| USSR participation in Cold War conflicts. War in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Brief results of the war in Afghanistan
(1979-1989)

Colonel General B.V. Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army, in his book “Limited Contingent” expressed the following opinion about the results of the actions of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan:

“I am deeply convinced: there is no basis for the assertion that the 40th Army was defeated, nor that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. Soviet troops entered the country unhindered at the end of 1979, fulfilled - in contrast from the Americans in Vietnam - their tasks and returned to their homeland in an organized manner. If we consider the armed opposition units as the main enemy of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us is that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans did only that. what they could."

Before the withdrawal of Soviet troops began in May 1988, the Mujahideen had never managed to carry out a single major operation and had not managed to occupy a single major city. At the same time, Gromov’s opinion that the 40th Army was not tasked with military victory does not agree with the assessments of some other authors. In particular, Major General Yevgeny Nikitenko, who was deputy chief of the operations department of the 40th Army headquarters in 1985-1987, believes that throughout the war the USSR pursued constant goals - suppressing the resistance of the armed opposition and strengthening the power of the Afghan government. Despite all efforts, the number of opposition forces only grew from year to year, and in 1986 (at the peak of the Soviet military presence) the Mujahideen controlled more than 70% of the territory of Afghanistan. According to Colonel General Viktor Merimsky, former deputy. head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Afghan leadership actually lost the fight against the rebels for its people, could not stabilize the situation in the country, although it had 300,000-strong military formations (army, police, state security).

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the situation on the Soviet-Afghan border became significantly more complicated: there were shelling of the territory of the USSR, attempts to penetrate into the territory of the USSR (in 1989 alone there were about 250 attempts to penetrate into the territory of the USSR), armed attacks on Soviet border guards, mining of Soviet territory (before May 9, 1990, border guards removed 17 mines: British Mk.3, American M-19, Italian TS-2.5 and TS-6.0).

Losses of the parties

Afghan casualties

On June 7, 1988, in his speech at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, the President of Afghanistan M. Najibullah said that “from the beginning of hostilities in 1978 to the present” (that is, until June 7, 1988), 243.9 thousand people have died in the country. military personnel of government forces, security agencies, government officials and civilians, including 208.2 thousand men, 35.7 thousand women and 20.7 thousand children under 10 years of age; Another 77 thousand people were injured, including 17.1 thousand women and 900 children under the age of 10 years. According to other sources, 18 thousand military personnel were killed.

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; Available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total. According to a researcher of the Afghan war from the United States, Professor M. Kramer: “During nine years of war, more than 2.7 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, several million more became refugees, many of whom fled the country.” . There appears to be no precise division of victims into government soldiers, mujahideen and civilians.

Ahmad Shah Massoud, in his letter to the Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan Yu. Vorontsov dated September 2, 1989, wrote that the Soviet Union’s support for the PDPA led to the death of more than 1.5 million Afghans, and 5 million people became refugees.

According to UN statistics on the demographic situation in Afghanistan, between 1980 and 1990, the total mortality rate of the population of Afghanistan was 614,000 people. At the same time, during this period there was a decrease in the mortality rate of the population of Afghanistan compared to previous and subsequent periods.

The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was the flow of Afghan refugees to Iran and Pakistan. Sharbat Gula's photograph, featured on the cover of National Geographic magazine in 1985 under the title "Afghan Girl", has become a symbol of the Afghan conflict and the refugee problem around the world.

The Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in 1979-1989 suffered losses in military equipment, in particular, 362 tanks, 804 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 120 aircraft, 169 helicopters were lost.

USSR losses

1979 86 people 1980 1484 people 1981 1298 people 1982 1948 people 1983 1448 people 1984 2343 people 1985 1868 people 1986 1333 people 1987 1215 people 1988 759 people 1989 53 people

Total - 13,835 people. These data first appeared in the Pravda newspaper on August 17, 1989. Subsequently, the total figure increased slightly. As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:

Soviet Army - 14,427
KGB - 576 (including 514 border troops)
Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28

Total - 15,031 people.

Sanitary losses - 53,753 wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 415,932 cases. Of those sick with infectious hepatitis - 115,308 people, typhoid fever - 31,080, other infectious diseases - 140,665 people.

Out of 11,294 people. 10,751 people dismissed from military service due to health reasons remained disabled, of which 1st group - 672, 2nd group - 4216, 3rd group - 5863 people.

According to official statistics, during the fighting in Afghanistan, 417 military personnel were captured and went missing (of which 130 were released before the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan). The Geneva Agreements of 1988 did not stipulate the conditions for the release of Soviet prisoners. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, negotiations for the release of Soviet prisoners continued through the mediation of the DRA and Pakistani governments.

Losses in equipment, according to widespread official data, amounted to 147 tanks, 1,314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM-2), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel tankers, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters (helicopter losses only 40th Army, excluding helicopters of the border troops and the Central Asian Military District). At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, information was not published on the number of combat and non-combat aviation losses, on the losses of airplanes and helicopters by type, etc. It should be noted that the former deputy commander of the 40th Army for armaments, General Lieutenant V.S. Korolev gives other, higher figures for losses in equipment. In particular, according to his data, Soviet troops in 1980-1989 irretrievably lost 385 tanks and 2,530 units of armored personnel carriers, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles (rounded figures).

On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began. The operation was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. Soviet troops have been in the country since December 25, 1979; they acted on the side of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee. The official purpose of the entry was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee used repeated requests from the Afghan leadership as a formal basis.

A limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) found themselves directly drawn into the civil war that was flaring up in Afghanistan and became its active participant.

The armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other took part in the conflict. The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. During the conflict, the dushmans were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European NATO member countries, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.
December 25, 1979 The entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka-Shindand-Kandahar, Termez-Kunduz-Kabul, Khorog-Fayzabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar.

The Soviet contingent included: the command of the 40th Army with support and service units, four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments, four combat aviation regiments, three helicopter regiments, one pipeline brigade, one logistics brigade and some other units and institutions.

The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages.

1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980 Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects.

2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.

3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations mainly to supporting the actions of Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special forces units fought to stop the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership’s policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation in the DRA. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within a 9-month period, starting on May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops completely withdrew from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

Introduction

Afghan war 1979-1989 -- an armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied forces of the USSR, who sought to maintain the pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.

Of course, this period is not the most positive in the history of the USSR, but I wanted to open a small curtain in this war, namely, the reasons and main tasks for the USSR to eliminate the military conflict in Afghanistan.

Cause of hostilities

The main reason for the war was foreign interference in the Afghan internal political crisis, which was a consequence of the struggle for power between the Afghan government and numerous armed groups of the Afghan Mujahideen (“dushmans”), who enjoy political and financial support from leading NATO states and the Islamic world, on the other hand.

The internal political crisis in Afghanistan was the “April Revolution” - the events in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, which resulted in the establishment of a Marxist pro-Soviet government in the country.

As a result of the April Revolution, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), whose leader was in 1978, came to power. Nur Mohammad Taraki (killed by order of Hafizullah Amin), and then Hafizullah Amin until December 1979, who proclaimed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would overcome Afghanistan's lagging behind have encountered resistance from the Islamic opposition. In 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war began in Afghanistan.

Lacking strong popular support, the new government brutally suppressed internal opposition. Unrest in the country and infighting between supporters of the Khalq and Parcham (the PDPA was divided into these two parts), taking into account geopolitical considerations (preventing the strengthening of US influence in Central Asia and protecting the Central Asian republics) pushed the Soviet leadership to introduce .troops to Afghanistan under the pretext of providing international assistance. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began on the basis of a resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, without a formal decision regarding this by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

In March 1979, during the uprising in the city of Herat, the Afghan leadership made its first request for direct Soviet military intervention. But the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Afghanistan reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops at the Soviet-Afghan border and, by order of Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing of the 105th Guards Airborne Division into Afghanistan. The number of Soviet advisers (including military) in Afghanistan was sharply increased: from 409 people in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979.

The impetus for the USSR's intervention was US assistance to the Mujahideen. According to the official version of history, CIA assistance to the mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, kept secret until today, is different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on secret assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979.

On December 25, 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Faizabad.

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan; the procedure for the use of weapons, even for the purposes of self-defense, was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov’s order appeared to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that Soviet troops would become garrisons and take protection of important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active action against opposition forces, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade crossed the pontoon bridge across the border river Amu Darya, which was tasked with capturing the high-mountainous Salang pass on the Termez-Kabul road to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops. On the same day, the transfer of units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. The first to land at the Kabul airfield were the paratroopers of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G.I. Shpaka.

The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar. Sending in troops is not easy; Afghan President Hafizullah Amin was killed during the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul. The Muslim population did not accept the Soviet presence, and an uprising broke out in the northeastern provinces, spreading throughout the country.

The Afghan War (1979-1989) is one of the stages of the civil war in Afghanistan between the armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and the armed opposition (Mujahideen); During this period, by decision of the CPSU Central Committee, a limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) was introduced into the territory of Afghanistan.

According to the official version of the Soviet leadership, the Soviet Army was supposed to prevent the threat of foreign military invasion into the territory of the USSR.
The formal basis for the introduction of the OKSV was repeated requests from the Afghan leadership for help.

The decision was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee.
The beginning of the Afghan war (introduction of OKSV) - December 25, 1979.
Ended: February 15, 1989.

Irrevocable losses(killed, died from wounds, diseases, accidents, missing) - 15,051 people (as of January 1, 1999).
Sanitary losses - almost 54 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 416 thousand sick (as of January 1, 1999).
Losses in equipment - 147 tanks, 1314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel tankers, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters (as of January 1, 1999).

After the outbreak of the Afghan war, several countries announced a boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games, which were held in Moscow.
During the developing conflict, support for the Mujahideen was provided by military specialists from the United States and a number of European NATO member countries, China, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.

Beginning of the Afghan Civil War

In the sixties, a communist party was created in the Kingdom of Afghanistan, which soon split into two factions: "Khalq" ("People", leader - Nur Mohammed Taraki) and "Parcham" ("Banner", leader - the son of the general of the Afghan armed forces, Babrak Karmal) .

In 1973, the king's cousin Mohammed Daoud Khan carried out a coup d'état and a republic was proclaimed in the country. The president tried to carry out a number of reforms, but on April 27, 1978 he was overthrown as a result of a military coup. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, Nur Mohammed Taraki became president, and Babrak Karmal became vice president.

In April 1979, an uprising against the communist regime began in all provinces, the so-called “Saur (April) Revolution.” As a result, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was proclaimed. Taraki became the head of state, and Hafizullah Amin became the chairman of the Revolutionary Council. The government launched reforms that sparked protests in traditional Afghan society.
The PDPA split into two factions, Amin stormed the presidential palace (September 14, 1979), Taraki was killed.

The Soviet government decided to send troops into Afghanistan to help the communist government deal with the rebels, remove Amin from leadership and return Babrak Karmal to power.

Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

Back in July 1979, a battalion from the 111th Parachute Regiment of the 105th Airborne Division arrived in Bagram. This was the first regular unit of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.

On December 9-12, the first so-called “Muslim battalion”, a special forces unit of the Soviet Army, created in preparation for the entry of troops into Afghanistan and staffed by fighters with a “Central Asian” appearance, arrived in Afghanistan.

On December 14, a separate battalion of the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment (OPDP) arrived in Bagram.
On December 25, 1979, at 15.00, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began across two pontoon bridges across the Amu Darya River near the city of Termez. The scouts crossed first, then the columns of the 40th Army - the 108th Motorized Rifle Division (commanded by General K. Kuzmin).

Military transport aviation, using transport aircraft Il-76, An-22, An-12, began airlifting the main forces of the 105th Airborne Division of a separate parachute regiment to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram.
7,700 paratroopers and 894 units of military equipment were delivered.

At the same time, the 357th and 66th motorized rifle divisions entered Afghanistan through Kushka and other border points, which occupied Herat and Farah in the west of the country.
On December 27, Operation Storm 333 was carried out - Amin's palace was stormed. The operation lasted 43 minutes. Amin, his son and about 200 Afghan guards and military personnel were killed.

1980

In February 1980, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan reached 58,000 people.
In March, the first major offensive operation of OKSV units against the Mujahideen was carried out, the so-called Kunar offensive.
In the summer, the 16th and 54th motorized rifle divisions were introduced into Afghanistan. In northern Afghanistan, a 100-kilometer security zone was created along the Soviet-Afghan border.

1981

The 357th Division was replaced by the 346th Division and the 5th Motorized Rifle Division was additionally introduced into Afghanistan.
In December, an opposition base in the Darzab region (Jawzjan province) was destroyed.

1982

On November 3, a fuel tanker explosion killed more than 176 people in the Salang Pass in the Hindu Kush Mountains.

1983

On January 2, in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Mujahideen took 16 Soviet civilian specialists hostage. 10 of them were released a month later, but six died.
In April, opposition forces were defeated in the Nijrab gorge (Kapisa province). Losses on the Soviet side: 14 people killed, 63 wounded.
The command of the 40th Soviet Army, located 50 km north of Kabul near the Bagram airbase, was transferred to the outskirts of Kabul.

1984

In 1984, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan reached 150,000.
Seven Soviet motorized rifle divisions were positioned along the important Afghan ring road and on the road to Kiber Pass.
The 105th Guards Airborne Division was located in the Bagram-Kabul area. One of the five airborne brigades included in this division was stationed in Jalalabad.
The command of the 40th Soviet Army was transferred from the outskirts of Kabul to the Soviet border and to Termez.

The main supply depots were on Soviet territory, in Kushka and Termez, and in Afghanistan - the Shindand air base between Herat and Farah, Bagram near Kabul, Abdalmir-alam near Kunduz and Kelagay on the Salang road. A fuel pipeline reaches Kelagai from the Soviet border. Near Termez, a combined road and railway bridge was built across the Amu Darya.

Su-25 aircraft and helicopters, including MI-24, were used to participate in ground combat operations. On January 16, the Mujahideen shot down a Su-25 aircraft for the first time using the Strela-2M portable anti-aircraft missile system (MANPADS). On October 27, an Il-76 transport plane was shot down over Kabul by a MANPADS.

On April 30, the 1st Battalion of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was ambushed in the Panjshir Gorge and suffered heavy losses.

1985

On April 21, in the Maravara Gorge (Kunar province), the 1st company of Soviet special forces under the command of Captain Nikolai Tsebruk was surrounded and destroyed.
Irreplaceable losses: 31 people.
On April 26, there was an uprising of Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war in the Badaber prison in Pakistan.
In the fall, the creation of support base areas began in hard-to-reach areas of the country.

1986

At the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev announced the beginning of developing a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.
In April, the Mujahideen suffered a major defeat as a result of the operation to destroy the Javara base.

On May 4, at the XVIII plenum of the PDPA Central Committee, Muhammad Najibullah was elected to the post of Secretary General instead of Babrak Karmal. The new government proclaims a policy of national reconciliation.

1987

In February and March, operations were carried out: “Strike” in the province of Kunduz, “Squall” in the province of Kandahar, “Thunderstorm” in the province of Ghazni, “Circle” in the provinces of Kabul and Logar.
In May, operations were carried out: "Volley" in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul and "South-87" in the province of Kandahar.
In November, Operation Highway was launched for the Afghan province of Khost on the border with Pakistan.

1988

The most fierce battle of Operation Magistral took place on January 7-8 in the area of ​​the height indicated on maps as 3234.
The 9th parachute company of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment with a total strength of 39 people, with the support of regimental artillery, defended the heights, which were attacked by special rebel units trained in Pakistan. The battle lasted 12 hours, the Mujahideen retreated.
Irreplaceable losses: six people. For this battle, all paratroopers were awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Star; junior sergeant V.A. Alexandrov and private A.A. Melnikov were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On April 14, the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were signed. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its troops within 9 months, and the United States and Pakistan had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

1989

The last Soviet combat operation in Afghanistan - "Typhoon" - was carried out on January 23-26. On February 4, the last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul.
On February 15, Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of troops was led by the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

All-Russian public organization "Russian Union of Afghanistan Veterans":

Afghan War (1979-1989) - military conflict in the territory Democratic Republic of Afghanistan(Republic of Afghanistan since 1987) between Afghan government forces and Limited contingent of Soviet troops on the one hand and numerous armed formations of the Afghan Mujahideen (“dushmans”) enjoying political, financial, material and military support leading NATO states and the conservative Islamic world on the other hand.

Term "Afghan War" implies a designation traditional for Soviet and post-Soviet literature and media for the period of military participation of the Soviet Union in the armed conflict in Afghanistan.

Convened soon UN Security Council at its meeting did not accept the anti-Soviet resolution prepared by the United States, the USSR vetoed it; it was supported by five Council member states. The USSR motivated its actions by the fact that the Soviet military contingent was introduced at the request of the Afghan government and in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation of December 5, 1978. On January 14, 1980, the UN General Assembly at its Extraordinary Session adopted a resolution expressing “deep regret,” also expressing concern about the refugee situation and calling for the withdrawal of “all foreign troops,” but the resolution was not binding. Adopted by 108 votes to 14.

In March 1979, during the uprising in the city of Herat, the Afghan leadership made its first request for direct Soviet military intervention (there were about 20 such requests in total). But the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Afghanistan, created back in 1978, reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

On March 19, 1979, at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev said: “The question was raised about the direct participation of our troops in the conflict that arose in Afghanistan. I think that... it’s not right for us to get drawn into this war now. We must explain... to our Afghan comrades that we can help them with everything they need... The participation of our troops in Afghanistan can harm not only us, but primarily them.”

However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops at the Soviet-Afghan border and, by order of Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division into Afghanistan. The number of Soviet advisers (including military) in Afghanistan was sharply increased: from 409 people in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979.

Under the supervision of the CIA, they supplied weapons to anti-government armed groups. On the territory of Pakistan, in Afghan refugee camps, centers for special training of armed groups were deployed. Mainly, the program relied on the use of the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) as an intermediary to distribute funding, supply weapons and train Afghan resistance forces.

Further development of the situation in Afghanistan- armed uprisings of the Islamic opposition, mutinies in the army, internal party struggle, and especially the events of September 1979, when the leader of the PDPA Nur Mohammad Taraki was arrested and then killed on the orders of Hafizullah Amin, who removed him from power - caused serious concern among the Soviet leadership. It warily followed Amin's activities at the head of Afghanistan, knowing his ambitions and cruelty in the struggle to achieve personal goals. Under Amin, terror unfolded in the country not only against Islamists, but also against members of the PDPA, who were supporters of Taraki. The repression also affected the army, the main support of the PDPA, which led to a drop in its already low morale and caused mass desertion and rebellion. The Soviet leadership was afraid that a further aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the coming to power of forces hostile to the USSR. Moreover, the KGB received information about Amin’s connections with the CIA in the 1960s and about secret contacts of his emissaries with American officials after the assassination of Taraki.

As a result, it was decided to prepare for the overthrow of Amin and his replacement with a leader more loyal to the USSR. It was considered as such Babrak Karmal, whose candidacy was supported by KGB Chairman Yu. V. Andropov.

When developing the operation to overthrow Amin, it was decided to use Amin’s own requests for Soviet military assistance. In total, from September to December 1979 there were 7 such appeals. At the beginning of December 1979, the so-called “Muslim Battalion” - a GRU special forces detachment - was sent to Bagram - specially created in the summer of 1979 from Soviet military personnel of Central Asian origin to guard Taraki and perform special tasks in Afghanistan. In early December 1979, USSR Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov informed a narrow circle of officials from among the top military leadership that a decision would obviously be made in the near future on the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. From December 10, on the personal orders of D. F. Ustinov, the deployment and mobilization of units and formations of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts was carried out. The 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Division, which was assigned the role of the main striking force in the upcoming events, was raised at the signal “Gathering”. The Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov, however, was against the introduction of troops.

On December 12, 1979, at a meeting of the Politburo, a decision was made to send troops .

According to the testimony of the Chief of the Main Operations Directorate - First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces V.I. Varennikov, in 1979 the only member of the Politburo who did not support the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan was A.N. Kosygin, and from that moment on Kosygin had a complete break with Brezhnev and his entourage.

Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov actively opposed the introduction of troops, about which he had heated disputes with a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Defense of the USSR D. F. Ustinov.

On December 13, 1979, the Department of Defense Task Force for Afghanistan was formed. led by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General S.F. Akhromeyev, who began work in the Turkestan Military District on December 14. On December 14, 1979, a battalion of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment was sent to the city of Bagram to reinforce the battalion of the 111th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, which had been guarding Soviet troops in Bagram since July 7, 1979 -transport planes and helicopters.

Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, December 1979.

At the same time, Karmal and several of his supporters were secretly brought to Afghanistan on December 14, 1979 and were in Bagram among Soviet troops. On December 16, 1979, an attempt was made to assassinate Kh. Amin, but he remained alive, and Karmal was urgently returned to the USSR. On December 20, 1979, the “Muslim Battalion” was transferred from Bagram to Kabul, which became part of the Amin Palace security brigade, which significantly facilitated preparations for the planned assault on this palace. For this operation, 2 special groups of the USSR KGB also arrived in Afghanistan in mid-December.

Until December 25, 1979, in the Turkestan Military District, the field command of the 40th Combined Arms Army, 2 motorized rifle divisions, an army artillery brigade, an anti-aircraft missile brigade, an air assault brigade, combat and logistics support units were prepared for entry into Afghanistan, and in the Central Asian military district - 2 motorized rifle regiments, mixed air corps control, 2 fighter-bomber air regiments, 1 fighter air regiment, 2 helicopter regiments, aviation technical and airfield support units. Three more divisions were mobilized as reserves in both districts. More than 50 thousand people from the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan were called up from the reserves to complete the units, and about 8 thousand cars and other equipment were transferred from the national economy. This was the largest mobilization deployment of the Soviet Army since 1945. In addition, the 103rd Guards Airborne Division from Belarus was also prepared for transfer to Afghanistan, which was already transferred to airfields in the Turkestan Military District on December 14.

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan; the procedure for the use of weapons, even for the purposes of self-defense, was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov’s order appeared to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that Soviet troops would become garrisons and take protection of important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active action against opposition forces, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979.

On the morning of December 25, 1979, the 781st separate reconnaissance battalion of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division was the first to be transported to the territory of the DRA. Following him, the 4th Airborne Assault Battalion (4th Airborne Assault Battalion) of the 56th Airborne Brigade crossed, which was tasked with guarding the Salang Pass. On the same day, the transfer of units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. The first to land at the Kabul airfield were the paratroopers of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G. I. Shpak. During landing, one of the planes carrying paratroopers crashed.

The 103rd Division's backup was the 106th Guards Tula Airborne Division. The 103rd Airborne Division was transported to air bases on alert and additional ammunition and everything necessary were delivered there. The situation worsened due to the frost that hit. The 106th Airborne Division received full ammunition, while simultaneously conducting battalion exercises as planned, and was withdrawn and transferred to take-off air bases in the last days of December. In particular, the reserve airfield in Tula and the MIG-21 air defense air base near Efremov were used. The breakdown by ship had already been carried out and the BMD turrets were removed from the external stops. Having stayed until January 10, 1980, at the air bases of the intended takeoff, units of the 106th Airborne Division were again returned in echelons to their places of deployment.

In Kabul, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division completed their landing by midday on December 27 and took control of the airport, blocking Afghan aviation and air defense batteries. Other units of this division concentrated in designated areas of Kabul, where they received tasks to blockade the main government institutions, Afghan military units and headquarters, and other important objects in the city and its environs. After a skirmish with Afghan soldiers, the 357th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Division and the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment established control over the Bagram airfield. They also provided security for B. Karmal, who was again taken to Afghanistan with a group of close supporters on December 23.

The former head of the Illegal Intelligence Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Yu. I. Drozdov, noted that the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was an objective necessity, since the United States intensified its actions in the country (they concluded an agreement with China on Afghanistan, put forward their technical observation posts to the southern borders of the USSR). In addition, the USSR had previously sent its troops into Afghanistan several times on a similar mission and did not plan to stay there for long. According to Drozdov, there was a plan for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1980, prepared by him together with Army General S.F. Akhromeyev. This document was subsequently destroyed on the orders of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. A. Kryuchkov.

Assault on Amin's palace and capture of secondary objects

The assault on Amin's palace - a special operation codenamed "Storm-333" , preceding the beginning of the participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan war of 1979-1989.

In the evening 27th of December Soviet special forces stormed Amin's palace, the operation lasted 40 minutes, during the assault Amin was killed. According to the official version published by the Pravda newspaper, “as a result of the rising wave of popular anger, Amin, together with his henchmen, appeared before a fair people’s court and was executed.”

Amin's former residence, Taj Beg Palace, in 1987. Photo by Mikhail Evstafiev.

At 19:10, a group of Soviet saboteurs in a car approached the hatch of the central distribution center of underground communications communications, drove over it and “stalled out.” While the Afghan sentry was approaching them, a mine was lowered into the hatch and after 5 minutes an explosion occurred, leaving Kabul without telephone communication. This explosion was also the signal for the start of the assault.

The assault began at 19:30. by local time. Fifteen minutes before the start of the assault, fighters from one of the groups of the “Muslim” battalion, driving through the location of the third Afghan guard battalion, saw that an alarm had been declared in the battalion - the commander and his deputies were standing in the center of the parade ground, and the personnel were receiving weapons and ammunition. A car with scouts from the “Muslim” battalion stopped near the Afghan officers, and they were captured, but the Afghan soldiers opened fire after the retreating car. The scouts of the “Muslim” battalion lay down and opened fire on the attacking guard soldiers. The Afghans lost more than two hundred people killed. Meanwhile, snipers removed the sentries from the tanks dug into the ground near the palace.

Then two self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" of the "Muslim" battalion opened fire on the palace, and two more - on the location of the Afghan tank guard battalion in order to prevent its personnel from approaching the tanks. AGS-17 crews of the “Muslim” battalion opened fire on the location of the second guard battalion, preventing the personnel from leaving the barracks.

On 4 armored personnel carriers, KGB special forces moved towards the palace. One car was hit by Kh. Amin's guards. Units of the “Muslim” battalion provided the outer ring of cover. Having burst into the palace, the attackers “cleared” floor by floor, using grenades in the premises and firing from machine guns.

When Amin learned of the attack on the palace, he ordered his adjutant to inform the Soviet military advisers about it, saying: "The Soviets will help." When the adjutant reported that it was the Soviets who were attacking, Amin in a rage threw an ashtray at him and shouted “You’re lying, it can’t be!” Amin himself was shot dead during the storming of the palace (according to some sources, he was taken alive and then shot by virtue of an order from Moscow).

Although a significant part of the soldiers of the security brigade surrendered (in total about 1,700 people were captured), some of the brigade's units continued to resist. In particular, the “Muslim” battalion fought with the remnants of the third battalion of the brigade for another day, after which the Afghans went into the mountains.

Simultaneously with the assault on the Taj Bek Palace by KGB special forces groups with the support of paratroopers of the 345th Parachute Regiment, as well as the 317th and 350th regiments of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, the general headquarters of the Afghan army, a communications center, KHAD buildings and Ministry of Internal Affairs, radio and television. Afghan units stationed in Kabul were blocked (in some places it was necessary to suppress armed resistance).

On the night of December 27-28 The new Afghan leader B. Karmal arrived in Kabul from Bagram under the protection of KGB officers and paratroopers. Radio Kabul broadcast an appeal from the new ruler to the Afghan people, in which the “second stage of the revolution” was proclaimed. The Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote on December 30 that “as a result of the rising wave of popular anger, Amin, along with his henchmen, appeared before a fair people’s court and was executed.” Karmal praised the heroism of the KGB and GRU troops who stormed the palace, saying: “When we have our own awards, we will award them to all Soviet troops and security officers who participated in the fighting. We hope that the government of the USSR will award these comrades with orders.”

During the assault on Taj Beg, 5 KGB special forces officers, 6 people from the “Muslim battalion” and 9 paratroopers were killed. The leader of the operation, Colonel Boyarinov, also died. Almost all participants in the operation were wounded. Also, the Soviet military doctor Colonel V.P. Kuznechenkov, who was in the palace, died from friendly fire (he was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner).

On the opposite side, Kh. Amin, his two young sons and about 200 Afghan guards and military personnel were killed. The wife of Foreign Minister Sh. Vali, who was in the palace, also died. The widow Amina and their daughter, wounded during the assault, served several years in a Kabul prison, then left for the USSR.

The killed Afghans, including Amin's two young sons, were buried in a mass grave not far from the palace. Amin was buried there, but separately from the others. There was no tombstone placed on the grave.

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