What do the Chechen and Afghan wars have in common. Class hour dedicated to the participants of the Chechen and Afghan wars

Last Wednesday parliamentary hearings dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan were held in the Small Hall of the State Duma. The initiator of this event was the chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, Hero of the Russian Federation, Colonel General Vladimir Anatolyevich Shamanov.

Under cover of semi-mystery

The hearings in the Duma became a landmark event, reflecting changes in assessments regarding the participation of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in the military conflict on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. As Senator Franz Klintsevich, speaking at the hearings, noted, he personally failed to arrange such hearings in the Duma either on the 20th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, or on the 25th anniversary. Moreover, when in December 2014 Franz Klintsevich took the initiative to review the decision of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which condemned the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, he did not find support from his colleagues, the Duma deputies.

Many issues were considered at the current hearings. We discussed a possible increase in the social status of veterans of the war in the DRA, civilian personnel, and family members of the victims. Considered the feasibility of introducing additional social benefits. They assessed how the Afghan war of 1979-1989 is presented in school textbooks, etc.

However, the key point of the hearings was the discussion of the role of the USSR Armed Forces in ensuring the security of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, its economic and political development. The participants in the hearings suggested that the State Duma adopt a special resolution on the 30th anniversary of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, which would give "an objective political assessment of the stay and withdrawal of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan."

The Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR put a stain on the Afghan war in December 1989. Under the influence of "democratic forces", he adopted a Resolution in which the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan received "political and moral condemnation."

Admittedly, the Afghan war was extremely unpopular in the Soviet Union. First of all, because for the first time in the post-war years, the country entered into a military conflict with heavy casualties. They were recognized semi-legally. Until 1987, zinc coffins with the bodies of the dead were buried without military honors, and the monuments did not indicate that a soldier who died in Afghanistan was in the burial.

Not only losses were hushed up, but also the true goals of the introduction of Soviet troops into the DRA. The wording "providing international assistance" in the eyes of ordinary people did not justify the intervention of the Soviet Union in the bloody civil conflict of a neighboring country.

This attitude changed little even when a detailed analysis of the real and potential strategic threats that the intra-Afghan armed conflict posed for our country appeared in the Soviet media. People had a strong feeling of unjustified participation of the USSR in this war and unjustified losses incurred.

By the beginning of the Second Congress of People's Deputies, the picture of the Afghan war had finally become clear. Troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan. The facts of the unparalleled courage and dedication of our soldiers, of the true combat brotherhood of Soviet soldiers, have become widely known. It became clear to many: this is how you can only fight for your country.

It seemed that people began to perceive positively the participation of Soviet soldiers in the Afghan conflict. But then politics intervened. The new party leaders tried to disassociate themselves from the Brezhnev era, and the unpopular decision of the Politburo to send troops to Afghanistan was the best fit for this. This is how the Decree of the Congress of People's Deputies appeared, which for many years branded the Afghan war as a political mistake of the Soviet leaders.

Time to correct mistakes

At the hearings in the Duma, Senator Klintsevich thanked General Shamanov for his work in revising the assessment of the participation of the Soviet army in the Afghan war. Probably, Vladimir Anatolyevich Shamanov really deserves such praise from one of the participants in the Afghan events, which is Colonel Klintsevich.

Another thing is that the attitude towards the participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan conflict has changed in society itself. A lot has happened since then. There were, for example, two Chechen wars... In the spring, life brought me to the building where, among other things, the regional branch of the Russian Union of Afghan Veterans lodges.

A memorial corner was arranged in the lobby of the office of the veterans' organization. The names of all those killed in Afghanistan and Chechnya are written there. I looked at the lists and experienced a culture shock. The memorial to those killed in Chechnya was twice the size of the Afghan one. At home I got into the reference literature, looked. 15,031 people have died in Afghanistan. In two Chechen wars - 13,184 (5731 and 7425).

According to official statistics, it turned out that fewer people died in Chechnya. Probably, the region, the memorial corner of which plunged me into a shock that is not typical for the country. Perhaps his conscripts had a large share of participation in these conflicts. Be that as it may, the losses of modern times have accustomed society to the fact that soldiers, protecting the interests of the country, can die en masse in local conflicts.

Now we also have Syria. They say that any comparison is not accurate. However, some parallels still arise. In Syria, as in Afghanistan, our soldiers were invited by the legitimate government of the country. In the Middle East, Russian soldiers are extinguishing a hotbed of terrorism, from where home-grown Islamists really threaten our security.

In Afghanistan, ethnic Tajiks of field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud fought on the side of the anti-government forces, ethnic Uzbeks and Turkmens participated in the battles on both sides of the conflict. Their kinship ties did not end with the border of Afghanistan and were a destabilizing factor for the republics of Soviet Central Asia.

Finally, by entering coastal Syrian waters, the Russian fleet drove the Americans out of the eastern Mediterranean and removed the danger of their missile attack by about a thousand miles. In Afghanistan, the flying distance of US missiles worried the Soviet command no less than ethnically close Mujahideen.

Other factors can also be mentioned. But the examples already given are enough to objectively assess the geopolitical significance of the Afghan war from the height of modern times. Three years ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin did this for the first time.

In February 2015, meeting with “Afghan veterans” on the occasion of the next anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Putin noted: “Now, when the years pass and when more and more facts become known, we understand better and better what served then reason and reason for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Of course, there were a lot of mistakes, but there were also real threats, which at that time the Soviet leadership tried to stop by bringing troops into Afghanistan.”

For the first time, the leader of the country spoke not about the “unnecessary and unjustified adventure of the Brezhnev Politburo”, but about stopping the real threats to the Soviet Union emanating from Afghanistan in 1979. This spring, Vladimir Putin again returned to rethinking the assessments of the Afghan war. The President supported the proposal of Vladimir Shamanov, chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, to sum up the political outcome of the war in Afghanistan on the 30th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, formalizing it with a special decision or statement of the Russian parliament.

At the parliamentary hearings held last Wednesday, such a statement was actually agreed upon. Here is how the main speaker, deputy Nikolai Kharitonov, presented it: “It must be unequivocally stated that the State Duma considers it necessary to recognize the moral and political condemnation of the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979, expressed in the decision of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Supreme Council of the USSR in 1989.

Everything goes to the fact that thirty years after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, this period of our history will receive an objective political assessment. On the eve of the anniversary date, it will be formulated not only within the walls of parliament. People expect that all significant political figures in Russia, and President Vladimir Putin in the first place, will express their vision of the Afghan events.

In Excursion into history

Losses of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (according to Krivosheev):

Losses in the First Chechen War (according to Krivosheev):

Dedicated to the end of the KTO in Chechnya (aka the Second Chechen; the end of the KTO was announced from 00:00 on 04/16/2009):

The second Chechen campaign officially began on September 23, 1999, after Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on the creation of a joint group of troops and forces (OGV) in the North Caucasus and the preparation of a counter-terrorist operation on the territory of the republic. It lasted 3493 days.
The number of federal forces at the initial stage of the operation was 93 thousand people. The number of militants in 1999 was estimated by the military at 15-20 thousand people. In 2009, official authorities say that there are between 50 and 500 irreconcilable militants in the republic.
The total losses of power structures during the active phase of hostilities (from October 1999 to December 23, 2002) amounted to 4,572 dead and 15,549 wounded. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Defense, from 1999 to September 2008, 3,684 servicemen were killed in the line of duty in the republic. According to the main personnel department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the losses of internal troops in August 1999-August 2003 amounted to 1055 people. Losses of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Chechnya, according to data for 2006, were estimated at 835 people killed. It was also reported that in 1999-2002, 202 FSB officers were killed in Chechnya. Thus, the losses of the Russian law enforcement agencies can be estimated at least 6 thousand people.
In 1999-2002, according to the headquarters of the United Forces, 15,500 militants were killed. Over the subsequent period, from 2002 to 2009, the security forces reported on the liquidation of about 2100 more members of illegal armed groups: the main part in 2002 (600) and 2003 (700). At the same time, the militant leader Shamil Basayev stated in 2005 that Chechen casualties amounted to 3,600 people. In 2004, the human rights organization "Memorial" estimated civilian casualties at 10,000-20,000 people, not counting 5,000 missing.
There are no official data on the cost of the operation in Chechnya. In November 2002, Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, said that during the period of active hostilities (autumn 1999-winter 2000), 20-30 billion rubles were spent on the counter-terrorist operation. per year, then the costs decreased to 10-15 billion rubles. In the report of ex-deputies Ruslan Khasbulatov and Ivan Rybkin "Economic aspects of the war in Chechnya" dated April 2003, it was reported that from September 1999 to the end of 2000, $ 10-12 billion were spent on the deployment of troops and military operations, in 2001 - $ 11-13 billion, in 2002 - $10-12 billion, for three months of 2003 - about $3 billion.

The Americans and their allies have been in Afghanistan longer than the Soviet troops.
November 26, 2010 marks 9 years and 50 days since the soldiers
NATO coalitions invaded the mountain ranges of Afghanistan. Exactly so much
the military operation that the USSR carried out in Afghanistan lasted. Rubicon,
as they say, we have moved on and it is already possible to draw some conclusions, to
comparisons and parallels, make predictions.

When Washington in 2001 introduced its troops into the "nest of the world
terrorism" in Afghanistan, in the post-Soviet space only a lazy
did not exercise wit on this occasion, skeptically assessing the chances
NATO. The Western world, on the contrary, arrived in enviable confidence that
they definitely will not repeat the mistakes of the totalitarian Land of Soviets and in
the foreseeable future will achieve the desired goal. In Europe and America, they believed
that all sorts of comparisons of the Afghan wars of the USA and the USSR in this case
out of place. However, it has now become clear that comparing the situation of the 1980s and
2000s is not only possible, but also necessary: ​​9-year history of the Afghan
war gave a huge layer of material in need of analysis, comparison and
forecasting the situation.

What do the aggressor countries of the USSR and the USA have in common with respect to Afghanistan?

Experts from the academy and exchange trading identified a number of patterns:
1. and the USSR and the USA at the time of the introduction of their troops
Afghanistan were superpowers. Their military potential was enormous,
which, in turn, made it possible to count on a quick and unambiguous
success;
2. both states were some kind of empires,
that is, carriers of a supranational ideology. The USSR fought for the triumph
communism throughout the world, the United States - for the victory of democracy. The armies of these countries
were international, that is, theoretically they could not
be guided in their actions by nationalist motives;
3. and in 1979-80 and in 2001 the invasion was carried out with lightning speed and almost without bloodshed;
4. military personnel of the USA and the USSR distinguished by high fighting spirit;
5. command of both armies declared control over the entire territory of Afghanistan;
6. number of OKSVA in different years
ranged from 80 to 104 thousand military personnel (this is not counting the employees
intelligence agencies, instructors and civilian specialists). As part of the troops
ISAF now operates about 130 thousand soldiers and officers (this is not counting
allegedly civilian employees of various security structures);
7. both the US and the USSR installed a puppet government in Afghanistan, which was financially supported, unsuccessfully trying to put on his shoulders many hardships of the war.
As you can see, the initial data of the two states participating in the war in
Afghanistan are roughly comparable. During the same
activities, there were both certain similarities and significant
differences.

What is the difference between the Afghan wars of the USSR and the USA?

The analytical service of the Masterforex-V Academy explained that:
against the Soviet troops many fought
disparate detachments of Mujahideen of various political views,
religious predilections (Tajiks and Uzbeks are moderate Sunnis, Pashtuns are
orthodox Sunnis, residents of the province of Herat - Shiites, among the population
Ismailism is widespread in Badakhshan), ethnicity. General
the number of armed opposition during the Soviet occupation is estimated
from 300 to 500 thousand people;
against NATO in Afghanistan is now at war
only one Taliban movement plus a small organization
Al Qaeda. The Taliban are predominantly Pashtuns who profess to
radical forms of Sunni Islam. The number of Taliban is unlikely
exceeds 100 thousand fighters;
in the 1980s, the Afghan Mujahideen were supported by the United States, Pakistan, China, Iran, all Arab countries;
Now to the Taliban have a hidden
patronage only Pakistani intelligence services, a little Iran and some
Arab organizations. In fact, the Taliban are forced to rely only on
the people of Afghanistan and then only on certain tribes and ethnic groups.
This is clearly not enough to conduct large-scale hostilities;
USSR, which was the leader of the Warsaw bloc,
still did not draw allies into Afghanistan: Poles, Czechs,
Gedeerites, Bulgarians. This made it possible to rely solely on their own
strength, to ensure unity of command and not to share responsibility. Even with
from a human point of view, such a step looks more noble
(Eastern European allies, however, did not appreciate this, but now
got the opportunity to taste all the "charms" of the Afghan war);
US initiates deployment of NATO troops to Afghanistan,
Fortunately, all member countries of the Alliance fully supported such a decision.
Now Afghan warriors will appear in more than 20 countries, including not even
NATO Australia and New Zealand.

The results of the operation can be called twofold:
— On the one side, neither the USSR nor the USA
were able to achieve their goals in Afghanistan. Socialism is not
built, Bin Laden was not caught, Al-Qaeda was not destroyed, democracy was not
distributed, it turns out, only people were lost in vain.
— On the other side, loss figures are largely
are not comparable, which gives grounds for many experts to talk about explicit
successes and advantages of NATO. During the 1980s, the death toll in Afghanistan
or more than 15 thousand Soviet servicemen died, more than 53 thousand were
wounded and 417 missing. At the same time, the troops of the international
coalitions have lost 6,900 troops to date and over 12,500 have been
injured.
In this case, NATO functionaries and analysts, in the absence of real
successes have to be content with little: they are not proud of what
brought peace to Afghanistan, and by the fact that they lost soldiers less than the USSR.
Allegedly, this clearly proves the effectiveness of the North Atlantic
Alliance. But the difference in losses, of course, has an explanation.

How can one explain the difference in the losses of troops in the "Afghan wars" of the USSR and the USA?

As Rasul Zhalalov, representative of the community of traders and investors from the USA and Canada of the Masterforex-V Academy, explained:
Soviet troops regularly or alone
conducted major military operations, or entrusted them to local allies,
tight control over execution. In any case, combat activity in
in the 1980s was much higher than in the 2000s. Limited contingent up to
recent days tried to carry out important strategic tasks, for example,
close the border with Pakistan, clear of Afghan insurgents
Pansher Gorge.
NATO soldiers for the most part
profess defense tactics, they control only the capital of the country,
conditionally, some large cities and means of communication (only about 10-11%
territory of Afghanistan, while the Soviet army really kept in
their hands 30-35%).
Soviet soldiers often performed
tasks unusual for them: built, helped in economic activities
etc. There were a lot of restrictions on the use of weapons.
Twenty years later, the Americans and their allies,
professing the priority of the life of their own military personnel, massively
shoot to kill at the slightest danger, almost never go beyond
limits of their well-fortified bases and try to avoid combat
clashes before the arrival of significant reinforcements. In fact, now in
Afghanistan is fighting only aviation and intelligence, under such conditions, losses
coalitions could be reduced altogether to a minimum.
Soviet soldiers used local water,
in connection with which the number of gastrointestinal diseases has steadily increased.
A significant part of the losses is due to this reason.
Americans and their allies consume only products delivered by planes from their native countries. Even water is brought to them in plastic bottles.

Thus, it is quite difficult to judge whose actions in Afghanistan are more effective.. Of course, you can make forecasts, but they are also rather illusory. It is now quite obvious that
* the loss of the coalition in Afghanistan will only grow (already today the average annual figure is comparable to the Soviet one);
* discontent in NATO countries will also increase significantly, then the troops
will be withdrawn, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will again be engulfed by civil
war, and it will finally plunge into the Middle Ages.

Question: Will the United States fall apart “after Afghanistan” like the Soviet Union?. Of course not.
* The USSR collapsed not at all because of the Afghan war;
* Americans will think they won in Afghanistan. US residents
never forget the main thing: to look at the world exclusively in
in a positive way.

The editors of the "Market Leader" magazine and experts from the Academy of Forex and Stock Trading Masterforex-V : Why is the US still in Afghanistan? Answer options:
* fight against terrorism
* drug traffic control
* spreading its influence in Central Asia, limiting the access of China and Russia there.

Source "Market Leader"

Ruslan Sultanovich, many years have passed since the end of the "Soviet-Afghan" war. Are there any "blank spots" in its history?

- The biggest "blank spot" is 273 prisoners of war who did not return home and disappeared, and our committee is currently very actively engaged in the search and return to their homeland.

– How do you search for them and what are the results?

– We work both in Afghanistan and in the countries adjacent to it, in particular in Pakistan. At the same time, we resort to the help of domestic and foreign special services. Over the past year, we have been able to learn in detail about the uprising of 15 Soviet prisoners of war in Badaber (Pakistan) in April 1985, to reconstruct the course of events, to find out the names of almost all the participants.

- How many prisoners of war and missing have you found over the years?

“With the help of our committee, we found and returned 12 people to their homeland. Mostly from Afghanistan. But former Soviet soldiers also live in the USA, Canada, Germany... One, who lived in Afghanistan and was found by us, returned to his family and friends, after spending a little time in Russia, again returned "beyond the river", as they said then: there he already had long family, children, he converted to Islam ...

Let me remind you that in total 417 people went missing and were captured, 119 of them were released, 97 returned home. Recently we have brought the next remains of soldiers. We currently have a group working in Afghanistan, where two more graves have been discovered.

- What is the main lesson of that war for you personally?

- There is no need to impose your model of socio-economic and other structure on a foreign country, to introduce “your own” system of power. At that time, we transferred everything that we had negative things in the USSR to Afghan soil, even religion began to be canceled ... Therefore, we could not but lose.

There are US troops in Afghanistan right now. To what extent do they take into account the experience of the battles of the Soviet troops?

- In any case, they do not conduct such hostilities as we do there. They are huddled there in their camps, bases, they carry out pinpoint special operations, nothing more.

– But to some extent they are trying to build democracy there in their own image and likeness...

You need to know Afghanistan. As long as Washington gives money to Kabul, the Afghan government will tolerate the presence of Americans in the country. You know what our employees say when they come from business trips to Afghanistan. Former Mujahideen say: we are fools that we fought with you! After all, the Americans deceived us, promised a bright future, and for several years now they have been solving only their “narrow” tasks, while profiting from the fight against international terrorism. And the Soviet Union at one time built roads, schools, hospitals in this impoverished country ...

– And how has the attitude towards internationalist soldiers changed in Russia and other CIS countries over the years?

- Yes, in general, no way. "Afghans" in honor, they are appreciated. In recent years, we have also established close cooperation with public "Afghan" organizations of the Baltic countries. Except perhaps Turkmenistan... The local "Afghans", and there are more than 12 thousand of them, have closed in on themselves. We correspond with them, provide them with some assistance, I personally invite them to our events, but alas...

What is the help you provide?

– Once a year, we approve a program of medical and social rehabilitation. Currently, our committee has registered 2,000 internationalist soldiers with no upper and lower limbs, 1,600 of them have no both legs, 15 have both arms, 30 have no legs and one arm, 430 live with one arm. The number of disabled people is growing. If in 1991 there were 15 thousand of them, then in 2003 their number exceeded 20 thousand people. Every year, up to 12% of the children participating in hostilities are recognized as disabled for the first time. The war is catching up with them.

Through the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, we are trying to synchronize some things. For example, there used to be benefits for “Afghans”, now they have been canceled in many countries. But in other countries, say, in Russia, free travel for "Afghans" remained. And we want an “Afghan”, for example, from Ukraine, to be able to travel around Russia for free. Therefore, we are seeking the introduction of some kind of unified certificates.

- How many internationalist soldiers are now fighting in Afghanistan?

– According to the official data given to us by the republics, there are 673,846 people. These are those that were called up from the territories of the CIS countries. Most of them are in Russia (306,600), Ukraine (160,375) and Uzbekistan (72,102), least of all - in Moldova (7412), Armenia (5371) and Azerbaijan and Georgia equally - 3369 people each. In addition, 5400 “Afghans” still live in Lithuania, 2350 in Latvia and 1652 “Afghans” in Estonia.

At the moment, in a country like Russia, which does not get out of either wars, or conflicts, or counter-terrorism operations, there is still no state body that would deal with "Afghans", "Algerians", "Spaniards", "Chechens" and other internationalist warriors. And let's say, in the same USA there is a Department of Veterans Affairs. This ministry is annually allocated 36 billion dollars, which is almost a third of the budget of the Russian Federation. And we have a law on veterans, a good law, which was adopted long ago and in the development of which we participated, practically does not work in its financial part. Its articles, when the budget is adopted, are suspended.

– Afghan and Chechen wars, do you think they are similar?

- Both wars are similar in that on both sides we are fighting partisans of the same kind. Therefore, in combat and in moral and psychological terms, the Afghan and Chechen wars are one and the same. But in the political and legal sense, these are, of course, completely different things.

But there is another aspect. Our state does not realize that when soldiers return from a war, be it "Afghan" or "Chechen", they need to be dealt with - in many areas. Our first return from Afghanistan was in 1980-1981, and the "Afghans" of the 80s still managed to somehow grab onto a peaceful life. Benefits were introduced, we were given jobs, we were given apartments, we were treated, our youth was brought up by our examples... Later, when perestroika broke out, and then democracy, the market, all this was already much more difficult to do. What can we say about "Chechens" today?! They don't do anything for them right now. Take the same "combat". Increased salaries will be introduced and for months, or even years, they do not pay the money due.

I understand this matter as follows: an appropriate program is created, and funds are allocated for it, an official responsible for its implementation is appointed, and so on. And we are told: why create a program or, all the more so, some special body, when we have the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Social Protection, the Pension Fund? So they each pull their own, but there’s a little problem: it’s not mine, it’s not mine ... And then, do not confuse the problems of an ordinary person and the problems of those who went through hostilities, these are completely different things.

This is one. But we also made a mistake in the course of the Chechen campaigns - we began to send police units to Chechnya, designed to protect public order. There he, a policeman, shot at people, killed, shot at him, and now he has returned with his psyche turned upside down and must continue to protect public order! The "Chechen syndrome" in the police environment is already working today, from "Chechen" policemen it is passed on to those who did not participate in this counter-terrorist operation, an example of this is the numerous cases of bullying of citizens by people in police uniforms.

– What is your forecast of the situation in Chechnya?

- As it goes, so everything will go. No war, no peace. Both in the near future and in the longer term. In addition, it is clear that the situation there is being fueled by external forces. The same United States openly declared the Caucasus a zone of their interests.

- They say that the problem is that if the leaders of the separatists - Basayev and Maskhadov - are caught, the situation will change for the better and even reverse.

- Stupidity! Dudayev was killed - and what has changed? Money went from one to another or to others. The problem is that during the years of the war there appeared fighters even worse than Basayev, or Gelayev, or any of their ilk. There, since 1992, when the events began, young people have grown up who neither studied at school nor were in the Komsomol (by the way, unlike Basayev), who are generally illiterate, learned only to play with military weapons and see the enemy in everyone Russian soldier. Those who in 1994, when the war began, were 7-10 years old, today 17-20, these are real wolves. For ten years, they only saw that they wanted to beautifully destroy them (“two regiments”), and they were brought up in the spirit of the fact that their enemy is Russia.

- And you finally left politics? Do you have any plans for the future?

- I don't have any plans yet. I do committee business and I love it. At one time, I came into politics by force. And if I wanted to become, say, a deputy, I would have no problems. But I do not want. I can’t imagine what I would do in the current State Duma... Is this the State Duma?!

Soviet war in Afghanistan e lasted 9 years 1 month and 18 days.

Date of: 979-1989

Place: Afghanistan

Outcome: The overthrow of H. Amin, the withdrawal of Soviet troops

Enemies: USSR, DRA against - Afghan Mujahideen, Foreign Mujahideen

Supported by : Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, USA, UK, Iran

Side forces

USSR: 80-104 thousand military personnel

DRA: 50-130 thousand military personnel According to the NVO, no more than 300 thousand

From 25 thousand (1980) to more than 140 thousand (1988)

Afghan war 1979-1989 - a prolonged political and armed confrontation between the parties: the ruling pro-Soviet regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with the military support of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) - on the one hand, and the Mujahideen ("dushmans"), with a part of the Afghan society sympathizing with them, with political and financial support of foreign countries and a number of states of the Islamic world - on the other.

The decision to send troops of the USSR Armed Forces to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in accordance with the secret resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. friendly regime in Afghanistan. The decision was made by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, A. A. Gromyko and L. I. Brezhnev).

To achieve these goals, the USSR sent a group of troops into Afghanistan, and a detachment of special forces from among the emerging special unit of the KGB "Vympel" killed the incumbent President H. Amin and everyone who was with him in the palace. By decision of Moscow, the protege of the USSR, the former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Afghanistan in Prague, B. Karmal, became the new leader of Afghanistan, whose regime received significant and versatile - military, financial and humanitarian - support from the Soviet Union.

Chronology of the Soviet war in Afghanistan

1979

December 25 - Columns of the Soviet 40th Army cross the Afghan border on a pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and ordered the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA to assist the troops being brought in.

1980

January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government rebellion by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. During the battle, about 100 rebels were killed; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded.

February 23 - tragedy in the tunnel at the Salang pass. During the movement of oncoming columns in the middle of the tunnel, a collision occurred, a traffic jam formed. As a result, 16 Soviet servicemen suffocated.

March - the first major offensive operation of the OKSV units against the Mujahideen - the Kunar Offensive.

April 20-24 - Massive anti-government demonstrations in Kabul are dispersed by low-flying jets.

April - The US Congress authorizes $15 million in "direct and open assistance" to the Afghan opposition. The first military operation in Panjshir.

June 19 - decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the withdrawal of some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.

1981

September - fighting in the Lurkoh mountain range in the province of Farah; the death of Major General Khakhalov.

October 29 - the introduction of the second "Muslim battalion" (177 OSSN) under the command of Major Kerimbaev ("Kara Major").

December - the defeat of the base point of the opposition in the Darzab region (Dzauzjan province).

1982

November 3 - Tragedy at the Salang pass. More than 176 people died as a result of the explosion of a fuel tanker. (Already during the years of the civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, Salang became a natural barrier and in 1997 the tunnel was blown up on the orders of Ahmad Shah Massoud to prevent the Taliban from advancing to the north. In 2002, after the unification of the country, the tunnel was reopened).

November 15 - meeting of Y. Andropov and Ziyaul-Khak in Moscow. The Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani leader, during which he informed him about the "new flexible policy of the Soviet side and understanding of the need for a speedy resolution of the crisis." The meeting also discussed the question of the expediency of the war and the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops from Pakistan, it was required to refuse assistance to the rebels.

1983

January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, dushmans abducted a group of Soviet civilian specialists numbering 16 people. They were released only a month later, while six of them died.

February 2 - The village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan was destroyed by bombs in retaliation for the hostage-taking in Mazar-i-Sharif.

March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation headed by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordoves with Y. Andropov. He thanks the UN for "understanding the problem" and assures the mediators that he is ready to take "certain steps", but doubts that Pakistan and the US will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.

April - an operation to defeat opposition groups in the Nijrab Gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.

May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan "to set a date for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops."

July - Dushman offensive on Khost. An attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.

August - the hard work of the mission of D. Cordoves to prepare agreements on a peaceful settlement of the war in Afghanistan is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country has been developed, however, after Andropov's illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of the Politburo meetings. Now it was only about "dialogue with the UN".

Winter - hostilities intensified in the Sarobi region and the Jalalabad valley (the reports most often mention the province of Laghman). For the first time, armed opposition detachments remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and resistance bases directly in the country began.

1984

January 16 - Dushmans shot down a Su-25 aircraft from the Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first case of successful use of MANPADS in Afghanistan.

April 30 - During a major operation in the Panjshir Gorge, the 1st Battalion of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses.

October - over Kabul from the Strela MANPADS, dushmans shoot down an Il-76 transport aircraft.

1985

April 26 - Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war revolt in the Badaber prison in Pakistan.

June - army operation in Panjshir.

Summer is a new course of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for a political solution to the "Afghan problem".

Autumn - The functions of the 40th Army are reduced to covering the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are involved. The creation of basic base areas in hard-to-reach places of the country has begun.

1986

February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of the development of a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.

March - the decision of the R. Reagan administration to start deliveries to Afghanistan to support the Mujahiddins with the Stinger ground-to-air MANPADS, which makes the combat aviation of the 40th Army vulnerable to ground attack.

April 4-20 - an operation to defeat the Javar base: a major defeat for the dushmans. Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan's detachments to break through the "security zone" around Herat.

May 4 - at the XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, instead of B. Karmal, M. Najibullah, who previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence service KhAD, was elected to the post of Secretary General. The plenum proclaimed the policy of solving the problems of Afghanistan by political means.

July 28 - M. Gorbachev defiantly announced the imminent withdrawal of six regiments of the 40th Army from Afghanistan (about 7 thousand people). The withdrawal date will be rescheduled at a later date. In Moscow, there are disputes about whether to withdraw troops completely.

August - Massoud defeated the base of government troops in Farkhar, Takhar province.

Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group from the 173rd detachment of the 16th special forces brigade captures the first batch of three Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile systems in the Kandahar region.

October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.

November 13 - The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU sets the task of withdrawing all troops from Afghanistan within two years.

December — an emergency plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA proclaims a course towards a policy of national reconciliation and advocates an early end to the fratricidal war.

1987

January 2 - An operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces General of the Army V. I. Varennikov was sent to Kabul.

February - Operation "Strike" in the province of Kunduz.

February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar province.

March - Operation Thunderstorm in the province of Ghazni. Operation Circle in the provinces of Kabul and Logar.

May - operation "Volley" in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul. Operation "South-87" in the province of Kandahar.

Spring - Soviet troops begin to use the Barrier system to cover the eastern and southeastern sections of the border.

1988

Soviet spetsnaz group preparing for operation in Afghanistan

April 14 - Through the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The USSR and the USA became the guarantors of the agreements. The Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting from May 15; The US and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

June 24 - Opposition detachments captured the center of the province of Wardak - the city of Maidanshahr.

1989

February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the Limited Contingent, Lieutenant-General B.V. Gromov, who, allegedly, was the last to cross the border river Amu-Darya (the city of Termez).

War in Afghanistan - results

Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army (led the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), in his book "Limited Contingent" expressed this opinion regarding the victory or defeat of the Soviet Army in the war in Afghanistan:

I am deeply convinced that there is no basis for asserting that the 40th Army was defeated, nor that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country without hindrance, completed their tasks, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, and returned to their homeland in an organized manner. If we consider armed opposition detachments as the main enemy of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us lies in the fact that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans only what they could.

The 40th Army had several main tasks. First of all, we had to assist the government of Afghanistan in resolving the internal political situation. Basically, this assistance consisted in the fight against armed opposition groups. In addition, the presence of a significant military contingent in Afghanistan was supposed to prevent aggression from outside. These tasks were fully completed by the personnel of the 40th Army.

The Mujahideen, before the start of the withdrawal of OKSVA in May 1988, never managed to carry out a single major operation and failed to occupy a single large city.

Military casualties in Afghanistan

USSR: 15,031 dead, 53,753 wounded, 417 missing

1979 - 86 people

1980 - 1,484 people

1981 - 1,298 people

1982 - 1,948 people

1983 - 1,448 people

1984 - 2,343 people

1985 - 1,868 people

1986 - 1,333 people

1987 - 1,215 people

1988 - 759 people

1989 - 53 people

By rank:
Generals, officers: 2,129
Ensigns: 632
Sergeants and soldiers: 11,549
Workers and employees: 139

Out of 11,294 people 10,751 people discharged from military service for health reasons remained disabled, of which - 1st group - 672, 2nd group - 4216, 3rd group - 5863 people

Afghan Mujahideen: 56,000-90,000 (civilians from 600 thousand to 2 million people)

Losses in technology

According to official data, there were 147 tanks, 1314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel trucks, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters. At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, no information was published on the number of combat and non-combat losses of aviation, on the losses of aircraft and helicopters by type, etc.

Economic losses of the USSR

About 800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government.