Defensive line. Germany

The Tannenberg line is a complex of German defensive structures in Estonia on the Narva Isthmus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipsi. The name of the line, according to the propagandists of the Third Reich, was supposed to support the weakened morale of the German troops: in the Battle of Tannenberg during the East Prussian operation of 1914, two corps of the 2nd Army of Russia under the command of General Samsonov were surrounded and defeated.

Back in the summer of 1943, the Germans began to strengthen the defensive line along the Narova River, giving it the code name “Panther”. Retreating from Leningrad, the Germans occupied the Panther defense line, but rather quickly losing ground, on June 26, 1944 they occupied the Tannenberg line, the defense line of which included the Vaivara Blue Mountains. The wooded, swampy Narva Isthmus, in itself, was a serious obstacle to the advancement of troops and military equipment. Reinforced with military engineering structures and firepower, it became almost impregnable.

The line consisted of three defensive line stripes with a total length of 55 km and a depth of 25-30 km. The first line of this line ran from the village of Mummasaare, located on the shores of the Gulf of Finland, along the three heights of the Blue Mountains through the strongholds of Sirgala, Putki, Gorodenka and further along the Narova River to Lake Peipsi. The basis of the defense was the Blue Mountains, 3.4 km long, which consisted of three heights: Tower Mountain, 70 m high, Grenadier Mountain, 83 m high, and Park Mountain, 85 m high. All three mountains had a dominant position in the surrounding their localities.

The first military structures were built on three, then unnamed, heights under Peter I, during the Northern War with the Swedes. They were built to protect the rear of the army during the assault on Narva. At the beginning of the 20th century, the heights with the battery located there were included in the coastal defense system of the Russian Empire. Moves were cut inside the mountains to deliver ammunition and reserves. Firing points and strong points were connected by underground communications. German troops used a system of ready-made underground structures, adapting and rebuilding everything to suit their needs. Himmler personally checked the reliability of the Tannenberg line.

Taking into account the fact that on one side there were impenetrable swamp forests with Lake Peipus, and on the other, the Gulf of Finland, the Germans considered the defense line an insurmountable natural barrier for the Red Army units advancing from the east.

Along the defense line in populated areas, several parallel full-profile trenches were dug, lined with logs and poles. The trenches were reinforced with dugouts and bunkers, as well as open and semi-open firing points. In wetlands, instead of trenches, fortifications were built from logs on wooden decks. In front of the first line of trenches there were several rows of barbed wire, Bruno spirals and minefields. Behind the trenches in the depths of the defense, reinforced concrete and wood-earth shelters were placed to shelter troops. The defenses in the Blue Mountains were reinforced with artillery positions, armored Crab machine gun nests, and buried tanks. The deep caves on the heights that had existed since Peter the Great's time were turned by the Germans into bomb shelters and shelters for guns. The trenches climbed the slopes in winding labyrinths, connecting at the top with casemates that hid long-range artillery. The stone buildings of the children's colony that once existed here have been rebuilt into nests for firing points. The foundations of the buildings have been converted into massive pillboxes. Headquarters and reserves were located on the slopes of the heights, in bunkers. To the north and south of the heights were the main communications - the railway and the highway, which led deep into Estonia and allowed the Germans to maneuver their troops.

The second defensive line of the Tannenberg Line ran along the Sytka River from Sillamäe in the direction of Van - Sytke through Sirgala to the south. The third strip was located 25 kilometers from the main one and ran from the Gulf of Finland through the settlements of Kukkvhvrja, Suur-Konya, Moonaküla, Oru Yaam and further along the shore of Lake Peenjare.

On July 24, 1945, the troops of the left flank of the Leningrad Front, having launched the Narva offensive operation, liberating the city of Narva, ran into the Tannenberg defensive line and were forced from July 27 to begin a fierce assault on the fortifications until August 10, after which they went on the defensive. The 3rd German SS Armored Corps, with a total number of 50 thousand people, fought against units of the 2nd and 8th Soviet armies, with a total number of 57 thousand people. Estonians, Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, Dutch, Belgians, Flemings, Finns and representatives of other nations who volunteered to join the SS fought on the side of the Germans. Having failed to penetrate the defenses head-on for two weeks, the Soviet command, according to the plan of the Tallinn offensive operation, abandoned the assault on the Tannenberg line and, from September 3, secretly began transferring troops of the 2nd Shock Army to the southwestern coast of Lake Peipus, to the river line Emajõgi, to attack the line from the rear. The transfer of troops was promptly discovered by the enemy and on September 16, Hitler signed an order to withdraw troops from Estonia to Latvia. On the same day, the Germans, without announcing the order, began to evacuate their units. The Estonian units were informed of Hitler's order almost two days late. They were supposed to cover the general withdrawal of German units and leave the Blue Mountains on the morning of September 19, 1944. However, the Estonians were “ahead of schedule” and already left their positions on September 18th.

During the fighting, the losses of the German side amounted to about 10 thousand people, incl. 2.5 thousand Estonians. The Red Army lost a little less than 5 thousand people. The discrepancy between the losses of attackers and defenders in the current proportion is explained by the significant superiority of the Red Army in aviation and artillery. On average, per day of the offensive, from 1 to 3 thousand shells and mines of various calibers fell on the German positions. In two weeks, attack aircraft and bombers carried out about a thousand combat missions. According to eyewitnesses, the Blue Mountains were turned into a complete conflagration, plowed up by heavy shells to a depth of 2-3 meters. Only 10-15 years after the war the first sprouts of trees began to appear there. Therefore, German losses would have been many times greater if they had not been saved by countless caste caves, adapted for shelters and shelters.

The Tannenberg line was one of the smallest German defensive structures in terms of length in the entire history of World War II and the only one that the Red Army could not take, although it suffered very serious material and human losses. Thus, the Tannenberg defensive line is one of the few fortifications in Germany that has fully completed its task, and even with minimal capital investment.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 4/1994

Capturing the enemy's intermediate defensive lines

ColonelY.V.IGNATOV

THE PROBLEM of capturing the enemy’s defensive lines first arose during the Second World War, when during offensive and counter-offensive operations it was necessary to quickly break down his defenses, hastily created in depth.

During the Great Patriotic War, this problem was mainly solved by the use of armored, mechanized, airborne, aviation formations and formations, the consistency of their use in operations, as well as a significant increase in the range of fire on the enemy. Conditions conducive to capture most often arose after front troops broke through the German tactical defense zone and developed an offensive. This was explained by the fact that at the start of counter-offensive operations the enemy was usually in a transitional (from offensive to defensive) grouping and had a compacted operational formation of troops, and its unspent reserves were close to the first echelon army corps. Thus, up to 80-90% of the forces and means were in the tactical defense zone, and it was there that the fire and barrage system was created. In the depths of the defense, advantageous positions, even if they were prepared, were not occupied by troops. Therefore, quickly overcoming the tactical zone contributed to the entry of front troops into operational space, which not only largely determined the success of the operation, but also created conditions for capturing subsequent defensive lines on the move, since the enemy did not have enough time or strength to create a stable defense.

In offensive operations, our troops, after breaking through the German tactical defense zone, repeatedly had to overcome the system of their intermediate defensive lines. Due to the significant length of the front line and the general lack of forces and means, these lines in the operational depth, as a rule, were occupied only during a defensive battle by withdrawing units and reserves that arrived from the depths or were transferred from other sectors. A similar situation took place in the Belarusian operation (1944) in the offensive zone of the 1st and 2nd Belarusian fronts (Minsk region). Behind the main line of their defense, the Germans prepared four intermediate lines, each 3 to 7 km deep, where they planned to stop our troops. However, the decisive, maneuverable actions of the fronts did not allow the enemy to occupy them in a timely manner. Therefore, the defense was characterized by insufficient organization of the fire system, reduced stability, the absence of strong reserves and second echelons, varying densities of saturation of combat formations with manpower and firepower, and the presence of unoccupied areas. This made it possible, having a 2-fold superiority in forces and means (in the zones of action of strike groups), to quickly overcome such defensive lines on the move, on a wide front, without complex regroupings, to save reserves for the further development of the offensive, and also to achieve the objectives of the operation in a more efficient manner. short terms and with less losses.

In modern conditions, during a counteroffensive operation, the situation in which intermediate defensive lines in depth can be captured will largely depend on how successfully the enemy’s tactical zone (advanced defensive line) can be overcome. The experience of recent exercises has shown that the enemy will strive to stop the advancing troops, defeat them and create conditions for the continuation of the air-ground operation precisely in the direction of action of the front’s strike groups. To this end, depending on the depth of the penetration, he can take up defense at an intermediate line or hastily move to it and equip a new defensive line in an unplanned area.

If a counter-offensive operation begins with the defeat of an enemy who has been stopped, going on the defensive, but has not had time to gain a foothold on the achieved lines, then conditions conducive to the capture of his subsequent defensive lines will most likely arise when the front forces break the enemy’s resistance, overcome the first defensive line and develop an offensive in depth. In this case, the enemy will try to use restraining actions to stop the advance of the front’s strike groups, withdraw troops and, by organizing a defense based on an intermediate defensive line, disrupt the counteroffensive. The front's task may be to capture this line on the move, disrupt the enemy's plans and ensure the specified tempo of the offensive.

In areas where the enemy has managed to gain a foothold, the front's counteroffensive operation will apparently begin with a breakthrough of the defense. In such a situation, the capture of intermediate defensive lines is possible after the defeat of the main forces of the first echelon army corps and the entry of troops into operational space.

The operational situation may also develop in such a way that a counter-offensive operation will begin with the development of army or front-line counterattacks. Under these conditions, in the attack directions, front troops can cut through unprepared tactical defenses and create a threat of encirclement by first-echelon army corps. In order to stop the groups that have broken through, the enemy will probably be forced to hastily create defensive lines in the threatened directions. At the same time, the front troops may be given the task of seizing these lines on the move, gaining a foothold on them and, increasing their efforts, continuing the counteroffensive.

Conditions for capture may arise during a counterattack on a retreating enemy, when he, through restraining actions, will try to impede the advance of front troops in order to gain time to withdraw his troops to a line advantageous for defense. The task of the front or army (AK) will be to prevent the separation of enemy troops, to forestall them in reaching an advantageous line and to capture them before the reserves arrive.

The most favorable situation is when the enemy is forced to hastily take up defense on a line that has not been prepared in advance and in unfavorable conditions (after an unsuccessful oncoming battle or counterattack, when trying to avoid defeat by going on the defensive in order to cover the flanks), as well as when there is a threat of encirclement.

Thus, during a counter-offensive operation of the front, the capture of defensive lines is possible in directions where the enemy did not have time to create a defense due to a lack of time, and also if the defense is occupied on a wide front with a lack of forces and means.

Research shows that in a modern large-scale or regional war, by the time the front forces go on a counteroffensive, the enemy, trying to defeat them in a short time, apparently will not, due to his initial superiority, pay due attention to the creation of defensive lines in depth. Most likely, he will begin the transition from offensive to defensive, having an offensive formation of troops. In such conditions there will be no classical defense formation. According to the views of US military experts, during the transition from offensive to defense, its organization and conduct is planned to be carried out in accordance with the Field Manual FM 100-5 and the NATO Allied Forces Manual ATP-35 A, if a further offensive becomes impossible due to large losses, vulnerability of communications or it is necessary to repel counterattack (counterattack) of a large enemy group. The decisive factor in organizing such a defense is time.

This can be confirmed by the NATO Allied Forces command and control unit “Winter-83, -85, -87, -89” and the NATO Allied Forces exercise “Serten Shield-91”, which, among other issues, tested the statutory provisions relating to the organization of combat operations on intermediate defensive lines. It was planned that the first intermediate defensive line, if necessary, could be defended by both reserves and second echelons of army corps. Subsequent intermediate defensive lines were to be occupied as needed. The defense on them was not continuous - significant gaps were allowed between divisions, and the divisions themselves along the front occupied strips that exceeded the standards. Intermediate defensive lines can be created deliberately and forcibly on one (the most dangerous) or simultaneously on several directions of action of front troops (in most of the counter-offensive zone), in a previously planned area or a new one, in front of important military and economic targets, as well as on barrier lines.

Based on the conclusions of military experts from developed countries regarding the organization of defense, we can take them as a guideline for further presentation of the material.

The results of modeling a counter-offensive front operation show that such lines can be defended by 2-3 or more reserve divisions or a combined group of approximately the same composition, formed from reserve and retreating formations (units) of operational formations. The purpose of creating such lines will apparently depend on the conditions of the situation, terrain, operational equipment of the combat area, the state of the troops and may be as follows: to prevent the capture of operationally or economically important objects and areas in the depths of one’s defense; stop the advance of enemy troops in one or more directions; create a new defense system based on an intermediate defensive line; prevent the encirclement of any group; cover the area in which troops are concentrated for a counterattack; prevent a sudden attack on the flank of your counterattacking group; prohibit the entry of the second echelon of the front; force the attacking troops to advance in a direction favorable to themselves, etc. In this regard, the need to capture each defensive line will pursue very specific goals. They, for example, may consist in ensuring a high rate of counter-offensive, capturing the enemy’s important military installations, economic regions, communications centers, disrupting his plans to create a new defense system based on an intermediate line or withdrawing troops from the semi-encirclement, which will require the involvement of a certain number of forces and means, the use of special methods of action of troops and fire destruction of the enemy.

The nature of modern operations allows us to put forward the assumption that not all front troops will participate in the capture of the enemy’s listed defensive lines, but only those formations in the direction of whose operations these lines will arise. They can be an army, an army corps, several divisions (brigades). Front troops allocated for the period of capture with means of support and reinforcement can be called a capture group, the period of operation of which is limited by the time the assigned task is completed. If it is necessary to capture several lines in succession, the capture group will continue operations in the same or changed composition (depending on the situation) until the appropriate order. It is advisable to entrust control of the capture group to the commander (commander) whose association (formation) forms its basis, and if several associations are involved in the capture, then to one of the deputy commanders of the front forces.

When a defensive line is captured, troops move towards it in designated zones and in a pre-created operational formation.

The action plan of the group in question may be as follows. First, fire strikes are carried out on enemy troops retreating, going on the defensive, and approaching the defensive line. Then forward and raid detachments, in cooperation with landing troops, sabotage, reconnaissance and airmobile groups, with the support of artillery and aviation, capture the most advantageous areas, unoccupied areas, and key objects, disrupting the enemy’s control, tactical and fire communications. Subsequently, the main forces of the formations of the first echelon, using the success of the air-ground echelon, expand the captured areas in depth, towards the flanks and take possession of the entire line. At the same time, the most mobile units, without waiting for the complete defeat of the enemy on the defensive line, continue to carry out further tasks.

Experience suggests that to ensure the success of capturing a defensive line even before launching an attack it is necessary: ​​to deprive the enemy of the influx of reserves; block his path to retreat; by inflicting fire and electronic strikes on control points and long-range fire weapons, deprive the enemy command of the ability to control its troops, maneuver and carry out fire on advancing capture groups. Naturally, the fulfillment of these tasks is directly dependent on the availability of the necessary reconnaissance, fire, strike forces and means, their capabilities to detect and destroy launchers, high-tech weapons systems, aviation, enemy arms, as well as conditions conducive to the capture of defensive lines.

The preparation time for capture is limited by the time it takes to overcome the inter-border space (40 - 60 km). Therefore, it is necessary to start it as early as possible, i.e. in the course of overcoming the first (previous) defensive line, and to complete it before the transition of the first echelon formations to the attack. Moreover, this time should be less than the time spent by the enemy on organizing a stable defense. In this case, you can count on success.

The quality and timeliness of training are directly dependent on the effectiveness of the methods used and the ability of commanders (commanders) and staffs to carry out the necessary preparatory measures within a limited time frame and at the same time control troops in a dynamic counter-offensive environment. This, in turn, necessitates more flexible planning and involves finding ways to reduce the time for the entire preparatory cycle, which is acceptable if the capabilities of the automated control system are fully used and the skills of front officials in managing subordinate troops are improved.

Planning flexibility lies in the development of several options for completing a given task. Any action plan must be thought out in detail so that one of its options is sure to be crowned with success.

In areas where divisions are captured, it is advisable, in our opinion, to create a 2-3 times superiority over the enemy. To do this, you should use the existing methodology to calculate their number, width and depth.

There are various options for capture, depending on the scale of the operation, the state of the troops of the parties, the situation in a particular direction, and the characteristics of the defensive line - length, depth, degree of employment and readiness of the defense, as well as the moral and psychological state of the enemy troops. Let's look at some of them.

First. The divisions of the first echelon of the capture group, each advancing in its own direction, capture individual areas on the defensive line. Initially, gaps are allowed between them, which, due to expansion towards the flanks and depth, are combined. The capture of a line is carried out until the enemy is completely defeated.

Second. The capture of a defensive line is carried out in the counter-offensive zone of an operational or operational-tactical formation of the first echelon, corresponding to the efforts of two or three divisions (brigades) in one direction; the expansion of the capture area is carried out by flank divisions.

Third. The capture is carried out in the direction of the main attack of the operational-strategic formation with the formation of a capture area on the adjacent flanks of the adjacent formations.

It should be emphasized that various combinations of the above options are possible.

The actions of troops to capture intermediate lines should be based on: highly maneuverable actions of troops, forces and means in combination with continuous fire impact on the entire depth of the enemy’s operational formation; suddenness; preemption in striking and troop actions; reliable fire destruction and electronic suppression of objects of the opposing group; disorganization of management at an early stage; isolation of the battlefield from the influx of reserves; defeating the enemy piecemeal and creating an active battle front in his rear (airborne landings, airmobile groups, formations and units operating in isolation from the main forces and remaining in the occupied territory). In addition, it is necessary to provide for measures to combat the enemy’s high-techniques and military forces (ROK), to protect one’s troops from massive fire strikes and air attack weapons.

Let's briefly look at the benefits of gripping. Firstly, it is carried out on the move, on a wide front, along the lines of action of the divisions (brigades) of the first echelon by those groupings that were created before going on the counteroffensive. Secondly, in capture areas, a smaller superiority in forces and means is created than in breakthrough areas, and the capture areas themselves are 2-3 times wider than the breakthrough areas. Third, During the capture, troops not only take possession of the territory defended by the enemy, but also destroy it there, preventing them from retreating from their positions. There are differences in the preparation of a breakthrough and capture. If the preparation of the first is carried out mainly in a static state, then the preparation of the second, as a rule, is in the process of advancing front troops to the next defensive line with constant fire contact with the retreating enemy.

In conclusion, we note that with the capture of each defensive line, the integrity of the enemy’s defense system is violated. The defeat of defensive formations reduces its overall combat potential by a corresponding proportion. This helps to increase the pace of advance, reduce losses, complete the operation in a shorter time, and therefore makes a significant contribution to increasing the effectiveness of the counteroffensive.

We are talking about lines in the depths of the operational formation, intended for organizing defense on them by retreating formations and units, as well as operational reserves.

Military thought. - 1992. -№2. - P.40 - 41.

Strategic essay of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1961.- P.312-313.

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Returning from the village along the Arzamas highway, we decided to take a cache that was not complicated and not time-consuming. The choice fell on the Gorky line of defense. The article contains a description of impressions and a photo report.

The line of defense, or defensive contour, is simply a ditch, in front of it are anti-tank hedgehogs, behind it is an embankment and pillboxes.

Let's give some historical information!

In January 1941, at a meeting with Hitler on the Barbarossa plan, it was planned to enter the city of Gorky in early October 1941, immediately after Moscow, and it was planned to use roads.

In the fall of 1941, as the enemy advanced, it was decided to create a ring fortified defense line on the territory of the Gorky region, primarily on the distant approaches to the city of Gorky - at a distance of 70-80 km from it. The defensive ditches formed an almost continuous broken line connecting Katunki, Purekh, Chistoe, Ilyino station, the left bank of the Klyazma, Gorbatov, Pavlovo, Zaplatino, Oranki, Kudrino, Staroselye, Tatinets. Anti-tank ditches were built parallel to the right bank of the Volga from Gorodets to Vasilsursk. And along the Oka they stretched to Mordovshchikov (present-day Navashino) and further to Shimorsky (this is the Vyksa district).

About 350 thousand Gorky residents, including 150 thousand workers and students, often manually with a shovel and crowbar, did the almost impossible. In two months, 12 million cubic meters of earthworks were completed on the distant approaches to the city, in forests and fields. For comparison, the White Sea-Baltic Canal is 20 million cubic meters, which stood for 20 months, and the milestone - for 2 months.

By January 1, 1942, the construction of defensive structures was completed. On January 14, they were adopted by a special commission. 1134 kilometers - this was the total length of the anti-tank trenches. 1,116 pillboxes and bunkers, 1,026 dugouts, and 114 command posts were erected on the defensive lines. Tank-dangerous directions were blocked by gaps, iron “hedgehogs” and rubble.

In 2010, a mass patriotic event dedicated to the construction of the defense line began. Memorial signs were installed at all its intersections with highways. The “defense line” sign near the village of Bogoyavleniye was installed on October 27, 2011.

From Nizhny Novgorod you need to drive along the Arzamas highway for about 55 km to Epiphany, in the village turn around and go towards Nizhny for about 500 meters, on the right side you will see a monument. For clarity, you can see the route map.

Now the trenches are overgrown with trees and it is easy to trace the trajectory of the trench in the distance. In many areas of our region there is this trench, but I think few people know that it is made man-made and not natural, and they do not understand how much effort was put into its creation. And it was mainly women, children and pensioners who dug the frozen ground. It’s good that the defensive structures were not useful.

Let's return to the cache, the description of which is .

Driving past, we often saw a monument standing by the road, so finding the hidden place was not difficult. Having examined the monument, we quickly found the necessary numbers for the coordinates of the bookmark. We came exactly to a tree, my husband examined it for a long time and poked it around with a stick. Having doubts about the right place, we examined the neighboring trees, but after downloading the photo from the site, we rushed back to the tree and found the treasure with our bare hands.

We took a waterproof case and put the toy in. For the first time we found a cache where we wanted to take just a few things that could be useful, and the impression of such a treasure is much more pleasant than when there is some rubbish lying around. Next time we will be more prepared and bring valuable gifts for the next geocachers.

Why was the line dug outside the village? It turns out that Epiphany would have been given to the fascists? This is how the defenders would have seen this village.

I wonder where else such monuments to the defense line stand in the Nizhny Novgorod region. If you have seen them, write in the comments, we will be grateful!

In the end, we liked the cache, but due to the simplicity and modesty of its location, it did not take a very high place among other caches. Our rating of geocaches from Geocaching in our personal opinion.

The nine-gun special purpose artillery naval battery “A” (“Aurora”) was formed by order of the commander of the naval defense of Leningrad and the lake region, Rear Admiral K. I. Samoilov, dated July 8, 1941, No. 013. In general, the order formed a separate artillery division special purpose two-battery composition. The division consisted of battery “A” - “Aurora” (at the Duderhof Heights, 130-mm/55 guns of the BS-13-1C type (the first series of guns, produced in the USSR until 1939) and “B” - “Bolshevik” (at Pulkovo Heights, guns 130 mm/55 guns of the B-13-2S type (second series, from 1939).The commander of the artillery division, M. A. Mikhailov, was at the Pulkovo Observatory.
Seven battery guns (130/55) were removed from the cruiser "Aurora" and moved to the foot of the Orekhovoya and Kirchhoff mountains, two guns (130/55) were also removed from the cruiser and installed behind the Kyiv highway. The personnel of battery “A” consisted of sailors of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, from the cruiser “Aurora”, and other ships and units that were part of the MOL and OR. 5 battery gun commanders were graduates of the Higher Naval School named after. P.S. Nakhimov in Sevastopol, sent after graduation to Leningrad. The commanders of the artillery division, Ivanov D.N. and Mikhailov M.A. were graduates of the Sevastopol Naval Artillery School of Coastal Defense named after. LKSMU, 40th and 39th years, respectively.
On August 28, 1941, battery “A” (and “B”) entered into active combat operations, opening fire at distant targets near Gatchina. After the Germans broke through the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area, on September 11, 1941, in an unequal battle with units of the 1st Tank and 36th Infantry Divisions of Nazi Germany, battery “A”, fighting until the last shell, died. The guns were either blown up or damaged. The captured 4th gun was destroyed by the battery's return fire. Several seriously wounded Red Navy men were executed. The last guns (8 and 9), located at some distance from the enemy, fired at the enemy until the morning of September 13, 1941, until the limit of shells was exhausted, after which the gun aiming devices were destroyed, and their crews retreated to Pulkovo, to the battery " B." Under the cover of the 8th and 9th guns, thousands of refugees from the territories of the Leningrad region occupied as a result of the breakthrough of the front were able to enter Leningrad. The remnants of the surviving batteries replenished the personnel of Battery B (Bolshevik) in Pulkovo. On September 30, 1941, battery “A”, as a “dead soul”, by order No. 0084 of the commander of the Leningrad Front Zhukov G.K., among others, was transferred to the Leningrad Front and was directly subordinate to the Krasnogvardeisky fortified region.
The discrepancies in the dates of the “last day of the battery” are due to the fact that the main battles of battery “A” occurred on September 11. On this day, most of its personnel and guns were killed, executions and suicide bombings of the soldiers of the surrounded guns took place. In general, out of 164 people of the first composition, on September 12, 96 people remained alive, including personal and command commanders. composition (it should be taken into account that these people continued fighting as part of Battery “B” (“Bolshevik”) of the artillery division from September 13, 1941).
The date of cessation of the last hostilities of the Aurora battery as part of a separate two-battery special purpose artillery division was the morning of September 13, 1941.

Photos in the album "

The task of capturing the city of Gorky was assigned to the second tank group of General Guderian. She had to break through Ryazan to Murom, and then, having crossed the Oka River, be in Arzamas on October 10, 1941, and, using the Moscow Highway and the Gorky-Murom highway, strike from the rear, ending it on October 15, 1941 with the capture of Gorky. However, these plans were disrupted by the heroic defenders of Tula.
On October 16, 1941, the critical point of the fierce battle near Moscow came. On this day, at the cost of huge losses, German troops managed to break through the front near Vyazma, opening the way to the city, and only the desperate resistance of the capital’s defenders did not allow the Reich troops to take possession of it on the move.
On October 16, 1941, all government institutions stopped working in Moscow, the metro did not open for the first time, all food stores were closed, which provoked their robberies; A spontaneous exodus of the population from the city began along the Entuziastov Highway in the direction of Gorky. And only the introduction of a state of siege in Moscow radically changed the situation in the capital. The order of the military commandant of Moscow began with the ancient expression “Hereby it is announced...”. Attempts at robbery and riots resulted in one punishment - execution on the spot without trial or investigation. This measure had an immediate effect.
In such a difficult situation, on October 16, 1941, the leadership of the Gorky regional committee of the CPSU (b) and the Gorky regional executive committee adopted a resolution to begin construction of a defensive line along the right bank of the Volga and along the Oka, as well as around Gorky and Murom (which at that time was part of the Gorky region) .
After this decision was reported, the State Defense Committee of the USSR, headed by Stalin, supported the actions of the Gorky residents by its resolution and ordered the construction of the defensive line to be completed by December 25, 1941 (TWO months!).
Created on October 23, 1941, the Gorky City Defense Committee (GGKO), headed by the first secretary of the regional and city party committees, Mikhail Rodionov, concentrated all power in its hands, and began building defensive lines.
The appeal “To the builders of the defensive line”, adopted by the State Defense Committee, said the following: “Comrades! These days, each of us must triple our strength. Each of us must remember that his life belongs to the Motherland. Our Motherland is in danger, and never before has there been danger "was not so great and formidable. Comrades! Participants in the construction of field fortifications! Every day of your work on the fortifications increases the security of the city. Build fortifications so that Gorky becomes an impregnable fortress."
In total, more than three hundred thousand people of the working population of the region, including 150 thousand residents of Gorky, were mobilized to build a defensive line, or, as they said then, “to the trenches.” The majority of those mobilized were women not engaged in military production, men not drafted into the army for health reasons, university and senior college students, and students in the ninth and tenth grades of secondary schools.
The defensive line consisted of anti-tank ditches - trenches three meters deep and four meters wide. In addition, in all tank-hazardous directions, concrete gouges and anti-tank “hedgehogs”, welded from scraps of rails, were installed, and rubble was made from large trees cut down in the nearby forests. Also, bunkers (long-term firing point) and bunkers (wood-earth firing point) for machine gun crews, command posts and dugouts were built.
Working and living conditions “in the trenches” were extremely difficult - winter came early in 1941, and frosts reached 40 degrees. The ground did not even yield to a crowbar, and military sappers had to first blast up the frozen ground with dynamite, and only then shovels were used. The Luftwaffe, often conducting low-level attacks to intimidate working people, dropped leaflets with the following verses:
Dear citizens,
Don't dig your dimples
Our tanks will arrive,
They will bury your dimples.
The working day “in the trenches” began at 7 am and lasted until 6 pm, with an hour break for lunch. The “trenchmen” were settled in village huts; they had to take care of their own food. Nearby collective and state farms helped as best they could, but they were not able to provide for the entire labor army. We ourselves had to take care of heating our homes, and to do this we had to go into the forest after a hard shift and cut down trees and prepare firewood.
Many comfrey soldiers, especially students, had shoes that were clearly out of season, and so people had to wear bast shoes. Colds and frostbite were common. Therefore, in the most severe frosts, comfrey soldiers (regardless of age) were given one hundred grams of vodka. Large overcrowding and unsanitary living conditions inevitably led to the appearance of lice.
1134 kilometers - this was the total length of the built anti-tank ditch. On the defensive lines, 1,116 pillboxes and bunkers were erected, 2,332 firing points and 4,788 dugouts, and 114 command posts were built.
In two and a half months of dedicated work in the most difficult weather conditions, the builders of the defensive line completed an enormous amount of work. 12 million cubic meters of earth were excavated (for comparison, this is 60% of the excavation work performed during the construction of the famous White Sea-Baltic Canal).
By January 1, 1942, the construction of defensive structures on the territory of the Gorky region was completed. On January 14, they were accepted by a special commission of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR.
80 of the most distinguished builders of defensive fortifications were awarded orders and medals. 10 thousand 186 builders of the defensive line were awarded Certificates of Honor from the GGKO, 873 people were awarded bonuses.
When the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established the medal “For the Defense of Moscow,” the executive committee of the Moscow Council awarded this medal to 1,525 residents of the Gorky region who took part in the construction of the defense line.
It so happened that this real labor feat of hundreds of thousands of residents of Gorky and the Gorky region, who accomplished the almost impossible in a short time, was rarely remembered after the war. And the memory of the construction of a thousand-kilometer anti-tank ditch could also be erased by time, as these ditches themselves gradually floated with earth.
But already in our time, local history schoolchildren in the Nizhny Novgorod region began search work to establish the line where the defense line passed. Now there are several memorial signs installed in the region. On May 7, 2011, on the Bogorodsk-Oranki highway, at the turn to the Beryozka children’s camp, the grand opening of a roadside monument in the shape of an anti-tank hedgehog took place. Now, everyone who stops at the turn to “Beryozka” can read the words carved on the memorial sign that this is where the defense line passed, the construction of which began in mid-October 1941