and the closure of the media.

Extremism can also be a characteristic image of a Slavic symbol. Let’s say a journalist goes to cover a holiday in honor of Ivan Kupala, we like to organize such “return to origins” on this day. Naturally, the organizers of the event actively use runic symbolism. So, it’s enough to change the color a little or show only one symbol - and such a publication can already be interpreted as extremist, says Galina Antonets.

In addition, the media lawyer reminds, you cannot write about organizations on the list without indicating that their activities are prohibited in Russia.

This point strictly applies only to extremist organizations. Information that they are prohibited must be in the material: in brackets, notes - in any form. Regarding terrorists, there is no such strict ban, and here everything remains, as they say, on the conscience of the journalist,” the expert notes.

Prohibited: disrespect for monuments, symbols and other objects of military glory

As the expert says, “the question is with history.” A precedent arose when one of the journalists from the Syktyvkar news agency asked the famous Russian blogger Ilya Varlamov if he knew which monument the locals called “Women Frying a Crocodile.” The material with this popular title was published, and one of the local residents saw it as an insult to the symbol of military glory and filed a lawsuit. The plaintiff’s arguments turned out to be convincing, and the publication was fined 200 thousand rubles.

So, if journalists decide to mention any popular names of monuments, they may well be charged with insulting symbols. In general, you need to be extremely careful with this point,” says Galina Antonets.

By the way, the now extremely popular law on insulting the feelings of believers works according to the same mechanism. The subtlety here is that all judicial proceedings on such charges are based not on the fact of the insult itself, but on the demonstration of such an act.

For example, a girl lit a cigarette from a church candle and posted a photo on a social network. She will be held accountable not for the fact that she smoked in church, but for the fact that she demonstrated,” notes Galina Antonets.

Briefly about the main thing

• The main source of news about events in the country for 52% of our fellow citizens is television
• 70% of Russians trust information from central channels
• Russians least of all trust in the objectivity of the media when covering economic events - 31%

MOSCOW, May 3, 2017 The All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) presents survey data on which media Russians most often turn to for news about events in the country and the world, information from which sources they trust more. Television remains the main source of news about events in the country for the majority of our fellow citizens , however, its popularity has been declining over time (62% in 2015, 52% in 2017). Radio and newspapers are mentioned much less often (3% and 4% of survey participants, respectively). At the same time, popularity is growing Internet(including information sites, social networks and blogs), which today is used to search for news materials by 32% of all respondents (in 2015 – 22%). Already today, for young people, the network is the main source of news for 65% of 18-24 year olds, 50% of 25-34 year olds. In the rating of trust in the media, central television still remains the leader, but the trend is not in its favor. The trust index* for central television today is 42 points, with a range from -100 to 100 points (for comparison, in 2012 – 58 points). Seven out of ten Russians (70%) express confidence in this type of media. The indicator for regional TV is lower (34 p.), the share of respondents who gave positive answers is 63%. Other media inspire trust in less than half of those surveyed, and the absolute outsiders are foreign television programs, newspapers, magazines, etc. – the index of trust in them has remained in the negative range for more than five years (-43 p.). In the event of conflicting information about any event in various media, Russians are more likely to believe television (46%), although this share has decreased from 60% in 2013. A quarter of respondents (25%) would give preference to websites and blogs in this matter. At the same time, respondents are less willing to trust traditional media such as radio (2%) and newspapers (2%) than word of mouth (11%). The objectivity of information coverage, according to the population, depends on the topic: more than half of citizens consider news materials about natural disasters (70%), as well as the activities of the head of state (55%) and Russia’s position on the world stage (51%) to be rather unbiased; they are much less likely to believe in objectivity when covering the state of affairs in the economy and activities opposition and other topics. VTsIOM research director Elena Mikhailova comments on the data: “Television continues to be the main source of news reports. Despite the active penetration of the Internet and the growing popularity of social networks, stories about current events broadcast on television are the most credible. Information that is accompanied by a video involves different senses; this format allows viewers not only to verify the reliability of the news, but also to delve deeper into the issue and independently interpret what they see. Television is perceived as highly responsible media, while Internet resources and social networks today provide an overly mosaic, unstructured picture. Navigating the news flow of Internet messages is much more difficult, and the contradictory nature of the information received on the Internet raises doubts about its reliability.”*Media Trust Index shows the level of trust of Russians in different types of media. The higher the index value, the higher the confidence. The index is based on the question “Do you trust the following media?” as the difference between positive and negative responses. The index can change in the range from -100 to 100 points.An initiative all-Russian survey by VTsIOM was conducted on April 20-24, 2017 in 130 settlements in 46 regions, territories and republics of 8 federal districts of Russia. Sample size: 1600 people. The sample represents the population of the Russian Federation aged 18 years and older by gender, age, education, and type of settlement.Sample multi-stage stratified, with step-by-step selection of households, using quotas at the last stage of selection. For this sample, the maximum error size (taking into account the design effect) with a 95% probability does not exceed 3.5%. The survey method is personal formal interviews at the respondent’s place of residence. In addition to sampling error, survey data can be biased by the wording of questions and various circumstances that arise during fieldwork.

Against the backdrop of a general increase in media noise and an increase in the speed of information delivery, many publications have relied on short and catchy texts. The minority continues to work the old fashioned way, in the genre of big stories.

Proponents of the clip format proceed from the assumption that the average reader is not able to perceive and analyze large volumes of information, or follow the author’s thoughts and logic. This assumption is partly based on sociological surveys, partly on the personal opinion of the editors-in-chief, and partly even on the statements of psychologists who diagnose a widespread attention deficit disorder in modern people.

The increase in noise and speed of information flow occurred in the world gradually - with the change in television formats, the emergence of the video clip as a genre, the advent of computers, and finally, the Internet. In Russia, the concept of clip thinking, as opposed to linear, arose in the mid-nineties.

Trying to adapt to the new, video generation, most domestic media came up with an important commandment: don’t overload. Whoever burdens the reader loses. Result: dictatorship of “funny pictures” (form prevails over content), an abundance of short and fractional texts.

The text, more like a slogan, and, as a side effect, scandalousness is another important consequence of the clip approach. Increasing the volume (and what else can you do in the “noise” - just scream) and catchiness of statements up to exceeding the threshold of reader sensitivity.

A recent example is the column of the famous writer and journalist Zakhar Prilepin “Letter to Comrade Stalin,” after which the author was indignantly branded (or happily proclaimed) a Stalinist and anti-Semite. Every sentence here is a slogan and a cry: “We sold the ice drifts and nuclear-powered ships you pledged and bought ourselves yachts”; “You put Russian people in seven layers to save the life of our seed.”

But one cannot judge a person’s beliefs by slogans and cries; one cannot reason with slogans and cries. However, neither the reader nor the author takes this into account, and radical slogans on both sides, multiplied and spread by the information flow, remain the only arguments in the dispute.

There is an apocrypha that Leo Tolstoy was once asked to briefly retell Anna Karenina. In response, he handed the book to his interlocutors: “That’s all I can say briefly. If I could take one word out of here, I would.”

Journalistic big stories are somewhat like books: they cannot be broken down into more accessible “pixels.” And, like paper books, it’s not the first year or even the first decade that they have been predicted to die soon. And they all live.

Yes, the reader’s perception has changed due to information oversaturation, but we should not submit to this, says Mukhamed Kabardov, Doctor of Psychology, Head of the Department of General Psychology at Moscow State University of Psychology and Education. - People have not yet degenerated so much that it is impossible to speak to them in long, intelligent texts. The reader can still handle eight pages of sequential text. The only question is whether he wants to. And here the most important thing is not the size of the text. Do you know that in the twenties the language of the Red Army soldiers or, for example, the language of village children was specially studied - so that it would be clear how exactly to speak to such an audience? The most important thing now is the ability of journalists to address their readers in a targeted manner.

The history of the Ogonyok magazine is indicative here. The famous media manager Leonid Bershidsky tried to reform it in a clip style, focusing on the abstract, successful and active reader who does not have time to read long texts. The active and busy Ogonyok did not read it, but the readers, accustomed to the traditional narrative and detailed stories, naturally turned away from the magazine. I had to play it back.

There are always and always will be people - both here and in the West - who are sickened by flickering and pixelation, who want to get a complete and coherent picture of an event, a country, a world. In this sense, “Russian Reporter” is a typical example of successful trend resistance: our readers easily perceive complex multi-page texts.

Multimediaization vs traditionalism

Newspapers and television in their traditional form are being replaced by new multimedia products.

There has been talk for a long time that newspapers, magazines and television in their current form will die sooner or later. At the end of the 2000s, newspaper circulation in the United States fell by about 7-10% annually. People preferred to read newspapers and magazines on the Internet. Various options were tried: some media outlets introduced paid access to materials on the site, and sent out the latest issue to subscribers in pdf format. You can now subscribe to many newspapers and magazines for iPad and Amazon Kindle versions.

At the same time, the same Internet began to breathe down the back of television. As a result, traditional media faced an important question: how to continue making money? The process of developing new formats continues. Back in the first half of the 2000s, it became clear that newspapers and magazines should become multimedia, and the border between paper and electronic media should gradually blur. And the point is not that the newspaper will be read, and TV will be watched from the screen of a computer or tablet. And the fact is that it will be a new product with text, video and pictures. Since the mid-2000s, paper media websites have offered options that are not possible on paper: video reports, video blogs and video columns.

The first experiments were not the most successful: “newspaper and magazine television” was frankly amateurish. But gradually the situation began to improve. Large information holdings like NewsCorp have all types of media in their portfolio, and the Internet pages of newspapers of such large corporations are the same multimedia products that, in addition to text, contain video, audio and photo content. In Russia, LifeNews and Komsomolskaya Pravda operate according to a similar scheme. The tabloids are now in the forefront; serious media are still lagging behind.

At the same time, a completely new format of journalism is developing - independent video blogs. Most often these are entertainment reviews like the American “=3” or the Russian equivalent “+100500”. Vloggers (the English vlogger has not yet taken root in Russia) make programs on a variety of topics: from teaching physics and astronomy to computer games and fashion. Some vlogger projects are becoming a normal business: Youtube shares part of the advertising revenue with the most popular authors.

Another direction of multimediaization is the creation of special content for tablets. The appearance of the first iPad was hailed by the media world as the salvation of a dying industry - many hoped that the traditional subscription would be revived through iTunes. As a result, after the release of the iPad, newspaper circulation continued to fall, although some publications successfully sell electronic versions of their issues. However, the development of a format that would be optimally suited for tablet computers is still ongoing.

Deprofessionalization vs elitism

In the good old days, professional journalists had a monopoly on receiving and distributing information. Newspapers, magazines, radio and television received information from correspondents and whistleblowers, had in-house experts analyze it with exclusive access to editorial archives, and then disseminated the information through their own channels.

The common man could neither receive nor distribute information. The journalist acted as an intermediary between him and the information. The advent of the Internet, then social networks, as well as progress in telecommunications, turned the world upside down.

Hand-made journalism was born almost simultaneously with social networks - at the very end of the 90s. As the Internet and electronics developed, it invaded the world of a wide variety of media. This includes the primary collection of information, its analysis (experts sitting in the editorial office and analysts who do not leave their homes have the same opportunities - searching on the Internet), and even the publication of independent online newspapers and magazines. Such projects are called “civic journalism.”

One of the first examples of “civil media” was the indymedia.org project, which appeared in 1999 to provide information support for anti-globalization projects. And civil media showed their true power in 2011, when, thanks to them, riots began in the Arab world, and the Occupy movement began in the United States and Western Europe.

Actually, now any blog, Facebook or Twitter account can be considered part of citizen journalism if the author devotes his posts to information or its analysis. You found yourself at the scene of a terrorist attack or accident, you took a photo or shot a video, you posted information on the Internet. Now you are an insider, now you shape the information agenda.

The most popular blogs in the Russian-language blogosphere, such as drugoi.livejournal.com (72 thousand subscribers) or the-nomad.livejournal.com (26 thousand subscribers), function as media. Insider blogs have also turned into media. For example, the blog of Guy Kawasaki, an Apple chronicler and owner of his own venture capital firm, is considered by Google Media to be the same media product as the New York Times or Popular Mechanics.

It turned out that the average person seems to be able to do without an intermediary journalist. But it immediately turned out that this intermediary was still needed. As more people get involved in online journalism, the value of professionals increases. Yes, the average person has a chance to be the first to find and tell the news. But a professional reporter with extensive experience can see more and tell it more interestingly.

In the format of a Twitter post, a casual eyewitness and a professional journalist are equal, but the journalist will beat the average person in the format of a large investigation, article, report, or book. Anyone can take a photo. A photograph that conveys the tragedy of the situation in one frame better than any, even the longest text, can only be taken by a highly professional photographer.

Even the most naive supporters of the new journalistic method finally realized by the end of the 90s: “objective journalism” can manipulate consciousness no worse than “subjective” journalism.

Against the backdrop of general deprofessionalization, professionals find themselves at a great price. And social networks give them the opportunity to function in new formats. An example is crowdsourcing projects like Arkady Babchenko’s project “Journalism without intermediaries”: people voluntarily transfer money to him for articles posted in LJ, as a result he turns out to be independent of the editors or sponsors. Also, the new information reality creates situations where it is impossible to do without professionals. An example is WikiLeaks. The intercepted dispatches of American diplomats were available to everyone. But in order to analyze them and understand which documents are of interest and which are not, the efforts of professionals were required.

Simulated objectivity vs social navigation

The recent history of Russian media has in many ways become a story about a love affair with Western journalism. Moreover, the novel is unsuccessful

“You shouldn’t take the reader for a fool. He only needs facts, the rest he will figure out on his own” - this approach became dominant in post-Soviet editorial offices already in the early 90s. Journalism teachers and media executives rushed to study Western experience and immediately divided into two camps. The older ones defended the Soviet traditions of ideological reporting and insightful essays. Younger and more energetic people with sincere enthusiasm introduced into the corporate environment the idea that a reporter is a container for collecting and delivering information to the editorial office, and let publicists and experts give out smart thoughts.

However, Western standards of journalism in their pure form have never fully taken root anywhere, and particularly zealous attempts to impose a “dictatorship of objectivity” inevitably led the Russian media to bankruptcy. The main disappointment of the decade was the Russian Telegraph newspaper. Huge money was pumped into it, it collected the best writers in the country at that time, but the dogmatic approach to both people and texts did not leave the publication a chance to survive. Even the Kommersant newspaper, which is often cited as an example of successful “objective journalism,” did not so much take Western standards as a basis, but was able to use them to the extent that they do not contradict the Russian tradition of perception of journalistic text.

Along with hopes for a successful business, professional enthusiasm also evaporated. Even the most naive supporters of the new journalistic method, which supposedly was completely devoid of signs of ideological violence, by the end of the 90s finally realized: “objective journalism” can manipulate consciousness no worse than “subjective” journalism. The interpretation of an event is not necessarily expressed in the imposition of the author's point of view. A media product that seems to contain nothing but information is no less insidious. The choice of topics, the selection of experts, the status of placement, the angle of a photo or video, the tactics of emphasis and omissions - all this is a much more effective and cynical toolkit for brainwashing.

By the end of the 90s, the romantic period in the Russian media’s relationship with “bare objectivity” more or less ended and a painful search for a new language and new means of expression began. This process coincided with the expansion of the state in the media market, which led to many journalists simply “returning to the USSR” - either to party newspapers or to dissident kitchens. And ideological hysteria, so familiar to the older generation of journalists, began to dominate the media - both on one side and on the other.

New information technologies defused the situation. In just a couple of years they destroyed the very possibility of a monopoly in the sphere of information dissemination. This relieved some of the tension in the professional workshop, but other problems arose. Millions of bloggers rushed into the media space, and then into the journalistic profession, and with them a new type of media message emerged: a minimum of information, a maximum of emotions, speculation and subjective charisma. Another extreme has begun - a terrible lack of elementary objectivity.

Only now, after experiencing the frenzy of subjectivity and the suspended animation of objectivity, Russian journalism is slowly groping for a harmonious path of development. And the choice is no longer between “bare information” and “author’s self.” There is an obvious demand in society for real semantic quality. People are ready to pay not those who will provide them with the maximum news or entertainment, but those who will save them from noise, unnecessary information and emotions.

The media of the future are not chefs, but nutritionists. People will pay them to decide for them what is healthy and what is harmful, and formulate an optimal diet. In the next decade, the winners in the media market will be those media that, while maintaining high standards of journalistic work, will be able to become a social navigator for their audience, that is, the force that forms a complete version of the world and answers the main questions of eternity and modernity.

News for everyone vs alternative view

Leading Western media have formed a unified global information agenda, but in recent years they have had competitors

For the past few years I have had the main mainstream channels on all the time. And all this time I continue to be convinced that they have absolutely the same agenda, the same set of stories, the same approach to covering them: Libya, Syria, Pussy Riot, whatever - they cover all these topics in exactly the same way. - When Russia Today editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan talks about mainstream channels, she means, of course, not “First” or “Russia 1”, but CNN, BBC, Sky News...

And if the unanimity of Russian TV commentators is explained by reasons of an internal political nature, then the identical picture among world news leaders has deeper roots.

The bipolar world that existed before 1991 presupposed two ideologically charged, distinct views of the surrounding reality. The overall picture was formed at the intersection of these views. As a result, the propaganda machine of the USSR and its allies, which repeatedly, using all resources, reproduced, for example, information about the mass murder of civilians in the village of My Lai by American soldiers, prevented the United States from presenting, say, the war in Vietnam as a “peacekeeping operation.”

In addition, the Western intellectual environment, especially after the Paris Red May of 1968, was full of those who sympathized with the Eastern bloc. Sometimes these were opinion leaders such as Jean-Paul Sartre.

Today, English-language Chinese TV channels and the Russian Russia Today are also trying to make their contribution to the global agenda. And these attempts are not hopeless

With the collapse of the USSR, this counterbalance disappeared. And since the beginning of the 90s, most of the planet has gotten used to looking at events in the world “with one eye.” What news to watch and how to interpret it were determined, in fact, by several global market players - TV channels and news agencies. News that didn't make it to CNN or Reuters didn't exist for the rest of the world. And a one-sided interpretation at one time, for example, convinced almost the whole world that Saddam Hussein has nuclear weapons, that all Serbs are bloody murderers, and that Kosovars are all noble fighters for independence. In order to talk about no less brutal crimes committed by the same Kosovo Liberation Army, and also about other news that does not fall into a single agenda, it was necessary to destroy the information monopoly.

The first to do this were the Qatari sheikhs, who created the Al-Jazeera TV channel in 1996. Then Al Arabiya appeared. And the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq took place under slightly different conditions than the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia. Al-Jazeera, with the help of its correspondents, as well as Osama bin Laden with his simple mobile television studio, managed to destroy the information monopoly.

Today, English-language Chinese TV channels and the Russian Russia Today are also trying to make their contribution to the global agenda. And these attempts are not hopeless. “One of the Financial Times columnists once wrote: “To my surprise, the Russia Today television channel covered the protests on Wall Street most fully. What an irony - I would never have thought that I would switch to a Russian “controlled” TV channel in search of objective news,” says Margarita Simonyan.

Projects such as WikiLeaks can also be called gravediggers of a global information system that has existed for almost two decades. Julian Assange, in an interview with RR almost two years ago, said that he sees his mission as “making civilization fairer and smarter,” and the way to achieve this is “by spreading knowledge in general and knowledge that today is deliberately hidden from people, in particular". In essence, this is the expansion of the information agenda, albeit using more radical methods than Al-Jazeera or Russia Today do. Which, in fact, is what Assange’s imprisonment in the Ecuadorian embassy in London proves.

Infotainment vs realpolitik

Entertainment almost killed politics in the Russian media, but a turbulent political year brought live politics back into journalism

“Democratic freedoms are expressed to a very large extent in the fact that people are concerned not with politics, but with dandruff in the head, hair on the legs, sluggish bowel movements, unattractive breast shape, sore gums, excess weight and stagnation of blood circulation,” he wrote half a century ago. in the book “Understanding Media” by the famous Canadian philosopher Marshall McLuhan. Two decades later, the American socio-political media have finally adapted to the new social mentality.

The pioneer was the program “60 Minutes,” aired on the CBS channel, whose hosts began to actively express their opinions on current topics, and journalists appeared in the frame almost on a par with the heroes of the reports. It is curious that almost the same age as the American “60 Minutes” was the Soviet “Vzglyad”, which not only broke with the traditions of official television, but also fit well into the global trend of presenting serious information in an accessible form.

Nevertheless, the first decade of the new Russian political media passed in the “old regime,” albeit in the Western sense, spirit: highbrow analytics, seasoned with a fair amount of hard compromising evidence.

The breakthrough into the new media world happened only at the beginning of the 2000s, when Gazprom seized control of NTV and the part of the old team remaining on the channel accepted the rules of the game of the new owner. They consisted in the maximum depoliticization of all broadcasts, including political ones. News turns into an object of curiosity, the viewer is taken away from the issues and serious discussion of the political.

The embodiment of the new style is the socio-political program “Namedni” of 2001–2004, an example of domestic infotainment. According to its editor-in-chief Nikolai Kartozia, from the very beginning the creators of the program consciously focused on American models: abandoning the strict division of topics into domestic political, economic and international, moving away from the traditional hierarchy of plots (the new “Harry Potter” could well have preceded the presidential address to parliament ), figurativeness in the interpretation of events and the “reification” of news, increased interest in “non-essential” details. Long political science debates about the behind-the-scenes games of the Kremlin and the White House in the style of Kiselyov’s “Results” have finally gone out of fashion.

But after the death of “Namedni” in 2004, domestic infotainment lost its former Parfenov-like integrity and harmony: some of the programs went into outright trash, that is, into black stuff, others into pure entertainment, that is, into entertainment.

The result was summed up in a recent study by German analysts who studied the news broadcasting of Russian channels and came to the conclusion that, despite the extremely low proportion of political programs, the amount of negative content in it is one of the highest in the world.

The situation in the print media is a little better: the era of infotainment has not given rise to full-fledged tabloids, such as in the West, which do not allow the local elite to relax, constantly delving into the dirty laundry of political leaders, and in this sense, oddly enough, are the guarantors of democracy.

However, at the end of the 2000s, the situation began to change. The 24-hour news channel “Russia 24”, the domestic analogue of CNN and BBC, went on air. After the December elections last year, a number of talk shows and analytical programs appeared on federal channels to satisfy the sudden return of demand for politics.

Journalists, believe me, are only too happy about this,” says Channel One presenter Maxim Shevchenko. - For some time there were no such programs, not because someone prohibited something, but because there were no topics for serious reflection. Now the themes have appeared - and comprehension has appeared.

And finally, the Internet TV channel Dozhd unexpectedly launched. Its slogan - Optimistic channel - and the pink tones of the screensavers little correspond to the real content, which, in fact, is a return to classic infotainment.

There was never an idea to create a political news channel,” says Dozhd editor-in-chief Mikhail Zygar. - There was an idea to make a TV channel for an audience that had stopped watching TV. We tried to make television that would be interesting to us and to people like us who lack high-quality, smart, interesting television. And then, experimentally, it turned out that what viewers miss most is news. Entertainment on TV channels is okay, but information is not so good. Therefore, “tainment” is very widely present on domestic television, but “infa” is very far behind it.

It is clear that format or style does not solve the problem of meeting the demand for politics as public dialogue. To join one or another political position, that is, not to think, but to know exactly where the enemy is and where the friend is, can be boring, in the old fashioned way, but it can also be done in a new, fashionable way. Creative brainwashing is essentially no different from directive brainwashing. Organizing a meaningful discussion of politics, real public debate, is the most difficult thing, it is against the trend, but such attempts will continue as long as culture and politics exist.

Forgers vs Whistleblowers

A new round of information wars is facilitated by the development of technology, but it also makes it easier to expose falsifiers.

No one will give you a definition of information war. All scientific and pseudo-scientific literature on this topic is waste paper and fiction, which is needed in order for students of numerous quasi-PR universities to take tests. - Political strategist Gleb Pavlovsky has been through more than one information war, he is, as they say, in the know.

In its recent history, Russia has experienced several very “bloody” information wars, and, characteristically, each had much more far-reaching consequences than its soldiers and generals initially assumed. The long-term consequence of one of them - Yeltsin's re-election to a second presidential term in 1996 - was a firm conviction in the limitless capabilities of media technologists, which persists to this day, both among those in power and their opponents.

The 1999 information war against the gubernatorial front led by Luzhkov and Primakov brought Putin to power. Subsequently, only targeted information special operations were carried out - information support for the arrest of Khodorkovsky, the resignation of Luzhkov, or a temporary cooling of relations with Lukashenko.

Each of these battles raised difficult ethical and professional questions for journalists. On the one hand, they seem to be “commanders” on whom the success of the entire business depends, on the other hand they are only “cannon fodder”, putting their reputation at the service of other people’s financial and political interests. You have to look for compromises, negotiate - first of all with yourself.

Let’s take, for example, Dorenko, who killed Luzhkov in 1999,” Pavlovsky reflects. - On the one hand, he had an order, but on the other, he quite sincerely disliked the Moscow mayor, who negotiated well with business executives, but showed obvious contempt for the liberal public, in particular for journalists, for which he received punishment. In general, many of those journalists who then took the Yeltsin-Putin side, which at that time was clearly the weaker, of course, worked off the money, but at the same time were sincerely convinced that, as in ’96, they were choosing the lesser of two evils.

The journalist’s sincere belief that he is defending a “just cause” guarantees his fighting effectiveness like nothing else. When our media passions subsided somewhat in the 2000s, nothing like this was observed in the West, where they actually came to us from.

A recent example is the Western media's coverage of the Arab revolutions, when the floor was actually given to only one side - the rebels. From the latest: a couple of months ago, Western media vied with each other to quote a report about the escape from Syria of President Assad’s closest associate, Republican Guard General Manaf Tlass. When he “suddenly” returned to his homeland, this fact was passed over in silence. It is difficult to suspect Western journalists of having sold themselves to the rebels - they simply have a completely sincere, but no less definite ideological position.

A new round of information wars is beginning in Russia. And it is associated with a sharp increase in the media importance of the Internet. And now Alexei Navalny, in his blog, exposes the abuses of large state-owned companies, and does this on the basis of what seems to be a deliberate leak of information, organized using 90s technologies (as in the case of the materials of the Accounts Chamber on Transneft). In turn, the state media respond in the old fashioned way - with films like the entevash “Anatomy of a Protest”, in which the authors do not disdain splicing, editing, and outright falsification.

At the same time, the spread of new technologies and, above all, the Internet complicates the task of “inducing society into a state of uncontrollable ecstasy” - this is how Gleb Pavlovsky defined the results of Yeltsin’s election campaign in 1996. The fact is that journalistic revelations are now much easier to verify. When a few years ago, United Russia blogger Vladimir Burmatov published photos allegedly from extinguishing forest fires, he was quickly caught using a photo montage. So Navalny’s opponents regularly point out frequent inconsistencies in his publications.

Information wars at the new stage will obviously be complicated by the significantly more advanced audience for which they are intended. However, it is clearly not possible to avoid them.

When you read the news, sometimes it seems that the press only covers tragic, unpleasant or sad events. Why does the media focus on life's troubles and not on positive things? And how does this preponderance towards the negative characterize us - readers, listeners and viewers?

It's not that there are nothing else but bad things to happen. Perhaps journalists are more attracted to their coverage because a sudden catastrophe looks more attractive in the news than the slow development of a situation. Or maybe editors believe that shameless reporting on corrupt politicians or coverage of unpleasant events is easier to produce.

However, it is likely that we, readers and viewers, have simply trained journalists to pay more attention to such news. Many people say they would rather have good news, but is that really true?

To test this theory, researchers Mark Trussler and Stuart Soroka conducted an experiment at McGill University in Canada. According to scientists, previous studies of how people react to news were not entirely accurate. Either the course of the experiment was not sufficiently controlled (for example, the subjects were allowed to view the news from home - in such a situation it is not always clear who exactly in the family uses the computer), or too artificial conditions were created (people were invited to select news stories in the laboratory, where each participant knew: the experimenter carefully monitors his choice).

So Canadian researchers decided to try a new strategy: misleading their subjects.

Trick question

Trussler and Soroka invited volunteers from their university to come to the laboratory for an “eye movement study.” First, subjects were asked to select several political stories from a news site so that the camera could capture some “basic” eye movements. The volunteers were told that it was important to read the notes to get accurate measurements, but what exactly they read did not matter.

Maybe we like bad news? But why?

After the “preparation” phase, participants watched a short video clip (which they were told was the point of the study, but was actually just a distraction) and then answered questions about what kind of political news they wanted read.

The results of the experiment (as well as the most popular notes) turned out to be quite gloomy. Participants often chose negative stories—about corruption, failure, hypocrisy, and so on—instead of neutral or positive stories. Those with a general interest in current events and politics were especially likely to read bad news.

However, when asked directly, these people said they preferred good news. Typically, they said that the press paid too much attention to negative events.

Reaction to danger

The researchers present their experiment as conclusive evidence of so-called negativity bias, a psychological term that refers to our collective desire to hear and remember bad news.

According to their theory, it's not just about gloating, but also about evolution, which has taught us to quickly respond to a potential threat. Bad news can be a signal that we need to change our behavior to avoid danger.

As you would expect from this theory, there is evidence that people respond more quickly to negative words. In a laboratory experiment, try showing a subject the words “cancer,” “bomb,” or “war,” and he will press a button in response faster than if the screen said “baby,” “smile,” or “joy” (although these are pleasant words are used a little more often). We recognize negative words faster than positive ones, and can even predict that a word will be unpleasant before we even know what it is.

So is our alertness to potential threat the only explanation for our addiction to bad news? Probably no.

Another interpretation of Trussler and Soroka's findings is that we pay attention to bad news because we generally tend to idealize what's happening in the world. When it comes to our own lives, most of us think we are better than others and, according to a common cliché, we expect everything to work out well in the end. Such a rosy perception of reality leads to the fact that bad news comes as a surprise to us and we attach more importance to it. Dark spots, as you know, are noticeable only against a light background.

It turns out that the nature of our fascination with bad news can be explained not only by the cynicism of journalists or our internal desire for negativity. The reason may also be our ineradicable idealism.

On days when the news is not very good, this thought gives me hope that all is not lost for humanity.