First trip to Crimea. Ancient Rus'

First Crimean campaign (1687). It took place in May 1687. Russian-Ukrainian troops took part in it under the command of Prince Vasily Golitsyn and Hetman Ivan Samoilovich. The Don Cossacks of Ataman F. Minaev also took part in the campaign. The meeting took place in the area of ​​the Konskie Vody River. The total number of troops that set out on the campaign reached 100 thousand people. More than half of the Russian army consisted of regiments of the new system. However, the military power of the allies, sufficient to defeat the Khanate, turned out to be powerless in the face of nature. The troops had to walk tens of kilometers through deserted, sun-scorched steppe, malarial swamps and salt marshes, where there was not a drop of fresh water. In such conditions, the issues of supplying the army and a detailed study of the specifics of a given theater of military operations came to the fore. Golitsyn's insufficient study of these problems ultimately predetermined the failure of his campaigns.
As people and horses moved deeper into the steppe, they began to feel a lack of food and fodder. Having reached the Bolshoi Log tract on July 13, the Allied troops were faced with a new disaster - steppe fires. Unable to fight the heat and the soot that covered the sun, the weakened troops literally collapsed. Finally, Golitsyn, seeing that his army could die before meeting the enemy, ordered to go back. The result of the first campaign was a series of raids by Crimean troops on Ukraine, as well as the removal of Hetman Samoilovich. According to some participants in the campaign (for example, General P. Gordon), the hetman himself initiated the burning of the steppe, because he did not want the defeat of the Crimean Khan, who served as a counterweight to Moscow in the south. The Cossacks elected Mazepa as the new hetman. Second Crimean Campaign (1689). The campaign began in February 1689. This time Golitsyn, taught by bitter experience, set out into the steppe on the eve of spring so as not to have a shortage of water and grass and not to be afraid of steppe fires. For a hike

an army of 112 thousand people was assembled. Such a huge mass of people slowed down their movement speed. As a result, the campaign to Perekop lasted almost three months, and the troops approached the Crimea on the eve of the hot summer. In mid-May, Golitsyn met with Crimean troops. After volleys of Russian artillery, the rapid attack of the Crimean cavalry choked and was never resumed. Having repelled the onslaught of the khan, Golitsyn approached the Perekop fortifications on May 20. But the governor did not dare to storm them. He was frightened not so much by the power of the fortifications as by the same sun-scorched steppe lying beyond Perekop. It turned out that, having passed along the narrow isthmus to the Crimea, a huge army could find itself in an even more terrible waterless trap.
Hoping to intimidate the khan, Golitsyn began negotiations. But the owner of Crimea began to delay them, waiting until hunger and thirst would force the Russians to go home. Having stood for several days at the Perekop walls to no avail and being left without fresh water, Golitsyn was forced to hastily turn back. Further standstill could have ended in disaster for his army. The Russian army was saved from a larger failure by the fact that the Crimean cavalry did not particularly pursue the retreating ones.

QUESTION No. 13 AZOV CAMPAIGNS OF PETER I Azov campaigns 1695 and 1696 - Russian military campaigns against the Ottoman Empire; were a continuation of the war started by the government of Princess Sophia with the Ottoman Empire and Crimea; undertaken by Peter I at the beginning of his reign and ended with the capture of the Turkish fortress of Azov. They can be considered the first significant accomplishment of the young tsar. In 1694, it was decided to resume active hostilities and strike not at the Crimean Tatars, as in Golitsyn’s campaigns, but at the Turkish fortress of Azov. The route was also changed: not through the desert steppes, but along the Volga and Don regions. In the winter and spring of 1695, transport ships were built on the Don: plows, sea boats and rafts for the delivery of troops, ammunition, artillery and food for redeployment to Azov. In the spring In 1695, the army in 3 groups under the command of Gordon (9,500 people with 43 guns and 10 mortars), Golovin (7,000 people) and Lefort (13,000 people - with the last two: 44 pikes, 104 mortars) moved south. During the campaign, Peter combined the duties of the first bombardier and the de facto leader of the entire campaign. From the Ukrainian side, Sheremetyev’s group and Mazepa’s Cossacks acted. On the Dnieper, the Russian army recaptured three fortresses from the Turks (July 30 - Kyzy-Kermen, August 1 - Eski-Tavan, August 3 - Aslan-Kermen), and at the end of June the main forces besieged Azov (fortress at the mouth of the Don). Gordon stood opposite the southern side, Lefort to his left, Golovin, with whose detachment the Tsar was also located, to the right. On July 2, troops under the command of Gordon began siege operations. On July 5, they were joined by the corps of Golovin and Lefort. On July 14 and 16, the Russians managed to occupy the towers - two stone towers on both banks of the Don, above Azov, with iron chains stretched between them, which blocked river boats from entering the sea. This was actually the highest success of the campaign. The fortress housed a 7,000-strong Turkish garrison under the command of Bey Hassan-Araslan. On August 5, Lefort's infantry regiments, supported by 2,500 Cossacks, made the first attempt to storm the fortress, which was unsuccessful. On the Russian side, losses in killed and wounded amounted to 1,500 people. On September 25, the second assault on the fortress took place. Apraksin with the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments and 1000 Don Cossacks managed to capture part of the fortifications and break into the city, but this was affected by inconsistency in the Russian army. The Turks managed to regroup, and Apraksin, not supported by other units, was forced to retreat. On October 2, the siege was lifted. 3,000 archers were left in the captured defensive towers, called the “Novosergievsky city”.

Second Azov campaign of 1696. Throughout the winter of 1696, the Russian army prepared for the second campaign. In January, large-scale construction of ships began at the shipyards of Voronezh and Preobrazhenskoye. The galleys built in Preobrazhenskoye were dismantled and transported to Voronezh, where they were reassembled and launched on the Don. On May 16, Russian troops again besieged Azov. On May 20, Cossacks in galleys at the mouth of the Don attacked a caravan of Turkish cargo ships. As a result, 2 galleys and 9 small ships were destroyed, and one small ship was captured. On May 27, the fleet entered the Sea of ​​Azov and cut off the fortress from sources of supply by sea. The approaching Turkish military flotilla did not dare to engage in battle. On July 16, preparatory siege work was completed. On July 17, 1,500 Don and part of the Ukrainian Cossacks arbitrarily broke into the fortress and settled in two bastions. On July 19, after prolonged artillery shelling, the Azov garrison surrendered. On July 20, the Lyutikh fortress, located at the mouth of the northernmost branch of the Don, also surrendered. By July 23, Peter approved a plan for new fortifications in the fortress, which by that time had been badly damaged as a result of artillery shelling. Azov did not have a convenient harbor for basing the navy. For this purpose, on July 27, 1696, a more favorable location was chosen on Cape Tagany, where Taganrog was founded two years later. Voivode Shein became the first Russian generalissimo for his services in the second Azov campaign. the importance of artillery and navy for warfare. It is a notable example of successful interaction between the fleet and ground forces during the siege of a seaside fortress, which stands out especially clearly against the backdrop of the nearby failures of the British during the assault on Quebec (1691) and Saint-Pierre (1693). The preparation of the campaigns clearly demonstrated Peter’s organizational and strategic abilities. For the first time, such important qualities as his ability to draw conclusions from failures and gather forces for a second strike appeared. Despite the success, at the end of the campaign, the incompleteness of the results achieved became obvious: without capturing the Crimea, or at least Kerch, access to the Black Sea was still impossible. To hold Azov it was necessary to strengthen the fleet. It was necessary to continue building the fleet and provide the country with specialists capable of building modern sea vessels. On October 20, 1696, the Boyar Duma proclaims “Sea vessels will be...” This date can be considered the birthday of the Russian regular navy. An extensive shipbuilding program is approved - 52 (later 77) ships; To finance it, new duties are introduced. On November 22, a decree was announced sending nobles to study abroad. The war with Turkey is not yet over and therefore, in order to better understand the balance of power, find allies in the war against Turkey and not confirm the already existing alliance - the Holy League, and finally strengthen the position of Russia, the “Great Embassy” was organized. The war with Turkey ended with the Peace of Constantinople agreement (1700)

QUESTION No. 14 Campaigns to Crimea by Minikha (1736) and Lassi (1737,1738) On April 20, 1736, Minich set out from Tsaritsynka with an army of about 54 thousand people. The troops were divided into five columns. Major General Spiegel commanded the first column, which formed the vanguard. The Prince of Hesse-Homburg led the second column, Lieutenant General Izmailov - the third, Lieutenant General Leontyev - the fourth and Major General Tarakanov - the fifth. In Minich's army there were both Zaporozhye and Ukrainian (Hetman) Cossacks. Minikh wrote to the empress about them: “In former times, the hetman’s Cossacks could field up to 100,000 people; in 1733 the number of employees was reduced to 30,000 and this year to 20,000, of which 16,000 people are now assigned to the Crimean campaign; they were ordered to be at Tsaritsynka in full force at the beginning of April, but we have already walked 300 versts from Tsaritsynka, and the hetman’s Cossacks in the army are only 12,730 people, and half of them ride on carts, and are partly poorly populated, partly thin, most of them we are forced carry with you like mice who in vain only eat bread. On the contrary, the Cossacks from the same people, fugitives from the same Ukraine, have 2 or 3 good horses for each person, the people themselves are kind and cheerful, well armed; with 3 or 4 thousand such people it would be possible to defeat the entire hetman’s corps.” Minich's army marched to Crimea along Leontyev's path, along the right bank of the Dnieper, at a distance of 5-50 km from the river. The first battle greatly raised the morale of the Russian army and, accordingly, aroused fear among the Tatars of the regular troops. A thousand soldiers were ordered to carry out a demonstrative attack on the Perekop positions on the right flank. The Turks succumbed to Minich's trick and concentrated significant forces in this area. There were up to 60 cannons in the fortress and towers, including several with the Russian coat of arms, captured by the Turks during the unsuccessful campaign of Prince Golitsyn.

Minikh ordered 800 soldiers of the Belozersky regiment to occupy the fortress, and appointed their colonel Devitsa as commandant of the fortress. In addition, 600 Cossacks were assigned to Devitsa. The Cossacks took from the enemy 30 thousand sheep and 4 to 5 hundred cattle, which they had hidden in the forest. On May 25, Minich convened a military council - what to do next. Minich thought in terms of a European war, where long-term supply of the army at the expense of the conquered country was normal. The capture of Kozlov further strengthened Minich in his opinion. Turkish troops concentrated in Kafa, and the main Tatar forces went into the mountains. Small cavalry detachments of the Tatars still surrounded the Russian army. On July 7, 1736, the Russian army reached Perekop. But the army had nothing to do at Perekop. Supplies of food and fodder were dwindling every day. The Tatar cavalry darted around, constantly attacking the foragers, stealing horses and cattle. Aporozhye and Ukrainian Cossacks were sent home immediately. On August 23, Lieutenant General Leontiev, who left the destroyed Kinburn, joined Minich.

Upon the arrival of the troops in Ukraine, Minich reviewed the troops. It turned out that half of the regular troops were lost during the campaign. Moreover, the majority of people died due to illness and physical fatigue. In total, the campaign of 1736 cost Russia about 30 thousand people. At this point the campaign of 1736 was over; at the end of the year Minich went to St. Petersburg to make excuses before the empress.

Campaign of 1737. On July 2, the Ochakov fortress was taken, and a Russian garrison was left in it under the command of Shtofeln. Another Russian army (about 40 thousand), led by Field Marshal Lassi, moved from the Don to the Sea of ​​​​Azov; then, advancing along the Arabat Spit, crossed the Sivash against the mouth of the Salgir River and invaded the Crimea. At the same time, she received very important assistance from the head of the Azov flotilla, Vice Admiral Bredal, who delivered various supplies and food to the Arabat Spit. At the end of July, Lassi reached Karasubazar and took possession of it; but due to increased sickness in the troops and depletion of provisions, he had to leave the peninsula. Having ravaged Perekop on the way back, he returned at the beginning of October. Like the previous ones, the campaign of 1737, thanks to climatic conditions and the accumulation of all kinds of disorder (embezzlement, bribery and sloppiness) in the administration of the troops, cost the Russian army huge losses in people; and due to the death of the horses, on the way back it was necessary to leave part of the artillery in Ochakov and in the Andreevsky fortification built on the Bug River. The war resumed; but the 1738 campaign was unsuccessful for the allies. Minikh with his weakened army, the replenishment of which he was denied, reached the Dniester with great difficulty in early August; but having learned that there was a strong Turkish army on the other side of the river and that plague had appeared in Bessarabia, Minikh decided to retreat. The retreat through waterless and deserted terrain, with the constant threat of danger from the Tatars pursuing the army, again entailed very significant losses. Lassi’s campaign in Crimea, in places devastated last year, was also in disaster, since this time the Turkish fleet prevented Vice Admiral Bredal from delivering the necessary supplies to the ground army. Russian troops were forced to leave Crimea at the end of August. For the Austrians, this year was especially unhappy: one defeat followed another. A number of all these failures did not lead, however, to the conclusion of peace. Only the plan of action for the future campaign was changed; Lassi had to limit himself to defense.

Danila Adashev was a dashing commander. He fought near Kazan, fought with the Nogais, and beat the Livonians in the tail and mane. Tsar Ivan IV took all this into account when he chose him from a large list of military leaders to carry out an important task. And the sovereign of all Rus' decided to make a campaign against the Crimea. After the capture of Kazan and the conquest of Astrakhan, the Crimean Khanate posed the greatest danger to the Russian state. Back in 1558, Dmitry Vishnevetsky, a great guardian of the military alliance between Moscow and Lithuania against the Crimean Khanate, went into the service of Ivan IV along with his Cossacks.

The sovereign received him graciously, granted him lands, and then sent him to the Donets River, from where Vishnevetsky was supposed to carry out raids on Azov, Kerch and other uluses of the Crimean Khan on ships. Prince Dmitry defeated the Crimean Tatars on the Aidar River near Azov, but Vishnevetsky’s forces were small, and therefore the king planned a larger-scale event. In February 1559, the Russian army marched to the Dnieper. The forces that the sovereign's people had were very significant: the Big Regiment, under the command of Danila Adashev, the advanced regiment of the governor Ignatius Zabolotsky and the guard regiment under the command of the Streltsy head Timofey Ignatiev.

The governor had a very specific goal - to take advantageous positions on the Dnieper in the Kremenchug region and from there harass the Crimean uluses. Arriving at the scene, Adashev quickly assessed the situation. By his order, large boats began to be manufactured, since the governor decided to attack Crimea from the sea. Thus, he avoided the difficult crossing of the steppes and clashes with the Tatar cavalry. And at the same time, he left himself greater freedom of maneuver, since he could attack anywhere from the coast. The first blow was dealt to Ochakov. Having descended the Dnieper, Russian warriors approached this fortress by sea and captured an enemy ship with a surprise attack. IN

Having landed on the shore, they killed many Tatars and Turks, captured a large ship and sailed to the island of Chulyu. There, in the channels, the Russians captured another ship, and the entire crew was taken prisoner. After this, Adashev attacked the Crimea with all the might of the Russian regiments. The attack was sudden, the original enemy was taken by surprise. Now the Crimean horde has experienced all the misfortunes that the Russian state experienced, its invasions. The advance detachment under the command of Prince Fyodor Khvorostinin moved forward, and Adashev divided the rest of the army into several parts and dispersed them throughout the Crimean uluses. For the first time since the time when the predatory Girey family established itself in Crimea, Russian people came here as warriors, and not as captives. The destruction of the khan's lands began.

The sovereign's soldiers stole horse and camel herds, burned yurts, captured Tatars and freed thousands of their fellow countrymen from captivity. The local Murzas tried to resist and attacked the tsarist troops, but the governors managed to deploy battle formations and, firing from arquebuses, repulsed the Crimean cavalry with great damage to it. It is noteworthy that while Adashev was smashing and ravaging the western part of the Crimean peninsula, Khan Devlet-Girey did not lift a finger to help his subjects. The cowardly ruler spent the entire two weeks that the pogrom lasted, holed up in a distant ulus, and slowly pulled up troops to his headquarters.

And only when the Russians left Crimea did he dare to leave his rookery. However, having learned how small the enemy’s forces were, the khan was filled with military spirit and decided to intercept him on the Dnieper. Meanwhile, Adashev again sailed to Ochakov. It is noteworthy that his troops did not suffer any losses and still maintained high combat effectiveness. There, the governor released all the captured Turks, declaring to the Ochakov pashas that his sovereign was fighting only with his enemy Devlet-Girey, and not with Sultan Suleiman. Then the Russian army returned up the Dnieper, but here the Crimean Khan was already waiting for her with his army and Nogai troops.

On the rapids and where the river narrows, the Krymchaks tried to organize an attack, but the Russians repelled all attacks each time with friendly fire from arquebuses. As a result, Adashev decided to give Devlet-Girey a general battle and, having gained a foothold on Monastic Island, prepared for battle. But the khan again became afraid and took his army to the Crimea. Adashev returned victorious, but Devlet-Girey remembered this slap in the face from Ivan IV and began to hatch plans for revenge.

OBLIGATIONS FOR PEACE WITH POLAND 1686

In 1686, Jan Sobieski agreed to an eternal peace, according to which he forever ceded to Moscow everything that it had won from Poland in the 17th century. (Kyiv is most important). This peace of 1686 was a very major diplomatic victory, which Moscow owed to V.V. Golitsyn. But according to this world, Moscow had to start a war with Turkey and Crimea, its subordinates. It was decided to march to the Crimea. Involuntarily, Golitsyn accepted command of the troops and made two campaigns to the Crimea (1687–1689). Both of them were unsuccessful (only the second time, in 1689, the Russians managed to reach Perekop across the steppe, but could not penetrate further). Lacking military abilities, Golitsyn could not cope with the difficulties of the steppe campaigns, lost many people, aroused the murmur of the army and brought accusations of negligence on the part of Peter. However, before the overthrow of Sophia, her government tried to hide the failure, celebrated the transition through the steppes to Perekop as a victory and showered Golitsyn and the troops with awards. But the failure was clear to everyone: below we will see that Peter took advantage of it and left Crimea alone in his offensive to the south.

[…] The annexation of Little Russia moved Moscow even more towards Crimea, and at the very end of the 17th century. (1687–1689) Moscow troops for the first time undertake campaigns against the Crimea itself. However, there was no luck yet - the steppe got in the way. This is where Moscow policy stopped before Peter.

Platonov S.F. A complete course of lectures on Russian history. SPb., 2000 http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/platonov/plats005.htm#gl2

PREPARATION FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1687

After long meetings, the Muscovites decided at the military council to send a significant army against the Small Tatars. Prince Golitsyn was appointed governor of the Bolshoi [regiment], that is, commander-in-chief, boyar Alexei Semenovich Shein - governor of Novgorod, that is, general of the Novgorod army, boyar Prince Dmitry Dmitrievich Dolgorukov, governor of Kazan, that is, general of the Kazan army, Prince Mikhail Andreevich Golitsyn - governor of Belgorod (this cousin of the great Golitsyn. He had such a great inclination towards foreigners that, leaving for the voivodeship, he took all those who wanted to follow him, including the Frenchman, who taught him the language in 6 months), Duma nobleman Ivan Yuryevich Leontyev - voivode Ertaul, that is, the general of a small Cossack army and other civilian detachments, which always go ahead of the army of the commander-in-chief, and consist of those who can be called hunters and the okolnichy Leonty Romanovich Neplyuev - the Sevsky governor, that is, the general of the Sevsky army.

All the troops of White Russia were also equipped with commanders, and the Cossacks had their usual hetman, they also thought about ways to have and receive military supplies and food. All residents of the great Empire of the Tsars were forced to pay a ruble from the court, and the ruble corresponds in value to almost five French livres; From this we can judge the enormous sums that were collected.

De la Neuville. Notes about Muscovy. M.. 1996 http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus6/Nevill/frametext4.htm

ADDRESS BY IGNATIUS RIMSKY-KORSAKOV\

However, the abbot of the royal monastery was not only a talented polemicist, but also a preacher. […] On February 21, 1687, the archimandrite of the Novospassky Monastery spoke to the troops setting off on the first Crimean campaign with an extensive sermon: “A word to the pious and Christ-loving Russian army,” and on March 14, a richly decorated copy of this word was presented to Princess Sofya Alekseevna.

That same spring […] the Novospassk preacher, presenting the icon of the Mother of God Hodegetria to a huge gathering of troops in the suburbs of Moscow, delivered a “Word to the Orthodox army about the help of the Most Holy Theotokos...”. […] In “Words” the author convinces his listeners of the inalienability of God’s help in the coming war, proving this with examples from the Old Testament and Russian history.

Nikulin I.A. Review of the life and work of Metropolitan Ignatius (Rimsky-Korsakov) before his appointment to the Tobolsk See http://www.bogoslov.ru/text/774364.html

The 112,000-strong army, which Prince V.V. Golitsyn led on the second Crimean campaign in 1689, included the same 63 regiments of the foreign system, as according to the list of 1681, only numbering up to 80 thousand, with a decreased composition of the regiments , although the noble mounted militia of the Russian system numbered no more than 8 thousand, 10 times less than the foreign system, and according to the list of 1681 it was only 5-6 times less.

Klyuchevsky V.O. Russian history. Full course of lectures. M., 2004. http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/kluchev/kllec61.htm

CRIMINAL CAMPAIGNS OF 1687 and 1689.

Having concluded the “Eternal Peace” of 1686 with Poland, Russia joined the coalition of powers (“Holy League” - Austria, Venice and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) that fought against the aggression of Sultan Turkey and its vassal - the Crimean Khanate. Prince V.V. was placed at the head of the Russian troops. Golitsyn. At the same time, the Don and Zaporozhye Cossacks were supposed to strike. In May 1687, the Russian army (about 100 thousand people) set out from Ukraine. After it crossed the river in mid-June. Konskie Vody (modern name - Konskaya, a tributary of the Dnieper), the Crimean Tatars set fire to the steppe. The Russian army lost food for its horses. On June 17, the decision was made to return. Soon the government, at the request of the Cossack foreman, supported by V.V. Golitsyn, removed Hetman I. Samoilovich, who had a negative attitude towards the war with Turkey and Crimea. In his place was put I.S. Mazepa. The instability of the position of the government of Sofia Alekseevna - Golitsyn forced it to continue military operations. In 1688, preparations were underway for a new campaign to the south. During this period, international the situation worsened as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began negotiations with Turkey for peace. Russia bore the brunt of the war. The campaign began in the early spring of 1689, a Russian army of approx. moved south. 150 thousand people On May 15, in the Green Valley tract (north of the Perekop Isthmus), a stubborn battle took place with the detachments of the Crimean Khan attacking the Russian army, which were repulsed. After fighting with the Crimean detachments, the Russian army approached the Perekop fortress on May 20, but due to the unfavorable balance of forces, it did not besiege it and began to retreat on May 21.

The Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689 provided serious assistance to Russia's allies, as they diverted the forces of the Turks and Crimean Tatars. But the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689 did not lead to the elimination of a dangerous source of aggression in the south and generally ended in failure, which was one of the reasons for the fall of the government of Sofia Alekseevna-Golitsyn.

Soviet Historical Encyclopedia http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/sie/8966#sel=3:198,3:214

GOLITSYN'S SECOND CAMPAIGN

Taught by experience, Golitsyn wanted to undertake a campaign in early spring, so as not to have a shortage of water and grass and not be afraid of steppe fires. The military men were ordered to assemble no later than February 1689. On November 8, a tenth collection of money for the army was announced from the townspeople and all merchants. Golitsyn needed to defeat the Tatars in order to defeat internal enemies who never ceased to remind him of themselves. They say that the murderer rushed towards him in the sleigh and was barely restrained by the prince’s servants; the murderer was executed in prison after torture, without publicity; shortly before setting off on a campaign, a coffin was found at the Golitsyn gate with a note that if this campaign was as unsuccessful as the first, then a coffin would await the chief governor. […]

Under such unfavorable conditions for the main leaders, the second Crimean campaign began. In February 1689, 112,000 troops moved to the steppe under the main command of the Guardian. On March 20, Golitsyn wrote to the tsars from Akhtyrka that “the campaign is being slowed down due to the great cold and snow, and the treasury has not yet been sent to the regiment and there is nothing to give to the military men, reiters and soldiers.” The cold and snow did not stop Hetman Mazepa, and his first thing when meeting with Golitsyn was to petition so that the great sovereigns would grant him, the hetman, and the entire Little Russian army, order to put the state coat of arms on the towers and town halls of the Little Russian cities. Golitsyn, of course, hastened to reassure Mazepa that his request would be fulfilled by the great sovereigns. In mid-April, news was received that there were no fires in the steppes, but that the khan was going to burn the grass as Golitsyn approached Perekop. When Moscow learned about this, they sent a letter to the Protector so that, after consulting with the hetman, he would send knowledgeable people beyond Samara to burn the steppe all the way to Perekop and to the Turkish towns on the Dnieper: by the time the Russian army arrived in those places, new grass would ripen. Golitsyn went to Perekop and in mid-May he met the khan with the hordes. The barbarians, as usual, quickly attacked the Russian army, but, fired from cannons, they left and did not resume their attacks; only at the edge of the horizon, in front and behind, like clouds, crowds of them could be seen: predators circled over their prey, the Scythians lured the enemy into their hopeless steppes.

Having repulsed the khan, Golitsyn hastened to send news of his triumph to Moscow, and wrote to the ruler to pray for his safe return. Sophia answered: “My light, brother Vasenka! Hello, my father, for many years to come! And again, hello to God and the Most Holy Theotokos, by the mercy and with your reason and happiness, having defeated the Hagarians! May you, Lord, continue to defeat your enemies! And to me, light my, I can’t believe that you will return to us; then I will believe when I see you, my light, in my arms. Well, my light, you write for me to pray: as if I am truly a sinner before God and unworthy; however, although "I am a sinner, I dare to hope for his benevolence. Hey! I always ask that you may see my light in joy. Therefore, hello, my light, forever and ever."

[…] On May 20, the troops approached the famous Perekop, to a fortified castle that protected a ditch that cut through the isthmus: beyond Perekop is the treasured Crimea, the goal of the campaign. But what is Crimea? The best, most experienced people, like Gordon, for example, had long explained to Golitsyn that it was easy to conquer the Crimea, only the steppe road to it was somewhat difficult. Golitsyn experienced this difficulty in the first campaign, avoided it in the second, reached the Crimea and only then saw that the main question had not been resolved in advance: what is Crimea and how to conquer it? They thought that as soon as they invaded Crimea with a large army, the Tatars would get scared and surrender to the will of the winner; They didn’t think about one thing, that beyond Perekop there was the same waterless steppe as on the road to the peninsula, that the Tatars could destroy everything and starve the enemy to death with hunger and thirst. Golitsyn stood at Perekop: it was necessary to take the fortress, but the army had already been without water for two days; They hurried to Perekop, thinking that there would be an end to their hardships, and what did they see? On one side is the Black Sea, on the other is the Rotten Sea, there is salty water everywhere, there are no wells, horses are falling, a few more days - and how will they retreat, what will the outfit be carried on? In order to return with something, Golitsyn started peace negotiations with the khan in the hope that he, frightened by the invasion, would agree to conditions favorable to Russia: but the negotiations dragged on, and Golitsyn could not wait any longer. and he turned back without peace; We were glad for one thing that in the steppe, in terrible heat, with the painful languor of thirst, the Tatars pursued easily, not with all their strength.