Cuban Missile Crisis. Cuban Missile Crisis - Briefly Cuban Conflict

At the same time, this war was far from homogeneous: it was a series of crises, local military conflicts, revolutions and coups, as well as the normalization of relations and even their “thaw”. One of the most "hot" stages of the Cold War was the Cuban Missile Crisis, a crisis when the whole world froze, preparing for the worst.

Background and causes of the Caribbean Crisis

In 1952, military commander F. Batista came to power in Cuba as a result of a military coup. This coup caused widespread indignation among the Cuban youth and the progressive part of the population. Fidel Castro became the leader of the opposition to Batista, who already on July 26, 1953, took up arms against the dictatorship. However, this uprising (on this day the rebels stormed the barracks of Moncada) was unsuccessful, and Castro, along with his surviving supporters, went to jail. Only thanks to a powerful socio-political movement in the country, the rebels were amnestied already in 1955.

After that, F. Castro and his supporters launched a full-scale guerrilla war against government troops. Their tactics soon began to bear fruit, and in 1957 the troops of F. Batista suffered a series of serious defeats in the countryside. At the same time, general indignation at the policies of the Cuban dictator also grew. All these processes resulted in a revolution, which, as expected, ended with the victory of the rebels in January 1959. Fidel Castro became the de facto ruler of Cuba.

At first, the new Cuban government sought to find a common language with the formidable northern neighbor, but then US President D. Eisenhower did not even deign to host F. Castro. It also became clear that the ideological differences between the US and Cuba could not allow them to fully converge. The USSR seemed to be the most attractive ally of F. Castro.

Having established diplomatic relations with Cuba, the Soviet leadership established trade with the country and provided it with enormous assistance. Dozens of Soviet specialists, hundreds of parts and other critical cargoes were sent to the island. Relations between the countries quickly became friendly.

Operation Anadyr

Another of the main causes of the Cuban Missile Crisis was by no means the revolution in Cuba and not the situation associated with these events. Türkiye joined NATO in 1952. Since 1943, this state has had a pro-American orientation, connected, among other things, with the neighborhood of the USSR, with which the country did not have the best relations.

In 1961, the deployment of American medium-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads began in Turkey. This decision of the American leadership was dictated by a number of circumstances such as a higher speed of approach of such missiles to targets, as well as the possibility of pressure on the Soviet leadership due to the even more clearly marked American nuclear superiority. The deployment of nuclear missiles in Turkey seriously upset the balance of power in the region, putting the Soviet leadership in an almost hopeless situation. It was then that it was decided to use the new bridgehead almost at the side of the United States.

The Soviet leadership turned to F. Castro with a proposal to deploy 40 Soviet ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba and soon received a positive response. The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces began the development of the Anadyr operation. The purpose of this operation was to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, as well as a military contingent of about 10 thousand people and an aviation group (helicopter, attack and fighter aircraft).

In the summer of 1962, Operation Anadyr began. It was preceded by a powerful set of camouflage measures. So, often the captains of transport ships did not know what kind of cargo they were transporting, not to mention the personnel, who did not even know where the transfer was being made. For camouflage, minor cargoes were stored in many ports of the Soviet Union. In August, the first Soviet transports arrived in Cuba, and in the autumn the installation of ballistic missiles began.

Beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis

In the early autumn of 1962, when it became clear to the American leadership that there were Soviet missile bases in Cuba, the White House had three options for action. These options are: the destruction of bases through pinpoint strikes, the invasion of Cuba, or the imposition of a naval blockade of the island. The first option had to be abandoned.

In order to prepare for the invasion of the island, American troops began to be transferred to Florida, where they were concentrated. However, putting Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba on full alert also made the option of a full-scale invasion very risky. There was a naval blockade.

Based on all the data, having weighed all the pros and cons, the United States already in mid-October announced the introduction of quarantine against Cuba. This wording was introduced because the declaration of a blockade would be an act of war, and the United States was its instigators and aggressors, since the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba was not a violation of any international treaties. But, following its long-standing logic, where "the strong is always right," the United States continued to provoke a military conflict.

The introduction of quarantine, which began on October 24 at 10:00, provided only a complete cessation of arms supplies to Cuba. As part of this operation, the US Navy surrounded Cuba and began patrolling coastal waters, while receiving instructions not to open fire on Soviet ships in any case. At that time, about 30 Soviet ships were heading towards Cuba, carrying, among other things, nuclear warheads. It was decided to send some of these forces back to avoid conflict with the United States.

Development of the crisis

By October 24, the situation around Cuba began to heat up. On this day, Khrushchev received a telegram from the President of the United States. In it, Kennedy demanded to observe the quarantine of Cuba and "keep prudence." Khrushchev responded to the telegram quite sharply and negatively. The next day, at an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, a scandal broke out caused by a skirmish between Soviet and American representatives.

Nevertheless, both the Soviet and the American leadership clearly understood that it was completely pointless for both sides to escalate the conflict. Thus, the Soviet government decided to take a course towards the normalization of relations with the United States and diplomatic negotiations. Khrushchev personally wrote a letter on October 26 addressed to the American leadership, in which he proposed to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba in exchange for lifting the quarantine, refusing to invade the island by the United States, and withdrawing American missiles from Turkey.

On October 27, the Cuban leadership became aware of the new conditions of the Soviet leadership for resolving the crisis. The island was preparing for a possible American invasion, which, according to available data, was to begin within the next three days. An additional alarm was caused by the flight of an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over the island. Thanks to the Soviet S-75 anti-aircraft missile systems, the plane was shot down, and the pilot (Rudolf Anderson) died. On the same day, another American aircraft flew over the USSR (over Chukotka). However, in this case, everything went without casualties: the interception and escort of the aircraft by Soviet fighters.

The nervous atmosphere that reigned in the American leadership was growing. President Kennedy was categorically advised by the military to launch a military operation against Cuba in order to neutralize Soviet missiles on the island as quickly as possible. However, such a decision would unconditionally lead to a large-scale conflict and a response from the USSR, if not in Cuba, then in another region. Nobody needed a full-scale war.

Conflict resolution and aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis

In the course of negotiations between the US President's brother Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, general principles were formulated on the basis of which it was envisaged to resolve the crisis. These principles formed the basis of a message from John F. Kennedy sent to the Kremlin on October 28, 1962. This message offered the Soviet leadership to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba in exchange for guarantees of non-aggression from the United States and the lifting of the island's quarantine. Regarding American missiles in Turkey, it was indicated that this issue also has the prospect of being resolved. The Soviet leadership, after some deliberation, responded positively to J. Kennedy's message, and on the same day, the dismantling of Soviet nuclear missiles began in Cuba.

The last Soviet missiles from Cuba were taken out 3 weeks later, and already on November 20, J. Kennedy announced the end of Cuba's quarantine. Also, soon American ballistic missiles were withdrawn from Turkey.

The Caribbean crisis was resolved quite successfully for the whole world, but not everyone was satisfied with the current state of affairs. So, both in the USSR and in the USA, high-ranking and influential persons were under the governments, interested in the escalation of the conflict and, as a result, very disappointed with its detente. There are a number of versions that it was thanks to their assistance that John F. Kennedy was assassinated (November 23, 1963) and N. S. Khrushchev was deposed (in 1964).

The result of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 was international detente, which was expressed in the improvement of relations between the US and the USSR, as well as in the creation of a number of anti-war movements around the world. This process took place in both countries and became a kind of symbol of the 70s of the XX century. Its logical conclusion was the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and a new round of growing tensions in relations between the USA and the USSR.

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In 1962 occurred . The whole world stood on the edge of the abyss - and this is not an exaggeration. The Cold War, which had dragged on between the USSR and the USA for almost twenty years, could escalate into a nuclear conflict. The Soviet Union secretly sent its missiles to Cuba, and, of course, America regarded such a move as an open threat.

Foothold in Cuba: Causes of the Caribbean Crisis.

Despite the long-standing confrontation and arms race, the deployment of missiles in Cuba was not an adventure of the Soviet government.

After the victory of the revolutionary forces of Fidel Castro in 1959 in Cuba, the USSR entered into close cooperation with the Cubans. This was beneficial to both parties - Cuba received the support of one of the most powerful powers in the world, and the USSR gained its first ally "on the other side of the ocean."

Of course, this alone was enough to make the American government feel some anxiety.

By the early 1960s, the United States had a significant advantage in terms of nuclear weapons. And in 1961, American missiles with nuclear warheads were deployed in Turkey - in close proximity to the borders of the USSR.

In the event of a nuclear conflict, these missiles "reached" including Moscow. According to John F. Kennedy, they were not much more dangerous than ballistic missiles deployed on submarines.

However, intermediate-range missiles and intercontinental missiles differ in approach time, and in addition, installations in Turkey were much easier to immediately put on alert.

One way or another, Khrushchev considered American missiles on the Black Sea coast a threat. Therefore, a retaliatory step was taken - the secret movement and installation of nuclear forces in friendly Cuba, which led to Caribbean crisis of 1962.

Conflict resolution.

Having learned about the presence of Soviet nuclear forces in Cuba, the US leadership decided to establish a naval blockade around Cuba. True, oddly enough, there was a hitch with the legality of such an act - after all, Soviet missiles did not formally violate international law, while the imposition of a blockade was considered a direct declaration of war.

Therefore, it was decided to call the blockade "quarantine" and cut off the sea communication not entirely and completely, but only in terms of weapons.

Diplomatic negotiations, during which the whole world was in suspense, lasted a week.

As a result, the parties agreed on the following:

  • the USSR withdraws its forces from Cuba;
  • The US removes missiles from Turkey and abandons attempts to invade Cuba.

Outcomes and consequences of the Caribbean crisis.

Almost causing the Third World War, he demonstrated the danger of nuclear weapons and the inadmissibility of using them in diplomatic negotiations. In 1962, the US and the USSR agreed to stop nuclear testing in the air, under water and in space, and the Cold War began to decline.

Also, it was after the Cuban Missile Crisis that a direct telephone connection was created between Washington and Moscow - so that the leaders of the two states no longer had to rely on letters, radio and telegraph to discuss important and urgent problems.

In the early 1960s Cuba has become an arena of rivalry between the great powers. The American government was quite alarmed at the prospect of having a communist state at its side. The revolutionary center that arose in Cuba represented a certain threat to American influence in Latin America. At the same time, the USSR was interested in turning Cuba into its ally in the fight against the United States.

USSR support

All the actions of the United States directed against Cuba were skillfully used by the Soviet government in their own interests. Thus, the economic blockade organized by the USA led to the fact that the Soviet Union began to supply oil to Cuba. The USSR and the countries of the socialist camp bought Cuban sugar, supplied the population of the island with everything necessary. This allowed the revolutionary regime to survive. In April 1961, the US attempt by Cuban emigrants to intervene on the island ended in the defeat of the landing force. It was after these events that F. Castro began to call the Cuban revolution socialist.

Deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba

The economic, political and military pressure of the United States on the rebellious island led to a further tightening of the revolutionary regime. Under these conditions, the Cuban authorities decided to strengthen the country's defense capability with the help of the USSR. The Soviet government, under a secret agreement with the Cuban leadership in the summer and autumn of 1962, deployed medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. Under the gunpoint of Soviet missiles were the vital centers of the United States.

The transfer of missiles was carried out in the strictest secrecy, but already in September 1962, the US leadership suspected something was wrong. On September 4, President Kennedy declared that the United States would under no circumstances tolerate Soviet nuclear missiles within 150 kilometers of its borders. In response, Khrushchev assured Kennedy that there were no Soviet missiles or nuclear weapons in Cuba and never would be. He called the installations discovered by the Americans Soviet research equipment. material from the site

October Crisis

The dramatic events in October 1962 developed in the following way. On October 14, pictures of an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft showed the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. October 22 was followed by an official statement by US President John F. Kennedy on the blockade of the island. American missile units were put on alert. Nuclear warheads were activated on 100 missiles. On October 24, Soviet ships loaded with missiles reached the quarantine line and stopped. Never before has the danger of nuclear war been so real. On October 25, Kennedy sent a telegram to Khrushchev demanding that Soviet missiles be withdrawn from the island. The Soviet leader sent two responses, in the first he demanded US guarantees of non-aggression on Cuba, and in the second he demanded the withdrawal of American Mars missiles from Turkey. Kennedy accepted the first, while the second condition was met a few months later. On October 28, Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles.

The Cuban crisis was followed by some improvement in international relations, which led to the signing on August 5, 1963 of an agreement between the USSR, the USA, Great Britain on the prohibition of testing nuclear weapons in three areas - in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. This improvement, however, began already in the absence of the main actors of the Caribbean crisis: on November 22-November 1963, John F. Kennedy was assassinated, and on October 14, 1964, N. S. Khrushchev was removed from all his party and state posts.

The Caribbean crisis is the most acute international crisis of the Cold War era, the manifestation of which was an extremely tense diplomatic, political and military confrontation between the USSR and the USA in October 1962, which was caused by the secret transfer and deployment of military units and units of the Armed Forces of the USSR, equipment and weapons, including nuclear weapons. The Caribbean crisis could lead to a global nuclear war.

According to the official Soviet version, the crisis was caused by the deployment in 1961 by the United States in Turkey (a NATO member state) of Jupiter medium-range missiles, which could reach cities in the European part of the USSR, including Moscow and the main industrial centers of the country. As a response to these actions, in the immediate vicinity of the US coast, on the island of Cuba, the USSR deployed regular military units and subunits armed with both conventional and nuclear weapons, including ground-based ballistic and tactical missiles. Submarines of the Soviet naval forces equipped with missiles and torpedoes with nuclear warheads were also deployed on combat duty off the coast of Cuba.

Initially, after the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Cuba did not have close relations with the USSR. The rapprochement between Cuba and the USSR became apparent after radical transformations began to be carried out in Cuba, including those directed against the dominance of the Americans. The imposition of US sanctions against Cuba in 1960 hastened this process of rapprochement. Such steps put Cuba in a very difficult position. By that time, the Cuban government had already established diplomatic relations with the USSR and asked for help. In response to Cuba's request, the USSR sent oil tankers and organized the purchase of Cuban sugar and raw sugar. Experts from various sectors of the national economy of the USSR went to Cuba on long business trips to create similar industries, as well as office work. At the same time, the Soviet leader N.S. Khrushchev considered the defense of the island important to the international reputation of the USSR.

The idea of ​​deploying missile weapons in Cuba arose shortly after the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation. N.S. Khrushchev believed that deploying missiles in Cuba would protect the island from a re-invasion, which he considered inevitable after the failed landing attempt. The militarily significant deployment of a critical weapon in Cuba would also demonstrate the importance of the Soviet-Cuban alliance to Fidel Castro, who demanded material confirmation of Soviet support for the island.

The fact that in 1961 the United States began to deploy in Turkey, near the city of Izmir, 15 PGM-19 Jupiter medium-range missiles with a range of 2400 km, which directly threatened the European part of the USSR, reaching Moscow, also played a role. Soviet strategists realized that they were practically defenseless against the impact of these missiles, but it was possible to achieve some nuclear parity by taking a counter step - placing missiles in Cuba. Soviet medium-range missiles on Cuban territory, with a range of up to 4000 km (R-14), could keep Washington at gunpoint.

The decision to deploy Soviet missiles on the island of Cuba was made on May 21, 1962 at a meeting of the Defense Council, during which N.S. Khrushchev raised this issue for discussion. The members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who were members of the Defense Council, supported N.S. Khrushchev. The ministries of defense and foreign affairs were instructed to organize the secret transfer of troops and military equipment by sea to Cuba.

On May 28, 1962, a Soviet delegation consisting of the USSR Ambassador A.I. flew from Moscow to Havana. Alekseev, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Marshal S.S. Biryuzov, Colonel General S.P. Ivanov, as well as Sh.R. Rashidov. On May 29, 1962, they met with Raul and Fidel Castro and presented the Soviet proposal to them. On the same day, a positive response was given to the Soviet delegates.

On June 10, 1962, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the results of the trip of the Soviet delegation to Cuba were discussed and a preliminary draft of the missile transfer operation, prepared at the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, was presented. The plan envisaged the deployment of two types of ballistic missiles in Cuba: R-12 with a range of about 2,000 km and R-14 with a range of about 4,000 km. Both types of missiles were equipped with 1 Mt nuclear warheads. It was supposed to send a group of Soviet troops to Cuba, for combat protection of five divisions of nuclear missiles (three R-12 and two R-14). After listening to the report of R.Ya. Malinovsky, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU voted for the operation unanimously.

By June 20, 1962, a group of Soviet troops in Cuba was formed to deploy on the island:

units of the Strategic Missile Forces, consisting of: a consolidated 51 missile division (16 launchers and 24 R-14 missiles), the 79th missile regiment of the 29th missile division and the 181st missile regiment of the 50th missile division (24 launchers and 36 R-12 missiles) with repair and technical bases attached to them, support and maintenance units and subunits;

ground troops covering missile forces: 302, 314, 400 and 496 motorized rifle regiments;

air defense forces: 11th air defense anti-aircraft missile division (12 S-75 installations, with 144 missiles), 10th air defense anti-aircraft division (anti-aircraft artillery), 32nd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (40 newest front-line MiG-21F fighters -13, 6 training aircraft MiG-15UTI);

air force: 134th separate aviation squadron (11 aircraft); 437th separate helicopter regiment (33 Mi-4 helicopters); 561st and 584th regiments of cruise missiles (16 launchers, of which 12 launchers have not yet been put into service with Luna tactical missiles);

navy: 18th division and 211th submarine brigade (11 submarines), 2 floating bases, 2 cruisers, 2 missile and 2 artillery destroyers, missile boat brigade (12 units); a separate mobile coastal missile regiment (8 launchers of the Sopka towed coastal missile system); 759th mine-torpedo aviation regiment (33 Il-28 aircraft); detachment of support vessels (5 units);

rear units: a field bakery, three hospitals (600 beds), a sanitary and anti-epidemic detachment, a transshipment base service company, 7 warehouses.

In Cuba, it was planned to form the 5th Fleet of the USSR Navy as part of the surface and underwater squadrons. It was planned to include 26 ships in the surface squadron: cruisers pr. 68 bis - "Mikhail Kutuzov" and "Sverdlov"; Project 57-bis missile destroyer "Angry", "Boikiy"; artillery destroyers of project 56 "Light" and "Fair"; brigade of project 183R missile boats "Komar" - 12 units; 8 auxiliary vessels, including 2 tankers, 2 bulk carriers, 1 floating workshop. It was planned to include in the squadron of submarines: Project 629 diesel missile submarines: K-36, K-91, K-93, K-110, K-113, K-118, K-153 with R-13 ballistic missiles; Project 641 diesel torpedo submarines: B-4 (submarine), B-36, B-59, B-130; project 310 floating base "Dmitry Galkin", "Fyodor Vidyaev".

General I.A. was appointed commander of the GSVK. Pliev. Vice Admiral G.S. was appointed commander of the 5th Fleet. Abashvili. The relocation of submarines to Cuba was singled out as a separate operation under the code name "Kama".

The total number of the redeployed group of troops was 50,874 personnel and up to 3,000 civilian personnel. It was also necessary to transport over 230,000 tons of logistics.

By June 1962, the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces had developed a cover operation codenamed "Anadyr". Marshal of the Soviet Union I.Kh. planned and directed the operation. Bagramyan. Missiles and other equipment, as well as personnel, were delivered to six different ports. The transportation of personnel and equipment by sea was carried out on passenger and dry cargo ships of the merchant fleet from the ports of the Baltic, Black and Barents Seas (Kronstadt, Liepaja, Baltiysk, Sevastopol, Feodosia, Nikolaev, Poti, Murmansk). 85 ships were allocated for the transfer of troops. In early August 1962, the first ships arrived in Cuba. On the night of September 8, 1962, the first batch of medium-range ballistic missiles was unloaded in Havana, the second batch arrived on September 16, 1962. The headquarters of the GSVK was located in Havana. Battalions of ballistic missiles deployed in the west of the island near the village of San Cristobal and in the center of the island near the port of Casilda. The main troops were concentrated around the missiles in the western part of the island, but several cruise missiles and a motorized rifle regiment were transferred to the east of Cuba - a hundred kilometers from Guantanamo Bay and the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay. By October 14, 1962, all 40 missiles and most of the equipment had been delivered to Cuba.

The United States became aware of the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, after October 14, 1962, the first reconnaissance flight over Cuba since September 5, 1962, was carried out. A Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, piloted by Major Richard Heizer, took off at about 3 am from Edwards Air Force Base in California. An hour after sunrise, Heizer reached Cuba. The flight to the Gulf of Mexico took him 5 hours. Heizer circled Cuba from the west and crossed the coastline from the south at 7:31 am. The plane crossed the whole of Cuba almost exactly from south to north, flying over the cities of Taco-Taco, San Cristobal, Bahia Honda. Heizer covered these 52 kilometers in 12 minutes. Landing at an air base in south Florida, Heizer handed the film to the CIA. On October 15, 1962, CIA analysts determined that the photographs were of Soviet R-12 medium-range ballistic missiles (“SS-4” according to NATO classification). In the evening of the same day, this information was brought to the attention of the top military leadership of the United States.

On the morning of October 16, 1962 at 8:45 a.m., the photographs were shown to US President J.F. Kennedy. This date is considered the beginning of the events that are known in world history as the Cuban Missile Crisis.

After receiving photographs showing Soviet missile bases in Cuba, J.F. Kennedy called a special group of advisers to a secret meeting at the White House. This 14-member group, later known as the "Executive Committee", consisted of members of the US National Security Council and several specially invited advisers. Soon, the committee offered the president three possible options for resolving the situation: destroy the missiles with pinpoint strikes, conduct a full-scale military operation in Cuba, or impose a naval blockade of the island.

An immediate bombing attack was rejected out of the blue, as was an appeal to the UN that promised a long delay. The real options considered by the committee were only military measures. Diplomatic, barely touched upon on the first day of the work, were immediately rejected - even before the main discussion began. As a result, the choice was reduced to a naval blockade and an ultimatum, or to a full-scale invasion. The idea of ​​an invasion was criticized by J.F. Kennedy, who feared that "even if Soviet troops did not take active action in Cuba, the answer would follow in Berlin", which would lead to an escalation of the conflict. Therefore, at the suggestion of Minister of Defense R. McNamara, it was decided to consider the possibility of a naval blockade of Cuba.

The decision to impose a blockade was made at the final vote on the evening of October 20, 1962: J.F. Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and US Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson, specially summoned from New York. On October 22, 1962, the United States announced the introduction of a complete naval blockade of Cuba from 10 am on October 24, 1962. Officially, these actions were called by the American side as "quarantine of the island of Cuba", because. the announcement of the blockade meant the automatic start of war. Therefore, the decision to impose a blockade was submitted for discussion by the Organization of American States (OAS). Based on the Rio Pact, the OAS unanimously supported the imposition of sanctions against Cuba. The action was called not a "blockade", but a "quarantine", which meant not a complete cessation of maritime traffic, but only an obstacle to the supply of weapons. The United States required all ships bound for Cuba to stop completely and present their cargo for inspection. In the event that the ship's commander refused to allow the inspection team on board, the US Navy was instructed to subject the ship to arrest and escort it to an American port.

Simultaneously, on October 22, 1962, J.F. Kennedy addressed the American people (and the Soviet government) in a televised speech. He confirmed the presence of missiles in Cuba and declared a naval blockade of 500 nautical miles (926 km) around the coast of Cuba, warning that the armed forces were "ready for any developments" and condemning the USSR for "secrecy and imposing delusion." Kennedy noted that any missile launch from Cuban territory against any of the American allies in the Western Hemisphere would be regarded as an act of war against the United States.

In response to N.S. Khrushchev declared that the blockade was illegal and that any ship flying the Soviet flag would ignore it. He threatened that if the Soviet ships were attacked by the Americans, a retaliatory strike would follow immediately.

However, the blockade went into effect on 24 October 1962 at 10:00 am. 180 ships of the US Navy surrounded Cuba with clear orders not to open fire on Soviet ships in any case without a personal order from the president. By this time, 30 ships and ships were going to Cuba. In addition, 4 diesel submarines were approaching Cuba, accompanying the ships. N.S. Khrushchev decided that the submarines, the Aleksandrovsk and four other missile-carrying ships, the Artemyevsk, Nikolaev, Dubna, and Divnogorsk, should continue on their current course. In an effort to minimize the possibility of a collision of Soviet ships with American ones, the Soviet leadership decided to deploy the rest of the ships that did not have time to reach Cuba home.

At the same time, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to put the Armed Forces of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries on high alert. All layoffs have been cancelled. Conscripts preparing for demobilization were ordered to remain at their duty stations until further notice. N.S. Khrushchev sent F. Castro an encouraging letter, assuring him of the unshakable position of the USSR under any circumstances.

October 24, 1962 to N.S. Khrushchev received a short telegram from J.F. Kennedy, in which he called on the Soviet leader to "show prudence" and "observe the terms of the blockade." The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU gathered for a meeting to discuss the official response to the introduction of the blockade. On the same day, N.S. Khrushchev sent J.F. Kennedy a letter in which he accused him of setting "ultimatum conditions." He called the quarantine "an act of aggression pushing humanity towards the abyss of a world nuclear missile war." In a letter to N.S. Khrushchev warned J.F. Kennedy that "the captains of Soviet ships will not comply with the instructions of the American Navy", and also that "if the United States does not stop its piracy, the government of the USSR will take any measures to ensure the safety of ships."

On October 25, 1962, at an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, one of the most memorable scenes in the history of the UN played out, when the US representative E. Stevenson tried to force the representative of the USSR V. Zorin, who, like most Soviet diplomats, was unaware of Operation Anadyr , to give an answer regarding the presence of missiles in Cuba, making the well-known demand: "Do not wait until you are translated!" Refused by Zorin, Stevenson showed photographs taken by US reconnaissance aircraft showing missile positions in Cuba.

At the same time, Kennedy gave the order to increase the combat readiness of the US Armed Forces to the level of DEFCON-2 (the first and only time in US history).

Meanwhile, in response to N.S. Khrushchev, a letter arrived from J.F. Kennedy, in which he pointed out that "the Soviet side violated its promises regarding Cuba and misled him." This time, the Soviet leader decided not to go for a confrontation and began to look for possible ways out of the current situation. He announced to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU that "it is impossible to store missiles in Cuba without going to war with the United States." At the meeting, it was decided to offer the Americans to dismantle the missiles in exchange for US guarantees to stop trying to change the state system in Cuba. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Ponomarev and Suslov supported Khrushchev. Gromyko and Malinovsky abstained from voting.

October 26, 1962 N.S. Khrushchev set about compiling a new, less militant message to J.F. Kennedy. In a letter, he offered the Americans the option of dismantling the installed missiles and returning them to the USSR. In exchange, he demanded guarantees that "the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces that would intend to invade Cuba." He ended the letter with the famous phrase: "You and I should not now pull the ends of the rope on which you tied the knot of war."

N.S. Khrushchev wrote this letter to J.F. Kennedy alone, without gathering the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Later in Washington there was a version that the second letter was not written by the Soviet leader and that a coup d'état may have taken place in the USSR. Others believed that the Soviet leader, on the contrary, was looking for help in the fight against hardliners in the ranks of the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces. The letter arrived at the White House at 10 am. Another condition was publicly broadcast over the radio on the morning of October 27, 1962: to withdraw American missiles from Turkey.

In the meantime, the political situation in Harbor was heated to the limit. F. Castro became aware of the new position of N.S. Khrushchev, and he immediately went to the Soviet embassy. F. Castro decided to write to N.S. Khrushchev a letter to push him to more decisive action. Even before he finished the letter and sent it to the Kremlin, the head of the KGB station in Havana informed the First Secretary of the essence of the message: “In the opinion of Fidel Castro, intervention is almost inevitable and will take place in the next 24-72 hours.” At the same time R.Ya. Malinovsky received a report from the commander of the Soviet troops in Cuba, General Pliev, about the increased activity of American strategic aviation in the Caribbean. Both messages were delivered to N.S. Khrushchev to the Kremlin at 12 noon on Saturday, October 27, 1962

At the same time, on the same day, October 27, 1962, an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down in the sky over Cuba. The pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson, was killed. Around the same time, another U-2 was almost intercepted over Siberia, as General K. Lemay, Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, disregarded the order of the President of the United States to stop all flights over Soviet territory. A few hours later, two US Navy RF-8A Crusader photographic reconnaissance aircraft were fired upon by anti-aircraft guns while flying over Cuba at low altitude. One of them was damaged, but the pair returned safely to base.

Military advisers to the President of the United States tried to persuade him to order the invasion of Cuba before Monday, "before it was too late." J.F. Kennedy no longer categorically rejected such a development of the situation. However, he did not leave hope for a peaceful resolution. It is generally accepted that "Black Saturday" October 27, 1962 - the day when the world was closest to a global nuclear war.

On the night of October 27-28, 1962, on the instructions of the President of the United States, Robert Kennedy met with Anatoly Dobrynin, the USSR ambassador to the United States, in the building of the Ministry of Justice. Kennedy shared with Dobrynin the president's fears that "the situation is about to get out of control and threaten to give rise to a chain reaction" and said that his brother was ready to give guarantees of non-aggression and the speedy lifting of the blockade from Cuba. Dobrynin asked Kennedy about the missiles in Turkey. “If this is the only obstacle to reaching the settlement mentioned above, then the president does not see insurmountable difficulties in resolving the issue,” he replied.

The next morning, October 28, 1962, N.S. Khrushchev received a message from Kennedy stating: 1) You will agree to withdraw your weapons systems from Cuba under the appropriate supervision of UN representatives, and to take steps, subject to appropriate security measures, to stop the supply of such weapons systems to Cuba. 2) We, for our part, will agree - provided that a system of adequate measures is created with the help of the UN to ensure the fulfillment of these obligations - a) to quickly lift the blockade measures introduced at the moment and b) give guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba. I am sure that other states of the Western Hemisphere will be ready to do the same.

At noon N.S. Khrushchev gathered the Presidium of the Central Committee at his dacha in Novo-Ogaryovo. At the meeting, a letter from Washington was being discussed, when a man entered the hall and asked Khrushchev's assistant, Troyanovsky, to phone: Dobrynin called from Washington. Dobrynin conveyed to Troyanovsky the essence of his conversation with Kennedy and expressed his fear that the US President was under strong pressure from Pentagon officials, and also conveyed word for word the words of the brother of the US President: “We must receive an answer from the Kremlin today, on Sunday. There is very little time left to resolve the problem.” Troyanovsky returned to the hall and read out to the audience what he managed to write down in his notebook. N.S. Khrushchev immediately invited the stenographer and began to dictate consent. He also dictated two confidential letters personally to J.F. Kennedy. In one, he confirmed the fact that Robert Kennedy's message reached Moscow. In the second - that he regards this message as an agreement to the condition of the USSR on the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba - to remove the missiles from Turkey.

Fearing any "surprises" and disruption of negotiations, Khrushchev forbade Pliev to use anti-aircraft weapons against American aircraft. He also ordered the return to airfields of all Soviet aircraft patrolling the Caribbean. For greater certainty, it was decided to broadcast the first letter on the radio so that it would reach Washington as soon as possible. An hour before the broadcast of N.S. Khrushchev (16:00 Moscow time), Malinovsky sent an order to Pliev to begin dismantling the R-12 launch pads.

The dismantling of Soviet rocket launchers, their loading onto ships and their withdrawal from Cuba took 3 weeks. Convinced that the USSR had withdrawn the missiles, US President J.F. Kennedy on November 20, 1962, gave the order to end the blockade of Cuba.

A few months later, American Jupiter missiles were also withdrawn from Turkey as "obsolete." The US Air Force did not object to the decommissioning of these IRBMs, because. by this point, the US Navy had already deployed the much more forward-based Polaris SLBMs.

The peaceful resolution of the crisis did not satisfy everyone. Offset N.S. Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU a few years later can be partially associated with irritation in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU regarding the concessions made by N.S. Khrushchev JF, Kennedy, and his inept leadership that led to the crisis.

The Cuban leadership regarded the compromise as a betrayal on the part of the Soviet Union, since the decision that put an end to the crisis was made exclusively by N.S. Khrushchev and J.F. Kennedy.

Some US military leaders were also dissatisfied with the result. Thus, the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, General K. Lemay, called the refusal to attack Cuba "the worst defeat in our history."

At the end of the Caribbean crisis, analysts of the Soviet and American intelligence services proposed establishing a direct telephone line between Washington and Moscow (the so-called “red telephone”), so that in case of crisis, the leaders of the “superpowers” ​​would have the opportunity to immediately contact each other, and not use telegraph.

The Cuban Missile Crisis marked a turning point in the nuclear race and the Cold War. In many respects, it was after the Caribbean crisis that the beginning of the détente of international tension was laid.

01 Dec 2017 Details Views: 1128

A mushroom cloud that has a column of water instead of a dust leg. A hole is visible on the pillar to the right: the battleship Arkansas (eng. USS Arkansas) covered the spray. Test "Baker", July 25, 1946

Black Saturday night talks saved the world from destruction

Humanity has never been as close to self-destruction as it was in the early 1960s. Mutual distrust and exorbitant ambitions of the politicians of the USSR and the USA brought the world to the threshold of the third world war - two superpowers, armed to the teeth with the most modern weapons, were ready to meet in a deadly battle with each other. As usual, each of the parties to the conflict blamed their opponents and tried to hide the details of the origin and resolution of the Caribbean crisis, even though more than half a century had passed since then.

The world is not divided into two

The Second World War resulted not only in the defeat of Nazi Germany, but also in the complete shift of the poles of world politics. The losers, of course, were punished and removed from decision-making. But the victors did not all survive the war without loss. Great Britain and France, by and large, ceased to be great powers. The USA and the USSR took the first roles.

Behind each of the superpowers were huge economic opportunities, advanced achievements of modern science and first-class, well-armed and front-line trained armies. Moreover, each side relied not only on weapons and allies, but also on its own ideological system.

The allied relations of the times of the anti-Hitler coalition were very quickly forgotten, and politicians plunged into a new confrontation, called the Cold War. Its essence, by and large, was reduced to the desire of the American and Soviet leadership to remake the world under their ideological guidelines.

Very soon, there were practically no neutral countries left that could be drawn into the orbit of their influence, and politicians and generals had to sit down at geographical maps. The Cold War now consisted not only of an arms race and propaganda campaigns, but also of intervening in conflicts around the world.

But it is not enough to win allies, you need to be able to protect them and prove that it is your defense that will be the most effective.

I must say that both sides were distinguished by completely absurd requests. Thus, the United States and its closest ally Great Britain, through the mouths of their first persons, declared that their relations with the USSR should be based on the conditions of "indispensable military superiority of countries in which English is spoken." Stalin responded with a demand to provide territory for military bases on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. All this was no more feasible than a world revolution, but the first turned against themselves Latin America, and the second - Turkey, Italy and France.

In the future, the projects became more and more modest, and besides, the United States lost its monopoly on nuclear weapons and were forced to be cautious about its possible use.

In addition, the USSR won one moral victory after another. Colonial empires collapsed, more and more "African friends", tempted by Soviet gifts, chose the socialist path of development. In a number of branches of military production, the Americans began to lose to the USSR.

By the end of the 1950s, a number of American politicians and the military came to the conclusion that a nuclear war in modern conditions was becoming unrealistic, and it was necessary to agree with the Soviet Union on the division of spheres of influence. Alas, they were in the minority. Soviet General Secretary Khrushchev, at first peaceful, also considered that dividing the world into two does not make sense, and moved on to threatening actions.

"Kuzka's mother" and "Turkish coast"

By 1960, the United States had a significant advantage (mostly quantitative) in strategic nuclear forces. The Americans were armed with about 6,000 warheads, and the USSR - no more than 300. By 1962, the United States was armed with more than 1,300 bombers capable of delivering about 3,000 nuclear charges to the USSR.

In addition, the United States was armed with 183 Atlas and Titan intercontinental ballistic missiles and 144 Polaris missiles on nine George Washington and Ethan Allen-class nuclear submarines. The Soviet Union was able to deliver about 300 warheads to the United States, mainly with the help of strategic aviation and R-7 and R-16 ICBMs.

The latter were the only headache for the Pentagon, as they had some advantage over the American ICBMs. The US strategists had little hope for bombers, since Soviet fighter-interceptors had no competitors in the sky. Plus, on October 30, 1961, the USSR tested the most powerful (51.5 megatons) thermonuclear bomb in the history of mankind - AN602, also known as the Tsar Bomba and Kuzkina Mother. This meant that the USSR received the technology to produce a nuclear warhead of any capacity. Now the enemy could respond to 3000 charges with a couple of charges, but with lethal force.

In response, the Americans placed in Turkey, in the Izmir region, fifteen Jupiter medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads. It was a real breakthrough - now the cities of the European part of the USSR, its main industrial regions, key military facilities were under attack. The flying time (about ten minutes) made the Jupiters a deadly argument.


Khrushchev considered the move a personal insult. In 1962, while in Bulgaria, he came up with the idea to make a counter move. One of the leaders of Bulgaria, pointing towards the Black Sea, asked the Secretary General what he could do with the American missiles located on the other side. Then Khrushchev thought about Cuba.

Initially, the regime of Fidel Castro, which came to power on January 1, 1959, was skeptical in the USSR. Bearded revolutionaries were considered something like an unprincipled riffraff, a disgrace to communist ideals.

In addition, the long-standing and strong ties between the United States and Cuba in the economy left little chance for effective intervention by the USSR. And Castro himself did not really want to become dependent on the Soviet Union. The Americans themselves spoiled relations with Freedom Island by trying to land there in April 1961 and restore the Batista regime. Castro realized that he needed protection.

AN602 ("KUZKINA'S MOTHER")

Soviet thermonuclear bomb. Developed by a group of nuclear physicists led by Igor Kurchatov (Sakharov, Adamsky, Babaev, Smirnov, Trutnev). Dropped from a Tu-95V bomber on October 30, 1961 from a height of 10,500 meters on Novaya Zemlya. The explosion was carried out at an altitude of 4200 meters. The power of the explosion significantly exceeded the calculated one (51.5 megatons) and ranged from 57 to 58.6 megatons in TNT equivalent.

The fireball of the explosion reached a radius of approximately 4.6 kilometers. Theoretically, it could grow to the surface of the earth, but this was prevented by a reflected shock wave, which crushed and threw the ball off the ground. The light radiation could potentially cause third-degree burns at distances up to 100 kilometers. Nuclear mushroom rose to a height of 67 kilometers.


To raise the power of the explosion by another 50 megatons, it was enough to make the third stage of the bomb (it was the shell of the second stage) not from lead, but from uranium-238, as was originally supposed.

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev closely followed the development of the Tsar Bomba, relying on it in the confrontation with the West. From 1959 until the tests, he let slip several times about the upcoming tests, promising to "show Kuz'kin's mother": in 1959 - to US Vice President Nixon during the American National Exhibition in Sokolniki, in 1960 - from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly. After successful tests, the name "Kuzkin's mother" was firmly stuck to the Soviet nuclear program in Western sources.

Operation Anadyr

On May 20, 1962, Khrushchev discussed the idea of ​​deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba with Mikoyan, Malinovsky and Gromyko. Only Mikoyan opposed. Already on May 29, the Soviet delegation was in Havana and met with Fidel and Raul Castro. Fidel asked for only a day to think. It is known that on May 30 he consulted with Ernesto Che Guevara. The content of their conversation is not known for certain, but, apparently, Che advised the Cuban leader not to accept the offer. However, on the same day, Castro agreed to accept the Soviet contingent with missiles.


It was supposed to send to Cuba a group of Soviet troops from five divisions of nuclear missiles (three R-12 and two R-14), a Mi-4 helicopter regiment, four motorized rifle regiments, two tank battalions, a MiG-21 squadron, forty-two Il-28 light bombers , two units of "cruise" missiles with nuclear warheads 12 Kt with a range of 160 km (RK "Luna"), several batteries of anti-aircraft guns, as well as twelve S-75 installations (144 missiles) and a grouping of the Soviet Navy: 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers , 12 Komar missile boats, 11 submarines (7 of them with nuclear missiles). In total, 50,874 military personnel were planned to be sent to the island.

Army General Issa Pliev was appointed to command the group, and Marshal Baghramyan was assigned to lead the transfer. The name of the operation was supposed to mislead American intelligence. In addition, all the participants did not know until the last moment where they were being sent. The official version was - to Chukotka. Short fur coats and felt boots were brought to the ports in whole trains, and the captains of the ships had to open envelopes with routes on the high seas under political leaders.

In September, the group was in Cuba and began to deploy, but the Americans still suspected something was wrong. Overflights of the island by reconnaissance aircraft began to be carried out up to six times a day, and on October 16, 1962, photographs appeared on the table of US President Kennedy, unambiguously indicating that Soviet R-12 ballistic missiles were deployed in Cuba.

On the brink of war

Kennedy immediately called a meeting. The military insisted on an immediate invasion and bombing of the positions of Soviet missilemen, assuring that the USSR would not go into open conflict in Cuba. Kennedy believed that aggression in the Caribbean would elicit a response in Europe, and suggested resorting to diplomatic steps. As a result, a compromise solution was worked out: a naval blockade of Cuba and an ultimatum to the leadership of the USSR.

The Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Dobrynin, was summoned to the White House. During the conversation, it became clear that he knew nothing about military preparations in Cuba. Did not know anything about the plans of the leadership and the Soviet representative to the UN Zorin.

There were problems with the blockade: according to international standards, it would be considered an act of aggression, while the deployment of missiles in Cuba (and in Turkey) was absolutely legal. The Americans nevertheless started it under the name "Quarantine". In response, Khrushchev wrote a rather aggressive letter to Kennedy, in which he expressed his determination to continue the course he had begun to the end, and at the same time put the Warsaw Pact troops on high alert.

Kennedy ordered an army strike force to be pulled into Florida and declared the penultimate level of combat readiness DEFCON-2 - the only time in American history.

And then Khrushchev suddenly made a 180-degree turn in politics. There is a legend according to which he invited the famous hypnotist and "thought reader" Wolf Messing for consultation. The ability of the latter to see through time, as well as such a meeting itself, are questioned. But the explanation according to which Messing predicted an imminent nuclear war if Khrushchev did not give in to Kennedy sounds beautiful.

Sakharov's plan

The well-known Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov, who was active in nuclear projects, warned Khrushchev against being drawn into a costly arms race. Instead, he proposed placing a series of 200- and even 500-megaton thermonuclear charges near the US maritime borders. According to Sakharov, this was supposed to cool the ardor of conservative circles in the United States.

"Black Saturday"

One way or another, but Khrushchev called a new meeting, at which he proposed to remove the missiles in exchange for US guarantees to leave Cuba alone. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Ponomarev and Suslov supported the General Secretary, Gromyko and Malinovsky abstained. On October 26, Khrushchev wrote a new letter to the American President. “You and I should not now pull the ends of the rope on which you tied the knot of war,” the Soviet leader reported.

The White House did not believe a single word, although in parallel with the proposals for negotiations, the Americans began to appear through intelligence channels. Kennedy generally decided that a coup d'état had taken place in the USSR, and it was no longer Khrushchev who wrote the letter.

How close the world was to a third world war became clear when an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba. This day was later called "Black Saturday". The military urged Kennedy to launch an immediate invasion. But at night, Dobrynin met with the American president's brother, Robert Kennedy, and assured him that the Soviet peace initiatives were not a hoax.

Negotiations were held in a hurry. Already on October 28, Khrushchev ordered Pliev to begin dismantling the R-12 launch pads. It took three weeks to withdraw the missiles from Cuba. On November 20, the Americans lifted the blockade and guaranteed the USSR their non-interference in Cuban affairs. And a few months later, the United States removed the Jupiters from combat duty, which everyone almost forgot about in the confusion. True, they did this not as a concession, but because this missile system was outdated.

Who came out of the Caribbean crisis as a winner, it is impossible to say unequivocally. The Cuban leadership regarded the compromise as a betrayal. US Air Force Chief of Staff General LeMay called the failure to invade America's worst defeat. Khrushchev was also reminded of his "reversal" a few years later, when he was removed from office. But hardly anyone seriously regrets that the war passed by in those October days.

NUCLEAR ROCKET ARSENAL OF THE USSR AND THE USA

USSR
R-7
The first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile. Chief designer - Sergei Korolev. Two-stage. Carrier weight - 170 tons. Detachable warhead weight - 3 tons. Launch from a pre-prepared stationary launch pad. Adopted in 1960, decommissioned in 1969. Range - 8000 kilometers (after completion 11,000 kilometers). Accuracy - within 10 km. Thermonuclear charge power - 3 Mt.
R-16
Two-stage intercontinental ballistic missile. Two-stage. Developer - Design Bureau "Yuzhnoye". Length - 34.3 m, diameter - 3 m, launch weight -141.5 t, Launch from a pre-prepared stationary launch pad. Adopted in 1962. Withdrawn from service in 1977. Range-13,000 kilometers. Accuracy - 2.7 kilometers. The power of a thermonuclear charge is 3-6 Mt.
R-14
Soviet medium-range ballistic missile. Chief designer - Mikhail Yangel. Length - 23.4 m, diameter - 2.4 m, starting weight - 87 tons. The maximum height of the trajectory is 570 kilometers, the maximum speed is 5200 m / s. Launch from ground launch pad. Adopted in 1961. Withdrawn from service in 1987. Range-4500 kilometers. Accuracy - up to 5 km. Thermonuclear charge power - 2.3 Mt.
USA
Medium range ballistic missile. Chief designer - Wernher von Braun. Length - Length: 18.3 m, diameter - 2.67 m, starting weight - 49,353 kg. The maximum height of the trajectory is 660 km, the maximum speed is 5140 m/s. Launch from mobile launcher.
Range - 2400 kilometers. Accuracy (maximum deviation) - 1500 meters. Thermonuclear charge power -1.44 Mt.
"ATLAS"
The world's first ICBM put into service. The developer is Atlant Corporation. Length - 22.9 m, diameter - 3.05 m, launch weight -118 tons. Launch from a pre-prepared stationary launch pad. Adopted in 1959. Withdrawn from service in 1965. Range - 10,200 kilometers. Accuracy - 0.6-1.2 km. Thermonuclear charge power - 1.45 Mt (SM-65D), 4.45 Mt (SM-65E / F).
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