The consequences of the explosion of the Dneproges in 1941. The myth about the "victims of the Dnieper"

In August 1941, the shaft of the Nazi blitzkrieg reached the Dnieper. On August 18, there was a breakthrough of German troops into the city of Zaporozhye, and the local command blew up the DneproGES. As a result of the explosion, a 30-meter wave gushed through a hole of 135 meters. Not only German soldiers fell into the flood zone, but also Red Army soldiers, as well as civilians in coastal areas. Historians argue about the number of victims today.

Why did they blow up the dam

On August 18, the Nazi command sent tank and motorized units to capture the DneproGES. Three hours before the explosion, a German shell hit the bridge connecting Khortitsa with the left bank of the Dnieper. It was possible to get to the opposite part of the river only through the dam, which was fired upon by Soviet artillery. On the island, in complete isolation, there were up to half a thousand Red Army soldiers of the 247th division, who put up a fierce rebuff to the Nazis.

After the Germans occupied Khortitsa, they began a mortar attack on the city. The order to undermine the DneproGES was given personally by Stalin.

The operation was entrusted to lieutenant colonels Epov and Petrovsky. On the evening of August 18, 20 tons of ammonal were blown up. The exact number of victims from the resulting wave is not documented. Oles Gonchar was the first to write about the catastrophe in the book “Man and Weapons” in 1960. In the late 1980s, the journal Sociological Research published an article by researcher A. Rumme, which was called "Tell people the truth."

Disaster on the Dnieper

KGB officer Viktor Rezun-Suvorov, who fled to Britain, wrote that 1,500 Wehrmacht officers and soldiers died from the wave, the rest of the troops were protected by the steep right bank of the Dnieper. However, there is no documentary evidence of this, and the traitor himself is a very unreliable source, repeatedly caught in a lie.

Nevertheless, undermining such a huge structure could not pass without a trace. The wave flooded the spaces of the Dnieper floodplain, demolished the lower part of the city of Zaporozhye and several villages. The memoirs of the surviving local residents were collected by Zaporozhye local historian K. Sushko. One of the eyewitnesses claimed that when the water receded, hundreds of Red Army soldiers and civilians were left hanging on the trees.

The explosion raised the water level in the Dnieper and the 2nd Cavalry Corps, as well as the 18th and 9th armies, were cut off from the "mainland". They crossed the river downstream. Most of the Red Army soldiers were captured or killed. The remnants of the units crossed to the left bank, abandoning all military equipment. It is believed that 20,000 Red Army soldiers and 75,000 to 100,000 civilians died. According to other, also unconfirmed reports, the water killed from 20 to 40 thousand inhabitants of Zaporozhye and the surrounding villages.

What the docs say

The decision to blow up the dam was not spontaneous. It was a pre-planned act and it was carried out on the basis of a cipher message received from the General Staff. Deputy Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR Pervukhin wrote: “In the afternoon, when the laying of explosives was almost completed, a representative of the front headquarters arrived, who handed a telegram to the representatives of the military command at the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station ... It was indicated that in the event of a danger of the Germans occupying the dam, it should be disabled."

Pervukhin recalled that with the onset of darkness, the fighters crossed to the left bank, and the dam was under German shelling, and it was no longer possible to stay on it.

There are also inconsistencies in the history of the dead two infantry armies and a cavalry corps. The withdrawal of troops began on August 17 by order of the commander of the Southern Front under No. 0077/OP. According to him, the units were transferred to the line of defense along the Ingulets River. The 2nd Cavalry Corps - to the area of Nikopol and Nizhny Rogachik, the 18th Army was assigned to the eastern bank of the Dnieper with the task of taking up defense along the Nikopol-Kakhovka line. 9th Army - in the sector from Kakhovka to Kherson. To protect the retreating units, it was ordered to use the rear guards and aviation.

For the redeployment of troops on the left bank of the Dnieper, pontoon crossings were built. On the morning of August 22, the bulk of the troops of the two armies and the cavalry corps ended up on the Left Bank in perfect order. The distance from the dam in Zaporozhye to the village of Nizhny Rogachik, where the 2nd Cavalry Corps was crossing, was more than 120 kilometers. The 18th Army was transported to Kacharovka, which is 160 kilometers from the city. Kakhovka, in which units of the 9th Army were concentrated, was even further downstream of the Dnieper.

Researcher Rumme wrote about 75-100 thousand dead, but these figures are clearly overestimated. Do not forget that after the explosion of the Dnieper hydroelectric power station on August 18, the city continued to defend itself for another 46 days. There were victims from the wave, however, due to the lack of documentary data, we are unlikely to know their exact number.

It is almost impossible to determine the exact number of deaths as a result of the explosion of the hydroelectric power station; the available sources allow us to estimate only the approximate losses of the warring parties. It is known about the probable death of 1500 German soldiers [Moroko V.N. Dneproges: Black August 1941 / / Scientific works of the Faculty of History of the Zaporozhye National University. - M.: ZNU, 2010. - VIP.XXIH. - S.200].

On the Soviet side, most of the 200,000 militiamen of the region, a rifle division (one of its regiments remained on Khortitsa Island), an NKVD regiment, two artillery regiments, and also smaller units were in the flood zone. The personnel of these units totals more than 20 thousand fighters. In addition, on the night of August 18, in a wide strip from Nikopol to Kakhovka and Kherson, two combined arms armies and a cavalry corps began to retreat to the left bank. This is another 12 divisions (150-170 thousand soldiers and officers). In addition to the military, residents of the low-lying streets of Zaporozhye, villages on both banks of the Dnieper, and refugees suffered from a sudden flood. The estimated number of people in the affected area is 450 thousand people. Based on these data, the number of dead Red Army soldiers, militias and civilians from the Soviet side in historical studies is estimated from 20-30 thousand (F. Pigido, V. Moroko) to 75-100 thousand (A. Rummo) [Moroko V.N. Dneproges: Black August 1941 / / Scientific works of the Faculty of History of the Zaporozhye National University. - M.: ZNU, 2010. - VIP.XXIH. - S.201; Rummo A.V. Tell people the truth // Sociological research. - Moscow, 1990. - No.9. - S.128]. By the way, A. Rummo also had a personal motive for researching the issue: his grandfather was among the Soviet citizens who died then on about. Khortytsya. So, the undermining of the DneproGES was carried out by military engineers authorized by the General Staff of the Red Army. Estimates of the number of victims by various researchers range from 20,000 people (F. Pigido, V. Moroko) to 75-100 thousand (A. Rummo).

From the memoirs of the direct performer:
EPOV Boris Alexandrovich
Born October 31, 1900. Colonel engineer. He graduated from the Kazan Military Engineering Courses (subsequently the 4th Engineering School) in 1919, the Military Engineering Academy - in 1937. Candidate of Technical Sciences. Author of many scientific papers on explosives. Laureate of the Stalin (later State) Prize for 1942-1943 (together with P.G. Radevich and N.I. Ivanov). In the Red Army since 1919 (platoon commander of the searchlight company of the Reserve Engineer Battalion, then served in the engineer battalion of the 13th rifle division of the Southern Front, in the 1st training Engineer battalion in a mine-blasting company). Since 1927, he was a senior technician at the mine-blasting laboratory of the Scientific Testing Engineering and Technical (NIIT) Polygon in Nakhabino. From 1939 to 1941 - teaching at the Military Engineering Academy. Member of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. In the first days of the Great Patriotic War, he left for Leningrad to test the remote control of anti-tank mine-protective means. From mid-July 1941, he participated in the reconnaissance and design of a system of engineering barriers on the outskirts of Moscow. From 1946 to 1950 he was the head of the Special Laboratory for Impact and Explosion. From 1950 to 1955 - Head of the Department of Explosives and Barrages of the Military Engineering Academy.

Here is what Boris Alexandrovich recalls about these days:
On August 14, I was summoned by the head of the engineering troops, General L.Z. Kotlyar offered to give ideas about the decommissioning of the Dnieper hydroelectric power station by destroying the dam, the bridge across the avankamera and the engine room and the materials necessary for this, and also ordered me to fly in the morning by a special plane to Zaporozhye to prepare the planned destruction, giving me two junior lieutenants and giving the necessary instructions Chief of Engineering Troops of the Southern Front, Colonel Shifrin.
Arriving in Zaporozhye and making sure that the necessary materials were delivered by another plane and were at the airfield, I went to the chief of the front and T. Kolomiyets, a member of the military council of the front, who was in Zaporozhye, and then proceeded with the help of the aforementioned junior lieutenants and one battalion allocated to prepare for the implementation of the received tasks. The head of DneproEnergo at that time was preparing and evacuating the station's generators. The protection of the preparatory work was carried out by the NKVD regiment.

The chief of staff of the front, General Kharitonov, who arrived with the commander Shifrin, ordered the destruction to be carried out after the Germans reached the right bank of the Dnieper. The right to carry out the task will be the withdrawal of the security regiment of the NKVD and Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Petrovsky, specially allocated for communication.
By the end of the day on August 18, the Germans reached the right bank of the Dnieper and began shelling the left bank; the NKVD regiment also withdrew to the left bank and the regiment commander, retreating together with the liaison lieutenant colonel Petrovsky, gave the command to carry out the destruction, which, together with the attached junior lieutenants, was carried out by me. As a result of the explosion in the body of the dam, about 100 meters along its length were torn out (out of the total length of the dam equal to 600m).
General Zaporozhets, head of the political department of the front, had to report on the execution of the destruction, since the entire composition of the Military Council of the front was in the troops and at the headquarters of the front.

Zaporozhets was the eldest of the officers; but he was in a panic mood, since he was located with the headquarters of the front on the left bank, while the Germans had already reached the right bank, and, moreover, he was not aware of the decision of the GOKO to put the Dneproges out of action. Therefore, his reaction was: "Surrender weapons." The idle adjutant, having taken away my revolver and not knowing what to do with me, in view of the order that had already been received to relocate the headquarters deep into the defense, handed me over to the front-line SMERSH (OGPU bodies in the troops during the war). SMERSH, of course, also not knowing about the order of the GOKO, charged me with treason and for ten days asked me - whose wrecking task I carried out; but forHowever, having understood the true state of affairs, he did not know how to get out of the created incident.

At this time, General Kotlyar got an appointment with Comrade Stalin and reported to him about this case; Stalin immediately gave instructions to the NKVD in the evening, and in the morning at 6 o’clock I was already released from arrest; the head of the front-line SMERSH apologized to me and took measures to put me in order and transfer me to the headquarters of the front engineering troops, and from there I returned by plane on September 20 to Moscow.
In 41 there were special departments, and SMERSH appeared in 1943 - Smersh (note SK)

From the testimony of the former assistant to the head of the Political Directorate of the Southern Front for the Komsomol, B.S. Melnikov:
Leading officials of the political department of the Southern Front “... On the night of August 17-18, the situation in the Zaporozhye direction of the Southern Front changed dramatically. The enemy broke through our defenses and the city, in fact, remained uncovered. Here is what was reported about the current situation by the Political Directorate of the Southern Front in a report addressed to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army Comrade. Mehlis: - ... On the morning of August 18, the enemy, with forces up to an infantry division with tanks, launched an offensive against the city of Zaporozhye. The poorly armed 274 s [rifle] division, which had just been put into battle, defending the Zaporozhye bridgehead, began to withdraw under the onslaught of the enemy ... To restore order, Major General Kharitonov was sent to the division by the Military Council (at that time he was deputy [alnik] of the front headquarters ...), and the political department of the front - 20 political workers, who were divided into two groups of ten people. One group operated under the leadership of the assistant to the head of the political department of the Southern Front for Komsomol, the battalion commissar. Melnikov, another under the leadership of the head of the political administration department, battalion commissar comrade. Usova. ... On August 19, 20 and 21, employees of the political department took an active part in organizing the battle, supplying the division with ammunition and food, and evacuating the wounded ...

Before our group, Comrade Zaporozhets, a member of the Military Council, and the leadership of the Political Directorate, Comrade Mamonov and Brezhnev, were tasked with holding back the randomly retreating units across the island of Khortitsa at any cost, creating a hasty defense of them along the old channel of the Dnieper, reliably covering the bridge. Stop the advance of the enemy and hold out until reinforcements arrive. The second group was supposed to operate in the area of the Dneproges dam.
A few minutes later we dismounted from the truck on the bridge connecting the city with the island of Khortytsya, since it was already impossible to drive further by car. The bridge was filled with an avalanche of people: cars, carts and cattle. It took superhuman efforts from each of us to hold back those fleeing in panic under enemy fire and turn them towards the enemy ...
Here we met with Major General Kharitonov, who approved of our actions and personally helped to form combat detachments and specified combat missions for them. The enemy was stopped. Three enemy tanks were knocked out on the bridge. Everyone perked up, cherishing the hope that reinforcements would soon come to us.
But after some time, the situation on the island of Khortytsia became simply critical and, it seemed, hopeless. There was a tremendous explosion, and soon another. The bridge of the dam was blown up and the bridge connecting the island with the city of Zaporozhye was blown up. The bridge across the old channel remained intact and, in fact, became open to fascist evil spirits.

The study of the available documents of the 157th regiment of the NKVD troops for the protection of especially important industrial enterprises, which guarded and defended the Dneproges until the last minute, allows us to set the time of the dam explosion to the nearest hour: 20.00-20.30 August 18, 1941.
It was at this time that the Dneproges, the Dnieper dams, the railway bridge across the Dnieper were blown up.
Military transports and people who were moving along the dam at that time naturally died. As a result of the explosion of the bridge and dam on the island of Khortytsya, an infantry regiment was cut off, which at that time was being transported to the eastern coast.
A large gap formed in the body of the dam, an active discharge of water began. As a result, a vast flood zone appeared in the lower reaches of the Dnieper. A giant wave washed away several enemy crossings, sank many fascist units that had taken refuge in the floodplains. But the water that escaped to freedom did not divide people into “us” and “them”.

In the memoirs of Speer, who from September 1930 was the head of the military construction of the Reich, and from February 1942 - the Reich Minister of Armaments, it is reported: “... I also visited the power plant blown up by the Russians in Zaporozhye. In it, after a large construction part managed to close a gap in the dam, German turbines were installed. During their retreat, the Russians disabled the equipment in a very simple and remarkable way: by switching the lubricant distributor with the turbines at full speed. Deprived of lubrication, the machines became hot and literally devoured themselves, turning into a pile of unusable scrap metal. A very effective means of destruction and everything - with a simple turn of the handle by one person!.

An almost thirty-meter avalanche of water swept through the Dnieper floodplain, flooding everything in its path. The entire lower part of Zaporozhye with huge stocks of various goods, military materials and tens of thousands of tons of food and other property was demolished in an hour. Dozens of ships, along with ship crews, perished in that terrible stream. The strength of the wave formed during the explosion of the DneproGES dam was such that the Volochaevka monitor was thrown ashore and then could be used as a defensive structure only on land.

In the floodplain zone of the island of Khortitsa and the Dnieper floodplains, tens of kilometers to Nikopol and beyond, military units stood in positions. The explosion of the dam sharply raised the water level in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, where at that time the crossing of the troops of the 2nd cavalry corps, the 18th and 9th armies, retreating near Nikolaev, began. These troops were "cut off" during the crossing, partly replenished the number of troops that were surrounded and captured, and partly managed to cross in incredibly difficult conditions, abandoning artillery and military equipment.

Here is how eyewitnesses describe this event:
“Suddenly the earth shook. Mishka looked to the west and gasped: there, somewhere near the Dnieper, a huge, agromagnest black mushroom rose silently, rising ... Dam! They blew up the dam!
“Mom, open your mouth wider!”
- What?
— Open! Wider! Mouth!
And it exploded! Oh, how it exploded! Our pride, our love, our handsome Dneproges, our dear Dniprostan, what a pain in our hearts your pain responded, your mortal wound, which, oh, how it will not heal soon! And how many more such wounds are ahead?
Ilya Kogan. That's how it was...

Here is what the former Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars M. G. Pervukhin writes in his memoirs:

In the afternoon, when the laying of explosives was almost completed, a representative of the front headquarters arrived, who handed the representatives of the military command at the Dneproges a telegram from the commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction, Marshal S. M. Budyonny, specifying the date of the explosion. It stated that in case of danger of occupation of the dam by the Germans, it should be put out of action. It was getting dark, the fighters crossed over the pottern to the left bank, since it was no longer possible to pass along the dam from above, because it was under strong enemy artillery fire. The moment came when the commander of the military unit defending the Dneproges closed the battery contacts, a dull explosion shook the dam.

On the evening of August 18, the outskirts of Zaporozhye resounded with the sound of an explosion of enormous force. A twenty-ton charge of TNT blew up the dam of the DneproGES. As a result of the explosion of the bridge and dam on the island of Khortytsya, an infantry regiment was cut off, which successfully defended itself, and then crossed to the eastern coast. The explosion of the dam sharply raised the water level in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, where at that time the crossing of the retreating troops of the 2nd cavalry corps, 18th and 9th armies began. Crossing of the 9th and 18th armies across the Dnieper.

... on August 18 .... when I got to the pier, I saw that the entire Oak Grove and coastal houses were flooded with Dnieper water, because on the night of the 17th ours blew up the dam (cofferdam) of the Dnieper hydroelectric power station, and the water gushed in a strong shaft and demolished everything in its path. And in the floodplains below the city there were many livestock and people. There was an ominous silence and desolation in the city, the Germans were waiting from hour to hour - the people on the occasion staged a robbery of mills and shops. The authorities came to their senses and after a couple of days order was restored in the city.

Shvidka Zoya. I am Zoya... (Memories of Shvidka Zoya Petrovna)

Leonid Sosnitsky claims that the order to destroy the Dneproges was given by the commander of the South-Western direction Budyonny S.M. " On the afternoon of August 18, Semyon Budyonny was seen in Zaporozhye (all known historical sources are silent about this), and it was probably he who decided to undermine the Dneproges. By that time, the Nazis were already masters of the situation on the island of Khortytsya, deployed artillery. They got to the island "for company" - absolutely peacefully, together with the encircled, militia, evacuated civilians and collective farm cattle. No one, according to the recollections, interfered with anything, the Germans also behaved "culturally". So the bridge across the Old Dnieper went to the enemy, and through the New Dnieper (the second branch of the river that washes Khortitsa - near the left bank) they managed to undermine. This was done so hastily and fussily that the troops, abandoning equipment and weapons, crossed a very significant water obstacle on some boards, barrels.».

The truth about Soviet power is bitter
and it certainly doesn't match what's on TV lately

“During the retreat on August 18, 1941, the fleeing Red Army blew up the dam of the Dnieper hydroelectric power station, killing 100,000 Ukrainians in the abyss of water.
PHOTO: Federal Archive of Germany. - A German officer against the backdrop of a power plant destroyed by the Soviets.

The advancing German soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, in a stupor with horror, only watched through binoculars the drama of the death of tens of thousands of people.
The Germans, with the help of Wehrmacht engineers and the forces of Ukrainian workers, managed to restore the Dneproges, and even paid for the work with Reichsmarks. But not having had time to work even a year during the counteroffensive of Stalin's troops, it had to be blown up again. Now with the retreat of the Germans. By the way, by the way, during this already German operation, not a single Soviet, not a single German, and not a single peaceful Ukrainian died ...
Ukraine needs to make a disaster film about this.

DETAILS:

On August 18, 1941, in a panic, retreating from Ukraine occupied by the Bolsheviks since 1920, Stalin's troops, trying to stop the advance of the Wehrmacht to the East, despite the danger to the civilian population and possible thousands of victims, cynically blew up the dam of the Ukrainian power plant DneproGES, near Zaporozhye ... As a result the explosion of the DneproGES dam by the Bolsheviks, from the resulting giant Dnieper wave, then killed about 100,000 (one hundred thousand) people of the innocent civilian population of Ukraine. - The Soviet occupation authorities in Ukraine did not take into account the lives of the people of Ukraine (UNR) enslaved by them since 1920.

Only with the restoration of Ukraine's independence from the USSR, the Cossacks began to slowly commemorate their countrymen, who died at the hands of Stalin's fleeing army on August 18, 1941.

On August 18, 1941, hastily leaving the city, Soviet soldiers blew up the main strategic facility - the DneproGES - with 20 tons of explosives - ammonal, resulting in a giant hole in the dam, which already provoked a wave several tens of meters high, which practically washed away the coastal city strip, float about. Khortytsia and safely reached the neighboring Ukrainian cities - Nikopol and Marganets. The Soviet command did not even warn the civilian population and their own troops about the danger! That is why in the USSR they preferred not to talk about the tragic events in Zaporozhye related to the explosion of the DneproGES.
It was the same with Chernobyl, the death of Kursk, Nord-Ost, Beslan ... - the Russian-Soviet fascist administrative tradition continues to dominate us even now.

Then, for their own justification, they came up with a version of "hostile sabotage by the German occupiers." But now that there is access to the archives of the USSR, Ukrainian historians have received documentary evidence that raises the curtain on all the inhumanity of this terrible tragedy. The Dnieper wave then swallowed up about a hundred thousand people: in the abyss of the man-made water element, 80 thousand Cossacks, refugees from neighboring regions, and about 20 thousand retreating Soviet soldiers choked and died.
The irony was that the man-made Soviet tsunami did little to no harm to the advancing German army, but killed 100,000 ordinary Ukrainians. - The German soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, in a stupor with horror, only watched through binoculars the drama of the deaths of tens of thousands of people - Soviet civilians and soldiers.

With the "Day" of the "Great Victory" - "I remember! I'm proud!"

DECLASSIFIED SOVIET DATA:

In response to your letter no. 19760/09-38 dated 08/17/2011 on the provision of information, we report the following.
1. "The undermining of the DneproGES was organized by the NKVD, which led to the death of 100 thousand people." According to a combat report dated August 19 of the headquarters of the Southern Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the dam of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station was blown up by the head of the Department of the Military Engineering Directorate of the headquarters of the Southern Front, Lieutenant Colonel O. Petrovsky and a representative of the General Staff, head of a separate research military engineering institute (Moscow) military engineer 1 rank B.Epov [Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. - F.228. - Op.754. - Ref.60. - Arch.95]. They acted in accordance with the orders of the General Staff of the Red Army, having received permission in case of emergency to blow up the dam.

It is almost impossible to determine the exact number of dead, the available sources allow us to estimate only the approximate losses of the warring parties. It is known about the probable death of 1500 German soldiers [Moroko V.N. Dneproges: Black August 1941 / / Scientific works of the Faculty of History of the Zaporozhye National University. - M.: ZNU, 2010. - VIP.XXIH. - S.200].

P.S. At the moment, it is not known for sure whether the highest government posts in Ukraine, already independent of the USSR, are occupied by direct descendants of the Soviet military responsible for this atrocity.

P.S.S. The monument to Stalin in Zaporozhye, taking into account these events, looks "very harmonious" ... - from the point of view of self-masochism."

During the retreat on August 18, 1941, the fleeing Red Army blew up the dam of the Dnieper hydroelectric power station, killing 100,000 Ukrainians in the abyss of water.
The advancing German soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, in a stupor with horror, only watched through binoculars the drama of the death of tens of thousands of people.
The Germans, with the help of Wehrmacht engineers and the forces of Ukrainian workers, managed to restore the Dneproges, and even paid for the work with Reichsmarks. But not having had time to work even a year during the counteroffensive of Stalin's troops, it had to be blown up again. Now with the retreat of the Germans. By the way, by the way, during this already German operation, not a single Soviet, not a single German, and not a single peaceful Ukrainian died ...
Ukraine needs to make a disaster film about this.

Only with the restoration of Ukraine's independence from the USSR, the Cossacks began to slowly commemorate their countrymen, who died at the hands of Stalin's fleeing army on August 18, 1941.

With the "Day" of the "Great Victory" - "I remember! I'm proud!"

DECLASSIFIED SOVIET DATA:

On August 18, 1941, the Soviet leadership in a panic ordered to blow up the dam of the Dnieper hydroelectric power station, along which refugees and retreating Soviet troops were walking at that time. The explosion generated a giant wave that killed several thousand more Soviet citizens and military personnel.
This myth is used to "illustrate" the inhumanity of the Soviet leadership and their disregard for the lives of their own citizens.

Examples of using

Option 1
“By order of the commander of the South-Western direction, Semyon Budyonny, sappers of the 157th NKVD regiment are undermining the Dnieper hydroelectric power station. The explosion only partially destroyed the dam, but a huge wall of water rushed downstream. According to eyewitnesses, the wave height was several tens of meters. She destroyed not only the German crossings and a relatively small number of enemy troops.
Option #2
Giant whirlpools cut off and literally sucked into themselves two of our retreating combined arms armies and a cavalry corps. Only separate scattered groups were able to swim out, then they were surrounded and captured. The wave hit the coastal Zaporozhye strip and columns of refugees.
Option #3
In addition to troops and refugees, many people who worked there, the local civilian population, hundreds of thousands of livestock died in the floodplains and the coastal zone. In a catastrophic stream, dozens of ships, along with ship crews, perished.
Option #4
“Then, during the retreat of our troops, it was decided to blow up the Dneproges. Few knew about the secret encryption. But the operation did not go as planned. The charge was not calculated, as a result, a gap was formed in the body of the dam 5 times larger than the calculated one. A powerful stream of water gushed into the lower reaches of the Dnieper. All coastal villages with local residents were washed away by a giant wave, pontoon crossings of our troops were destroyed. As a result of the flood, the fighters of the two combined arms armies and the cavalry corps, for the most part, were surrounded and captured.
Option #5
All work on the preparation of the explosion was carried out in secret from the front command, since the Military Council of the front did not give permission for this.
Option #6
A breakthrough wave about 25 meters high surged down the river bed. A giant stream demolished all the coastal villages on its way, burying several thousand civilians under it. Two combined arms armies and a cavalry corps were cut off during the crossing. Some of the fighters managed to cross the Dnieper in the most difficult conditions, while most of the military personnel were surrounded and captured.
Option #7
“No one was warned about the planned explosion of the Dnieper dam either at the dam itself, along which at that time military transports and troops were moving, which retreated to the left bank of the Dnieper, nor the population and institutions of the city of Zaporozhye - 10-12 kilometers from the hydroelectric power station downstream of the Dnieper . The military units located down from Zaporozhye in the Dnieper floodplains were also not warned.
Option #8
Military transports and people who were moving along the dam at that time naturally died. An almost thirty-meter avalanche of water swept through the Dnieper floodplain, flooding everything in its path. Dozens of ships, along with ship crews, perished in that terrible stream.
Option #9
The explosion of the dam sharply raised the water level in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, where at that time the crossing of the troops of the 2nd cavalry corps, the 18th and 9th armies, retreating near Nikolaev, began. These troops were "cut off" during the crossing, partly replenished the number of troops that were surrounded and captured, and partly managed to cross in incredibly difficult conditions, abandoning artillery and military equipment.
Option #10
It was said that approximately 20,000 Red Army soldiers died in the floodplains at that time - exactly how many no one thought to count. In addition to the troops, tens of thousands of cattle and many people who were at work there at that time died in the floodplains.
Option #11
“Then, from the huge wave caused by the explosion, from 75 to 100,000 unwarned residents and about 20,000 Red Army soldiers, forgotten by the command and not evacuated, died.”
Option #12
“On August 18, 1941, in a panic, retreating from Ukraine occupied by the Bolsheviks since 1920, Stalin’s troops, trying to stop the advance of the Wehrmacht to the East, despite the danger to the civilian population and possible thousands of victims, cynically blew up the dam of the Ukrainian power plant DneproGES, near Zaporozhye ... As a result of the explosion By the Bolsheviks of the Dnieper hydroelectric dam, from the resulting giant Dnieper wave, then about 100,000 (one hundred thousand) people of the innocent civilian population of Ukraine died. The German soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, in a stupor with horror, only watched through binoculars the drama of the deaths of tens of thousands of people - Soviet civilians and military personnel."

Reality

The analysis of this myth is better divided into several parts, and you can start with the fact that supposedly no one knew about the upcoming undermining of the dam, including the command of the Soviet troops defending it.
The explosion of the DneproGES dam was carried out on the basis of a cipher message from Stalin and Shaposhnikov, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, to the command of the Southern Front. To carry out this operation, the head of the engineering troops of the Red Army, General Kotlyar, sent an experienced demolition officer, Lieutenant Colonel Boris Epov. To communicate with the engineering department of the front, he was paired with a specialist in the technical department, Lieutenant Colonel Petrovsky. Here is what the former Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars M.G. writes in his memoirs. Pervukhin: “In the afternoon, when the laying of explosives was almost completed, a representative of the front headquarters arrived, who handed the representatives of the military command at the Dneproges a telegram from the commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction, Marshal S. M. Budyonny, specifying the date of the explosion. It stated that in case of danger of occupation of the dam by the Germans, it should be put out of action.
It was getting dark, the fighters crossed over the pottern to the left bank, since it was no longer possible to pass along the dam from above, because it was under strong enemy artillery fire. The moment came when the commander of the military unit defending the Dneproges closed the contacts of the battery, a dull explosion shook the dam.

photo taken May 5, 1942
And here is what the direct organizer of the explosion, Lieutenant Colonel Epov, writes in his memoirs:
On August 14, I was summoned by the head of the engineering troops, General L.Z. Kotlyal and offered to give ideas about the decommissioning of the Dnieper hydroelectric power station by destroying the dam, the bridge across the avankamera and the engine room and the materials necessary for this, and also ordered me to fly in the morning by a special plane to Zaporozhye to prepare the planned destruction, giving me two junior lieutenants and giving the necessary instructions Chief of Engineering Troops of the Southern Front, Colonel Shifrin.
Arriving in Zaporozhye and making sure that the necessary materials were delivered by another plane and were at the airfield, I went to the chief of the front and T. Kolomiyets, a member of the military council of the front, who was in Zaporozhye, and then proceeded with the help of the aforementioned junior lieutenants and one battalion allocated to prepare for the implementation of the received tasks. The head of DneproEnergo at that time was preparing and evacuating the station's generators. The protection of the preparatory work was carried out by the NKVD regiment.
The chief of staff of the front, General Kharitonov, who arrived with the commander Shifrin, ordered the destruction to be carried out after the Germans reached the right bank of the Dnieper. The right to carry out the task will be the withdrawal of the security regiment of the NKVD and Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Petrovsky, specially allocated for communication.
By the end of the day on August 18, the Germans reached the right bank of the Dnieper and began shelling the left bank; the NKVD regiment also withdrew to the left bank and the regiment commander, retreating together with the liaison lieutenant colonel Petrovsky, gave the command to carry out the destruction, which, together with the attached junior lieutenants, was carried out by me. As a result of the explosion in the body of the dam, about 100 meters along its length were torn out (out of the total length of the dam equal to 600m).
General Zaporozhets, head of the political department of the front, had to report on the execution of the destruction, since the entire composition of the Military Council of the front was in the troops and at the headquarters of the front.
Zaporozhets was the eldest of the officers; but he was in a panic mood, since he was located with the headquarters of the front on the left bank, while the Germans had already reached the right bank, and, moreover, he was not aware of the decision of the GOKO to put the Dneproges out of action. Therefore, his reaction was: "Surrender weapons." The idle adjutant, having taken away my revolver and not knowing what to do with me, in view of the order that had already been received to relocate the headquarters deep into the defense, handed me over to front-line counterintelligence (employees of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO in wartime, from April 19, 1943 SMERSH ). The counterintelligence officers, not knowing about the order of the GOKO, charged me with treason and for ten days they asked me whose sabotage task I was carrying out; and then, having understood the true state of affairs, they did not know how to get out of the created incident. At this time, General Kotlyar got an appointment with Comrade Stalin and reported to him about this case; Stalin immediately gave instructions in the evening, and in the morning at 6 o’clock I was already released from arrest; The head of the front-line counterintelligence apologized to me and took measures to put me in order and transfer me to the headquarters of the engineering troops of the front, and from there I returned by plane on September 20 to Moscow.

Photo taken May 8, 1942
Thus, as we can see, the command of the Southern Front was not only aware of the impending explosion, but also actively participated in its preparation. By the way, the memories of direct witnesses of the explosion put an end to the chilling story about the troops and refugees who were crossing along with the dam.
Now consider the fate of the two armies and the cavalry corps, allegedly washed away by the resulting wave.

Photo taken May 8, 1942

Crossing 9th. and 18th armies across the Dnieper.

On August 17, the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction authorized the withdrawal of the troops of the Southern Front to the Dnieper in order to organize a strong defense at the turn of this large water barrier. In the evening of the same day, the combat order of the commander of the troops of the Southern Front No. 0077 / OP followed, which determined the procedure for the withdrawal of the troops of the two armies from the line of the Ingulets River beyond the Dnieper. The 2nd Cavalry Corps was to withdraw to the Nikopol-Nizhny Rogachik area. The 18th Army was withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Dnieper with the task of taking up defense in the Nikopol - Nizhny Rogachik - Kakhovka sector. Accordingly, the 9th Army - in the Kakhovka - Kherson section. The retreat was ordered to be covered by strong rearguards and aviation actions. After the crossing, the newly formed 30th Cavalry Division was transferred to the 18th Army, and the commander of the 9th Army was instructed to subdue the 296th Rifle Division. Thus, all the armies of the front, one way or another, received secondary divisions under their control.
In the section from Nikopol to Kherson, the average width of the Dnieper is about one and a half kilometers. Bulky pontoon parks during the retreat were lost on the roads and in battles. For example, the 2nd Cavalry Corps was forced to leave its pontoon park on the Southern Bug River for the crossing of the retreating units of the 18th Army. The remains of pontoon-bridge property preserved in the armies could only be used for the construction of light ferries. The ships of the Dnieper River Shipping Company came to the aid of the troops. Barges, floating piers quickly adapted to ferries, everything that could be used for the crossing was mobilized.
As a result, three ferry crossings were built:
1) for the 2nd cavalry corps - three ferries on wooden boats near Nizhny Rogachik (for the 5th cavalry division, horses had to be transported by swimming), a tugboat with a barge - at Bolshaya Lepatikha (for the 9th cavalry division);
2) for formations of the 18th army - a ferry on barges and two ferries on improvised means in the area of Kochkarovka;
3) for the formations of the 9th Army - two ferries in the Western Kaira area, three ferries on barges in the Kakhovka area and two ferries near Tyaginka.
I draw your attention to the fact that the ferry crossing is not a floating bridge. Composed of a pontoon park or improvised means, the ferry was forced to move from one coast to another, each time transporting a relatively small number of people and equipment. At the same time, the average duration of the ferry trip was about one hour. The troops of the two armies and the cavalry corps began crossing on the morning of August 18. The strictest timing, precise organization of loading and unloading, round-the-clock work of tugs made it possible to transport the bulk of the troops to the eastern coast by the morning of August 22. At the same time, I note that the crossing took place after the explosion of the DneproGES.
It should be noted that this entire operation could not take place in the event of an impact on the ferries from the air. It was enough for enemy aviation to break the ferries, and the troops would be pressed to the shore of a wide and full-flowing (especially after the explosion of the DneproGES) river. Fortunately, there were no serious enemy air raids on the entire front of the crossing of the 18th and 9th armies.
Not surprisingly, the order of the headquarters of the 9th Army of August 21st says:
ORDER
FOR THE TROOPS OF THE 9TH ARMY
August 21, 1941
№ 00173
Forced to retreat from the Dniester to the Dnieper, by August 21, the 9th Army successfully crossed the Dnieper in the most difficult conditions and is fixed on the left bank of the latter.
The task of the army in this period is to put in order the combat units, their rear, headquarters and control facilities.
Having replenished the ranks, the army must be ready for decisive blows to defeat and destroy the presumptuous enemy.
…
Command troops of the 9th army
Colonel General Cherevichenko
Member of the Military Council 9 A
Corps Commissar Kolobyakov
Nashtarm 9
Major General Bodin
This is also evidenced by the directive of the command of the Southern Front:
Directive
commander of the troops
Southern Front
No. 0083/op
on defense
along the left bank
R. Dnieper
(August 21, 1941)
…
Fifth. 18 A- composition 176, 164, 169 sd and 96 gd and 30 cd.
The task is to defend the east. bank of the river Dnieper, firmly hold the crossing and the Nikopol district in your hands, prevent a breakthrough in the direction of Nikopol, Melitopol.
Have at least one SD in reserve, closer to the right flank.
The border on the left is (claim.) Bereznigovata, (claim.) Gornostaevka, (claim.) Melitopol.
Sixth. 9 A- composition 51, 150, 74, 30 and 296 sd.
The task is to defend the east. bank of the river Dnieper, firmly hold tete-de-pon at Berislav and Kherson, prevent a breakthrough in the direction of Perekop.
In reserve, have at least one SD closer to the right flank.
The border on the left is Sokogornaya, St. Askania Nova, Skadovsk.
Apparently, the fate of the 6th and 12th armies, who died in the Uman cauldron two weeks earlier, became the basis for the rumors about the “armies washed away by the wave”.
Now let's look at the map. The distance from the dam of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station to the village of Nizhny Rogachik, where the 2nd Cavalry Corps was transported, is approximately 125 km, and to the village. Velyka Lepetikha - about 145 km. To Kachkarovka, where the 18th Army was crossing, this distance is approximately 160 km. Cairo, Kakhovka and Tyaginka, where units of the 9th Army crossed, are located even further along the Dnieper. Any person familiar with physics within the framework of at least a school course will easily understand that there can be no talk of any “thirty-meter waves” at such distances.
Let's take a closer look at the photographs of the dam destroyed by this explosion, taken from the side of a German military aircraft.

Photo after the explosion of DneproGES

Photo after the explosion of DneproGES
The height difference at the DneproGES is 37 meters. The volume of the pressurized reservoir is 3.3 cubic meters. km. The height of the dam is 60 meters, the pressure front of the reservoir is 1200 meters. Immediately after the explosion, a breakthrough wave 12 meters high and a maximum width of 110 meters begins to dissipate radially over a 1200 meter wide floodplain at an approximate speed of 70 to 90 km/h. After about 20 seconds, when the wave reaches the shores of the island of Khortytsya, it is 1.5 meters, decreasing even more with time and downstream. The approximate rate of water rising downstream is 4 to 5 centimeters per minute.

Elementary calculations show that the maximum wave height after 20 seconds was 1.5 meters. But not 30 meters. To the floodplains, the rapid rise of water amounted to a maximum of 1 meter, and looked more like a flood. As a result, from the point of view of the science of physics, the statement of some "historians" about a thirty-meter tsunami is nonsense of an inflamed consciousness. Given the fact who promotes this next horror story, then we are dealing with inflammation of the brain, thirsting for any sensation.
The article by Vladimir Linikov generally says that the drain spans were opened on August 18, before the explosion. Employees of the power plant drained water from the reservoir, which means that the water level was even lower, which means that the wave height near Khortitsa was generally no more than 1.5 meters. In addition, due to the discharge of water from the reservoir at the beginning of the day on August 18, the water level below the dam was already elevated - up to an estimated 0.5 meters. And the spans were blown up around 20-00. So everything speaks of the far-fetchedness of the tsunami and the number of victims - which are sucked out of State Department grants ...