What do the missile forces do in the army? How do they serve in the missile forces?

On December 17, the Strategic Missile Forces celebrate the 55th anniversary of its founding. According to the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General Sergei Karakaev, the missilemen are able to reliably carry out assigned combat missions in any situation. Read about service in the missile forces today and what awaits the Strategic Missile Forces military personnel in the future in our material.

There are 400 ballistic missiles from the Strategic Missile Forces group on combat duty in Russia every day. “Approximately two-thirds of the nuclear warheads of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are concentrated there.” — said the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General Sergei Karakaev.

In total, about 400 missiles with warheads assigned to them are on combat duty.

“In 2014, we continued to re-equip the group with the latest missile systems, which have increased capabilities to overcome the existing and future missile defenses,” Karakaev said. According to him, the troops received 16 RK YaRS intercontinental ballistic missiles. 12 of them are mobile ground-based, and 4 are mine-based. As part of the rearmament, the personnel of three missile regiments underwent retraining for new missile systems.

In addition to new missile systems, the Strategic Missile Forces are equipped with modern digital information transmission technologies, advanced electronic warfare systems and camouflage systems.

Active rearmament will make it possible by 2015 to significantly increase the share of modern missile systems, both mobile and stationary, in the Strategic Missile Forces grouping. “By the end of December this year, the share of modern missile systems will be about 50%,” Karakaev said.

It is planned to create the latest combat railway missile system (BZHRK) “Barguzin”.

According to Karakaev, it will be developed at enterprises exclusively of the domestic military-industrial complex and will become the embodiment of “the most advanced achievements of our military rocket science.”

Currently, components and assemblies of the latest heavy liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile "Sarmat" are being tested. It is planned that the rocket will be created by 2020.

Since July 2014, the “State Missile Center named after Academician V.P. Makeev” has been extending the service life of the Voevoda missile system.

Ukrainian enterprises were withdrawn from industrial cooperation, which ensured the maintenance of the complex in technical readiness.

In 2015, the Strategic Missile Forces will increase the number of combat training and test launches of missiles. “14 launches are planned for 2015, providing for flight testing of promising weapons and monitoring the technical readiness of missile systems put into service,” Karakaev said. In 2014, 8 launches were carried out, two more are planned for December.

Military units of the Strategic Missile Forces will not be formed on the territory of Crimea.

According to Karakaev, this is not necessary: ​​“the firing range of modern ballistic missiles allows them to hit targets anywhere in the world, without approaching the borders of Russia.”

More than 98% of missile officers have higher education, while the average age of Strategic Missile Forces servicemen in 2014 was 31 years.

Interest in serving in the Strategic Missile Forces does not wane, as evidenced by the high “competition bar.” “This year, 4.3 thousand candidates were selected, only 2.7 thousand of the best of them received contracts,” says Karakaev.

Today, more than 40% of military positions of privates and sergeants are staffed by contract servicemen.

It is planned that in 2015 the number of contract soldiers in the Strategic Missile Forces will increase to 50%.

In 2014, command post exercises of the missile forces with the Tatishchev and Barnaul missile formations took place in the Altai Territory, during which more than 4,000 military personnel and about 400 units of military equipment were involved.

Particular attention was paid to the issues of withdrawing units and subunits of the Strategic Missile Forces from the attacks of a mock enemy and countering modern and promising means of air attack, as well as warning about the threat of their use in cooperation with formations and units of the Central Military District.

In 2014, about 800 military personnel received permanent housing, and another 206 received housing through housing subsidies.

Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces) are separate branch of the military Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. They represent the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces - the Strategic Nuclear Forces, or the so-called “nuclear triad”, which includes, in addition to the Strategic Missile Forces, strategic aviation and naval strategic forces. Designed for nuclear deterrence of possible aggression and destruction by group or massive nuclear missile strikes of the enemy’s strategic targets, which form the basis of its military and economic potential. They can be used independently or in interaction with other components of strategic nuclear forces.

The Strategic Missile Forces are troops of constant combat readiness. The basis of their weapons are ground-based ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) equipped with warheads with nuclear warheads. Based on the method of basing, ICBMs are divided into:

• mine;
• mobile (ground) based.

Currently, only three countries in the world (Russia, the USA and China) have a full-fledged nuclear triad, that is, ground, air and sea components of strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, only Russia has such a unique structure as the Strategic Missile Forces in its armed forces.

In the United States, unlike the Russian Federation, intercontinental ballistic missile formations are part of the air force. The ground and air components of the American nuclear triad are subordinated to a single structure - the Global Strike Command within the US Air Force. The American analogue of the Strategic Missile Forces is the 20th Air Force of the Global Strike Command, consisting of three missile wings armed with silo-based Minuteman-3 ICBMs. Unlike the Strategic Missile Forces, American ground-based strategic forces do not have mobile-based ICBMs. The air component of the American strategic nuclear forces includes the 8th Air Force of the Global Strike Command, armed with B-52H strategic bombers Stratofortress and B-2 Spirit.

Before considering the current state of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, let us turn to the history of this type of troops and briefly consider the main milestones in the creation and development of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces.

Strategic Missile Forces of the USSR: HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND WEAPONS

The development of strategic missile weapons in the USSR began in the early post-war years. The basis for the creation of the first Soviet ballistic missiles was captured German V-2 missiles.

In 1947, construction began on the 4th Central State Training Ground Kapustin Yar, where a special-purpose brigade of the Supreme High Command Reserve (Armor RVGK) arrived under the command of Major General of Artillery A.F. Tveretsky with elements of V-2 missiles. In the same year, test launches of German missiles began, and a year later, on October 10, 1948, the first Soviet ballistic missile R-1 was launched - a copy of the V-2, assembled from Soviet-made units.

Between 1950 and 1955 As part of the artillery of the RVGK, six more armored units were formed (since 1953 - engineering brigades of the RVGK), armed with missiles R-1 and R-2. These missiles had a range of 270 and 600 km, respectively, and were equipped with conventional (non-nuclear) warheads. Special-purpose brigades armed with missiles were theoretically intended to destroy large military, military-industrial and administrative facilities of important strategic or operational importance, but their actual combat value was low due to the low characteristics of missile weapons. It took 6 hours to prepare the rocket for launch; the fueled rocket could not be stored - it had to be launched within 15 minutes or the fuel had to be drained and then the rocket had to be prepared for re-launch for at least a day. The brigade could fire 24-36 missiles per knock. The accuracy of the R-1 and R-2 missiles was extremely low: the CEP (circular probabilistic deviation) was 1.25 km, as a result of which it was possible to fire at objects with an area of ​​at least 8 square meters. km. However, a missile with a non-nuclear warhead ensured the complete destruction of urban buildings within a radius of only 25 m, which made the use of R-1 and R-2 ineffective in real combat conditions. In addition, the numerous equipment of the starting battery were very vulnerable to artillery fire and air attack. Taking into account all of the above, the first Soviet missile brigades had minimal combat value, representing rather training and testing centers for training specialists and testing missile technologies. To turn them into a real fighting force, much more advanced missile weapons were required.

In the second half of the 50s. MRBMs (medium-range ballistic missiles) R-5 and R-12 with flight ranges of 1200 and 2080 km, respectively, as well as ICBMs R-7 and R-7A are being adopted.

Single stage tactical ballistic missile R-5 became the first truly combat Soviet missile. The increase in the firing range resulted in its extremely low accuracy: the COE was 5 km, which made the use of this missile with a conventional warhead pointless. Therefore, a nuclear warhead with a yield of 80 kilotons was created for it. Its modification, the R-5M, carried a nuclear warhead with a yield of 1 megaton. R-5M missiles were in service with six engineering brigades of the RVGK and significantly increased the firepower of the Soviet Army. However, their range of 1200 km was clearly insufficient for a strategic confrontation with the United States. In order to “cover” the territory controlled by NATO as much as possible, two divisions of the 72nd Engineering Brigade with four R-5M missiles were moved in strict secrecy to the territory of the GDR, after which the south-eastern part of Great Britain was within their reach.

Here we should make a short digression in order to understand the further development paths of Soviet ballistic missiles. The fact is that a split arose among Soviet designers. Outstanding rocketry designer S.P. Korolev was a supporter of liquid rockets, where liquid oxygen was used as an oxidizer. The disadvantage of such missiles was discussed above: they could not be stored in a fueled state for any long period of time. At the same time, M.K. Yangel, Korolev's deputy, advocated the use of nitric acid as an oxidizer, which made it possible to keep the rocket fueled and ready for launch for quite a long time.

Ultimately, this dispute led to the creation of two independent design bureaus. Yangel and his team founded the Special Design Bureau No. 584 at the rocket plant under construction in Dnepropetrovsk (Yuzhmash). Here he develops IRBM R-12, which was put into service in 1959. This missile had a CEP of 5 km and was equipped with a nuclear warhead with a capacity of 2.3 Mt. Given the relatively short range of the R-12, its undeniable advantage was the use of stored fuel components and the ability to store it at the required level of combat readiness - from No. 4 to No. 1. In this case, the preparation time for launch ranged from 3 hours 25 minutes to 30 minutes. Looking ahead, let's say that the R-12 missile has become a “long-liver” of the Soviet missile forces. In 1986, 112 R-12 launchers were still in service. Their complete removal of weapons took place only in the late 80s as part of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles.

While Yangel was creating the R-12, Korolev was developing the R-7 rocket. Introduced into service in 1960, this ICBM with a range of 8,000 km became the first Soviet ballistic missile capable of reaching US territory. However, a serious drawback of the R-7 was the long refueling time - 12 hours. This required 400 tons of liquid oxygen, and the fueled rocket could be stored for no more than 8 hours. Thus, the R-7 was well suited for a pre-emptive strike against the enemy, but did not provide the opportunity to carry out a retaliatory launch. For this reason, the maximum number of deployed R-7 launchers never exceeded four, and by 1968 all R-7s were withdrawn from service, making way for new generation missiles.

In 1958, the missile forces were divided in accordance with their tasks: engineering brigades of the RVGK, armed with operational-tactical missiles R-11 and R-11M, were transferred to the Ground Forces, and intercontinental ballistic missiles R-7 were part of the first ICBM formation under conditional called “Object “Angara”.

Creation of the Strategic Missile Forces

Thus, by the end of the 50s. In the USSR, missile samples with sufficient combat effectiveness were created and put into mass production. There is an urgent need to create centralized leadership of all strategic missile forces.

On December 17, 1959 No. 1384-615, a top-secret resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers “On the establishment of the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Missile Forces within the Armed Forces of the USSR” created an independent branch of the Armed Forces - the Strategic Missile Forces. Currently, December 17 is celebrated as Strategic Missile Forces Day .

Resolution No. 1384-615 prescribed that the Strategic Missile Forces should have (medium-range) missile brigades of three to four regiments and missile divisions of five to six regiments, as well as ICBM brigades consisting of six to eight launches.

The formation of directorates and services of the Strategic Missile Forces begins. On December 31, 1959, the following were formed: the Main Headquarters of the Missile Forces, the Central Command Post with a communications center and a computer center, the Main Directorate of Missile Weapons, the Combat Training Directorate, and other services. The first commander of the USSR Strategic Missile Forces was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense - Chief Marshal of Artillery M.I. Nedelin.

Within a short time after the official creation of the Strategic Missile Forces, numerous missile regiments and divisions began to appear on the territory of the USSR. Tank, artillery and aviation units were hastily transferred to the missile forces. They handed over their previous weapons and quickly mastered new missile technology. Thus, two directorates of the Long-Range Aviation air armies were transferred to the Strategic Missile Forces, which served as the basis for the deployment of missile armies, three directorates of air divisions, 17 engineering regiments of the RGK (they were reorganized into missile divisions and brigades) and many other units and formations.

By 1960, 10 missile divisions were deployed as part of the Strategic Missile Forces, based in the western part of the Union and the Far East:

1) 19th Missile Zaporozhye Red Banner Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov Division, headquarters in the city of Khmelnitsky (Ukrainian SSR);

2) 23rd Guards Rocket Oryol-Berlin Red Banner Division - headquarters in the city of Valga;

3) 24th Guards Rocket Gomel Order of Lenin Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky Division - Gvardeysk in the Kaliningrad region;

4) 29th Guards Rocket Vitebsk Order of Lenin Red Banner Division - Siauliai (Lithuanian SSR);

5) 31st Guards Rocket Bryansk-Berlin Red Banner Division - Pruzhany (BSSR);

6) 32nd missile Kherson Red Banner Division - Postavy (BSSR);

7) 33rd Guards Missile Svirskaya Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Alexander Nevsky Division - Mozyr (BSSR);

8) Guards Rocket Sevastopol Division - Lutsk (Ukrainian SSR);

9) missile division - Kolomyia (Ukrainian SSR);

10) missile division - Ussuriysk.

All these divisions were armed with R-12 missiles, the total number of which in 1960 was 172 units, but a year later there were 373. Now all of Western Europe and Japan were under the gun of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces.

The only division armed with R-7 and R-7A intercontinental missiles was based in Plesetsk.

In IRBM formations, the main combat unit was the missile division (RDN); in ICBM formations, the missile regiment (RP).

By 1966, the number of R-12 MRBMs in service with the Soviet missile forces reached 572 - this was the maximum, after which a gradual decline began. However, the range of the R-12 was still not very large. The task of creating a massive rocket capable of “reaching” US territory has still not been solved.

By 1958, Soviet chemists had developed a new promising fuel - heptyl. This substance was extremely toxic, but at the same time it was effective as a fuel, and most importantly, long-lasting. Heptyl rockets could be kept in combat condition for years.

In 1958, Yangel began designing a rocket R-14, which was put into service in 1961. The flight range of the new missile, equipped with a 2 Mt warhead, was 4,500 km. Now the USSR Strategic Missile Forces could freely keep all of Western Europe in their sights.

However, the R-14, like the R-12, was extremely vulnerable in an open launch position. There was an urgent need to increase the survivability of missiles. A simple, albeit labor-intensive solution was found - to place strategic missiles in silos. This is how silo-based missile launchers R-12U “Dvina” and R-14U “Chusovaya” appeared. The Dvina launch position was a rectangle measuring 70 by 80 m, with launch silos located in the corners and a command post underground. “Chusovaya” had the shape of a right triangle with sides of 70 and 80 m, with launch shafts on the tops.

Despite the enormous progress in the development of missile technology achieved in the 50s and the first half of the 60s, the Soviet Union was still unable to launch a full-fledged nuclear missile strike on American territory. An attempt in 1962 to place Soviet R-12 and R-14 missiles in Cuba, closer to the US borders, ended in an acute confrontation known as the “Cubby Crisis”. There was a real threat of World War III. The USSR was forced to retreat and remove its strategic missiles from Cuba.

At the same time, by 1962, the United States was armed with three hundred(!) intercontinental ballistic missiles Atlas, Titan-1 and Minuteman-1 with a maximum deviation from the target of 3 kilometers, equipped with nuclear warheads with a capacity of 3 Mt. And the Titan-2 missile, adopted in 1962, was equipped with a thermonuclear warhead with a capacity of 10 megatons, and had a maximum deviation of only 2.5 km. And this is not counting the huge fleet of strategic bombers (1,700 aircraft) and 160 Polaris SLBMs on 10 George Washington-class submarines. The superiority of the United States over the USSR in the field of strategic weapons was simply overwhelming!

There was an urgent need to close the gap. Since 1959, the development of a two-stage ICBM R-16. Unfortunately, the haste had tragic consequences in the form of a series of accidents and disasters. The largest of them was the fire at Baikonur on October 24, 1960, which arose as a result of a gross violation of safety regulations (engineers and rocket scientists tried to troubleshoot an electrical circuit on a loaded R-16 rocket). As a result, the rocket exploded, spreading rocket fuel and nitric acid across the launch pad. 126 people were killed, including the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Marshal Nedelin. Yangel miraculously survived, as a few minutes before the disaster he went behind the bunker to smoke.

However, work on the R-16 continued, and by the end of 1961, the first three missile regiments were prepared to go on combat duty. In parallel with the development of R-16 missiles, silo launchers for them were created. The launch complex, designated Sheksna-V, consisted of three silos located in one line at a distance of several tens of meters, an underground command post and fuel and oxidizer storage facilities (the missiles were refueled immediately before launch).

In 1962, there were 50 R-16 missiles in service, and by 1965 their number in the Strategic Missile Forces reached its maximum - 202 silo-based missile launchers R-16U in several basing areas.

The R-16 became the first mass-produced Soviet missile, the flight range of which (11,500-13,000 km) made it possible to hit targets in the United States. It became the base missile for creating a group of intercontinental missiles of the Strategic Missile Forces. True, its accuracy was low - the maximum deviation was 10 km, but it was compensated by a powerful warhead - 3-10 Mt.

Around the same time, Korolev was developing a new oxygen ICBM R-9. Its testing dragged on until 1964 (although the first combat systems were deployed in 1963). Despite the fact that Korolev himself considered his missile to be significantly superior to the R-16 (the R-9 was much more accurate, had a range of 12,500-16,000 km and a powerful warhead of 5-10 Mt with half the weight), it was not intended for widespread use. Only 29 R-9A missiles entered service with the Strategic Missile Forces, which served until the mid-1970s. After the R-9, oxygen rockets were not created in the Soviet Union.

Although the R-16 missiles were adopted and built in significant numbers, they were too large and expensive to become truly widespread. Rocket designer Academician V.N. Chelomey proposed his solution - a light “universal” rocket UR-100. It could be used both as an ICBM and in the Taran missile defense system. The UR-100 was put into service in 1966, and in 1972 its modifications with improved tactical and technical characteristics - UR-100M and UR-100UTTH - were put into service.

UR-100 (according to NATO classification - SS-11) became the most massive missile ever adopted by the USSR Strategic Missile Forces. From 1966 to 1972 990 UR-100 and UR-100M missiles were put on combat duty. The launch range of a missile with a light warhead with a power of 0.5 Mt was 10,600 km, and with a heavy warhead with a power of 1.1 Mt - 5,000 km. The great advantage of the UR-100 was that in a fueled state it could be stored for the entire period of its being on combat duty - 10 years. The time from receiving the command to the launch was about three minutes, which was required to spin up the rocket's gyroscopes. The massive deployment of relatively cheap UR-100 missiles was the Soviet response to the American Minutemen.

In 1963, a decision was made that would determine the shape of the Strategic Missile Forces for many years to come: to begin the construction of silo launchers (silos) for a single launch. Throughout the entire territory of the USSR, from the Carpathians to the Far East, a grandiose construction of new positional areas for basing ICBMs began, in which 350 thousand people were involved. The construction of a single launch silo was a labor-intensive and expensive process, but such a launcher was much more resistant to nuclear strikes. The silo launchers were tested by real nuclear explosions and showed high stability: all systems and fortifications remained intact and capable of combat operation.

In parallel with the development of the UR-100 light ICBM, the Yangel Design Bureau began developing the complex R-36 with heavy class ICBMs. Its main task was considered to be the destruction of highly protected small-sized targets on US territory, such as ICBM launchers, command posts, nuclear missile submarine bases, etc. Just like other Soviet ICBMs of that time, the R-36 was not highly accurate, which they tried to compensate for with a 10 Mt warhead. In 1967, the heavy R-36 ICBM was adopted by the Strategic Missile Forces, by which time 72 missiles had already been deployed, and by 1970 - 258.

The R-36 launcher was a huge structure: depth - 41 m, diameter - 8 m. Therefore, they were placed in uninhabited areas: Krasnoyarsk Territory, Orenburg and Chelyabinsk regions, Kazakhstan. Units armed with the P-36 became part of the Orenburg Missile Corps, which was later transformed into a missile army.

Strategic Missile Forces in the 60s - 70s.

The rapid growth of the Soviet ballistic missile force was accompanied by numerous changes in the structure of the Strategic Missile Forces. The deployment of increasing numbers of ICBM launchers and medium-range missiles required reliable control, warning and communication systems. In a potential nuclear conflict, time was counted in seconds - the missiles had to leave the silos before the enemy destroyed them. In addition, silo launchers required complex maintenance and reliable security. ICBM position areas occupied vast deserted spaces. The launchers were located at a considerable distance from each other so that they were more difficult to destroy with one blow. Maintenance of the missiles required a large number of personnel and powerful infrastructure.

The Strategic Missile Forces became, in essence, a closed “state within a state.” Secret cities were built for rocket scientists that were not listed on maps. Their existence, like everything connected with the Strategic Missile Forces, was a state secret, and only railway lines that went to supposedly deserted places could indicate the location of secret objects. The Strategic Missile Forces were in charge not only of military facilities, but also of their own factories, state farms, forestries, railways and roads.

The organizational structure of the Strategic Missile Forces began to take shape with the transfer to their composition of two air armies of Long-Range Aviation, on the basis of which two missile armies were formed, armed with medium-range missiles R-12 and R-14. They were placed in the western regions of the USSR.

The headquarters of the 43rd Missile Army was located in Vinnitsa (Ukrainian SSR). Initially, it consisted of three missile divisions and two brigades, later - 10 divisions stationed in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The headquarters of the 50th Army was located in Smolensk.

The deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles required the creation of a large number of new missile formations. In 1961, five separate missile corps with headquarters in Vladimir, Kirov, Omsk, Khabarovsk and Chita appeared as part of the Strategic Missile Forces (in addition to the two armies above). In 1965, two more separate missile corps were formed with headquarters in Orenburg and Dzhambul, and the Orenburg corps received heavy R-36 ICBMs, which represented the main striking force of the Strategic Missile Forces of that time.

Subsequently, the number of new missile divisions created grew into the dozens, which required increasing the number of management structures of the Strategic Missile Forces.

By 1970, 26 ICBM divisions and 11 RSD divisions were stationed on the territory of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. By this time, there was a need for a large-scale reorganization of the Strategic Missile Forces, which was done in the first half of 1970. Three separate missile corps, Khabarovsk, Dzhambul and Kirov, were disbanded, and the remaining four were deployed into missile armies.

• 27th Guards Rocket Vitebsk Red Banner Army (headquarters in Vladimir);
• 31st Rocket Army (headquarters in Orenburg);
• 33rd Guards Missile Berislav-Khingan Twice Red Banner Army (headquarters in Omsk);
• 43rd Rocket Red Banner Army (headquarters in Vinnitsa);
• 50th Rocket Red Banner Army (headquarters in Smolensk);
• 53rd Missile Army (headquarters in Chita).

Heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles R-16U were in service with missile divisions stationed in Bersheti (52nd Missile Division), Bolog (7th Guards RD), Nizhny Tagil (42nd RD), Yoshkar-Ola (14th RD ), Novosibirsk, Shadrinsk and Yurye (8th RD).

Korolev R-9A missiles were in silos in the vicinity of Omsk and Tyumen.

The most popular light ICBM, the UR-100, was deployed throughout the Soviet Union. It was adopted by divisions whose commands were located in Bersheti (52nd RD), Bologoy (7th RD), Gladkaya (Krasnoyarsk Territory), Drovyanaya (4th RD) and Yasnaya Chita region, Kozelsk (28th RD), Kostroma and Svobodny (27th RD) of the Amur region, Tatishchev (60th RD), Teykovo (54th RD), Pervomaisky (46th RD) and Khmelnitsky (19th RD).

Heavy R-36 ICBMs were adopted by five divisions of the 31st Orenburg Missile Army - the 13th Missile Division in Dombarovsky (Yasnaya), the 38th in Zhangiz-Tobe, the 57th in Derzhavinsk, the 59th in Kartaly, 62- I'm in Uzhur.

After the death in 1972 of Marshal N.I. Krylov, the Strategic Missile Forces was headed by Chief Marshal of Artillery V.F. Tolubko, who since 1960 was the first deputy commander of the missile forces. He remained in this position for 13 years, until 1985.

Despite the atmosphere of strict secrecy surrounding the Strategic Missile Forces, it was hardly possible to conceal the location of the launchers and garrisons of the Soviet missile forces from the Americans. Space, air and electronic reconnaissance tools allowed them to track and establish the exact coordinates of all strategic objects of interest. Western intelligence agencies sought to obtain information about Soviet missiles through intelligence. In the early 1960s. GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, working undercover in England, gave the American and British intelligence services a huge amount of information about Soviet strategic missiles, in particular, those then stationed in Cuba.

SALT I Treaty

In the early 70s. both sides of the nuclear missile confrontation - the USSR and the USA - possessed such large nuclear arsenals that their further quantitative buildup lost sense. Why be able to destroy your opponent twenty times if once is enough?

On May 26, 1972, in Moscow, Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee Brezhnev and US President Nixon signed two important documents: the “Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems” and the “Temporary Agreement on Certain Measures in the Field of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” as well as a number of annexes to them.

For the first time in history, rivals in a major geopolitical confrontation were able to agree on limiting their nuclear missile arsenals. The temporary agreement, which later became known as the SALT-1 Treaty, provided for a mutual renunciation of the construction of new intercontinental ballistic missile silos, as well as the replacement of light and obsolete ICBMs with heavy modern ones. It was allowed to complete the construction of stationary launchers that were already under active construction. At the time of signing the SALT-1 Treaty, the number of Soviet silos was 1,526 units (for the USA - 1,054). In 1974, after the completion of the mines, the number of deployed Soviet ICBMs increased to 1,582, reaching an all-time high.

At the same time, the number of sea-based nuclear missiles was limited. The USSR was allowed to have no more than 950 SLBM launchers and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines, the USA - no more than 710 SLBM launchers and 44 submarines, respectively.

Third generation of strategic missiles

The conclusion of the SALT I Treaty was only a short respite in the nuclear missile race. Formally, the Soviet Union now surpassed the United States in the number of ICBMs by almost one and a half times. But the Americans negated this advantage due to their new technologies.

In the early 70s. Minuteman ICBMs with multiple independently targetable warheads are entering service. One such missile could hit three targets. By 1975, there were already 550 Minutemen in service, equipped with multiple warheads.

The USSR began to urgently develop an adequate response to the new American missiles. Back in 1971, the USSR adopted ICBM UR-100K, which could carry three dispersive warheads of 350 Kt each. In 1974, another modification of the UR-100 was put into service - UR-100U, which also carried three 350 Kt dispersive warheads. They did not yet have individual targeting of warheads, and therefore could not be considered an adequate response to the Minutemen.

Less than a year later, the USSR Strategic Missile Forces received a missile UR-100N(developed by Chelomey Design Bureau), equipped with six independently targetable multiple warheads with a capacity of 750 Kt each. By 1984, the UR-100N ICBMs were in service with four divisions located in Pervomaisk (90 silos), Tatishchevo (110 silos), Kozelsk (70 silos), Khmelnitsky (90 silos) - a total of 360 units.

In the same 1975, the Strategic Missile Forces received two more new ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads: MR-UR-100(developed by KB Yangel) and the famous “Satan” - R-36M(aka RS-20A, and according to NATO classification - SS-18Mod 1,2,3 Satan).

This ICBM has long been the main strike force of the Strategic Missile Forces. The Americans did not have missiles with such combat power. R-36M missiles were equipped with a multiple warhead with 10 individual guidance units of 750 Kt each. They were located in huge shafts with a diameter of 6 m and a depth of 40 m. In subsequent years, the Satan missiles were repeatedly modernized: its variants were adopted: R-36MU and R-36 UTTH.

Fourth generation missiles

Missile complex R-36M2 "Voevoda"(according to NATO classification - SS-18 Mod.5/Mod.6) became a further development of the “Satan”. It was put into service in 1988 and, compared to its predecessors, it was able to overcome the missile defense system of a potential enemy and deliver a guaranteed retaliatory strike against the enemy even in conditions of repeated nuclear impact on the positional area. This was achieved by increasing the survivability of missiles to the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion both while in the silo and in flight. Each 15A18M missile could technically carry up to 36 warheads, but according to the SALT-2 treaty, no more than 10 warheads were allowed on one missile. However, a strike with just eight to ten Voyevoda missiles ensured the destruction of 80% of the US industrial potential.

Other performance characteristics were also significantly improved: the accuracy of the missile increased by 1.3 times, the preparation time for launch was reduced by 2 times, the autonomy duration was increased by 3 times, etc.

The R-36M2 is the most powerful strategic missile system in service with the USSR Strategic Missile Forces. Currently, “Voevoda” continues to serve in the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Federation. According to a statement by the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General S. Karakaev, made in 2010, this complex is planned to remain in service until 2026, until a new promising ICBM is put into service.

Since the 60s. In the USSR, attempts were made to create mobile ground-based missile systems, the invulnerability of which would be ensured by constantly changing location. This is how the Temp-2S mobile missile system appeared. In 1976, the first two missile regiments, each with six launchers, went on combat duty. Later, on the basis of the Temp-2S complex, the Nadiradze Design Bureau created the Pioneer medium-range ballistic missile, known as the SS-20.

For a long time, RSDs remained “in the shadow” of intercontinental ballistic missiles, but since the 70s. their importance increased due to the restrictions imposed by Soviet-American treaties on the development of ICBMs. Development of the complex "Pioneer" began in 1971, and in 1974 the first launch of this rocket was made from the Kapustin Yar test site.

Self-propelled units for the complex were created on the basis of the six-axle MAZ-547A chassis, produced by the Barrikady plant in Volgograd. The weight of the self-propelled unit with the transport and launch container was 83 tons.

The 15Zh45 rocket of the Pioneer complex was a two-stage solid propellant. Its flight range was 4,500 km, the COE was 1.3 km, and the launch readiness time was up to 2 minutes. The missile was equipped with three individually targeted warheads of 150 Kt each.

The deployment of the Pioneer complexes proceeded quickly. In 1976, the Strategic Missile Forces received the first 18 mobile launchers, a year later 51 installations were already in service, and in 1981, 297 complexes were already on combat duty. Three Pioneer divisions were stationed in Ukraine and Belarus, and four more in the Asian part of the USSR. The Pioneer complexes were used to arm formations that were previously armed with R-12 and R-14 RSDs.

At that time, the USSR was preparing not only for confrontation with NATO - there were also tense relations with China. Therefore, in the late 1970s. "Pioneer" regiments appeared near the Chinese border - in Siberia and Transbaikalia.

The active deployment of Pioneer missile systems has caused serious concern among the leadership of NATO countries. At the same time, the Soviet leadership stated that the Pioneers do not affect the balance of power in Europe, since they are being adopted instead of the R-12 and R-14 missiles. The Americans also deployed their Pershing 2 medium-range missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles in Europe. All this marked a new stage in the nuclear missile race. The nervousness on both sides about intermediate-range missiles was understandable. After all, their danger lay in their proximity to potential targets: the flight time was only 5-10 minutes, which did not give them a chance to react in the event of a sudden attack.

In 1983, the USSR deployed missile systems in Czechoslovakia and the GDR "Temp-S". The number of Pioneer complexes continued to grow and by 1985 reached its maximum - 405 units, and the total number of 15Zh45 missiles on combat duty and in the arsenals of the Strategic Missile Forces amounted to 650 units.

With the coming to power of M.S. Gorbachev, the situation in the field of nuclear missile confrontation between the USSR and the USA changed radically. Unexpectedly for everyone, in 1987 Gorbachev and Reagan signed an agreement on the elimination of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles. This was an unprecedented step: while previous treaties only limited the buildup of ICBMs, here we were talking about the elimination of an entire class of weapons on both sides.

Subsequently, many high-ranking Soviet military figures announced the unfavorable terms of this agreement for the USSR, calling Gorbachev’s actions a betrayal. Indeed, the USSR had to destroy more than twice as many missiles as the United States. In addition to the Pioneers, the operational-tactical missile systems Temp-S (135 installations, 726 missiles), Oka (102 installations, 239 missiles) and the latest RK-55 cruise missile installations (not yet deployed) were also eliminated. By June 12, 1991, the process of destroying these missile systems was completely completed. Some of the missiles were destroyed by launching them into the Pacific Ocean, while the rest were blown up after the nuclear warheads were dismantled.

Some of the missile formations armed with medium-range missiles had to be disbanded, and the rest received mobile Topol ICBMs.

SALT II Treaty

The signing of the SALT-1 treaty gave hope that the nuclear missile confrontation between the USSR and the USA would finally end. From 1974 to 1979, negotiations on further limiting the strategic nuclear arsenals of the parties took place with varying success. The final version of the treaty, agreed upon in 1979, provided for each party the opportunity to have no more than 2,250 strategic carriers (ICBMs and strategic bombers with cruise missiles), of which no more than 1,320 carriers with multiple warheads. Strategic bombers were equated to intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRVs. It was allowed to have no more than 1,200 units of land-based and sea-based missiles with MIRVs, of which no more than 820 units were ground-based ICBMs.

It is interesting that during the negotiations, “pseudonyms” were invented for all domestic missiles. The true names of the missiles were a military secret, but they still had to be designated somehow. Later, pseudonyms for ICBMs, along with their original names, began to appear in domestic sources. This creates some confusion, so let's be clear:

• UR-100K – RS-10;
• RT-2P – RS-12;
• "Topol" - RS-12M;
• "Temp-2S" - RS-14;
• MR-UR-100 – RS-16;
• UR-100N – RS-18;
• R-36 – RS-20.

A new aggravation of Soviet-American relations in the late 1970s - early 1980s. dealt a blow to the RSD-2 agreement. There were enough reasons for the escalation: the establishment of a pro-communist regime in Angola with the direct assistance of the USSR, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, and an increase in the number of medium-range missiles in Europe. Therefore, the SALT II treaty, signed by J. Carter and L.I. Brezhnev in 1979, was never ratified by the US Congress. With the coming to power of Reagan, who set a course for confrontation with the USSR, the SALT-2 treaty was forgotten. However, in the 1980s, the parties generally complied with the main provisions of the SALT II treaty, and even sometimes accused each other of violating its articles.

Mobile ICBM "Topol"

In 1975, the Nadiradze Design Bureau began developing a new self-propelled missile system based on the RT-2P solid-fuel ICBM. After learning about the development "Poplars", the Americans accused the Soviet side of violating the SALT-2 treaty, according to which each side could develop one new ICBM in addition to existing models (and the USSR at that time was already developing the silo- and railway-based RT-23 missile). It turned out that the USSR was developing not one, but two ICBMs. To these accusations, the Soviet leadership responded that the Topol was not a new missile, but only a modification of the RT-2P ICBM. Therefore, the new missile system received the RT-2PM index. Of course, this was a trick - Topol was a new development. The Americans, although they did not agree with the Soviet arguments, considering them a trick, could do nothing to interfere, and in 1984 the deployment of RT-2PM ICBMs in positional areas began.

In 1985, the first two regiments armed with Topols entered combat duty. In total, by that time the Strategic Missile Forces had 72 RT-2PM complexes. In subsequent years, the number of Topol ICBMs in the USSR Strategic Missile Forces grew rapidly, reaching a maximum in 1993 - 369 units, and in 1994-2001. remained at the level of 360 units, which amounted to from 37 to 48% of the number of the entire Russian group of strategic missile systems.

The Topol ICBM launcher is mounted on a seven-axle MAZ-7912 chassis. The maximum flight range of the RT-2PM missile is 10,000 km, the CEP is 900 m. The warhead is monoblock, with a power of 550 Kt.

The massive deployment of Topol missile systems meant a new approach by the command to ensuring the survivability of the Strategic Missile Forces in the face of an enemy nuclear attack. If earlier the emphasis was on powerful protection of underground silos and their dispersal over large areas, now the main factor of protection was the mobility of launchers, which could not be kept at gunpoint - because their location was constantly changing. In the event of a surprise nuclear strike by the enemy, due to its survivability, the Topol PGRK was supposed to provide 60% of the combat potential necessary for a retaliatory strike. The launch of the RT-2PM missile could be carried out in the shortest possible time from any point on the combat patrol route, or directly from the place of permanent deployment - from a special structure (shelter) with a sliding roof.

Before the collapse of the Union, 13 divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces received Topols. Ten of them were based in Russia, three in Belarus. Each Topol missile regiment consisted (and consists) of nine mobile launchers.

The deployment of a large number of mobile ICBM launchers caused serious concern among American strategists, as it significantly changed the balance of power in the nuclear missile confrontation. Measures were being developed to neutralize Topol launchers on combat patrol. Single installations were truly vulnerable, for example, when meeting with an enemy sabotage group. But the destruction of one installation does not solve anything, and organizing the identification and coordinated destruction of hundreds of mobile launchers by saboteurs, and even on Soviet territory, is an unrealistic task. As another means of combating the Topols, the B-2 “stealth aircraft” was considered, which, according to its developers, could identify and destroy mobile launchers while remaining invisible and invulnerable to Soviet air defense. In practice, American stealth systems would hardly cope with this task. Firstly, their “invisibility” is largely a myth; we can only talk about reducing radar signature, but in the optical range the “stealth” is visible in the same way as a regular aircraft. Secondly, as in the previous case, the destruction of individual launchers does not solve anything, and it is hardly possible to detect and simultaneously destroy hundreds of installations while being in enemy airspace.

In addition to the Topols, the Soviet command presented the Americans with another unpleasant surprise in the form of “nuclear trains” - the P-450 combat railway missile systems (BZHRK). Each missile train carried three R-23UTTH ICBMs with multiple warheads. The first BZHRK entered combat duty in 1987, and by the time of the collapse of the USSR there were already 12 trains, consolidated into three missile divisions.

The collapse of the Union and the fate of the Strategic Missile Forces

During the collapse of the USSR, the strategic missile forces managed to maintain combat effectiveness to a greater extent than other types of troops. While the reduction of conventional weapons was proceeding at a tremendous pace, the Strategic Missile Forces were not touched, except for the elimination of medium-range missiles. However, their turn has come. The Americans, who considered themselves victors in the Cold War, began to dictate their terms.

On July 31, 1991, the START I treaty was signed in Moscow. Unlike the SALT 1 and 2 treaties, it did not provide for a limitation, but a significant reduction in strategic weapons. The number of deployed strategic missiles for each side was set at 1,600 units, and 6,000 warheads for them. However, a number of restrictions were established for the USSR, which greatly weakened the Strategic Missile Forces and, in fact, brought them under the control of the Americans.

The number of the most powerful Soviet ICBMs R-36 was halved - to 154 units. The adoption of new types of ICBMs was prohibited.

The mobility of missile trains, which the Americans were very afraid of, was limited as much as possible. They were allowed to be only at stations, with a total number of no more than 7, for the convenience of observing them from space. It was forbidden to disguise the compositions.

Mobile Topol launchers were allowed to be deployed in strictly limited areas, each of which could contain no more than 10 installations (i.e., approximately a regiment). Strictly limited deployment areas were also established for missile divisions. Thus, the Americans deprived the mobile-based formations of Soviet ICBMs of the main factor of their survivability - the ability to constantly and secretly move.

As a result, the enormous resources spent on creating the Strategic Missile Forces were thrown away. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear missile carriers, giant ICBM silos - everything that took decades to create was destroyed within a few years. What’s interesting is that the process of eliminating weapons and infrastructure of the Strategic Missile Forces took place with the direct financial support of a potential enemy - the United States. The long-term nuclear missile race ended with the collapse of the Soviet state and the degradation of its armed forces.

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ON THE RUINES OF THE EMPIRE

In 1992, after the collapse of the Union, the Strategic Missile Forces were formed “anew” as a branch of the armed forces within the RF Armed Forces. The main task for them at that time was to bring the organizational structure and armament of the missile forces into line with new realities. It's no secret that in the 90s. The combat effectiveness of the general purpose forces of the Russian Armed Forces was seriously undermined, therefore the Strategic Missile Forces and Strategic Nuclear Forces were the main factor in ensuring Russia’s security from external attacks. Despite all the upheavals, the command of the Strategic Missile Forces tried with all its might to preserve the combat effectiveness of the missile forces, their weapons, infrastructure and human potential.

Everything that could be exported from the territory of the former Soviet republics was exported. The Topol units were withdrawn from the territory of Belarus. Missile silos in Ukraine and Kazakhstan had to be liquidated.

In the 1990s. The main trend in the development of the Strategic Missile Forces has emerged - a focus on solid-fuel mobile missile systems. Silo-based liquid missiles have not disappeared completely, but their share in the ICBM group has been steadily declining.

In 1993, George W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin signed the START-2 treaty, which prohibited the use of ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. The logic behind the MIRV ban was as follows: if the sides have approximately equal numbers of nuclear missiles, a preventive strike loses its meaning, since to destroy one nuclear missile of the defending side, the attacker must spend at least one of its own missiles, but without a 100% guarantee of success. Some part of the defending side's nuclear missile arsenal will be preserved, while the attacker will completely deplete its arsenal in the first strike. But the use of missiles with MIRVs, on the contrary, gives an advantage to the attacking side, since it can destroy all the enemy’s nuclear missile launchers with a relatively small number of its missiles.

Although Russia later refused to ratify the START-2 treaty, it had a great influence on the development of the Strategic Missile Forces. The BZHRKs, the missile trains that the Americans were so afraid of, came under attack because they carried ICBMs with multiple warheads. They were removed from service and disposed of (the last train was removed from combat duty in 2005). While the fate of the START II treaty remained unclear, Russia did not develop ICBMs with multiple warheads. The basis of the nuclear missile group was monoblock missiles.

Even in the most difficult conditions of the 90s. was developed and put into service in Russia Fifth generation ICBM RT-2PM2 - “Topol-M”. This missile, unified for silo and mobile deployment, appeared as a response to the active creation by the Americans of a missile defense system. The RT-2PM2 three-stage solid-propellant missile has a flight range of 11,000 km and has increased capabilities to overcome the missile defense of a potential enemy. It is equipped with a detachable warhead with a capacity of 550 Kt. The warhead is capable of maneuvering on the final part of the trajectory after separation from the missile, and is equipped with a system of active and passive decoys, as well as means of distorting the characteristics of the warhead. The missile's propulsion turbojet engine allows it to gain speed much faster than previous types of missiles of this class, which also makes it difficult to intercept it during the active phase of the flight.

In 1997, the first two Topol-M ICBMs in the silo version entered combat duty. In subsequent years, silo-based RT-2PM2 complexes continued to be transferred to the troops in small batches of 4-8 units, and as of 2015, their number reached 60. RT-2PM2 in the version of the mobile ground missile system (PGRK) entered service in 2006- 2009, and today their number is 18 units.

After Russia withdrew from the START-2 treaty in 2002 and replaced it with a softer SNP treaty (Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty), the question of equipping the Strategic Missile Forces with multiple warhead ballistic missiles arose again. Significant US efforts to create a global missile defense system made the prospect of “nullifying” the Russian nuclear missile potential a real possibility, which could not be allowed. It was necessary to ensure guaranteed retaliation in the event of a preventive nuclear missile strike by a potential enemy, which means that the Strategic Missile Forces needed missiles capable of penetrating all existing and future missile defense systems.

In 2009, the first unit of new mobile missile systems was transferred to the troops RS-24 "Yars". In 2011, the first regiment of the Yars PGRK was brought to full strength (9 launchers).

The RS-24 missile is a modification of the Topol-M, equipped with a MIRV with four individually targetable warheads with a power of 150 (according to other sources - 300) Kt. These ICBMs, unified for silo-based and ground-based systems, should in the future form the basis of the Strategic Missile Forces missile group, replacing the RS-18 and RS-20 missiles.

In 2001, by decree of the President, the Strategic Missile Forces were transformed from a branch of the armed forces into a separate branch of the military, and the Space Forces were separated from them.

In general, the nineties and zeros became a difficult time for the Strategic Missile Forces. As a result of the aging of the nuclear missile arsenal, as well as political pressure from the West, the number of Russian ICBMs and nuclear warheads steadily decreased during this period. Nevertheless, it was possible to maintain the combat effectiveness of the Strategic Missile Forces, and, most importantly, the scientific, technical and human potential of the country in the nuclear missile field. Promising types of mobile, silo-based and sea-based ICBMs have been developed and adopted, which in the foreseeable future will allow Russia to maintain parity with the United States and other nuclear powers.

RUSSIA'S Strategic Missile Forces TODAY: STATE AND PROSPECTS

START-3 Treaty

Before considering the structure and armament of modern Russian Strategic Missile Forces, we should dwell on the document that currently defines the nuclear missile balance between Russia and the United States - the SALT-3 Treaty. This document was signed in 2010 by Presidents D. Medvedev and B. Obama, and came into force on February 5, 2011.

Under the terms of the treaty, each party can have no more than 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and no more than 700 delivery vehicles: ICBMs, submarines and strategic missile-carrying bombers. Another 100 media can be stored unrolled.

START-3 does not impose restrictions on the development of the American missile defense system. However, when developing the terms of the agreement, its condition and development prospects were taken into account. In the event of an increase in the capabilities of the American missile defense system, which falls under the category of “exceptional circumstances,” Russia reserved the right to withdraw from the START-3 treaty unilaterally.

As for missiles with multiple warheads, it appears that the START-3 treaty does not contain a strict ban on them, like START-2. In any case, Russia is not going to give up either the Yars ICBM or the Bulava SLBM, equipped with MIRVs with individually targetable nuclear units. Moreover, it is planned to commission a new generation of combat railway missile systems, equipped with ICBMs with MIRVs, created on the basis of the Yars.

Armament of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces

As of the beginning of 2015, the Strategic Missile Forces had a total of 305 missile systems of five types capable of carrying 1,166 warheads:

• R-36M2/R-36MUTTH – 46 (460 warheads);
• UR-100NUTTKH – 60 (320 warheads);
• “Topol” – 72 (72 warheads);
• “Topol-M” (mobile and silo versions) – 78 (78 warheads);
• "Yars" - 49 (196 warheads).

Structure of the Strategic Missile Forces

Currently, the Strategic Missile Forces are a branch of the Russian Armed Forces, subordinate directly to the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

The structure of the Strategic Missile Forces includes:

• headquarters;
• three missile armies;
• units and subdivisions of special forces (engineering, communications, chemical warfare, missile technology, electronic warfare, meteorological, geodetic, security and reconnaissance);
• rear units and units;
• educational institutions, including the Military Academy of the Strategic Missile Forces named after. Peter the Great and its branch - the Serpukhov Military Institute of Missile Forces;
• research institutions and missile sites, including: State Central Interspecific Test Site “Kapustin Yar”, “Kura” Test Site (Kamchatka) and Sary-Shagan Test Site (Kazakhstan);
• arsenals, central repair plants and weapons and military equipment storage base.

Until April 1, 2011, the Strategic Missile Forces had their own aviation, which is currently transferred to the Air Force.

The total number of personnel of the Strategic Missile Forces is 120 thousand people, of which 2/3 are military personnel, the rest are civilian personnel.

Rocket armies

The missile armies of the Strategic Missile Forces include 12 missile divisions (RD). Let's consider their composition and weapons.

27th Guards Rocket Army (Vladimir):

• 60 rd (Tatishchevo) – 40 UR-100NUTTKH, 60 “Topol-M” (mine-based);
• 28 Guards RD (Kozelsk) – 20 UR-100NUTTH, 4 RS-24 “Yars” (mine-based);
• 7th Guards RD (Vypolzovo) – 18 “Topol”.
• 54 Guards RD (Teykovo) – 18 RS-24 “Yars” (mobile-based), 18 “Topol-M” (mobile-based);
• 14 rd (Yoshkar-Ola) – 18 “Topol”.

31st Missile Army (Orenburg):

• 13 rd (Dombarovsky) - 18 R-36M2;
• 42 rd (Nizhny Tagil) – 18 RS-24 “Yars”
• 8 rd (Yurya) - “Topol”.

33rd Guards Rocket Army (Omsk):

• 62 rd (Uzhur) - 28 R-36M2;
• 39 Guards RD (Novosibirsk) – 9 RS-24 “Yars” (mobile-based);
• 29th Guards Rd (Irkutsk) - armed with Topol missile systems, currently disarmed; it is expected to be re-equipped with the promising RS-26 Rubezh ICBM.
• 35 rd (Barnaul) – 36 “Topol”.

Strategic Missile Forces control system

The combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces depend not only on the number and characteristics of the missiles in service, but also on the effectiveness of their control. After all, in a nuclear missile confrontation, time counts in seconds. In the course of daily service, and, moreover, in a combat situation, it is vitally important to have a quick and reliable exchange of information between all structural units of the Strategic Missile Forces, and to clearly communicate commands to all carriers and launchers of ballistic missiles.

The first ballistic missile formations used the principles and control experience developed in artillery, but with the creation of the Strategic Missile Forces as a branch of the USSR Armed Forces, they received their own centralized control system.

Control bodies of the Strategic Missile Forces were created: the Main Headquarters of the Missile Forces; Main Directorate of Missile Weapons; Central command post of the Missile Forces with a communications center and a computer center; Directorate of Combat Training and Military Educational Institutions; Rear of the Missile Forces; as well as a number of special services and departments. Subsequently, the structure of the military command and control bodies of the Strategic Missile Forces changed repeatedly.

Currently, the central body of military command of the Strategic Missile Forces is Strategic Missile Forces Command, part of the Central Office of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The commander of the Strategic Missile Forces is Colonel General Sergei Viktorovich Karakaev.

To the Strategic Missile Forces Command includes the Headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces, who reports directly to the commander of this branch of the military. The functions of the Headquarters include organizing combat duty and combat use of the Strategic Missile Forces; maintaining combat readiness; development of the Strategic Missile Forces; management of operational and mobilization preparations; ensuring nuclear safety and some others. The headquarters is headed by a chief who is the first deputy commander of the Strategic Missile Forces.

Centralized combat control of the Strategic Missile Forces on duty is carried out Central command post of strategic missile forces (TsKP Strategic Missile Forces). Four identical shifts are on combat duty. The Strategic Missile Forces Central Command Center includes management and main units: duty shifts; information preparation department; department for training and control of combat readiness, coordination of the activities of central command posts; analytical group and others.

The Strategic Missile Forces Central Operations Center is located in the village of Vlasikha near Moscow (since 2009 it has had the status of a closed city) in an underground bunker at a depth of 30 meters. The equipment of the Strategic Missile Forces Central Command Center ensures continuous communication with all combat posts of the Strategic Missile Forces, where a total of 6 thousand missile officers are on duty.

The automated combat control system (ACCS) for strategic nuclear forces is called “Kazbek”. Its portable terminal “Cheget” is known as a “nuclear suitcase”, which is constantly kept by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - the President of the Russian Federation. The Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff have similar “suitcases”. Their main purpose is to transmit to the command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces a special code authorizing the use of nuclear weapons. Unlocking will only occur if the code is received from two of the three terminals.

With the adoption of the Yars missile system in the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, the fourth generation combat control system is being introduced and state tests of the fifth generation automated control system are already underway. Its units are planned to begin to be introduced into the troops as early as 2016. The fifth-generation ASBU will be able to convey combat orders directly to each launcher, bypassing intermediate links. It will be possible to quickly retarget modern types of missiles (Topol-M, Yars, Bulava) directly in flight. But for missiles of obsolete types - R-36 and UR-100 - this possibility is no longer provided.

Perimeter system

Speaking about the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, it is worth noting one of their unique features - the ability to deliver a guaranteed nuclear missile strike against an aggressor even if all the command links and combat control systems of the Strategic Missile Forces are destroyed and the personnel of the missile units are dead.

For a long time there was no reliable information about the Perimeter system due to the regime of strict secrecy surrounding it. Today it is known that a complex for automatic control of a massive retaliatory nuclear strike by the Strategic Missile Forces exists, and is designated 15E601(in Western media it was called “Dead Hand”). According to the official website of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Perimeter system entered combat duty in 1986. The fact that it is still on combat duty was confirmed in 2011 by the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General S. Karakaev, in an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda.

“Perimeter” is a backup control system for all branches of the military armed with nuclear warheads, and is designed to ensure the guaranteed launch of silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs in the event of the destruction of the Kazbek command system and the combat control systems of the Strategic Missile Forces, Navy and Air Force.

The operating principle and capabilities of the Perimeter complex are not reliably known. There is information that the main component of the system is an autonomous software-command complex based on artificial intelligence, which controls the situation according to many parameters using its own sensors. After the final decision has been made on the fact of a nuclear missile attack and on a retaliatory strike, special 15A11 command missiles, created on the basis of the MR-100 missile, are launched. Using powerful transmitters in flight, they broadcast launch commands to all surviving ICBMs and SLBMs.

According to other sources (an interview allegedly with one of the system developers to Wired magazine), the complex is still activated manually by an authorized person. Then monitoring of the sensor network begins and, if the use of nuclear weapons did occur, communication with the General Staff is checked. If there is no connection, the system automatically unlocks the nuclear weapon and, bypassing the standard complex procedure, transfers the right to make the decision to launch missiles to anyone located in a special highly protected bunker.

Prospects for the development of the Strategic Missile Forces

Nowadays, given the growing tension in the world, the factor of nuclear deterrence is as important as during the Cold War. Russia needs powerful Strategic Missile Forces - perhaps not as numerous as in the 70s and 80s. last century, but clearly and reliably controlled, with high survivability, armed with missile systems that have significant modernization potential and are capable of overcoming any existing and future missile defense systems. In the foreseeable future, this guarantees maintaining the combat effectiveness of the Strategic Missile Forces at a high level and inflicting unacceptable damage on any aggressor.

As already mentioned, the development of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces is currently regulated by the START-3 treaty, which provides for the achievement of nuclear parity between Russia and the United States by 2018. The number of deployed nuclear warhead carriers should be 700 units each. Currently, Russia has only 515 delivery vehicles, and therefore has the right to deploy another 185. At the same time, Russia will have to get rid of 90 non-deployed delivery vehicles and 32 deployed nuclear warheads.

The development plans of the Strategic Missile Forces provide for the removal of obsolete types of ICBMs from combat service as their established service life expires: UR-100NUTTKH - in 2019, Topol - in 2021, R-36M2 Voevoda - in 2022.

They will gradually be replaced by the RS-24 Yars ICBM in silo, ground and, possibly, railway-based versions. The Topol-M missile systems will no longer be purchased, but will remain on combat duty, presumably until 2040.

The Yars ICBM with 4 warheads, of course, cannot become a full replacement for the Voyevoda, which carries 10 warheads. Therefore, the State Missile Center named after. Makeeva in the Urals is developing a new heavy liquid ICBM "Sarmat". Development work on it should be completed by 2018 - 2020. “Sarmat” will be smaller and half lighter than “Voevoda” - its launch weight will be 100 tons, with a stated throw weight of 5 tons. Thrust indicators per unit weight of “ Sarmat" compared to the R-36 will increase significantly. The weight and size characteristics of the Sarmat ICBM approximately correspond to the UR-100NUTTH, which will make it relatively easy to convert existing missile silos to accommodate new missiles.

In the current year 2015, tests of an improved version of Yars were successfully completed - RS-26 "Rubezh" developments of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT). It is expected to enter service with the troops in 2016. The first RS-26 will be received by the Irkutsk 29th Guards Missile Division.

The BZHRK is expected to return to service. The new rocket train will be called “Barguzin”. By 2016, MIT should prepare design documentation for it, and by 2019 the first sample will appear. The new BZHRK will be armed with Yars missiles, which are half the weight of the R-23UTTKh (49 and 104 tons, respectively). Therefore, Barguzin will be able to carry six missiles. At the same time, its mobility will increase, and due to the lower weight of the cars, the train will not wear out the railway tracks as much. Instead of three diesel locomotives, like the Molodets BZHRK, Barguzin will be pulled by only one diesel locomotive. This will increase the stealth of the train, because it will be difficult to distinguish it from ordinary freight trains. And what’s also important is that Barguzin will be a completely Russian product - unlike Molodets, most of the parts of which were produced at the Yuzhmash plant.

CONCLUSION

Currently, the Strategic Missile Forces remain the main component of Russia’s “nuclear triad”, the main guarantor of its security and territorial integrity. Despite the collapse of the armed forces that followed the collapse of the USSR, the missile forces retained their combat effectiveness. The main threat to the combat effectiveness of the Strategic Missile Forces was the moral and physical aging of missile weapons. Missiles that failed due to the expiration of their established service life were not replaced with a sufficient number of new ones.

The Strategic Missile Forces are currently being actively re-equipped with new types of missiles. It is expected that by 2020 the share of new missile systems in the Strategic Missile Forces will be 98%. The troops are also receiving other equipment designed to ensure combat duty. The combat control system is being improved.

The process of training military personnel is ongoing. In accordance with the Strategic Missile Forces training plan, about a thousand different exercises are planned for the year. Thus, in January-February 2015, the Strategic Missile Forces held large-scale exercises aimed at practicing the tasks of maneuvering PGRK in order to remove them from attack and change positional areas. An extensive list of tasks and introductory tasks was worked out, including on bringing to the highest levels of combat readiness, performing maneuverable actions on combat patrol routes, countering sabotage formations and attacks by high-precision weapons of a mock enemy, performing combat missions in conditions of active electronic suppression and intensive enemy actions in troop deployment areas.

The Strategic Missile Forces are staffed by professionals who have undergone serious selection and long-term training and are dedicated to their work and the Motherland. All this gives confidence that Russia’s nuclear shield is reliable, and combat orders will be carried out in any scenario.

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To the officers and soldiers of the Makhachkala Regiment
I dedicate to the wild Caucasian division of the Strategic Missile Forces...

Wild Caucasian Division of the Strategic Missile Forces

I served in the army, first Soviet and then Russian, for exactly 20 years and reached
pension with the rank of lieutenant colonel. And my service began at the end of August 1978, when, after graduating from Moscow Higher Technical School, I was assigned to TsNIIMASH in what is now Korolev and quickly realized that no one there was particularly needed there. I was sent to build some garages, they didn’t give me a dormitory, they didn’t give me a registration, and at a family council we decided that I needed to join the army. You will still have to serve someday...
From Zagorsk the military registration and enlistment office sent us with one boy from ZEMZ - Kolya Chuprin to
Vinnitsa, to the headquarters of the army of the Strategic Missile Forces. In Moscow, visit us
Another guy who worked in the Komsomol Central Committee joined. All the way on the train we
They played pref and wrote bullet after bullet, pinning them onto a nail in the wall of the compartment.
At army headquarters we were redirected to the shores of the Caspian Sea - to the Makhachkala regiment
Ordzhonikidze division, nicknamed among the two-year officers Dikoy
Caucasian. We arrived there on the weekend and, since no one from the authorities was there, again
We played cards for two more days.
And on Monday morning we were dressed in field uniforms and taken to the commander
division. As I remember now, he was sitting in a smoking room on the street, and in front of him stood at attention
a hefty lieutenant with his head bandaged. It all looked like it was in combat
The situation is quite scary. But later it turned out that two-year officer Seryoga Seryogin
during the missile regulations, he stuck his head somewhere in the wrong place and got hit on the
a tripped air valve...
We were divided into divisions. Who got into the launch preparation groups (LPT), who
to headquarters, and I was assigned to the regimental regulations group.
There we honestly served our two years and returned home - some to civilian life, and some as
I remained in the ranks and continued to serve in the Strategic Missile Forces...

One MIC out of a thousand

In the meantime, my colleague, two-year student Yura Marulin, a lieutenant like me, but only from Kazan, and I were assigned according to the calculations of the Regulations Group. I ended up as the head of the 4th crew serving the underground MIC (installation and testing building) of the 1st division of the regiment, where combat missiles were delivered for inspections during routine maintenance. During the interval between flights of American spy satellites, installers took them out of the mines, placed them on special transport carts and delivered them along a concrete path to what was now my MIC.
Regulations were carried out once every six months, and the rest of the time I was busy studying various technical manuals and filling out a thick stack of ZHUTS (technical condition logs) with replies about the supposed daily inspections of MIC technical equipment that I allegedly carried out. After which he went to the surface, sat in the smoking room and once again stupidly looked at the surrounding nature, consisting of small mountains and a low oak forest. It was boring. But the allotted two years had to be endured and served.
But at the time of the regulations, life was in full swing. My crew, consisting of Tajiks and Belarusians, fussily ran into their pockets and manually opened the multi-ton hydraulic gates. The use of automatic equipment, as always happens in the army after an emergency, was prohibited by the higher command, since two soldiers in one of the regiments were crushed while riding on the same gate.
One day, my soldiers were taken from me to work in the vineyards of a neighboring collective farm, and I alone opened both gate leaves, manually pumping the hydraulics of first one gate, and then the other. Gasping, I ran under the obscene screams of the officers, who had already rolled two carts with missiles, from one pocket to another pocket to open first one and then the second armored doors - each weighing 8 tons. I barely had enough strength. But I managed...
The 8K65 missiles on which we served are huge metal ingots more than 24 meters long and about 2.5 meters in diameter, stuffed with sophisticated equipment. There was practically no free space inside the engine compartment, and my job was to climb inside through the hatch and check with a special probe for the absence of electrostatic electricity. I had difficulty squeezing between the nozzles and tubes, and sometimes I dozed there so as not to have to climb back and forth while the regulations group officers were fixing some problems...

Captain Tuzov

Service in the division was not easy. If someone thought otherwise, then it is not so. Every day, early in the morning, officers and warrant officers living in Makhachkala got into PAZs and kungs and went 70 kilometers to their divisions. Ours was the farthest.
A dirt road along the foothills of the Caucasus is not the Red Army Avenue. Sometimes in winter, cars would drift to the edge of the road on the ice, and we would hover in horror over a terrible abyss. It was especially scary when the drivers were inexperienced first-years. But you get used to everything, and the old officers no longer paid attention to these “minor” incidents, and soon we all also became fatalists...
They also all left the regiment together, cursing and waiting for an hour and a half for the division commander, who always gave orders to the duty shift at the very last moment. On weekends, as a rule, all those who were not on duty for long or short shifts (4 or 3 days, respectively) were on duty in the barracks - supervising the soldiers.
The officers were practically not provided with housing; almost all of them lived in rented apartments. Getting the next rank was also difficult. If a person retired as a major, it was considered good luck because major positions were few and far between. And there were only a few lieutenant colonels in the regiment.
That is, no career growth, no apartment prospects. And to retire, you had to serve 25 years. And it was possible to quit early only either due to disability or drunkenness. This is how these people SERVED. And we, who accidentally fell into their circle from different capitals and large cities, were only amazed at their patience and perseverance.
Their heavy, hopeless bondage was brightened up by their families, whom they saw only at night, and the usual male entertainments - hunting, fishing, and sometimes just vodka at night.
With all this, among the career officers there were the most talented specialists, professionals from God. I remember two.
The head of our department, Captain Alexander Nikolaevich Smirnov, knew the entire rocket perfectly. If we, young people, had difficulty mastering some of the motor parts, some of the control system, then he knew EVERYTHING. I don’t remember a single regulation that prevented failures from happening - there must have been some kind of check that was not carried out. And then the brainstorming of our smartest and most intelligent commander began. And he almost always brilliantly found the solution to the malfunction of one or another parameter, one or another device.
And when he was unable to find the reason for the refusal, then the head of the regiment’s engineering service, Captain Tuzov, came. Above average height, a slightly stooped man with a worn-out face and wearing an officer’s cap with a broken visor and a spring taken out long ago for foppishness, possessed some qualities inexplicable by material Marxist science. He was a genius.
I remember that all the officers gathered around him in a circle and watched with reverent surprise his seemingly chaotic manipulations over the control panel for routine checks. But minutes passed, a maximum of half an hour, and everything began to WORK again! It was incomprehensible. But, apparently, thanks to precisely such folk nuggets, often with only a secondary military engineering school behind them, our missiles hit the target. From 1969 to 1974, the regiment conducted live firing at the training ground three times and performed them “excellently.” Many officers and soldiers then received well-deserved military orders and medals...
Usually, after successfully completing the regulations, we gathered at the divisional officers' hotel and poured half a flask of alcohol into cut glasses for stew with boiled potatoes. Moreover, as the veterans said in a low voice, the regulations for just one rocket were to supply 20 liters of alcohol, but we tested as many as three of them! But, as they say, everyone needs alcohol, including the command, which received numerous checks from Moscow and from army headquarters in Vinnitsa...
The thin face of Captain Tuzov, who was often brought to the regulations directly from another binge (which is why he was never supposed to receive major shoulder straps), was illuminated with inspiration. He made a short speech and traditionally proclaimed our main toast: “For those in the pit!” (for those who don’t know, rocket scientists call their mines a pit)…

Groundwater

With my conscription, 17 two-year officers from Moscow, Kazan, Tula and Kuibyshev (now Samara) arrived at the same time to the regiment. Without the supply of specialists from civilians, the then huge army could not exist, since there was a catastrophic shortage of regular officers. That is why, after graduating from universities, we were awarded lieutenant ranks and called up for service.
Among our brothers there were mostly ordinary guys, but there were also talented technicians, and even just heroes.
One of these heroes was Valera Kuznetsov from an earlier conscription, originally from Podolsk near Moscow, a graduate of the Moscow Aviation Institute.
One day, an inspection from Moscow came to the regiment. Inspectors at high ranks, accompanied by local commanders, went down into the missile silo, and then, as if on purpose, the unexpected happened - groundwater, unknown how it had broken through the defenses, poured into the mine premises!
The inspectors - pot-bellied guys - instantly found themselves at the top, and so did everyone else. And only when they were safe did everyone suddenly realize that if water broke into the shaft itself, where the fueled missile with a warhead stood, the consequences would be unpredictable. Only Valera Kuznetsov was not at a loss, he did not panic and did not rush up after everyone else, but remained in the mine. Not thinking about the danger threatening him, he, tearing his hands bloody, battened down the hatch to the missile silo and only then hurried out. The rocket was saved.
The accident was repaired, the hole was repaired, and the water was pumped out. And the head of the Moscow inspectors silently took the watch off his hand and gave it to Valera. No one offered him a medal for courage and bravery - no one was going to report to the top about the emergency that had happened - it was more expensive for themselves...

Failed brakes

Lieutenant Eldar Rafikov, a Tatar originally from the remote village of Verkhnyaya Tereshka, lived with me in a private apartment. He was younger than us, from the next draft after us.
He was assigned to serve in the RSD (missile installation department) of the 1st Division. He was a thin, slightly strange guy. We didn't notice anything outstanding in him. But one day he came back from the division all pale, as if taken down from the cross. We begged him for a long time to tell us what happened to him. And he told a terrible story.
It was necessary to transport a training rocket to the 2nd Division. If combat missiles are transported accompanied by security, and in front and behind the convoy are insured against car accidents by huge KRAZ vehicles, then the training missile was sent on an old tractor, driven by a young first-year soldier. Our Eldar was appointed senior to his cabin. In the army, soldiers did not travel independently, but were always accompanied by an officer. That's how it was supposed to be.
We left in the afternoon, through the window between the American satellites. The road to the 2nd Division lay along a plateau between endless poppy fields. And then, on one of the descents, the hydraulic brakes completely unexpectedly failed, and a multi-ton tractor with a huge rocket gradually accelerated downwards, sliding off the road towards the abyss. The soldier fell into a stupor, grabbed the steering wheel and froze, closing his eyes. Eldar, who was driving such a tractor for the first time in his life, tried to turn the steering wheel, but the hydraulics failed everywhere - both the brakes and the steering wheel did not work. Then the lieutenant tried to open his door - it turned out that there was no inside handle on his door!
And then Eldar climbed over the soldier and jumped out of the tractor through his door to the outside. Jumping down, he looked around in panic. A huge colossus with wheels the size of a man had already slid off the road and was rolling straight into the abyss.
For the death of a rocket, even a training one, one could end up in court - and this is a prison! In despair, Eldar threw his cap under the wheels - the tractor continued to drive. Then the overcoat - the tractor was driving. And then the young lieutenant, instantly looking around, noticed a huge stone fifty meters from the road and ran towards it. How he lifted him, how he dragged him, Eldar no longer remembered. He only remembered how he threw it under the front wheel of the tractor, and the multi-ton colossus finally stopped...
He pulled the shaking boy out of the cabin, sat down exhaustedly next to him and, clasping his face in his hands, began to sob...

Fallen warhead

Our regiment was equipped with outdated missiles, and therefore the equipment on it
the weapons were quite old. This inevitably led to various accidents. But sometimes they happened for other reasons. I remember one such incident for the rest of my life.
At night, a convoy of KrAZ trucks and security vehicles drove towards a secret railway station, where new missiles from the arsenal were to be brought in special carriages disguised as ordinary civilian ones. I, like several of my comrades, rode as the eldest in cars. Along a deserted road, accompanied by traffic police, we reached the station, attended the loading of missiles onto transport carts, and took them to another division. Having safely handed them over to our colleagues, we went to the officer’s hotel to get some sleep. And in the morning we learned that an emergency had occurred during the night.
When trying to attach a warhead to the rocket, the installer, in which the novice driver was sitting, turned over, unable to withstand the weight of the warhead, and it hit the concrete with all its might. They say it even struck a spark!
You can imagine a silent scene: everyone froze for one, most terrible, moment in fear, and then the commanders rushed with obscenities to inspect the fallen warhead, and then find out the causes of the accident and look for those to blame. A nuclear explosion, thank God, did not threaten us - there is protection not only against such accidents - they realized this almost immediately. But the warhead was dented. And this is already a judicial matter.
They began to find out WHY the installer overturned?! It turned out that the soldier forgot to place the crane on special stops that protect it from tipping over (or maybe they were simply faulty). And for some reason the senior officer didn’t remember about this either...
What to do here?! To report to the top about such an emergency would cause the heads of not only the regiment and division commander to fly, but also those of people with much bigger stars. Therefore, they kept silent about the accident - by general agreement, and punished one old major, the commander of the ESD, who was already preparing for retirement, by demoting him to captain and transferring him out of harm's way to another regiment. That's where the matter was hushed up...

War, especially nuclear war, never starts suddenly. There is always a certain period of deterioration in the political situation between rival countries, during which the command takes measures to save its nuclear potential. Realizing that the location of missile silos has long been known to both one side and the other, in order to save their missiles from a nuclear strike, our army created special combat readiness restoration units from improvised vehicles. At the pre-crisis moment, upon command from above, they had to go to specially designated points away from the missile silos, which would be targeted by a potential enemy missile strike, and then return to combat positions and try to restore dilapidated military installations and organize a retaliatory salvo. By the way, this is no longer a secret, the missiles of our Caucasian division were aimed at the northern cities of China, relations with which the USSR did not have very good relations in the 70s...
We had such an OVBG in our regiment. It included almost all the vehicles of the Regulation Group in which I had the honor to serve. But the trouble was that our regiment was old, and the vehicles in it were old and worn out. Of course, from time to time we received brand new cars, but such was the order in the brainless Soviet country that they were immediately sent along with the soldiers, as we used to say, to “virgin lands” - that is, to harvest the collective farm harvest somewhere in Siberia or the Urals. From there they returned broken into trash. It was on these half-dead machines that we were tasked with restoring the combat readiness of the nuclear forces of our beloved regiment.
These machines, to my misfortune, were registered with me as the head of the 4th crew of the Regulations Group. When my predecessor handed them over to me during the generously covered “clearing,” I still didn’t suspect anything, because even today I’m not very strong in automotive technology. But after “acceptance” it turned out that not every car has engines. Therefore, our VBG detachment, leaving for the next “training”, resembled a column of disabled people on crutches, only the crutches were rigid couplings on which cars with motors pulled cars WITHOUT motors.
It was terrible. But it was so, and we had to live with it...
I think that our combat readiness restoration detachment would have coped with the combat mission in any case, but not because, but DESPITE all the circumstances. Because there were people who served there who were not afraid of any difficulties.
And when leaving the regiment, I handed over my cars in the same way through a covered “clearing” to my replacement - young lieutenant Andryusha Kvas from the Kyiv Polytechnic. We officers trusted each other, and what difference did it make whether there were engines or not - we would still have to fight with what we had. I didn't come up with this...

Japanese truth

I was told a long time ago, when I was still serving, that they saw a funny Japanese cartoon about our and American rocket scientists. For the Americans, everything in the cartoon was automated, everything was accurate and cool. But when they aimed the rocket at a large paper target (like the one at the shooting range), it took off and fell... next to the target, not reaching the target.
And then they showed our rocket scientists. Soviet officers in uniform with large red stars, dressed for some reason in windings and bast shoes, drank vodka and slurped cabbage soup from a common pot in some kind of wooden hut, apparently symbolizing the barracks. At the alarm signal, they quickly ran to the Soviet missile, opened its warhead like a lid and began to pour fuel inside with buckets, by eye. Then they raised the rocket with a rope thrown over a tree branch into a vertical position. Launch - and she hit EXACTLY the target!
Yes, that’s how it was, by and large...

And yet... Despite all these stupidities, accidents and absurdities, our army is alive. The Strategic Missile Forces are also alive. It is they, our formidable “troops that never fight” (and, God forbid, that they ever fight) who have kept and are keeping the arrogant Americans from imposing their will on the whole world. It is because of our missiles that there are no more world wars on the planet.
Let's remember this.
And I believe (I’m just SURE!) that our missiles will ALWAYS hit the target, despite all this past and present chaos in our country. Because guys like Valera Kuznetsov, Eldar Rafikov and Captain Tuzov served, are serving and will always serve in the “troops that do not fight”...