Russian-Turkish War 1768-1774

Russian-Turkish War 1787-1791

1768-74 became the fifth military conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

The main contradiction remained the same - having free access to the Black Sea. And the formal reasons for the Russian-Turkish war can be called the following: Russian authorities, led by Catherine II, began to actively interfere in the political affairs of Poland, where at that time there was a war between oppositionists from the Bar Confederation and the ruling king Stanislaw Poniatowski. Russian troops fought on the side of the king.

Pursuing opposition troops, a Russian detachment of Cossacks invaded Turkish lands and occupied the small town of Balta. The Turkish authorities, having concluded an alliance with the Polish confederates and enlisting the support of Austria and France, declared war on Russia on September 25, 1768. Thus officially began the Russian-Turkish War of 1768-74.

In this war, Turkey aimed to expand its possessions by capturing Kyiv, Astrakhan and the Azov region; France and Austria hoped to weaken the influence of Russia and restore the former borders of Poland, and the Polish confederates hoped to finally seize power in the country.

Until the end of 1768, the parties did not conduct active military operations, but only gathered their forces and prepared for war. The army led by General Golitsyn slowly advanced, occupying the territory around the Dniester, towards And the second Russian army, commanded by General Rumyantsev, was supposed to protect the territory of Ukraine from Crimean-Turkish raids.

The fighting began in the winter of 1769, when a cavalry army invaded Ukrainian lands. As expected, this attack was repelled by Rumyantsev's army. At the same time, Russian troops captured Taganrog, cleared access to the Sea of ​​Azov and began creating the Azov flotilla.

The Russian-Turkish War of 1768-74 was significant in that during it the troops of the Ottoman Empire failed to win a single significant victory. At the same time, she suffered her most crushing defeats in the Battle of Chesme and in the Battle of Cahul.

The Battle of Chesma took place at the end of June 1770, when the Russian squadron, commanded by admirals Spiridov and Greig, as a result of a brilliant operation, was able to lock enemy ships in the bay near Chesma and completely destroy the Turkish fleet. As a result of this battle, the Turks lost 10 thousand, while the Russians lost only 11 people.

And in the land battle of July 21, 1770 at Cahul, the future Field Marshal Rumyantsev distinguished himself. His 17,000-strong army was able to defeat the 100,000-strong army of Halil Pasha. This happened thanks to the brilliant offensive tactics used by Rumyantsev. At some point, when the Turkish troops were especially violently pushing back the Russian troops, Rumyantsev himself rushed into battle and turned his soldiers, who began to retreat, to attack. After the first offensive, the Janissaries gave up, began to give up positions and scatter.

As a result of the battle, one and a half thousand people were lost on the Russian side, and more than 20 thousand on the Turks. After the greatest Kagul victory, the Turkish fortresses of Izmail and Kiliya surrendered.

From 1770 to 1774 The crisis intensified in the Ottoman Empire. Active military operations were carried out in the Caucasus and the Black Sea region, in which Russian troops won victories over and over again. The Turks practically did not receive the promised help from Poland, Austria and France. Therefore, in 1772, the Turkish authorities decided to begin negotiations on a truce. The main point on which the parties did not agree was the fate of Crimea. The Russian side insisted on the independence of Crimea, but the Turks refused this in every possible way. Therefore, without reaching a common opinion, the parties resumed hostilities.

In 1773-74, Russian troops were able to occupy the army under the command of Suvorov, which won brilliant victories near Girsov, Kozludzha and Turtukai.

In Georgia at this time there were also military operations with the Turks, although not as successfully as in Moldova and the Crimean steppes. In 1771, Catherine II ordered the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia, since she considered their stay there to be further useless. However, events in the Caucasus distracted the Turkish forces from the central theater of military operations, which also had a positive impact on the course of the war.

Finally, the Turkish authorities were forced to sign and fulfill all the conditions put forward by Russia. Thus ended the Russian-Turkish war of 1768-74. This happened in the small Bulgarian town of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi in July 1774.

The results of the Russian-Turkish war can be called the following: The Russian Empire received the territory between the Dnieper and the Bug, including the sea coast and Crimean fortresses. was declared an independent state, and the Russian merchant fleet received the right of unhindered passage through the straits. Thus, Russia was able to fulfill its maximum plan set in the Russian-Turkish war.

The beginning of the war. Battle of Chesma (1770)

By the second half of the 18th century, the times when Europeans associated the name of the Turks with the end of the world were long gone. However, the power of Turkey, or the Ottoman Porte, did not yet seem illusory to Europe. Having lost the sea to the Europeans, the Turks continued to be formidable opponents on land. This was all the more strange since European military art had stepped far forward, and the modus operandi of the Turkish army had hardly changed over the past three centuries. The Turks immediately brought a huge mass of troops into battle. Their first blow was terrible, but if the enemy managed to withstand it, then the battle was usually lost by the Turks. The Turkish troops easily succumbed to panic, and their numerical superiority turned against them, making it difficult to rebuild battle formations and repel the enemy counterattack. The Turks preferred to attack with large concentrations of cavalry. The most combat-ready part of the infantry were regular detachments of Janissaries, formed by forcibly recruiting boys and young men in the Christian parts of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish artillery was not inferior in quality to European artillery, but the Turks lagged behind in the organization of artillery.

Eugene Savoysky was the first to discover successful field battle tactics against the Turks at the beginning of the 18th century. The Austrian generalissimo initially sought to withstand the first onslaught of the Turks, building his troops in huge squares and protecting them with slingshots. If successful on the battlefield, he moved on to the siege of Turkish fortresses.

For a long time, the Russian army could not successfully resist the Turks: the Turkish campaigns during the time of Sophia ended ingloriously, Peter I suffered a disaster on the banks of the Prut. Only Field Marshal Minich, a student of the Prince of Savoy, managed to find the real course of action in the war with them. The Stavuchany victory, the capture of Khotin, and the occupation of Moldova were original feats and, at that time, brilliant. However, Minich also adhered to purely defensive tactics. The slow movements of troops, built in clumsy divisional squares, long sieges of fortresses, as well as the name of a foreigner and intolerable pride prevented Minich from winning decisive victories.

The war declared on Russia by Turkey in 1768 entailed fundamental changes in the actions of the Russian army. The Russians, under the command of Golitsyn and Rumyantsev, spent the first year of the war timidly, trying mainly to prevent a Turkish invasion. But 1770 deafened both the Turks and the Russians with the thunder of unheard-of victories. Rumyantsev's military talent suddenly showed up in full brilliance. He decided to destroy the slingshots, which instilled timidity in the soldiers, and attack the mounted masses of the Turks with small, agile squares. The success of this tactic was stunning. The 38,000-strong Russian army defeated 80,000 Turks at Larga, and then crushed the 150,000-strong army of the Grand Vizier on the Cahul River. The Battle of Cahul became the largest victory of the European army over the Turks in the entire history of their military conflicts.

Rumyantsev reported to Catherine about this victory: “May I be allowed, most gracious empress, to liken the present case to the deeds of the ancient Romans, whom Your Imperial Majesty ordered me to imitate: isn’t this what Your Imperial Majesty’s army now acts when it does not ask how great the enemy is, but only looking for where he is.”

Unfortunately, such glorious victories did not lead to the end of the war. Rumyantsev's military advantages, undoubted in the field of tactics, somehow strangely disappeared when it came to strategy. Here he was still captivated by outdated views. Instead of pursuing the Turks and building on their success, Rumyantsev took up the “proper” siege of Turkish fortresses, scattered his forces and wasted time, allowing the Turks to recover from their defeats. His caution extended to the point that he often did not give precise instructions to his subordinates in order to have an excuse in case of failure. Seeking glory, Rumyantsev feared disgrace, and spent 1771 in indecisive, sluggish actions.

The Empress herself showed much more determination. She developed amazing energy in herself, worked like a real chief of the general staff, went into the details of military preparations, drew up plans and instructions, hurried with all her might to build the Azov flotilla and frigates for the Black Sea, sent her agents to all corners and crannies of the Turkish Empire in search of , where to start a mess, conspiracy or uprising, raised the Imeretian and Georgian kings against the Turks and at every step came up against her unpreparedness for war: having decided to send a naval expedition to the shores of the Morea, she asked her ambassador in London to send her a map of the Mediterranean Sea and the Archipelago; trying to raise Transcaucasia, she was perplexed where Tiflis was located - on the Caspian, Black Sea coast, or inside the country. Her thoughts were dispelled by the Orlov brothers, who only knew how to decide, and not to think. At one of the first meetings of the council, which gathered on war matters under the chairmanship of the empress, Grigory Orlov proposed sending an expedition to the Mediterranean Sea. A little later, his brother Alexei, who was recovering his treatment in Italy, indicated the direct goal of the expedition: if we go, then go to Constantinople and free all Orthodox from the heavy yoke, and drive the infidel Mohammedans, according to the word of Peter the Great, into the empty and sandy fields and steppes , to their former homes. He himself asked to be the leader of the uprising of Turkish Christians.

It was necessary to have a lot of faith in providence, writes V.O. ironically. Klyuchevsky, in order to send a fleet for such a task, bypassing almost the entire Europe, which Catherine herself four years ago recognized as worthless. And he hastened to justify the review. As soon as the squadron, which sailed from Kronstadt (July 1769) under the command of Spiridov, entered the open sea, one ship of the latest construction turned out to be unfit for further voyage. The Russian ambassadors in Denmark and England, who inspected the passing squadron, were struck by the ignorance of the officers, the lack of good sailors, the many sick people and the despondency of the entire crew.

The squadron moved slowly. Catherine was losing her temper with impatience and asked Spiridov, for God’s sake, not to hesitate, to gather his spiritual strength and not to disgrace her in front of the whole world. Of the 15 large and small ships of the squadron, only 8 reached the Mediterranean Sea. When A. Orlov examined them in Livorno, his hair stood on end and his heart bled: no provisions, no money, no doctors, no knowledgeable officers. With a small detachment, he quickly raised the Morea against the Turks, but was defeated by the Turkish army that arrived in time and abandoned the Greeks to their fate, irritated by the fact that he did not find Themistocles in them. Having united with another Russian squadron that had meanwhile arrived, Orlov chased the Turkish fleet and in the Chios Strait near the Chesma fortress overtook an armada that was twice the size of the Russians. The daredevil was frightened when he saw “that structure,” and out of desperation he attacked it.

After a four-hour battle, when the Turkish flagship, which it had set on fire, took off after the Russian Eustathius, the Turks took refuge in Chesme Bay. A day later (June 26, 1770) on a moonlit night, the Russians launched fire ships and by morning the Turkish fleet crowded in the bay was burned. Not long before, Catherine wrote to one of her ambassadors: “If God pleases, you will see miracles.” And, Klyuchevsky notes, a miracle happened: a fleet worse than the Russian one was found in the Archipelago. “If we had not been dealing with the Turks, [we] would all have been easily crushed,” wrote A. Orlov.

The successes of Russian weapons turned France, Austria and Sweden against Russia. Catherine II entered into negotiations with the Sultan, but Turkey, having fully recovered from the shock, showed intransigence. “If the peace treaty does not preserve the independence of the Tatars [of Crimea], nor shipping on the Black Sea, then it can be truly said that with all the victories, we did not win a penny over the Turks,” Catherine expressed her opinion to the Russian envoy in Constantinople, “I will be the first to say that such a world will be as shameful as Prut and Belgrade in terms of circumstances.”

The year 1772 passed in fruitless negotiations, and in March 1773 hostilities resumed.

Arrival of Suvorov in the army

In the winter of 1772, Suvorov received orders to inspect the Russian-Swedish border “with a note of political circumstances.” As he expected, there was no serious military threat from Sweden. Upon returning to St. Petersburg, he managed to obtain an appointment to the Moldavian army from Catherine II. On April 4, the Military Collegium determined that Major General Suvorov should be sent to the 1st Army, giving him 2 thousand rubles granted by the highest authorities for the journey. Four days later, having received a travel passport, Suvorov left for the Rumyantsev army.

In early May he was already in Iasi. Rumyantsev received him rather coldly, without showing any distinction (envy and arrogance were among Rumyantsev’s unkind qualities) and appointed Suvorov to the corps of Lieutenant General Count Saltykov, located at the Negoeshti Monastery.

Suvorov's arrival in Moldova coincided with the beginning of active operations against the Turks. Back in February, Rumyantsev received orders from the Empress to go beyond the Danube, defeat the vizier and occupy the region to the Balkans. Rumyantsev did not fulfill this order - he had only about 50 thousand people, with whom he had to guard a cordon line 750 miles long, as well as the Wallachian and Moldavian principalities. Meanwhile, the Turkish forces in the Shumla area were growing and had already begun to harass Russian outposts on the Danube.

Battle of Turtukai

Rumyantsev developed a plan for conducting small-scale searches on the right bank of the Danube. The main one - the raid on Turtukai - was entrusted to Suvorov.

The Turtukai fortress covered the crossing of the Danube at the mouth of the Argesh River. The Danube here is not wide, and Turkish patrols often crossed themselves to the Russian shore.

Suvorov immediately found himself in his native, offensive element. He prepared 17 boats to ferry his 600 men. Since the mouth of Arges was under fire from Turkish artillery, he gave the order to secretly deliver the ships on carts. At the same time, he asked Saltykov for infantry for reinforcements.

On the evening of May 7, Suvorov once again inspected the crossing and went to bed at the outposts not far from the shore. Before dawn, he was awakened by gunshots and loud cries of “Alla, Alla!” - this Turkish detachment attacked the Cossacks. Jumping to his feet, Alexander Vasilyevich saw the Turks galloping not far from him. He barely had time to gallop away after the Cossacks.

With the help of infantry, the Turks were driven away. One of the prisoners testified that the Turtukai garrison reached 4 thousand people.

On the morning of May 8, carts with boats and reinforcements arrived. Saltykov sent cavalry. Suvorov is perplexed: why does he need her? Nevertheless, he schedules the crossing on the night of May 9 and sits down to write the disposition: the infantry will cross by boat, the cavalry will cross by swimming; the attack is carried out by two squares, the arrows disturb the enemy, the reserve does not reinforce unnecessarily; repulse Turkish raids offensively; the details depend on the circumstances and the skill of the commanders; Burn and destroy Turtukai; from each corporal allocate four people to take the loot, the rest should not be distracted by robbery; to spare wives, children and ordinary people very much, not to touch mosques and clergy, so that the enemy would spare Christian churches; God help you!

Suvorov is worried about the lack of infantry in his detachment. He writes several notes one after another to Saltykov, where he persistently repeats: “Alas, there are few infantry; the carabinieri is extraordinary, but what should they do on the other side?”; “It still seems to me that there are not enough infantry, and hardly more than 500.” In the last note, he assures Saltykov that “everything will be fine, as [if] God favors” and adds: “And there seems to be little infantry.” Suvorov needs a resounding success, so he does not want to rely on one surprise. The notes reflect not wavering will, but the mature deliberation of his actions.

In the evening, Alexander Vasilyevich once again drove around the shore and placed the battery himself.

As night fell, the Russians began crossing. The Turks opened fire, but in the darkness they were unable to do much damage. The Russians lined up in a square and charged with bayonets. The attack was carried out hotly, the officers were the first to attack the enemy batteries. The excitement was so great that no prisoners were taken. Suvorov was in one of the squares. An exploding Turkish cannon wounded him in the right leg and side, and he, bleeding, was forced to fight off the oncoming Janissary. Help arrived in time and repulsed him. Three Turkish camps near the city and Turtukai itself were taken quickly, and at four o’clock in the morning it was all over. The city was mined and blown up, and 700 local Christians were transported to the Russian shore. Turkish losses reached 1,500 people; The Russians wounded about 200, there were few killed, mostly those who drowned during the crossing.

Even before dawn, while his leg and side were being bandaged, Suvorov sent short notes to Saltykov and Rumyantsev informing them of their success. “Your Excellency, we won,” he wrote to Saltykov, “glory to God, glory to you.” He apparently liked the second part of the phrase because of its rhythm, and in a note to Rumyantsev he joked:

Glory to God, glory to you,
Turtukai has been taken and I am there.

Returning to his shore, Suvorov built a square and served a prayer service. The soldiers generously provided the priests with looted gold and silver.

On the same day, having rested, Alexander Vasilyevich began to write a detailed report to Saltykov. In it, he firmly defines the price of victory: “Everyone here rejoiced greatly... Truly yesterday we were veni, vade, vince (distorted “veni, vidi, vici: “I came, I saw, I conquered.” - S.Ts.), and I'm so first-timer. I will continue to serve Your Excellency; I am a simple-minded person. Just, father, let’s quickly get the second class (that is, the Order of St. George, II degree. - Author).” Two days later, he repeats in the same naive tone: “Do not abandon, Your Excellency, my dear comrades, and for God’s sake do not forget me. It seems that I really deserved the St. George second class; No matter how cold I am towards myself, it seems to me that way too. My chest and broken side hurt a lot, my head seemed to be swollen; forgive me for going to Bucharest for a day or two to take a steam bath..."

Suvorov's victory looked even more impressive against the backdrop of the failure of the other searches, in one of which the Turks killed 200 Russian soldiers and officers and captured Prince Repnin. Alexander Vasilyevich received the reward he asked for.

A period of inaction ensued, and the Turks restored the fortifications of Turtukay. Suvorov was powerless to do anything against this and dispelled his melancholy by zealously preparing his troops. Unfortunately, before he had time to recover from his wound, he fell ill with local fever. Severe paroxysms were repeated every other day, and on June 4 Suvorov requested to go to Bucharest for treatment. But the next day he received an order from Rumyantsev for a new search on Turtukai. Alexander Vasilyevich immediately felt better, which he immediately reported to Saltykov, hoping to take charge of the matter. However, on June 7, a sharp exacerbation of the disease occurred, and Suvorov was forced to entrust the command of the operation to Prince Meshchersky. Still, Alexander Vasilyevich personally drew up a “good disposition” and scheduled a search on the night of June 8, trusting that his replacement officers would repeat his dashing raid a month ago. Imagine his indignation when he learned that the search had failed: the Russians caught the Turks on their guard and returned. Enraged, Suvorov left for Bucharest without speaking to anyone. On the same day, he wrote a letter of justification to Saltykov: everything was ready - both the flotilla and the disposition, “it’s disgusting to talk about the rest; Your Excellency will guess for yourself, but let it be between us; I’m a stranger, I don’t want to make enemies for myself here.” The vagueness of expressions in the official report is due to the fact that one of the main culprits of the failure - Colonel Baturin - was friendly with Suvorov, which forced Alexander Vasilyevich to restrain his expressions. But in a private letter the next day, Suvorov gives vent to his feelings: “G.B. [Baturin] is the reason for everything; everyone was scared. Could there be such a colonel in the Russian army? Isn't it better to be a governor, or even a senator? What a shame! Everyone was afraid, their faces were not the same. For God's sake, Your Excellency, burn the letter. Again, I remind you that I don’t want [myself] an enemy here and would rather give up everything than wish to have one... My God, when I think about what meanness this is, my veins are torn!”

Suvorov suffers from a fever, from shame for his subordinates and from fears that the need for a search may pass. On June 14, half ill, he returns to Negoiesti and schedules a new attack on the night of the 17th. The disposition is the same, but, given the previous failure, Suvorov orders “the rear ones to be pushed very much onto the front ones.”

This time, about 2,500 people crossed to the Turkish coast. The battle was stubborn and lasted four hours. Almost all Russian officers were wounded. Baturin's two columns again almost ruined the whole thing by not supporting the attack in time. However, the rest of the troops performed well, even the new recruits. Suvorov himself, due to another attack of fever, walked leaning on two Cossacks, and spoke so quietly that he kept an officer next to him, repeating his orders. The victory gave him strength, and at the end of the battle, Alexander Vasilyevich mounted his horse.

Turtukai was destroyed for the second time. This time, the crossing of the Danube by other Russian detachments was also successful. Rumyantsev besieged Silistria. Suvorov did not send his detachment with a flotilla to reinforce Saltykov, but asked to return to Negoesti: “Order, your Excellency, that I with all my group turn to Negoesti; it is not great... Believe me, your Excellency is of no great use to us, and even more so to me, I need to recover; If consumption comes, I won’t be fit for purpose.” Apparently he was on the verge of exhaustion. Saltykov allowed not to take part in the offensive, especially since soon the Russian troops that had crossed to the Turkish coast began to gather at the crossings again. Rumyantsev did not have enough strength for a wide offensive. General Weissman was tasked with covering the retreat. On June 22, at Kuchuk-Kainardzhi, Weisman's 5,000-strong detachment inflicted a complete defeat on the 20,000-strong Turkish army. Weisman himself, standing in the front rank of the square, received a mortal wound in the chest. As he fell, he only managed to say: “Don’t tell people.” Weisman was one of the most capable generals of the Russian army and a favorite of the soldiers. Their rage at the loss of their beloved commander exceeded all measure: the Russians not only did not take prisoners in this battle, but also killed those who had already surrendered before Weisman’s death. Weisman's military talent was of the same kind as Suvorov's, and Alexander Vasilyevich, not being personally acquainted with Weisman, felt this very well. His grief was sincere. “So I was left alone,” he wrote, having received confirmation of the death of the young general.

By early August, balance at the front had been restored.

Weisman's death forced Rumyantsev to take a closer look at Suvorov. The commander-in-chief decided to remove Alexander Vasilyevich from direct subordination to Saltykov and give him the opportunity to act independently. This marked the beginning of a long-term friendship between the two commanders, which lasted until Rumyantsev’s death. Both of them, by the way, were very hostile towards possible rivals in military glory, and did not tarnish their relationship with either intrigue or envious squabbles.

Suvorov's release from Saltykov's command had another reason. Their relationship seemed good only in appearance, but in reality it was very strained. The inactive nature of the chief provoked open ridicule from Suvorov, who, with the air of a simpleton, compared the three generals - Kamensky, Saltykov and himself: “Kamensky knows military affairs, but it does not know him; Suvorov does not know military affairs, but it knows it, and Saltykov is neither familiar with military affairs, nor is he known to him.” Saltykov himself was glad to get rid of the subordinate with whom he was stabbed in the eyes. So, Kamensky shrugged his shoulders with an innocent look: “I don’t know which of the two of them is the boss in Negoesti.”

Suvorov was unable to leave immediately upon Rumyantsev’s call - he slipped on the wet stairs of the Negoesti Monastery and, falling on his back, was badly injured. He could barely breathe and was taken to Bucharest, where he spent two weeks.

Battle of Girsovo

Upon Suvorov’s recovery, Rumyantsev entrusted him with a very important task: a search in the Girsovo area - the only point on the other side of the Danube that was held by the Russians and which had already been attacked by the Turks twice. Rumyantsev did not embarrass Suvorov with detailed instructions, and reported to Catherine II: “I entrusted the important Girs post to Suvorov, who confirmed his readiness and ability for any task.” Generals Ungarn and Miloradovich were ordered to support Suvorov.

Suvorov did not have to look for the Turks. On the night of September 3, he was informed that Turkish cavalry had appeared 20 versts from Girsov. The Cossacks received orders to lure her closer under the fire of Russian redoubts. Suvorov observed the actions of the Turks from the forward trench (auxiliary field fortification, a 4-cornered trench with bastions at the corners). The Turkish cavalry indeed at first chaotically pursued the Cossacks, but when the latter cleared the field, the Janissaries sitting behind the horsemen dismounted, unexpectedly lined up in three rows in the European style and moved forward. Suvorov realized that the Turks were demonstrating the lessons learned from the French officers; he pointed out their maneuvers to his subordinates and laughed heartily.

The Russian cannons were camouflaged in the bastions, so Suvorov did not order the artillerymen to reveal themselves until the last minute. The Turks had already approached the forward redoubt, and still no one responded to their shooting. They calmly surrounded the trench from all sides and suddenly attacked it so quickly that Suvorov barely had time to move inside the fortification. Grapeshot volleys cut off their first ranks and threw them into confusion. The grenadiers struck from the trench with bayonets; on the other hand, Miloradovich’s brigade was pressing on the Turks.

For some time the Turks held out very stubbornly, but then fled in disorder. The hussars and Cossacks pursued them for 30 miles until the horses were exhausted.

The Girsovo affair cost the 10,000-strong Turkish detachment 1,500 killed; Russian losses amounted to 200 soldiers and officers. The battle ended the 1773 campaign.

Beginning of the 1774 campaign

In February 1774, Suvorov received a rescript from Catherine II regarding promotion to lieutenant general. The limits of his independence have expanded even wider, and Rumyantsev entrusts him with joint actions with Lieutenant General Kamensky on the other side of the Danube. Repnin's division had to go to his aid at the first request of Alexander Vasilyevich. Rumyantsev allowed Suvorov and Kamensky to act at their discretion, without directly subordinating one to the other.

The Turks were also preparing for active action. Sultan Abdul-Hamid, who ascended the throne in place of his recently deceased brother, although he preferred to spend time in harem pleasures, called on the faithful to crush the infidels and ordered the Grand Vizier to go on the offensive.

The 1774 campaign opened in May. On the 28th, Kamensky moved to Bazardzhik. Suvorov was supposed to cover his movement, but due to the delay of replenishment, he was able to set out only on May 30. To make up for time, he did not move along the agreed road, but along the shortest one, which turned out to be extremely bad. At the same time, hoping to quickly reach the designated point, Suvorov did not warn Kamensky about changing his route. Kamensky was amazed when he lost sight of Suvorov’s troops and immediately reported to Rumyantsev, but he answered evasively that Kamensky himself had the ability to force Suvorov to obey. Rumyantsev was disingenuous: Kamensky did not have such an opportunity precisely because of the strange softness of the commander-in-chief, who allowed dual command in this operation; Suvorov, condemning dual command as a harmful thing in general, in this case willingly took advantage of this circumstance.

On June 2, Kamensky, after a successful business, occupied Bazardzhik and stopped there, awaiting Suvorov’s approach. Without waiting, on May 9 he moved to the village of Yushenli to attack Shumla. Only here Kamensky received news of Suvorov’s approach, thus remaining in uncertainty for 10 days.

During these movements, the vizier, not yet knowing about the Russian offensive, ordered Effendi Abdul-Razak and the Janissary Agha with 40 thousand people to go to Girsa. The Turks set out from Shumla to Kozludzhi on the day Kamensky left Bazardzhik.

Battle of Kozludzhi

On June 9, Turks and Russians from different sides entered the forest in the Kozludzha area and began to approach each other, unaware of each other. Suvorov, having connected with Kamensky, postponed explanations until another time and immediately went on reconnaissance. On the way, he learned about the Cossack attack on Turkish outposts. The Cossacks were driven away, but took several prisoners. Suvorov reinforced the Cossacks with cavalry, and he himself followed them with infantry. We had to walk along narrow paths, in complete uncertainty regarding the enemy’s location. Suddenly, from behind the trees and bushes, cavalry appeared, driven forward by the Albanians. The horsemen crashed into the Russian infantry and confused its formations; panic began and turned into flight. The Albanians, in order to increase the horror among the Russians, cut off the heads of prisoners before their eyes. Suvorov could not do anything, and he himself barely escaped from the spagi who attacked him (cavalry units recruited by the Turks from the inhabitants of North Africa). “In this battle,” he said, “I was captured and pursued by the Turks for a very long time. Knowing the Turkish language, I myself heard their agreement among themselves not to shoot at me or chop me down, but to try to take me alive: they found out that it was me. With this intention, they overtook me several times so close that they almost grabbed my jacket with their hands; but at each of their attacks my horse rushed forward like an arrow, and the Turks chasing me suddenly fell behind by several fathoms. That’s how I was saved!”

The brigade of Prince Mochebelov arrived in time and drove off the Albanians. Suvorov again led the troops forward. There was terrible stuffiness in the forest. Suvorov's troops arrived at Kozludzhi after a tiring night march, the horses were not watered, many soldiers fell dead from heatstroke and exhaustion.

Thus, Suvorov walked 9 miles, fighting off the Turks from time to time, and finally emerged from the forest. At that moment, as if taking pity on the Russians, a downpour poured in, refreshing the exhausted people and horses. The downpour seriously damaged the Turks, wetting their long clothes and, most importantly, the cartridges and gunpowder that the Turks kept in their pockets.

8 thousand Russians came out of the forest into the clearing, without artillery.

The Turkish army, formed on the heights in front of the camp, opened fire. Suvorov quickly formed troops in a square in two lines and sent rangers forward. The Turks repulsed them and attacked the square several times, frustrating some of them, but the Russians, reinforced by a second line, continued to move forward.

The Turks gradually converged on the camp, the approach to which was covered by a ravine. Suvorov placed 10 guns that had arrived in front of the camp and, after a short bombardment, attacked with cavalry in front. Russian fire and the sight of Cossack lava with peaks at the ready filled the Turks with horror. There was complete chaos in the camp, the Janissaries cut off the tracks of the artillery horses and shot at their riders in order to get a horse for themselves. Several shots were even fired at Abdul Razaq, who was trying to stop the fugitives.

Battle of Kozludzhi June 9, 1774 Engraving of Buddeus from a drawing by Schubert. 1795

By sunset, the camp with trophies was in the hands of Suvorov. The pursuit of the Turks continued until night. Thus, Suvorov’s soldiers spent the whole day on the march, under fire and in hand-to-hand combat; Suvorov himself did not get off his horse all this time.

Official documents about the battle of Kozludzhi are confusing and contradictory, including those coming from Suvorov himself. In his autobiography, he gives a somewhat comical explanation for this: “I am not responsible for the report, below [and also] for my report, due to the weakness of my health.” But his state of health, as we have seen, allowed Suvorov to endure the terrible strain of his strength; the paper confusion was caused by the fact that the battle was a complete improvisation on both sides, was entirely determined by the “tactics of circumstances,” was accompanied by incredible turmoil, and was completely not coordinated with Kamensky. In addition, Suvorov did not want to admit that he was on the verge of defeat several times, and only his usual determination helped correct the situation. Fortunately, this time nothing was damaged from the clash between Suvorov and Kamensky except the service-hierarchical principle. Kamensky managed to swallow the insult in silence and, in his report to Rumyantsev, praised the actions of everyone, and Suvorov in particular. But from now on they began to treat each other with hostility, which grew over the years. The strength of this enmity can be judged by the fact that in 1799, Kamensky’s son, having fallen under the command of Suvorov in Italy, doubted a good reception, however, in vain.

Kuchuk-Kainardzhi world

This stupid victory also had stupid consequences. At the military council, it was decided to wait for food to be delivered and not go to Shumla until then. This was all the more surprising since the vizier in Shumla after the battle at Kozludzha had only about a thousand people. Suvorov and Kamensky spent six days inactive. Rumyantsev was dissatisfied: “It’s not days and hours, but moments in this state of the road.” In 1792, Alexander Vasilyevich, recalling this episode, made excuses: “Kamensky prevented me from moving the theater of war through Shumla to the Balkans.” Suvorov himself had few troops, and they were exhausted. Obviously, Kamensky not only did not want to follow him, but also demanded obedience, and Suvorov, apparently feeling guilty for his past “amateur action,” did not insist. They could no longer be together. Rumyantsev again subordinated Suvorov to Saltykov, and he left for Bucharest.

The battle of Kozludzhi was the last in this war. Türkiye entered into negotiations with Russia, which Rumyantsev conducted quite well. On July 10, the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace Treaty was concluded. Russia received Kinburn, Azov, Kerch, free navigation in the Black Sea and 4.5 million rubles in indemnity. The independence of the Crimean Khanate from the Ottoman Empire was proclaimed, which significantly weakened Turkey’s position in the Northern Black Sea region.


Map of the Russian Empire indicating territorial acquisitions under the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Treaty (highlighted in red).

§ 134. First period of external relations. Türkiye (1768–1774)

At a time when Empress Catherine's attention was turned to pacifying the Polish confederates and the Haydamak movement, Turkey declared war on Russia (1768). The pretext for this was the border robberies of the Haidamaks (who ravaged the border towns of Balta and Galta); the real reason was that the Turks were under the influence of France, hostile to Russia, and, at her suggestion, found this moment convenient for settling their long-standing scores with Russia. Hoping that Russian troops were occupied in Poland, the Turks counted on success. Indeed, they took Catherine by surprise. But the empress showed great energy and courage and began to actively gather forces for the fight. In the first year (1769) of the war, they managed to inflict a sensitive defeat on the Turks (at the Khotyn fortress). The second year of the war (1770) was unusually successful. Count Rumyantsev, with amazing skill, twice defeated several times the strongest enemy near the river. Prut, on the Larga and Kagul rivers. The Cahul victory was especially important and brilliant, opening the road to the Danube and even beyond the Danube for Rumyantsev.

Pyotr Aleksandrovich Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky

At the same time, the Russian fleet was sent from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean under the command of Count Alexei Orlov. Orlov raised a Greek uprising against the Turks in the Peloponnese and met with the Turkish fleet near the island. Chios. After a terrible battle in the Chios Strait and in Chesme Bay, the entire Turkish fleet was burned (the heroes of these battles were admirals Spiridov and Greig). The Chesme victory brought the entire Archipelago into Orlov’s power; but he failed to penetrate the Dardanelles. The fame of Cahul and Chesme spread throughout Europe; it paralyzed the energy of the Turks. The further war was waged on the Danube itself, because the Turks no longer dared to act north of this river and limited themselves to defending its banks. More than once Rumyantsev managed to cross the Danube with his army and besiege the Danube fortresses; but it was impossible to stay behind the Danube for a long time due to lack of provisions. However, in 1774, Rumyantsev, having crossed the Danube, went by different roads to the Shumle fortress, and his advanced detachments even reached the Balkan Mountains. For the extraordinary feat of the first Russian crossing of the Danube and for moving the war deep into Turkey, Catherine awarded Rumyantsev the rank of field marshal and the title “Transdanubian”. The second Russian army (Prince Dolgoruky) acted no less successfully: it captured the entire Crimea and established itself there. It became clear to the Turks that the war could not end well for them.

Russian-Turkish War 1768-1774. Map

In 1774, in the Russian camp on the right (southern) bank of the Danube, in the village of Kyuchuk-Kainardzhi, there was

France pushed Turkey to war against Russia. The Ottoman Empire demanded that Russia stop patronizing dissidents and withdraw its troops from Poland. Having received a refusal, the Porte declared war on Russia at the end of 1768. (Application IN)

Compared to the first half of the 18th century. The balance of forces has changed not in favor of Turkey. The Ottoman Empire gradually fell into decline, its state structure and army were completely archaic. Meanwhile, the size and combat experience of the Russian army increased significantly. But still, Russia was not ready for war. Preparations have begun. General Prince Alexander Mikhailovich Golitsyn and General Count Pyotr Aleksandrovich Rumyantsev were appointed commanders-in-chief of the two armies.

Due to the aggravation of Russian-Turkish relations, since 1769, the Empress concentrated all power in the country in the Council she created at the Supreme Court - the highest advisory body, in which she certainly presided. The Council, consisting of 8 people, consisted of the most prominent statesmen - A.A. Vyazemsky, A.A. Bezborobko, P.A. Rumyantsev, G.A. Potemkin and others (after the war, the Council continued to act both on issues of military and foreign policy , and domestic policy).

On April 15, 1769, the Russian army crossed the Dniester in order to prevent the Turks from entering Poland. A.M. Golitsyn did not besiege the Khotin fortress: there was not enough artillery and food. Moldavia was plundered by the Turks, and the Russian army returned to the left side of the Dniester.

In June, a 200,000-strong Turkish army crossed the Dniester, but Major General Prozorovsky pushed him back. Golitsyn again approached Khotin and surrounded him. The Turks sent forty thousand Tatars to help the fortress. On June 22, the Crimean Khan attacked Russian troops, but retreated with heavy losses. The Turks joined the Tatars, and now the number of enemy troops amounted to more than 100 thousand people, however, it was decided to move to the left bank of the Dniester again. On September 6, Russian troops dealt a crushing blow to the Turks, who left Khotyn and moved to Iasi. A.M. Golitsyn was recalled to St. Petersburg. His place was taken by P.A. Rumyantsev, who had previously commanded the Second Army, operating between the Don and the Dnieper.

The fighting was conducted passively. In 1770 P.A. Rumyantsev, at the head of the first army, launched an offensive towards the Danube. In a stubborn 8-hour battle on the Larga River (a tributary of the Prut), the Russian army put the Turkish troops to flight, inflicting especially heavy damage on the cavalry of the Crimean Khan. In the next battle on the Cahul River, Rumyantsev, having only 27 thousand soldiers with 118 guns, attacked and defeated the Turkish army, numbering 150 thousand and 180 guns. The victory was achieved thanks to the skillful maneuver of the Russian troops, skillful artillery actions and the courage of the soldiers in bayonet combat. After this victory, Rumyantsev captured the important Turkish fortresses of Izmail, Kiliya and Brailov. The second army of P.I. Panin occupied Bendery.

From the very beginning of the war, Catherine wanted to tear Crimea away from the Turks and make it independent. The order to deal a crushing blow to the Crimean Khanate and force it to abandon Turkish patronage was given to the commander of the Second Army, Count Pyotr Ivanovich Panin. A squadron was sent to the Mediterranean, which left Kronstadt under the command of Admiral G.A. Spiridova. It was tasked with assisting the Greek rebel movement against Turkish rule and blocking the sea routes to and from Istanbul.

A brilliant victory was also won at sea. Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral G.A. Spiridov, having circumnavigated Europe, arrived in the Mediterranean Sea and inflicted a severe defeat on the superior forces of the Turks in Chesme Bay. Taking advantage of the crowding of Turkish ships, Spiridov used fire ships - torch ships - against them. The fire spread from side to side, and the entire Turkish squadron was destroyed. .

In 1770 and 1771 further successes were achieved. Rumyantsev's troops crossed the Danube several times. The Russian army occupied Crimea in 1771. The Turks were forced to negotiate. However, relying on the support of France and Austria, they refused to grant independence to Crimea, which Russia insisted on. In 1773, fighting resumed. Russian troops launched an offensive deep into the Balkans, but failed at Varna and Shumla. Meanwhile, the peasant war that had begun in Russia demanded an early conclusion of peace. In 1774, Russian troops numbering about 24 thousand people under the command of A.V. Suvorov defeated the forty-thousand-strong Turkish corps at Kozludzha. Türkiye was forced to resume negotiations. The negotiations on the Russian side were led by Prince Nikolai Vasilyevich Repnin. In St. Petersburg they were satisfied with the concluded peace.

On July 10, 1774, peace was signed in the Bulgarian village of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi. Russia received a strip of the Black Sea coast between the mouths of the Dnieper and the Southern Bug with the fortress of Kinburg, Kerch and Yenikale in the Crimea, Kuban and Kabarda. Crimea was recognized as independent from the Ottoman Empire. Moldova and Wallachia actually came under Russian protection. Türkiye also paid an indemnity of four million rubles.

Thus, the results of the intense war had enormous consequences for Russia: the fertile lands of the northern Black Sea region became the object of economic development; Crimea, from where the khans carried out predatory raids for many centuries, ceased to be a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, which strengthened the security of Russia’s southern borders.

Annexation of Crimea and the Kuban region.

The annexation of Crimea to Russia promised several benefits: it provided freedom of navigation on the Black Sea, and freed Russia from maintaining many fortresses on the peninsula remote from the mainland. But there was no reason to convince the empress of the advisability of annexing Crimea, because she perfectly understood how much her fame would increase as a result of such an event. Catherine herself reminded Potemkin several times of his plan.

On May 30, 1783, she wrote to the prince: “God grant that the Tatar or, better said, the Crimean affair will end soon”; June 9: “Don’t delay with the occupation of Crimea”; June 13: “It is desirable that you occupy Crimea as soon as possible, so that the opponents do not somehow cause unnecessary obstacles.”

But Potemkin had strong motives not to rush - he considered it more beneficial for Russia that the “wart on the nose,” as he called Crimea, be eliminated non-operatively, that is, without the use of weapons. He informed the Empress: “I am in favor of them asking for citizenship themselves, I think that it will be more pleasing to you.” This time Potemkin turned out to be more perspicacious than Catherine, probably because he had the opportunity to observe the events in Crimea from a close distance.

Khan Shagin-Girey, placed on the throne by Suvorov, was soon forced to flee from the persecution of his next rival to the Petrovsky Fortress under the protection of Russian troops. Here Potemkin and Suvorov convinced Shagin-Girey to voluntarily accept Russian citizenship. The former khan rightly reasoned that it was much preferable to live on full board for the empress than to while away his time in distant Siberia as an exile. Moreover, Catherine, having received the news of the Khan’s abdication, gave Potemkin the following instructions: “The Khan renounced the Khanate. And there is nothing to regret about that, just order him to be treated kindly and with respect befitting an owner, and to give out what was assigned to him.”

The annexation of Crimea to Russia was to be formalized after Shagin-Girey left the peninsula. But the former khan delayed leaving, counting on the fact that he would have defenders abroad. However, there were no such people.

Finally, on July 10, the Empress received the long-awaited dispatch from Potemkin: “In three days, I congratulate you on the Crimea. All the nobles have already sworn allegiance, now everyone will follow them.”

At the same time as the Crimean Tatars, the Nogais swore allegiance to Russia. The ceremony took place in a small fortress at the mouth of the Yeya River - the Yeisk fortification, which was Suvorov's headquarters. About six thousand Crimean and Nogai Tatars gathered there, Shagin-Girey was also present, announcing to them that he was voluntarily relinquishing his khan's dignity, giving him the right to choose a successor, and he himself decided to lead a private life.

A celebration began that lasted three days. One hundred bulls and eight hundred sheep were eaten, and five hundred buckets of plain vodka were drunk.

This is how Crimea was annexed. Suvorov received the Order of St. Vladimir, first degree, as a reward, and Potemkin received the title of Field Marshal and Tauride Governor-General. Shagin-Girey was not left without awards - the size of his pension was 200 thousand rubles a year; the empress promised to keep the faith of her new subjects intact. All income (customs, salt, and land) was allowed to be spent on the needs of the region.