July Uprising 1917. July Days (1917)

The old order was stained with treason, and those who, loving political freedom, above all and above all, they loved Russia, believed that the revolution would heal the state from this ulcer. Alas! It happened differently. The revolution itself turned out to be deeply permeated with elements of treason, the pernicious infection of which spread throughout the entire people's organism.

An orgy of national-state apostasy began, preached under the proud name of revolution, but in reality being the worst enemy of what is truly revolutionary in the completed coup d'état. One revolution is the struggle that, in the name of the national tasks and state greatness of Russia, was waged against the power of the tsar and the irresponsible bureaucracy as enemies and brakes on national-state development. great country. Another revolution is one that, for the glory of Germany united around the Kaiser, paralyzes Russia as a nation, splits it into hostile classes under conditions in which there should be no place for class feelings, proclaims the treacherous dismemberment of the state at the moment of the greatest external danger, and finally, conducts criminal agitation. against the allies and the civil peace of their countries.

There can be no agreement between these two revolutions, for they directly exclude one another. One revolution - cosmopolitan in theory, in practice - treacherous in relation to the allies, class and treacherous inside; the other is patriotic-national, loyal to the allies, proudly observing the honor and good name of the nation.

The spiritual impotence of the Provisional Government, and especially of its left wing, was reflected in the fact that it did not immediately understand the deep discord between these two movements, which both appropriate the name of revolution, but between which, in essence, there can be no reconciliation. Meanwhile, the experience of the revolution has now revealed precisely this with undeniable clarity. For example, how far we are now from the moment when Kerensky, Prime Minister and Tereshchenko Entrepreneur, banker, from March 1917 - Minister of Finance under the pressure of anti-patriotic sentiments, hiding behind the form of socialism, Guchkov was ousted from the ministry Liberal-conservative, oppositionist, member of the IV State Duma, from March 15, 1917 - Minister of War and Naval and Milyukov leader of the cadet party ?

What gave this change of faces?

From a patriotic point of view, it turned out to be practically harmless only insofar as Kerensky and Tereshchenko not only did not weaken the basic tendencies of the policy of their predecessors, but, on the contrary, under the pressure of circumstances, strengthened these tendencies, despite the struggle they themselves waged against Guchkov and Milyukov.

But this departmental harmlessness of the change that has taken place does not in the least eliminate the irreconcilable fundamental strife between the patriotic and anti-patriotic elements of the revolution.

This strife, on the contrary, is growing all the time, for all the "respite" that the war has given the revolution so far is drawing to a close, and, like an inexorable creditor, it will submit all bills for collection. The tragedy of all the left leaders of our revolution (including the most important of them, Kerensky) lies in the fact that, having been put forward in the first place by the anti-patriotic elements of the revolution, they cannot remain in its power without committing national betrayal, and at the same time unable to enter into a mortal battle with her. Personally, I see in this split a genuine and, moreover, an objective tragedy, i.e. the contradiction for actors of this type is essentially unresolvable...

The prologue of the July crisis was the exit from the government on July 2 (15), 1917, of four Cadets ministers (A. Shingarev, D. Shakhovsky, A. Manuilov and V. Stepanov), who left the cabinet in protest against the recognition of the autonomy of Ukraine, about which Kerensky, Tsereteli and Tereshchenko agreed with the Central Rada. This agreement, according to the Cadet Central Committee, violated the will of the Constituent Assembly to determine the political future of the country. Of course, the ministerial demarche was a measure of pressure on the socialists in order to adjust their policy in the direction of its toughening, but it was also a manifestation of the growing contradictions within the coalition. Unexpectedly for everyone, he caused a stormy reaction from the soldiers of Petrograd.

On the evening of July 3, the government and the Council received the first reports of unrest in the city. Soldiers of the 1st Machine Gun Regiment, the 1st Reserve Infantry Regiment, sailors and other military units who had arrived from Kronstadt took to the streets from the barracks. On the night of July 3-4, 30,000 workers from the Putilov factory joined them. A huge crowd of people literally laid siege to the Tauride Palace, where the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was located, and demanded the resignation of all capitalist ministers and the transfer of power to the Soviets. The protesters were convinced that it was the bourgeois ministers who bore the main responsibility for the deepening economic ruin and the ongoing war.

The origin of the events of July 3-5 is still not entirely clear. It can definitely be said that the initial impulse of the performance was caused by the unwillingness of the revolutionary-minded units of the garrison to leave the capital and go to the front for an offensive. We also note that the spontaneous explosion was largely prepared by the purposeful activities of the Bolsheviks, who paid great attention to work in the army and navy.

Immediately after the overthrow of the autocracy, Bolshevik organizations were created in a number of military units. At the end of March, 48 cells of the RSDLP (b) were already operating in the capital's garrison. In May 1917, a special Military Organization (Voenka) was created under the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b). It included prominent Bolsheviks: V. Antonov-Ovseenko, V. Nevsky, N. Podvoisky, M. Lashevich, N. Krylenko, P. Dybenko and others. By July, Bolshevik military organizations existed in 43 cities, including Petrograd (6 thousand members of the RSDLP (b)) and Moscow (2 thousand). The Baltic sailors were the shock detachment of the Bolsheviks in the navy. In Kronstadt, by mid-summer, the Bolshevik Party consisted of over 3 thousand sailors, in Reval about 3 thousand, in Helsingfors - 4 thousand. The Bolsheviks P. Dybenko, chairman of the Central Balt (the highest elected body of sailors) and F. Raskolnikov, enjoyed great influence in the fleet , who became one of the leaders of the July 4 demonstration in Petrograd.

Meanwhile, the plans of the Bolsheviks at first did not provide for active participation in spontaneous actions of soldiers and workers. So, on the afternoon of July 3, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) with the participation of members of the Petrograd Committee and the Military Committee, a decision was even made about the untimeliness of such actions. But already on the night of July 3-4, given the scope of the movement, the Bolsheviks declare their intention to lead the demonstration in order to give it an organized character, and firmly speak out for the immediate transfer of power to the Soviets. Urgently returning early in the morning on July 4 from a short vacation to Petrograd, Lenin approved the actions of the party leadership. In fact, the Bolsheviks tried to conduct the first decisive test of strength. As G. Zinoviev later recalled these days: Lenin laughingly told us: “but shouldn’t we try now?” But he immediately added: “No, it’s impossible to take power now, it won’t work now, because the front-line soldiers are not still ours ...”

One way or another, but held on July 4 in Petrograd almost half a million demonstration was held under the Bolshevik slogan "All power to the Soviets!". During the demonstration, in which soldiers and sailors armed with rifles and machine guns also took part, there were bloody incidents. V different parts Petrograd shots were heard. Soldiers with red bows drove around the city on requisitioned trucks with machine guns mounted on them. According to the city police, shooting was carried out from cars and from houses along Troitskaya Street. Nevsky Prospekt, near the Economic Society, from Sadovaya to Italianskaya Street, on the Moika. Demonstrators on Liteiny Prospekt, near Sennaya Square and in other places were also fired upon. In response, some of them themselves used force. Having broken through to the Tauride Palace, where the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was meeting, the participants in the speeches demanded that the “deals with the bourgeoisie” be ended and that power be immediately taken. In their hands was the leader of the Social Revolutionaries, the Minister of Agriculture of the Provisional Government V. Chernov. Only the intervention of L. Trotsky and F. Raskolnikov saved him from the lynching of the Kronstadt crowd.

It is difficult to establish exactly who was the first to start shooting, the demonstrators themselves, among whom there were many anarchists and simply criminal elements, their opponents or the Cossacks who patrolled the city that day. It is clear that the speech itself was far from peaceful in nature and the riots that arose were a direct consequence of it.

On July 5 (18) a state of siege was introduced in Petrograd. Troops loyal to the government were called in from the front. The Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) decided to stop the demonstration. On the same day, the Kshesinskaya Palace, where the Bolshevik Central Committee was located, was destroyed. The junkers carried out a pogrom against the editorial office and the printing house of Pravda. On July 6 (19) the Provisional Government issued an order to detain and put on trial for<государственную измену» Ленина и других большевистских руководителей. Все воинские части, принимавшие участие в выступлении, подлежали расформированию. Были арестова­ны и заключены в тюрьму «Кресты» активные участники со­бытий Л. Троцкий, Л. Каменев, Ф. Раскольников. Ленин и Зиновьев перешли на нелегальное положение и скрылись в 32 км от города, на станции Разлив в устроенном шалаше.

A loud anti-Bolshevik campaign unfolded in the press. The reason for it was the accusations of the leaders of the Bolsheviks and, above all, Lenin in contacts with the German General Staff, betrayal and espionage. Together, the failure of the offensive and the July events in Petrograd were connected, which were presented by government propaganda as a Bolshevik attempt to break through the internal front.

The question "about the German gold of the Bolsheviks" has long been discussed in science. It can be considered established that the Bolsheviks, however, just like other socialist parties, received money during the war from various sources, including the German military circles interested in the subversive activities of Russian revolutionaries against their state. Probably, Lenin was aware of the secret channels for financing his party. However, it is clearly groundless to assert that the July speeches were inspired by Lenin together with the Germans. Lenin was the largest political figure of his time, and the independence and originality of his line is beyond doubt. Ultimately, it was by no means monetary subsidies to the Bolsheviks that decided the fate of the country and the revolution.

It is significant that a number of opponents of the Bolsheviks from among the socialist leaders (Yu. Martov, I. Astrov, the Left Social Revolutionaries) came out sharply against the persecution unleashed by the government of the RSDLP (b) and the entire left wing of revolutionary democracy. This circumstance largely explains the fact that the authorities did not dare to go for large-scale repression against the Bolsheviks throughout the country. Bolshevik organizations in various cities of Russia after the July events, which experienced a certain decline in their activities, soon became more active again. In late July - early August 1917, the VI Congress of the RSDLP (b) was held in Petrograd, revising the tactics of the Bolsheviks. It was declared that the period of peaceful development of the revolution under the conditions of dual power was over and that a decision should be made on the need to prepare for an armed seizure of power by the proletariat.

The July events had significant consequences for both the Provisional Government and the Soviets. G. Lvov left the post of head of the cabinet. On July 8 (21) A. Kerensky became the Minister-Chairman, remaining at the same time the Minister of War and the Navy. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets recognized "unlimited powers" and "unlimited power" for the Provisional Government, declaring it the government of "saving the revolution." On July 24 (August 6), the 2nd coalition cabinet was formed. It included 8 Cadets ministers or those close to them, 3 Social Revolutionaries (A. Kerensky, N. Avksentiev, V. Chernov), 2 Mensheviks (A. Nikitin, M. Skobelev), 2 People's Socialists (A. Peshekhonov, A. Zarudny) and one "non-factional" Social Democrat (S. Prokopovich). Despite the apparent balance between the ministers-capitalists and socialists within the government, a clear political turn to the right was outlined in society and the desire to establish a regime of personal power intensified.

10.07.2017. As we promised at the beginning of the year, we return to the topic of ideological confrontation associated with the 100th anniversary of the 1917 Revolution.

Exactly 100 years ago, the events commonly referred to as the “July Days” took place. We can already see what interpretation of these events was chosen by the official domestic “historical science” - the one that the white emigrants defended and propagated throughout the post-war period: the July days are an “anarcho-Bolshevik adventure”, a failed attempt by the extreme left to seize power. This primitive propaganda point of view, even in the West and even in the conditions of the Cold War, was refused to be supported by really honest and really literate historians (even if they were in the minority), and even in the USSR, where tens of thousands of participants in the July events were alive, it generally no one took it seriously: there was simply no evidence base for this.

It was the absence of this evidence base that made the official media react so sluggishly to the 100th anniversary of the July days - in contrast to 1997, when there was just a wave of tabloid anti-Bolshevik publications (after all, it was in the July days that the legend of "German gold" and "German spy "Lenin!").

We understand that even now not everyone in the domestic historical workshop is ready to support and propagate the anti-Bolshevik legend about the July days. But we know exactly what interpretation of events will be imposed on students in the coming years.

Therefore, we publish materials that show with the utmost clarity that the July days were not at all an “anarcho-Bolshevik conspiracy”, but a spontaneous movement of the revolutionary masses (Petrograd workers, soldiers and sailors), clearly expressing their hatred of the Provisional Government and their naive confidence that street demonstrations alone are enough for the Provisional Government to cede power to the Soviets (then still by no means Bolshevik). Details about the events of July 1917 in Petrograd are described in the work of the Russian revolutionary, who stood at the origins of Soviet historical science, Vera Vladimirova July Days 1917 . As an appendix to it, we publish excerpts from the memoirs of the counter-revolutionaries about the July days. One of their leaders, Ivan Flerovsky, tells in detail about the role of the revolutionary Kronstadt sailors in the July events in his memoirs. July political lesson . And the picture of mass moods at the factories of Petrograd and its immediate environs is perfectly conveyed by the selection Petersburg workers about the July days .

We draw the readers' attention to the fact that the published materials very clearly and convexly show how easily and quickly the Provisional Government, so beloved by our liberals, resorted - at the slightest danger - to the help of the Black Hundred reaction and to its encouragement. This perfectly debunks the liberal myth of the Provisional Government and explains why it was the “democratic counter-revolution” that became the ancestor of the “White Terror” in the Civil War.

JULY EVENTS of 1917 (July Days), a political crisis in Russia, expressed in mass demonstrations of workers guarded by the armed Red Guard, as well as soldiers of the garrison and sailors of the Baltic Fleet in Petrograd. They were held under the slogan "All power to the Soviets!". They were preceded by the defeat of the June 1917 offensive and the beginning of another crisis of the coalition Provisional Government, which aggravated the political situation in the country. The July events began on July 3 (16), when, at the call of the soldiers of the 1st machine gun regiment, who were under the influence of anarchists, spontaneous anti-government demonstrations began in Petrograd, in which soldiers of a number of parts of the city garrison, workers of the Putilovsky and other factories of the capital took part. The Bolsheviks, who had great influence on the soldiers and workers of Petrograd, considered the action premature, but could not prevent it. Given the scope of the movement, on the night of July 3 (16) to July 4 (17), the leadership of the RSDLP (b) decided to lead it and give it a peaceful character. On July 4 (17), a detachment of sailors of the Baltic Fleet and soldiers (up to 10 thousand people) arrived from Kronstadt, led by F. F. Raskolnikov, joined the demonstrators. On that day, the number of demonstrators reached, according to various estimates, 400-500 thousand people (of which 40-60 thousand soldiers). The All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which banned the demonstration, declared it a "Bolshevik conspiracy", rejected the demands of the demonstrators, and on the night of July 4 (17) to July 5 (18) decided that "full power" should remain with the Provisional Government. Demonstrations by opponents of the Provisional Government were accompanied by counter-demonstrations by its supporters. In a number of places in the city, fire was opened on the demonstrators from the windows and roofs of buildings (by whom exactly, it remained unknown), 56 people were killed, 650 people were injured. To restore order, the Provisional Government summoned units from the front to Petrograd with a total number of 15-16 thousand military personnel. On July 5 (18), troops loyal to the government established control over the city center, destroyed the printing house and the editorial office of the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda. At the same time, the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) published an appeal calling for an end to the demonstrations. On July 6 (19), the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, who had taken refuge in the Peter and Paul Fortress, were forced to surrender their weapons and go to Kronstadt, and the Bolsheviks were forced to leave the mansion of M. F. Kshesinskaya, occupied by them after the February Revolution of 1917 and turned into party headquarters. The military units that took part in the demonstration in full strength were disarmed and disbanded, and their personnel were sent to the front. Many Bolsheviks who were direct participants in the July events were arrested on charges of organizing and leading an armed uprising against state power (G. E. Zinoviev and V. I. Lenin fled from arrest). According to the initial results of the investigation, 13 people (among them - Zinoviev, Lenin, A. V. Lunacharsky, A. M. Kollontai, F. F. Raskolnikov, L. D. Trotsky) were accused of entering into an agreement with agents Germany, in order to disorganize the army and rear, received funds from abroad to propagate among the population and troops the idea of ​​"renunciation of military operations against the enemy" and organized an armed uprising against the supreme power. Those arrested pleaded not guilty. The accusation against the Bolsheviks of organizing demonstrations was refuted by the witnesses involved in the investigation. Further investigation of the July events was interrupted by the October Revolution of 1917; many aspects of the July events are still debatable.

Under the influence of the July events in Petrograd, anti-government demonstrations took place in Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Orekhovo-Zuev, Nizhny Novgorod, Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk and other cities.

Lit .: 3rd - 5th July 1917 Based on unpublished materials of the judicial investigation and the archive of the Petrograd Committee of the RCP. P., 1922; July Days in Petrograd // Red Archive. 1927. No. 4; The revolutionary movement in Russia in July 1917. M., 1959; Znamensky O. N. The July Crisis of 1917 M.; L., 1964; Rabinovich A. Bloody Days: The July Uprising of 1917 in Petrograd. M., 1992; Zlokazov G. I. Materials of the Special Investigation Commission of the Provisional Government on the July events of 1917 // Domestic History. 1999. No. 5.

July Uprising

Oleg Nazarov
Doctor of Historical Sciences

The execution of the July demonstration in Petrograd in 1917. Hood. I.I. Brodsky. Sketch. 1923

At the beginning of July 1917, a mass demonstration of soldiers, sailors and workers took place in Petrograd. And although the uprising was quickly crushed, it had very serious consequences.

These events are often referred to as the "July Bolshevik Uprising". Such a definition is not quite correct, because it ignores important "nuances". Not only the Bolsheviks took part in the movement demanding the transfer of all power to the multi-party Soviets. And they didn't start it...

riot of machine gunners

The first to rebel were the soldiers of the 1st machine gun regiment, the largest unit of the Petrograd garrison at that time (over 11 thousand people). Two weeks earlier, on June 20 (July 3), the regiment received an order to allocate about half of its personnel and up to 500 machine guns to be sent to the front. Rumors spread that the regiment would then be disbanded.

There was talk among the soldiers about the need to prevent the attempted disbandment by taking to the streets with weapons in hand. On the morning of July 3 (16) a rally began in their ranks. The soldiers elected a Provisional Revolutionary Committee, which included anarchists and Bolsheviks and was headed by a Bolshevik ensign Adam Semashko. Messengers were sent to enterprises and military units with a call to take to the streets with weapons by 5 p.m.

When it became known about this initiative of the machine gunners, the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) categorically ordered its Military Organization not to participate in the action. Not all Bolsheviks liked this decision. In 1932, in the journal Hard Labor and Exile, a former member of the military Vladimir Nevsky said: “Some comrades are now wondering who was the initiator of the July events - the Central Committee or the Military Organization or the movement broke out spontaneously. In some respects this question is worthless and doctrinaire. Of course, the movement matured in the depths of the broadest masses, dissatisfied with the policy of the bourgeois government and thirsting for peace. And so, when the Military Organization, having learned about the performance of the machine-gun regiment, sent me, as the most popular orator of the "military", to persuade the masses not to speak, I persuaded them, but I persuaded them in such a way that only a fool could draw a conclusion from my speech that should not act."

Some researchers, based on Nevsky's confession, conclude that in July 1917 the Bolsheviks planned to take power. At the same time, for some reason, the position of the Central Committee is not taken into account. It is worth agreeing with a slightly different view of the historian Alexandra Shubina: “Nevsky’s memoirs confirm only what has long been known: there were disagreements between the “military commissar” and the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks. By holding back the uprising and giving it a peaceful character, the Bolshevik leaders, led by Lenin, were forced to overcome the radical moods of a part of their activists, including the "military". It is clear that when Nevsky had to obey the decision of the Central Committee, he carried it out without enthusiasm.

Machine-gunners' messengers rushed through Petrograd and its environs. They visited the Moscow, Grenadier, 1st Infantry, 180th Infantry, Pavlovsky, Izmailovsky, Finland and Petrograd Reserve Regiments, the 6th Sapper Battalion, an armored automobile division and other military units, visited the Putilov plant and enterprises of the Vyborg region.

Despite the resolute attitude of the messengers, their initiative did not meet with support everywhere. “In some regiments, the calls of machine gunners did not go further than local committees and were completely rejected,” notes the American historian. Alex Rabinovich. - First of all, these are the Lithuanian, Volyn and Preobrazhensky regiments, which played a decisive role in the February Revolution. Some units responded by declaring their neutrality. So, for example, it was in the Petrograd regiment, where the regimental committee decided "not to impede the demonstration, provided that it is peaceful."

"There is such a party!"

First All-Russian Congress of Soviets. June 1917. Hood. A.A. fists

Exactly one month before the uprising - June 3 (16), 1917 - the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies began its work in Petrograd. It was attended by 1090 delegates (822 with a decisive vote, the rest with an advisory vote). 285 mandates belonged to the Social Revolutionaries, 248 to the Mensheviks, 105 to the Bolsheviks.

On the second day of the congress, a significant event took place, which is included in all Soviet history textbooks. During the debate on the report of the Menshevik Mikhail Lieber "The Provisional Government and Revolutionary Democracy", the leader of the Mensheviks, Irakli Tsereteli, who served as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, justified the correctness of the idea of ​​a coalition government, said: "At the moment in Russia there is no political party that would say: give power is in our hands, go away, we will take your place. In response, the voice of Vladimir Lenin was heard from the hall: “Yes!” Taking the floor, the Bolshevik leader announced that no party could relinquish power. “And our party does not refuse this: every minute it is ready to take power entirely,” he concluded. This remark was met with applause and laughter.

As subsequent events showed, the opponents of the Bolsheviks laughed in vain. In the book “Memoirs of the February Revolution”, written by Tsereteli already in exile, he admitted that Lenin’s statement testified “to the extraordinary courage of the Bolshevik leader, who, having against himself the overwhelming majority of the people and organized democracy, expressed readiness and was really ready to take in own hands to the fullness of power in a country that was going through a deep economic crisis and a very real danger of external defeat.

Criticizing the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, Lenin urged them: “We must be the power in the state. Become her, gentlemen, the current leaders of the Soviet - we are for it, although you are our opponents ... As long as you do not have the power of the whole state, as long as you endure the power of ten ministers from the bourgeoisie over you, you are entangled in your own weakness and indecision.

"SHOULD WE BE TREASONABLE FOR LONG?"

Nevertheless, the proposals of the machine gunners received significant support both in parts of the Petrograd garrison and in factories. The workers of many enterprises took up arms.

Until late in the evening on July 3 (16), the people went to the Tauride Palace. Soviet historian Sofia Levidova wrote: “At about one in the morning, 30 thousand Putilovites with their wives and children, workers and workers of the Peterhof, Moscow and Kolomensky districts, walked along Sadovaya Street to Nevsky Prospekt with flying banners and singing revolutionary songs. The Putilovites sent delegates to the Central Executive Committee, and they themselves settled around the palace in the street and in the garden, declaring that they would not leave until the Soviet [Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. - HE.] will not agree to take power into their own hands.

Soon a group of Putilovites broke into the meeting room of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. One of the workers jumped onto the podium. Trembling with excitement and brandishing his rifle, he shouted: “Comrades! How long should we, the workers, endure betrayal? You have gathered here, discussing, making deals with the bourgeoisie and landowners. You are betraying the working class. So know that the working class will not tolerate it. There are 30,000 of us Putilovites here, every one of us. We will get our will. No to the bourgeoisie! All power to the Soviets! Rifles are firmly in our hands. Your Kerenskys and Tseretelis will not fool us…”

This turn of events did not discourage the presiding Menshevik, Nikolai Chkheidze. He handed the worker the proclamation adopted by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the prohibition of the demonstration and calmly said: “Here, comrade, take it, please, I beg you, and read it. It says here what you and your Putilov comrades need to do.”

“The appeal said that all those who spoke on the street should go home, otherwise they would be traitors to the revolution,” testified later Nikolai Sukhanov, an active participant in the Russian revolutionary movement, at that time a Menshevik-internationalist. - The confused sans-culotte, not knowing what to do next, took the appeal and then without much difficulty was pushed back from the rostrum. Soon they "convinced" to leave Zala and his comrades. Order was restored, the incident was liquidated, but still I have in my eyes this sans-culotte on the podium of the White Hall, in self-forgetfulness shaking a rifle in the face of hostile "leaders of democracy", in agony trying to express the will, anguish and anger of the true proletarian lower classes, smelling betrayal but powerless to fight it. It was one of the most beautiful scenes of the revolution. And in combination with Chkheidze's gesture, one of the most dramatic.

Vladimir Lenin, being not quite healthy, from June 29 (July 12), 1917, was in Finland, in the village of Neivola near Mustamyaki station, at the dacha of his old friend, a Bolshevik Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich. On the events in Petrograd in the early morning of July 4 (17) he was informed by a Bolshevik who had arrived from the capital Max Saveliev. Lenin quickly packed up and left for Petrograd, where he arrived at 11 o'clock in the morning.

That same morning, several thousand sailors from Kronstadt landed on Angliskaya and Universitetskaya embankments, responding to the call of machine gunners. When asked by the townspeople about the purpose of their arrival, the sailors answered: "The comrades called, they came to help restore order in Petrograd, since the bourgeoisie here dispersed too much." On the balcony of the Kshesinskaya mansion, where the Kronstadters went, they saw Yakov Sverdlov and Anatoly Lunacharsky. The latter, according to one of the eyewitnesses, "made a short but heated speech, in a few words describing the essence of the political moment."

Leaflet of the Central Committee of the RSDLP protesting against the slander against Vladimir Lenin

Upon learning that Lenin was in the mansion, the sailors demanded a meeting with him. Bolshevik Fedor Raskolnikov with a group of comrades entered the mansion. They began to beg Lenin to go out onto the balcony and say at least a few words. “Ilyich at first denied, citing ill health, but then, when our requests were strongly supported by the demand of the masses on the street, he relented,” Raskolnikov recalled. - The appearance of Lenin on the balcony was greeted with thunderous applause. The ovation had not yet had time to completely subside, as Ilyich had already begun to speak. His speech was very short.

Menshevik leader Irakli Tsereteli, commenting later on this speech, he noted that the sailors wanted to "get clear instructions on the task of an armed demonstration", but Lenin "avoided a direct answer and made a rather vague speech about the need to continue the struggle for the establishment of Soviet power in Russia with the belief that this struggle would be crowned success, and called for vigilance and steadfastness.

Sukhanov also acknowledged that the speech was "very ambiguous". “Lenin did not demand any specific actions from the seemingly impressive force that stood before him,” he stressed. Biographer of Lenin Robert Payne, in turn, noted that with such words "they do not inspire the revolutionary army, preparing it for the upcoming battle."

"All power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies!" - such was the main slogan of the July speech in Petrograd. 1917

Lenin himself, in the article “Answer”, written between July 22 and 26 (August 4 and 8), 1917, in connection with the investigation launched by the prosecutor of the Petrograd Court of Justice into the recent unrest in the capital, claimed that the content of his speech “was as follows: (1) an apology that, on the occasion of illness, I limit myself to a few words; (2) greetings to the revolutionary Kronstadters on behalf of the St. Petersburg workers; (3) an expression of confidence that our slogan "All power to the Soviets" must and will win, despite all the zigzags of the historical path; (4) a call for "endurance, steadfastness and vigilance."

summer offensive

After two days of artillery preparation on June 18 (July 1), 1917, the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front began. In total, more than 1 million people were involved in the operation.

Russia's allies in the Entente put pressure on the Provisional Government throughout the spring of 1917, demanding the intensification of hostilities. The plan for the offensive operation of the troops of the Southwestern Front was developed by June. In material terms, the Russian army, according to both allies and enemies, at that time was better equipped than in 1914-1916. However, the morale of the soldiers fell, and desertion increased sharply.

The news of the beginning of the offensive caused an explosion of enthusiasm among supporters of continuing the war to a victorious end, but at the same time it was a catalyst for protest moods. The transition to the offensive required the transfer of additional forces to the front, which could not but provoke unrest in parts of the Petrograd garrison. Having lost faith in the Provisional Government, many soldiers insistently demanded the transfer of power to the Soviets, linking their hopes for peace with this.

Meanwhile, the summer offensive ended in a major setback. On July 6 (19), the Germans launched a counterattack, breaking through the front near Tarnopol (now Ternopol) to a width of 20 km. Soon the enemy threw back the Russian troops far beyond their original positions, capturing all of Galicia. The most combat-ready units suffered the greatest losses. Historian Vladlen Loginov described the situation as follows: “The newspapers regularly published lists of those killed. Echelons with the wounded were coming from the front. With the beginning of the June offensive, the number of casualties increased. Every day in the cities and villages of Russia, some families mourned the loss of their breadwinners - father, brother, son. And from the endless discussions about the war that were held at various congresses and conferences, meetings and sessions, meetings and rallies, a feeling was born not only of talkativeness, but also of shameless deceit, because for the soldiers the war was not a problem of words, but of life and death.

And although the Tarnopol breakthrough was made far from Petrograd, and after the suppression of the July unrest in the capital, the press announced the Bolsheviks as the main culprits for the defeat at the front.

"TAKE POWER, YOU SON OF A BITCH!"

Lenin's call for "restraint and vigilance" did not stop the Kronstadters. At about three o'clock in the afternoon, when their column was approaching the Tauride Palace, shots rang out. Some sailors lay down on the road, others opened fire indiscriminately, others rushed to the entrances of the nearest houses. Later, newspapers wrote that machine guns were allegedly found on the upper floors of neighboring buildings, and several people suspected of shooting were allegedly shot.

Soon the movement of sailors who arrived in Petrograd resumed. “... The inhospitably met Kronstadters set off on an interrupted path,” Raskolnikov testified. - But no matter how hard the vanguard of the procession made to build the correct columns again, it did not succeed. The balance of the crowd was broken. Everywhere seemed lurking enemy. Describing the mood of the Kronstadters who approached the Tauride, the Bolshevik Ivan Flerovsky concluded that "they would gladly wring the necks of all 'compromise' leaders."

The first person the angry sailors wanted to see was the Minister of Justice Pavel Pereverzev who dared to arrest an anarchist sailor Anatoly Zheleznyakov- the same "sailor Zheleznyak" who, six months later, in January 1918, would actually dissolve the Constituent Assembly.

One of the most striking scenes of the revolution played out next. Leader of the cadet party Pavel Milyukov wrote: “Tsereteli came out and announced to the hostile crowd that Pereverzev was not here and that he had already resigned and was no longer a minister. The first was true, the second was wrong. Deprived of an immediate pretext, the crowd became a little embarrassed, but then shouts began that the ministers were all responsible for each other, and an attempt was made to arrest Tsereteli. He managed to hide in the doors of the palace.

The leader of the Mensheviks was replaced by the ideologue of the Socialist-Revolutionaries Viktor Chernov who served as minister of agriculture. He sought to calm the excited sailors and workers. In his official statement to the Commission of Inquiry of the Provisional Government, Chernov later noted that as soon as he left, there was a cry: "Here is one of those who shoot at the people." The sailors rushed to search the "village minister", calls were heard to arrest him. Chernov tried to explain the position of the Soviet on the question of the Provisional Government, which only raised the degree of popular indignation. A tall worker stood out from the crowd and, raising his big fist to the nose of the minister, loudly said: “Take power, you son of a bitch, if they give!” The sailors dragged the member of the government into the car, intending to take him somewhere...

Chernov saved the future chairman of the Constituent Assembly Leon Trotsky sent from the CEC meeting to rescue the head of a rival party. Raskolnikov, accompanying Trotsky, saw Chernov, who "could not hide his fear of the crowd: his hands were trembling, his twisted face was covered with deathly pallor, his graying hair was disheveled." Another eyewitness of the event recalled: “Trotsky was known and, it would seem, all of Kronstadt believed him. But Trotsky began to speak, and the crowd did not let up. Hardly Trotsky, agitated and at a loss for words in a wild environment, forced the nearest ranks to listen to him. Declaring that "red Kronstadt has again shown itself to be a vanguard fighter for the cause of the proletariat," the orator secured Chernov's release and took him to the palace. Then the ardor of the surrounding Tauride people was cooled by a sudden downpour, which forced the sailors and workers to seek shelter.

Skirmishes and skirmishes occurred, however, in other parts of the city. At the Liteiny Bridge, a battle broke out between the 1st Infantry Reserve Regiment and the Cossacks. In total, about 700 people were killed and wounded in the July days. Criminals also contributed to this statistic. However, the criminal situation in the capital was acute even before the July events and remained so after.

Troops loyal to the Provisional Government near the Kshesinskaya mansion. July 1917

“FROM THE ENDLESS DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE WAR, A FEELING OF A SHAMELESS DECEPTION IS BORN, FOR FOR SOLDIERS WAR WAS NOT A MATTER OF WORDS, BUT OF LIFE AND DEATH”

On the night of July 5 (18), the Provisional Government began to suppress the unrest. The entry into Petrograd of a large combined detachment of soldiers and Cossacks of the Northern Front, loyal to the government, and the news that Lenin was a German spy contributed to the rapid success. “The news that the Bolshevik uprising served German goals immediately began to spread through the barracks, making a stunning impression everywhere,” recalled the Socialist-Revolutionary N. Arsky. “Earlier, the neutral regiments decided to come out to suppress the rebellion.”

Final uprising historian Andrzej Ikonnikov-Galitsky described as follows: “The remnants of the relatively controlled Anarcho-Bolshevik masses (several hundred sailors, machine gunners and grenadiers) tried to hold the Trinity Bridge and the Kshesinskaya mansion. Several thousand sailors locked themselves in Petropavlovka. Surrounded by Preobrazhenians, Semenovtsy, Volhynians and Cossacks, by the morning of July 6 they all laid down their arms.

"GERMAN MONEY"

The July speech gave rise to the organization of the persecution of the leaders of the Bolshevik Party. The preparation of Lenin's "spy case" began long before these events in the capital. “The evidence was based on the testimony of a certain ensign of the 16th Siberian Rifle Regiment D.S. Yermolenko, who escaped from German captivity, writes historian Oleg Airapetov. - Appearing in Russia to the counterintelligence agencies, he announced that he had been recruited by the Germans and sent to the Russian rear in order to prepare explosions, uprisings and the separation of Ukraine there. As a liaison, he was given ... Lenin. The ridiculousness of this kind of "evidence" was obvious even to the leaders of counterintelligence, who, after the July events, were very serious about dealing with the Bolsheviks.

Nevertheless, the case was set in motion without waiting for the results of the investigation. On the initiative of Minister of Justice Pereverzev, on the afternoon of July 4 (17), when the power of the Provisional Government was under threat, a message made with the help of counterintelligence officers was sent to the capital's newspapers that Lenin was a German spy.

Head of the Provisional Government Alexander Kerensky (center) on Nevsky Prospekt in Petrograd. July 4, 1917

It is very significant that even the Mensheviks, who in those days the Bolsheviks caused a lot of unrest, did not want to disseminate information discrediting Lenin. Chkheidze after contacting him Joseph Stalin phoned the editorial offices of newspapers with a request not to publish the "materials" sent by Pereverzev. On July 5 (18) almost all the newspapers refrained from publishing this "information".

The exception was the Living Word, which wrote about Lenin's espionage connections. This publication had the effect of an exploding bomb. In the following days, articles about Lenin's "espionage" appeared in many newspapers. The Kadet "Rech" came to the conclusion that "Bolshevism turned out to be a bluff, fanned by German money."

However, the joy of Lenin's opponents was short-lived, and the victory they won was pyrrhic. Summing up the July events, Milyukov concluded that for the Bolsheviks they turned out to be "extremely encouraging", for they demonstrated "how easy it is in essence to seize power."