On the night of the fourth there was a continuous meeting in the Tauride Palace. Central Committee, St. Petersburg Committee, and the Military Organization under the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), Interdistrict Committee, Bureau of the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet. The Central Committee, through agitators and delegates, had contact with military units and factories. The issue of the 4th of July demonstration was discussed. From reports from the districts it turned out that: “1) workers and soldiers cannot be kept from demonstrating tomorrow; 2) demonstrators will come out with weapons solely for the purpose of self-defense in order to create a valid guarantee against provocative shots from Nevsky Prospekt...” The meeting, by an overwhelming majority of votes, decided to give the spontaneous movement a conscious and organized character. An appeal was adopted to the workers and soldiers of Petrograd calling for a peaceful organized demonstration under the slogan “All power to the Soviets!”

On the night of July 4th. Peterhof. A meeting of representatives of the company and regimental committees of the regiment, 1st and 2nd battalions was held in the 3rd Infantry Reserve Regiment. The meeting discussed questions about the attitude to the events taking place, about strengthening the guards, about the selection of delegates to be sent to the 1st machine gun regiment, about the convening of a meeting, about the connection of the regiment with all military organizations, about the choice of the regiment headquarters, about the organization of the regiment's security. On the first issue, a resolution was adopted demanding the transfer of all power to the hands of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. “This demand,” the resolution said, “the 3rd Infantry Regiment is ready to support immediately with the force of its weapons in agreement with the entire Petrograd garrison.” The 3rd Infantry Regiment sent 1400-1500 people to Petrograd

In the morning, rumors spread throughout the city that provocateurs were preparing another slander against Lenin. It became known that the author of the dirty slander was Aleksinsky (a well-known slanderer, defencist, member of Plekhanov’s Unity group). I.V. Stalin, at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee, protested against this slander and demanded that the Central Executive Committee take measures to suppress it. Chairman of the Central Executive Committee Chkheidze, on his own behalf, as well as on behalf of Tsereteli, as a member of the Provisional Government, was forced to telephone all newspaper editorial offices with a proposal to refrain from publishing Aleksinsky’s slander. All newspapers complied with this request, with the exception of the tabloid newspaper Zhivoe Slovo.

Kronstadt. By 7 o'clock in the morning, about 10 thousand armed Kronstadters had gathered on Anchor Square. The distribution of ammunition began, the distribution of those gathered among barges and tugs. A rally was organized, at which the Bolshevik S.G. spoke. Roshal and others. The speakers said that the purpose of the speech was to show their power and demand the transfer of power to the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Kronstadters headed to Petrograd.

A grandiose demonstration took place in Petrograd, in which up to 500 thousand workers took part, soldiers and sailors. The regiments of the Petrograd garrison took to the street, and some units also arrived from Peterhof, Oranienbaum, Krasnoye Selo, and Kronstadt. The demonstration took place under Bolshevik slogans. From different areas, columns of demonstrators headed to the Kshesinskaya Palace. As the Kronstadters passed in front of the palace, V.I. gave a speech from the balcony. Lenin. He conveyed greetings to the revolutionary Kronstadters on behalf of the Petrograd workers and expressed confidence that the slogan “All power to the Soviets” should and will win. At the same time, Lenin called for “restraint, steadfastness and vigilance.” At the Tauride Palace, demonstrators, through their delegates, presented demands to the Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet. Despite the peaceful nature of the demonstration, cadets, Cossacks and officers fired at the demonstrators with rifles and machine guns. They shot from windows and from rooftops. They shot at workers and soldiers on the corner of Nevsky and Sadovaya, Nevsky and Liteiny, Nevsky and Vladimirsky. In the evening, a clash occurred between soldiers and Cossacks on Liteiny. The total number of killed and wounded that day was 400 people. The counter-revolution went on the offensive. The Central Election Commission took the path of open support for the bourgeoisie.

The Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik Central Executive Committee sent out orders and instructions to the Mikhailovsky Manege of the reserve armored automobile division, to the Preobrazhensky Guards Regiment, to the Volyn Guards Regiment, to the Armor Department of the 1st Reserve Automobile Company, to the Committee of the Reserve Battalion of the Izmailovsky Guard Regiment, to the Executive Committee of the Oranienbaum Rifle School, to the Arsenal, to the 2nd Machine Gun regiment and other units - send soldiers, weapons and armored cars to guard the Tauride Palace from demonstrators.

In the evening at about 9 o'clock the anarchists seized the printing house of "New Time" and declared that they would not allow the next issue of this newspaper to be published. The typesetters printed an appeal to the anarchists, which the latter went to distribute; some of them remained to guard the printing house.

The CEC Bureau approved the decision of the Provisional Government on the unification of all actions to suppress the action of revolutionary workers and soldiers of Petrograd. The Central Election Commission sent its representatives (two Socialist Revolutionaries) to help the government.

The provisional government issued a decree on the unconditional prohibition of all armed demonstrations.

Minister of War and Navy A.F. Kerensky in connection with the events in Petrograd sent a telegram to G.E. Lvov demanding the suppression of revolutionary uprisings by armed force, the disarmament of military units and the bringing to trial of the participants in the uprisings.

Kerensky gave the order to the commander of the Petrograd Military District Major General Polovtsev to immediately suppress the performance of soldiers in Petrograd. Kerensky asked to give the order to the chief military prosecutor to immediately begin an investigation into the events of July 3 in Petrograd and bring all those responsible to justice.

The Provisional Government gave orders to the commander of the Petrograd Military District“clear Petrograd of armed people”, take away machine guns from the 1st machine gun regiment, arrest all participants in the revolutionary uprising, arrest the Bolsheviks occupying Kshesinskaya’s house, clear it and occupy it with troops.

General Polovtsev gave the order to the commander of the Guards reserve artillery division about sending eight light guns to Petrograd on Palace Square under the cover of detachments of warrant officer schools.

Arrived in Petrograd summoned by the Provisional Government and the Central Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to suppress the speech of workers and soldiers of the military school cadets of the Northern Front, soldiers of the 2nd machine gun regiment from Strelnya, cadets of the Vladimir Military School, soldiers of the 9th cavalry and 1st Cossack regiments, etc. Security has been strengthened at the district headquarters, the Winter Palace, ministries and other government institutions. A hundred Cossacks, a platoon of regular cavalry and a platoon of infantry were sent to each district to deal with the demonstrators.

Tiflis. On June 25, a rally of many thousands of the entire Tiflis garrison took place. Bolshevik resolutions, posters, banners, and Bolshevik slogans were unanimously adopted in all the stands. The leaflets of the M-Kov and the Socialist-Revolutionaries are against us. The soldiers tore them and burned them. A complete victory for our platform; tell the military congress: we didn’t have time, we received the telegram with the invitation late. Please give one hundred rubles. Daria Iosipovich. Tiflis. Krotaradze.

(Sources: The Great October Socialist Revolution. Chronicle of events in 4 volumes; N. Avdeev. “Revolution of 1917. Chronicle of events”; Collection “Truth No. 1-227, 1917, issue IV)

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The collapse of the July offensive accelerated the extinction of defensist sentiments among the people. The revolutionary activity of the masses grew rapidly. “When you come into a working environment,” said one of the Bolsheviks, party workers in the Vyborg district of the capital, “you feel how it is seething and raging there.”

At the same time, a new government crisis was brewing. The imperialist circles of Russia and its allies openly demanded the creation of a “firm hand” government capable of putting an end to the revolution and ensuring the continuation of the war “to a victorious end.” The defeat at the front served as a reason for the bourgeoisie to demand that the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries move from “persuasion” to a policy of repression and, blaming the Bolsheviks for the military defeats, crush the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat. Using a secondary pretext (negotiations with the Ukrainian Rada), the Cadet ministers resigned on July 2 and thereby put the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries in danger of breaking the government coalition. The frightened compromisers were ready to make concessions to the counter-revolution again. But the masses reacted differently.

The maneuver of the bourgeoisie overflowed the patience of the workers and soldiers. Since the end of June, violent protest rallies took place in Petrograd against the offensive at the front, the violation of the democratic rights of workers, and the government’s attempts to send revolutionary-minded units of the capital’s garrison to the front. The provocative resignation of capitalist ministers aggravated the situation to an extreme degree. On July 3, spontaneous anti-government demonstrations began in Petrograd. The first to speak were the soldiers of the 1st Machine Gun Regiment. Its representatives came to a meeting of the Petrograd Conference of Bolsheviks and declared: “They want to cash out our regiment, they are mocking us, we can’t wait any longer and decided to speak out, for which we have already sent our delegates to factories and regiments.” The movement grew rapidly, threatening to erupt into armed clashes.

The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party believed that the revolutionary crisis was not yet ripe. The army and the provinces were not fully prepared to support the revolutionary forces of the capital, and an isolated action in Petrograd could only make it easier for the counter-revolution to defeat the revolutionary vanguard. Therefore, party representatives immediately went to factories, factories, and regiments in order to keep the masses from going out into the streets. But this turned out to be impossible. On the evening of July 3, some military units and workers from a number of factories had already set out. The soldiers came out with weapons in their hands. Taking into account the real situation, the Bolsheviks on the night of July 3 decided to lead the uprising of the masses in order to give it a peaceful and organized character.

On July 4, a grand demonstration took place in the capital. More than five hundred thousand workers, soldiers and sailors marched under the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” Armored cars and chains of armed sailors, soldiers, and Red Guards protected the demonstration from attacks and provocations. Some of the demonstrators headed to the Kshesinskaya Palace, where the Bolshevik Central Committee was located. Here, from the balcony, Bolshevik speakers spoke. The Kronstadt sailors were greeted by V.I. Lenin, who called for restraint, steadfastness and vigilance. Numerous delegations visited the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets at the Tauride Palace, declaring their unyielding will: power must pass into the hands of the Soviets. “I, a representative of 54 factories,” said one of the workers’ envoys. “You see what is written on the posters... We trust the Council, but not those whom the Council trusts...”

The demand of the masses for the transfer of power to the Soviets had every opportunity to be realized. But the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries were most afraid of the dissolution of the coalition with the bourgeoisie and, in order to preserve it, accepted all the conditions of the Cadets. The counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie was strongly supported by representatives of the Allies. On July 4, the British Ambassador Buchanan handed a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Tereshchenyo, in which he demanded the restoration of the death penalty in the army and navy (the death penalty at the front and in the rear was abolished by a decree on March 12), to disarm the workers, establish military censorship, ban Bolshevik newspapers, disarm all the Petrograd regiments that took part in the demonstration, etc.

The Provisional Government decided to use weapons against the demonstrators, instructing the commander of the Petrograd District troops, General Polovtsev, to “restore order in the city.” The Compromisers declared the demonstration a “Bolshevik conspiracy,” a “rebellion,” and an “armed uprising.” The Menshevik-Socialist Revolutionary Central Executive Committee of the Soviets decided to ban the demonstration, and anyone who violated this decree would be considered “traitors and enemies of the revolution.” He urgently requested troops from the front and allocated his representatives to help Polovtsev for the bloody reprisal of peaceful demonstrators.

On the afternoon of July 4, on the orders of Polovtsev, the Cossacks and cadets opened fire on the demonstrators. More than 400 people were killed and wounded. The government declared Petrograd under martial law. Arrests and murders of Bolsheviks and revolutionary workers began, and the disbandment of military units that took part in the demonstration began. Counter-revolutionary detachments destroyed the premises of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, the editorial office of Pravda and the printing house in which the newspaper was printed.

The government gave the order to arrest V.I. Lenin and bring him to trial on charges of “high treason” and organizing an armed uprising. In reality, the counter-revolutionaries did not intend to arrange a trial, but physical reprisal against the leader of the revolution. Taking this into account, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party decided to transfer Lenin to an illegal position. For several days, Lenin remained illegally in Petrograd, and then hid in a hut near the Razliv station (later, at the end of August, he moved to Finland).

Thousands of demonstrations under the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” were also held in Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov, Kyiv, Riga and a number of other cities. In Nizhny Novgorod, an armed clash occurred between workers and cadets. Serious unrest arose among the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet.

Revealing the political essence of the July events, V.I. Lenin wrote: “The movement of July 3rd and 4th was the last attempt through a manifestation to induce the Soviets to take power. From this moment on, the Soviets, i.e., the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks who dominate them, actually transfer power to the counter-revolution...”

The “socialist” ministers tried to disguise their counter-revolutionary policies. To this end, they proposed to publish a government declaration containing promises to proclaim Russia a republic and convene a Constituent Assembly, to begin developing laws on an 8-hour working day, on social insurance, on land, etc. The head of government, Prince Lvov, decisively rejected the draft declaration and retired. On July 8, A.F. Kerensky became minister-chairman, retaining the post of military and naval minister. When the former tsar learned of Kerensky’s appointment, he wrote in his diary: “This man is positively in his place at the present moment: the more power he has, the better it will be.”

The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets declared the Provisional Government “the government to save the revolution” and recognized it as having “unlimited powers and unlimited power.” Now the Kerensky government has taken the path of open terror, implementing a program that the Russian imperialists and their allies had outlined even earlier. The death penalty was restored at the front, military courts and preliminary military censorship were introduced, others were prohibited, punitive expeditions were sent to Nizhny Novgorod, Tver, Tsaritsyn, Helsingfors, etc.

After the July days, power was completely concentrated in the hands of the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government, and the Soviets, led by the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, became its appendage. Having achieved their goal, the Cadets were able to return to the government; on July 24, a new coalition Provisional Government was formed, headed by Kerensky, from representatives of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties.

The July events served as a harsh lesson for the masses and accelerated the process of political development of the people. “...It was after the July days,” wrote V.I. Lenin, “that the majority of the people began to quickly go over to the side of the Bolsheviks.” The revolution has entered a new phase of development.

The July crisis of 1917 was the result of deep political, socio-economic and national contradictions that worsened in our country after the fall of the autocracy. The latter circumstance led to the fact that representatives of monarchist movements left the political arena, and a struggle for power developed in the government. The unsuccessful offensives of the Russian army at the front led to a worsening of the situation, which contributed to new internal disasters.

Prerequisites

The July crisis of 1917 erupted as a result of accumulated contradictions between various groups that fought for influence in the cabinet. Until June of this year, the leading position was occupied by which, however, quickly left the political arena. The Octobrists and Progressives could not stay at the helm of government. But despite this, the remaining groups continued to fight.

The championship passed to the Socialist Revolutionaries, who supported and advocated an alliance with the Cadets. Another influential group were the Mensheviks, who were not a homogeneous force. However, they also advocated an alliance with the temporary government and the bourgeoisie. Both parties were inclined to the need to wage the war to a victorious end. The reasons for the July crisis of 1917 were that there was no agreement at the top of the government regarding the future fate of the country and its continued participation in hostilities.

Bolshevik participation

This party demanded that power be given to the soviets. The Bolsheviks were the only force that opposed the Provisional Government and demanded Russia's withdrawal from the war. They became especially active after Lenin returned to the country in April of the year in question.

A few months later, mass demonstrations under Bolshevik slogans took place in Petrograd. The demonstrators demanded Russia's withdrawal from the war and the transfer of power to their local cells. The July crisis of 1917 began in the first days of the month. In response, the government ordered the shooting of the protesters and also issued an arrest warrant for the Bolshevik leaders.

Accusations

The party was accused of carrying out subversive work in the country with German money and deliberately organizing an armed uprising against the official authorities.

Regarding this problem, two points of view have been established among scientists. Some researchers believe that Lenin actually enjoyed the support of Germany, which was interested in the military defeat of Russia. Other historians argue that there is no basis for such a conclusion.

So that the reader can get at least some idea of ​​how and in what sequence the events unfolded, we have placed brief information on this topic in a table.

However, there is a hypothesis that the July crisis of 1917 was a provocation of the government itself in order to have a reason to blame the Bolsheviks for Be that as it may, the party went underground after these events.

Consequences

These events led to serious political changes in the country. At the end of the month, a new one was formed, headed by the Socialist Revolutionary Kerensky. In this way, the official government tried to reconcile the interests of various political groups.

The new leader tried to maneuver between groups, but he failed to achieve at least some stability in the country. The July crisis of 1917, the results of which led to the fact that the Bolsheviks took a course towards, became the reason for a new military uprising, which almost led to the fall of the government.

We are talking about the speech of General Kornilov. His rebellion was suppressed with the help of the Bolsheviks, whose position was significantly strengthened after this incident, which made it easier for them to come to power in October of that year.

Results

The July crisis of 1917 greatly contributed to the success of the coup. The table given in this review shows the main chronology of events. After the shooting of the demonstrators, Lenin wrote a new work in which he announced that the peaceful stage of the revolution had come to an end. Thus, he justified the need for an armed overthrow of power. Another important result of the crisis was the elimination of dual power in the country. This was due to the Bolsheviks going underground. The problem of the country's participation in the war remained one of the most pressing issues.

Meaning

The July crisis of 1917 showed the weakness of the Provisional Government and its inability to solve the problems of the country's development. Subsequent events further strengthened the influence of the Bolsheviks, who easily seized power just a few months later. Therefore, the mutiny in question should be considered the penultimate in a series of crises that shook the supreme power in the summer of the mentioned year.

B.F. Dodonov,
Candidate of Historical Sciences,
Chief Specialist of the State Archives of the Russian Federation

The article introduces the study of the July events in Petrograd in 1917. The author, based on archival documents from the funds of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, as well as eyewitness accounts of the events, criticizes the Soviet concept of the July crisis, describes the actions of the Provisional Government to suppress the pro-Bolshevik uprising and restore order in the capital.

The year 1917 was extremely eventful. After the rapid February Revolution and the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II, the Provisional Government came to power in the country. It lasted only eight months, but it had a huge impact on many subsequent years. However, the new government turned out to be extremely unstable - during the activities of the Provisional Government, three major political crises occurred, and the composition of the government was renewed four times.

In this article we examine the activities of the Provisional Government in one of the most acute periods of its history - during the July crisis of 1917, which arose after the unsuccessful attempt of the Bolsheviks to carry out a coup d'etat and overthrow the Provisional Government, relying mainly on materials from meeting journals and surviving secretarial records, materials of the Provisional Government Commission for the Investigation of the July Events.

It is necessary to especially note the works of G. A. Gerasimenko, G. Z. Ioffe and A. Rabinovich, which illuminate certain aspects of the July events from a modern point of view. It is important to note that the July crisis and the activities of the Provisional Government during these days in Soviet historical literature were considered extremely biased and biased; the adventuristic and aggressive course of the leadership of the Bolshevik Party in the July days was carefully hidden. The study itself was based on secondary sources - memoirs, the press, the works of V.I. Lenin. The main sources were deliberately not involved, primarily the journals of the meetings of the Provisional Government itself, and documents from the office of the Provisional Government. Currently, the journals of the meetings of the Provisional Government have been published and become available to a wide range of researchers. All conditions have been created for an objective and comprehensive study of the activities of the Provisional Government. In this article, the main areas of activity of the Provisional Government are examined using, first of all, meeting journals.

Defeat at the front in June 1917 again aggravated the situation in Petrograd. The question of strengthening discipline in the army also became acute.

Although the government fought against desertion, it was not possible to eliminate this phenomenon. The provisional government and military command tried to send revolutionary-minded units of the Petrograd garrison to the front. Caused mainly by military considerations, this decision made it possible to simultaneously withdraw from the capital the units most susceptible to Bolshevik propaganda. This threatened the Bolsheviks with the loss of influence on the military garrison of the capital; they would have lost the forces with which they hoped to seize power. In response to the government's measures, they organized a propaganda campaign denouncing the imperialist war and the bourgeois government, and again, as in February 1917, this led to unrest among the soldiers.

The July events were in many ways similar to the political crisis that arose at the end of April 1917. The ease with which the Bolsheviks managed to bring armed soldiers and workers ready for protest and rebellion into the streets was alarming and frightening. It is obvious that they tried to bring the situation in the capital to a similar one at the end of February 1917, when soldiers and workers took to the streets of Petrograd and overthrew the autocracy; a similar role was to be played by crowds of soldiers, sailors and workers on the streets of the city, allowing the overthrow of the Provisional Government. At the same time, the Bolshevik leaders did not think much about the organs of the uprising, its plan, etc. - they were counting on a spontaneous uprising of the masses.

The so-called Military Organization under the Petrograd Committee of the RSDLP (b) played an active role in the July events. It arose in March 1917, in April it was transformed into a Military Organization under the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b). Prominent Bolsheviks took an active part in the creation and activities of the military organization of the party: V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko, A. Ya. Arosev, K. E. Voroshilov, P. V. Dashkevich, P. E. Dybenko, M. S. Kedrov , S. M. Kirov, G. N. Korganov, N. V. Krylenko, K. A. Mekhonoshin, P. N. Mostovenko, A. F. Myasnikov, S. M. Nakhimson, V. I. Nevsky, N I. Podvoisky, E. F. Rozmirovich, S. G. Roshal, Ya. F. Fabritsius, M. V. Frunze, Em. Yaroslavsky and others.

An important role in increasing the role of this organization was played by the All-Russian Conference of front-line and rear military organizations of the RSDLP (b), held on June 16 - 23 (June 29 - July 6), 1917, which was attended by 167 delegates from 43 front-line and 17 rear military organizations representing 26 thousand party members, members of these organizations. Lenin made presentations at the conference on the current situation and the agrarian question. Podvoisky’s report was devoted to the goals and objectives of the military organization of the RSDLP (b); organizational issues - Nevsky's report
.
The Bolsheviks conducted active propaganda among parts of the Petrograd garrison. This primarily applied to the 1st Machine Gun Regiment, the largest part of the garrison (11,300 soldiers and 300 officers). In terms of numbers, it actually corresponded to the division. The 1st Machine Gun Regiment was formed at the beginning of the First World War. It was initially stationed in Oranienbaum, and from March 1917 in Petrograd (People's House and Palace of the Emir of Bukhara, Kamenoostrovsky Prospekt, 44 b, from mid-March three battalions were located on Bolshoy Sampsonievsky Prospekt (Vyborgsky district, near the Lessner plant), one battalion (3- j) and auxiliary teams returned to Oranienbaum. The number in February 1917 was 19.5 thousand soldiers, about 1.5 thousand machine guns. The regiment was replenished by representatives of the most diverse strata of society - not only workers, but also representatives of the intelligentsia were called up for military service, creative professions Naturally, this entire public was not eager to go to the front.

The regiment was the initiator of the Oranienbaum uprising and the campaign of the rebel troops against Petrograd, which contributed to the victory of the February Revolution. The regiment became the instigator of demonstrations in the July days of 1917 and went to demonstrations under Bolshevik slogans. The regiment was quartered in one of the most revolutionary-minded working-class districts of Petrograd - the Vyborg side. French journalist Claude Anet put it this way about the Vyborg side in July 1917: “Lenin and Trotsky reign here like gentlemen.” Due to numerous contacts with workers, the regiment was constantly exposed to socialist agitation. The regiment was formed as a large training team, sending a marching company to the front once a week, so the soldiers of the regiment were especially sensitive about possible sending to the front. With the start of the June offensive at the front, Headquarters ordered the regiment to send 30 machine-gun teams to the front at once; in response to this, on June 21, the regimental committee decided not to send marching companies “until the war takes on a revolutionary character.” In addition, there on the Vybskaya side, in the Durnovo dacha, the headquarters of the anarchists was located, which contributed to the spread of anarchist agitation in the area. The Kronstadt naval base, which was under the influence of the Bolsheviks and anarchists, also caused great concern to the Provisional Government. Since May 12, the Kronstadt Council has actually become the only power in this city.

However, the Bolsheviks and their anarchist allies failed to win over the entire Petrograd garrison to their side. A number of military units remained loyal to the Provisional Government (scooters, and, above all, Cossack units stationed in the city) - ultimately, it was they who decided the outcome of the matter, playing a leading role in the failure of the Bolshevik adventure.

By mid-June, the provisional government was trying to protect itself from possible excesses. In mid-June, military units loyal to the Provisional Government dispersed the anarchist headquarters at the former Durnovo dacha. But this measure escalated the situation even more - in addition to the anarchists, a number of public organizations were located in the building, and the garden at the dacha was used by the workers of the Petrograd side as a park - the actions of the authorities caused mass strikes. Rumors began to spread in Petrograd that the Provisional Government was allegedly calling 20 thousand Cossacks from the front as a punitive expedition.

On June 28, 1917, on the proposal of the War Ministry, the Provisional Government adopted a resolution “on the formation in Petrograd and Moscow of commissions on deserters, on the re-examination of white-ticket officers and on checking deferments of those liable for military service,” and on July 1, on the proposal of the War Ministry, on changes and additions to the resolution of the Provisional Government “ on the restoration of the death penalty and the establishment of military revolutionary courts."

From the testimony of numerous witnesses interviewed by the Commission of the Provisional Government to investigate the July events, it follows that at the end of June - beginning of July 1917, the barracks of military units stationed in Petrograd were filled with agitators who agitated for failure to comply with the orders of military commanders and called for demonstrations demanding resignation Provisional Government.

On July 3, 1917, mass demonstrations began. Lenin called for disobedience to the authorities. The speeches were held under the slogan of the immediate resignation of the Provisional Government and negotiations with Germany on concluding peace. Kronstadt sailors, soldiers of the 1st machine gun regiment, and workers of Petrograd factories took part in the unrest. The Bolsheviks expected to seize power by the time the VI Congress of the RSDLP (b) scheduled for July 26 began. It was supposed to achieve the goal using parts of the Petrograd garrison and squads of workers, putting daily pressure on the Provisional Government throughout July.

According to F. F. Raskolnikov, on July 3, the 1st Machine Gun Regiment sent its delegates to Kronstadt, calling on them to arm themselves and move to Petrograd. An organizational commission of 9 people was created in Kronstadt to lead the demonstration, it included Raskolnikov (Bolshevik), S. S. Gredyushko, S. M. Roshal (Bolshevik), P. N. Belyaevsky (Socialist Revolutionary), A. Pavlov, A. K. Samoukov, G. Popuridi (Socialist Revolutionary), M. M. Martynov, A. I. Remnev. The Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee of the RSDLP (b), the Military Organization under the Central Committee of the Party, the Interdistrict Committee of the RSDLP decided on the participation of soldiers and sailors in the armed movement, according to Lenin, “in order to give it a peaceful and organized character.”

By July 3, the so-called “revolutionary committee” had already been elected in the 1st Machine Gun Regiment, chaired by Warrant Officer Semashko, who took over the leadership of the armed uprising. At the request of activists, the Renault plant supplied gasoline for cars that drove onto the streets of Petrograd with machine guns mounted on them.

The rebels received instructions by telephone from the military organization under the Central Committee of the RSDLP. Moreover, the regiment's performance was far from universal - the majority of officers were against the performance. Among the rebels there were calls: “We must kill them all.”

The Provisional Government and its chairman, Prince G.E. Lvov acted actively at this decisive moment: the commander-in-chief of the Petrograd Military District, General Polovtsov, received an order to clear Petrograd “of armed people disturbing peace and order... today to take away the machine guns from the Machine Gun Regiment, to arrest all those guilty of using machine guns and participating in the violation of order in streets of Petrograd." The Chairman of the Government also instructed Polovtsov to “arrest both the participants in the riots” and the Bolsheviks who occupied Kshesinskaya’s house (the instructions were to “clear it and occupy it with troops”).

On July 4, Polovtsov addressed the residents of Petrograd with an appeal “not to go out into the streets unless absolutely necessary, to lock the gates of houses and take measures against the entry of unknown persons into houses.” Accordingly, on July 4, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee summoned the Volyn Regiment to defend the Tauride Palace from the alleged attack of the Bolsheviks, and on the night of July 4-5 declared martial law in the city. The night of July 4 passed in Petrograd relatively calmly. However, in the morning soldiers of the 1st reserve machine gun regiment from Oranienbaum and the 3rd reserve regiment from Peterhof arrived in Petrograd; by 12 o'clock in the afternoon they were joined by the 1st and 176th reserve regiments, the 1st reserve machine gun regiment and the Guards Grenadier reserve battalion.

On the morning of July 4, sailors gathered on Anchor Square in Kronstadt and, boarding tugboats and passenger ships, set off for Petrograd. Having passed through the sea canal and the mouth of the Neva, the sailors landed at the pier of Vasilyevsky Island and on the English Embankment. The sailors crossed to the St. Petersburg side and, walking along the main alley of Alexander Park, arrived at the Bolshevik headquarters in the Kshesinskaya mansion. Comrade spoke to the demonstrators from the balcony of the mansion. Sverdlov, Lunacharsky and Lenin, calling on the armed sailors to go to the Tauride Palace and demand the transfer of power to the Soviets (that is, the removal of the Provisional Government from power). An armed demonstration marched along Trinity Bridge, Sadovaya Street, Nevsky Prospect and Liteiny Prospekt, moving towards the Tauride Palace.

At this time, the Minister-Chairman of the Provisional Government, Prince G. E. Lvov, members of the Government and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee were at the headquarters of the Petrograd Military District.

Regarding the armed clashes between demonstrators and supporters of the Provisional Government, opposing points of view are expressed in historical literature. Soviet historiography clearly and unequivocally stated that cadets and officers opened fire on the demonstrators on the orders of the Provisional Government. Modern historian V. Rodionov believes that the clashes were provoked by the Bolsheviks, who seated their riflemen on the roofs and began firing machine guns at the demonstrators, while the Bolshevik machine gunners inflicted the greatest damage on both the Cossacks and the demonstrators.

Eyewitnesses differ sharply in their assessment of the events. One of the leaders of the Kronstadt sailors, F. F. Raskolnikov, accused the Provisional Government of provocation; the acting head of counterintelligence of the Petrograd Military District, Captain B. V. Nikitin, in turn, wrote that the Bolsheviks provoked an armed clash; P. spoke similarly in his memoirs. A. Polovtsov.

Among the documents of the office of the next (after Prince Lvov) Minister-Chairman of the Provisional Government A.F. Kerensky, an important document has been preserved - a telegram from the commander of the Petrograd Military District P.A. Polovtsov, sent to Headquarters addressed to the then Minister of War Kerensky at 5:10 minutes July 5, 1917. The telegram describes the events of the decisive day, July 4, Polovtsov writes that, according to a report from the commander of the 19th Infantry Reserve Brigade, “parts of the brigade were called by deputies of the indignant units and workers for a peaceful but armed demonstration. Having met the Cossacks on Liteiny Prospect, panic occurred in the ranks of the first reserve regiment, which resulted in shooting and losses in the ranks of the Cossacks and infantry.”

By noon, the rebel military units moved to the Tauride Palace, armed people were moving around the city “in trucks and cars,” “shooting was opened in many places in the city,” the commander of the troops, Major General Polovtsov, noted in a telegram to Minister of War Kerensky.

An eyewitness to the events, acting as chief of counterintelligence of the Petrograd Military District, Captain B.V. Nikitin, described what was happening as follows: “We were surrounded by a tight belt of an avalanche of several tens of thousands of people. The Bolsheviks really tried to catch up with as many people as possible, but it was precisely this number of participants that doomed them to failure today... they lost each other, they themselves were lost in this monstrous crowd of countless heads. The Bolsheviks, first of all, were stuck. As more people arrived, they lost control. By noon it was noticeable how the chains were breaking and the cordon was disappearing. And in the second half of the day, the technical controls were completely crushed by the mass, which was evident from all its stupid movements.”

It is important to note that in the events that took place, the Petrograd Soviet stood in solidarity with the Provisional Government and acted together, which predetermined the defeat of the Bolsheviks. On the evening of July 3, the head of counterintelligence of the Petrograd Military District, B.V. Nikitin, received information that the Bolsheviks were going to raise an armed uprising the next day: “The Bolsheviks, ignoring the Provisional Government, will go to the Tauride Palace, disperse that part of the deputies that supports the Provisional Government, and announce transfer of supreme power to the Soviets and form a new government.” A group of people who entered the Tauride Palace were looking for the Minister of Justice Pereverzev, but instead took the Minister of Agriculture Chernov. Thanks to the intervention of Trotsky, who gave a speech to the crowd, Chernov was released. The crowd parted with a dissatisfied look; Trotsky, grabbing Chernov by the sleeve, quickly led him away. Raskolnikov also tried to calm the crowd, but unsuccessfully.

Serious armed clashes between the rebels and units loyal to the Provisional Government took place at the Trinity Bridge. As Polovtsov notes, the Cossacks “suffered quite significant losses”2. The culmination of events has arrived. Polovtsov writes that the rebel units were the first to use artillery - opening artillery fire “at a platoon of horse artillery” - “The platoon fired four shots at the Vyborg side. After the artillery fire, the crowd at the Tauride Palace fled,” notes Polovtsov.

On July 4, 1917, events in Petrograd reached their highest intensity. The severity of the confrontation is evidenced by the surviving report of the commander of the 1st Don Cossack Regiment to the Special Investigation Commission dated August 17, 1917. The list of Cossacks of the 1st hundred killed, wounded and shell-shocked in the clashes on July 4, attached to the report, mentions 41 Cossacks (6 killed, died from wounds - 1, wounded - 12, shell-shocked - 23).

An armed uprising was evident and units loyal to the Provisional Government had to face serious resistance from the rebels. It is important to note that no documentary evidence of rebel losses has been preserved. Therefore, we can assume that they were not large - the rebels were not persistent and organized enough and immediately fled, having received rebuff from units loyal to the Provisional Government.

The commander of the district troops, P. A. Polovtsov, summoned the Cossacks, two squadrons of the 9th reserve cavalry regiment and guards horse artillerymen from Pavlovsk to the district headquarters and the Winter Palace.

Infantry units were ordered to remain in their barracks and be on alert. Compared to Lenin and Zinoviev, who fled from Petrograd, Trotsky’s actions in July were distinguished by their audacity: he alone spoke out in front of a crowd of virtually uncontrolled Kronstadt sailors, who by that time had already robbed up to three hundred “bourgeois” in Petrograd, and recaptured Chernov from them. In his speech, Trotsky declared: “Comrades of Kronstadt, the beauty and pride of the Russian revolution! I am convinced that no one will overshadow our today's holiday, our solemn review of the forces of the revolution, with unnecessary arrests. Whoever is in favor of violence here, let him raise his hand!”

According to Captain B.V. Nikitin, during the events who served as chief of counterintelligence of the Petrograd Military District, the sailor who grabbed Chernov “was an ordinary criminal who had previously been imprisoned in Kresty for theft.” Having learned by telephone about the arrest of Chernov and the violence of the sailors in the Tauride Palace, the commander of the military district, P. A. Polovtsov, decided that it was time to take active action, acting as the savior of the Council. Polovtsov ordered the colonel of the horse artillery regiment, Rebinder, with two guns and a hundred covering Cossacks to move at a trot along the embankment and Shpalernaya to the Tauride Palace and, after a short warning, or even without it, open fire on the crowd gathered in front of the Tauride Palace.

Rebinder, having reached the intersection of Shpalernaya and Liteiny Prospekt, was fired on from both sides. According to Nikitin’s description, the battle between Rebinder’s Cossacks in the Liteiny Bridge area was fought with the Bolshevized soldiers of the 1st Reserve Regiment, and the machine gun on the Liteiny Bridge was placed by soldiers of the Finnish Regiment. According to the memoirs of P. A. Polovtsov, a crowd of Bolsheviks near the Tauride Palace, hearing close artillery fire, ran away in panic in all directions. During this skirmish, 6 Cossacks, 4 horse artillerymen were killed, there were many wounded and many horses were killed.

According to B.N. Nikitin, who was in the Tauride Palace, panic among the crowd surrounding the palace arose not because of artillery shots from Rebinder’s detachment, but as a result of random rifle shots from the crowd itself at the palace, as a result of which people were wounded first rows near the palace.

Under these conditions, the Provisional Government decided to strike a political blow against its opponents - on the evening of July 4, Prince G. E. Lvov contacted I. G. Tsereteli by telephone and invited him to come to the government residence for a meeting of the Provisional Government.

Those present were familiarized with the document received by Minister of Justice Pereverzev, who proposed sending it to newspaper editorial offices. From this document it was clear that ensign of the Russian army D.S. Ermolenko, having been captured, on April 28 was transferred by the Germans behind the front line to the location of Russian troops with the task of conducting propaganda among his former comrades in arms in favor of the speedy conclusion of a separate peace with Germany . He probably, wittingly or unwittingly, revealed to the Russian officers the purpose for which he was sent across the front line and additionally reported some secret information, according to which two people, V.I. Lenin and a certain A.F. Skoropis-Yoltukhovsky, were sent to Russia to undermine trust in the Provisional Government. Moreover, they had money sent from Stockholm through trusted agents. Other names were mentioned there as well. This message was met with mixed reactions. Members of the government demanded verification of this information - nevertheless, a publication appeared in Novy Slovo, and on July 20 it was reproduced by the newspaper Rech. Other documents have been published, the origin of which many researchers associate with the government counterintelligence department.

Members of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party greeted this message extremely negatively and tried to immediately neutralize the impression of this publication. Lenin demanded that a commission of investigation be appointed. Meanwhile, the Provisional Government ordered the arrest of members of the Bolshevik Central Committee, Lenin and Zinoviev went underground.

At night and in the morning of July 5, some of the sailors returned to Kronstadt. From dawn, combined detachments of St. George's cavaliers and cadets began arresting Bolshevik combat detachments. By the morning of July 5, the remnants of the defeated Bolshevik supporters gathered at the Kshesinskaya mansion and occupied the northern end of the Trinity Bridge. Some of the Kronstadt sailors, including several hundred, took refuge in the Peter and Paul Fortress. Government troops occupied the Trinity Bridge without a fight. On the morning of July 5, cadets occupied the editorial office and printing house of the newspaper Pravda, which Lenin had left literally a few minutes earlier. After the defeat of Pravda, the Bolsheviks for some time tried to publish a newspaper called Leaf of Pravda. In fact, everything was over and on this day the Minister-Chairman of the Provisional Government, Prince. G. E. Lvov sent a telegram to the provincial, regional and city commissars of the Provisional Government about the suppression of the July rebellion.

On July 6, Kuzmin’s combined detachment prepared to storm Kshesinskaya’s mansion with the support of heavy artillery, but the Bolsheviks decided not to defend it. During a search at the Bolshevik headquarters, a large number of weapons were discovered, and a warehouse of propaganda literature was discovered in one of the rooms. Seven Bolsheviks who were involved in the destruction of archives were arrested. On July 6, troops called from the front began to arrive in the capital: in the morning, scooter riders, an armored division and a squadron of Little Russian dragoons arrived, and in the evening, a detachment consisting of an infantry brigade, a cavalry division and a battalion of scooter riders arrived in Petrograd from the front. At the head of the detachment, Kerensky appointed a certain warrant officer G.P. Mazurenko (Menshevik, member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee) with Colonel Paradelov as chief of staff. The forces that arrived from the front numbered, however, only 10 thousand people, significantly inferior in number to the Petrograd garrison.

The suppression of the Bolshevik rebellion in Petrograd did not end the political crisis in the Provisional Government. It arose in connection with the demands of the regional authorities in Ukraine - Central are happy to grant Ukraine autonomy. The socialist members of the Provisional Government were inclined to satisfy these demands, but the Cadets resolutely opposed this. The crisis in the government complicated the political situation in the country, led to the collapse of the first coalition government, the resignation of the Minister-Chairman of the Provisional Government, Prince G. E. Lvov, and the further weakening of the influence of the Cadet Party in the government.

At the end of June - beginning of July, the activity of all political forces intensified, and intensive negotiations began between various political groupings. I. G. Tsereteli in his memoirs argued that the Freemasons played an active role in them. It was intended to replace Prince G. E. Lvov as Minister-Chairman of the Provisional Government with A. F. Kerensky, which could help strengthen power.

Tsereteli also argued that the Cadets only used the Ukrainian issue as a pretext, but the main thing was the desire to shift responsibility for the situation in the country to their coalition partners.

Kerensky took advantage of the events in Petrograd - on July 4, he sent a sharp telegram to Prince Lvov demanding “an end to the treacherous actions, the disarmament of the rebellious units and the bringing to justice of all instigators and rebels.” The telegram was clearly provocative in nature. This telegram was the reason for the resignation of the minister-chairman.

On July 7, the Provisional Government was headed by A.F. Kerensky, and a new period in its history began. Kerensky was characterized by an authoritarian leadership style; for example, he himself noted that the decisive measures taken against the rebel soldiers and sailors in the July days were taken on his initiative.

The new style in the leadership of the Provisional Government can be traced to a certain extent in the journals of the meetings. The system of power established during the July crisis is characterized in modern historical studies as a center-right “democratic dictatorship.” The government was called the “Government of Salvation of the Revolution”; its efforts were focused primarily on suppressing political opponents of the extreme left. Moreover, many figures on the right accused Kerensky of insufficient repressive measures against left-wing radical groups.

The July political events were widely discussed at meetings of the Provisional Government. For example, at a meeting on July 6, 1917, the Minister-Chairman of the Provisional Government, Prince G. E. Lvov, proposed: to bring “to justice all those who participated in the organization and leadership of an armed uprising against state power” and to arrest “those guilty of public calls for murder, robbery , robbery, pogroms and other serious crimes, as well as violence against any part of the population”, “in a public call for non-compliance with lawful orders”, in calls for officers and soldiers “for non-compliance” with existing laws and orders of military authority.

The Minister of Labor Skobelev and the Manager of the Maritime Ministry Lebedev, as well as representatives of the Central Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Council of Peasants' Deputies were entrusted with the task of "unifying the actions of the military and civil authorities to restore order."

On July 7, 1917, at the proposal of the Minister of War and Navy, the Provisional Government decided “to disband all military units that took part in the armed rebellion on July 3, 4 and 5, 1917.” At the proposal of the Ministry of Justice “to investigate the organization of the armed uprising on July 3-5,” it was decided to concentrate the investigation into “the hands of the prosecutor of the Petrograd Judicial Chamber.”

The decree obligated “government and public institutions, as well as officials and private individuals, who are in possession of the information and materials available on this case, to immediately deliver them to the prosecutor of the Petrograd Judicial Chamber.” On the same day, the Bolshevik Kozlovsky was removed from the Special Meeting on the preparation of the “Regulations on the Elections to the Constituent Assembly” (magazine No. 125).

On July 8 (magazine No. 126), a declaration of the Provisional Government was adopted in connection with “the renewal of its composition and the events being experienced.”

In the document, the Provisional Government stated that “it will act with all the energy and determination that the extraordinary circumstances of the time require,” which considers its main task to be “the effort of all forces to fight the external enemy and to protect the new state order from all anarchist and counter-revolutionary attempts.” . The address set out a number of tasks, in particular on land reform, social issues, etc. On the same day, an appeal to the active army was also adopted. The Provisional Government also decided to arrest delegations of sailors from the Baltic Fleet who arrived in Petrograd on the ships “Orpheus” and “Threatening” and to prevent the penetration of “press organs that have a corrupting effect on the army” to the front.

July 9, 1917 The Provisional Government, at the proposal of the Ministry of Justice, decides to organize a “Special Investigative Commission to investigate the degree of participation in the uprising of July 3-5, 1917, of individual units of troops and ranks of the garrison of Petrograd and its environs” (magazine No. 127).

The surviving secretarial record of this meeting of the Government contains information about the course of discussion of this resolution, the participants in the discussion, etc. In particular, the question was raised about organizing one commission “or several commissions” to investigate the uprising itself, and the involvement of Bolshevik leaders in it (a decision was made form “one commission”).

As a result of the July crisis, serious changes occurred in the composition of the Provisional Government, the representation of the Cadet Party was reduced, and they were replaced by the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. These changes were reflected in the office documentation. For example, on July 11, 1917, I. N. Efremov was appointed Minister of Justice, and I. G. Tsereteli was appointed temporary manager of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (magazine No. 128), and the resignation of the Chairman of the Meeting of Comrade Ministers of the Provisional Government (the so-called “small council”) was accepted. ), G.D. Skaryatin was appointed to this post.

The Provisional Government accepted the resignation of the Minister-Chairman, Prince G. E. Lvov “and the ministers-members of the Cadet Party: A. A. Manuylov, Prince. D.I. Shakhovsky, N.V. Nekrasov (he remained a member, but left the cadet party, and initially he announced his resignation along with everyone else), A.I. Shingarev, P.N. Pereverzev and the head of the Ministry of Trade V. A. Stepanova. The composition of the Provisional Government was discussed again on July 24. The resignations of I. G. Tsereteli, V. N. Lvov, I. V. Godnev were accepted and a new composition of the Government was finally formed (recorded in “special journal No. 13”).

It included: Minister-Chairman and Minister of War and Navy A.F. Kerensky, Deputy Minister-Chairman and Minister of Finance N.V. Nekrasov, Minister of Internal Affairs N.D. Avksentyev, Minister of Foreign Affairs M.I. Tereshchenko, Minister Justice A. S. Zarudny, Minister of Public Education S. F. Oldenburg, Minister of Trade and Industry S. N. Prokopovich, Minister of Agriculture V. M. Chernov, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs A. M. Nikitin, Minister of Labor M. I. Skobelev, Minister of Food A.V. Peshekhonov, Minister of State Charity I.N. Efremov, Minister of Railways P.P. Yurenev, Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod A.V. Kartashev, State Comptroller F.F. Kokoshkin. An interesting document was preserved in the secretarial records - a list of all those present at the meeting of the Provisional Government on July 12, 1917, and a diagram of the placement of Government members at the meeting table was drawn.

In July 1917, the political situation in the country continued to be very difficult, although the political tension subsided somewhat after the creation of the second coalition government. The Provisional Government managed to largely eliminate the threat from left-wing radical movements by showing firmness and determination. It is important to note that during the crisis there was a rapprochement between the Provisional Government and the leaders of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets; the Provisional Government was then supported by most of the army.

Thus, the political situation in the summer of 1917 did not always develop as the Provisional Government wanted. Whether this is due to the miscalculations of the Provisional Government itself, or to the general slowness and ponderousness of the clumsy bureaucratic mechanism, which the Provisional Government failed to reform, or to objective circumstances - these aspects require deeper research.

“Lenta.ru”: The American historian argued that not a single event of the Russian revolution of 1917 had as many lies written about it as about the July days. What do you think it really was - the first attempt at a Bolshevik coup or spontaneous riots demanding the transfer of power to the Soviets?

Tsvetkov: Pipes indeed wrote extensively about the July Crisis of 1917. I think it was actually a combination of the organizational principle and elements of spontaneity - a kind of test of strength. Remember when Lenin wrote that 1905 was a “dress rehearsal” for 1917? Following this analogy, we can say that July 1917 became a rehearsal for October.

On the one hand, this was a kind of attempt at grassroots self-organization of revolutionary soldiers and sailors. Few people now remember that literally on the eve of these events, on July 1-2, a meeting of the Military Organization under the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) (abbreviated as “Military Commissariat”) was held in the Tauride Palace, which advocated a complete transfer of power to the Soviets. Even earlier, at the end of June, the All-Russian Conference of front-line and rear military organizations of the RSDLP(b) opened, which also supported the slogan “All power to the Soviets.”

On the other hand, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, including Lenin himself, believed that the moment for armed action had not yet arrived. When several regiments rebelled in the capital, joined by sailors from Kronstadt and workers from factories, the Bolshevik leadership had no choice but to try to ride this wave of protest. At the same time, we must not forget that all the rebellious military units had been propagandized by Bolshevik agitators since April.

What caused the bloody events of July 1917 in Petrograd?

There were many reasons: the protracted dual power between the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government, growing economic problems in the country, the failure of the June offensive of the Russian army on the Southwestern Front and the government crisis due to disagreements on the Ukrainian issue.

What did Ukraine have to do with it?

The provisional government agreed to negotiate with the Central Rada in Kyiv on the autonomy of Ukraine within Russia. In protest against this decision, four cadet ministers left the Provisional Government: Shakhovsky, Manuilov, Shingarev and Stepanov. They were convinced that the status of Ukraine and its future borders should be determined only by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, therefore neither the Provisional Government in Petrograd nor the Central Rada in Kyiv had any legal authority to resolve this complex and sensitive issue.

But Kerensky, having arrived in Kyiv on June 28 at the head of the delegation of the Provisional Government (he was then still Minister of War), in negotiations with the Rada promised to recognize the autonomy of Ukraine, which became the cause of the government crisis in Petrograd. It is clear that without four key ministers, the Provisional Government has effectively become ineffective.

Anarchy is the mother of riots

It is often said that the main striking force of the armed uprising in July 1917 in Petrograd was not the Bolsheviks, but the anarchists.

They acted in a coordinated manner. It is difficult to say which of them played a decisive role in those events. Anarchists, due to their ideology, were guided not by the decisions of some party bodies, but exclusively by the will of the masses - as they understood it then. That is, they believed that if the masses (in this case, soldiers and sailors) want a transfer of power from the Provisional Government to the Soviets, this should be achieved by all available means, including by organizing mass protests.

With the use of weapons?

Certainly. Anarchist sentiments in the Petrograd garrison (and even more so among the sailors of the Baltic Fleet) were very strong - it is no coincidence that the 1st Machine Gun Regiment went out for an armed demonstration on the streets of Petrograd on July 3. Although, for example, the soldiers’ committee of this regiment was headed by the Bolshevik Adam Semashko.

Isn’t this the one who will later become People’s Commissar of Health?

No, his name was Nikolai. Under Soviet rule, Adam Semashko would become the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Latvia, and in 1922 he would flee to the West.

But in other regiments that took up arms against the Provisional Government in early July (Reserve Moscow Guard, Reserve Grenadier Guard), the Bolsheviks had significant weight. For example, in the Grenadier Regiment, the chairman of the soldiers’ committee was the famous Bolshevik warrant officer Krylenko, who at the end of 1917 would become the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, and under Stalin he would be a prosecutor and people’s commissar of justice. Sailors of the Baltic Fleet, led by the Bolsheviks, took an active part in the events: deputy chairman of the Kronstadt Council Raskolnikov and head of the city organization of the RSDLP (b) Roshal.

You said that the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, headed by Lenin, objected to the uprising. What about party discipline?

At this time, Lenin, on the contrary, strongly encouraged any initiative from below. Therefore, the grassroots leaders of the RSDLP(b) in those circumstances could act according to the situation. It is not surprising that their revolutionary creativity often went beyond the bounds of reason.

These are all the reasons, but what was the reason for the July events in Petrograd?

Just these days, after the unsuccessful offensive of the Russian army in June 1917, the Austro-German counter-offensive began. Rumors began to spread in Petrograd that a significant part of the garrison personnel would now be sent to the front. Actually, this is why reserve regiments were kept in the capital - so that they could then be formed into marching companies to be sent to the active army. This became the immediate reason for the armed uprising: the less the soldiers understood why they were being sent to die, the more they liked the slogan “All power to the Soviets.”

Peacemaker Stalin

What role did Stalin play in the July crisis? I had to read that in the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party it was he who was assigned to negotiate with the Mensheviks and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. This is true?

Yes it's true.

Stalin as a peacemaker is an interesting story.

Certainly. The Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet was the Menshevik Nikolai Chkheidze, Stalin's old comrade-in-arms in the social democratic structures in Transcaucasia. The third participant in these negotiations was another comrade, the Minister of the Provisional Government Irakli Tsereteli, who, by the way, together with Kerensky in June went to Kyiv to establish contacts with the Central Rada.

In other words, in the critical days of July 1917, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party hoped that the three Georgians would somehow be able to come to an agreement among themselves?

Yes. Oddly enough, Stalin then had a reputation as a very moderate Bolshevik. And after the October Revolution, he was the only member of the Council of People's Commissars who voted against declaring the Cadet Party enemies of the people. It was later, during the Civil War, that he would gradually become the Stalin we know. But in July 1917 he showed those traits which, I think, later helped him to win the struggle for power.

For example, what kind?

Prudence. When Trotsky, in the days of the July crisis, called from all platforms to overthrow the Provisional Government (and not only called, but also acted), Stalin behaved extremely cautiously. At meetings of the Party Central Committee, he, of course, resolutely spoke out in support of an armed uprising. But when he was sent to negotiate with Chkheidze at the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Stalin demonstrated his readiness for any compromise. In the July days of 1917, he clearly took a wait-and-see attitude.

They say that this is what saved Stalin from arrest after the failure of the July armed uprising.

Certainly. Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders were sent to Kresty on charges of attempting a violent change of power, but Stalin was not touched. And the same Lenin was generally accused of high treason, that is, of working for Germany.

Lenin and German money

To what extent do you think these accusations are justified?

I believe that they are completely far-fetched, since no supporting documents have yet been discovered. There are no serious reasons to consider Lenin a German spy.

What about the money from Parvus?

Parvus in 1917 was already a Menshevik and did not communicate with Lenin, although he did collaborate with German structures. There was also the story of Jakub Goniecki (Furstenberg), who had commercial contacts with German companies through Sweden. He transferred part of the profits to the party treasury - hence the talk about the “German trace”. But all this cannot be considered espionage in the then understanding of the word. Kerensky, by the way, knew about this since May 1917, but before the July events he did not even try to use such information against the Bolsheviks.

What role did Lenin play in the July crisis?

This is an interesting question. On the eve of the armed uprising in Petrograd, on June 29, Lenin unexpectedly went on vacation to Finland, to the town of Neivola. Bonch-Bruevich argued in his memoirs that events in the capital took Ilyich by surprise. It is still unclear whether Lenin knew about the impending uprising and was simply waiting on the sidelines to see how things would end, or whether he was actually not aware of the events.

In any case, he returned to Petrograd only on July 4th. But when he was charged with spying for Germany, it became an unpleasant surprise for him: Lenin was ready to go to prison as a revolutionary, but not as a traitor and provocateur. It is known that he was even going to appear in court to defend himself, but his party comrades (including Stalin) persuaded Vladimir Ilyich to hide in Razliv.

Is it true that Kerensky, having become the head of the Provisional Government after the July events, warned Lenin through third parties about the impending arrest?

This is a historical myth, which, however, has a basis in reality. They just mixed up similar names later. It was not Kerensky who warned Lenin about his impending arrest on charges of treason (he and Lenin sincerely hated each other), but the prosecutor of the Petrograd Court Chamber, Nikolai Sergeevich Karinsky.

On the evening of July 4, he called his fellow lawyer Bonch-Bruevich and, out of old friendship, told him about this. Lenin left the Kshesinskaya mansion, where the Bolshevik headquarters was then located, literally an hour before a team of cadets and scooter riders arrived there to arrest him. Not finding the Bolshevik leader, they staged a pogrom in the building, including destroying the printing house. By the way, after the arrest of the Provisional Government in October 1917, Lenin fully thanked Karinsky: he personally ordered his release from custody and allowed him to travel abroad.

In July 1917, Stalin waited, and Lenin was not entirely aware of events... It turns out that of the Bolshevik leaders, Trotsky was the most active in those days?

Yes, he acted decisively and was not afraid to take the initiative, for which he paid by going to prison.

Blood on the streets of the capital

Is it known who was the first to start shooting on the streets of Petrograd?

Most modern historians agree that there were no special execution orders - such as, for example, January 9, 1905 - initially. The first shots were fired on July 4 at five in the morning: an armed demonstration on Liteiny Prospekt was fired at from the upper floors of buildings. In response, demonstrators opened indiscriminate fire at the windows, resulting in the deaths of many civilians.

Who do you think could have shot at the march participants? Did the anarchists and Bolsheviks have opponents on the right?

Certainly. There were several completely legal armed structures: the Union of Army and Navy Officers, the Union of Knights of St. George, the Union of Cossack Troops, and the Military League. During the July crisis, they turned to the commander of the Petrograd Military District, General Polovtsev, and expressed their readiness to provide their combat troops to defend the legitimate government. It is quite possible that they were the ones who started shooting at Liteiny.

Real street fighting in Petrograd began around two o'clock in the afternoon on July 4, when, after a grenade explosion at the intersection of Nevsky Prospekt and Sadovaya, a chaotic shootout broke out between demonstrators and supporters of the Provisional Government. What kind of explosion it was and why it happened is still not known for certain. In general, there are many such blank spots left in the history of the July events. When tens of thousands of armed and angry people confront each other on the streets of the capital, it is almost impossible to figure out who opened fire first.

Approximately how many people died during the July crisis?

The exact number is unknown, but more than 700 people on both sides. The dead Cossacks were solemnly buried in the Alexander Nevsky Lavra; Kerensky himself took part in the funeral procession. The killed Red Guards, soldiers and sailors participating in the armed uprising against the Provisional Government were quietly interred in other capital cemeteries.

Who participated in the suppression of the Bolshevik and anarchist uprising in July 1917?

The Provisional Government was defended by the Guard's reserve Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky and Izmailovsky regiments, the Armored Division, the 2nd Baltic crew, the capital's cadet schools, Cossack units and, which turned out to be extremely important for the Provisional Government, artillery. Then the scooter division and army formations brought to the capital from the front got involved. They drove the Bolsheviks out of the Kshesinskaya mansion, and the anarchists from the Durnovo dacha. On July 5, the Kronstadt sailors tried to take refuge in the Peter and Paul Fortress, but the next day after negotiations (which, by the way, took place with the participation of Stalin), they surrendered to the Provisional Government.

Premonition of civil war

Why do you think this uprising failed?

I think we can agree with Lenin’s assessment of the July events: because the Bolsheviks in those conditions were not ready for a forceful seizure of power. Still, the armed uprising in July was organized very poorly. There were many glitches and unforeseen impromptu moments. When Lenin writes in October that “insurrection is an art,” he will take into account all the lessons of July. In addition, as we see, in July there were many people who were ready to defend the Provisional Government with arms in hand.

If they all supported Kerensky in July, then why didn’t they help him in October?

It was believed that in August Kerensky betrayed Kornilov - after which a significant part of the officers and Cossacks turned away from the prime minister.

What were the consequences of the July crisis?

The Bolshevik Party was not formally banned, but actually went semi-underground. Only in the wake of the struggle against the “Kornilovism” in August-September 1917 were the Bolsheviks able to restore and even strengthen their influence. After July, they abandoned the slogan “All power to the Soviets,” accusing the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet of conciliation and betrayal of the interests of the revolution.

Following the bloodshed on the streets of Petrograd, there was a noticeable polarization and radicalization in public sentiment in Russia. There was a demand for firm power that could restore order. It is noteworthy that at this time he even wrote in his diary about Kerensky, who headed the Provisional Government after the crisis: “This man is positively in his place at the present moment; The more power he has, the better.”

But general bitterness, intolerance towards people of other political views, inability to negotiate and make reasonable compromises, a penchant for violent methods of conducting political struggle - all this has become a distinctive feature of both the extreme left and the extreme right.

Street battles in Petrograd in the July days of 1917 became the first outbreaks of the future Civil War - it was then that its main warring parties began to take shape. Without the events of July, August with the failed Kornilov speech would have been impossible. The consequence of the collapse of the “Kornilovism” was the Bolshevik coup in October, and after the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918, Civil War became inevitable in Russia.