Light infantry in the Russian army. Russian infantry in battle

INFANTRY TACTICS

Russian military doctrine at the beginning of the reign of Empress Anna Ioannovna was based on the Peter's Charter of 1716. It, in turn, was in many respects a transposition of the "Establishment for battle to the present time" of 1708 - a tactical guide that combined the experience of the first half of the Northern War.

Following the example of the Anglo-Dutch troops, infantry battalions deployed in a line in four ranks, and soldiers were trained to fire in rows or platoons, according to the modern Prussian system. In 1831, Prussian military advisers appeared in the army, who were supposed to help introduce the latest Prussian infantry regulations of 1726. The battalions were divided into four divisions, each of which, in turn, was divided into two platoons. The soldiers were still forming in four lines, but the last did not fire, but was used to fill the gaps in the formation. If the grenadiers remained with the battalion (they were often taken away to form the combined grenadier regiments), they occupied a place on the right flank of the battalion line. A new Prussian invention - "cadent" marching (with striking a step with the whole foot) - did not appear in the Russian army until 1755.

General Pyotr Semenovich Saltykov, who commanded the main forces of the Russian army in the battles of Palzig and Kunersdorf. This popular and talented commander was dismissed in the winter of 1759–1760. because of illness. (Suvorov Museum, St. Petersburg)

During the campaigns of Minich against the Turks, great attention was paid to the conduct of firefighting, and the Russian infantry was trained to shoot in the "Karakol" offensive. This method was abolished in General Fermor's "Dispositions for military preparations and advances in a general battle against the Turks," published in 1736, which provided for a combination of offensive and defensive tactics. Fermor understood that the firing of lines of entire companies or battalions after a short time stopped by itself due to the thick smoke caused by the use of black powder. Dispositions recommended firing by platoons commanded by knowledgeable officers; only in this case firing on the battlefield could continue for as long as desired.

After the accession to the throne in 1740 of Empress Elizabeth, Prussian tactics were largely abandoned - the Empress demanded a return to the tactical doctrines introduced by Peter the Great. This next episode of the struggle against German dominance in the army led to the emergence in 1746 of a new infantry regulations, written by Field Marshal Lassi: "Field Regulations of an Infantry Regiment for the Russian Imperial Army." Although many of Peter's ideas were retained in the charter, the document retained a new look at firefighting, with the addition of the requirement that bayonets should be attached during battles in deployed lines. This was the result of experience gained in battles against the Turkish light cavalry, when the bayonet was considered a good defense against cavalry.

The next and most significant change in the Russian infantry regulations occurred in 1755, during the Shuvalov army reform. The "Description of the Infantry Regimental System" was a revision of the new and advanced infantry regulations of the Prussian army. Shuvalov consulted both with the Russians and with Austrian experts in the field of tactics, but the resulting document became one of the most complex infantry regulations of the Russian army, which also appeared just before the start of the Seven Years War. As a result, at least until 1759, the infantry commanders, due to insufficient experience, were unable to apply the provisions of the new regulations in the army.

Battle of Palzig, July 23, 1759. The Russian army is in dense defensive formations in two lines, artillery covers the only possible approach to its positions, as shown on the plan. The Russians were victorious mainly through careful positioning and the use of reserves from the Observation Corps. (From the collection of the author)

The main formation of the battalion was still four-ranked, but it was complicated by the fact that when approaching the enemy up to 70 steps, it was advised to reorganize into three ranks. With a four-legged system, the first two ranks dropped to the knee when firing; when lining up in three ranks, only the first of them would kneel. The Prussian system of dividing the battalion into four divisions, eight half-divisions and 16 platoons was considered convenient for increasing control over soldiers on the battlefield. The battalion's grenadiers were stationed on both flanks, and the reserve, with a force of three platoons, was 25 fathoms (about 50 meters) behind the battalion line. The reserve was assigned the same role as the fourth rank, which did not enter the shooting, according to the charter of 1731; in the period from 1740 to 1755 no reserve was allocated.

In practice, the Shuvalov regulations revealed a number of shortcomings, including quick stops in the firing of platoons - a problem that the Prussians also faced. “Our muskets and cannon responded, but, of course, not in one gulp, but to tell the truth, in great disorder, but the shooting was carried out much more often than by the enemy,” wrote a contemporary. This rate of fire, presumably three Russian shots for every two Prussian shots, was a direct consequence of the old Petrine doctrine revived by Minich and Fermor. The firepower and closeness of the ranks under enemy fire throughout the Seven Years War remained the cornerstones of Russian military practice, and not at all a bayonet strike, as historians of the later period believed.

The experience gained in the first battles of the war served as the basis for Fermor's second leadership in 1758 - "General disposition for the battle with the enemy." This document required “to open fire by platoon at the command of officers, aiming at half the height of the enemy. When the Prussians come closer, open fire with divisions and continue the battle with bayonets, until with the help of God and through the bravery of the Russian army, the enemy is defeated and will not be expelled from the battlefield. "

The Prussian regulations required to fire without aiming at the middle of the enemy's formation, but Fermor's instructions were more practical; in this case, a much higher percentage of bullets should have hit the target. Higher firing accuracy, coupled with a higher rate of fire, gave Russian soldiers a significant advantage in fire combat, which was usually fought at a distance of 50–70 steps.

Emperor Peter III, husband of Catherine II, is depicted in this engraving in the uniform of a cavalry company commander. After the death of Empress Elizabeth, Peter III intended to conclude an alliance with Frederick the Great - this decision cost him the throne and his life: Peter was killed as a result of a conspiracy led by his wife, Empress Catherine. (From the collection of Walter Yarborough, Jr.)

The weakness of the Russian army lay elsewhere, and this weakness largely nullified the advantages. A British observer reported that "Russian troops ... under no circumstances can act with haste." The tediously prescribed techniques of rebuilding and maneuvering, almost in a state of lethargic sleep, led to the fact that Russian troops could hardly move on the battlefield. A Russian eyewitness noted that at Gross-Jägersdorf "our army stood in line throughout the entire battle, with the first rank sitting on its knee." The Prussians remarked that "... although they [the Russians] have adopted a line formation, an infantry regiment is hardly capable of leveling a line in less than an hour, and even so there is always a great mess." By 1759, the situation had improved somewhat, and with the adoption of Fermor's charter, the deployment of the column in line was facilitated.

The advancement of troops as part of large divisional columns was adopted by the Russian infantry during the Minich campaigns against the Turks, and this practice continued in the early years of the Seven Years' War. Such a formation was unusual for rapprochement with the enemy, but the cramped battlefield near Zorndorf (1758) forced the troops into columns, so that the shots of the Prussian artillery pierced huge gaps in the ranks. Although Shuvalov's instructions recommended using battalion columns as an offensive formation, Russian commanders on the battlefield continued to deploy their units in a line, since with such a formation the entire battalion could fire. After reaching the position, the entire line opened volley fire, and then continued the attack, trying to expel the enemy from the battlefield with bayonets. In 1761, during the Kohlberg campaign, the formation of a brigade was adopted, in which two battalions moved in columns, forming a movable square, and the soldiers had to either deploy a front square when danger appeared, or, if necessary, turn into a line. This provided greater mobility on the battlefield compared to the early years of the Seven Years' War.

The principles of building an army on the battlefield during the course of the war also underwent changes. At the beginning of the century, it was customary to deploy the infantry in two lines, and the third line remained behind them, forming a reserve. The cavalry covered the infantry from the flanks. If you do not take into account the huge columns that were formed during the war with the Turks, the first improvement can be considered the formation in two main lines with the allocation of a small intermediate line of regimental reserves. The cavalry remained on the flanks, the infantry relied on firefight and mobile field fortifications (slingshots) to prevent a frontal cavalry attack. Near Palzig (1759), the Russian army preferred to erect field fortifications in order to disrupt the enemy's formation, and the second line of mixed reserves was ready to support the troops in the event of a breakthrough by the enemy.

Empress Catherine II the Great (reign 1762-1796). After the overthrow of her husband Peter III, Catherine reigned as an absolute monarch and continued to strengthen her army. Almost immediately after the end of the Seven Years' War, its troops were involved in a prolonged war with Turkey (1768-1774). (From the collection of Walter Yarborough, Jr.)

Another important innovation during the war was the experience of using light infantry in the Russian army. During the siege of Kohlberg (1761), two battalions of five companies were formed. They were supposed to provide cover, acting independently in small groups, relying mainly on accurate shooting. During the reign of Catherine the Great, the idea would be supported and the light infantry would develop into a special kind of troops, but in 1761 their units were intended only for confrontation with the Prussian riflemen in the Kohlberg region.

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Traditional military history tends to operate on a large scale - commanders-in-chief give orders, troops conduct operations that end in success or failure. The historian's gaze is rarely distracted from the map of the theater of war and goes “down” to individual units. In this article we will look at the typical actions of Russian infantry companies and battalions in the Balkans in 1877-1878 and the problems faced by soldiers and officers.

More than a hundred infantry regiments and rifle battalions participated in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 from the Russian side. They were the main participants in such striking events as the crossing of the Danube at Sistovo, the first Trans-Balkan campaign of the Advance detachment of General I.V. Gurko, the defense of Shipka, the capture of Lovchi and three assaults of Plevna. We will not analyze specific battles, but will try to give examples illustrating the typical actions and problems of the Russian infantry in the field battles of 1877-1878.

The beginning of the battle

The battle began long before contact and even eye contact with the enemy. The troops were rebuilt from a marching order to a combat formation at a distance of effective artillery fire (usually about 3000 steps). The regiment advanced with two battalions in the first line and one battalion in reserve, or vice versa - with one battalion in front. The second option made it possible to save more reserves, which means that the commander expanded his capabilities to parry unexpected strikes. It was more profitable for the chiefs to be located together with the reserves, so as not to lose control of the battle, but this was not always observed. So, Colonel I.M. Kleingauz, the hero of the first assault on Plevna on July 8, 1877, died while in the forward units of his Kostroma regiment. General M.D. Skobelev, before the storming of the Green Mountains on the outskirts of Plevna, asked his subordinate Major General V.A. Tebyakin, who commanded the Kazan regiment, was in reserve, but he could not resist the temptation to personally lead his regiment into the attack and was struck by a grenade.

It is worth making a digression here, which will serve as a "guiding thread" in our story. Contrary to popular belief, by the 1870s, the Russian military was already well aware that rifled rifles and new artillery systems were capable of creating an insurmountable fire curtain. In this regard, tactical changes became necessary - for example, the transition to more rare formations. No less clearly the question arose of how to protect people from fire without losing control of the battle.

The Russian infantry regiment consisted of three battalions. Each battalion was divided into five companies, one of which was called a rifle company. Usually, it was this company that formed a rifle chain in front of the battalion's formation - the fighters scattered forward at a distance of 2-5 steps from each other. The rest of the companies formed in close columns behind the rifle line.

Ordinary battalion formation. Author's outline

As a rule, four closed companies lined up in a checkerboard pattern, with a rifle chain in front. Thus, three battle lines were obtained - a chain, the first two companies (1st battle line) and the second two companies (2nd battle line). The intervals between the columns in one battle line rarely exceeded the length of the columns along the front, and the distance between the chain and the 1st battle line was clearly stipulated by the charter - exactly 300 steps. Such severity was due to the concern that the 1st battle line had time to come to the aid of the chain in case of a threat, but practice showed that the distance was not chosen well. First, the proximity of the 1st line to the chain led to unnecessary losses; secondly, the 1st line gravitated towards the chain, which led to the thickening of the latter and the premature consumption of reserves. Colonel A.N. Kuropatkin noted this mistake at the Kazan regiment during the battle for Lovcha on August 20-22, 1877.

After the war in the Balkans, some Russian commanders proposed increasing the authorized distance to 500-600 steps, but at the insistence of the then military authorities, the new instruction stated that the chain, 1st and 2nd lines should determine the distance themselves. In general, the formation of the battalion was distinguished by excessive density, and the three battle lines often "crawled" on top of each other.

Difficulties in management

Specialists, including Major General L.L. Zeddeler, Soviet theoretician A.A. Svechin and the modern American researcher B.U. Manning, criticized the scattering of just one company into the chain. From their point of view, in this case, the battalion used only 1/5 of its firepower, but in practice even one company did not always develop its fire at full strength, since long-range shooting was not welcomed in the Russian army. "Good infantry is stingy with fire, - quoted General M.I. Dragomirov of the prominent French theoretician Marshal T.-R. Bujot, - Frequent shooting is a means by which cowards try to drown out the feeling of fear in themselves. ".

Controlling the infantry chain and its fire was not an easy task, so they tried to appoint the most intelligent and competent officers to the rifle company - however, their capabilities were also limited. The officer could more or less control what was happening within a radius of 20 steps, the rest of the space was not covered by his voice and was often hidden from his sight. The horns, once a symbol of light infantry specializing in loose formation, were considered unusable by the 1870s. On maneuvers, they tried to use whistles to give signals, but in battle they apparently were not used - commands were usually given by voice, and private chiefs, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers repeated it and passed it on. The difficulties of management are clearly visible from the description of the battle on Shipka on August 11, 1877, which was led by the companies of the Oryol infantry regiment:

“[…] The handful of those who fought dwindled and dwindled by the hour; in some places the chain thinned so much that one person occupied a space of 20 or more steps. The right flank was threatened with bypassing whole columns, and therefore by six o'clock this flank began to move back, and behind it the center. It was positively impossible to control the chain on such rough terrain as the real one: the voice was drowned out by the thunder of shots, and even a tenth of the chain, hidden by the bushes, did not notice the given signs. Thus, the involuntary retreat began, albeit step by step. "

A lot depended on the company commander in battle - usually much more than on the battalion commander, who, after entering his battalion into the battle line, usually lost the ability to influence events and joined one of the companies. The company commander had to manage his chain, make many independent decisions, adapt to the terrain, maintain contact with other companies, take care of his flanks - all this was hampered by a lot of circumstances inevitable in any battle.

First of all, company commanders often died and were wounded, so they were recommended to familiarize their subordinates with combat missions and appoint several deputies in advance. If the company commander was out of action, the company faced a serious problem common to the entire Russian army. The fact is that everything in the company was controlled by its commander (often over the heads of platoon and squad commanders). Thus, junior chiefs (warrant officers and staff captains) lost initiative, authority and command skills. In different units, this problem was fought in different ways - for example, in the 14th division, which became famous during the crossing of the Danube and the defense of Shipka, strict transmission of orders along the entire command chain and the initiative of junior officers were cultivated, and the replacement of retired chiefs was worked out. As a result, the companies of this division continued to accurately carry out their tasks even in the event of injury or death of their commanders.

Russian troops near Plevna, drawing by a contemporary.
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The second circumstance that added difficulties to the company commander was the problem of reinforcements. Even during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, it was noted that the infusion of reinforcements into the chain often leads to the mixing of units and a complete loss of control over them. The best minds of the Russian army undertook to solve this problem, but the disputes did not subside either before the campaign in the Balkans, or after it. On the one hand, the decision was to form a strong chain immediately, on the other hand, in this case its density increased, and hence the losses from fire. In addition, the military, who after many years of peaceful service came under fire, faced an unpleasant discovery - a real battle is much more chaotic and incomprehensible than the slender lines in textbooks and on the parade ground. The injection of adrenaline into the blood, the whistle of bullets and the rumble of cannonballs, the sight of falling comrades completely changed the perception of the battle.

For years, the military has tried to streamline and structure the chaos of combat. This approach can be conditionally called "the Jomini way" (G. Jomini was a Swiss theorist of the 1810s – 1830s, who did not lose his authority in the 1870s). K. von Clausewitz, on the contrary, emphasized that war is an area of danger, physical stress, uncertainty and chance, which is useless to fight. Russian military theorist General G.A. Leer, relying on the works of Jomini, proposed to replenish the chain strictly from the "native" part. In turn, Dragomirov, one of the most attentive Russian readers of Clausewitz, suggested putting up with the mixing of parts and teaching the soldiers to it even on maneuvers.

Chain actions

The chain was supposed to perform the following tasks:

start a fire fight;
force the enemy to reveal his strength;
protect the companies following her from a surprise attack;
if possible, prepare their attack.

To successfully complete these tasks, the chain had to advance as planned, observing the authorized 300 steps of distance from the 1st combat line. At the same time, under fire, the movement of the chain slowed down, and the speed of the rear mouths, on the contrary, increased - hence the same "pressure" from the 1st combat line, which Kuropatkin criticized.

The attack with a chain was usually carried out in sections: one section of the chain (for example, a detachment) advanced, and the other supported it with fire. To conduct such an offensive, coordination and mutual support were required, the chiefs of the sections had to have a good eye so as not to fall under the fire of neighbors and correctly calculate the dash (it should not tire the fighters too much, the recommended distance was no more than 100 steps). The slightest obstacle or unevenness of the terrain served as a shelter for the chain, but the relief had to be able to use it. Kuropatkin describes such an incident that occurred in the battle for Lovcha:

“I had to run 500-600 steps down the valley completely openly. The first closure from enemy bullets on the path of the regiment's advance was a mill with several dozen trees surrounding it. Some of the people ran across the valley, as they say, in one spirit; others, using small ridges of pebbles formed by the flow of the water [of the Osma River], lay behind them, the back ones joined the former ones, and in places dense ranks of lying ones formed. But these closures did not protect well against enemy fire, directed from two thousand steps and therefore striking at a large angle. […] Meanwhile, there was no need to run through this space. It was necessary to move further in the gardens, then go through the outskirts of the city and, finally, go to the very mill mentioned above. The difference was that instead of a chord, one would have to describe an arc. "

The attack of the Pskov regiment on the Gyuldiz-Tabia redoubt in the battle on Shandornik on November 17, 1877.
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The fire could only be opened at the command of an officer. He usually ordered the best shooters to make test shots to determine the height of the sight, then the height was reported to the soldiers, and the order was given to open fire. The officer had to make sure that no unnecessary shots were made, the soldiers correctly set the sight on their rifles, and it changed in time and correctly. To do this, it was necessary to know whom to entrust test shots, to be able to determine the distance to the target, and finally, to correctly choose the target itself.

In addition, the officer decided what type of fire to use. At a distance of 300–800 steps, they fired single shots and quite rarely. It was recommended to open fire from a distance of 800 steps, since it was believed that from this distance there was a chance to hit a single person. Sometimes, if a suitable target was presented (for example, an artillery battery or a dense formation of enemy infantry), a volley was fired on command. If it was required to carry out intensive shelling, but did not want to spend a lot of cartridges, they gave the command "frequent fire" and added the number of cartridges that had to be fired. This technique was criticized as the officer could not control the actual amount of ammunition used by the soldiers. Finally, the officer could give the command to lie down. In general, a commanding commander was considered to be one who controlled his unit even under heavy fire.

It was not easy to lift the soldiers who lay behind the cover and move forward. In addition, the requirement to protect people from fire conflicted with the need to control the troops. Kuropatkin continues his story about the battle for Lovcha:

“It was in vain that one young officer shouted in a hoarse voice 'forward', 'hurray', and waved his saber, the crowd [hiding behind the mill] was not yet disposed to follow him, and the young man, having rushed forward with several soldiers, did not have time to run a few steps, as was already killed. "

Save cartridges

It was not in vain that Dragomirov cited Bujot's aphorism about the connection between shooting and cowardice. He and other military authorities believed that it was necessary to restrain the desire of soldiers to open fire from a distance. The standard ammunition load was a rather meager 60 shots, and the sight on the Krnka rifle could be set at a distance of no more than 600 steps (for non-commissioned officers and soldiers of rifle battalions - 1200 steps). The soldier risked shooting all the ammunition before his unit reached the so-called decisive distances (800-300 steps), not to mention the fact that firing served as a convenient excuse not to move forward. Shooting training ended at a distance of 1500 steps - from this distance it was already difficult to distinguish a separate person, and in battle the fire was usually directed at the haze from enemy shots. Nevertheless, the temptation of long-range shooting was great, especially since the Turks actively used fire from long distances (from a distance of 2000 steps it became sensitive).

The Russian army also had its own apologists for long-range fire. One of them, Baron Zeddeler, called for the introduction of long-range shooting in the regulations as a special and effective form of combat fire. According to him, long-range shooting should have been carried out across areas, counting not on accuracy, but on the mass of lead released at a time. This type of shooting was occasionally used by the Russian troops, as well as another type of long-range fire - throw-over shots. Bullets fired in a long arc fell behind the earthworks, which the Turks loved so much. "Crossover, distant and, moreover, concentrated fire, perhaps, will again siege the shovel in its proper place", - believed Colonel V.F. Argamakov. After the war, most military authorities recognized long-range fire as a legal means in the hands of commanders, but called for caution in its use. The instruction for the training of the company and the battalion, published immediately after the war, required the use of it. "With extreme discretion" and claimed that the near fire still "The main value in battle belongs".

The experience of the 1877-1878 war rather confirmed this conclusion. In the Forward Detachment, which successfully operated beyond the Balkans in the initial period of the war, General I.V. Gurko forbade the infantry to shoot from great distances so as not to waste time. Colonel D.S. Naglovsky, who participated in the Gurko raids, enthusiastically described the actions of the 4th rifle brigade, which used to attack, "Not firing a single cartridge until they approach the Turks at half the distance of their rifle shot", that is, 600 steps. The Oryol regiment, which captured Mount Bedek near Shipka just at the time when Gurko's detachment was operating on the other side of the ridge, did not shoot for a more prosaic reason - "They were sorry for the cartridges, and there was little hope for their delivery due to the remoteness of Gabrova, where the ammunition boxes were located".

Was the lack of ammo really a serious problem? Statistics compiled by the artillery department show that in the 1877-1878 campaign, the regiment rarely fired more than 30 rounds of rounds per gun in one battle. However, this is only "the average temperature in the hospital": one company of the regiment could stand in reserve for the entire battle and not fire a single shot, while the other could be in a chain, conduct an intense firefight and experience an acute shortage of cartridges. Nevertheless, the statistics allow us to make some interesting observations. For example, it is striking that rifle battalions usually consumed much more ammunition than infantry regiments. This is explained both by the specialization in firing, and by the fact that the rifle battalions most often went ahead of the infantry regiments, engaged in battle, and therefore remained under fire longer. A kind of record was set by the 13th rifle battalion of the 4th rifle brigade, which used up 122 rounds per rifle in the battle at Shipka-Sheinov (December 27-28) - twice the standard ammunition load.

General M.D. Skobelev in the battle on August 30, 1877 near Plevna.
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Among the infantry regiments, the Vladimirsky regiment had the highest ammunition consumption in one case during the third assault on Plevna on August 30–31 - 91 shots per rifle (however, this is an exceptional case). For example, such an intense battle as the battle for Gorny Dubnyak on October 12 required the guards regiments to spend 25-30 rounds of rounds per rifle. The Life Guards Jäger Regiment, which attacked neighboring Telish on the same day, fired 61 shots on the barrel, which was significantly higher than the "normal level". During the first assault on Plevna on July 8, the Kostroma regiment was severely short of cartridges (the consumption was more than 56 shots per person), which was the reason for Colonel I.F. To Tutolmin write in the report:

"The Kostroma regiment retreated, firstly because there were no cartridges, and secondly because there was no reserve.".

Rapprochement with the enemy

Moving in dashes and hiding behind the folds of the terrain, the chain approached the enemy at a close distance, and the bulk of the battalion advanced behind it. Oddly enough, at a distance of 800-300 steps, the fire, as a rule, was felt less - many bullets were already flying over their heads. This meant that the Turks felt the proximity of the enemy, forgot to rearrange the sight on their rifles, shoot without aiming or even not sticking out from behind cover. Shooting from a rifle raised overhead was not uncommon for the Turkish infantry. The attackers, on the contrary, increased the fire, bringing it to the limit. According to peacetime calculations, from a distance of 400 steps, about half of the bullets should have hit the target.

Although the excitement also affected the attackers, the distance of 400-200 steps was considered decisive. At this stage of the battle, the "game of nerves" began, which most often determined the winner. It was possible to increase your chances of success by covering the flank of enemy positions, and this technique was actively used. So, the 4th rifle brigade carried out a partial coverage of the Turkish position in the battle at the village of Uflani at the southern foot of Shipka on July 4, 1877. Caught in the crossfire, the Turks wavered and began to retreat indiscriminately - the battle did not have to be brought to a bayonet fight.

Flank coverage had its own characteristics. It was not easy to get the chain involved in the shooting, to change the front. Therefore, more often the coverage was carried out by the arriving reinforcements, which were attached to the flank of the chain and occupied an enveloping position. The enemy could do the same - in this case, the tactical textbooks recommended not to pull the front of the chain back, but to send reinforcements, which should not be attached to the side of the threatened units, but stand on a ledge behind them. Then, already the enemy units, covering the Russian flank, fell under indirect or even longitudinal fire - as General Leer said, "Who bypasses, he himself is bypassed".

Reception of coverage and countering it by turning the front and sending reinforcements.
Dragomirov M.I. Tactics textbook. SPb., 1879

It was when the chain approached the enemy by 400-200 steps that the 1st and 2nd lines had the legal right to catch up with it, join the chain and intensify its fire, preparing, if necessary, for a bayonet strike. In practice, this often happened by itself, against the will of the bosses. The chain stopped, and the 1st and 2nd battle lines approached it, forming one or two dense masses of fighters (the second - if it was possible to observe the order of the offensive).

In the 1870s, it was believed that fire alone could not force a stubborn enemy to retreat. However, the Turks were not classified as stubborn opponents - indeed, they often retreated during shelling, and it did not come to a bayonet fight. For example, General Skobelev, when crossing the Imitli Pass in December 1877, used a rifle company armed with captured Peabody-Martini rifles, and she forced the Turks to leave their positions. Of course, the Russian troops also had to retreat - in such cases they suffered the most heavy losses. The soldiers lost their composure and rushed back headlong, the officers could no longer stop the confusion, and sometimes they themselves fled. During the unsuccessful second assault on Plevna on July 18, 1877, the Serpukhov regiment suffered terrible losses - the regiment commander, two of the three battalion commanders, many officers and lower ranks were killed or wounded. Only a handful of several dozen soldiers remained in the ranks, two officers and one banner - apparently, the Serpukhovites suffered most of the losses during the retreat.

Putting it all together, it is worth noting that the basis of successful infantry combat tactics was a reasonable balance between keeping fighters from fire and controlling the unit. Company commanders and other chiefs were required to have good tactical training, initiative, the ability to make decisions in extreme situations, and personal authority before the soldiers.

Sources and Literature:

"Military Collection", 1878-1900
Dragomirov MI Textbook of tactics. SPb., 1879
Collection of war stories. T. I-VI. SPb., 1879
Svechin A.A.Evolution of military art. M.-Zhukovsky, 2002
Collection of materials on the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Issue 5, 10, 88, 93
Argamakov V.F. Memories of the war of 1877-1878. // Journal of IRVIO. - Book 6, 7. - 1911
Prisnenko, lieutenant regiment. 1st Plevna and 19th Kostroma Infantry Regiment in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878. SPb., 1900
Sobolev L.N.The last battle for Shipka. Concerning the memoirs of V.V. Vereshchagin. 1877-1878 // Russian antiquity. - 1889. - No. 5
Vereshchagin V.V. Memoirs of an artist. Crossing the Balkans. Skobelev. 1877-1878 // Russian antiquity. - 1889. - No. 3

Heavy Infantry - GRENADERS

The grenadiers were considered the striking force of the infantry, and therefore the tallest and physically strongest recruits were traditionally selected for the grenadier units. Moreover, the total number of grenadiers united in large units in the Russian army was relatively small: only the Life Grenadier Regiment had 3 grenadier battalions, the rest of the grenadier regiments consisted of 1 grenadier and 2 musketeer battalions. In addition, to reinforce the conventional infantry units in each musketeer regiment (modeled on France), one grenadier company was introduced for each battalion. At the same time, grenadier companies of reserve battalions that did not participate in campaigns were reduced to grenadier battalions and brigades and followed the troops, being a combat reserve of infantry divisions and corps.
The grenadiers wore general army infantry uniforms; the insignia of this elite branch of the military were the metal emblems of the "three-fire grenada" on the shako and red shoulder straps. The grenadier regiments differed among themselves by the initial letters of the regiment's name, embroidered on the shoulder straps.

Grenadier of an infantry regiment in full dress and a grenadier - non-commissioned officer of a jaeger regiment in marching uniform

Medium Infantry - Musketeers

Soldiers of rifle units were called musketeers in the Russian army; muskets were the main type of Russian infantry. True, in 1811, the musketeer regiments were renamed infantry, but the companies retained the name of the musketeer, and throughout the war of 1812, the infantrymen in the Russian army, out of habit, continued to be called musketeers.
Musketeers wore general army uniforms, outwardly differing from other types of infantry only by the badge on the shako - "one fire grenada." At parades, the musketeers fastened tall black sultans to their shako, however, on the march, the sultans were removed so as not to interfere in battle. Among themselves, the infantry regiments were distinguished by multi-colored shoulder straps according to seniority in the division: red, white, yellow, green, blue, and planar; on all shoulder straps the number of the division, which included the regiment, was embroidered.

Musketeer of Odessa and non-commissioned officer of the Simbirsk infantry regiments in summer uniform, musketeer of the Butyrka infantry regiment in winter uniform

Light infantry - Jaeger

Jaegers were a type of light infantry that often operated in loose formation and fought at maximum distances. That is why some of the gamekeepers were supplied with rifled weapons (fittings), which were rare and expensive for that time. In the jaeger companies, people were usually selected of small stature, very mobile, good shooters: one of the most important tasks of the jaegers in battles was to "knock out" officers of enemy units with sniper fire. It was also welcomed if the recruit was familiar with life in the forest, since the rangers often had to go on reconnaissance, forward patrols, and attack the enemy's guard pickets.
The Jaeger uniform resembled the general army infantry uniform of the musketeers; the difference lay in the color of the pantaloons: unlike all other infantrymen who wore white pantaloons, the gamekeepers both in battle and in the parade wore green pantaloons. In addition, knapsack belts and rangers' sling were not whitewashed, as was done in other types of infantry, but were black.

Private of the 20th and non-commissioned officer of the 21st Jaeger regiments

Engineering Troops - PIONEERS

This "discreet" type of troops, which is often forgotten when it comes to the heroism of the infantry, played an extremely important role in the war. It was the pioneers who built (often under enemy fire) defensive fortifications, destroyed enemy fortresses, erected bridges and crossings, without which it is impossible to advance the army forward. Pioneers and sappers provided both the defense and the offensive of the troops; without them, the conduct of the war was virtually impossible. And for all that, the glory of victory always belonged to the infantry or cavalry, but not to the pioneer units ...
With the general army uniform, the pioneers of the Russian army wore not white, but gray pantaloons and a black instrument color with red piping. The grenades on the shako and the harnesses on the epaulettes were not gilded, but silver (pewter).

private and staff captain of the 1st pioneer regiment

Irregular Infantry - SECURITY

This type of troops at that time was not provided for by the charter of any of the armies of Europe. The militias appeared only in Russia, when the invasion posed a threat to the very existence of the state, when the entire Russian people rose to defend the Fatherland. The militia often had no normal weapons at all, they armed themselves with carpenter's axes, obsolete sabers and captured rifles taken from home. And, nevertheless, it was the militias who played the most important role in the Patriotic War, only they were able to raise the size of the Russian army in a short time to the level that could "crush" the numerous Napoleonic army of a new type. This came at a very high price: only 1 out of 10 militias who went to defend the Fatherland returned home ...
The militia's dress code was very varied; in fact, in every county, the organizer of the militia developed his own pattern of uniform, unlike the form of the militia of the neighboring county. However, often all these types of uniforms were based on the traditional Cossack caftan, which received different colors in different counties; common to the form of the militia was the so-called "militia cross" with the motto "For Faith and Fatherland", attached to the caps of the militia.

Ordinary militias and officers of the Petersburg and Moscow militias

GUARANTEES

The Russian partisan detachments of the Patriotic War of 1812 were of two types. Some were formed from army (mainly cavalry) units, were subordinate to the high command, carried out his assignments and wore their regimental uniforms, used standard weapons. Other partisan detachments were created spontaneously from peasants - residents of the occupied regions. The soldiers of these detachments wore their peasant clothes, and as weapons they used carpenter's axes, pitchforks, sickles and scythes, kitchen knives and clubs. Firearms in such detachments were at first very rare (mainly hunting rifles), but over time the partisans were armed with captured French rifles, pistols, sabers and broadswords; some especially strong units sometimes managed to get and use 1-2 guns in battle ...

The infantry is the main and most numerous type of troops. She can go everywhere, take everything and hold everything. The rest of the combat arms only help the infantry in its difficult and complex combat work.

The history of the Russian infantry begins with the history of our homeland.

In 911, Prince Oleg of Kiev was at war with Byzantium. Having destroyed the enemy army, he nailed his shield on the gates of Constantinople as a sign of victory. The success of this battle was decided by the infantry, which consisted of free citizens - residents of cities and villages.

The Russian infantry was distinguished by high discipline and courage, tenacity and endurance. In 1240, Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich with his squad and Novgorod infantry defeated the Swedes on the Neva. Armed with axes, the favorite weapon of the Russians, the Novgorod infantrymen with one blow split the iron helmets of the Swedes like clay pots. The Swedes, defeated by the Russians, fled and for a long time after that did not dare to go back to our land.

In the famous battle with the Livonian knights - crusaders on Lake Peipsi in 1242, the Russian infantry again showed what true military prowess means.

Under Tsar Ivan Vasilievich the Terrible, archers first appeared in Russia. They were divided into shelves.

The archers already had a certain form of clothing and were armed with a squeak (handgun), a reed (a crescent-shaped ax with a long handle) and a saber. They lived in special settlements, guarded the border towns, and in wartime - in battles - they were the mainstay of the battle formation of the Russian army.

In 1700, Peter the Great formed a regular army - 27 infantry regiments and 2 dragoon regiments. With this army, he began the fight against Sweden, which seized the Russian lands near Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland.

On November 19 of that memorable year for Russia, the enemy attacked our army, which was besieging Narva. Young Russian troops, who did not yet have combat experience, were defeated. But the new infantry of Peter, the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments - the former "amusing" ones - held their positions, repelling all the attacks of the Swedes. They then saved the army from complete defeat.

The infantry won the war with Sweden.

1702 - Russian infantry stormed and took the Nottenburg fortress. 1703 - Peter's infantry, boarded by fishing boats, attacked the ships Astril and Gedan. This attack turned into fierce hand-to-hand combat, which ended in complete victory for the Russians. 1708 - Russian infantry and artillerymen, together with cavalry, crush the Swedes at the village of Lesnoy, and, finally, on June 27, 1709 - a complete defeat of the enemy near Poltava.

Peter's infantry especially distinguished itself in the battle of Gangut.

Embarked on rowing ships - galleys - turned into sailors, the infantry crushed the enemy, taking even the Swedish admirals prisoner. Clinging to the gear, in hand-to-hand combat, side by side with Swedish ships, the Russians climbed onto the guns, not fearing death - neither from fire, nor from a bayonet, nor from water.

"The boarding was so brutally repaired that from the enemy's cannons several soldiers were not torn by cannonballs and buckshot, but by the spirit of gunpowder from the cannons ... it is truly impossible to describe the courage of ours, both the initial and the rank and file," Peter wrote then about the infantrymen.

The successors of their glory were the Suvorovites.

The great Russian commander Suvorov himself began his service as a "lower rank" - in the infantry, in the Semyonovsky Guards regiment. He believed that the study of military affairs should have begun with the infantry - the main and main branch of the army.

Suvorov's baptism of fire took place in the Seven Years War. The Russian infantry then distinguished itself in battles, inflicting one defeat after another on the Prussian army, which was considered the best in the world. Already in the battle at Zorndorf in 1758, the Prussian king Frederick was struck by the bravery of the Russian infantry. Divided into small groups by the Prussians' cavalry attack, the Russian grenadiers did not surrender or flee. Standing with their backs to each other, they bristled with bayonets like hedgehogs, and resisted to the last breath.

In 1759, Frederick was utterly defeated at Kunnersdorf. A year later, the elite Russian infantry stormed the Berlin bastions and then solemnly entered the surrendered German capital with fluttering banners. From that time on, Frederick no longer risked engaging in battles with the Russians, limiting himself to "maneuvering at a respectful distance."

Together with the courage, the skill of the Russian infantrymen grew.

In the Italian campaign of 1799, the huntsmen of General Bagration used one very original military technique.

Thanks to the help of our colleague from Moscow Maksim Bochkov, a well-known photographer among fans of historical reconstruction, we got acquainted with the wonderful club of historical reconstruction "Infanteria" from the Moscow region.

Members of the Infanteria club are reconstructing, thus paying tribute to the memory and respect of their fellow countrymen from the 209th Infantry Regiment of Bogorodsk, who fought in the First World War.

The regiment became part of the 1st Brigade of the 53rd Infantry Division of the XX Army Corps of the 10th Army of the Northern Front and fought in East Prussia.

During the retreat of the 10th Army from East Prussia in January-February 1915, the regiment covered parts of the 20th corps, was surrounded by the enemy in the Augustow forests and suffered huge losses. Only about 200 people made it to Grodno. Only a small number of the Bogorodians were taken prisoner by the Germans.

The regimental banner was rescued by the regimental priests Father Philotheus, thanks to which the regiment was re-staffed.

On April 30, 1915, the newly formed 209th Bogorodsky Infantry Regiment, which was staffed with officers and soldiers from other regions of the country, became part of the 34th Army Corps of the North-Western Front that was being formed. In 1916, a unit in the XXIII Army Corps took part in the Brusilov offensive in Volyn.

We have recorded several stories of the commander of the club, Andrei Bondar, about small arms from the First World War, which we will place in the series "Stories about Weapons". Andrey has a very impressive knowledge of the weapons of that time, we are sure it will be very informative.

But we will begin our stories with a demonstration of the uniform and equipment of the infantryman of the 209th Bogorodsky regiment during the First World War.

For those who do not like to watch the video (although it is worth it), we will partially duplicate it the old fashioned way.

The Russian infantryman, leaving for the battlefields of the First World War, was equipped no worse than his allies or opponents.

Let's start the review, naturally, with the form.

The underwear consisted of underpants and a shirt made of cotton fabric. The uniform, consisting of breeches and a tunic, was also sewn from cotton fabric, or, for regions with a colder climate, from cloth.

Equipment. What the Russian infantryman took with him on the campaign.

Naturally, the waist belt. On the belt were two cartridge pouches for 30 rounds in clips each. Plus an additional pouch for bullets in bulk. At the beginning of the war, each infantryman also had a mounted bandolier for 30 rounds, but in the second half of the war bandoliers were less common.

Sugar bag. There was usually placed dry rations, the so-called "knapsack stock", consisting of crackers, dried fish, corned beef, canned food.

Overcoat. From the so-called greatcoat cloth. In the warm season, in the skate. To prevent the ends of the overcoat from spreading, a bowler hat and two leather straps were used for fastening.

A raincoat-tent with a set of pegs and pegs was attached to the overcoat. It was necessary to have a rope about 3 meters long for fastening the assembled tent.

In the cold season, when a soldier was wearing an overcoat, a raincoat-tent with accessories was attached to a knapsack.

Satchel. Intended for storage and transportation of personal belongings of a soldier. A set of linen, footcloths, windings, personal hygiene items, a supply of tobacco.

Each soldier was entitled to a small infantry shovel. Which was later called a sapper, but that is the correct name. The cover for attaching the scapula was originally leather; over time, it began to be made from substitutes, tarpaulin or canvas.

Flask. Glass or aluminum, always in a cloth case. The cover played the role of a thermal insulator, and made it possible not to heat up the liquid in the heat, or vice versa, not to freeze quickly in the cold.

The flask was accompanied by an aluminum mane (cup) for drinking, for example, alcoholic beverages. The Russian soldier was entitled to a glass of alcohol 10 times a year, on major holidays. So basically the cup was meant for hot tea.

Cap. The standard headdress of the Russian infantryman was made either from cloth or from cotton fabric, depending on the climatic conditions. A steel spring was originally inserted into the cap, but it often broke, so it was not forbidden to wear a cap without a spring.

In winter, the soldier was entitled to a sheepskin hat and a camel's hood.

Shoulder straps. The shoulder straps of the Russian soldier were field (green) and ordinary, red. The guards regiments wore shoulder straps, edged with the "corporate" color of the regiment. The regiment number was usually applied on the shoulder straps.

Boots. Boots in the Russian imperial army were made of leather.

As the war progressed, cheaper boots with windings came into use. Winter boots were boots.

The last piece in a soldier's outfit was. In our case, the Mosin rifle of the 1891 model. And a bayonet. The bayonet always had to be sided.

The rifles were equipped with a belt, which, however, was not intended to be worn permanently. According to the regulations, the rifle was worn in the shoulder position.

We will tell about the Mosin rifle itself and its rivals in the following articles, prepared with the participation of the Infanteria club.