Launching of the squadron battleship “Wittelsbach” On July 3, a new squadron battleship was launched at the Wilhelmshaven State Admiralty, which was listed under the letter O during construction and received the named name during the descent. This battleship, according to the message

Launching of the squadron battleship “Mecklenburg” On November 9 (NS) 1901 at the shipyard “Vulcan”, in Stettin, the squadron battleship F was launched, which received the name “Mecklenburg”. This battleship is the fifth and last Wittelsbach-class ship.Main

The launch of the German squadron battleship "Elsass" In Danzig, at the shipyard Shihau, took place on May 16 (n.st.) 1903, the launching of the squadron battleship of the "Braunschweig" type, which was being built there by order of the German government, was temporarily listed under the letter J and received

The launch of the squadron battleship "Deutschland" On November 20 (NS) 1904, in Kiel, at the shipyard "Germany", the battleship N was launched, which received the name "Deutschland" during the descent and christening. The laying of this battleship was carried out July 20 (N.S.) 1903, so the time

The launch of the squadron battleship “Hannover” On September 29 (NS) 1905, the squadron battleship R was launched at the Wilhelmgaven Admiralty, which received the name “Hannover” at baptism. This is the second Deutschland-class ship. Its laying took place in the summer

Appendix No. 1 Damage to battleships of the 5th squadron in the battle of Jutland [* From the book of K.P. Puzyrevsky. Damage to ships from artillery and the struggle for survivability. Leningrad. Sudpromgiz. 1940] "Worspite". Belonged to the fifth squadron of battleships and was third in the convoy.

"Tsesarevich" (1903-1917)
"Citizen" (1917-1925)

Historical data

Total information

EU

real

dock

Booking

Armament

Artillery armament

• 2 x 2 - 305 mm guns;
• 6 x 2 - 152 mm Canet guns.

Auxiliary armament

• 20 - 75 mm guns;
• 20 - 47 mm guns;
• 2 - 63.5 mm landing guns;
• 2 - 37 mm landing guns;
• 10 machine guns.

Mine and torpedo armament

• 2 surface TA;
• 2 underwater TA.

Ships of the same type

The design of the battleship "Tsesarevich" was drawn up by the French engineer A. Lagan, who proposed placing twelve 152-mm guns in six two-gun turrets with the middle turrets placed on the side cuts, which gave them a firing angle of 180 ° and allowed in the bow and stern volleys, except end 305-mm guns, use eight 152-mm. New in the project was a 38-mm armored anti-torpedo bulkhead installed in the middle part of the battleship at a distance of two meters from the outer skin.

The decision was made quickly - one of the new battleships for the Russian Imperial Navy will be built by the French.

Construction and testing

The anonymous society Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, founded in 1835, was the most significant shipbuilding enterprise in France of that period. The company had shipyards and workshops in Le Havre, Marseille and the town of La Seine near Toulon, where the battleship Tsesarevich was laid down on May 18, 1899. The order for the construction of an armadillo in France was issued to the company on July 8, 1898. From the Russian side, the ship engineer K.P. Boklevsky and captain 1st rank I.K. Grigorovich.

The battleship "Tsesarevich" differed from the previous battleships in a much more complete armor: the mass of the new French Krupp armor, which was 16-30% superior in resistance to the Russian Harvey's, reached approximately 30-32% displacement.

The guns for the battleship were manufactured at the Obukhov plant, however, the turret mounts, in contrast to the existing practice, were also manufactured in France, not counting the upper recoil parts. Along the way, it turned out that the turret mounts adopted in Russia for 305-mm guns do not fit in French-style turrets. I had to urgently design new machines and order them to the Putilov plant for an additional 237,600 rubles. Petersburg Metal Works manufactured torpedo tubes for the battleship. Everything else, including machines, boilers and other systems, was made in France.

On February 23, 1901, the squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" was launched, having spent one year and ten months on the slipway. Completion continued for the next year and a half. The delay was associated with numerous alterations and refinements.

On June 27, 1903, they were tested for maximum speed, which made it possible to develop 18.34 knots. These news encouraged the Main Naval Headquarters (GMSH) in St. Petersburg, which has recently demanded that all acceptances and tests be accelerated, because. the difficult situation in the Far East immediately required the strengthening of the Russian Pacific Fleet. It was proposed to curtail all work on the "Tsesarevich", which threaten to delay the departure of the ship to Kronstadt and postpone those that can be carried out by "ship means". As a last resort, they promised to allow them to specially go to Toulon on their way to the Far East in order to correct the problems that had come to light.

But the routine of incessant malfunctions and related corrections and alterations, the difficulty of mastering the ship by a newly arrived poorly trained crew, preparation for new and still unfinished tests, did not allow the plans of the Main Naval Staff to be implemented.

Desperate to see the "Tsesarevich" in Kronstadt, the Naval Ministry decided to attach the ship to the detachment going to Port Arthur already in the Mediterranean Sea. In worries about an early departure, the main tests provided for by the contract with a 12-hour run at full speed had to be abandoned.

New obstacles to leaving were discovered with the beginning of the acceptance of tower installations. Having withstood fire tests on August 13 and 14, 1903, they discovered the extreme failure of the ammunition supply system in the turrets of 305-mm guns. She held back the pace and at the slightest pitching ceased to act. But even this flaw was ordered to close their eyes. And although the plant promised to cope with the alterations in three weeks, they decided to delay the payment of the last payment of 2 million francs and oblige the company to send the converted supply system to Port Arthur.

In order to "push" the "Tsarevich" from Toulon and then lead an accelerated campaign to the East, Rear Admiral A.A. Virenius. But he also turned out to be powerless in the face of many still unresolved problems and imperfections.

On August 18, 1903, as a result of the construction that dragged on for 50 months, an unprecedentedly accelerated signing of the act of accepting the battleship to the treasury took place, stating that its main weapon, the 305-mm guns, was not ready for action. The squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" officially entered service. The total cost of building the ship is 14.004.286 rubles.

Design Description

Frame

"Tsesarevich" on the slipway. February 1901

The hull of the battleship was recruited according to the transverse-longitudinal system. The shape of the hull with the sides turned inward was also quite unusual for Russia, due to which the width of the upper deck was significantly less than the maximum width of the ship. Such a complex design, widely used in French military shipbuilding and rather significantly complicating and increasing the cost of construction, had a number of advantages: the weight of the upper structures was reduced, which increased stability, the middle towers were able to fire along the diametrical plane, and in a storm, the blockages played the role of roll dampers: the masses of water rolling onto them prevented the roll from growing.

At the same time, in addition to complexity and cost, the blockage also created operational difficulties, for example, it made it difficult to raise and lower boats or load coal into the sea. The main transverse bulkheads divided the ship's hull into ten watertight compartments. The total weight of the hull, including the anti-torpedo bulkhead, armor lining, internal devices and practical items, amounted to 5118.5 tons.

Booking

Armor scheme and the location of the guns on the battleship "Tsesarevich"

The main armor belt extended the entire length of the ship and consisted of 29 Krupp steel plates on one side. Plates above the waterline had a thickness of 120 mm at the extremities to 250 mm in the middle, below the waterline the thickness of the armor along the entire length of the hull was 170 mm. Above the waterline, the armor belt rose by 50 cm, going under water by 1.5 m.

The battleship had two armored decks. The upper (it is also the main or battery) consisted of 50-mm armor plates. The lower armored deck (at the level of the upper edge of the lower belt) consisted of two layers of armor 20 mm each.

The main battery turrets were protected by 254 mm armor plates, hardened according to the Krupp method. Roof armor had a thickness of 40 mm.

Medium caliber turrets with 150 mm Krupp armor. The roofs of the towers were 30 mm thick.

The conning tower of the ship, 1.52 m high, had a semicircular shape in plan and was protected by 254 mm Krupp steel armor plates.

The total weight of the armor without lining and fasteners, included in the weight of the hull, amounted to 3347.8 tons.

Power plant and driving performance

From March 18, the divers of the "Tsesarevich" began to clear the drained compartments from silt and debris. From March 26, the torn edges of the holes began to be successfully cut with an electric cutter. Exactly one month later, on April 26, the installation of new frames, made to replace those destroyed by the explosion, and then the outer skin, began. On May 20, the last sheet of outer skin was installed, only the bulkheads remained to be completed. The caisson was removed on 24 May. The only thing that could not be completely corrected was the steering: due to the long stay in the water, the electrical insulation of the engines and generators suffered, so the main drive of the steering wheel had to be made hydraulic, and the electric one should be transferred to the backup category.

In total, it took 118 days to repair the Tsesarevich.

Battle in the Yellow Sea

After the appointment on March 27, I.K. Grigorovich as the commander of the Port Arthur port, the duties of the captain of the "Tsesarevich" were performed by senior officer D.P. Shumov. On May 11, a new commander was appointed to the "Tsesarevich" - captain of the 1st rank N.M. Ivanov.

On March 31, 1904, a new blow was dealt to the Russian Pacific Fleet. On this day, in the early morning, Vice-Admiral Makarov once again brought the Russian fleet out to fight the Japanese. However, soon at 09:43, Makarov's flagship Petropavlovsk was blown up by a mine bank set by the Japanese the night before. The battleship sank almost instantly; Vice Admiral Makarov died along with 10 staff officers, 18 ship officers, and 652 sailors. 80 people were saved. The death of "Petropavlovsk" had an extremely negative impact on the combat activities of the Pacific squadron. The fleet lost not only one of the battleships, but also the talented leader and organizer of the defense of Port Arthur, Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov, who was loved and respected by the personnel. An adequate replacement for him until the end of the war was never found.

Rear Admiral V.K. took command of the Pacific Fleet. Witgeft. He raised his flag on the repaired "Tsesarevich" and thus the battleship became the new flagship of the 1st Pacific Squadron.

On June 10, the squadron made an attempt to break through to Vladivostok. After a long exit to the outer roadstead and a long following of the minesweeper caravan, the Russian ships reached clear water and at 16:40, at a speed of 10 knots, laid down on a course of south-east 20 °. "Tsesarevich" was at the head of the squadron. At about 6 pm, the main Japanese forces were sighted, as well as detachments of their light forces. At 18:50, when the distance between the squadrons was reduced to 53 cables, Admiral Witgeft decided not to engage in battle and return to Port Arthur. On the way back, the battleship Sevastopol was blown up on a Japanese mine, which delayed the next attempt to break through. But the attacks of the Japanese destroyers were completely unsuccessful.

On July 25, the Japanese began bombarding the harbor with 120-mm cannons. At that time, the Retvizan suffered the most from their fire, having received an underwater hole, which they did not have time to properly repair by the exit. The Tsesarevich was hit by two shells. One hit the armored belt and did no harm, while the second hit the admiral's wheelhouse, killed the telegraph operator and slightly wounded the flag officer. After that, it became clear to absolutely everyone that if the fleet remained in Port Arthur, it would die. A decision was made on a second attempt to break through.

The squadron made its second and, as it turned out, last attempt to break through on July 28. It included:

• Six squadron battleships: Tsesarevich (flagship), Retvizan, Pobeda, Peresvet, Poltava and Sevastopol
• Detachment of cruisers - 4 armored cruisers ("Askold" (flagship), "Pallada", "Diana" and "Novik");
• 1st detachment of destroyers - "Hardy", "Vlastny", "Thunderstorm", "Courageous";
• 2nd detachment of destroyers - "Silent", "Fearless", "Merciless" and "Stormy".
• Red Cross steamship "Mongolia".

The squadron did not have the armored cruiser Bayan, which was blown up by a mine on July 14 and was docked for repairs.

This time the exit was scheduled for 5 am, and the trawling was carried out more quickly. At first they went 8 knots, fearing for the strength of the patch installed on the Retvisan hole, then they increased the speed to 10 knots, and with the advent of the enemy - up to 13 knots.

The commander of the ship, captain 1st rank N.M. Ivanov, was knocked down, but remained intact. Going to the conning tower, he did not raise the signal about the death of the admiral in order to prevent the "sheer chaos" that took place in the squadron during the death of Admiral S.O. Makarov; instead, he began a turn to close with the Japanese and increase the effectiveness of the Russian artillery.

At that moment, a second 305-mm projectile hit, as a result of which the steering gear was damaged and the wiring of the engine telegraph was disabled, and attempts to contact the central post were also unsuccessful. All speech pipes were broken, and telephone communication operated only with one of the engine rooms. In addition, shell fragments killed or injured everyone on the bridge of the battleship, including severe head wounds received by the ship's commander Ivanov.

The armadillo, uncontrolled by anyone, cut through the wake column of Russian ships, almost falling under the ram attack of the fourth "Peresvet" that was moving. Other ships first tried to move behind the flagship, but, realizing that it was uncontrollable, they lost formation. Meanwhile, on the "Tsesarevich" captain of the II rank D.P. took command of the battleship. Shumov. Having taken command, Shumov ordered the rear admiral's flag to be lowered and the signal "Admiral transfers command" to be raised. Junior flagship Rear Admiral Prince P.P. Ukhtomsky, who is on Peresvet, could not really lead the squadron. The squadron was already dispersed.

At this time, the "Tsesarevich" had already turned about 100.5 ° to the left. The control of the ship was managed by maneuvering the machines. Other ships of the squadron overtook the flagship, retreating in a panic towards Port Arthur. "Tsesarevich" did not keep well on course and quickly fell behind the rest of his battleships. The Japanese battleships, located east of the Tsesarevich, again opened fire on it.

From the bow and from the port side, the flagship Russian battleship was fired upon by enemy cruisers. Due to the darkness, the Japanese fire became less accurate and, despite the large number of shells falling around the Tsesarevich, the enemy achieved only two direct hits of 152-mm shells that exploded in the poop. Soon, the Japanese finally lost the Russian flagship.

In the battle on July 28, "Tsesarevich" fired 104 305-mm, 509 152-mm, 81 75-mm and 127 47-mm shells at the enemy.

After battle

After dark, the "Tsesarevich" began to lag behind the squadron leaving for Port Arthur, and soon completely lost sight of it. Captain Shumov decided to take advantage of the darkness and, turning south, go according to the order to Vladivostok. Around 20.00, the Tsesarevich, heavily turning around, turned south. All compasses on the ship were broken or damaged, and the course was laid approximately along the North Star.

Upon a detailed examination of the battleship, it turned out that the damage received did not significantly affect the combat capability: all the guns of the main and medium caliber, as well as most of the anti-mine guns, remained intact, the machines worked properly, one boiler was damaged in the aft stoker, but it was also repaired on its own ; the existing holes were not dangerous, and the most significant damage was the failure of communications and control in the conning tower. Some of the problems were corrected while at sea.

At night, captain 1st rank N.M. first came to his senses. Ivanov, and then Rear Admiral N.A. Matusevich. Ivanov, arrived on the bridge and, after listening to the damage report, decided not to go to Vladivostok, where the ship could not reach due to coal overrun caused by a drop in thrust due to broken chimneys, but to move to the Chinese port of Qingdao, which was then under German control, where it would be possible to correct the damage received during the battle, replenish coal reserves and again go to sea, to Vladivostok.

July 29 at 21.00 "Tsesarevich" entered the raid of the German naval base of Qingdao. There, the Russian cruiser Novik and the destroyer Silent, which had also decided not to return to Port Arthur, were already loaded with coal. At night, Novik will leave Qingdao, and on the morning of July 30, two more destroyers arrived - Fearless and Merciless.

On August 1, the governor of Qingdao, Captain 1st Rank Truppel, determined the deadline for the stay of Russian ships in the port. The battleship "Tsesarevich" was given six days, and three destroyers up to thirty-six hours. However, on August 2, at 10:00, the governor of Qingdao, referring to the order received from the Kaiser from Berlin, demanded that the Russians immediately leave the port or disarm. As a senior in rank, Rear Admiral Matusevich ordered the ships to obey the German requirements. The ships lowered their flags and on the same day began to unload ammunition ashore.

They handed over to the Germans locks from 75-mm guns, parts from locks of large guns and two covers of spool boxes of medium-pressure cylinders. They brought ashore and all the guns and revolvers, leaving only 50 for guard duty. The war for the "Tsesarevich" ended, the ship began a full repair.

Between two wars

After the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, which put an end to the Russo-Japanese War, the interned ships began to prepare for the transition to their homeland. "Tsesarevich" had to go to the Baltic with the heavy thought that of the 15 battleships that participated in the war with the Japanese, he was the only one who survived. On November 14, 1905, the battleship under the command of Captain II rank Shumov left Qingdao and headed west. February 2, 1906 "Tsesarevich" arrived in Libau.

In the Baltic, the "Tsesarevich" became the flagship of the "Midshipman Detachment" - this was the semi-official name of the formation intended for midshipmen to undergo sea practice before they were promoted to officers. The detachment included the battleship Slava and the cruiser Bogatyr. Later, the cruisers "Oleg" and "Admiral Makarov" will join them.

On June 8, 1906, the detachment left Libau and on June 11 arrived in Kronstadt. The last repair work and re-equipment were completed here to accommodate graduates of the Naval Corps and the Naval Engineering School, who were to undergo practical training on the Tsesarevich before being promoted to officers.

On July 1, 1906, the ships of the detachment began training practice for graduates. Up to and including 1910, the "Tsesarevich" as part of the detachment made many foreign trips, during which the ports of Scandinavia, Europe, Africa, and the Balkan Peninsula were visited. The detachment repeatedly went to the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.

On October 10, 1907, the Tsesarevich squadron battleship was reclassified as a battleship.

On December 15, 1908, while in the port of Augusta, Fr. Sicily, the detachment received the news of a catastrophic earthquake that destroyed the city of Messina to the ground. Russian ships rushed to the aid of the stricken city. The Russian sailors who landed in Messina took an active part in rescue operations and the evacuation of the surviving residents of the city. After that, the training practice of the detachment resumed.

In 1911, "Tsesarevich" was included in the brigade of battleships of the Baltic Fleet. The battleship spent 1911, 1912 and 1913 in intensive exercises and campaigns as part of a brigade.

World War I

1914

On July 28, 1914, the First World War began. On August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia. In the first months of the war, a brigade of battleships, which still included the Tsesarevich, along with a brigade of cruisers and a mine division, deployed almost every day near a mine position near about. Nargen, where they practiced various options for repelling an enemy attack. For the night we returned to Helsingfors or Revel.

On August 26-27, the entire brigade, together with the cruisers, again entered the Gulf of Finland, covering the minesweepers; cruisers carried out close reconnaissance. This formally unsuccessful campaign finally convinced the Russian command that the Germans were not going to take any really serious actions to break into the Gulf of Finland, limiting themselves only to imitation of activity with the help of several cruisers. The result was the advancement of the fleet further west, to the Moonsund area. Everything changed on October 11, 1914, when the Pallada cruiser was sunk by the German submarine U-26, sinking within a minute and a half with the entire crew. The death of the Pallada stunned the Russian command. Prior to this, they did not take into account the underwater danger in the Baltic at all, only now they realized the complete defenselessness of the fleet from the underwater threat. The battleships immediately took refuge in Helsingfors. The campaign of 1914 for the "Tsesarevich" ended there.

1915

In the campaign of 1915, "Tsesarevich" and "Glory" received the task of protecting the coast of Finland and the Abo-Oland region from German raids.

July 10, 1915 "Tsesarevich" was put in for repairs in the Kronstadt dock. During the repair, the rear bridge and the cabin were eliminated, the underwater part of the hull was cleaned and the barrels of 152-mm guns were replaced. After that, he again took up duty.

November 5 "Tsesarevich" came to Kronstadt and again stood in the dock. On December 31, with the help of an icebreaker, the ship left for the winter in Helsingfors, where repair work continued.

1916

During the 1916 campaign of the year, the Tsesarevich, patrolling in the area of ​​the Irben Strait, followed the enemy's attempts to break through it. On August 30, "Tsesarevich" moved to Moonsund, where "Glory" had been located for a long time. In October, large ships began to leave the Gulf of Riga, but the Tsesarevich remained here for the winter.

1917

Probably, it was the remoteness from the revolutionary events that followed in February - March 1917 that made it possible in those days to avoid reprisals against the officers of the "Tsesarevich" that occurred on all other Baltic ships. However, discipline, and hence the combat capability of the ship, began to decline.

On April 13, 1917, the battleship "Tsesarevich" was renamed "Citizen", continuing to carry out military service in the Gulf of Riga.

On September 1, 1917, German troops launched an offensive to capture Riga, which they succeeded on September 7 due to the decay and demoralization of the Russian army. Having taken Riga, the Germans began to prepare for the capture of the Moondzund Islands, allocating for this purpose a very impressive force: 10 dreadnought battleships, 1 battle cruiser, 9 light cruisers, 56 destroyers, 11 destroyers, 6 submarines, 26 squadron minesweepers, 65 boat minesweepers and over 300 support ships. Against such forces, the Russians were able to field only two old pre-dreadnoughts "Citizen" and "Slava", several light cruisers, destroyers and minesweepers. The fleet was completely disorganized and collapsed. Orders were not obeyed, officers were killed or threatened with death.

On October 13, 1917, the Germans began landing on about. Ezel and a breakthrough through the Irben Strait, where they did not meet organized resistance.

On October 17, the battleships Grazhdanin and Glory focused on the Kuavaste raid. Having forced the Russian ships out of the Gulf of Riga, the German ships marched in two columns to the southern exit of the Moonsund Canal, consisting of two battleships and eight destroyers. Two light cruisers covered them from the flank. Bypassing the Russian minefields on the right, the enemy ships approached the area of ​​the Larin Bank, where the Russian old battleships - Grazhdanin and Glory and the cruiser Bayan were stationed.

At 09.30, Russian ships were raided by enemy planes, but were driven away by anti-aircraft artillery. At 10.05 enemy battleships opened fire on Russian ships from a distance of 130 cables. The Russian ships fired back at the enemy minesweepers, who tried to clear the way from mines for the main forces of their fleet. After that, the minesweepers withdrew to the south.

At 11.10, the enemy battleships also began to withdraw in order to bypass the Russian minefields from the west. At 11.40, the German battleships, turning to the north, sharply increased their speed. At 11.50, having discovered the maneuver of the enemy, the Russian battleships weighed anchor and went south. At 12.04 "Grazhdanin" from a distance of 70 cables again opened fire on enemy minesweepers, at 12.06 - "Slava" opened fire, and then - the cruiser "Bayan" and destroyers. The German minesweepers again withdrew to the south.

Meanwhile, the enemy battleships, continuing to move north at high speed, quickly reduced the distance unfavorable for them and at 12.13 opened fire on the Russian battleships from a distance of 90 cables. At 12.35 "Slava" received the first direct hit, followed by six more. The battleship, engulfed in fire, was out of action.

At 12.39, Grazhdanin was hit by two 305-mm shells one after the other, causing significant damage. Unable to withstand the onslaught of the enemy, the Russian ships at 12.40 began to withdraw along the Moonsund Canal to the north. The German battleships did not dare to pursue the Russians in the shallow strait because of the great mine danger. They continued to fire on the Russian ships leaving to the north until 12.50, when the distance increased to 130 cables. "Grazhdanin", "Slava" and "Bayan" continued to go north, fighting off enemy aircraft attacking them, two of which were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery "Grazhdanin".

The heavily damaged Slava could not pass through the Moonsund Canal. It was decided to sink the old battleship at the entrance to the canal to block the way for the German fleet. "Glory" was ordered to skip forward "Bayan" and "Citizen". However, while performing this prik, Slava, having made a mistake in maneuvering, almost collided with the Citizen and, evading, ran aground away from the fairway, after which it was blown up by the crew.

October 20 "Citizen" arrived in Lapvik and after a short stay there moved to Helsingfors. The battleship "Tsesarevich-Citizen" had the sad honor of participating in the last battle of the Russian Fleet under the flag of St. Andrew.

The further fate of the ship

December 23-25 ​​"Grazhdanin" moved to Kronstadt. After that, the old battleship was nominally included in the reserve detachment of the Kronstadt Naval Forces, but never went to sea again.

On March 2, 1918, the Andreevsky flag was lowered on the battleship Grazhdanin and the flag of the Naval Forces of the RSFSR was raised.

In June 1922, the battleship Grazhdanin was towed to a shipbreaking base in Petrograd and finally dismantled by 1925.

The ship was in service for 15 years. Enlisted in the lists of the Russian Navy on January 11, 1899, excluded from the lists on August 7, 1922.

commanders

• 1899-1904 - captain 1st rank Grigorovich
• 1904-1905 - captain 1st rank Ivanov
• 1905-1906 - Captain 2nd rank Shumov
• 1906-1907 - captain 1st rank Dmitriev
• 1908-1909 - Captain 1st rank Lyubimov
• 1909-1910 - Captain 1st rank Mankovsky
• 1911-1913 - Captain 1st Rank Kerber
• 1913 - Captain 1st Rank Pilkin
• 1913-1915 - Captain 1st Rank Rein
• 1915-1917 - captain 1st rank Cheglokov
• 1917-1918 - captain 1st rank Rudensky
• 1919-1920 - Rear Admiral in / about Kolyubakin
• 1920 - Art. Lieutenant Koshobakin
• 1921 - ? Kolesov

Notes

Literature and sources of information

Literature

• Berezhnoy S.S. Armored and battleships. Gunboats.. - Military publishing house, 1997.
• Bunich I.L. In the fire of the state cataclysm. - Yauza, 2004.

Links

• Rafail Mikhailovich Melnikov “Tsesarevich” Part I. Squadron battleship. 1899–1906



The battleship "Grazhdanin" during dismantling. Mid 1920s

Appendix No. 2: Squadron battleships "Retvizan" and "Tsesarevich"

(From the archive of V.P. Kostenko)

A series of battleships of the Peresvet type was built according to the main shipbuilding program of 1895, according to which 5 battleships were scheduled for construction. The last 2 ships of this program differed sharply from the Peresvet and belonged to two completely different types, although with the same artillery armament and approximately the same tonnage. They were simultaneously ordered to two foreign factories in 1898 after an additional emergency appropriation for shipbuilding and were vivid spokesmen for two opposing trends in naval technology and tactics of the late 19th century. These differences were based on a different understanding of the naval battle situation.

The Russian Naval Ministry, giving abroad an order for 2 battleships to the best factories in France and the United States, sought to obtain two opposite technical solutions to the same tactical task: to obtain an exemplary warship for squadron combat, in order to then make a project choice when building a series of 5 battleships under the program of 1898, which they decided to build already in Russia at St. Petersburg factories. These two ships, with the same tonnage, artillery and speed, had a completely different hull design, armor system, artillery location, seaworthiness, people's side height and appearance.

Project "Tsesarevich"

A completely different type of ship in terms of design and location of artillery was the battleship "Tsesarevich", which is the embodiment of the ideas of the French naval engineer Emile Bertin. In many respects, he was the spokesman for the new principles of military shipbuilding in matters of armor protection from artillery shells and torpedo explosions, as well as in matters of survivability and unsinkability.

The technique of further development of the warship type adopted and improved the new principles laid down in the Tsesarevich project, applying them to ships created after the Russo-Japanese War on the basis of the combat experience gained. Thus, the "Tsesarevich" turned out to be the ancestor of several subsequent generations of battleships, and many of its features, assimilated by subsequent ships, can be traced back to the era of battleships that entered the modern, world war.

The project was developed by the chief engineer of the company " Forges et Chantiers de la Mediterranee"In Toulon by engineer M. Lagane. The main design features of the Tsesarevich are the product of the gradual development of the French type of battleships, starting with Jaureguiberry (1893) and ending with the Republigue and Democratic class (1904). Republigue" was designed by engineer Bertin at the same time with the "Tsesarevich", but was completed a little later.

Typical features of the "Tsesarevich", which distinguished it not only from the "Retvisan", but also from all previous series of Russian battleships ("Petropavlovsk", "Peresvet") were the following characteristic design features:

a) Location of decks: 4 above-water decks, including 2 armored ones throughout the ship, namely: lower armored deck - 40 mm, battery or main deck - 50 mm, upper - 7 mm and spard from stem to stern 1 2-dm . towers. The height of the freeboard with the stem on the forecastle is 7.8 m (26 ft.).

b) seaworthiness. The high freeboard and the blockage of the outer skin above the armor belt ensured high seaworthiness in fresh ocean weather.

c) Booking. Along the waterline from waist to stern there were 2 continuous armor belts. The lower main belt had an upper edge 500 mm above the waterline. The lower shelf under the waterline is 1,500 mm.

The thickness of the armor plates at the upper edge: between 12-in. towers was equal to 250 mm, with a lower edge of 1 70 m, in the bow and stern from 12-dm. towers from 230 to 170 mm. The upper belt had 200 mm, in the nose from 12-in. towers decreased to 120 mm, aft from 12-dm. towers up to 130 mm.

The total height of the belt armor: amidships - 3.67 m, in the bow - 4.4 m, in the stern - 4.0 m.

2 armored decks: the main one covered the side armor, along the entire length of the ship, 50 mm thick; the lower one, 300 mm above the waterline, consisted of 2 layers of 20 mm each (40 mm in total).

The anti-mine armored bulkhead on a length of 88.8 m at a distance of about 2 m from the side, from 2 layers of 20 mm each (40 mm in total) sticks normally to the outer skin along the cheekbone and replaces the 5th stringer; connected along a radius of 2 m with the lower armored deck.

Towers 12-in. guns: rotating part - 254 mm, shirt under armor -30 mm, filed pipes - 229 mm, shirt - 30 mm, roofs from 3 layers with a total thickness of 60 mm.

Elliptical conning tower (dimensions inside the cabin 3.85x3.25 m): vertical armor - 251 mm, roof - 45 mm, wire protection pipe - 1 27 mm

The total weight of Krupp cemented armor, armored decks, mine bulkhead, wooden lining and armored sides is 4325 tons or 33% of the normal displacement.

d) Location of artillery: 4 12-inch. guns in twin turret mounts on the forecastle and poop.

Axes of guns 12-dm. bow tower - 9.6 m above the waterline.

12 6-in. guns in 6 two-gun turrets, of which there are 4 turrets on the spardeck: 2 turrets behind the bow 12-inch turret and 2 ahead of the stern 12-inch turret, with shelling fore and aft, within an arc of 135 °.

On the upper deck, amidships between the stokers, there are 2 towers, each with firing at the bow and stern in an arc of 180 °.

16 75-mm guns are placed: 8 guns in the central battery on the main deck, 2 guns in the stern on the main deck, 2 in the bow on the upper deck, 2 on the bow bridge, 2 on the aft bridge.

Fire directly at the bow and stern: 2 12-inch, 8 6-inch, 4 75-mm.

Fire directly along the beam: 4 12-in., 6 6-in. and 8 75 mm.

e) Scheme of unsinkability, "Tsarevich" according to the system introduced by Bertin, was the first ship to receive a high armor belt from bow to stern of 2 rows of plates, rising above the water level by 2.1-7 m, and 2 continuous armor decks along the waterline .

The upper armor covered the belt armor, and the lower one descended to the lower edge of the belt by 2.5 m under the load waterline. The armored belt of 2 sides and 2 armored decks associated with it formed at the waterline level an armored box closed on all sides, or a kind of pontoon, divided into a large number of compartments by longitudinal and transverse bulkheads. This armored checkered layer at the waterline level was supposed to ensure combat stability and buoyancy of the battleship in case of all artillery damage, and also reliably cover all living quarters below the waterline from the penetration of both whole shells and fragments when ruptured between the armored decks.

All the main transverse bulkheads were brought to the lower armored deck, firmly connected to it and had no doors. There were no similar shafts or necks from the lower armored deck to the holds. All mines, elevators and coal loading arms and ventilation ducts were brought either to the battery deck, or even higher to the upper one. In order to go down from the lower deck into the cockpits or into the holds, it was first necessary to go up to the battery deck and from there go down the vertical impenetrable shaft.

On the lower armored deck, isolated from the holds, watertight doors were installed in the transverse bulkheads on the rims (near the centreline). With such an arrangement of doors, they did not pose a threat to unsinkability, while at the same time providing an extremely important message along the ship, between 2 armored decks, completely protected by armor from bursts of high-explosive shells and shrapnel.

According to the combat schedule and water alarm, the doors had to be kept battened down.

f) The principle of compartment autonomy. The rooms above the lower armored deck within the side protected by the mine bulkhead were divided by the main transverse bulkheads into autonomous compartments, which had all systems and pipelines that were not connected with adjacent compartments.

The main compartments, in addition to 2 terminal ones, were:

1. Bow compartment 12-in. towers.

2. Compartment 2 nasal 6-in. towers.

3. Compartment of the bow boiler room.

4. Compartment 2 medium 6-inch. towers.

5. Compartment of the aft boiler room.

6. Compartment 2 engine rooms separated by a diametrical bulkhead.

7. Compartment 2 aft 6-in. towers.

8. Compartment aft 12-inch. towers.

Two end compartments remained outside the mine bulkheads: the bow ram and the stern helmsman. Each main compartment had its own independent hold systems: flooding, drainage, drain and bypass, fire and ventilation, as well as plumbing and intercom.

No pipelines cut through the transverse bulkheads below the armored deck and were enclosed with all branching pipes only within their compartment. Of the main compartments, 5 had their own 800-ton tidal turbines driven by electric motors. There were 8 turbines in total. Large compartments had two turbines each. Bypass pipes were connected to these turbines with clinkets on transverse bulkheads from smaller adjacent compartments.

2 end compartments and 3 6-inch compartments did not have their own outflow turbines. towers (bow, middle and stern). To drain small amounts of water from holds, onboard and double-bottom compartments, there were 8 hold-fire 50-ton steam pumps installed on the cockpits of the respective compartments. The fire main ran along the entire ship along the lower deck under a 50-mm armored battery deck with vertical branches down to the pumps and up to the fire horns in each compartment.

On the battery deck, the side of which did not have armor protection, there were 5 transverse watertight bulkheads with doors that were battened down by a water alarm.

g) Mine protection. On the "Tsesarevich", following the example of the French battleship "Jaureguiberry", an onboard armored bulkhead was arranged from two layers of 20 mm sheets (40 mm thick in total), at a distance of 2 m from the outer skin. At that time, it was believed that such underwater protection was quite sufficient to protect the interior of the ship from the effects of an 18-inch explosion. Whitehead torpedoes with a charge of 80-120 kg of pyroxylin or barrage mines. The side armored bulkhead with its upper edge passed along the radius into the lower deck and was made of the softest shipbuilding steel, which allowed very significant deformations without rupture in the expectation that this would absorb the energy of the gases during the explosion. The disadvantage of this design was the lack of a direct strong connection between the lower armor deck and the lower shelf of the main armor belt.

The belt and deck armor were connected in the form of a horizontal stringer or platform made of sheets 16-20 mm thick and up to 2 m wide, which served as the floor of the corridor behind the armor. However, during the explosion of torpedoes, mines and shells below the armor belt, this platform, covering the outer and inner side compartments, had to fall into the sphere of destruction, and therefore water through the hole filled not only the lower side compartments, but also the upper hull behind the armor, as well as the compartment on the lower deck if the aft corridor bulkhead was damaged.

On ships of later construction, the Russian-built battleships Suvorov, Orel and Glory, as well as on 5 French battleships of the Republique series (1902) and on 6 ships of the Danton series (1909), this drawback was eliminated. The last French battleships of the Danton type were built taking into account the experience of the Russo-Japanese War.

h) Placement of coal pits.

Since boiler rooms, engine rooms and bomb cellars were directly adjacent to the armored anti-mine bulkhead from the inside, it was necessary to abandon the arrangement of onboard coal pits so as not to violate the integrity of the armored bulkheads by installing doors or necks, which would create the danger of flooding the boiler rooms during a mine explosion with open mouths for coal loading.

In order to avoid this danger, the Tsesarevich had to abandon the arrangement of side coal pits and leave the side compartments unused, and switch to transverse pits at the main bulkheads of boiler rooms to store consumable coal. Spare pits were placed on the lower armor deck along the corridors behind the armor. Therefore, the placement of coal pits on the "Tsarevich" differed sharply from the previous types of battleships "Petropavlovsk", "Peresvet" and "Retvizan", which had side pits. This location presented significant inconveniences:

a) coal in the side compartments served as an additional and quite effective protection during mine explosions due to the absorption of gas energy for crushing and compressing coal;

b) side compartments were not used to accommodate payloads, as a result of which the battleship lost a large underwater volume, amounting to 2 sides: 2292 m2, which was 13% of the ship's normal displacement. This led to great constraint in the placement of holds and a sharp reduction in the capacity of pits, and consequently to a decrease in the navigation area.

The normal supply of coal was assumed to be 800 tons, and the total capacity of all pits was 1370 tons, while on the battleship Retvizan, which was being built at the same time, the total supply of coal reached 2000 tons, and on ships of the Peresvet type even up to 2500 tons.

i) Appearance.

Thanks to its high freeboard, elevated bed nets with a bulwark and developed rosters, 2-storey bow and stern bridges with cabins, heavy masts, huge pipes and a large number of towers on the spardeck, the Tsarevich was an excellent target for enemy shells.

In this regard, he had a great resemblance to the French battleships of the nineties of the Galouis and Suffren types.

Advantages of the Tsesarevich type over the Retvizan type

1) More developed armor protection of the waterline along the entire length and good coverage of the extremities.

2) The presence of 2 solid armored decks.

3) The formation of an armored checkered layer along the entire length of the ship with a height of 2 to 2.9 m above the waterline and 1.5 m below the waterline.

4) Anti-mine side protection from armored bulkheads on a length of 3/4 of the ship.

5) Placement of the entire 6-inch. artillery in 2 gun turrets protected by 6-in. armor and heavy fire on the diametrical plane.

Comparison of the battleships "Retvizan" and "Tsesarevich"

1. Hull (including mine bulkhead, wooden parts, 5118.50 armor lining, internals and fittings)

2. Booking 3347.80

3. Supply, including - 295.20

anchors and ropes (113.60)

moorings and tugs (10.00)

boats (65.00)

water tanks and distillers (12.00)

galleys (16.00)

tarpaulins, flags, navigation accessories (7.60)

miscellaneous supplies and supplies (71.00)

4. Masts with tops and rigging 43.00

5. Auxiliary mechanisms (steam and electric) 106.50

6. Machines and boilers with water 1430.00

7. Artillery with ammunition 1363.00

8. Mines and electricity 203.00

9. Normal fuel capacity 800.00

10. Crew with luggage 82.65

11. Provision for 60 days 99.85

12. Water for ten days 20.50

13. Displacement reserve 200.00

Total: 13110.00

Steam mechanism weight

1. Main machines with accessories and refrigerators 442.00

2. Shafts 108.00

3. Propellers 25.00

4. Auxiliary mechanisms (circulation pumps and pump) 35.20

5. Pipeline and water receivers 56.00

6. Platforms and ladders of cars 17.00

7. Tools and spare parts 27.00

8. Machine fans 60.00

9. Boilers 14.00

10. Nutrient tanks 3.00

Total weight of mechanisms 787.00

Water in refrigerators and pipes 22.00

Total weight of mechanisms with water 809.20

Boiler weight

1. Boilers with masonry and economizers 366.50

2. Purifiers, expanders, tanks, 6.50

3. Donkey 9.50

4. Air blowers 6.50

5. Smoke outlets and chimney 40.00

6. Platforms and ladders 15.00

7. Pipeline in stokers 36.00

8. Fans 14.00

9. Tools and spare parts 28.00

10. Nutrient tanks 16.00

Total weight of boilers without water 538.00

Water in boilers 49.00

Water in tanks 33.80

Total weight of boilers with water 620.80

Steel case (as part of the article "Case with devices")

1. Outer plating from keel to lower shelf 419.00

2. Shirt behind armor 170.80

3. Sheathing above the armored deck 84.20

4. Horizontal keel 20.20

4. Reinforcements of the outer skin 41.30

5. Laying of the upper armored deck 263.20

6. Battery deck lining 103.50

7. Upper deck lining 67.00

8. Mine bulkhead 769.90

Total steel case 1939.10

Shirt for rotating turret armor 85,00

Tower Reinforcements 283.00

Wooden parts of the hull 183.00

Armor lining and bolts 157.00

Internal devices 116.50

Particular things on the body 333.00

Booking

1. Lower armor belt 775.40

2. Upper armor belt 663.40

3. Upper armored (battery) deck 730.00

4. Armored commings 41.50

5. Conning tower with communication pipe 62.50

6. Armor of the supplied pipes 12-dm towers 215.00

7. Rotating armor of 12-inch towers 288.00

8. Armor of the supplied tubes of 6-dm towers 292.00

9. Rotating armor of 6-inch towers 280.00

Total booking weight 3347.8

Coal at normal load - in the hold 588.00 - on the lower deck 212.00

Notes.

The distribution of load items is given according to a handwritten copy from the collection of papers of the famous shipbuilder V.P. Kostenko, who in 1904-1905. served as an assistant builder of the Orel squadron battleship, which was being prepared for a campaign with other Borodino-class ships as part of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. By the nature of his official activity, V.P. Kostenko had to constantly monitor the compliance of the design data of numerous articles of the Orel design load with its actual values, and also compare them with the corresponding parameters of the Tsesarevich, the prototype of the entire series of battleships of the Borodino class, which included "Eagle".

(Personal archive of V.P. Kostenko., Folder XVII -I).

Weight is given in metric tons (1 mt = 1000 kg)

The Tsesarevich is a French-built Russian squadron battleship that took part in the Russo-Japanese and World War I. On the basis of his draft design, battleships of the Borodino type were created.
By the end of 1897, it became clear to the Russian government that in the near future a military clash with Japan, which was intensively increasing its power, was quite likely. Already the first two Japanese battleships, Fuji and Yashima, were roughly equivalent in combat power to Russian Poltava-class ships and surpassed the Peresvet-class semi-cruisers. Therefore, at a special meeting held at the beginning of 1898, a shipbuilding program "for the needs of the Far East" was adopted, approved by Emperor Nicholas II on February 23.

By order of the Maritime Department (No. 9 of January 11, 1899), signed by the head of the maritime ministry, it was reported that on December 21, 1898, Emperor Nicholas II "deigned to command" to name the first ships of the new program. In this largest (three battleships, five cruisers, 14 destroyers and mine transport) in the history of the fleet, the battleship and cruiser ordered in France were simultaneously listed on the lists, received the names "Tsesarevich" and "Bayan".
Like all battleships and cruisers named in the order, the names were historically successive. The Baltic 44-gun frigate (it was on the lists of the fleet from 1838 to 1858) and the sail-steam 135-gun ship of the line laid down in 1853 in Nikolaev were called "Tsesarevich". Built in 1857, in 1859 it sailed to the Baltic, where a car was installed on it. The ship remained on the lists of the fleet until 1874. Together with the Retvizan, which was excluded from the lists in 1880, the Tsesarevich completed the era of sail-steam ships of the line. Now, two ships with these names have begun an era of qualitatively new squadron battleships. Continuing the glorious traditions of the fleet, they were supposed to provide him with regular victories. But for the victory, the glory of the ancestors alone was not enough. The ministry did not listen to the belief that ships of the same name often repeat the fate of their predecessors. And it has already turned into a clearly defined long-term construction during the work in France.


Of the three battleships simultaneously enrolled in the lists, the Tsesarevich began construction later than everyone else, exactly one year after the start of construction of the Pobeda and six months after the Retvizan. But when I.K. Grigorovich, upon his appointment as superintendent of the construction, wished to receive from V.P. Verkhovsky's guiding instructions and instructions, he replied with undisguised complacency that there was no need for them. The admiral was convinced that the contracts and specifications signed by him were “developed to the last detail”, and therefore no questions or inconsistencies in the work of the commission could occur. But they showed up surprisingly quickly. The company's machine-building plant in Marseille, being, in essence, only an assembly and finishing plant, producing almost nothing on its own and doing only commerce, easily scattered its extensive orders almost throughout France .. This was allowed by the absence in the contract of the company's obligation to pay for travel supervising engineers for testing and acceptance of materials and products. The treasury suffered significant losses, and the engineers, instead of monitoring the work, had to spend a considerable part of their time on the trains of the railways of the French Republic. If the company is obliged to pay for these trips, it, of course, as the observing engineer D.A. Golov, would take care of "a greater concentration of her orders."


I had to call a second mechanic from Russia. They became N.V. Afanasyev (apparently, the son of the famous mechanic V.I. Afanasyev). Graduated in 1896 from the mine class as a mine mechanic, and in 1896 from the Naval Academy, he had the “title” of assistant to a senior mechanical engineer. Such cumbersome "ranks" instead of military ranks were invented by the bureaucracy in order to more tangibly separate the rabble of the fleet - mechanics from its aristocracy - combatant officers. This frank humiliation had to be borne by the nobles, who, to their misfortune, chose not a prestigious share of mechanics. Supervising ship engineer (with the rank of "junior shipbuilder", recently promoted from the rank of "senior shipbuilder's assistant") K.P. Boklevsky (1862-1928), also demanded that an assistant be sent or allowed, if necessary, to entrust the acceptance of individual factory orders to the official receivers of the French government. This was done for the ships of the Brazilian and Japanese fleets. The French “repulsed” both from the MTK’s unforeseen contract requirement to keep a weight log during construction (accounting for the receipt and distribution of metal into the ship’s hull on the slipway) and from the monthly presentation (as was customary in domestic shipbuilding) of information on the amount of metal supplied and the number of artisans (by workshops ) employed in construction. The French responded to this requirement to the observing engineer that it was “not in the habit” with them. The same answer was received by I.K., who tried several times to influence the plant, observing I.K. Grigorovich.
And the ITC still did not make a distinction between the seemingly priority construction in France of the lead battleship, recognized as the standard and model, and the many cruisers and destroyers that were imprudently ordered at the same time and did not have such decisive importance for the program. The commission in La Seine did not achieve this either, which allowed the plant to begin construction of the cruiser (“Bayan”) already in November 1898 and patiently at the same time waited for the conclusion on the battleship project to mature in the ITC. Nor could the cause be helped by the notification of the Ministry of Transport and Trade of December 17, 1898, about the absence of any cardinal changes in the expected conclusion. The plant did not want to be satisfied with such vague information. Steadily observing all the mossy bureaucratic rituals, instead of saving time by contacting the plant or directly to the supervisor, the MTK continued to conduct all correspondence through the GUKiS.


The GMSH also continued to be the fifth wheel in the chariot, also participating in the two-stage forwarding of the commission's documents to the MTC and the GUKiS. The work was slowed down by the absurd officer ambitions of the chairman I.K. Grigorovich. Too different for him and the ship engineer K.P., who is always accustomed to independent creative work. Boklevsky turned out to be concepts of duty, rights and obligations. Observing the norms of etiquette necessary according to his concepts, the ship engineer, upon arrival in La Seine in November 1898, considered it necessary in full dress uniform to pay visits to the chief commander of the port of Toulon and other officials of the city. Responsible by virtue of the current tradition only to the MTC, he considered this a necessary condition for proper interaction with the authorities of the city and the plant. In the eyes of I.K. Grigorovich, who considered himself the sovereign head of all the specialists sent to the plant, the engineer committed monstrous and defiant violations of discipline and all the concepts of subordination that had been brought up among the front-line officers. And therefore I.K. Grigorovich, as he himself later reported to the ministry, was not slow to make "a sharp remark to the engineer and explain to him his duties as a technician."


But K.P. Boklevsky, apparently did not heed them in due measure, and then the developed by I.K. Grigorovich, a special disciplinary instruction that regulated every step of the engineer. In particular, attendance factory time from the original two hours was brought to a full working day. For all movements of the engineer, it was necessary to seek the permission of the observer without fail and in advance. In the event of arrival in Paris, it was instructed to “appear” to the naval agent (attache). It was forbidden to wear uniforms and any treatment of newspapermen.
He took, in his words, "the most active part in the development of ship drawings" and at the same time did not cease to remind the engineers that he was the most important over them. Grigorovich managed to create an intolerable situation for them. Not satisfied with the commission, he tried to subdue even artillery receivers, who, observing the execution of orders from the naval ministry, traditionally (in Russia and abroad) closed only on the ITC.
Deeply versed in court intrigues, I.K. Grigorovich did not hesitate to intervene even in the religious activities of his subordinates. In order not to burden the family of the Duchess of Macklenburg-Schwerinskaya Anastasia Mikhailovna, who was in Cannes, with an excessive number of compatriots (the duchess invited them “to whom it will please” to break their fast after bright matins), I.K. Grigorovich took action. To introduce the duchess to the table, a delegation was assembled, which, consisting of I.K. Grigorovich, the commander of the cruiser "Bayan" and representatives of the ships (2 officers and 3 non-commissioned officers each) and appeared in the Cannes church. All the rest, on the instructions of the chairman of the commission, “voluntarily” dispersed to the surrounding Russian churches in Nice, San Remo and Menton.

The Ministry paid attention to the abnormal situation in the commission only after 15 months. Trying to bring an engineer who had too much self-importance into a “disciplinary” state, as they said then, I.K. Grigorovich, among the acts of his defiant disobedience, even wrote about the “nasty things” that the main observer allegedly had to endure. K.P. Boklevsky, in response, quite substantively explained to the ITC that, due to the established by I.K. Grigorovich orders, he "is deprived of the opportunity not only to handle the ITC, but as an observer is reduced to the level of a pointer, responsible only for the thoroughness of riveting and chasing." “Deprived of any independence,” he, in his words, was placed in complete impossibility for the responsible performance of duties. Only then did the Chief Inspector of Shipbuilding consider it necessary to draw the attention of the head of the maritime ministry to the painful consequences of I.K. Grigorovich.
And action was taken. Confidential letter from the Assistant Chief of the Main Staff Rear Admiral A.A. Virenius (1850-1919), dated January 31, 1900, it was explained to the chairman of the commission that "the main person responsible for the correct construction and quality of work is the engineer who oversees the construction, and the first demand is from him, and not from the commander." A.A. Virenius wrote that, in his sense, "a ship engineer is in charge of the ITC, for the resolution of which he submits all technical issues that arise in the performance of his duties." But the bureaucracy did not give out its priests: the engineer had to carry out his correspondence with the MTC only through the commander of the "Tsesarevich", who by that time had already appointed I.K. Grigorovich.
It was not possible to establish mutual understanding. Knowing his own worth, K.P. Boklevsky was close to leaving the service in the Naval Department altogether. Considerable damage was done to the construction, but the commander was nevertheless left at his post, and K.P. Boklevsky was soon transferred to St. Petersburg, where he became an assistant to the chief ship engineer of the St. Petersburg port.


Having completed the unhurried development of the project and the order of the first batches of materials and products, by February 17, 1899, the plant recognized it as possible to start counting the contract period for the construction of the battleship. It was assumed that by this time the Naval Ministry would have time to give exhaustive answers to all questions and objections that were caused by the MTK magazine of January 12, 1899. The 30-40-day period for a response named by the plant (questions were transferred to I.K. Grigorovich on February 25 , and sent by him to the GUKiS on March 4) expired on April 7. But also on May 13, when 77 days have already passed. The MTK continued to remain silent. And the plant, not considering itself obliged to enter into the position of the MTK, which for some reason remained inexpressibly overloaded, declared its right to postpone the start of work until the time of receiving a response.
On June 2, consent was received. Most likely, the reason for the approval lay in the desire of Admiral General Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich to build a new battleship precisely at this company; in any case, on June 6, the MTK magazine No. 62 published a resolution of Vice Admiral F.K. Toulon and stipulate in the contract the delivery of detailed drawings of its hull and mechanisms for the construction of the same types in our Admiralties.
Among the changes in the project of A. Lagan, which the MTK introduced already on June 2, the most important are the increase in the metacentric height to 1.29 m and the replacement of the Harvey armor, still used in France, with the hardened one according to the Krupp method. Already at the meeting on June 9, the head of the Baltic Plant, K. K. Ratnik, drew attention to the insufficient number of boilers in the French project. A more detailed analysis was prepared by the plant's specialists by June 30. According to them, it turned out that there should be 13.8 hp per square foot of the heating surface of the boilers according to the project of A. Lagan. machine power, while for ships of Russian projects - the cruiser "Russia" and the battleship "Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky" - it was respectively 9.63 and 10.2 hp, for English cruisers - from 11.3 to 11 .8 hp per square foot. Inconsistencies were also found in various articles of the weight load.
"Tsesarevich" on stocks


The company clearly did not set itself an ambitious task - to overtake the Retvizan, which was being built in America, in the pace of work. Throughout June 1899, the workers did not appear at all on the slipway. Materials arrived so slowly and in such small batches that they were only enough to make frames in workshops. Of the ordered 3118 tons of steel, only 882 tons were accepted. Grigorovich, the company answered the official request about the reasons for such unacceptable slowness with a series of weighty-looking excuses. In particular, attention was drawn to the failure to receive a response to an inquiry about ambiguities in the design of the towers, as well as to the failure to receive drawings of underwater mine vehicles. Which in turn delayed bookings. The strike of the miners in the Laura basin also made itself felt, which is why part of the orders had to be transferred to factories in northern France, and part to Belgium.
In August-September, the assembly of the vertical keel with its facing squares was completed throughout the hull. They began to put frames with floors and reverse angles, then - stringers, the first sheets of the second bottom and watertight bulkheads. The production of boilers at the Delaunay-Belleville factory near Paris was on a par with cruiser boilers. For the main machines, the 3rd and 4th crankshafts, three connecting rods, two intermediate shafts and one propeller shaft were forged. Of the ordered 3250 tons of steel, 1100 tons were accepted. In September, along with the continuation of the installation of frames, stringers, bulkheads, struts and beams of the lower armored deck, the armoring of this deck began. A total of 800 tons of structures were installed. At the plant in Marseilles, two cylinder jackets and seven piston rods were cast and forged and started to be machined. Continuing the above-mentioned work on the hull, in January 1900 they were able to proceed with the installation of the cast part of the sternpost. In April 1900, it became possible to begin the installation of machine foundations and propeller shaft brackets. Finished the details and began assembling the first (trial) turret of 152-mm guns. Almost all the main castings and forgings of mechanisms, according to their extensive range, which hardly changed in anything during the 40-year period of armored shipbuilding, were received by the plant in Marseilles. It was now up to their timely processing and subsequent vigorous assembly.
But there were no grounds for optimism in this regard. The plant consistently lagged behind with the machines of the French ("Jena", "Montcalm") and Russian ships. Supervising mechanical engineer N.V. Afanasiev, replacing D.A. The head, now had to, as it was established, become the chief mechanic of the battleship. He could express nostalgia only about boilers. Experiencing the peak of popularity (orders for all the fleets of the world), owning an extensive well-developed production, the Delaunay-Belleville company confidently worked according to its standard models and failures in its work could not be expected. She produced really serial samples.
In May, the installation of bulkheads of coal pits made of corrugated galvanized steel began, the couplings of the propeller shaft brackets were fitted, and the assembly of the trial turret of 152-mm guns was completed. But so far, out of the 4000 tons of the launching weight of the battleship hull, only 2740 tons were on the slipway. In June, they were finally able to begin installing the beams and the upper deck flooring. The foundations of the bow and stern boiler rooms were brought to 20% and 80% readiness, and the engine rooms - up to 45%. Propeller shaft brackets were installed, pin tubes of 152-mm gun turrets and rotation mechanisms were assembled. A complete set of steam heating delivered from Paris was being prepared for installation.
Cabin furniture was also made in Paris. Having already accepted 60% of the delivery. I.K. Grigorovich recognized the furniture as "very successful." From the order of metal furniture, as in the types of fire safety at the insistence of the MTC was done at the "Retvizan" in America, "Tsesarevich" was released. (Perhaps, due to the same special grand ducal patronage). In August, the installation of chimneys and propeller shaft brackets and the assembly of turret platforms for 152-mm guns continued. We started assembling the first 305 mm turret and its rotation and feed mechanisms. The degree of readiness of the towers was 30%, the test 152-mm turret was 60%, the total for the hull was 43%. Deck armor was accepted at three factories, and plates adjacent to the sides arrived in La Seine. They had to be installed before the hull was launched into the water.
Launching of the squadron battleship "Tsesarevich", February 10, 1901


The descent of the battleship into the water took place at 11 o'clock on February 10 (23), 1901. Despite the petition of I.K. Grigorovich, who reminded that the launching of ships at the shipyard is a “huge celebration”, participating in which the whole city is decorated with flags, P.P. Tyrtov, as in the case of the descent of the Bayan, did not allow Russian military flags to be hoisted on the ship. The ban was motivated by the fact that Russia, under the terms of the contract, did not yet have ownership rights to the ship and could completely abandon it if its conditions were not met. It was forbidden, as not accepted in the Russian fleet, and the rite of baptism of the ship.
February 11 from P.P. Tyrtov A. Lagan was sent a telegram of welcome, to which he received an equally kind response of thanks. According to the established custom, the special report of the Admiral General (on the Main Staff) brought the descent to the "highest notice." It was also reported that a retired naval doctor of the French fleet, Paul Seitz, who was present during the descent, was inspired by the event and wrote poems "serving as an expression of the heartfelt feelings of a French patriot for His Imperial Majesty and for the entire Russian nation." Poems dedicated to the Russian Emperor were also reported to the Admiral General.
In June, the installation of watertight bulkheads in the battery deck, chimney casings, hatch armor coamings and fixed parts of all 8 towers was completed. In the workshops, their turning parts were finished. We started finishing the ammunition magazines, checked the stability of the hull in a state without belt armor and began its installation. Completion was greatly hampered by cracks and other defects constantly found in the castings of the machines (for example, seven out of eight cylinder covers were rejected), which caused the parts to be rejected, as well as the delay in sending guns to France, made in Russia at the Obukhov plant overloaded with orders.


A batch of armor plates manufactured by the French Creusot factory was also rejected, but out of a total of 12 batches of hull armor, four were rejected, and two out of four batches for towers manufactured by the Saint-Chamond factory were rejected: they did not withstand firing tests.

The ship spent most of December 1902 in the dock, where outfitting work was being completed, and the underwater part of the hull was repainted. At the suggestion of the naval attaché, Lieutenant G.A. Yepanchin for the experiment (the type of coloring was not specified in the contract) painted over two strips from each side with the National patent paint to compare with the usual one, although for the most part the already widely used Dabris composition was used. Now, having made sure that after a year of completion afloat, the sections covered by the International did not have any signs of fouling or rust (the surfaces painted by Dabris were affected by rust in the form of dense bubbles), we decided to use new paint.


New, unfavorable circumstances for Russian customers did not cease to emerge. A. Lagan, who arranged a profitable order for the company, went on a promotion and was transferred to the board of the Forge and Chantier society. Mr. Fournier, who replaced him, no longer considered it necessary to be delicate with the Russians, which is why, as in August 1901, he informed I.K. Grigorovich, "for no reason, various obstacles and failures in the supply and construction of the battleship began to appear." It was possible to achieve satisfaction of their demands only "through endless correspondence and statements of complaint to the Ministry."


The repeated cases of rejection of parts of the main machines (cracks were found in four large castings) and armor plates, the order of which was distributed among five factories in France, were also painfully manifested. And when captain N.M. Rodzevich, the inspector of the MTC, had to reject a batch of plates from the Creusot plant (the content of sulfur and phosphorus in the castings exceeded the limits set by the MTC) I.K. Grigorovich saw this as a danger to the construction
armadillo. The delay in the delivery of slabs could give the Forge and Chantier factory an excuse to extend the construction period and would force them to “start saving to our detriment” to make up for their losses.
With an inexplicable delay - only in December 1901 - it turned out that the ladders already made and partly installed, made according to the samples of the French fleet, did not meet the requirements of the ITC. The ladders had to be made anew according to the drawings approved for the Varyag cruiser. On November 29, 1901, the ship was brought into the dock for cleaning and painting the underwater part, which was fairly overgrown with algae and shells.
At the same time, as a batch of armor plates was tested by firing, they were being prepared for installation on a ship. It turned out that out of all 12 batches of side and turret armor plates, four did not pass the shooting tests (at the training ground in Le Havre) and were made anew.
Failure to achieve speed was explained by non-optimal propeller parameters, as well as the influence of zygomatic keels. In March 1903, it was decided to shorten the latter, but the work could only be carried out from May 21 to June 5. From the keels, shortened by 17.2 m, there was only a straight section in the middle part of the hull. In addition to the lack of speed, the tests also revealed heating of the bearings of the main and auxiliary mechanisms and malfunctions in the rudder blade position indication system. Later it turned out that the launching device of the mine boats was “very unsatisfactory”, and the boats themselves, ordered in England at the White factory, needed to be fine-tuned.
sea ​​trials


The first batch of the team (96 people) arrived on the battleship in February, the officers led by I.K. Grigorovich got on board on May 2, in mid-July the second batch of the team (337 lower ranks) was sent to France. From St. Petersburg they hurried with the tests: the situation in the Far East was getting tense, and the ship still had to go to the Baltic for a traditional review.
Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" on trials, Toulon, summer 1903


However, the company did not speed up the testing program. True, some work is still reduced or canceled. So, it was allowed not to test torpedo tubes by firing at speeds above 12 knots, and it was decided to postpone the installation of the radio station.
On June 27, the next sea trials took place, at which it was possible to reach a speed of 18.34 knots: shortening the keels and fine-tuning the propellers was not in vain. But already in July, cracks were found in the front low-pressure cylinder of the left car. To speed up the completion of the tests, Rear Admiral A. A. Virenius arrived in Toulon from St. Petersburg, but this could not help in a significant way.


As early as July 16, the GMSH believed that the ship would leave for Kronstadt exactly in 2.5 weeks, but this forecast was not shared in Toulon. The plant (to eliminate the risk of additional work) relied on the 4-month acceptance period specified in the contract. I.K. Grigorovich also saw no reason to leave prematurely, when much still needs to be done. The contradiction was eternal: the authorities expected diligence from subordinates and quick execution of orders to leave, while the commander understood that excessive diligence would result in accidents that would certainly occur due to crumpled or incomplete tests. And the demand for this will not be from those who hastened the departure, but from him, the commander.
Next running test. Toulon. France, summer 1903

On August 18/31, 1903, as a result of the construction that dragged on for 50 months, an unprecedented crumpled signing of the act of accepting the battleship to the treasury took place, stating that its main weapon, the 305-mm guns, was not ready for action. Having shown belated erudition, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, in one of his many biting remarks on the margins of A.A. Virenius pointed out that the supply system with unsuccessful “automatic carts” was designed by the same engineer Lagan as on the French battleship Saint Louis.

Recognized as one of the "most unfortunate ships of the French Navy", she was notorious for frequent breakdowns of both mechanisms and turret installations. But this circumstance did not affect the determination of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky (he already directly suspected the officers of sabotaging the acceptance due to their unwillingness to part with the delights of the French Riviera) to push the Tsesarevich out of Toulon by any means.
The squadron battleship Tsesarevich leaves Toulon, September 4, 1903


On August 27, four days late against the promised Z.P. Christmas time and having crumpled all the tests, A.A. Virenius, under his own flag, moved the battleship to the East. I had to refuse to enter the Baltic: they decided, contrary to tradition, to immediately send the battleship to the Pacific Ocean. In order to shorten the test period, full 12-hour sea trials were abandoned, and the corrections of the detected malfunctions in the main caliber ammunition supply system were postponed until arrival in Port Arthur, delaying the payment of the last payment of two million francs to the company until the converted supply system was completed. will be delivered to the Far East. We accelerated testing of the drainage system and the cellar flooding system, postponing corrections for the future. In the first passage, on the way to the Strait of Messina, the cast-iron eccentric of the medium pressure cylinder of the left machine broke. The accident exactly repeated the one that occurred during the tests on February 8. Then I.K. Grigorovich forced the firm to produce the same spare eccentric, but the firm was not required to replace cast iron with steel. Having replaced the broken eccentric with a spare one in Naples, they came to. Poros, in the roadstead of which the reloading of ammunition from the steamer already waiting for the battleship took place. Here they also received another spare, sent from Toulon, but also a cast-iron eccentric.
ship officers


The “Tsesarevich” and “Bayan” arrived in Sabang Bay on the Dutch island of Pulo Vey on October 28, 1903. This port had just (in 1899) been “opened” by the Russian fleet. The initiative of a private Dutch company made it possible to do without calling at Singapore, where the British could at any time interfere with the supply of coal to Russian ships. Here, "Tsesarevich", having taken 1170 tons, filled all the coal pits. The campaign continued on November 2. On November 5-7, we stood in Singapore, replenishing only food supplies. There was already a direct, but protracted throw to Port Arthur with a length of 2630 miles. This path, going at an average speed of 9.68 knots, was overcome in 272 hours. Coal was spent: "Tsesarevich" - 997, "Bayan" - 820 tons. In readiness to break through with battle, the ships entered the Yellow Sea, and on November 19, from a distance of 60 miles from Port Arthur, the "Tsesarevich" entered into radio communications with the Golden Mountain station.

On the morning of November 20, the head of the squadron, Vice Admiral O.V. Stark (1846-1928) visited the "Tsesarevich" and "Bayan", after which the "Petropavlovsk" and "Boyarin" weighed anchor for a trip to Chemulpo. This Korean port served as a kind of invisible border between the interests of Russia and Japan. European powers kept their stationers here. There was always something going on here. This time it was necessary to understand the reasons for the attack on the Russian sailors from the gunboat "Beaver" that was stationed there by a huge crowd of Japanese soldiers dressed as coolies, as they suspected. On the morning of November 21, the Tsesarevich and Bayan weighed anchor and entered the Eastern Inner Basin.
The unloading of delivered ship stores, weapons and supplies, and sorting of mechanisms after a long voyage began. Here, the ships changed their white color to combat. As recorded by midshipman Shishko in the Tsesarevich logbook dated December 1/14, 1903 (on this day, the battleship moved from the pool to the inner roadstead, as the Western Pool has recently begun to be called), that “for painting the battleship while parking at the wall Eastern basin in battle color, 39 pounds 52 pounds of drying oil, 9 pounds of 8 pounds of soot, and 19 pounds of 20 pounds of ocher were overused, about which an act was drawn up. In the evening, Bayan also joined the Tsesarevich. Here in the armed reserve were the battleships "Peresvet" (flag of Rear Admiral), "Retvizan" (he came to Port Arthur on April 21, 1903, and the next day was enlisted in the squadron) "Victory", the cruisers "Askold "," Diana. "Pallada", "Novik", mine transport (layer) "Yenisei", gunboat "Gilyak", transport "Angara" (former steamship of the Volunteer Fleet "Moscow"), "Ermak" and destroyers. As a novice ship that has just begun to master the squadron combat training program, the Tsesarevich. like "Bayan", was left in the campaign.


The arrival of "Tsesarevich" and "Bayan", the expected approach of the detachment led by "Oslyabey", caused the viceroy to rise in a militant mood. At a conference of commanders and flag officers convened on December 18, he announced that he "considers it desirable to go to Sasebo and find the enemy there to inflict the 2nd Sinop on him." But he was convinced that it would be more prudent to wait for the reinforcements to come. And then already the success of the defeat of the Japanese fleet could be considered guaranteed. Flag-captain of the squadron captain 1st rank A.A. Eberhard was sure that even with the forces that had forces, the success of the battle off the coast of Japan would be ensured. More balanced headquarters wisdom was shown by the head of the temporary naval headquarters of the viceroy, Rear Admiral V.K. Witgeft. In his opinion, the task of the fleet should be considered dominance in the Yellow Sea from Kwantung to Kelpart, "calling the enemy to him from its shores." This will prevent the most anticipated operation of the Japanese - the landing of the vanguard army on the western coast of Korea. But the squadron was nevertheless instructed to draw up a calculation of the need for coal for the Campaign to the shores of Japan.

December 20, accepting a representative commission of squadron specialists headed by the flagship mechanical engineer (from Petropavlovsk). A. Lukyanov, "Tsesarevich" in tow of port boats left the inner roadstead for the outer one. 15 shots saluted the flag of the Petropavlovsk stationed here, received 7 shots in return according to the charter and laid down on the south-east 78 ° course. The joint campaign on December 23 with Petropavlovsk did not take place - the flagship battleship went to the Eastern Basin. On the "Tsesarevich" they raised the flag pennant of the elder on the roadstead. According to the squadron's custom, they loaded coal from barges, replenishing the stock to the maximum, and continued raid exercises and exercises. They practiced repelling mine attacks. At night, searchlights were illuminated by the approaching steamers, of which one (it was at the end of the night of December 26) suddenly turned sharply and went to sea. But to check a suspicious vessel, sending after the Varyag cruiser that was on the road that day or calling a destroyer from the harbor, the senior on the road had no rights and tasks. So a month before the war, the system of formal attitude to the security service showed itself.
"Tsesarevich" in Port Arthur


On December 28, they said goodbye to the Varyag cruiser, which left for Chemulpo at 1 o'clock in the afternoon. The ship never returned from there. On December 29, taking advantage (as the admiral ordered) of the decrease in frost to 1″ of heat, they fired from the guns.
Unable to withstand the aggravation of the situation and no longer afraid to disrupt the plans of the St. Petersburg "economy", the governor on January 17, 1904 (duplicating the order of the squadron chief No. 40 of January 19) ordered almost the entire squadron to start the campaign. Pobeda, Yenisei, Diana (January 18), Peresvet, Retvizan (January 19), which were already in the campaign since the beginning of 1904, and most of the cruisers began to join the Poltava, Petropavlovsk and most of the cruisers, "Tsesarevich", "Amur" (January 20).
Squadron battleships "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizan" in the inner basin of Port Arthur
By the end of the day on January 19, the squadron was preparing for battle. In the evening, to check the blackout, they hid all the lights for half an hour. Communication with the shore was allowed only from 6 o'clock. morning. On the afternoon of January 20, a signal was made from Petropavlovsk for the entire squadron (common letter call sign “03”): “Prepare for the campaign, take provisions for 3 days, tomorrow at 8 in the morning have 10 knots of speed.” By 8 o'clock in the evening they stopped communicating with the shore. The Angara transport entered the squadron duty, the Pallada and Retvizan provided combat lighting for the night. At night until the morning of shooting, the Gilyak gunboat was anchored in the sea.


In the early morning of January 21, the Askold cruisers successively weighed anchor and went to sea. "Diana", "Bayan". At 7 o'clock. 30 min. from "Petropavlovsk" it was ordered to prepare for shooting from anchors, and at 8 o'clock. followed by the signal "Move anchor all at once." After 5 minutes, the squadron set in motion. The battleship Sevastopol, which was testing the machines (it was plagued by protracted problems due to design defects) and 7 destroyers, as well as the Gilyak gunboat and the Angara transport guarding the raid, remained on the road.


The battleships marched in the formation of two wake columns (distance 3 cab.): in the right "Petropavlovsk", "Poltava", "Tsesarevich", in the left "Peresvet", "Retvizan", "Victory". They did not include either the “Emperor Alexander III” (he could well have made a trip together with the “Tsesarevich” or after him), nor the “Oslyaby”, who was living in an absurd way in the Mediterranean Sea, nor those sent in December 1901, as it were “ for repairs "(although it should have been long ago to have funds for this in the Far East), but the battleships Navarin and Sisoi the Great did not return.
Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" in the inner basin of Port Arthur


The cruisers went ahead, forming a chain with a distance of 10 miles between the ships and the Bayan closest to the squadron. "Boyarin" and "Novik" kept at the squadron, at a distance of 6 miles from it were 10 destroyers.
On the evening of January 23, 1904, the commander of the Japanese joint fleet, Vice Admiral Togo, received an imperial decree instructing him to begin hostilities. It was no longer a task to use a prepared, trained and mobilized military machine to the smallest detail.


At midnight, a meeting of flagships and commanders took place on the flagship battleship Mikasa, which determined the last details of the campaign. In the morning, when the announcement of the Japanese government about the severance of diplomatic relations had not yet been made, the Japanese armada, waiting only for an order, left Sasebo for the sea. In its composition, with battleships, there were transports with troops for landing in Chemulpo. On the morning of the same day, January 24, that is, again, before the announcement of the break in relations, near Fuzan, the steamer of the Voluntary Fleet Ekaterinoslav, which was heading to Port Arthur with a cargo of food and canned food, was captured. On the morning of January 25 at Fr. The Naiping "by right of war booty" seized a steamship belonging to ROPiT. In total, 9 Russian civil ships were captured in the ports of Korea and Japan. Without refusing to continue the sophisticated game of European diplomacy, the Japanese, on the evening of January 25, allowed the ship Shilka, which was arrested in Nagasaki on January 24, which had just arrived from Vladivostok, to go to sea. Lost by the Japanese at sea, he miraculously managed to arrive safely in Port Arthur on the second day of the war. Without knowing it, the ship shamed the St. Petersburg strategists, who, led by the chief of staff, assured the emperor that the Oslyabi detachment should not be allowed to break into Port Arthur.


Moving freely in a seemingly extinct sea and not encountering any Russian warships, the Japanese fleet rose to the latitude of Chemulpo. Here at Fr. Single to Chemulpo turned, escorting transports, a detachment of Rear Admiral Uriu. And here the Russian fleet, except for the calmly allowing the Japanese to land the troops "Varyag" and "Korean" (they had such an instruction!), did not show itself in any way. No Russian cruisers were found on the Shantung parallel. According to the wise reasoning of Adjutant General E I. Alekseeva were to appear only the next night, so the main forces of Togo were able to approach unhindered almost close to the serene parking lot of the Russian fleet.


Not yet quite skillful, the Japanese apparently mixed up something in preparation for their attack, which, as you might guess, was a shootout between their detachments. As the mine officer of the "Tsesarevich" later recalled, Lieutenant V.K. Pilkin, this "distant shooting" was heard 3.5 hours before the attack. On the "Tsesarevich" she was mistaken for the doctrine, which was talked about in the squadron. Neither the headquarters of the squadron, nor the governor himself, who loved to follow the little things of life and exercises on ships, were alarmed by this incomprehensible shooting, and the cruisers were not sent to check the incident at sea. They were not concerned about the safety of the huge steamship of the Russian East Asian Society "Manchuria", which left Shanghai on January 21 on the orders of the viceroy. Without exaggeration, he was carrying an invaluable cargo - the second set of ammunition for Vladivostok and Port Arthur, an aeronautical park for Port Arthur and 800 thousand cans of canned meat. Already after the attack, he "caught up" with the Japanese squadron, which was at sea (20 miles from Port Arthur), and got them as an additional bonus for audacity and foresight in organizing the attack.
On the night of January 27, 1904, the Tsesarevich also remained motionless in the roadstead.
On the night of January 26-27, the "Tsesarevich" continued to remain at anchorage No. 8, which he occupied upon returning from a campaign to Shantung. From the south it was covered by ships of two lines of disposition. The urgency of the situation was especially evident after the mass exodus of Japanese subjects from Port Arthur on the evening of January 26. The silence that reigned in the roadstead after the crackling of firecrackers and fireworks throughout Port Arthur (Chinese residents on the night before their new year expelled evil spirits from their homes ) became especially sinister. Knowing about the break in diplomatic relations, the commanders of some ships tried to take security measures themselves. The anti-torpedo nets on the battleships "Poltava" and "Sevastopol", which had begun to be prepared for installation, were again removed into the hold by order of the squadron chief, and the commander of the "Peresvet", who asked for permission to stop the night loading of coal unmasking the ship, received a suggestion from the admiral for not understanding the combat significance of this operations.
The commander of the Tsesarevich was also worried, whose signalmen on January 25 intercepted a semaphore message to one of the ships about an alleged declaration of war that had already taken place. But he received an explanation from the flag-captain that there was no cause for concern. The guards that night were carried by the destroyers "Fearless" and "Quick" that went out to sea. The ships were ordered to have anchor lights lit in order to let the ships of the dredging caravan and the OKVZhD steamer pass. The cruisers on duty (who had half the number of boilers under steam to immediately set off) were the Askold and Diana cruisers. In terms of lighting (in readiness to immediately turn on the searchlights), the Pallada cruiser and the Retvisan battleship were on duty. To repel a possible attack, the anti-mine guns on the ships were loaded.
The first three detachments that crept up to the raid were guided by the beams of searchlights, which shone on duty cruisers. Almost following the Japanese destroyers that had bypassed them, the Russians also turned to the roadstead at about 11 p.m. Being 5-6 miles from the parking lot, they heard the shooting, but, unaware of the attack that had already taken place, they continued to act according to the instructions.
“Fearless”, approaching the raid, tried to make identification signals in all forms, to which he received no answer. The squadron was already busy repulsing the attack. Despite the shells flying over the ship, the destroyer approached the side of the Petropavlovsk for an oral report. His approach coincided with the news of the attack that had just reached the admiral. The torpedoes hit only three ships. All of them, even the cruiser Pallada, were able to miraculously stay afloat. And if there was a full-fledged dock in Port Arthur, the consequences of damage could be dealt with in a few weeks.
"Retvizan" and "Tsesarevich" were blown up at the same time. It is believed that the Retvizan took the first blow. On the "Tsesarevich" the chief of the watch, midshipman K.P. Hildebrant was vigilant. He sounded the alarm, having managed to notice the silhouette of a stealing destroyer in the darkness. The shrill signal of the bugler "attack on the port side" set the whole ship in motion. The commanders of the 75 mm and 47 mm guns immediately opened fire. The ship was lit up with flashes of shots. The spotlights were turned on. This moment coincided with the attack on the Retvizan, and according to some reports, it happened even earlier.
An explosion at the side of the Tsesarevich. Drawing of that time


Commander I.K. Grigorovich immediately climbed to the platform of the port side, but did not have time to properly look around, as the ship shuddered from an explosion in the stern. The torpedo hit somewhere between the two aft turrets of 305- and 152-mm guns. Shooting under the command of Lieutenant D.V. Nenyukov (1869-1929) was unsuccessful - the enemy disappeared, and soon the fire from 75-mm guns had to be stopped due to the rapidly increasing roll. By order of midshipman Yu.G. Gadda, who had taken command of the battery, had the guns tucked in and the ports battened down. A desperate struggle to save the ship began.
Two holes from shells that carried out part of the bulwark on the poop from the port side and penetrated into the officer's cabins


Almost at the same moment, the Pallada was also blown up. Her watch officer, Lieutenant A.A. Brovtsyn also did not hesitate to sound the alarm. Of the seven torpedoes fired at her, one hit (in the region of 68-75 sp.), The others went through the bow, and one of them was apparently the one that hit the Retvizan.
On "Petropavlovsk" they continued not to believe in what had happened. They even tried to stop the shooting with a set signal. Only an hour after the attack from "Petropavlovsk" a signal followed: "Open fire", and after 10 minutes. gave the order to "Novik" (it was at 0 o'clock 55 minutes already on January 27) "Pursue the enemy destroyers." Behind him, raising steam, the cruiser "Askold" came out to guard the squadron. But they did not see the enemy. De-anchoring and responding to fire, the squadron moved towards the enemy. But Togo, instead of the decisive battle promised to his fleet, hurried (already at 11:45) to retreat. Too insufficient, apparently, seemed to him the results of the night attack of the destroyers. Yes, and "Nissin" with "Kasuga" were not ready for battle. And the Russians, despite the proximity of their base and the support of coastal batteries (this has never happened again), allowed him to leave. For the "Tsesarevich" both battles (at night and in the morning) merged into a struggle for the survivability of the ship. The French technique, praised and so beloved by the Admiral General, did not reveal any clear advantages over either the American (Retvizan) or domestic (Pallada) models. The newest battleship, the last miracle of technology in the squadron, was almost in a more distressed situation.
Owning Port Arthur for six years, the owners of the fleet did not think in the least about the absurdity of sending battleships to Vladivostok for docking. The insignificance of repair facilities in Port Arthur was repeatedly drawn to the attention of the authorities by successive squadron commanders in the Pacific Ocean: in 1897-1899, F.V. Dubasov and in 1900-1902. Ya.A. Hiltebrandt (1843-1915). Yes, and the commander of naval forces in the Pacific Ocean, Admiral E.I. Alekseev in 1900 reported on the need to "give all the means to quickly build two docks in Port Arthur." The war began, and it turned out that not only the dock, but also the workers in the fortress were sorely lacking. Cheaper for the treasury, the Chinese workers left the workshops of the port and the fleet was saved from complete paralysis of repairs only thanks to the work detachment of the Baltic Shipyard. Its 113 skilled workers, headed by ship engineer N.N. Kuteinikov managed to get to Port Arthur on March 16.


But there were not enough materials, and there were plenty of troubles, and they were able to cope with the correction of the Pallada in dock conditions only after two months. The battleships had to be repaired in a completely old-fashioned way - with the help of caissons being built right there in the port. Derived from ancient diving bells, the design of the repair caisson took the form of an open and rigid extension pocket adjacent to the damaged side or bottom. The water was pumped out, and workers descended into the caisson. In this way, in 1880 and 1885. damage to the hulls of the imperial yacht Livadia in Ferrol and the corvette Vityaz in St. Petersburg were repaired. But the routine of the former leisurely and economical organization with a constant lack of tools, materials and workers put obstacles at every step. As P.A. Fedorov, "the construction of the caisson is progressing, but quietly."
Caisson for "Tsesarevich"


On the ship, meanwhile, the hold under the leadership of P.A. Fedorov, using wooden wedges, cement and lead, they worked in the water during periods of low tide, when part of the side was exposed. First of all, it was necessary to repair the crack in the living deck. Active assistance in the work was provided by a group of junior mechanic V.K. Korzun. P.A. Fedorov managed to overcome the routine attitude of the authorities to the distribution of St. George's crosses allocated to the ship, according to the "lot". The owners of the hold compartments Petrukhov, Buyanov and Lyubashevsky received awards for their real exploits. The mechanic did not present himself for the award.
At the side of the "Tsesarevich". Work in progress in the caisson


The troubles, however, did not recede. On February 14, the wing of the typhoon "Tsesarevich" that swept over the port was blown aground and carried around the barrel. The "Askold" and "Novik" that were on the way were saved only by the lightning-fast reaction of their watch commanders - they managed to give commands to release the anchor chains. On the same day, the first newly made caisson is served by crane to the side of the Retvizan, which was still standing in the aisle. But when drained, it began to deform, and in a semi-recovered state it was only enough to transfer the ship from the passage to the harbor. Here the caisson began to fill with water and the ship, in order to stay afloat, had to, having set in motion, throw its bow into the shallows. At high tide, the water covered the deck, coming close to the tower. The “Tsarevich” had to be afraid of the same. But on February 16, it was possible to completely seal and drain the compartment of the turret compartment. On February 19, diver Tikhomirov removed the body of the deceased Afinogen Zhukov from the flooded compartment. On the ship, they raised money to provide material assistance to his family. The custom of posthumous awarding of heroes did not yet exist.
On the "Tsesarevich" close up holes

S.O. Makarov, who arrived in Port Arthur on February 24 as commander of the fleet, and on February 27 reported to the governor on the situation, noted that "the correction of ships due to lack of adequate funds in the port is not very successful." We also had to admit the bitter fact that "our equipment is much weaker than the enemy's, which seriously affects the tactical properties of the squadron and the work to correct the ships."
Admiral Makarov climbs the Tsesarevich


Meanwhile, the divers of the "Tsesarevich" from March 18 began to clear the drained compartments from silt and debris. The increasingly clearer picture was supplemented by the calculations of the chief ship engineer of the port, R.R. Svirsky (the author of the caisson project) and the French engineer Coudros. It turned out that before capsizing the "Tsesarevich" it was enough to add a roll of 0.5 °. The ship owed its salvation to an armored bulkhead (it limited the flow of water into the hull) and vigorous counter-flooding, which P.A. managed to carry out just before the threshold of stability loss. Fedorov. To seal the contour of the caisson, which continued to leak, at the suggestion of the head of the Port Arthur rescue party, Gorst, divers from bags released a cloud of sawdust. Filling the narrow cracks, they partly reduced the flow of water into the caisson. Continued filtration was fought with a heart rate monitor (a pistonless pump powered by steam).


From March 26, the torn edges of the holes began to be cut very successfully with an electric cutter at the initiative of Colonel A.P. Meller. As a representative of the Obukhov plant, he led the repair of artillery in the fortress. On April 26, the installation of the first frames, and then the outer skin, began. The work began to approach the final stage, and only then did the authorities remember that the newest and strongest battleship in the squadron, without having completed a full course of combat training, also did not have a full-time commander.
After the appointment of I.K. Grigorovich on the proposal of S.O. Makarov as the port commander (it was necessary to revive this work in a forced manner), the duties of the battleship commander were temporarily performed by senior officer D.P. Shumov. His direct appointment to this position was hindered by the immutable laws of the qualification. Although he had been a senior officer of the ship since the time of construction and therefore knew both the ship and its people to perfection, D.P. Shumov, however, was hopelessly "young" both in terms of service and age.
In place of the commander of the "Tsesarevich", the admiral appointed his flag captain, captain of the 2nd rank M.P. Vasiliev (1857-1904), who commanded in 1895-1897. destroyer "Sokol", and in 1898-1901. Icebreaker "Ermak" But then the Commander-in-Chief himself rebelled, he is also the viceroy of His Imperial Majesty in the Far East. He believed that Captain 1st Rank A.A. would be more worthy of commanding the Tsesarevich. Eberhard. Fate judged the dispute with its inherent evil irony: M.P. Vasiliev, unable to take command, died like S.O. Makarov during the disaster of "Petropavlovsk" on March 31, 1904 Ebergard, on whose appointment, as the governor wished, the highest order had already been issued (why this failed command goes through all the track records of Andrei Avgustovich), the same governor, leaving Port Arthur April 22 (so as not to fall into a siege), he took with him. Now he's A.A. Eberhard, as an experienced staff worker, was more needed in Mukden.

,
Only before the "Tsesarevich" no one cared anymore. He still remained under the temporary command of a senior officer, who, of course, could not adequately prevent V.K. Vitgeft "pulling away" the ship's crew for coastal needs. Everyone seemed to have forgotten that a ship that did not even have the combat training that was on the ships of the squadron would soon have to lead the fleet in battle.
Particularly imperfect was the system for adjusting fire from coastal posts and methods for transmitting target designations. The admiral spent too much energy on achieving his main goal - preparing the squadron to leave for battle with the Japanese fleet. Flip-flop shooting was relegated to the background. And therefore, only two ships participated in the first such shooting on March 9: Retvizan and Peresvet.
The underestimation of the mine danger, and the shortcomings of the staff ranks, who did not insist on trawling the fairway before the admiral (where Japanese destroyers were visible at night) led to the fact that the admiral and his whole business of reviving the fleet were finished on the morning of March 31, 1904. From that day on, General adjutant Alekseev and his worthy chief of staff Vitgeft, in spite of the heroism and selflessness of the sailors, led the fleet to destruction.
The possibilities of concentrating fire on single Japanese ships remained unfulfilled, and during their third flip-flop firing, which took place on April 2/15, 1904, the Russians responded to 190 shells fired by the Nissin and Kassuga cruisers with only 34. 28 shells fired "Peresvet" , 3 "Sevastopol", 2 "Poltava" and 1 "Victory". Even the thought of revenge for "Petropavlovsk" did not move the Adjutant General to a consolatory and fierce attack on the visitors.
The death of "Petropavlovsk"

On May 23 and 24, the Retvizan and the Tsesarevich took off their caissons and finally gained complete freedom of movement. Having replenished part of the removed weapons, the ships were able to begin full-fledged combat training. As early as May 11, according to the headquarters circular, having retained the former greenish-olive color of the hull, all other visible parts, including masts, chimneys and towers, were painted in a new way - in light brown, or, as they said at the squadron, “in sandy-brown " color. He was supposed to mask the ships against the backdrop of the rocks of the Kwantung coast. Having kept his cannons in the towers, “The Tsesarevich found himself in a more advantageous position - he lacked only 4 75-mm guns. Of the other ships, Pobeda turned out to be especially destitute. On it, in addition to 4 254-mm guns in the towers, there were only 8 (instead of 11) 152-mm and 15 (instead of 20) 75-mm guns. V.K. did not take care Witgeft and about the main armament of the cruisers: "Diana" and "Pallada", had only six (instead of the standard 8) 152-mm guns. On the "Askold" - there were only 10 (out of the previous 12) calibers of 152 mm and 75 mm.



Even the 75-mm guns, the admiral considered necessary against the siege artillery of the Japanese. And the ground command, trying to prevent the close imposition of the fortress, hurried the squadron to leave. According to the conditions of the tidal situation, the commander appointed him for June 10. But the Japanese, well aware of the events in the fortress, were not slow to scatter a new portion of mines over the raid the day before. The security forces of the raid, and this time, as it happened before the death of S.O. Makarov, managed to "step on a rake", not recognizing the enemy in the destroyers darting through the raid. Having left for the raid in the morning, the ships suddenly found themselves surrounded by mines visible from the sides. The minesweeping forces, despite some replenishment, were still not enough. But the Japanese understood their role, and the destroyers tried to attack the ships that were moving with trawls. Novik and Diana drove the enemy away. For an hour - from 15 to 16 hours - the movement was delayed by a malfunction of the steering device on the "Tsesarevich" - it either slowed down, or went out of order for corrections. At 16 o'clock. 40 minutes, having followed the trawls 8 miles, the fleet released the minesweeper caravan, as, apparently, by analogy with the dredging caravan, a detachment of improvised minesweepers was called. Increasing the speed to 10 knots, they laid a course to the south-east of 20 °. Around 18 o'clock. being 20 miles from Port Arthur, they noticed the Japanese fleet going across: 4 battleships and two cruisers Nissin and Kasuga. Behind him, detachments of cruisers and destroyers could be seen on different sides of the horizon. But all of them could not pose a direct threat to the Russian battleships. All of them would have to make way for our fleet if it could overcome the resistance of the Japanese main forces. And the chances for that seemed win-win: six Russian battleships against four Japanese ones. The fleet, for the first time after the death of S.O. Makarova, who went to sea for a decisive battle, did not doubt his success.
Armored cruiser "Kasuga"


The situation before the exit was aggravated by the shelling of the harbor by Japanese siege artillery, which began on July 25. The siege 120-mm (so far) battery installed on the western slopes of the Wolf Mountains fired up to 100 shells that day. One shell hit the Tsesarevich's armor belt, the other hit the admiral's cabin, where the telephone exchange was located. Here they received messages from ships and observation posts, recorded in a special log all information about the movement of enemy ships on the approaches to the raid. The telephone operator was killed by the explosion, the flag officer was slightly injured (in the arm). Retvisan, Pobeda and Peresvet responded to the shelling that resumed on the morning of July 26. The Tsesarevich, who needed practice (it was important to check the results of the repair), was not allowed to shoot this time either. On July 27, Retvizan was hit even more seriously. It was hit by 7 120-mm shells, one of which (together with two 152-mm guns ready for installation) sank a barge brought to the side. The driver of a port crane preparing to load was killed. The exit to the sea behind the trawls of the trawling caravan began at 5 o'clock. morning. It succeeded twice as fast as on June 10th. The Bayan cruiser, which, due to a mine explosion on July 14, could not participate in the campaign. More likely would have been the success of a quick and unexpected breakthrough of the squadron into the sea. At 10 o'clock. 30 min. the fleet released the minesweepers. The Nissnn and Kasuga, which kept aloof, did not dare to touch them. In the meantime, detachments of Japanese cruisers and destroyers appeared, keeping out of firing range. The speed of the fleet, which was 3-5 knots when escorted behind the trawls, was increased to 8. This gradualness was explained by fears for the strength of the bulkheads in the compartments of the Retvizan, which entered the breakthrough with combat damage. With the advent of the Japanese main forces, the speed was increased to 13 knots. Surrounding the Russian squadron on all sides, the Japanese left a free path to return to Port Arthur. This time, too, they hoped that the Russians would return back to the harbor, where siege batteries would be able to finish them off without much trouble. But the Russians were not going to retreat. The first battle, which lasted from 12 noon. until 14 o'clock. 20 min., "Tsesarevich" began from a distance of 75 cab., Responding to the sighting of the Japanese squadron directed at him. Behind the short-range (about 400 m) the second shot fell closer to the Japanese. The direction was correct. For the first time in open combat, the Japanese demonstrated their art of long-range shooting. As noted by the commander of the bow 305-mm tower, junior artillery officer Lieutenant N.N. Azaryev, "the shooting of the Japanese was very fast and well-aimed." Affected "great practice when shooting from long distances" and the presence of optical sights.
"Fuji"


In the course of more than two hours of battle, the "Tsesarevich" received only a few holes in the surface (most of the shells fell undershot), which did not cause serious damage. By the end of the first phase of the battle, the distance on the counter-tacks decreased to 36 cab. At these distances more familiar to Russians, several hits on the enemy were achieved. From a distance of 45 cabs, the Japanese also launched 152-mm guns. But our squadron did not show high accuracy. The lack of practice in shooting at long distances and the lack of methods for determining the correction for the speed of the enemy led to the fact that many shots did not have the necessary lead. They lay either in front of or behind the stern of Japanese ships. This, as was seen in battle, was the fault of many ships of the Russian squadron.
Squadron battleship Mikasa, July 1904


During the first phase of the battle, the "Tsesarevich" received one underwater hole. The projectile, hitting the starboard armor in the region of 30-32 frames, apparently ricocheted down and exploded against the front stoker. In a few minutes, the roll reached 3-4 °. The bilge mechanic P.A., who came to the place of damage, arrived in time. Fedorov, using a drain valve, established that two lower corridors 25-31 and 31-37 frames were flooded, as well as two upper 23-28 and 28-33 frames. He eliminated the roll by connecting the lower corridors with those opposite the other side, and to balance the upper ones, he filled the lower corridors in the engine room with water. The buoyancy of the ship from this decreased by 153 tons. At the very beginning of the battle, two 305-mm enemy shells hit caused huge damage in the side under the left aft 152-mm turret. The fence around the tower in the form of a low bulwark (French architectural excess) was crushed, which caused the tower to almost jam. But the tower itself was not damaged. A surface hole (1.52 m above the waterline) on the starboard side was caused by another 305-mm projectile. The explosion tore off the anchor, broke the top of the foremast with all its rigging. The aft chimney was slightly damaged.
Armored cruiser Yakumo


The hit of another 305-mm projectile in the roof of the aft 305-mm turret under the base of the aiming dome strongly pressed the roof, tore off several rivets and nuts. The galvanizer was killed, the gunner was wounded. At the same time, shell fragments riddled the 47-mm cartridge feed elevator on the rear upper bridge. The cartridges had to be fed in two stages, first inside the mast to the top, and from there at the ends to lower down. True, the tower suffered from flaws in its own technology. Wetting the deck before the battle from fire during explosions, the deck crew hit the turret embrasure with a jet. This was enough to blow the fuse for the vertical guidance network. At the time of repairing the damage had to switch to manual drive. There was a time when the right charger could only be used manually. At the end of the first battle, the galvanic firing circuit also failed: shell grease got into the contacts of the lock frame. I had to shoot using tubes.
At the same time, sailors Savenko and Tikhonov serving the rangefinder Barr and Stroud were wounded on the lower bridge. On the main-mars, they killed the marshal and wounded the commanders Vasilenko and sailor Ivanov, who were correcting the shooting. Elevation problems that occurred in the aft 305-mm turret delayed firing. Often the shells and charges of one gun were transferred to another. Commander of the tower midshipman A.N. Spolatbog fired, correcting the shot of one gun by the shot of another. He was assisted by requesting the distance by phone and disposing of the loading, the flagship mine officer, Lieutenant N.N. Schreiber (1873-1931, London). In the second battle, he had to replace the midshipman, who was supposed to leave the tower in order (having the training of a navigator) to go to the conning tower and replace the killed senior navigator.
Damage to the tower on the "Tsesarevich"


The consequences of French architectural excess - the team of 152-mm tower No. 6 (stern right) also felt the threat of jamming by a dented bulwark explosion. The damage was dealt with under the leadership of midshipman M.V., who commanded the aft towers. Kazimirov. A shell that hit the same turret between the guns and just below their embrasures exploded without causing much damage and damaging only the doors. There were no consequences when several fragments got inside the tower, of which one got stuck in the sleeve of the artillery quartermaster Busygin. There were also quite a few minor injuries caused by the unsuitability of the mechanisms and drives for intense live fire. They were able to be eliminated at the cost of a cease-fire for a period of 15 to 30 minutes. The nose turret of 305-mm guns, commanded by a junior artillery officer, Lieutenant N.N., experienced the greatest impact of enemy fire. Azaryev. As if warning of the seriousness of the ensuing battle, with the first Japanese shots, the tower was showered with many fragments, some of which fell into the open upper neck. But there were no direct hits on the tower for a long time. At the very beginning of the battle, Lieutenant Azariev managed to get into Yakumo, there were hits in Mikasa and Asahi.
Asahi squadron battleship


Catching up with the Poltava, which was far behind (up to 1.2 and even 2 miles), the Japanese, it seems, were preparing to make it the first object of the fire massing method that was already being worked out at that time. They have already begun approaching the distance of their destructive general volley (apparently, about 30 cabs). But "Poltava" from a distance of 32 cabs managed to make its own salvo, which turned out to be preemptive. Both shells of its bow 152-mm turret (commander midshipman A.A. Pchelnikov) exactly hit the casemate of the head Japanese battleship (it was either Mikasa, or, as many were convinced from the battle on June 10, Asahi). And the Japanese involuntarily, forgetting about the distance of the prepared salvo that had not yet been reached, discharged it at the Poltava from the 32 cab. He lay down with a spectacular undershoot and, apparently, disorganized the entire shooting. Frantic shooting, opened by the Japanese who lost their self-control, did not bring significant damage to the ship. So the heroic "Poltava" delayed the rapprochement of the Japanese with the main forces of the Russian fleet. Meanwhile, on the squadron, by checking along the line, it was established that the ships did not receive significant damage during the first phase of the battle.
Squadron battleship "Poltava" in the area of ​​Port Arthur

Fearing that the Russians, in fact, would be able to break into the sea before dark, the Japanese developed extremely frequent shooting, trying to concentrate all the fire on the Tsesarevich. This first experience, which has already become tangible, of massing fire, regardless of the huge consumption of shells, the Japanese undertook at the end of the first hour of the battle, when they were convinced by the example of Poltava that the traditional skirmish, although with predominant fire on the head, does not cause noticeable damage to the Russians.
The shooting began after the hoisting of a signal flag of some special, unimaginably large size on the Mikasa. Due to the reduced distance, the shooting was not particularly accurate, but the fountains of water rose around the "Tsesarevich" in an almost solid wall. The entire headquarters, which followed the example of the commander, was doused with streams of water on the open lower bridge. Pretty soon everyone was soaked to the skin. Began to become more frequent and hit 305-mm shells. From a larger number of hits, damage to the unarmored parts of the hull multiplied, but the armor was not pierced anywhere. All towers remained intact. Damage caused by the unreliability of equipment (failures of electrical and mechanical drive systems for feeding and loading, breakage of brackets and rollers at charging tables, etc.) managed to cope during the battle. Towers increasingly had to be switched to manual mode. The deadly fire of the Japanese "psychic" attack, opened in the second phase of the battle, turned into a continuous roar of fragments showering towers. As Lieutenant N.N. Azaryev about his turret, “a mass of fragments with water and acrid black smoke increasingly flew into its embrasures” Serve only on the left table. The rate of fire has dropped noticeably. Shooting (and this is also a general observation of all participants in the battle) was extremely difficult due to the practical indistinguishability of hits from one's own and other people's shells. Their explosions gave the same inconspicuous white trail as the shots of Japanese guns.
The aft 305-mm turret operated confidently under the command of midshipman A.N. Spolatbog. He showed himself to be a true commander and a born gunner. There were no hits in the tower for a long time, but one sailor, trying to catch his breath, stuck his head out, opening the door and was immediately killed by a fragment of another shell that exploded near. Due to the burnout of the vertical guidance rheostat of the left gun, they had to operate manually, and the burned-out conductor of the horizontal guidance manipulator forced the entire turret to turn manually.


Approximately at 17 o'clock. 55 min. "Tsesarevich" was struck by explosions of three successively, almost at the same time, hit by 305-mm high-explosive shells. One completely demolished the radio room, which was behind the combat room, the other “carried out” almost nine-tenths of its cross-section from the base of the foremast, the third landed exactly in the viewing gap of the conning tower. As if by order for description in all future anthologies, a 305-mm projectile (it was assumed that it was a ricochet) entered exactly into the viewing 305-mm clearance of the conning tower, slightly “squeezing” up the edge of the mushroom-shaped roof that interfered with it. Being at the end, he managed to burst outside the cabin, densely staining with yellow (melinite sediment) its outer wall and the surrounding structures of the bridge. The head part, which broke off almost completely, going obliquely, was reflected inside the cabin from its roof and again, slightly squeezing it, entered cutting clearance from the opposite side. After the battle, she was found in bed nets and demonstrated as a fragment that killed the admiral.
In fact, his body was torn apart and blown overboard (one leg survived) by the first and second external explosions that demolished the radio room (he was standing next to it) and tore a hole in the mast. Together with the flagship navigator Lieutenant N.N. Azariev and junior flag officer midshipman Ellis killed a bugler and two signalmen. Rear Admiral N.A. was wounded. Matusevich (he did not regain consciousness until night), senior lieutenant flag officer
Nantes M.A. Kedrov and junior flag officer midshipman V.V. Kuvshinnikov. It knocked down the commander of the battleship captain 1st rank N.M., who was standing in front of the conning tower. Ivanova.


The commander moved to the conning tower, where the helmsman, galvanizers, senior artilleryman, senior mine and senior navigational officers stood at the control instruments, speech pipes and indicators. Here the senior flag officer Lieutenant B.N. approached him. Knorring with a message about the death of the commander and the severe wounding of the chief of staff. In order not to introduce disorganization in the management of the squadron, the commander decided not to make notifications about the death of the admiral and wait until the chief of staff could take command. As stated in the commander's report, he wanted to prevent the "sheer chaos" that occurred in the squadron at the time of the death of S.O. Makarov.
Damage to the pipe on the ship after the battle on July 28

The fate of the Tsesarevich was now decided by the desperate struggle now unfolding at the steering gears to restore the ship's controllability. The helmsman Lavrov, sent down, began to correct the bent connecting rod of the drive, midshipman Daragan was sent to the poop to establish control with the help of tiller-hoists. This method, leading the hoists to the aft capstan, was repeatedly tested on the armadillo during exercises. For some reason, there was no provision for a steering wheel with a drive to the rudder in the aft compartment. The senior officer, captain of the 2nd rank, Shumov, who came to the conning tower (he spent the whole battle, as it should be for a senior officer at posts where immediate orders, help, or elimination of a hitch was required) tried to establish control of the machines in the meantime. And the "Tsesarevich", meanwhile, ignoring the heroic effort of the crew, stubbornly refused to obey him. With each attempt to shift the rudder, he abruptly rushed to the side, deviating each time on board up to 8 points, that is, up to 90 °. “The battleship walked, describing arcs all the time to the right, then to the left,” the senior flag officer, Lieutenant M.A., confirmed this observation. Kedrov. This was explained by the yaw inherent in the armadillo, which was especially intensified due to the trim on the nose.


On the way, the Tsesarevich separated from the ships returning to Port Arthur - his officers decided to fulfill the emperor's command and turned to Vladivostok. The actions of the other ships in the conclusion of the commission of inquiry in the case of the battle of July 28 are spoken of with appropriate harshness. “The poorly organized squadron fell apart and could no longer assemble.” Having lagged behind the squadron, the “Tsesarevich” had already completely lost its course for Port Arthur. The attacks of the destroyers were beaten off, turning their stern towards them. Almost constantly changing the course to all points, they completely lost their orientation. The damage to the ship was outwardly impressive, but the combat capability was not significantly affected. The night allowed some of them to be dealt with, and therefore, after a consultation with the officers, senior officer D.P. Shumov decided to break through to Vladivostok. At Port Arthur, the ship that was lagging behind and did not know the way could be intercepted by the Japanese. Going south, one could expect to get lost in the sea and slip through the Tsushima Strait at night.
The consumption of coal due to a hole in the pipe was, of course, above the norm, but at an economic speed, as the senior engineer confirmed, it should have been enough to reach Vladivostok. The return to Port Arthur was recognized as unpromising. There, the ship could expect only an inglorious death under the fire of Japanese siege batteries. The course to the south was ruled by the Polar Star, holding it astern. Already in the ensuing darkness, "Askold" passed close, a little later - "Diana". But the cruisers, considering themselves acting independently, did not want to join their flagship, and they did not have time to give them a signal from the Tsesarevich, it is possible that they were mistaken for the enemy in the dark or simply not noticed.



The morning of July 29 was encouraging. The weather was clear, the fog had disappeared, the horizon was clear. It was possible to mobilize all forces and begin to eliminate the most significant damage. But the unanimous decision by the officers to break through to Vladivostok met with the objection of the commander who came to his senses. The commander, who survived shock and a serious concussion, was wounded in the head and arm late in the evening (at about 11 p.m.), despite the protests of doctors, demanded that he be taken to the conning tower. Here he spent time repelling mine attacks, and the next morning, having assessed, as it seemed to him, the picture of serious damage to the ship, he recognized it, as he put it before the commission of inquiry, “terrible”. By that time, Rear Admiral Matusevich also came to his senses. Both of them decided that before breaking through to Vladivostok, it was necessary to go to the German port of Kiao-Chao (Qingdao) to repair and replenish coal reserves.
July 29, 1904 "Tsesarevich" arrived in Qingdao.
The squadron battleship Tsesarevich enters Qingdao, July 29, 1904

"Tsesarevich" at the wall - the holes were sealed, the mast was seized with additional stretch marks, because after the fight began to sway.


Upon arrival in Qingdao on the evening of July 29, the commander was in no hurry with orders to replenish coal reserves and order the materials necessary for repairs. He was not inspired by the example of those who had come earlier and were already preparing to leave for the breakthrough of Novik and Silent. Worse, Captain 1st Rank Ivanov found it convenient to evade the recommendations that the commander of the Fearless, Lieutenant P.L., turned to him for. Trukhachev (1867-1916).

Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" in Qingdao. Starboard


Arriving on the morning of July 30 along with the Merciless, he apparently believed that the ships that had broken through should go to Vladivostok together. Having taken over the overall command, speeding up the replenishment of the coal reserves on the destroyers with the help of his team, the "Tsesarevich" could put a whole detachment into the sea. Depending on the situation, he could either make a breakthrough to Vladivostok or go south to wait for the arrival of the 2nd Pacific Squadron in hard-to-reach areas of French or even foreign colonies. A campaign to connect with the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers was not excluded.
Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" in Qingdao. Bow turret and starboard side


All this was quite realistic in the presence of special cruisers of the Volunteer Fleet in the Russian fleet. After all, their operations already at the beginning of the war caused a great commotion among firms involved in military smuggling. A wide development of cruising operations was planned, which was quite realistic to be associated with the fate of the ships that had broken through. Recall that S.O. Makarov considered it quite real to break through to Port Arthur (and, possibly, to Vladivostok) of the battleship Oslyabya, captured by the beginning of the war in the Red Sea.
Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" in Qingdao. Damage to the second chimney


But the commander of yesterday's flagship and his staff did not find the strength to fulfill their duty to the end and prevent disarmament in neutral Qingdao. The ships were left to themselves and acted completely uncoordinated. "Novik", hurrying to leave before morning, and not having received help from the "Tsesarevich", left the port with an incomplete supply of coal. This circumstance played, as it soon became clear, a fatal role in his fate. "Silent" made every effort to cope with the repairs in the shortest possible time, until the Japanese swooped down on the port, and manage to leave for a breakthrough. "Fearless", waiting for his readiness, was in a hurry with the acceptance of coal. There is no mention in the documents about the help to the ships for all this time from the side of the "Tsesarevich".
Having evaded all initiatives and quite pleased with the circumstances, commander N.M. Ivanov retired with a sense of accomplishment.
Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" in Qingdao. Medium six inch tower


On the morning of July 30, he went ashore to a German hospital, leaving his ship on his own to solve the problems created by them, Ivanov. Admiral Matusevich was also there. But the ship, despite the strange behavior of its two most senior commanders, did not give up. The hope for the possibility of repair and subsequent breakthrough was aroused by the telegram of Emperor Nicholas II transmitted to the ships on July 31, encouraging the crew "in the mind of sacredly and honorably fulfilled duty to the throne and homeland."
German band at the forefront of the battleship "Tsesarevich" in Qingdao, summer 1904


In a response telegram from Admiral Matusevich addressed to the head of the naval ministry, feelings of reverence were expressed with which everyone on the battleship and destroyers accepted the “highly merciful words” of the emperor, and wishes were expressed for “sending health and prosperity to the beloved sovereign emperor and highly newborn heir.” Further, loyal feelings and the unanimous desire of the crews of the ships "to bear our lives again for the glory of the throne and the fatherland" were expressed. Alas, reality did not confirm these lofty feelings of all-devotion to the throne. The Germans, however, in order not to expose the ships to Japanese attacks from the sea, on July 31 they transferred them to the inner pool, and on August 1 the governor announced that the Tsesarevich was allowed to stay for 6 days. It was explained by the need to bring the ships into the condition necessary for going to sea (but not for full combat readiness). From the “Merciless” on the day of arrival, they first demanded to leave the port within 24 hours (as from “Novik” before that), and then, referring to the permission of the German emperor, the parking period was extended until midnight from August 3 to 4.



But on August 2, the attitude of the usually amiable German authorities suddenly changed. At 10 in the morning, the commanders of all ships were announced the order of Kaiser Wilhelm II immediately - by 11 o'clock, lower the flags and disarm. Everyone was lost in conjecture about the reason for such exceptional perfidy. After all, Russian ships in all the years preceding the war got used to the feelings of cordiality, hospitality and even friendship that were constantly manifested by the German authorities (especially in Kiel). Germany in that war clearly sympathized with Russia, and German ships with a cargo of coal were already preparing (under contracts concluded with private firms) to accompany the campaign of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.
Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" in Qingdao, summer 1904


But N.A. Matusevich, either due to depression from the wound he had experienced or excessive delicacy, did not even try to explain to the Germans the absurdity of their demands: the ships that began repairs needed much more time to go to sea. He did not consider it necessary to use his right of the strong, which allowed him to simply ignore the dishonest German ultimatum. The authorities in St. Petersburg, as is often done in Russia and as it had just happened with the cruisers Petersburg and Smolensk operating in the Indian Ocean, preferred to simply disown their ships. The unprofessionalism of the supreme authorities again showed itself in all its ugliness.
To Qingdao


Without waiting for a response from St. Petersburg to his urgent request, Matusevich ordered the ships to obey the German demands. The ships lowered their flags and on the same day began to unload ammunition ashore. They handed over to the Germans locks from 75-mm guns, parts from locks of large guns and two covers of spool boxes of medium-pressure cylinders. They brought all the guns and revolvers ashore, leaving only 50 for guard duty.
Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" in Qingdao after arrival. At the side of the raft, from which the sailors close up the holes. There is a sun awning on the bow.


That day, as if already knowing what had happened, a Japanese destroyer showed up at the port. Quarrels with Germany were not part of the plans of the Japanese, and they did not attempt to capture the battleship. Satisfied with the information about the disarmament of the battleship, the destroyer immediately withdrew. The countdown to the imprisoning of ships has begun.
With ease, with one stroke of the pen, to abandon the magnificent warship, the construction of which alone took five years, this decision cannot be called anything other than a crime. However, with "Diana" in Saigon, they acted even more magically. Despite the fact that the French authorities did not make any demands for disarmament and guaranteed to carry out the entire repair of the ship, the disarmament order was sent here as well. And this happened on August 22, when the ship could, if desired, go to sea and, for sure, join the squadron of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. In the name of the Admiral General, the order was given by Vice Admiral Avelan, head of the Naval Ministry. And before the wisdom of this order, it remains only to shrug.
"Tsarevich" - broken pipes, traces of fragments on the hull and boats.


So the rulers of St. Petersburg, it is not clear ‘” thinking about it, easily “surrendered” all the ships that had broken through. For some reason they were considered unnecessary for the war. Having obeyed the will of the Admiral General, the Tsesarevich also plunged into the new, now no longer driven by anything, unhurried - for the whole war - repair season. Not having time, as it was possible on the Diana, to leave the ship as a group before disarmament, the officers of the battleship, together with the routine of the repair and coastal service, set about comprehending the invaluable combat experience that fell to their lot. After all, he could still be useful. As, once on August 1, 1904, the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Fleet began a campaign in Kronstadt.
"Tsesarevich" - sealing a hole in the board. To facilitate the foremast, the spars were removed and placed on the deck at the bow house.


Fate did not leave the optimistic ship with its worries either - it arranged so that one of the officers (the flag officer of the headquarters, Lieutenant M.A. Kedrov), had the opportunity, like the three officers of the Diana, to take part in the campaign and battle of squadron Z. P. Rozhdestvensky. It is not known with what attention (and whether he generally considered it necessary) Zinovy ​​Petrovich reacted to their experience, but having the most information (the flag officer of the headquarters of Makarov and V.K. Witgeft), Lieutenant Kedrov received an appointment far from the tasks of generalizing experience - an artillery officer on cruiser (armed passenger steamer) "Ural". The system, as if set out to destroy the fleet, remained true to itself.
"Tsesarevich" - the ship's ladder was damaged in battle, so a German ladder with wheels was installed at the side.


The main question in the fate of the "Tsesarevich" remains unanswered - why the ministry, without blinking, agreed to disarm the ship. What, it would seem, the most energetic efforts should have been made in order to save for the war a magnificent new battleship with a shelled crew! Instead, an absurd disarmament order was issued that caused general amazement.
"Tsesarevich" - view of the deck with rowing vessels. The stern pipe was badly damaged by hits from two large-caliber shells and, so as not to fall apart, was pulled together with additional cables.


The heroes of this dark story did not leave their explanations. Bypassed her in his work (“The meaning and work of the headquarters based on the experience of the Russian-Japanese war”) and Lieutenant A.N. Shcheglov (1874-1953). But there is no doubt that here, too, the result of the activity of the Main Staff was manifested, all the military orders of which, according to A.N. Shcheglov, "were not substantiated and directly harmful." As a result, "the fleet died from disorganization, and this is entirely the fault of the Main Naval Staff, which rightfully owns 90% of the failures of our fleet." It is possible, without the risk of making a big mistake, to offer the following explanations for the fate of the "Tsesarevich" in Qing-tao, which are quite consistent with the "chaotic" nature of the headquarters' activities, which is so frankly mentioned in the named work of Lieutenant Shcheglov.
"Tsesarevich" in 1905 after repair - the foremast was completely removed and new chimneys were installed.


Turning to the motives that somehow made it possible to understand the decision of the St. Petersburg strategists, one cannot escape the feeling of their involvement or direct belonging to some virtual world where the laws of logic and common sense do not apply. For how else to explain that, being seemingly in a mortal battle with an extremely active, active and enterprising enemy, while suffering constant setbacks, having lost the first squadron in the most mediocre way and preparing the second for the campaign, they so carelessly abandoned the experience of the war and the two newest ones, like the air of the necessary own battleships, from the "Glory", despite the opportunity to have time to put it into operation, and the "Tsesarevich", which could well have avoided disarmament. And at the same time - this is the plot for an exciting documentary detective story - desperate, albeit obviously doomed to failure (the whole deal could not take place without the knowledge of England, which was then in alliance with Japan), attempts were made to smuggle the acquisition of the notorious "exotic cruisers".
On the "Tsesarevich" during repair work


In front of the eyes of the whole world and to its ridicule, for more than a year, a spectacle of multi-stage intrigues was played out with many flocked to profit, promising to "arrange" the purchase of "intermediaries", in which the main role with a false passport, in a wig and with a false beard was played by an already familiar to us longtime adjutant of the Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, Rear Admiral A.M. Abaza. This adventure could also be accompanied by the bluff of the emperor, who, despite failures, continued to look down on or even contemptuous of the enemy (it is known that in resolutions he allowed himself expressions like “macaque”), and therefore a demonstrative rejection of the “Tsesarevich” could portray the breadth of the Russian soul and the boundless possibilities of Russia, capable of crushing the enemy, regardless of the number of battleships.


The internal antipathy of the chief of staff to the battleship, which for so long aroused his righteous anger and indignation, could also manifest itself. The withdrawal of the battleship from the game could somehow be combined in the sick imagination of Zinovy ​​\u200b\u200bPetrovich with a triumph over his opponents in the eternal undercover bureaucratic struggle. Who knows the truth now...

1905 Internment in Qingdao. Russian destroyers (from left to right) - "Brave", "Courageous", "Merciless", "Fearless", "Silent". The main mast "Tsesarevich" is visible in the background.

To Qingdao


For fourteen long months the imprisonment of the "Tsesarevich" in the harbor of the German colony continued. Time, which was flowing so rapidly, and in Port Arthur and every day aggravated the siege, here, in Qingdao, seemed to have stopped. On September 9, 1905, Admiral Greve was notified of the highest approved distribution of ships. Of these, following the ratification of the peace treaty, Tsesarevich, Gromoboy, Rossiya, Bogatyr, Oleg, Aurora, Diana and Almaz left for the Baltic Sea. In Vladivostok, the cruisers Askold, Zhemchug, Terek, the Lena transport, the gunboat Manjur and all the destroyers were to remain. On October 2, they clarified from St. Petersburg: the detachment of Vladivostok cruisers will be led by its commander, Rear Admiral K.P. Jessen (1852-1918), the remaining four cruisers and the Tsesarevich will form the second detachment under the command of Rear Admiral O.A. Enquista (1849-1912).

Tsesarevich is back in the ranks


By May 1905, only one representative of the headquarters remained on the "Tsesarevich" from the previous composition of officers (people left for treatment after injuries, on vacation, on business trips, on other ships) - the flagship gunner K.F. Ketlinsky and 12 combat officers: senior officer D.P. Shumov, watch officers Lieutenant B.N. Knorring 2, midshipmen Yu.G. Gadd, L.A. Babitsyn. watch officers midshipmen M.V. Kazimirov, L.A. Leontiev, D.I. Daragan, V.V. Kushinnikov, auditor midshipman A.A. Richter, Senior Artilleryman Lieutenant D.V. Nenyukov, and the younger - Lieutenant N.N. Azaryev. Of the mechanics, lieutenants P.A. remained (renamed at the beginning of 1905 into military ranks). Fedorov. A.G. Shplet, D.P. Ostryakov, V.K. Korzun.
The ship's priest, hieromonk of the Veliky Ustyug Mikhailo-Arkhangelsk Monastery, Father Raphael, also remained the same. The bearer of one of the most “marine” names in the Russian fleet (the name “Raphael” from the time of Peter the Great to the beginning of the 19th century had eight ships under the Andreev flags), the priest, being inseparably on the “Tsesarevich” throughout his military suffering, tirelessly fulfilled his duty. Among the best priests of the squadron, he was awarded a gold pectoral cross.
The team on the ship at the time of the conclusion of peace consisted of 754 people. The position of commander was temporarily replaced by the commander of the destroyer "Silent" captain 2nd rank A.S. Maksimov (1866-1951).
Rear Admiral Enquist appointed Saigon as the gathering place for his detachment, where on October 20 he arrived from Manila with his cruisers Aurora and Oleg. Here they received an order to urgently send Diana on a separate voyage. The officers missing on it were transferred from the Aurora, and on November 1, Diana left.
As part of the squadron


"Tsarevich" arrived at the assembly point on November 7, but the joint exit was delayed by waiting for the arrival of the "Almaz", which was still carrying the missing officers around the ships. Then they decided to send the "Tsesarevich" alone. About experiments in maneuvering in joint navigation, which Minister Birilev so insistently demanded from K.P. Jessen, they didn’t even begin to remember here. In Singapore, it was necessary to receive the engine and boiler parts that arrived for the "Tsesarevich" from France.
They left Saigon on November 10. They followed the approximate route set by the admiral: arrival in Singapore on November 26, in Colombo on November 10, in Djibouti on December 23 and in Suez on December 30, and in Port Said on January 2, 1906. Upon arrival in Algeria on January 6, one should have expected the orders of the admiral.
"Tsesarevich" in Algeria


The voyage was like an escape from the fire that was about to overtake the ship, which was walking around Russia. The GMSH, as during the war, continued to be a surprisingly clumsy bureaucratic machine: the admiral did not receive requests for how to explain to the teams the meaning of the "most merciful" manifesto of October 17. The officers themselves tried to do this, but the troublemakers who found themselves in the teams did it in their own way. As a result, the "Tsesarevich" came to Colombo with an almost mature conspiracy preparing an uprising at the crossing to Djibouti. Fortunately, 28 instigators managed to isolate in time and sent to the Kuronia steamer going to Russia.
On Tsesarevich during the replacement of 12-inch guns and setting on the barrel.


On February 2, the second of the ships returning from the Far East (January 8, the Diana arrived), the Tsesarevich entered the harbor of the vast port of Emperor Alexander III in Libau. More recently, overcrowded with a huge and seemingly invincible squadron Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, the port was now deserted and forlornly empty. The Tsesarevich, which had come from abroad, and the Slava, which remained in the Baltic, now constituted the entire real strike force of the once formidable Baltic Fleet.
On May 29, 1906, while continuing to stay in Libau, "the ships of the detachment of ship's midshipmen," as it was then called, began the campaign on the orders of the General Staff. On the "Tsesarevich" they raised the pennant of the commander of the detachment, Captain 1st Rank I.F. Bostrom. For him, it was an unheard-of rise in his career, opening the way to the admiral's rank.
On the deck of the Tsesarevich. 1906


On June 8, three ships of the detachment and the destroyer "Executive", which was going to the Baltic Shipyard, weighed anchors and arrived in Kronstadt on June 11.
On the Kronstadt raid

Here they completed the last repair work and re-equipment of the ship to accommodate classrooms and living quarters for the entire graduation of two schools - the Naval Corps and the Naval Engineering School. Supplies were accepted, details of the sailing route were specified, midshipmen were placed in cockpits.
In the ancient bay of Rogervik (Baltic Port), where Peter the Great began the construction of the fleet base, the ceremony of the final break with the bleak past took place. By nightfall, as if removing the spell of bygone days, the ships practiced combat lighting. In the afternoon of August 7/20, the Tsesarevich, and after him the Glory, weighed anchor to follow in Biorca. Separately, having caught up on the way and then, having gone ahead, “Bogatyr” followed. He was already caught at anchor at Fr. Ravitz, after which on the same day the whole detachment went to Kronstadt.
The Tsarevich enters one of the Kronstadt docks


At sea, turning to the right, they did a maneuver of rebuilding in reverse order with the Bogatyr at the head. Such maneuvers, in contrast to the practice of pre-war voyages (and which Rozhdestvensky never did in the campaign of the 2nd squadron), became everyday exercises in the voyages of the detachment. Having gone through a series of pre-cruising troubles that filled all the days of the parking lot with endless acceptance of supplies, understaffing the officers and finally placing midshipmen in the cockpits, the ships were presented on August 19 at the Highest review.



The royal favors that followed the review were unheard ofly generous. The main distinction was awarded to the commander of the detachment I.F., who justified the hopes of the emperor. Bostrem. Following the departure of the emperor, he was ordered by a signal from the yacht "Alexandria" to raise the rear admiral's flag instead of a braided pennant. By the highest order of the same day, the commanders of the "Tsesarevich" and "Bogatyr" complained of the rank of captains of the 1st rank, and the commander of the "Glory" - the Order of St. Vladimir of the III degree.
"Tsesarevich" during the review


The chief officers (lieutenants and midshipmen) expressed royal favor, midshipmen - gratitude for their zealous service during the previous two months of inland navigation. The royal thanks were announced to the lower ranks and the traditional monetary reward was assigned for an excellent review.
"Tsesarevich" during the review


Senior boatswains and conductors were given 10 rubles each, boatswains 5 rubles each, non-commissioned officers 3 rubles each, privates 1 rub. For sailors who had the insignia of the military order (St. George's Cross), the reward increased to 4 rubles.
At the side of the Tsesarevich during the imperial review


August 20, 1906 at 8 a.m. in the morning, the flag of the commander of the detachment raised on the "Tsesarevich" was saluted with 13 shots by Fort Konstantin. From the "Tsesarevich" they answered with 7 shots. At 2 o'clock. 10 min. in the afternoon, Slava and Bogatyr took off from the anchors on the Bolshoi Kronstadt roadstead. With a semaphore from the "Tsesarevich" "Glory" was invited to go forward, after it the "Tsesarevich" also weighed anchor. This maneuver continued to assert itself, which had not been used at all (especially in the 2nd squadron), the practice of transferring the flagship to the general system, in order to give it the opportunity to stay in the ranks, and ships from the general formation to fulfill the duties of the leader. A new exchange of the same number of shots - now farewell salutes and the ships, following the alignment of the Kronstadt lighthouses, follow the Glory into the Gulf of Finland. So from the first minute of the campaign, by ordering "Glory" to lead the detachment, his unchanging studies were resumed.
Tsesarevich during exercises


At the London lightship (named in memory of the 54-gun battleship London bought in England, which died here on the shallows in 1714), the battleships spent two hours determining the deviation. At 17 o'clock. 30 min. squad already
led by the "Tsesarevich" continued swimming. At 8 o'clock. in the afternoon (they continued to keep track of time as usual - on a 12-hour scale: from midnight to noon) near about. Lavensaari on * carried the first coordinates of the reckoning 60 ° 5′ N on the map. and 28°30′ E at 7 o'clock. On August 21, passing Cape Surop, they telegraphed to the commander of the Revel port to transfer their place and speed (12 knots) to Libau. This was done at the request of the head of diving, Rear Admiral E.N. Shchensovich (1852-1910, in Port Arthur he commanded the Retvizan), which he tried to use every appearance of ships and detachments in the sea to carry out training attacks on his submarines.
On the Reval raid


Adhering, as requested by E.N. Shchensnovich, on the coast of Libau, allowed the boats to carry out attacks according to all the rules of their newly formed science. On the ships, as the commander reported, “it was ordered to watch the sea especially carefully, and, despite this, the boats remained completely unnoticed until they showed their identification lights and blew their whistles.”
The attacks took place at 2 o'clock. 15 minutes. on the night of August 22, when the first boat, having fired a torpedo shot, marked itself with a bright white fire to the right of the detachment's course. At 2 o'clock. 20 minutes. on orders from the "Tsesarevich" "Glory" illuminated the boat with a searchlight,
On August 23, the first port of call for the detachment appeared on the horizon - the fortress city of Kiel. The bay, protected by the outer archipelago, was similar to Sevastopol, and in length - up to 8 miles - even surpassed it. The ship was visited by Prince Heinrich of Prussia (1862-1929), the Emperor's brother. He readily allowed the officers and midshipmen to make informative inspections of the military port, the Govaldswerke factory and ships. Their midshipmen examined in two shifts - morning and evening.
Tsesarevich during exercises


They took off from the barrel of the Kiel Bay on the morning of August 29. The formation of the front crossed the wide Skagerrak Strait and under the Norwegian coast made their historical turn to the right. This meant that the path of the ships, in contrast to the traditional routes of the previous voyages of the fleet, did not run to the Mediterranean Sea, but to the Russian north. On August 31, the ships arrived in Bergen. At the parking lot, as in Kiel, coal reserves were replenished. The campaign continued on 6 September. Having the maximum load (draft 8.42 m), under the pilot's guidance, we entered the North Sea. From September 7, in the Tsesarevich's logbook, they began to record the coordinates of the dead reckoning and observation of navigation in the Atlantic Ocean, and from noon on September 8 - already in the Arctic Ocean. Having circled the Norwegian fortress of Varde, and continuing to march in front, they laid a course almost directly to the south. Here, to the right of the Norwegian Varanger Fjord and to the left of the Rybachy Peninsula, behind the Ainovsky Islands, lay the Russian territory, which was the last to the west, with its only Pechenga Bay convenient for parking. At 1 o'clock. 15 minutes. On the afternoon of September 10, we met the steamer of the Kola administration "Murman" that appeared from the Pechenga Bay. Following him, the detachment entered a long bay, bordered by forests and going deep into the mainland, or, as they said in the north, a lip. At 2 o'clock. 40 minutes, having successfully completed the first half of the voyage, they anchored at 21 sazhen depths of an exceptionally friendly raid that seemed to everyone.
In Catherine's Bay. 1906


Leaving the bay, the "Tsesarevich" moved to the rendezvous appointed by the admiral 5 miles north of the eastern tip of about. Kildin. This place corresponded to the disposition for conducting hydrological research by the forces of the entire detachment. Their goal was obviously the admiral's intention to help the Murmansk expedition of "Andrew the First-Called" and give the midshipmen a lesson in oceanography. On the morning of the 24th we continued our march and in the evening we arrived at Tromsø. On the 28th, having overcome another labyrinth of fiords, we went out into the ocean. At noon on September 30, we approached the Trondheim fiord, along which we made an even longer journey in an exceptionally winding fairway.
The 890-mile route from the Norwegian Trondheim to the English port of Greenock lay along routes practically unknown to Russian ships. Only twice, skirting the north of Scotland, did Russian ships pass here. The first time - in 1863, when the squadron S.S. Lesovsky (1817-1884) went on her famous "American expedition". In 1904, the Russian auxiliary cruisers Don and Terek went this way towards the Bay of Biscay to intercept Japanese military contraband. In 1899, solo voyages were made to the Arctic from the Newcastle (East coast of England), which built it, the icebreaker Yermak.
In the early morning of October 13, 1906, we crossed the course of the most famous campaign in world history, the "Invincible Armada" (1588). The famous Firth of Clyde, which we entered on October 14, combined the beauty of the Norwegian fiords and the grandeur of the spectacle of an unheard-of multitude of ships, ports, docks, shipyards and shipyards. Crowding one to the other, they are on the 30-kilometer journey to Glasgow along the river. The Clyde filled all its banks.
On the deck of the "Tsesarevich" 1906


The famous Sir Basil (Vasily Vasilyevich) Zakharov rendered the detachment particular assistance in getting to know England. A.N. Krylov characterized him as "the richest man in Europe, a billionaire and the actual owner of the famous Vickers firm", and then the owner of a casino and roulette in Monaco and "countless different enterprises around the world." A rare genius of world entrepreneurship, a native of Russia, he was glad to show attention to his compatriots. The Vickers-Maxim firm then owned the former Napier plant on the Clyde, and in Barrow-in-Furness, at one of its 12 shipyards, began building the cruiser Rurik for Russia.
Tsesarevich on a joint voyage with Slava


Thanks to the attention of Sir Basil Zakharov, the stay of the midshipmen in Greenock (from 14 to 21 October) and Barrow (from 22 to 26 October) became for them, without exaggeration, a feast of technology. With special thoroughness they were shown "Rurik". England conquered not only midshipmen. On the day of departure from Barrow, four sailors were missing on the Tsesarevich. They, one must understand, decided to take a closer and forever join Western civilization.
"Tsesarevich" on the firing range


The next point of entry was (October 28) Brest. In the bay, the Tsesarevich exchanged salutes with the battleship Zhorigiberri flying under the vice-admiral's flag, which, as we already know, was the prototype of the Tsesarevich. The Slava, which followed him on the raid, was the last modification of the Russian series of these ships. By the way, the French battleship Republic turned out to be on the roadstead, its project was a development, but already for the French fleet, such as the Tsesarevich.
On the afternoon of November 6, having examined the port and visited the French ships, the midshipmen said goodbye to Brest. The final stage of their voyage began, with renewed maneuvers, working out the formation of the front, checking combat schedules and more intensive classes for midshipmen. They deployed in full force on the roadstead of the Spanish port of Vigo. Closed from the sea by a high island, it looked like a spacious harbor up to 7 miles long, where ships of all countries of the world liked to stop for raid exercises.
On the transition from Bizerte to Toulon, which began on February 1, 1907, the first race of the detachment after the experience of the Pacific squadron in 1903 was carried out at full speed. A restless steep wave (7 points) and an 8-point wind from the north-east forced the ships to take water with the whole tank, and the battleships lost up to 2 knots of speed. "Tsesarevich" maintained a speed of up to 16 knots (83-86 rpm), the average for the passage time was 13.5 knots. At the end of the race, Slava was 15-20 miles ahead of the detachment and arrived in Toulon on the evening of February 2. "Tsesarevich" and "Bogatyr", having waited out the night on the roadstead, entered the pool on the morning of February 3.
Tsesarevich in Toulon


The French Republic, with indescribable delight, met in 1893 the Russian squadron (then Russia was needed to confront Germany) Rear Admiral F.K. Avelana, this time, received her allies with an almost defiant coldness. The war with Japan undermined the prestige of the regime of Nicholas II, and in recent years its complete dependence on French banks made it possible to not stand on ceremony with the Russians at all. And to the usual request of the head of the detachment about replenishing coal reserves, the maritime prefect, himself quite discouraged, answered that, by telegraphic order from Paris, ships were allowed to release only 200 tons of coal. Having instructed the "Tsesarevich" to accept 600 tons of coal allowed by the French government, A.I. Rusin was forced to order coal for the rest of the ships in Marseille. He reported to St. Petersburg that, in the light of such circumstances, a preliminary order for coal should be made in England. In total, "Tsesarevich", "Glory" and "Bogatyr" received 800, 1023 and 478 tons of coal.
In Toulon during the parade


After the two-week period of work allotted by the commander of the detachment, the ships moved to the Giyers Bay, where, as if quite recently, but in reality a whole historical era ago, the Bayan and Tsesarevich were tested.
February 20 at 9 a.m. in the morning they took off from the barrels of the Toulon raid and laid a course between Barcelona and Fr. Menorca. Having passed the Balearic Islands, they carried out the first "rough-live shooting" on the detachment on February 23, having passed Gibraltar, they also passed Cape Trafalgar, memorable in world history by the famous battle.
Tsesarevich in Gibraltar


Here the "Bogatyr" went out of order for the practice of ships in determining distances with a rangefinder. New devices now made it possible to determine the distance from 40 to 70 cab. On February 25, they arrived in Vigo, where they conducted the fourth verification test of midshipmen. On March 3, with the participation of the boats of the Duke of Edinburgh, who came to the raid, they arranged an officer sailing race without rudders and a midshipman with rudders. The race for quartermasters and non-commissioned officers had to be canceled due to calm and fog.
Upon leaving Vigo on March 8, live firing was carried out at sea. On the night of March 11, anchored on the east side of the Isle of Wight. In the afternoon we entered the famous Spithead raid, which had opened behind the island. Salutes were exchanged with the fortress and the sailing battleship Victory. The reserve battleship Revenge and the cruiser Berwick were caught in the roadstead.
"Tsesarevich" and "Bogatyr" on the Speedhead raid


The British did not stint on the send-off ceremony that took place when the detachment left on March 14, 1907. Despite the early time (7 am), when honors are not provided for by the Naval Charter, a guard with an orchestra was called to Victory. From the ship of Admiral Nelson, the detachment was escorted by the sounds of the Russian anthem. On the battleship Revenge, the teams lined up on the deck in honor of the Russians shouted “Hurrah” three times. Our ships responded in the same way. Due to the short stay, the number of those leaving was significantly increased, but the losses of the fugitives turned out to be small. Commendor Iosif Lebedev and sailor 1st article Mikhail Sizov did not return from the dismissal on the Tsesarevich.
After leaving the floating lighthouse, the ships, at the signal of the commander, gradually increased their speed to 16 knots, and this new unprecedented race continued until 7 pm. The second live firing from large guns, planned for the next day, had to be canceled due to fog. They fired only (for the practice of plutong commanders) from 75-mm cannons.
In the fog that continued to intensify, the entire North Sea passed by dead reckoning. In the fog they made the whole way to Kiel. On the morning of March 20, almost all the main forces of the German fleet were caught in the Kiel roadstead. In coal loading (1477 tons were taken in total), Slava reached the highest speed (58.8 tons / hour). Having replenished food supplies, the detachment weighed anchor on March 27 and arrived in Libau on the morning of March 29.

On July 26, 1899, as part of the program for the construction of warships for the Far East, at the French shipyard "Forge and Chantier" in Toulon, by order of the Russian government, a new battleship was laid down, named "Tsesarevich". The ship had powerful armament for those times (4 305-mm, 12 152-mm guns of the Obukhov plant in two-gun turrets, 20 75-mm and 20 47-mm guns), 18-knot speed and good seaworthiness.

Its displacement was about 13 thousand tons. February 10, 1901 "Tsesarevich" was launched, and August 21, 1903 he entered service with the Baltic Fleet. In early September, the battleship left Toulon and headed for Port Arthur. On the night of January 27, 1904, while moored in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur, the Tsesarevich was damaged by a torpedo explosion fired by a Japanese destroyer, but remained afloat and, after sealing the hole with the help of a caisson, was re-commissioned. After the death of the battleship "Petropavlovsk" with the commander of the squadron, Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov March 31, 1904 "Tsesarevich" became the flagship of the squadron. On July 28, 1904, after a battle with the Japanese fleet in the Yellow Sea, he broke through to Qingdao, where he was interned by the Chinese government the next day. At the end of the Russo-Japanese War, in February 1906, the battleship returned to the Baltic and, after repairs, was retrained as battleships and included in the training navigation squad. As part of the detachment, he spent several long overseas voyages. In December 1908, he participated in providing assistance to the population of the city of Messina in Sicily affected by the earthquake. During the 1st World War, the battleship covered the raiding and mine-protecting actions of the light forces of the fleet. Since 1916 he was part of the defense forces of the Gulf of Riga. After the February Revolution, it was renamed "Citizen". From September 29 to October 6, 1917, together with the battleship Slava, he actively participated in the Moonsund operation. In December 1917, he made the transition from Helsingfors to Kronstadt, where he remained in long-term storage. During the Civil War, the ship's artillery armament was used on river, lake flotillas and land fronts. In 1924, the Komgosfondov was handed over for disassembly and on November 21, 1925 was expelled from the RKKF.

The model is assembled almost completely "out of the box". and 47mm. from spare parts. BTT and aviation. Enjoy viewing! The Tsesarevich model was built in 1904.