Pre-war level of industrial production. Stalin's economy

The war destroyed part of the economic potential, which amounted to about one one third of the country's total national wealth . A huge number of factories and factories, mines, railways and other industrial facilities were destroyed.

Restoration work began during the Great Patriotic War, immediately after the liberation of part of the occupied territories.

In August 1943 a special resolution was adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR “On urgent measures to restore the economy in areas liberated from German occupation.” By the end of the war, as a result of the titanic efforts of our workers, it was possible to recreate part of industrial production.

However the main restoration processes took place after the victorious end of the war, during the fourth five-year plan (1946-1950).

It was believed that the Soviet economic model had withstood the harsh and difficult test of the war and therefore not only justified itself, but was also very promising.

As in the years of the first five-year plans, the emphasis in industrial development was placed on the production of means of production (group “A”), i.e. for heavy industry, and The share of production in this area in the total volume of industry was higher than before the war:

- in 1940 it was 61.2%,

- in 1945 - 74.9%,

- in 1946 - 65.9%,

- in 1950 - 70%.

Restoration and development of the national economy:

Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-1950) - restoration and development of the USSR economy

- restoration and construction of 6,200 industrial enterprises.

The largest industrial facilities:

restored: built:

1) Dneproges; Kolomna Heavy Transport Engineering Plant;

2) “Zaporizhstal”; Kaluga Turbine Plant;

3) Donetsk coal gas pipeline Saratov - Moscow

Achieving the pre-war level of industrial production ( 1948 ).

Emphasis on increasing indicators for the production of metal, fuel and industrial raw materials to the detriment of the production of consumer goods.

Currency reform and abolition of the card system for basic consumer goods ( December 1947).

Agriculture is seriously lagging behind. The pre-war level of agricultural production was reached only in the early 1950s.

Industry was being rebuilt in a peaceful manner, and the output of civilian products was increasing. The level of pre-war industrial production was achieved, according to official data, by 1948. In total, 6,200 large enterprises were restored and rebuilt, including such giants as the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Plant and Zaporizhstal, the Ust-Kamenogorsk Lead-Zinc Plant, the Kolomna Heavy Transport Engineering Plant, the Saratov-Moscow gas pipeline, etc.

Agriculture in the Fourth Five-Year Plan did not have time to reach pre-war levels. This was only achieved in the next five-year period.

At the same time, the country faced enormous difficulties and problems. In 1946, famine broke out in a number of regions as a result of:

- drought,

- traditional state policy regarding agriculture

Farms.

Since the period of collectivization, he has used the village as a segment from which resources and funds were taken for:

Industrial development;

Ensuring foreign policy objectives ( in particular, in 1946-1947. The Soviet Union exported 2.5 million tons of grain to Europe at preferential prices).

The famine, as usual, was not recognized at the official level, and the authorities only intensified administrative and repressive measures. In the summer and autumn of 1946, two party and state resolutions were adopted:

- “On measures to ensure the safety of bread, preventing its squandering, theft and damage” and

- “On ensuring the safety of state grain.”

They declared accounting and control, rather than grain production, to be the main means of solving the food problem. The consequence of these decisions was massive repressions against collective farm chairmen and other agricultural leaders.

The war and its consequence - the rationing system of supplying the population - upset the country's financial system. The critical situation in the consumer market, the expansion of natural exchange, and inflationary processes threatened to disrupt the program for restoring the national economy, so the the question of monetary reform.

As the then People's Commissar of Finance A.G. Zverev recalled, it was prepared carefully and top secret. It was also proposed to combine it with the abolition of the card system, which was supposed to demonstrate the overall success of the Soviet economy not only for the population of the country, but also in the international arena.

JV Stalin believed that this action needed to be carried out before it happened in other European countries, which were also forced during the war to resort to rationing the supply of the population (England, France, Italy, Austria). In the end, that’s what happened. On December 16, 1947, the USSR began:

- implementation of monetary reform,

- cards for food and industrial goods were cancelled.

Money was released into circulation and exchanged within a week (until December 22, 1947) for existing old cash in a ratio of 1:10 (i.e., 10 old rubles were equal to one new ruble).

Deposits and current accounts in savings banks were revalued as follows: 1:1 (up to 3 thousand rubles); 2:3 (from 3 thousand to 10 thousand rubles) and 1:2 (over 10 thousand rubles).

Everywhere:

Prices for bread, flour, pasta, cereals, and beer decreased;

Prices for meat, fish, sugar, salt, vodka, milk, eggs, vegetables, fabrics, shoes, and knitwear were not changed.

Overstocked Moscow counters were shown in documentary newsreels in all corners of the country, so that every worker thought about how the people's well-being was steadily growing. But it is quite obvious that the reform pursued confiscation goals and “ate up” part of the savings of the Soviet people.

The life of the people in the first post-war period was not easy in material and everyday terms, although it was attractive in terms of emotional and psychological intensity:

The war ended victoriously,

Peaceful construction began

There was hope for a better future.

Average salary in the country:

In 1947 it was 5 thousand rubles per month,

In 1950 - 700 rubles (after monetary reform). This corresponded approximately to the level of 1928 and 1940.

Basic retail prices of food products (in rubles) in 1950 .:

1 kg of premium bread cost 6-7;

1 kg of sugar - 13-16;

1 kg of butter - 62-66;

1 kg of meat - 28-32;

A dozen eggs - 10-11.

Industrial goods were much more expensive. For example, the cost of men's shoes was 260-290 rubles, and a suit - 1,500 rubles.

Since 1949, a constant decline in prices began, but the purchasing power of the population was extremely low, which created the illusion of abundance and improved life.

The financial situation of the population was aggravated by forced loans from the state from the people through subscription and purchase of various bonds. But nevertheless, due to the peculiarities of human memory, all this is a pleasant memory of people of the older generation.

In the entire history of mankind, no country has suffered such damage as a result of military action. The USSR lost about 30% of its national wealth. The death toll was 27 million people, the number of wounded and maimed cannot be accurately calculated. In 1946, the population of the USSR, amounting to 172 million people, barely exceeded the level of 1933. 1,710 cities and towns (60% of their total number), over 70 thousand villages and villages, about 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 65 thousand kilometers of railways, 25 million people lost their homes. 100 thousand collective and state farms were ruined, 7 million heads of cattle, 20 million pigs, 27 million heads of sheep and goats were slaughtered or driven to Germany. The amount of direct losses caused by the war in 1945 was estimated at 679 billion rubles, which was 5.5 times the national income of the USSR in 1940.

True, the volume of industrial production decreased slightly – by only 9%. But it must be taken into account that the bulk of the production was the production of weapons. And peaceful industries have greatly reduced their output. By the end of the war, consumer goods were produced 2 times less than before it. In 1945, the industry of the areas liberated from occupation produced only 30% of pre-war production. The greatest damage was caused to ferrous metallurgy (the country was set back by more than 10-12 years in metal production and ore mining), oil (the lag was 15 years), coal, chemical, energy, and mechanical engineering.

The relatively small (about 9%) decrease in the overall level of industrial production is explained by the unprecedented scale of evacuation. Up to 2.6 thousand enterprises were evacuated, of which more than 1.5 thousand were large. This began the accelerated development of the eastern regions, where 3.5 thousand large enterprises were put into operation, and military production increased at a particularly rapid pace. As a result, the industrial power of the Urals increased by 3.6 times, Western Siberia by 2.8 times, and the Volga region by 2.4 times. With a general reduction in industrial potential, heavy industry (the so-called group “A” - production of means of production) exceeded the pre-war level by 12%. Its share in the total volume of industrial production increased in 1945 to 74.9%.

This was achieved largely due to a sharp drop in production of already poorly developed industries and the food industry. In 1945, the production of cotton fabrics amounted to only 41% of the 1941 level, shoes – 30%, sugar – 21%, etc. Thus, the war not only caused colossal damage to industry, but also changed its geographical and especially industrial structure. Therefore, in some respects, the war can be considered as another, very specific stage in the further industrialization of the USSR.

Since 1943, as the occupiers were expelled, the USSR began to restore the economy destroyed by the war. In addition to these works, industrial conversion had to be carried out, since by 1945 more than 50% of industrial production was accounted for by military products. But the conversion was partial, since simultaneously with the reduction in the share of military equipment and ammunition produced, the modernization of the military-industrial complex (MIC) and the development of new types of weapons took place. In September 1945, a message appeared in the press that the USSR had successfully tested the first atomic bomb, and in August 1953, a hydrogen bomb. During these same years, mass demobilization took place. The personnel of the armed forces decreased from 11.4 million people. in May 1945 to 2.9 million in 1948. True, the size of the army soon increased again in connection with the Korean War: in the early 1950s. it reached almost 6 million people. In 1952, direct military expenditures amounted to 25% of the state budget, i.e. only 2 times less than in the war year of 1944.

Unlike the reconstruction process after the Civil War, there was no need to rebuild the entire industry. The value of industrial fixed assets in 1946 was equal to the pre-war value: in the East of the country, as much was built during the war as was destroyed in the West. Therefore, restoration now came down to three processes: restoration of what had been destroyed in areas subject to occupation, demobilization of part of the industry, and return of part of the evacuated enterprises to their old places. Many enterprises established in new locations remained there.

The pre-war level of industrial production was restored in 1948, and in 1950 industry produced 70% more than in 1940. The pre-war level of national income was restored only in 1950, but official figures for the dynamics of industrial production during this time need clarification. The economic recovery was accompanied by a slight increase in people's living standards compared to pre-war times. In 1947, food rationing cards were abolished, and then prices were lowered for several years. In 1947, the average price level was three times higher than in 1940, and the reduction in prices made it possible to reduce their level by 2.2 times, so that even after the reduction they remained somewhat higher than the pre-war level. In addition, the decline in prices was accompanied by the withdrawal of part of the money earned from the population in the form of compulsory loans. Thus, the standard of living in 1946 - 1950. did not increase, but only approached the level of 1940, without reaching it.

The post-war economic growth of the USSR had several sources. First of all, the planned economy still retained the mobilization character inherent in it during the first five-year plans and during the war. Millions of people were organized in an organized manner to restore the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Plant, metallurgical plants of Krivoy Rog, Donbass mines, as well as to build new factories, hydroelectric power stations, etc. The USSR received reparations from Germany in the amount of 4.3 billion dollars. As reparations, industrial equipment, including factory complexes, was imported into the USSR from Germany and other defeated countries. 1.5 million German and 0.5 million Japanese prisoners of war worked in the USSR. In addition, approximately 8-9 million prisoners were kept in the Gulag system during this period, whose work was practically unpaid.

The sources of economic growth include the ongoing policy of redistributing funds from the social sphere in favor of heavy industry. Every year, the country's population had to subscribe to government loans for an average of 1-1.5 monthly wages. Total for 1946-1956 11 loans were placed. As before, the main burden of generating funds for heavy industry was borne by agriculture, which emerged from the war weakened. During the war, more than 40% of all collective and state farms were destroyed. The working-age population decreased from 34.4 million people. to 23.9 million. The number of tractors was 59% of the pre-war level, and the number of horses decreased from 14.5 to 6.5 million heads. In general, the volume of gross output decreased by 40%. After the war, the level of agricultural production compared to pre-war was lower than the level after the First World War and the Civil War. A severe drought (the worst in the previous 50 years) once again significantly undermined the economic potential of agricultural regions: Moldova, the Lower Volga region, the Central Black Earth regions, and Crimea.

The pre-war level of agricultural production was restored in the first half of the 50s, i.e. much later than in industry. But this restored level was at the same time the level of agriculture in Tsarist Russia on the eve of the First World War. The grains were now collected at 88 million tons. per year (in Russia on the eve of the war 86 million tons). Cattle in the first half of the 50s. there were 56-57 million heads (in 1916 – 58.4 million). 5 million tons of meat were produced. (the same number in 1913)

True, at this time progress was made in the mechanization of agricultural production. By the beginning of the 50s. the number of tractors increased by 2 times compared to pre-war, and grain combines by 2.5 times. But the process of raising the technical level of agriculture itself would be one-sided. The so-called “basic field work” was mechanized: cropping, sowing, harvesting and threshing grain, while livestock farming, production of industrial crops, potatoes and vegetables were almost unaffected by mechanization processes. If the listed “main field work” was now 80-90% mechanized, and not 50-60% as before the war, then flax harvesting was only 30%, and potato harvesting was 10%. At the same time, technical progress was understood as mechanization, and the production of fertilizers and land reclamation remained aloof from this process.

As in the pre-war years, unequal exchange of goods between city and countryside continued using pricing policies. Government procurement prices for major products changed very slowly and did not reflect changes in production costs. Thus, purchase prices for milk reimbursed only a fifth of the costs of its production; for grain - a tenth; for meat - twentieth. All losses were covered by subsidies or through government loans, which, as a rule, were not returned but written off. The peasants, receiving almost nothing for their workdays, lived off their personal subsidiary plots. On private plots, which occupied several percent of the country's cultivated area, vegetables, potatoes were grown, and livestock was kept.

But starting in 1946, the state began to cut back on personal plots and impose significant monetary taxes on farms. In addition, each peasant household had to submit a tax in kind in meat, milk and other products. Such practices in relation to the rural population continued to become more severe. In 1948, it was strongly “recommended” that collective farmers “sell” their small livestock to the state, although the collective farm charter allowed them to be kept. In response to this “recommendation,” the peasants began to slaughter their livestock, as a result of which more than 2 million pigs, goats, sheep and other animals were slaughtered in six months.

It became increasingly difficult for collective farmers to sell their products on the market, as fees and taxes on income from sales increased sharply. In addition, products could be sold on the market only if there was a certificate stating that the relevant farm had fulfilled its obligations to the state. If there was no document, the products were confiscated, and the peasants themselves were fined. In 1947, the mandatory requirement of working a minimum of workdays for collective farmers was confirmed. In case of failure to comply, criminal penalties could be applied to them. Thus, as in the years of the first five-year plans, the post-war village survived on the brink of starvation.

Control over farms by MTS and their political departments has again increased. MTS again received the right to distribute planned tasks among collective farms. Higher organizations, through the MTS system, determined the timing of sowing, harvesting and other agrotechnical work for farms. MTS also carried out mandatory procurement of agricultural products, collected payment in kind from collective farms for performing mechanized work, etc. Moreover, in the early 1950s. Collective farms were consolidated under the same pretext of strengthening the processes of mechanization of agricultural production. In fact, the consolidation of collective farms simplified state control over farms through MTS. The number of collective farms decreased from 237 thousand in 1950 to 93 thousand in 1953.

Despite these measures, agriculture developed slowly. Even in the relatively favorable year of 1952. year, the gross grain harvest did not reach the level of 1940, and the yield in 1949 - 1953. was only 7.7 centners per hectare. (In 1913 - 8.2 centners per hectare). In 1953, the number of cattle was less than in 1916, and the population over these years grew by 30 - 40 million people, i.e. the food problem remained very acute. The population of large cities was supplied intermittently.

In 1952, I. Stalin published the work “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,” in which he continued to insist on the priority development of heavy industry and accelerating the process of transforming collective farm-cooperative property into national (state) property. It was especially emphasized that the collective farms, which nominally still remained the owners of the products produced, were a temporary, transitional structure. In order to increase the efficiency of agriculture, in 1948, the grandiose “Stalinist Plan for the Transformation of Nature” was adopted, in accordance with which the creation of forest shelter belts in the southern and south-eastern regions of the European part of the USSR was adopted to retain moisture in the fields and reduce the harmful effects of dry winds on agricultural crops. land. This plan also provided for the construction of an irrigation system in Central Asia - the Great Karakum Canal, through which water from the Amu Darya was supposed to flow to irrigate fields in Turkmenistan. Shelter forest belts protect fields from dry winds, improve the water regime of the soil, humidify the air and create a favorable microclimate for crops, and prevent the blowing out of the top fertile layer and soil erosion. In order to give afforestation in the steppe and forest-steppe regions an organized character and state scope, the “Plan for field protective plantings, the introduction of grass-based crop rotations, the construction of ponds and reservoirs to ensure high and sustainable yields in the steppe and forest-steppe regions of the European part of the USSR” was adopted.

Particular attention was paid to afforestation. During 1950-1965 provided for the creation in 16 regions of 8 large forest belts with a total length of 5320 km. In addition, it was planned to plant protective forest belts on the fields of state and collective farms with a total area of ​​5 million 709 thousand hectares. Work began in the spring of 1949. Until 1951, strips were laid on an area of ​​1 million 852 thousand hectares. Their length is more than 6 thousand km. Forest plantations created more than 40 years ago still protect 25 million hectares. lands and are an example of the peaceful application of human energy and caring attitude towards the earth and nature.

In accordance with the plan for the transformation of nature, the construction of huge hydroelectric power stations on the Volga, Dnieper, and other rivers (Gorky, Kakhovskaya, Kuibyshevskaya, Saratov, Stalingrad) also began. All these stations were put into operation in the 1950-1960s. In 1952, the Volga-Don Canal was built, connecting five seas into a single system: White, Baltic, Caspian, Azov, Black.

As stated above, the card system was abolished in 1947. Its abolition was planned for the end of 1946, but due to drought and crop failure this did not happen. The abolition was carried out only at the end of 1947. The USSR was one of the first European countries to abolish card distribution. But before abolishing the rationing, the government established uniform food prices to replace the previously existing rationing and commercial prices. As a result, the cost of basic food products for the urban population has increased. So, the price is 1 kg. black bread was 1 rub., but became 3 rubles. 40 kopecks, price 1 kg. meat increased from 14 to 30 rubles, sugar - from 5.5 to 15 rubles, butter - from 28 to 66 rubles, milk - from 2.5 to 8 rubles. At the same time, the minimum wage was 300 rubles. per month True, for low- and medium-paid categories of workers and employees, along with uniform prices, “bread allowances” were established on average of about 110 rubles. per month, but these allowances did not solve the general problem of income.

At the same time, a monetary reform was carried out. Its necessity was determined by the imbalance of the monetary system during the war year, since the sharp increase in military spending required the release into circulation of a huge amount of money that was not backed by consumer goods and services. Due to a significant reduction in retail trade turnover, the population found itself with more money than was required for the normal functioning of the economy, and therefore the purchasing power of money fell. In addition, there was a lot of counterfeit money in the country, issued by the Nazis during the war.

On December 14, 1947, the Government Decree “On carrying out monetary reform and the abolition of cards for food and industrial goods” was issued. Old money was exchanged for new money at a rate of 10:1 within a week. For those who kept money in savings bank accounts, the exchange was more preferential. So, deposits up to 3 thousand rubles. remained unchanged and were not subject to revaluation. Deposits in the amount of 3 to 10 thousand rubles. exchanged at the rate of 3:2, and deposits over 19 thousand - 2:1.

At the same time, all previously issued government loans were combined into a single new 2 percent loan, and old bonds were exchanged for new ones in a ratio of 3:1, bonds of the freely marketable loan of 1930 - in a ratio of 5:1. With the help of such methods, the excess money supply was withdrawn, and the reform itself acquired a mainly confiscatory character. During the reform, it was mainly rural residents who suffered, who, as a rule, kept their savings at home, and speculators who made money during the war and did not have time to sell large sums of cash.

On January 1, 1950, the government recognized the need to increase the official exchange rate of the ruble against foreign currencies and determined it in accordance with the gold content of the ruble (0.222168 pure gold), although in those years this fact had no economic significance, since as the established official ruble exchange rate was not used in any calculations.

All the years of the first five-year plans, the war and post-war years were for the country a time of extreme, extraordinary development. During this period, the urgent needs of the population were postponed until later. For almost 25 years the economy has been working under the greatest strain. All the successes achieved were paid at a superhuman price. According to official statistics, the average nominal wage of workers increased between 1928 and 1954. more than 2 times. According to other sources, during this period the cost of living in the USSR increased 9–10 times, as retail prices rose constantly. But if the general index of retail prices in state and cooperative trade in 1928 is taken as 1, then in 1932 it was 2.6, in 1940 - 6.4, in 1947 -20.1, in 1950 –11.9. Real wages for this period, excluding taxes and loan subscriptions, but including the wage supplement in the form of free medical care, education and other social services, changed as follows: if we take the wage level in 1928 as 1, then 1937 it was 0.86; in 1940 -0.78; in 1944 –0.64; in 1948 –0.59; in 1952 –0.94; 1954 -2.19.

Meanwhile, in the memory of people of the older generation, the opinion has taken root that under Stalin prices decreased every year, and after him they only increased. But the secret to lowering prices should be sought in the huge jump that occurred after the start of collectivization. Thus, retail prices for rye bread increased in 1928-1952. almost 19 times, for beef – 17 times, for pork – 20.5; for sugar – 15; for sunflower oil at 33; for eggs – 19.3; for potatoes - 11 times. Therefore, it was not difficult to implement an annual price reduction—by several percent—for basic food products. In addition, this price reduction was carried out due to the actual decrease in the standard of living of collective farmers, since, as indicated above, the growth rate of purchase prices for agricultural products was much higher than the growth of retail prices. And finally, the majority of the rural population hardly felt this reduction in prices, since government supplies in rural areas were very poor.

The housing issue remained extremely acute. Many workers and their families in the cities lived in dormitories, communal apartments, barracks and basements. During these years, housing construction was carried out on a very limited scale. The main budget allocations were spent on the military-industrial complex, heavy industry, and the energy system. The further development of the USSR economy rested on its excessive centralization. All economic issues were resolved only in the center, and local economic authorities were strictly limited in resolving any matters. The main material and monetary resources necessary to fulfill planned targets were distributed through a significant number of authorities. Departmental disunity and mismanagement led to constant downtime in production and large material losses.

An army of special commissioners, or “pushers,” grew up, who were engaged in obtaining raw materials and scarce materials in factories and ministries. Reports from heads of enterprises and ministers were full of additions to the fulfillment and overfulfillment of plans, so statistical data should be taken critically due to their certain unreliability. An example is the report of G.M. Malenkov at the 19th Party Congress (1952), in which it was said that the grain problem in the USSR had been solved and that a harvest of 8 billion poods had been harvested. And just two years later it was announced that data on agricultural development were inaccurate.

After the war, various administrative reforms were carried out several times, but they did not make fundamental changes to the essence of the planned system. In March 1946, the people's commissariats turned into ministries, and the people's commissars into ministers, and this meant that they were no longer people's commissars. Civil ranks and classes were established, vaguely reminiscent of the “table of ranks” of Peter I. The tightening of the economic system left its mark on the entire social life of the country.

After the war (1946), public persecution of writers, composers, theater figures and film directors began. The goal of these companies was to force the creative intelligentsia to work strictly in the spirit of “party spirit” and “socialist realism”. A similar goal was pursued by discussions in philosophy, biology, linguistics, and political economy, which began in 1947. The fight against “cosmopolitanism” and “adulation to the West” was encouraged. the incitement of chauvinism and anti-Semitism intensified. Since 1948, repressions have been renewed.

The choice of economic strategy of the USSR was determined by the political course. In this case, it depended primarily on the will of Stalin, the balance of forces in the ruling circles, as well as on the international situation and especially on its understanding by the Soviet leadership. The foreign economic factor determined both the degree of conversion and the amount of resources allocated to the development of the military-industrial complex (MIC), as well as the level of economic cooperation with Western powers, and in particular the possibility of obtaining foreign loans and investments. These were fundamental circumstances that largely determined the scale of savings, their structure (in particular, the share of domestic savings in the gross domestic product) and the degree of closedness of the Soviet economy.

Victory in the war dramatically changed the international situation. The USSR became not only a full member, but also one of the leaders of the world community; his relations with the Western powers acquired a partnership, even, it seemed, friendly character. However, it was not so much about the wider inclusion of the USSR in the global economic context, but about the choice of an economic development model. The war changed the social atmosphere and gave impetus to the democratic renewal of the system and hopes for change for the better. Fear began to gradually disappear in the public consciousness. The war taught me to think critically. For many, it was the “discovery” of the West. Millions of citizens visited abroad for the first time (more than 6 million people in the active army and another 3.5 million people repatriated). They were able to evaluate the achievements of Western civilization themselves and compare them with Soviet ones.

Unprecedentedly broad cooperation with “imperialist” countries in the fight against a common enemy, the weakening of ideological manipulation during the war years shook the established stereotypes and aroused interest and sympathy for the West. Reformist sentiments also penetrated into the Bolshevik elite, which was noticeably renewed during the war years. The war accustomed management circles to initiative and relegated the fight against pests and enemies of the people to the background.

During the war years, the degree of centralized state regulation of some sectors of the economy decreased. As a result, in areas not subject to occupation, the incomes of rural residents increased slightly. Concern for the survival of the population and the fulfillment of government tasks prompted local authorities to encourage small-scale production. A return to peaceful life required: either the legitimization and institutionalization of these innovations, a significant adjustment of the pre-war economic policy, or a return to the previous over-centralized model of the economy with a hypertrophied military sector (even civilian enterprises simultaneously had a military profile, mobilization capacities in case of war), the strictest administrative political control over the activities of enterprise administrations and all workers.

Already in 1945 - 1946. When considering the draft 4th Five-Year Plan, a discussion arose about ways to restore and develop the economy. In these and subsequent years, a number of leaders of various ranks emerged who advocated softening or changing certain aspects of economic policy, balanced development of the national economy, and some decentralization of its management. Similar proposals were also made during the development and closed discussion of the new Constitution and the new party program.

Among them were the Secretary of the Central Committee, the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU A. Zhdanov, the Chairman of the State Planning Committee N. Voznesensky, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR N. Rodionov and others. The First Secretary of the Kursk Regional Committee of the CPSU P. Doroshenko proposed to reorganize collective farms, radically change the role of peasant families and transform them into the main structural unit of agricultural production. These leaders supported their calculations with an analysis of the international situation, believing that the transition to peaceful life would cause an acute economic and political crisis, which would not only prevent any threat of creating an anti-Soviet coalition of Western powers, but, on the contrary, would promise the USSR new opportunities, in particular, as market for crisis-ridden Western economies.

Supporters of a return to the pre-war model, among whom were G. Malenkov, L. Beria (who headed the most important military projects), and leaders of heavy industry, on the contrary, appealed to the works of the economist E. Varga, who refuted the theory of the imminent and inevitable crisis of capitalism and proved its ability to adaptation. Believing that this made the international situation potentially explosive, Malenkov and Beria advocated the accelerated development of the military-industrial complex.

They managed to win their first major victory with the approval of the 4th Five-Year Plan. Adopted in May 1946, the Law on the Five-Year Plan for the Restoration and Development of the National Economy for 1946-1950. contained very intense tasks and proclaimed as the main task: “Ensure the priority restoration and development of heavy industry and railway transport.” It was supposed already in 1946 to “complete the post-war restructuring of the national economy” and in the near future not only to catch up, but also to surpass “the achievements of science outside the USSR.” However, many aspects of the economic strategy were not yet fully defined. The tasks of the 4th Five-Year Plan did not exclude some variability in development.

However, the progressive collapse of the anti-Hitler coalition, the struggle with the Western powers for the division of Europe and the beginning of the Cold War contributed to the final victory of the supporters of centralization and development of the military-industrial complex, behind whom stood Stalin. In the absence of the threat of fascism uniting the world, the initially inherent contradictions within the anti-Hitler coalition, the geopolitical interests of the powers inevitably led to a new split of the world into warring blocs.

After the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945) and the defeat of Japan (the act of surrender of which was signed on September 2, 1945), the contradictions between the allies intensified sharply. The most important reason for the collapse of the anti-Hitler coalition and the beginning of military-political confrontation was the struggle for spheres of influence. Already in 1945, through the efforts of the Soviet authorities, people's democratic governments controlled by the USSR were created throughout Eastern Europe. The transformation of Eastern Europe into a virtual protectorate of the USSR came as a surprise to many Western politicians, who still viewed communist ideology as the basis of Soviet foreign policy, rather than Stalin's emerging imperial ambitions and cold geopolitical calculations.

All these countries were provided with intensive material, financial and military assistance, the true extent of which was always kept secret. It is only known that as preferential long-term loans in 1945 - 1952. they were provided with 15 billion rubles. ($3 billion). Such huge funds for those times were provided to countries in response to the implementation of socio-economic transformations in them according to the Soviet model.

The United States, in turn, sent enormous material assistance to Western European countries in the amount of $12.4 billion as part of the Marshall Plan. These funds were used not only for post-war economic recovery, but also to strengthen US military and political influence in the region. On October 4, 1946, W. Churchill publicly accused the USSR of fencing off Eastern Europe with an “iron curtain” and called for organizing pressure on the USSR. Essentially, it was a call for open confrontation with the USSR. Nevertheless, the inertia of allied relations still persisted for some time. In 1949, with the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the NATO bloc, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact organization were created - the split of Europe into two hostile camps was finally formalized, which had the most negative (primarily economic) consequences for the internal life of the USSR.

The fact is that at the turn of the 1940-1950s. Industrially developed countries began to introduce the achievements of the modern scientific and technological revolution (STR) into production, and this led them to a new, post-industrial stage of economic development. The Soviet economy, due to its over-centralization, insufficient initiative and entrepreneurship in various economic structures, turned out to be incapable of widespread introduction of scientific and technical developments into production (except for the military-industrial complex) and began to lag behind countries with developed market economies. In addition, these countries began to noticeably outstrip the USSR in terms of the standard of living of the population and in ensuring various democratic rights and freedoms. The USSR sought to prevent the “pernicious influence” of the West on the Soviet people, using the resources of the repressive apparatus.

Stalin was pushed to tighten domestic policy and deploy a new round of terror both by personal experience and by some internal factors, in particular the famine of 1946, which contributed to a sharp tightening of state control over the countryside and the aggravation of the socio-economic situation in the cities. In 1947, the USSR refused to participate in the Marshall Plan. In 1947, the Berlin crisis broke out, almost leading to a military conflict with the United States. The hardliners' final victory was sealed by the defeat of their opponents. N. Voznesensky (accused of underestimating the indicators of the 4th Five-Year Plan), P. Rodionov and many other economic managers were repressed. The targets of the 4th Five-Year Plan were revised towards even greater increases; new, super-intense tasks were given to military production.

Despite the relative stabilization in Europe, the parties were actively developing plans for a new war, with the United States focusing on atomic bombings. But in the USSR in 1949, a nuclear device was detonated for the first time. In 1950, North Korea, with the help of China and the USSR, tried to reunite the country by armed means. The United States and 15 other countries came out on the side of South Korea under the UN flag. In the northeastern regions of the USSR, near Alaska, accelerated construction of airfields and bases began, and assignments for weapons production increased sharply. These many other signs indicated accelerated preparations for armed conflict with the United States.

This determined the economic policy of the last years of the Stalinist USSR. The country not only returned to its previous economic model, but also lived literally in the pre-war regime. The accelerated development of heavy industry was accompanied by propaganda campaigns and the deployment of terror. Without it, without non-economic coercion, it would have been impossible to pursue such an economic policy. Repressions began to increase after the war in the western regions of the USSR; they affected Soviet prisoners of war who found themselves in camps after their return, and were then used against various representatives of the intelligentsia, military personnel, etc. The last hopes were finally dashed by the campaign against cosmopolitanism that unfolded from the end of 1948. By playing on the patriotic sentiments of the Soviet people, the authorities thereby tried to erase from people’s consciousness the interest and sympathy for the West that arose during the war years, to strengthen the ideological isolation of the country, to incite chauvinist and anti-Semitic feelings and urgently renew the image of the external enemy, which was shaken during the war.

The unfolding new round of mass terror was interrupted by the death of Stalin. Nevertheless, for 1945-1953. the number of prisoners in GULAG camps and colonies alone increased from 1.5 to 2.5 million people. As a result of the post-war wave of repressions, 5.5 - 6.5 million people ended up in prison and exile. With the hands of prisoners, numerous major facilities of the fourth and fifth five-year plans were built in the nuclear, metallurgical, energy industries, as well as in transport.

The war unleashed by Nazi Germany caused great damage to the Soviet Union. More than 25 million Soviet citizens died at the fronts, behind enemy lines, and in concentration camps. Many hundreds of thousands of people were mutilated and could not return to full-blooded human life. The country lost its best production personnel, technical support for production was suspended, and commodity-money turnover sharply decreased.

On September 13, 1945, the Pravda newspaper published a message from the Extraordinary State Commission to establish and investigate the atrocities of the Nazi invaders. The occupiers plundered, destroyed and burned 1,700 cities, more than 70 thousand villages and hamlets on the territory of the USSR, and deprived 25 million people of their homes. About 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 65 thousand km of railway tracks, 13 thousand railway bridges, 16 thousand steam locomotives, and over 400 thousand carriages were disabled. The Nazis plundered and ruined 98 thousand collective farms, about 2 thousand state farms, 3 thousand machine and tractor stations, stole 17 million cattle, 47 million sheep, goats, and pigs. During the war years, USSR agriculture lost 7 million horses, 137 thousand tractors and much more. The list of Hitler's atrocities took up several newspaper pages.

The direct damage caused by the invaders amounted to 679 billion rubles, which is approximately equal to the total capital investments of the USSR during the first four five-year plans. If we take into account the expenses of our country on restructuring industry on a war footing, waging war and the loss of income from areas captured by the Nazis, then the damage amounted to 2 trillion. 596 billion rubles. For comparison, all state budget revenues in 1940 amounted to 180 billion rubles.

As a result of the losses incurred, the national economy was thrown back: in the production of cement and the processing of industrial wood to the level of 1928-1929, in the production of coal, steel, and ferrous metals to the level of 1934-1938, i.e. for no less than 10 years.

During the war years, much of the equipment was badly worn out, and much was no longer usable. The curtailment of military production affected primarily heavy industry enterprises, where the volume of output in 1946 was 27% less than in 1945. In the light and food industries, the transition to peaceful production occurred much earlier. Already in 1946, the production of consumer goods increased by 13% compared to the previous year. However, as before, priority remained with heavy industry, which was fueled by income from the sale of consumer goods.

The problem of personnel was also extremely acute. Thus, compared with the pre-war period, the total number of workers and employees in the national economy decreased by more than 5 million people (from 33.9 million in 1940 to 28.6 million in 1945), including . in industry - by 14%, in transport - by 9, in agriculture - by 15%. The bulk of the labor force was made up of women, old people and teenagers. The composition of those employed in production has also deteriorated sharply. Thus, the number of engineers in industry in 1945 was 126 thousand less than in 1940.

It is also necessary to take into account that the Soviet people were in dire need of literally everything. In cities, a rationing system for the distribution of food and many consumer goods was maintained. A regular card issued monthly about 2 kg of meat and fish, 400 g of fat, 1.5 kg of cereals and pasta.

At the same time, a significant part of the funds went to the defense of the USSR and international assistance to people's democracies.

Country Recovery Program

The restoration of the national economy and its partial restructuring on a peaceful basis began in the summer of 1943 - the moment of the mass expulsion of the Nazis from the occupied territories of the country.

The main provisions of the program for the restoration and further development of the national economy were set out in Stalin’s speech to voters in the first post-war elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February 9, 1946.

Five-year plan for the restoration and development of the USSR economy for 1946-1950. provided for the accelerated development of the Soviet economy, raising the living standards of the people, and strengthening the country's defense power. Industry was supposed to reach the pre-war level already in 1948, and by the end of the five-year plan it should have exceeded it by 48%. Twice as much money was allocated for capital construction as for all pre-war five-year plans combined. The total volume of capital investments amounted to 250.3 billion rubles. 157.7 billion were allocated for industry, and 19.9 billion rubles for agriculture. The plan also provided for an increase in the production of consumer goods and the replacement of the card system with expanded state trade. It was envisaged to reduce prices for all goods, increase wages, large-scale housing and cultural construction, expand the healthcare system, public education, etc. Although the already meager funds were devoured by the military-nuclear moloch. In accordance with the five-year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR, similar plans were adopted in all 16 union and 20 autonomous republics.

The Soviet people steadfastly endured the hardships of post-war devastation. The idealized pre-war life, and most importantly, the victory over fascism, fueled the people's confidence in a wonderful future, their readiness to endure all the difficulties and hardships, and the desire to work hard.

Already in 1945, about 5 million people who were forcibly taken to work in Germany, 2.5 million Soviet prisoners of war, most of whom ended up in Gulag camps, returned to the USSR. Until 1948, the Soviet Army was reduced by almost 8.5 million people.

The victory over fascism caused a great political and labor upsurge of the entire Soviet people. The forms of labor activity were different. The enthusiasm of the workers was actively supported by party and trade union bodies, the Komsomol and the administration. However, most organizational activities were reduced not to the analysis of economic phenomena, but to the requirements of the political situation. Without discussing the fundamental issues of reality, a simple, traditional and so far reliable method was used - “to push or attribute.”

At the end of the 40s, the struggle between two lines of development of the economic mechanism continued: one aimed at strict centralization, comprehensive control, order methods, and the other at expanding the economic independence of production, introducing cost accounting, and the material interest of workers.

In the leadership of the country and locally, people began to appear who, in the practice of state and economic management, were convinced that emergency management measures suppressed economic independence and the initiative of workers, which led to public apathy, economic stagnation, increased command-bureaucratic actions and political repression. Already at the end of the 40s, society did not accept command methods of management and organization during the war, as well as production dictates and neglect of the social and spiritual needs of man. The war ended, but the difficulties and unsettled life remained.

Although the public consciousness was ready to accept new “enemies of the people,” it increasingly felt the need for reforms. However, the reform trend was significantly at odds with the interests of the administrative system. The logic of reform would ultimately lead to the realization of the need not for private, but for fundamental changes in public life, which in practice would show the harmfulness of the administrative-command apparatus and the socio-political system. Realizing the danger of the collapse of the created management system, the party-bureaucratic apparatus strengthened the proven methods of work - promises, lies, dictatorship.

Transition of industry to a peaceful direction

In the field of industrial production in the post-war years, a number of complex tasks were solved simultaneously: the transition from military production to the production of civilian products; restoration of destroyed enterprises; expansion of production and product range; construction of new enterprises; technical re-equipment and development of advanced technologies. During the Fourth Five-Year Plan, it was necessary not only to restore the pre-war level of industrial production, but also to exceed it by almost half.

The successful implementation of the assigned tasks was due to: a unified state plan covering all sectors of the national economy, which made it possible to centralize the distribution of the country's budget; the industry of the eastern regions of the USSR, which, after reconversion, became a powerful basis for the speedy restoration of the western and central regions affected by the war; additional funds received from government loans, high prices for food and consumer goods, and low wages.

During the restoration and further development of the national economy with the technical re-equipment of production, the growth of the cultural and technical level of the working class, and the improvement of production processes, close and constant cooperation between engineers and scientists was a vital necessity. Without such a union, it became impossible to solve complex economic problems and further technical progress.

In March-April 1947, a competition began between engineering and technical workers in industry to increase labor productivity and reduce the labor intensity of products based on improving technology and introducing advanced work methods. The initiator of the competition, the Ural technologist of the third mechanical shop of the Kirov Tractor Plant, A. Ivanov, by updating production technology, improving the skills of workers and using the experience of innovators, achieved an outstanding result at his site: the labor productivity of machine operators increased by 2 times, 30% of workers were released, 11 metal-cutting machines , the cost of manufacturing parts has sharply decreased. On May 17, 1947, Pravda wrote: “If every technologist in his area acts as creatively as A. Ivanov, then industry will achieve a significant increase in labor productivity, better use of machines and available equipment, and an increase in production output... It is necessary support in every possible way this new manifestation of creative activity and Soviet patriotism of engineering and technical workers.” On May 30, 1947, the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions adopted a resolution on organizing the All-Union Competition of Technologists. Thus, it was no longer single specialists, but entire groups of engineers who accepted obligations aimed at improving technology, introducing mechanization and reducing the labor intensity of production operations, further increasing labor productivity, and ensuring savings in raw materials.

During 1946, industrial production was restructured to produce civilian products, and in 1948 the pre-war production level was already exceeded by 18%, including in heavy industry by 30%.

During the recovery period, special attention was paid to ferrous metallurgy enterprises and coal mines of Donbass. In honor of their restoration, special award medals were established. However, the pre-war level of coal production in the Donbass was achieved only in 1950, and the metallurgical industry of the Ukrainian SSR, which produced 75% of the country’s total metal before the war, was restored only in 1951.

Along with the restoration of old ones, the construction of new industrial facilities was underway. Power plants were built: Farhadskaya (Uzbek SSR), Sevanskaya (Armenian SSR), Kramskaya and Sukhumskaya (Georgian SSR), Rybinskaya (on the Volga), Shchekinskaya (Moscow region), etc. Metallurgical complexes were laid in Rustavi (Transcaucasia), Bogovat (Uzbekistan ), Ust-Kamenogorsk lead-zinc plant, pipe-rolling plants in Sumgait (Azerbaijan) and Nikopol (Ukrainian SSR), etc.

Between the Volga and the Urals, new oil fields were intensively developed. The so-called Second Baku already in 1950 provided 44% of the country’s total oil production, although another 80% of the country’s fuel was allocated to coal.

In total, 6,200 large enterprises were built and restored during the five-year plan. However, the five-year target for commissioning new production facilities in the iron and steel industry, the coal industry and the construction of power plants was not fulfilled.

In general, targets were exceeded for the production of metals, coal and oil production, electricity generation, etc. However, a number of industries and especially the production of consumer goods have not reached pre-war levels.

The situation of agriculture after the Great Patriotic War

One of the most important tasks of the Fourth Five-Year Plan was to restore agriculture and ensure the further development of agricultural production in general. Without a general rise in agriculture, it was impossible to improve the financial situation of the working people, abolish the rationing system for the distribution of food and consumer goods, and provide industry with raw materials.

Meanwhile, the damage caused by the Nazi occupiers to collective farms alone amounted to 181 billion rubles. In terms of the size of sown areas, the country was at the level of 1913. Gross agricultural output in 1945 was 60% of the 1940 level. During the war years, the machine and tractor fleet was reduced by an average of a third, the number of horses was halved. There were farms where they plowed on their own and sowed by hand from a basket. The human losses were especially noticeable. The difficulties of the recovery period were aggravated by the severe drought of 1946. In addition, spending on agriculture during the Fourth Five-Year Plan was almost 4 times less than on industry.

In the most difficult conditions, collective and state farms and MTS were mainly restored in a short period of time. Industrial enterprises and townspeople provided great assistance to collective farms. In 1946, 3/4 of the sown areas of the occupied regions were brought into working condition.

By the end of the five-year plan, gross agricultural output was expected to exceed the 1940 level by 27%. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (February 1947) adopted a resolution “On measures to boost agriculture in the post-war period,” which emphasized the technical equipment of agriculture with tractors, cars, and various agricultural machines. And yet, there was not enough equipment on the collective farms; moreover, it was ineffective, there was a lot of downtime, and there was a lack of spare parts. The situation with mechanization in livestock farming was unsatisfactory.

During the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the capacity of rural power plants tripled. In 1950, 76% of state farms and 15% of collective farms were electrified, compared to 4% in 1940.

Serious attention was paid to the promotion and implementation of scientific achievements and best practices in agriculture. Three-year agro-zootechnical on-the-job training courses for collective farmers were of great importance.

At the same time, in the process of restoring agriculture locally, and often in the center, serious mistakes were made. The grass-fed system of field cultivation was routinely planted, which led to a reduction in the crops of grain and legumes and hampered the production of the grain needed by the country. Excessively centralized planning, multi-stage and incompetent bureaucratic leadership fettered the economic initiative of peasants, led to irrational distribution of agricultural crops, violated the timing of sowing, harvesting, etc.

The development of agricultural production was significantly hampered by low procurement prices for grain, potatoes, meat and other products, as well as raw materials that the state received from collective farms as mandatory deliveries. Procurement prices not only did not cover the cost of their production, but did not even justify transportation costs for the delivery of procured products. The payment for a collective farmer's workday was extremely low and did not stimulate his interest in work.

At the same time, high taxes were levied on collective farmers (tax on personal plots, personal livestock, beehives, fruit trees, etc.).

Standard of living of the population after the Great Patriotic War

The main indicator of the living standard of the Soviet people was the growth of national income, the physical volume of which in 1950 exceeded the pre-war level by 1.62 times. This enabled the Soviet government to abolish the card system for the distribution of food and consumer goods in December 1947. At the same time, a monetary reform was carried out in a ratio of ten to one, i.e. one old-style chervonets was exchanged for one ruble of new money. Cash deposits in savings banks and the State Bank were revalued on preferential terms. The monetary reform did not affect the wages of workers and employees, or the labor income of peasants, which remained at the same level. In this way, excess (issued) and counterfeit money, and a significant part of the population’s cash savings, were confiscated.

The standard of living of the population was characterized by wages and retail prices for food and household industrial goods. After the war, before the abolition of the card distribution system, retail prices increased on average 3 times compared to 1940: for food by 3.6 times, for industrial goods - by 2.2 times. Over the years, wages for workers and employees have increased only 1.5 times. The average wage in the national economy in 1940 was 33 rubles; in 1945 - 43.4 rubles; in 1948 - 48 rubles; in 1950 - 64 rubles. per month, from which it was necessary to deduct the amount for subscription to government loans. The highest salaries were among scientific workers - an average of 46.7 rubles per month. in 1940 and 38-48 rubles. in 1950. Thus, the abundance in stores of food, consumer goods and even luxury goods (gold, furs, etc.) was a consequence of the low purchasing power of the bulk of the population.

In 1950, per capita consumption was: meat - 26 kg, milk and dairy products - 172 kg, outerwear - 0.3 pieces. etc. Many cultural and household items - televisions, washing machines, radios, etc. were considered luxury goods.

The improvement in the financial situation of broad sections of the population was ensured by a reduction in retail prices for consumer goods and household services. In state trade, prices decreased every year in April. If their level before the abolition of the card distribution system is taken as 100%, then on March 1, 1949 their index was 71%, on April 1, 1954 - 43%, and yet prices were more than 1/3 higher than the pre-war level. People with high earnings benefited most from the reduction in prices: workers in trade, public catering, various procurement, material supplies, as well as employees of administrative bodies.

It was very difficult for the peasants, who were actually forcibly attached to the land. In the early 50s, a collective farmer received 16.4 rubles for his hard work. per month, i.e. 4 times less than a worker. Wheat was bought from collective farms for 1 kopeck. per kilogram at a retail price for flour of 31 kopecks. and so on.

In a letter to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks G. Malenkov, a student of the Smolensk Military-Political School N. Menshikov wrote: “As a communist, it pains me to hear such a question from collective farmers: “Do you know whether the collective farms will be dissolved soon? ... there is no strength to live like this.” further"".

The difficult situation after the war was with the housing stock, the restoration and construction of which was carried out simultaneously and in conjunction with industrial construction. If in 1940 the average per capita urban population was 6.7 square meters. m, then in 1950 - 7 sq. m, and yet many lived in basements, and the bulk of the population lived in communal apartments.

Thus, the standard of living of the population was still far from normal and largely depended on investments in heavy industry, defense, and international assistance.

Changes in territories included in the USSR

A feature of the restoration and development of the national economy were transformations in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, Right Bank Moldova, which joined the USSR in 1939-1940, as well as in the Tuva Autonomous Region, Transcarpathian, Kaliningrad and Sakhalin regions, which were included in composition of the USSR in 1944-1945.

Socialist transformations begin from the moment the Nazi troops are expelled from these territories. By decision of the Soviet and party bodies, specific measures are being taken to liquidate all bodies and institutions of nationalist power and create party, Soviet state and local institutions. The main core of party and state events were operational groups of party and Soviet activists, representatives of partisans and underground fighters, as well as local residents demobilized from the Soviet Army.

A fierce struggle with the bodies of Soviet power was waged by nationalists - capitalist elements in the city, kulaks in the countryside, and the clergy, who had well-armed secret detachments.

To establish the new government, it was necessary to carry out socialist transformations throughout the entire economic complex. Along with the nationalization process, there was a restoration of industrial enterprises and the expansion of the material and technical base of the republics. As a result, industrial output in 1950 in Estonia exceeded the pre-war level by 3.4 times, in Latvia by 3 times, etc. Industrial production was significantly expanded, new branches were mastered, enterprises were equipped with first-class machines and the latest technological equipment.

In an atmosphere of intense struggle, changes also took place in agriculture, where the sad experience of collectivization of the countryside and the struggle against landowners and kulaks was also used. Violent methods of agricultural transformation led to the expropriation and liquidation of the kulaks, who made up the bulk of the rural population of the Baltic states, as well as to the expulsion from their homes of all those who resisted.

Particularly striking changes occurred in the Tuvan village. Semi-patriarchal and feudal relations prevailed here, and a significant part of the Arat population led a nomadic lifestyle. Thanks to the help of the Soviet peoples and the strong-willed party-Soviet leadership, the peasantry of the Tuva Autonomous Region, bypassing the capitalist stage of development, moved to “socialism.”

The political process, or more precisely, the population’s dogmatic memorization of Marxist-Leninist theory, “mastery of the method of socialist realism” and “scientific communism,” was complex and difficult, and in many ways incomprehensible. In the field of culture and education there was a massive ideological filling and Russification.

Thus, using traditional methods, from class positions and with the help of party and administrative pressure, the restoration and development of the USSR took place.

Sources and literature

The secrecy has been removed. Losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in wars, hostilities and military conflicts: Stat. study. M., 1991.

Zubkova E.Yu. Society and reform, 1945-1964. M., 1993.

Knyshevsky Extraction: The Mystery of German Reparations. M., 1994.

Manenkov A.I. Cultural construction in the post-war village (1946-1950). M., 1991.

Polyak G.B. Post-war restoration of the national economy. M., 1986.

Khanin T.E. Dynamics of economic development of the USSR. Novosibirsk, 1991.

Chronicle of the Day. Seventh post-war price decline in the USSR:

This law became the basis for the activities of all communist parties building socialism and even the governments of some capitalist countries seeking to mitigate the consequences of economic crises. This will be discussed further.

Stalin's annual price reduction and wage increase is nothing more than an increase in the investment of workers and employees, pensioners and students of the entire huge country in its economy. For example, if a citizen’s purchasing power increases, he spends more money on food and, by investing in agriculture and the food industry, increases their sales volume and, naturally, the profit of these industries.

If his income has increased, he spends more money on clothes and shoes - the light industry helps out. If he has enough money, he builds himself a new or improves existing housing, purchases building materials, makes the industry of building materials and construction organizations more profitable, and so on.

If a citizen has money left over from necessary purchases or there is a need to raise money for a large purchase, he invested the money in the savings bank and from this the savings bank developed. The depositor received interest, and the bank guaranteed him the safety of his money. Such an economy ensured the constant development of all sectors of the country's economy without crises.

Post-war annual decline in retail prices.

Already two and a half years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, in December 1947, a monetary reform was carried out in the USSR, cards for food and industrial goods were abolished, and uniform reduced state retail prices for consumer goods were introduced.

At this first stage of price reduction, the reduction in prices for consumer goods in state retail trade alone amounted to 57 billion rubles during the year. In addition to the reduction in prices on the collective farm and cooperative markets, prices were reduced by 29 billion rubles. In total, budget losses in 1947 from lower retail prices amounted to 86 billion rubles.

This amount was a net loss for the state budget, which was covered due to increased labor productivity, increased production of consumer goods and reduced production costs.

On March 1, 1949, the second stage of reducing prices for consumer goods in state trade in the amount of 48 billion rubles was completed, in addition, in cooperative and collective farm trade - in the amount of 23 billion rubles.

The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks stated that “as a result of a new reduction in prices, the purchasing power of the ruble will again significantly increase and the ruble exchange rate will improve compared to the exchange rate of foreign currencies, the real wages of workers and intellectuals will again increase and costs will again significantly decrease peasants for the purchase of industrial goods."

“In this event, the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government showed with renewed vigor a great concern for the working people, for their prosperity, for the growth of well-being and culture,” reported in the editorial of the Pravda newspaper on March 1, 1949.

By the indicated Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, prices were reduced in the following amounts:

• bread, flour and bakery products, cereals and pasta, meat and sausages, fish and fish products, butter and ghee, wool and silk fabrics, furs, hardware and electrical goods, cameras and binoculars, and a number of other goods - for 10 %;


• coats, suits, dresses and other garments made of woolen fabrics - by 12%;


• dresses, shirts, blouses and other garments made of silk fabrics, shoes, hats - by 15%;


• cheese and cheese, perfumes, hardware and saddlery, individual tailoring, dishes and household appliances made of plastic, motorcycles and bicycles, radios, pianos, accordions, button accordions, gramophone records, jewelry, typewriters - by 20%;


• TVs, vodka - by 25%;


• salt, cement, gramophones, watches, hay - by 30%.

The same Resolution reduced prices accordingly: in restaurants, canteens, tea houses and other catering establishments. (Pravda newspaper, March 1, 1949)

All over the country, meetings and rallies were held at enterprises, at which the workers were informed of the Resolution “On a new reduction in prices...”

Reductions in retail prices in the USSR, especially after the Great Patriotic War, during Stalin’s lifetime, were carried out annually. The first post-war five-year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR was completed ahead of schedule - in four years and three months. The production of grain, meat, oil, cotton, flax, and wool increased significantly.

National income in the last year of the five-year plan increased by 64% compared to 1940, and by 12% over the last year. An editorial in the Pravda newspaper on April 1, 1952 noted:

“Comrade Stalin teaches that the essential features of the basic economic law of socialism are to ensure maximum satisfaction of the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the entire society through the continuous growth and improvement of socialist production on the basis of higher technology.”

This Stalinist policy ensured the development of the USSR economy without crises for many decades.

On April 1, 1952, based on the powerful growth of industry and agriculture, the fifth post-war price reduction was carried out totaling 53 billion rubles, which caused general jubilation among the population.

How high were the growth rates of industry during the years of Stalin’s five-year plans is shown by the following data:

“Produced national income in 1950, compared to 1913, increased by 8.8 times, all industrial output by 13 times, the production of means of production (group A) by 27 times, and the productivity of social labor by 8.4 times.” . (National Economy of the USSR for 60 years. P.12. M. 1977)

After Stalin's death, and even after the condemnation of his personality cult, a policy of regular salary increases was implemented, prices remained unchanged.

With the cessation of the decline in retail prices, the growth rate of national income began to decline. In 1980-85 it averaged only 3% per year. The XXV11th Congress of the CPSU set the task of increasing the growth rate of national income in 1986-90 to 5% on average per year. (Materials of the XXV11th Congress of the CPSU. P. 228, M. 1987) Let us recall that during the Stalin period the growth rate of national income was 9-12% per year.

Fragment from the book of the Chairman of the All-Ukrainian Association “ZUBR” Elena Mazur and Nikolai Lativok “1932-1933: famine in Europe and America. 1992-2009: genocide in Ukraine. Facts and documents. Analysis. Series “For the Union of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.”

Elena Mazur, Nikolay Lativok

The Soviet Union emerged from the war with enormous human and material losses. 1,710 cities, over 70 thousand villages and villages, 32 thousand industrial enterprises were destroyed. Direct damage caused by the war exceeded 30% of national wealth.

In March 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the fourth five-year plan. It was planned not only to restore the national economy, but also to exceed the pre-war level of industrial production by 48%. It was planned to invest 250 billion rubles in the national economy. As in the years of industrialization, these funds were received at the expense of the country's population, mainly the peasantry.

During the war, the entire economy was rebuilt on a war footing, and the production of goods was virtually stopped. A huge amount of money, not backed by goods, was deposited in the hands of the population. To relieve the pressure of this mass on the market, a confiscatory monetary reform was carried out in 1947. Money in the hands of the population was exchanged at a ratio of 10:1. A more lenient regime was provided for funds kept in personal accounts in savings banks. But this benefit affected only a few, because the amount of deposits was 15 times less than the annual salary fund of workers and employees, in other words, the meager savings of citizens were then kept in “little jars” at home. And yet, the reform helped in a short time to stop inflation and stabilize the financial system disrupted by the war. Of even greater importance was the simultaneous abolition of the rationing distribution of goods, which had become a kind of symbol of the hard times of war, simultaneously with the monetary reform. After this, the government began a gradual increase in wages for workers and employees, as well as a regular reduction in retail prices for consumer goods: this was carried out annually from 1948 to 1954. However, at the same time, a program was being implemented for the forced distribution of government bonds, for the purchase of which It took an average of 1-1.5 months' salary per year. This significantly devalued the population's gains from price reductions. Nevertheless, the real wages of workers and office workers slowly increased. If in 1944 it was 64% of the level of 1928, in 1948 - 59%, then in 1952 - already 94%, and in 1954 - 119%. Vacations and an 8-hour working day were restored, and medical and sanatorium services for workers were improved. In 1948 - 1950 about 5.5 million workers and employees received vouchers at the expense of trade unions in sanatoriums, dispensaries and rest homes.

After the reform, the card system introduced during the war was abolished. However, prices for food and consumer goods were on average 3 times higher than pre-war. As in the years of industrialization, forced government loans were carried out from the population. These tough measures helped to improve the economy.

The restoration of the destroyed industry proceeded at an extremely rapid pace. In 1946, there was a certain decline associated with conversion, and from 1947 a steady rise began. In 1948, the pre-war level of industrial production was surpassed, and by the end of the Five-Year Plan it exceeded the 1940 level by 70%, instead of the planned 48%. This was achieved by updating production in territories liberated from fascist occupation. The restored factories were equipped with equipment produced in German factories and supplied as reparations. In total, 3,200 enterprises were restored and restarted in the western regions. They produced civilian products, while defense enterprises remained where they were evacuated - in the Urals and Siberia.

The development of the post-war economy was one-sided. The main emphasis was on the development of heavy industry, to the detriment of light industry and agriculture. 88% of capital investments in industry were directed to mechanical engineering. The production of consumer goods increased extremely slowly, and there was a shortage of essentials. Transport lagged behind sharply, especially road construction. In essence, there was no construction of public housing - in fact, the government shifted these concerns onto the shoulders of the citizens themselves.

Things have been especially difficult in agriculture. Only 7% of the total allocations were allocated for its development in the Fourth Five-Year Plan. They went mainly to the construction of tractor factories. With the help of machines, only the fields were plowed and grain harvested - everything else was done by hand. The village was not electrified. In 1953, only 15% of collective farms received electricity.

The main burden of restoration fell on the village. The state seized over 50% of the products of collective and state farms in the form of taxes and compulsory deliveries. Purchasing prices for agricultural products have not changed since 1928, while for industrial products they have increased 20 times during this time. Based on workdays, a collective farmer received less per year than a worker earned per month. In practice, collective farmers worked on the collective farm for free and lived off their plots.

At the end of the 40s. personal plots were also heavily taxed. The peasants began to get rid of livestock and cut down fruit trees, since they could not afford to pay taxes. The peasants could not leave the village because they did not have passports. Nevertheless, the rural population was declining - peasants were recruited to construction sites, factories, and logging. In 1950, the rural population was halved compared to 1940.

The last independence of collective farms was eliminated. District party committees removed and appointed chairmen, dictated what, where and when to sow. Their main task was to confiscate as many agricultural products as possible.

By the end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, there was a slight rise in living standards in cities. Annual price reductions began to be practiced. By 1950, real wages had reached the level of 1940, but it should be remembered that this level was only equal to 1928, that is, there was actually no increase.

After the death of I.V. Stalin, the new leaders of the country inherited an extremely difficult inheritance. The village was destroyed, and the threat of famine loomed over the country. The new Chairman of the Council of Ministers G.M. Malenkov stated that it is now necessary to increase the production of consumer goods, direct more capital investments to the development of light industry, and provide the population with a sufficient amount of food in the shortest possible time. First of all, it was necessary to stop the degradation of the village.

In 1953, a tax reform was carried out, taxes on personal plots were halved. Now the tax was levied only on land, and not on livestock and trees. In September 1953, a plenum of the Central Committee was held dedicated to the development of agriculture. Purchasing prices for agricultural products were increased significantly (3-6 times), and taxes on collective farmers were reduced by 2.5 times. The independence of collective and state farms was expanded, they got rid of the petty tutelage of district party committees. 1953 was a turning point in the history of the Soviet village. It is no longer seen only as a source of funds and resources for industry.

The grain problem in the country was acute; immediate emergency solutions were required. The idea arose to sharply increase grain production by introducing additional land into circulation in the east of the country (in Siberia, Kazakhstan). The country had an excess of labor resources and uncultivated fertile lands.