Italian fleet in World War II. Facts and slander

Italian Andrea Doria-class battleships guard African convoys delivering supplies to German and Italian forces in North Africa. The video shows either Andrea Doria himself or his sister Caio Duilio. The time is most likely winter, early 1942. Collapse Italian battleships of the Andrea Doria class - powerful ships, built during the First World War, but underwent serious modernization until 1940. displacement up to 28882 tons. 12 boilers were removed, and turbine repairs increased power to 75 thousand hp. and speed up to 26 knots. In 1942, the ship was armed with 10 320 mm guns, 12 triple 135 mm guns (four gun turrets), and also had serious anti-aircraft weapons: 10 90 mm, 15 37 mm and 16 20 mm guns (later 4 more 37 mm guns were added and 2 20 mm guns were removed). The crew consisted of 1,485 people (35 officers and 1,450 sailors). #ItalianBattleships

“The only successful operation of the Italian General Staff,” B. Mussolini commented on his arrest. “The Italians are much better at building ships than they are at fighting on them.” An old British aphorism. ...The submarine Evangelista Torricelli was patrolling the Gulf of Aden when it encountered strong enemy opposition. Due to the damage received, we had to return on the surface. At the entrance to the Red Sea, the boat met the English sloop Shoreham, which urgently called for help. “Torricelli” was the first to open fire with her only 120-mm gun, hitting the sloop with a second shell, which was forced to retreat and go to Aden for repairs. Meanwhile, an Indian sloop approached the site of the ensuing battle, and then a division of British destroyers. Against the boat's only gun there were nineteen 120 mm and four 102 mm guns, plus many machine guns. The boat's commander, Salvatore Pelosi, took over the battle. He fired all his torpedoes at the destroyers Kingston, Kandahar and Khartoum, while continuing to maneuver and conduct an artillery duel. The British dodged the torpedoes, but one of the shells hit Khartoum. Half an hour after the start of the battle, the boat received a shell in the stern, damaging the steering gear and wounding Pelosi. After some time, the Evangelista Torricelli gun was destroyed by a direct hit. Having exhausted all possibilities for resistance, the commander ordered the ship to be scuttled. The survivors were taken aboard the destroyer Kandahar, with Pelosi receiving a military salute from British officers. From aboard the Kandahar, the Italians watched as a fire broke out on the Khartoum. Then the ammunition detonated, and the destroyer sank to the bottom. “Khartoum” (built in 1939, displacement 1690 tons) was considered the newest ship. The case of a submarine sinking a destroyer in an artillery battle has no analogues in maritime history. The British highly appreciated the valor of the Italian submariners. Commander Pelosi was received as senior naval officer in the Red Sea by Rear Admiral Murray. In addition to the losses suffered by the British ships, the British fired 700 shells and five hundred machine gun magazines to sink one submarine. "Torricelli" went under water with the battle flag flying, which can only be raised in sight of the enemy. Captain 3rd Rank Salvatore Pelosi was awarded Italy's highest military award, the Medalia D'Or Al Valor Militari (Gold Medal for Military Valor). The mentioned “Kandahar” did not ply the seas for long. In December 1941, the destroyer was blown up by mines near the Libyan coast. The light cruiser Neptune sank with him. Two other cruisers of the British strike force (“Aurora” and “Penelope”) were also blown up by mines, but were able to return to base.

The light cruisers Duca d'Aosta and Eugenio di Savoia are laying a minefield off the coast of Libya. In total, during the period of hostilities, warships of the Italian Navy deployed 54,457 mines on communications in the Mediterranean Sea. The descendants of the great Marco Polo fought all over the world. From the icy blue of Lake Ladoga to the warm latitudes of the Indian Ocean. Two sunken battleships (“Valiant” and “Queen Elizabeth”) are the result of an attack by Decima MAS combat swimmers. The sunken cruisers of His Majesty “York”, “Manchester”, “Neptune”, “Cairo”, “Calypso”, “Bonaventure”. The first fell victim to sabotage (a boat with explosives). "Neptune" was blown up by mines. Manchester became the largest warship ever sunk by torpedo boats. Cairo, Calypso and Bonaventure were torpedoed by Italian submarines. 400,000 gross registered tons - this is the total “catch” of the ten best submariners of Regia Marina. In first place is the Italian “Marinesco”, Carlo Fecia di Cossato with a result of 16 victories. Another submarine warfare ace, Gianfranco Gazzana Prioroggia, sank 11 transports with a total displacement of 90 thousand gross tons. The Italians fought in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, off the coast of China, and in the North and South Atlantic. 43,207 trips to sea. 11 million miles of combat travel. According to official data, Regia Marina sailors provided escort for dozens of convoys that delivered 1.1 million military personnel and 60 thousand Italian and German trucks and tanks to North Africa, to the Balkans and Mediterranean islands. Precious oil was transported on the return route. Frequently, cargo and personnel were placed directly on the decks of warships. And, of course, a golden page in the history of the Italian fleet. Tenth Assault Flotilla. The combat swimmers of the “black prince” Valerio Borghese are the world’s first naval special forces, which terrified their opponents. The British joke about “Italians who don’t know how to fight” is true only from the point of view of the British themselves. It is obvious that the Italian Navy, both quantitatively and qualitatively, was inferior to the “sea wolves” of Foggy Albion. But this did not stop Italy from becoming one of the strongest naval powers and leaving its unique imprint in the history of naval battles. Anyone familiar with this story will notice an obvious paradox. The bulk of the Italian Navy's victories came from small ships - submarines, torpedo boats, man-torpedoes. While large combat units did not achieve much success. The paradox has several explanations. Firstly, the cruisers and battleships of Italy can be counted on one hand. Three new Littorio class battleships, four modernized World War I battleships, four Zara and Bolzano type TCRs, and a pair of first-born “Washingtonians” (“Trento”). Of which, only the “Zary” and “Littorio” + a dozen light cruisers, the size of a destroyer leader, were really combat-ready. However, even here there is no need to talk about the lack of success and complete uselessness. None of the listed ships were at the pier. The battleship Vittorio Veneto completed 56 combat missions during the war years, covering 17,970 miles in battle. And this is in a limited “patch” of the Mediterranean theater of operations, in the presence of a constant threat from under water and from the air. Regularly falling under enemy attacks and receiving damage of varying degrees of severity (the battleship spent 199 days on repairs). Moreover, he still managed to live until the end of the war.

It is enough to trace the battle path of any of the Italian ships: each line there corresponds to some epic event or famous battle. “Shot at Calabria”, the battle with the Espero convoy, the shootout at Spartivento, the battle at Gavdos and the battle at Cape Matapan, the first and second battles in the Gulf of Sidra... Salt, blood, sea foam, shooting, attacks, battle damage! Name those who managed to take part in so many ups and downs of such a scale! The question is rhetorical and does not require an answer. The Italians’ enemy was a “tough nut to crack.” Royal Navy of Great Britain. "White Ensign". It couldn't be cooler. In fact, the enemy forces turned out to be approximately equal! The Italians managed without Tsushima. Most of the battles ended with an equal score. The tragedy at Cape Matapan was caused by one single circumstance - the lack of radars on Italian ships. British battleships, invisible in the night, approached and shot three Italian cruisers at point-blank range. This is such an irony of fate. In Gugliemo Marconi's homeland, not much attention was paid to radio technology. Another example. In the 30s Italy held the world aviation speed record. What didn’t stop the Italians air force to be the most backward air force among Western European countries. During the war the situation did not improve at all. Italy had neither a decent air force nor naval aviation. So is it any wonder that the German Luftwaffe achieved greater success than the Italian sailors? You can also remember the shame in Taranto, when low-speed “whatnots” disabled three battleships in one night. The blame lies entirely with the command of the Italian naval base, who were too lazy to install the anti-torpedo net. But the Italians were not alone! Episodes of criminal negligence occurred throughout the war - both at sea and on land. The Americans have Pearl Harbor. Even the iron “Kriegsmarine” fell with its Aryan face into the dirt (the battle for Norway). There were completely unpredictable cases. Blind luck. Record hit by “Warspite” in “Giulio Cesare” from a distance of 24 kilometers. Four battleships, seven minutes of fire - one hit! “The hit can be called a pure accident” (Admiral Cunnigham). Well, the Italians were a little unlucky in that battle. Just like the British “Hood” was unlucky in the battle with the Bismarck LK. But this does not give grounds to consider the British unfit sailors! As for the epigraph to this article, one can doubt its first part. The Italians know how to fight, but at some point they forgot how to build ships. Not the worst on paper, the Italian Littorio became one of the worst ships in its class. Second from the bottom in the ranking of fast battleships, ahead of the obviously discounted King George V. Although even a British battleship with its shortcomings may outperform the Italian. There are no radars. Fire control systems at the level of World War II. The repurposed guns hit at random. The first of the Italian “Washingtonians”, the cruiser “Trento” - a terrible end or horror without end? The destroyer “Maestrale” - which became a series of Soviet destroyers of Project 7. Our fleet had enough trouble with them. Designed for “hothouse” Mediterranean conditions, the “sevens” simply fell apart in northern storms (the death of the destroyer “Crushing”). Not to mention the very flawed concept of “everything in exchange for speed.” Zara-class heavy cruiser. They say the best of the “Washington cruisers.” How is it that the Italians, for once, have a normal ship? The solution to the problem is simple. The “Makaroniniks” did not care at all about the cruising range of their ships, rightly believing that Italy was located in the center of the Mediterranean Sea. What does it mean - all the bases are nearby. As a result, the cruising range of Italian ships of the selected class, compared to ships of others. countries, was 3-5 times smaller! This is where the best security and other useful qualities come from. In general, the Italians' ships were below average. But the Italians really knew how to fight with them.

During the international crisis that erupted with the outbreak of the Ethiopian Campaign in the spring of 1935, the Italian fleet was mobilized for the first time since the First World War. After the conclusion of the Ethiopian operation, many of the fleet's support services were cut, but the fleet remained mobilized at the end of 1936. The Spanish Civil War, various international crises and finally the occupation of Albania - all this forced the fleet to be kept on alert.

Such events, of course, had a negative impact on preparations for a future world conflict. The constant readiness of ships led to wear and tear on the mechanisms and fatigue of the crew, and interfered with long-term planning. Moreover, the Italian government notified the armed forces that the outbreak of war was not expected to begin until 1942. This was confirmed during the signing of the Axis Treaty between Italy and Germany. The fleet made its plans based on this date.

On June 10, 1940, when hostilities were about to begin, many of the components of what was called "readiness for war" had not yet been completed. For example, the initial plans called for building 4 new powerful battleships and completing the complete modernization of 4 old ones by 1942. Such a core of the fleet would force any enemy to respect itself. In June 1940, only Cavour and Cesare were in service. Littorio, Vittorio Veneto, Duilio and Doria were still completing their fitting out at the shipyards. It took another 2 years to complete the battleship Roma, at least 3 to complete the Impero (In fact, the Roma was completed in the spring of 1943, work on the Impero was never completed). The premature outbreak of hostilities saw the construction of 12 light cruisers, many destroyers, escort ships, submarines and small craft. The outbreak of war delayed their completion and equipment.

In addition, an additional 2 years would make it possible to eliminate deficiencies in technical equipment and crew training. This is especially true for night operations, torpedo firing, radar and asdic. The biggest blow to the combat effectiveness of Italian ships was the lack of radar. Enemy ships and planes attacked Italian ships with impunity at night, when they were practically blind. Therefore, the enemy developed new tactics for which the Italian fleet was completely unprepared.

The technical principles of the radar and asdic operation have been known to the Italian fleet since 1936. But the war interrupted scientific work on these weapons systems. To bring them to practical use required expensive industrial development, especially for radar. It is doubtful that the Italian fleet and industry would be able to achieve significant results, even with those same 2 years. However, the enemy would lose the surprise advantage of using them. By the end of the war, only a few aircraft radars were built, and then rather experimental installations.

During the war, the Italian navy paid dearly for these and other minor shortcomings, which often prevented them from taking advantage of a favorable situation. However, the Italian fleet was well prepared for the war and was fully worth the investment.

The fleet's preparatory measures included the accumulation of all kinds of supplies, and when the war began, the reserves of many types of supplies were sufficient to meet any requirements. For example, shipyards operated without delays throughout the war and even after the armistice almost exclusively from pre-war stocks. The growing demands of the Libyan Front forced the fleet to re-equip some ports - more than once - and solve sometimes unexpected problems, resorting only to its own reserves. Sometimes the fleet complied with requests from other branches of the armed forces.

Fuel supplies were completely inadequate, and we will see later how acute this problem became. In June 1940, the fleet had only 1,800,000 tons of oil, collected literally drop by drop. At the time, it was estimated that the monthly consumption during the war would be 200,000 tons. This meant that naval reserves would only last 9 months of the war. Mussolini, however, believed that this was more than enough for a “three-month war.” In his opinion, hostilities could not drag on longer. Based on this assumption, he even forced the Navy to transfer part of the reserves - a total of 300,000 tons - to the Air Force and civilian industry after the start of the war. Therefore, during the war, the navy was forced to limit the movements of ships in order to reduce oil consumption. In the first quarter of 1943 it had to be cut to the ridiculous figure of 24,000 tons per month. Compared to the original estimate of 200,000 tons as the minimum required, it is easy to see the impact this had on operations.

All these shortcomings were balanced by the magnificent spirit of the officers and sailors. Throughout the 39 months of fierce fighting before Italy signed the armistice, the personnel of the Italian fleet more than once showed examples of mass and individual heroism. Following its traditions, the fleet resisted the inculcation of fascist political views. It was difficult to bring oneself to hate Britain, whose fleet had always been considered a natural ally.

But when the die was cast, the fleet, driven by a sense of duty, began the battle, straining all its strength. He was opposed by powerful opponents, but he passed the test of fire with honor and courage.

Navy opposition to the war and its original plans

At the beginning of 1940, suspicions that Italy would enter the war were already in the air. However, Mussolini had not yet specifically told the chiefs of staff of the three branches of the armed forces that he intended to intervene in the conflict. In the first months of this fateful year, the government, in order to support exports, forced the navy to sell 2 destroyers and 2 destroyers to Sweden. This fact was quite naturally understood by the navy as a sign of the government's reluctance to enter into war, at least in the near future. But within a few days of von Ribbentrop's visit to Mussolini in March 1940, which was immediately followed by a visit from Sumner Welles, the government's real attitude towards the war began to become clear. This decision was communicated to headquarters on April 6, 1940.

On this day, Marshal Badoglio, the Chief of the General Staff, convened a meeting of the three chiefs of staff of the armed forces and informed them of the Duce’s “firm decision to intervene at the time and place of his choosing.” Badoglio said that the war on land would be fought defensively, and offensively at sea and in the air. Two days later, on April 11, the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Cavagnari, expressed his views on this statement in writing. Among other things, he noted the difficulty of such events due to the enemy's superiority in forces and the unfavorable strategic situation. This made offensive naval warfare impossible. Besides, the British fleet could quickly replenish!” any losses. Cavagnari declared that this was impossible for the Italian fleet and would soon find itself in a critical position. The admiral warned that it would be impossible to achieve initial surprise, and that operations against enemy shipping in the Mediterranean would be impossible, since it had already ceased.

Admiral Cavagnari also wrote: “Since there is no possibility of solving strategic problems or defeating enemy naval forces, entering the war on our initiative is not justified. We will only be able to conduct defensive operations." Indeed, history knows no examples of a country that started a war immediately going on the defensive.

Having shown the disadvantageous situation in which the fleet would find itself due to inadequate air support for naval operations, Admiral Cavagnari concluded his memorandum with these prophetic words: “Whatever character the development of the war in the Mediterranean may take, in the long run our losses at sea will be heavy. When peace negotiations begin, Italy may well find itself not only without territorial gains, but also without a navy and perhaps without air power.” These words were not only prophetic, they expressed the point of view of the Italian fleet. All the predictions made by Admiral Cavagnari in his letter were completely justified, with the exception of one. By the end of the war, Italy was left without an army and air force, destroyed by powerful opponents, but still had a fairly strong navy.

Italian Navy in World War II

Chapter I.

Italian fleet on the eve of the war

Preparation

Navy opposition to the war and its original plans

Mussolini, fearing that peace would return to Europe before Italy had its say, ignored these warnings. Moreover, he simply brushed them aside, relying on his confidence that military operations would be very short - no more than three months. However, the Italian fleet was preparing for war on the basis of operational plans that had been expressed more than once before. They can be summarized as follows: keep naval forces concentrated to obtain maximum defensive and offensive power; as a consequence - not to participate in the protection of merchant shipping except in special rare cases; abandon the idea of supplying Libya due to the initial strategic situation. Having France as an enemy, it was considered impossible to conduct ships through the Mediterranean.

Mussolini did not object to these concepts. He assumed that the conflict would not drag on, and therefore coastal shipping could be reduced, and Libya would survive for six months on the supplies that were collected there. It turned out that all of Mussolini's assumptions were wrong. The Italian fleet found itself forced to do something it had absolutely no intention of doing. Exactly 3 days after the start of the war, a demand came to Rome from Libya to urgently deliver urgently needed supplies. And these demands, which were growing at an alarming rate, had to be fulfilled, of course, by the fleet.

On June 16, 1940, the submarine Zoea began loading ammunition for delivery to Tobruk. Due to the proximity of the base to the front line and its distance from other Italian bases, the command did not want to send transports there, even accompanied by an escort. The submarine went to sea on June 19. This was the first of countless trips to Africa.

These operations, carried out under the pressure of circumstances, became the main occupation of the Italian fleet, although not the most beloved. They led to a serious dispersion of forces. On June 20, a flotilla of destroyers led by Artillere left Augusta for Benghazi to transport anti-tank guns and gunners. After 5 days, the first guarded convoy left Naples for Tripoli, carrying various supplies and 1,727 soldiers. On the same day, the submarine Bragadin went to sea with a cargo of materials for Tripoli airport. These few examples clearly show how self-sufficient Libya was. The Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Badoglio, demanding that Admiral Cavagnari send the first 3 or 4 convoys to Libya, each time firmly assured that “this is the last time.”

The confidence that the war would end in 3 months soon dissipated. Mussolini was misled by Hitler's propaganda claims about the landing in England. In reality, at the end of August 1940, the Italian High Command, based on information received from Berlin, had to give the order to prepare for a protracted war that would last several years.

Unfortunately for the Italian fleet, the premises on which its operational planning was based turned out to be fundamentally flawed. Nevertheless, the fleet fought tenaciously for 39 long months under difficult - and sometimes hopeless - conditions and inflicted heavy losses on the powerful enemy. Despite the bloody trials, Italian sailors, from the admiral to the last sailor, always remained faithful to duty, the spirit of self-sacrifice and unfailing courage. Their devotion was simply remarkable, since it was not the result of blind obedience, but a manifestation of a conscious will, which was confirmed at every stage of the struggle.

At the beginning of the war, the core of the Italian fleet consisted of 2 old, but modernized battleships and 19 cruisers. The British and French had 11 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers and 23 cruisers stationed in the Mediterranean. The already enormous superiority of the Allies became simply overwhelming when one took into account their forces outside the Mediterranean theater, which could be used as reinforcements and to make up for losses. Roughly speaking, Italy had a navy with a total displacement of about 690,000 tons, and the enemy had four times that.

It is important to consider the deployment of the warring parties' fleets. Anglo-French forces were based in Toulon, Gibraltar, Bizerte and Alexandria. At this time there were no ships in Malta. Italian ships were mainly divided between Naples and Taranto, with several cruisers based at Sicilian ports. These forces could unite using the Strait of Messina, although they were exposed to the danger of attack while passing through it. Only a few submarines and torpedo boat formations for coastal defense were based in the northern part of the Tyrrhenian Sea.

The Adriatic was an inland sea, the strategic cover of which was provided from Taranto. Tobruk was an advanced outpost close to enemy lines, so only light patrol ships were based in the din. The Dodecanese islands and their main base on Leros were effectively blocked, since Greek waters could not be considered neutral. Only patrol and sabotage units could be based here. The Red Sea base of Massawa, home to a group of obsolete destroyers, submarines and torpedo boats, had been completely isolated since the start of the war and was of limited importance.

Therefore, we can say that the deployment of the Italian fleet corresponded to the geographical factor. The main forces were in the center of the Mediterranean, and the rest were in a number of peripheral points. The situation at the beginning of the war did not foretell immediate clashes unless both opposing fleets took overtly aggressive positions. The Italian fleet could not do this and, as was shown earlier, did not even intend to. However, as the enemy declared, his fleet would wage an offensive war, especially the formation commanded by Admiral Sir Andrew Brown Cunningham.

Sea supply and fleet operations

Throughout the Greek campaign and even for several months after its completion, maintaining supply lines across the Adriatic required considerable strain on the fleet. Exclusively bad weather, the congestion of Albanian ports, uncoordinated but always urgent demands, the British air offensive, the growing activity of enemy submarines, the danger of unexpected night attacks by British ships, the narrowness of the water area compared to the volume of traffic on it, the huge volumes of transported supplies - all these factors taken together forced The fleet is straining all its strength and expending a lot of energy. The loads were increasingly increasing, since at the same time it was necessary to solve other, no less important and urgent tasks, the first of which was the ever-increasing transportation to Libya.

Under these conditions, transport across the lower Adriatic not only required a large number of cargo ships of all sizes, but also forced the use of a large number of warships in addition to those used for direct escort of convoys. Cruisers based in Brindisi and Taranto had to patrol the Strait of Otranto at the slightest alarm, as well as during the passage of any military convoy. Each report of an enemy submarine was followed by an intense search for several days. The discovery of minefields laid by British submarines placed heavy work on the minesweepers. When sea transportation became vital, the fleet did not hesitate to provide not only its supply vessels, but also ships, including cruisers and destroyers, for transportation.

As for the actions of the fleet, they brought complete success. You could even call them a significant military success. The transfer of supplies and reinforcements to the Greek-Albanian front was on a scale hitherto unprecedented. In fact, their full volume is still not known exactly. However, despite. all the difficulties and dangers, transportation was accompanied by minimal losses. The given statistics of transportation from Italian ports to the Greek-Albanian coast proves this. Reverse transitions are not included in these figures, which cover the Greek campaign right up to its infancy, that is, until April 30, 1941. The percentage of losses is given in parentheses. Transportation included:

Personnel 516440 people (0.18)

Military cargo 510688 tons (0.2)

Riding and pack animals 87092 heads (0)

Guns, armored personnel carriers, cars 15951 pieces (0.55)

Providing these transportations, Italian warships made 1070 departures. This does not include exits for the purpose of indirectly covering convoys.

It should be noted here that even after the occupation of Greece, the fleet was required to continue transportation. In total, before the armistice, 895,441 people and 1,387,537 tons of cargo were transported from Italy to the Greek-Albanian theater. Total losses were minimal - 0.2% of people and 0.5% of materials.

At the end of November, the fleet began new operations at the request of the army. This included frequent shelling of Greek and Albanian positions. In addition, actions began against Greek ships and coastal objects, which were carried out by Italian ships based in the Dodecanese Islands.

One of the many consequences of the Greek campaign was the isolation of the Dodecanese Islands, which were held by the Italians. Residents and troops of the garrison gradually began to feel a shortage of various urgently needed things. The current situation made sending convoys an extremely difficult problem. For this reason, some supplies were delivered by submarines. However, since the capacity of the submarines was very small, it soon became necessary to use a different system. Therefore, three small ships - Kalino, Kalitsa and Ramb III, each with a displacement of about 1200 tons, were adapted to break the British blockade without escort.

The first to set off was the Kalino, which left Naples on December 1, 1940 and reached Leros 5 days later, undetected by the enemy. The system proved viable, and the blockade runners continued until Greece was finally occupied. There were no losses. In total, the blockade runners made 16 voyages and transported 16,190 tons of cargo.

These travels were accompanied by a thousand and one adventures, but the most incredible befell Lieutenant Commander Giorgio Jobbe. At the very moment when he was passing the Kaso Strait to enter the Aegean Sea, he noticed a heavily guarded British convoy in a rain squall very close. The convoy was on the same course as the Italian ship. Lieutenant Commander Jobbe, taking advantage of poor visibility and a large number of enemy ships, joined the convoy and sailed into the Aegean Sea with it. At the first opportunity, he escaped and reached his target safely.

Despite the isolation and the relative difficulties that resulted from it, surface ships and submarines based at Leros made several alarming raids on British supply lines between Egypt and the Aegean.

Perhaps for this reason, in the last days of February, the British attempted to occupy the Italian island of Kastellorizzo, located between Rhodes and Cyprus. At dawn on February 25, about 500 British soldiers from a special assault unit landed ashore from a landing craft covered by a division of cruisers. The handful of sailors and customs officers who were on Kastellorizzo fought back as best they could. They created a defensive line in the mountainous part of the island and radioed for help. In the afternoon, the Italian destroyers Sella and Crispi and the destroyers Lupo and Linche, having taken on board 240 soldiers and sailors, left Rhodes. At night these ships, under the command of Admiral Biancheri, reached Castelorizzo, the Lupo entered the small port and began to land troops. The strong excitement that arose forced the landing to be postponed and forced the ships to return to Rhodes. As soon as weather conditions permitted, Lupo, Linche and 2 torpedo boats returned to Castelorizzo and disembarked the remaining soldiers. By sunset the British were surrounded and came under fire from Italian ships. Meanwhile, Crispy and Sella brought in new soldiers and weapons. The next morning, the surviving English soldiers surrendered. Admiral Cunningham wrote to London, justifying the failure that "the Italians acted with the utmost energy and enterprise." He called the whole operation a "rotten affair."

Meeting in Merano

Germany and Italy up to this point had considered their military operations completely independent. Apart from a few attempts at cooperation that were purely symbolic and had only propaganda value, each country fought the war independently. In fact, each diligently kept their plans secret from their partner. When the Italians' hopes for a short war faded, it became clear that the further, the more Italy would depend on an ally supplying raw materials and weapons, which Italy lacked. However, the Italians continued to hesitate. They were worried about the idea of working too closely with Germany. After all, the Germans, instead of fulfilling the requests of the Italians to send weapons and equipment, offered to send fully equipped German units, such as the X Air Corps and the Afrika Korps. This policy had the very obvious purpose of infiltrating the Italian military machine in order to control it in German interests, which were too often at odds with Italian ones. Therefore, the Italian High Command was faced with a dilemma - either agree to a more or less widespread German intervention, or refuse financial assistance, which became increasingly necessary.

Similar, only even more justified fears existed in the naval area. Germany was not a powerful naval power, and the Italian fleet considered it absurd and intolerable for the Germans to interfere in its affairs in exchange for equipment that the fleet wanted to receive from Germany. The intervention looked even more strange, given that the Italian fleet could not learn anything from the German one, with the exception of certain technical innovations. Until this time, contacts between the two navies were exclusively superficial and were carried out through naval missions in Rome and Berlin. However, the members of these missions played the role of simple observers.

In January 1941, circumstances pushed both navies into closer understanding regarding the German offensive in Greece. For the first time, the Germans occupied part of the Mediterranean coast. However, until the very end the fleets maintained complete operational independence. For its part, the Italian fleet hoped that these new circumstances would help solve the difficult problem of providing fuel. In mid-February 1941, the chief of staff of the Italian fleet, Admiral Ricciardi, and his German counterpart, Admiral Raeder, met in Merano. The negotiations lasted 3 days. The official purpose of the meeting was to exchange ideas and military experiences, but we will talk about the real reasons for the meeting below.

As mentioned earlier, the Italian fleet began the war with 1,800,000 tons of oil. Despite savings and restrictions imposed as soon as it became clear that the war was dragging on, by February 1941 1,000,000 tons of this reserve had been used up. It was the ninth month of the war. At this rate, the Italian fleet would have to stop all activity in the summer. Representatives of the fleet repeatedly drew the attention of the Supreme Command to this difficult problem, but no agreement was reached with the Germans. Therefore, the Italians hoped that direct negotiations with the German commander, who, as a professional, understood the problem well, would provide a satisfactory solution to the issue. Indeed, the meeting in Merano brought the issue to Raeder's attention. In the spring of 1941, some oil began to arrive from Germany, but it was completely insufficient even to meet minimal needs. Supermarine had already been forced to limit the fleet's monthly fuel consumption to 100,000 tons, which was half the fuel needed to ensure operational freedom. In reality, for various reasons, this figure did not exceed 50,000 tons, or one-fourth of the requirement. The supply of fuel not only did not ensure normal operations, but also began to seriously affect ongoing operations.

In the summer of 1941, with only 103,000 tons of oil arriving from Germany, the Italian navy's reserves were finally exhausted. From this point on, the Italian navy was forced to carry out operations only when oil supplies allowed. During those periods when they were delayed or interrupted, the activities of the fleet were completely paralyzed. Later we will see the crisis that broke out in the winter of 1941, and the real shackles on the hands of the fleet in mid-1942.

At the meeting in Merano, German representatives boasted of their own successes in the North Sea and demanded a more aggressive course of action from the Italian fleet. However, the Italian representatives have clearly demonstrated that the situation in the North Sea is in no way similar to the Mediterranean. They showed the need for the Italian fleet to adhere to the line of conduct that had been chosen earlier. Deviations from it were considered possible only in special cases, which have not yet presented themselves.

In this regard, it should be briefly noted that Supermarina had to adhere to the general directives and special orders that came to her from the High Command. All these directives had one goal: not to expose Italian battleships to undue risk. Mussolini wanted to come to the peace table with a strong navy at his disposal. This is not the place to discuss the extent to which these directives influenced the methods of naval warfare, but the author must personally testify that on several occasions, at least in the first year of the war, Mussolini directly influenced Supermarina decisions towards greater caution.

The Germans in Merano expressed Berlin's fears that the British might transfer strong reinforcements to Greece. Of course, these fears were aroused by the Germans' preparation for their own invasion of Greece. For this reason, the Germans proposed that the Italian fleet launch several attacks on British shipping between Egypt and Greece. These actions would complement attacks by Italian submarines and light forces from the Dodecanese Islands. Admiral Ricciardi explained how difficult it would be to find an opportunity to achieve a decisive success in this area. He noted that due to the high efficiency of British air reconnaissance and the long distances, the enemy had a serious chance of withdrawing his convoys before the Italian ships arrived. The Germans were satisfied with the admiral's explanations, and the issue was abandoned.

In early March, Berlin informed Rome that intensive preparations were being made for operations on the Greek front, and insisted that the Italian fleet do something to prevent the British from transporting supplies to Greece. Yielding to this political pressure, the Italian High Command ordered the fleet to comply with German demands. In essence, the Navy was once again forced to reap the fruits of the ill-conceived enterprise against which it had previously protested.

Following orders from the High Command, Supermarina began several operations. The number of submarines was increased in the years around Crete. Special assault units were ordered to attack the ships in Suda Bay again. Finally, capital ships were tasked with carrying out the raid. Supermarina carried out these orders reluctantly, feeling that the risk they entailed greatly outweighed the possibility of surprising enemy convoys near Crete. The fleet, however, did not raise new objections due to the political consequences of refusing to carry out the operation. The Germans showed exceptional interest in this enterprise and eased Supermarina's doubts by promising assistance from X Air Corps aircraft. They also claimed that German torpedo bombers had damaged two of three British battleships east of Crete on 16 March - a completely unfounded claim, as it turned out.

The operation against British supply lines was based on three absolutely necessary premises:

1. Suddenness.

2. Effective aerial reconnaissance, which will allow Italian ships to quickly establish contact with possible targets and evade all threats.

3. Effective air cover for ships, which will drive away enemy reconnaissance aircraft and protect ships from air attacks, since they will have to operate in waters under the control of British aircraft.

Adequate air support was promised. Supermarine was assured that the day before the start of Operation X Air Corps would conduct an intensive reconnaissance of the eastern and central Mediterranean, raid Malta and intercept any aircraft that might take off from there. At dawn, when the Italian ships are near Crete, Italian aircraft will bomb the island's airfields, conduct reconnaissance of the usual British routes near Crete and as far as Alexandria, and will also cover the ships as far as the meridian of Apollonia. At the same time, X Air Corps would reconnoiter the area between Cyrenaica and Crete and cover the Italian ships for most of the day until two hours remained before sunset. Finally, the Italian Air Force gave assurances that fighters from Rhodes would escort and cover the ships throughout the morning while they were in the Crete area. Given such air support, the risk of a naval operation became acceptable. All planned aviation actions are described in detail so that it can be compared whether much was accomplished and how.

The operation consisted of a cruiser raid supported by the battleship Vittorio Veneto, which arrived in Naples from La Spezia on 22 March. The operation was scheduled to begin on 24 March, but was delayed by 2 days at the request of X Air Corps. The Germans wanted to negotiate personally with Admiral Iachino about the details of German air support, since the X Air Corps was to interact with the Italian fleet for the first time. Among other things, it was decided to conduct exercises to escort and identify ships, involving a large number of aircraft on the day when the Italian formation would pass the Strait of Messina.

On the evening of March 26, Italian ships went to sea. The Vittorio Veneto left Naples under the flag of Admiral Iachino, who commanded the squadron, and 4 destroyers. The 1st Division (Admiral Cattaneo), consisting of the heavy cruisers Zara, Pola, Fiume and 4 destroyers, left Taranto. The 8th Division (Admiral Legnani) left Brindisi, consisting of the cruisers Abruzzi, Garibaldi and 2 destroyers. At dawn on March 11, the Vittorio Veneto passed through the Strait of Messina. Ahead, at a distance of 10 miles, was the 3rd Division (Admiral Sansonetti). It consisted of the heavy cruisers Trento, Trieste and 3 destroyers, which had recently left Messina. At 10.00, 60 miles from Augusta, they were joined by the 1st Division, and at 11.00 - by the 8th Division.

From this moment, the formation was supposed to move in the direction of Apollonia (Cyrenaica) until 20.00. At this time, being at the longitude of Crete, the 1st and 8th divisions were supposed to move into the Aegean sea but the easternmost point of Crete, which they were supposed to reach by 8.00. After this, they should have turned back and linked up with the Vittorio Veneto at 1500 hours, 90 miles southeast of Navarino, to return to base together. Meanwhile, Vittorio Veneto and the 3rd Division were to reach a point 20 miles south of the small island of Gavdos off the southern coast of Crete. At about 7.00, if contact with the enemy was not established, they should have taken a return course. Naturally, the purpose of both raids was to attack enemy convoys or warships. The main danger, especially for ships entering the Aegean Sea, was the possibility of British air attacks from Crete or Greece.

Battles at Gavdos and Matapan

On the morning of March 27, exercises were planned to practice air cover for Italian ships, but the German plane never appeared. A dress rehearsal was to be held in the afternoon, but “a large number” of aircraft also did not appear. But at 12.20, Trieste reported the British seaplane Sunderland, which circled at a distance for half an hour and then disappeared. His radio transmission was intercepted and immediately decrypted. It turned out that Sunderland, due to poor visibility, noticed only the 3rd division and knew nothing about Vittorio Veneto and the other two divisions behind. This contact destroyed the main premise of the operation - surprise. The position of the 3rd Division and its course clearly indicated its aggressive intentions.

Supermarina was later criticized for not canceling the operation after losing the element of surprise. But it should be remembered that the exit was not a reaction to the current tactical situation. It was undertaken under external pressure, mainly for political reasons. If Supermarina had turned the ships around with permission from the High Command after a single and accidental contact, this decision could have had far-reaching consequences in the Italo-German political game in Greece. Therefore, Supermarina did not recall the squadron.

The day passed without incident. At 1900, the 1st and 8th Divisions moved towards the Aegean, and the Vittorio Veneto, together with the 3rd Division, moved to a point south of Gavdos. At 2200, Supermarina ordered the first group not to proceed further into the Aegean, but instead to join with the second group and act together the next morning. This cautious decision to keep all forces together was motivated by the lack of any information about enemy movements since contact with Sunderland.

At dawn on March 28, the Vittorio Veneto was steaming toward its target zone, the 3rd Division 10 miles ahead of it and the 1st and 8th Divisions 15 miles to port astern. At about 6.00 "Vittorio Veneto" and "Bolzano" ejected their Ro.43 reconnaissance seaplanes. At 0635, an aircraft from the Vittorio Venet spotted 4 British cruisers and 4 destroyers heading south about 50 miles southeast of the Italian force. At 0758, the 3rd Division sighted British ships, later identified as the cruisers Orion, Ajax, Perth and Gloucester, and Admiral Pridham-Whippel's four destroyers. Admiral Sansonetti chased the British at full speed and at 8.12 opened fire from a distance of about 25,000 meters. Thus began the battle at Gavdos.

The British cruisers tried to escape. Following at maximum speed, they managed to stay at the limit of the range of the Italian guns. The Italians immediately concentrated their fire on the Gloucester, which was forced to zigzag to avoid being hit. But the firefight at such a long distance, further complicated by poor visibility, did not bring hits to either the Italian or British sides. (The British opened fire 15 minutes later than the Italians and fired sporadically.)

After about an hour of battle, at 8.50 Admiral Iachino ordered the 3rd Division to turn back, and some time later the entire Italian formation was returning to its base. The risk of continuing a pointless firefight was hardly justified, especially since the Italian ships had gone far beyond Gavdos and were almost halfway to Tobruk. Moreover, it was logical to expect that British air attacks could begin at any moment, but the covering fighters had not yet appeared. In addition, the Ro.43 scouts did not find any British convoys nearby, so the task could be considered completed.

After the 3rd Division began to withdraw to the northwest, the British cruisers followed, although they continued to stay out of range of its guns. At 10.45 Admiral Iachino turned south, although neither British ships nor aircraft were yet aware of the presence of the Vittorio Veneto. He hoped with this maneuver to squeeze the British cruisers between the battleship and the 3rd division. At 10.50 the Vittorio Veneto sighted Pridham-Whippel's ships, which were taken by surprise. Iacino ordered the 3rd Division to rotate to form the other half of the pincer. At 10.56, the Vittorio Venete opened fire with its huge guns from a distance of 25,000 meters.

The British cruisers immediately turned around and headed southeast at full speed. Hiding behind smoke curtains, they zigzagged away from the 381-mm shells, sometimes responding with volleys. Their high speed allowed them to break away from the battleship. Official British reports state that one shell landed so close to the Orion that the ship was seriously damaged. The report also states that the Gloucester was "in mortal danger" when the shooting stopped.

The pincers conceived by Admiral Iacino did not work out due to the lack of tactical air reconnaissance. Since the Ro.43 had to fly to Rhodes due to its short range, the Italians could only guess about the position of the British. What was seen from the Vittorio Veneto could not serve as a basis for confident conclusions, and the 3rd Division was too far away to intervene immediately. Therefore, Pridham-Whippel managed to escape to the southeast.

At 11.00, shortly after the Vittorio Veneto opened fire, it spotted 6 British torpedo bombers, which Admiral Cunningham immediately sent to attack as soon as the cruisers found themselves in a dangerous situation. Indeed, at this moment Pridham-Whippel's ships were in serious danger, since the Italian battleship was firing at them from 381-mm guns, and something needed to be changed quickly. At 11.15, the British torpedo bombers reached their initial attack position, and the Vittorio Veneto, already preparing to reap a rich harvest, was forced to maneuver to evade the new threat. Encountering heavy anti-aircraft fire, the enemy aircraft dropped their torpedoes at a distance of 2,000 meters from the target, but the Vittorio Veneto skillfully evaded them. However, the British pilots reported to Admiral Cunningham that they had achieved one definite hit and another probable one.

While these events were taking place, a group of British cruisers, having safely escaped danger, left the scene at full speed and disappeared over the horizon.

The time approached 11.30, and Iacino was still south of Crete. There was no news of enemy convoys. Air attacks began, but fighter cover never appeared. At the same time, British reconnaissance aircraft circled the skies above the Italian squadron continuously until sunset. It was time to hurry back home, and at 11.30 the Italians set course for Taranto.

At 12.07, the 3rd Division was also attacked by torpedo bombers, but received no hits. From 14.30 to 17.00 British aircraft launched 9 separate attacks, fortunately without results.

However, at 15.20, the Vittorio Veneto was subjected to a combined attack by bombers and torpedo bombers, which had more serious consequences. The British used this tactic for the first time, which required excellent interaction between the two types of aircraft. First the bombers appeared and diverted the attention of the Italian anti-aircraft gunners. Immediately after this, 3 torpedo bombers entered the ship from the stern, literally flying along the waves. Approaching the Vittorio Veneto, these 3 aircraft simultaneously changed course and dropped torpedoes from three different directions. One plane was shot down, but the huge hull of the battleship was not agile enough to evade three torpedoes thrown from a very short distance. The blow hit the left side propellers. For some time the ship could not move; 4,000 tons of water poured into the hole. This was a critical moment, but soon the ship began to move again. There were 420 miles left to Taranto. Using only the starboard propellers, the battleship reached a speed of 10 catches, but gradually increased it and finally exceeded 20 knots. For a ship in such condition, this was a great achievement. Credit must be given to the technical skill and organization of the crew.

Iacino often and completely in vain repeated the demand to send cover fighters. The headquarters of X Air Corps, whose intervention was demanded by Supermarina with increasing insistence, especially after the torpedoing of the Vittorio Veneto, replied at 17.30 that they could do nothing. The position of the British squadron remained unknown, and German planes could mistakenly attack the Italians.

Since it was logical to assume that enemy air attacks would continue until sunset, it was to be feared that the battleship would receive early hits - already with fatal consequences. Admiral Iachino sent the 8th Division to Taranto, and rebuilt the remaining ships into an unusual formation of five columns.

The Vittorio Veneto sailed in the center, with a destroyer at the bow and a destroyer at the stern. On the right were the cruiser Cattaneo, and on the left were the cruisers Sansonetti. The outermost columns were formed by destroyers.

Admiral Iacino still did not know that not only the cruisers of Pridham-Whippel, but also the main forces of the Alexandrian fleet were hanging on his tail, albeit out of sight. The last group consisted of the battleships Warspite, Barham, Valiant, the aircraft carrier Formideble and 9 destroyers. It was slower than the Italians and had no chance of catching up with them if the planes failed to slow down the enemy’s retreat. Therefore, Admiral Cunningham sent all available aircraft to attack. Confident that the Vittorio Veneto had not only been torpedoed in the morning, but also badly damaged by bombs in the afternoon (as reported by the pilots), he prepared to deal the fatal blow to the Italian battleship in a gun battle after sunset.

Supermarina and Iacino, on the other hand, based all their maneuvers on the assumption that only Pridham-Whippel's cruisers were at sea, but they had already turned back to Alexandria. In reality, there was no concrete information that would justify such an assumption. In addition, there was some reason to suspect that the enemy was preparing for a night battle against the Italians. If only Supermarina or Iacino had paid more attention to these suspicions, the night battle, which will be described below, could have been avoided, or at least losses could have been reduced.

Thus, on the evening of May 28, the Italian command, both in coastal headquarters and on ships at sea, was completely unable to orient itself to the situation. These mistakes had extremely dire consequences, aggravated by a coincidence of circumstances.

At 18.00, having deciphered the order to Admiral Cunningham from Alexandria, Admiral Iacchino realized that at sunset British torpedo bombers were again attacking Italian ships. At 18.23 9 aircraft were spotted. Being out of range of anti-aircraft guns, they calmly circled the Italian squadron for almost an hour, studying the situation. The ships were powerless to drive them away. At 18.51 the sun set, and at 19.20, as darkness fell, enemy aircraft began to approach. At this tense moment, the Italian squadron set up a smoke screen, and the cruisers turned on searchlights to blind the pilots. At 19.25, the Italian destroyers spotted the approaching aircraft and all ships opened intense anti-aircraft fire. The attack lasted 20 minutes. The ships skillfully maneuvered in the smoke and darkness, although they were in a dense and unusual formation. The pilots of the enemy torpedo bombers were amazed at the fury with which the Italians fought back and dropped torpedoes at random. When the shooting stopped, it seemed that not a single ship was damaged at all. But soon after this it became known that “Pola” was hit by a torpedo at the very end of the attack and lost speed.

Meanwhile, Supermarina informed Admiral Iachino that, according to radio direction finding data, at 17.45 the British squadron was 75 miles from the present one. "Vittorio" position. From this message, Admiral Iacino could conclude that, as a last resort, British destroyers were present there, conducting night patrols. Supermarina conveyed this information without any comment, which seemed to confirm the above assessment. Therefore, at 20.18 Iachino ordered the 1st Division of Admiral Cattaneo, to which the Pola belonged, to go to the aid of the damaged ship. This order came at the same time as Cattaneo's request to send 2 destroyers to help the cruiser. Therefore, at 20.38 Iachino confirmed his order and informed Cattaneo about the Supermarina radiogram of 17.45.

Since Admiral Cattaneo was killed in action, the reasons why he hesitated to carry out the order remained unknown. Perhaps he was waiting for detailed information from “Pola” about the damage received. Indeed, at 20.53 he received a request for towing. A few minutes earlier, Admiral Cattaneo requested confirmation of the orders received and received it at 21.05. After this, he ordered the Zara and Fiume and the destroyers Alfieri, Carducci, Oriani and Gioberti to turn to help Pola. It appears that Admiral Cattaneo was firmly convinced that the British ships were far away, as he chose a wake formation, with the destroyers bringing up the rear. Perhaps he himself led the column, wanting to be the first to see the “Sola” in order to immediately give orders to save the cruiser.

Admiral Cunningham believed that the Vittorio, in addition to the damage it had received during the day from torpedoes and bombs, had received another torpedo hit during the attack at dusk. At least that's what the torpedo bomber pilots reported. The English admiral did not know that the Pola was standing still, having lost momentum. On the other hand, he mistakenly believed that the Vittorio was now just a drifting ruin. Therefore, after nightfall, he sent his destroyers on reconnaissance with orders to torpedo and finish off the battleship. They were supported by the cruisers of Pridham-Whippel. The main forces of the British squadron walked behind. Thus began the first of the knots of fatal coincidences that led to the tragic outcome of the night battle for the Italians.

At 20.32, the radar of the cruiser Ajax outlined the silhouette of the Pola standing still. Pridham-Whippel, believing it to be a battleship, ordered destroyers to torpedo it. He himself and his cruisers went in search of the remaining Italian ships. Due to confusion in the communications system, the British destroyers did not launch an attack, which turned out to be fatal... for the Italians! Instead, the destroyers continued to move north. If they attacked the Pola, it would alarm Admiral Cattaneo.

Cunningham, in turn, having arrived in the area where Ajax spotted the Semi, moved extremely carefully, believing that the cruiser had discovered the covering destroyers. At 22.03, the Valiant's radar detected the cruiser Pola, located at a distance of 8 miles. Cunningham's battleships turned in that direction and prepared to open fire. At the same time, Cattaneo's ships, completely unaware of the danger, were preparing to assist the damaged cruiser. Only half of the team was at combat posts. The towing lines were already being prepared at Fiume.

The second fatal coincidence led Cattaneo to the Field at the same moment as Cunningham’s battleships. Therefore, at 22.25, Warspite and other British ships, approaching the Field, noticed the Zara group, first with the help of radar, then visually. Another coincidence: Pola saw the dark silhouettes of British ships gliding north and, believing them to be ships of the Italian 1st Division, signaled with a red flare to indicate its position. Cattaneo's ships saw the missile and realized that it was from the Pola. The Italians turned all their attention there, unaware of the presence of British ships, which were now sailing on an almost parallel course from the other side.

At 22.28, the British destroyer Greyhound, which was closer than the other enemy ships to the Italians, illuminated the Cattaneo cruiser with a searchlight. The rest of the British ships did the same. Immediately, all 3 British battleships opened fire with their 381 mm guns on the cruisers almost point-blank. They were joined by destroyers, who fired at the Italian destroyers with 120 mm guns. It was impossible to even imagine a greater surprise. "Zara" and "Fiume" immediately received heavy damage, stopped and caught fire. The British battleships fired several more salvos and at 10:31 p.m. they turned to starboard to evade the torpedoes of the Italian destroyers, which finally launched an attack. An unimaginable clash of Italian ships and British destroyers followed, during which some British ships almost suffered from the fire of their own comrades.

The Fiume suffered a large list, the fires on it got out of control, and the commander had to give the order to abandon the ship, which sank at 23.15. On the Zarya, the fires burned so intensely that there was no way to break through to the guns or fight the fire. We also had to give the order to abandon ship. Since the cruiser was sinking too slowly, the chief mate and a group of volunteers went down into the cellars to blow them up. Admiral Cattaneo and the ship's commander also remained on board. Exploding at 00.30, the Zara took these officers and many sailors to the bottom along with it.

On the destroyer Alfieri, despite heavy damage and many casualties among the crew after the very first volleys of the British, the survivors tried to make progress. When a British destroyer was spotted, it was fired upon as there was nothing else to do. One of the torpedo tubes miraculously survived among the wreckage, and its crew stood unshakably on its pestles. In the end, the midshipman managed to fire 3 torpedoes at the British destroyer, but due to the strong list of the damaged ship, they missed. The list increased and the commander ordered to abandon the ship. Completely calm, he refused to get into the rescue boat. Instead, he lit a cigarette and began helping the wounded. He died along with the ship.

On the Carducci, fires got out of control and the commander ordered the ship to be scuttled. He also remained on board. "Oriani" received a hit, which stopped one of its vehicles. However, he managed to get out from under fire in one car. After an adventurous voyage, he managed to reach Calabria. Only the Gioberti, which brought up the rear, escaped damage amid the general devastation. He bravely went on the attack. Showered by shells, literally under the muzzles of enemy guns, the brave ship was forced to put up a smoke screen and retreat, breaking away from the enemy.

Meanwhile, “Pola” remained a helpless spectator of this tragic performance. The damage received did not allow us to move forward, or aim the heavy guns, or even supply ammunition to the medium artillery. He could only wait for the British to come and finish him off. Finally, the commander ordered the seams to be opened and the crew to abandon ship. The British, however, were still unaware of the presence of the stationary cruiser. Only at 00.20 he was noticed by the destroyer "Havok", which retreated instead of attacking. At 0110, Havok approached again, this time along with the rest of the destroyers. They fired several shells and retreated again. The cruiser sank very slowly, due to darkness and extreme cold water almost the entire crew of the Pola chose to return on board. The commander, seeing this escape from the water, as well as the fact that the ship was not tilting, although it sat deep enough, ordered the flooding to be stopped, expecting that help would still come.

However, at about 3.00 British destroyers appeared again. They were terribly surprised to see a lonely and silent cruiser. It had already sunk almost to the upper deck, half the crew had left it, but the flag still hung on the mast. The flagship of the squadron, Jervis, came alongside and took off 258 people, including the commander (The version, heavily inflated by British propaganda and repeated by Admiral Cunningham, that “panic and confusion” reigned on board the Paula, is completely unfounded.). The Italian cruiser was later sunk by 2 torpedoes. Thus ended the tragic clash, which was called the Battle of Cape Matapan, although it took place 100 miles south of it.

The events of this night will be discussed by naval historians for years to come, but some points will remain unclear. Among them is the inconsistency of information and its interpretation by both opponents. The British were firmly convinced (perhaps still are) that they had seen a Colleoni-class cruiser leading the Zara group. They claimed that they fired at him, set him on fire, and he walked away. The Italians knew for sure that such a ship could not be there. Moreover, the British claimed that another group of Italian ships behind Cattaneo's squadron, which were furiously firing at each other, was in sight. But in reality, Iachino's ships not only did not open fire, they were more than 50 miles from the battle site - so far that all searches by Pridham-Whippel's cruisers and destroyers were unsuccessful. The crew of the Pola stated that they definitely saw five burning ships. Who was fifth? Was this the mysterious cruiser spotted by the British? Who could it be if both the Italians and the British stated that they did not suffer other losses in this battle than those indicated above?

The light of searchlights, flashes of guns and a distant glow over the horizon were seen on the remaining Italian ships. However, Cattaneo's ships themselves were unable to transmit any information about the battle. Only at dawn did fragmentary reports from “Oriani” and “Gioberti” arrive. For this reason, and also because the Vittorio had taken on a lot of water, Admiral Iacchino did not want to risk blindly new ships to clarify the situation. He continued on to Taranto, where he arrived in the afternoon of March 29.

Meanwhile, dozens of life rafts filled with survivors of sunken ships remained at the battle site. Admiral Cunningham nobly radioed their coordinates to Supermarine. But due to a poor understanding of the size of the disaster and the distance to the battlefield, assistance was limited and late. The suffering of the survivors is impossible to imagine or describe. Despite such conditions, they all held their own with magnificent courage, great determination and unshakable faith. In total, about 3,000 Italians died that night!

Let's draw some conclusions from this fight. The entire operation was based on three assumptions that were not realized. From the moment Sunderland sighted the 3rd Division off Sicily, surprise was lost. We have already mentioned the political motives that made it impossible to stop the operation. There was no effective aerial reconnaissance. The rare and inaccurate reports that did arrive from her did not allow the Italian headquarters to paint a clear picture of the situation at sea. Moreover, she was unable to find out that the Mediterranean Fleet had left Alexandria and was very close to the Italian fleet. The ineffectiveness of aerial reconnaissance was aggravated by poor radio communications, which is why some of the reports arrived too late.

Although several friendly fighters appeared to appear over Cattaneo's ships in the afternoon, it remains to be seen whether their brief intervention had any effect. In any case, British reconnaissance aircraft flew around the Italian formation all day on March 28 without interference. Of course, the outcome would have been serious even if everything had ended with two torpedo hits on the Vittorio and Pola. But indirectly, it was these two torpedoes that proved to be the decisive element in the strategic success achieved by Admiral Cunningham.

Despite the fact that three key conditions were not met, the operation had to continue at any cost. The skirmish at Gavdos formed the offensive part of the plan and was carried out brilliantly by the Italians. Success eluded them at the very last moment, when it was completely in their hands, due to the extremely timely intervention of torpedo bombers. The actions of all Italian ships in the second phase of the battle during enemy air attacks were the best. The Vittorio was hit only thanks to the sacrifice of the brave British pilot. The defensive formation immediately chosen by Admiral Iacino turned out to be very good and effective. The ships managed to reorganize in the smoke and darkness. The crew of the Vittorio Veneto showed miracles of organization and skill. He traveled 420 miles, evading air attacks, although half the machines were not working. The stern of the battleship almost went under water, but she managed to develop 20 knots.

Although there was no effective aerial reconnaissance, the available information should have alarmed Supermarina and Admiral Iacino - after all, the British fleet could be very close. If this had taken place, the night battle would not have occurred or would have ended with less heavy losses. But Admiral Cunningham's tactical success was achieved largely due to radar, which the Italians were unaware of. The success was also the result of a whole chain of coincidences, one after another, which increased Italian losses. Things would have turned out differently if the British destroyers had attacked the Pola immediately after being spotted by Ajax at 20.33, or if Cunningham had arrived a few minutes earlier than Cattaneo. On the other hand, it should be noted the complete failure of the British night searches for Italian ships. The battle of the 1st Division was no exception, as it occurred by complete accident. The destruction of the Italian battleship was Admiral Cunningham's main goal, which he intended to achieve on March 28. His report admits that “the fact that the Vittorio Veneto, although damaged, was allowed to escape us is extremely regrettable.”

As always, it should be noted that the behavior of the Italian crews during the battle deserves the highest praise. The cold season holds secret numerous examples of courage and self-sacrifice. But many others are well known, and only lack of space prevents them from being mentioned here.

At the beginning of the chapter it was stated that the measures taken by the Italian navy to disrupt traffic between Egypt and Greece included not only the exits of surface ships, as described above, but also the operations of special attack units and submarines. On the night of March 27, 2 Italian destroyers from Leros crossed the Aegean Jure and launched 6 special exploding boats near Souda. After 6 years of top-secret work on the creation of special types of weapons, their first use in the Court was crowned with success. This operation will be described further, but here it is enough to mention that it ended with the sinking of the British cruiser York, a large military tanker and 2 cargo ships in Suda Bay.

An Italian submarine patrol south of Crete brought another painful success a few days later. "Amber" attacked from the surface on the evening of March 30 and sank the British cruiser "Bonaventure". That same night and in the same area, the submarine Dagabur successfully fired 2 torpedoes at the ships of the enemy convoy.

Secrecy of maritime operations

The experience gained from the operations at the end of March has led to some concrete results. Mussolini and the Air Force were finally convinced that the navy could only receive adequate air support by having aircraft carriers. Therefore, they lifted the veto imposed many years ago on the construction of aircraft carriers. It was decided to immediately convert the transatlantic liner Roma into an aircraft carrier, named L'Aquila. Later, a similar decision was made regarding the transatlantic liner Augustus. It was to become the aircraft carrier Sparviero. But due to the deteriorating situation in industry, both aircraft carriers never returned to service. On the day Italy signed the armistice - September 8, 1943 - the re-equipment of the Aquila was almost completed, but the aircraft were not ready for it. It took several more months to complete work on Sparviero.

Meanwhile, taking into account the lessons of Matapan, the Italian High Command temporarily prohibited battleships from operating “outside the radius of fighter cover.” An order of 31 March 1941 further limited the operational freedom of Italian battleships. Its literal interpretation practically paralyzed the battleships, with the exception of cases when the British came close to the Italian coast.

Analysis of the events of the end of March raised suspicions that Italian plans were becoming known to the enemy. After the war, documents published by the British confirmed that they expected the Italians to appear on the supply routes of Crete. In addition, it is quite possible that they learned that the Italian fleet had begun the operation described above even before the Sunderland sighted the 3rd Division.

Admiral Cunningham in his official report says that his expectations of the Italian's exit were based on many signs, ranging from direct observations - aerial reconnaissance detected the passage of the Vittorio Veneto to Naples. The increase in reconnaissance flights over Alexandria did not go unnoticed. Therefore, even before receiving a report from Sunderland, he “had already ordered the entire fleet to raise anchors on the evening of March 27.” Cunningham also took other measures to create the most favorable situation. All these preparations, so precise and decisive, give strong grounds to believe that Cunningham had some specific information that came through intelligence channels or from a radio interception service. In this case, Cunningham had a colossal advantage. He had the opportunity to disrupt any Italian operation and deploy his strike forces, in particular aviation, in advance. This significantly increased their efficiency. Such movements had a multifaceted impact on the course of operations.

On the other hand, it should be recognized that even if the British received some information from spies and decryption services about the timing of the start of the Italian operation, it could not have a decisive influence on the outcome of the night battle. It was the result of a whole chain of coincidences, which can only be fully seen by considering the entire operation as a whole. In fact, the night battle was the result of circumstances that developed during the operation. The bloody skirmish was a coincidence for both opponents.

Considering the issue of “espionage” as a whole, it can be said without a doubt that the British were aware of the preparations and movements of the Italian fleet, as well as the Supermarine. often knew about their actions. For example, in Gibraltar, the Italian fleet had as large and experienced a spy organization as one could only dream of. But such a statement does not mean that the British received most of their information with the help of spies. In all wars, always and everywhere, they liked to attribute the enemy’s successes to imaginary spy networks. Today we know for sure that the British Navy sometimes claimed to have received information about some actions of the Italian fleet through its spies at Italian headquarters, when in fact it was the result of direct observations and conclusions of analysts from an assessment of the strategic situation.

In modern warfare there are many channels and ways of obtaining direct information, which - within certain limits - makes it possible to foresight. Over a long period of time, these methods provide more complete, more accurate and more recent information, whose most experienced spies, whose information is dubious at best. For example, aerial photography, given the constant improvement of equipment, produces excellent results. During periods of air supremacy, the Luftwaffe flew reconnaissance aircraft to British Mediterranean ports almost daily, and even twice a day to Malta. The information they supplied in itself allowed Supermarina to have a constant and detailed understanding of everything that was happening in these places and even what was planned. But the Italians did not have a secret intelligence network in Malta.

Careful listening to British radio channels also provided a lot of useful information. For example, if the Italians noticed an increased exchange of radio messages of a certain type between London and British bases in the Mediterranean, this served as a warning that a new operation was beginning. Therefore, the Italians could take measures against her in advance. Radio interception allowed the Italians to learn about the death of British ships or about the entry of the enemy fleet to sea. In the latter case, direction finding helped determine his position.

Another way to obtain vital operational information was to decipher intercepted radiograms. We have previously shown many times how Italian cryptographers have succeeded in such work, and we will do this further. Although naval codes are usually designed in such a way that they are difficult to decipher quickly and use the resulting data in the course of a developing operation, Italian cryptographers often achieved such outstanding results that even now it is impossible to tell in detail about it. Further, they successfully deciphered - immediately - the messages of British aircraft. Supermarina often used the eyes of British pilots to obtain news about the situation at sea - news that Italian sources could not provide. Often, using only this method, Supermarina diverted danger from Italian formations.

In the Italian Navy, advance orders to ships and convoys were never sent by radio. Moreover, for many serious reasons, which need not be listed here, it seems completely improbable that the British would ever have been able to decipher a radio message addressed to a ship at sea, and this would have helped them during the operation. However, the same cannot be said about the Italian Air Force ciphers, which were ridiculously easy to break. When Italian and German aircraft began to participate more actively in naval warfare, it became absolutely necessary to keep the Superaereo and X Air Corps informed of the movements of Italian ships at sea. Higher headquarters sent these messages to their units, mostly using radio. It is therefore likely that the British obtained operational intelligence by deciphering messages coming from this weak point in the Italian communications system.

It is clear that the enemy was completely unaware of the operations being undertaken without air support. This applies to the actions of special assault units, blockade runner raids in the Aegean Sea and the Atlantic, and other special operations. Therefore, in some cases, Supermarina preferred to act completely without the help of aviation. This ensured that all information would remain within naval structures and would not be transferred to units not under the control of Supermarine.

Another source of information was the analysis and comparison of various information. With the help of deduction: it was often possible to reveal unexpectedly important facts. For example, by analyzing the complex routes taken by British ships through the Strait of Sicily, it was possible to establish their true route, although the spies gave completely erroneous information. From this point on, it became possible to achieve serious success, as will be described below.

Studying the details of the passages of British minzag cruisers between Great Britain and Gibraltar not only enabled the Italians to accurately predict when such a ship would be sent through the Strait of Sicily, but also enabled Supermarine to one day achieve outstanding success. This happened during the Tunisian campaign. A vague report was received about an unknown ship spotted at night south of Sardinia. Based on an analysis of previous events, it was correctly concluded that that night the British minelayer would lay mines exactly 12 miles north of Ras al-Qur'an (Tunisia). The Italian convoy, which was heading in this direction, was immediately turned around, which saved it from destruction. The minesweepers later found a minefield in the exact location that Supermarine's analytics had predicted by pure deduction.

We should not forget other sources of information that do not fall into the category of “pure” espionage. Pseudo-neutral representatives have always been a productive source of information for both opponents. Suffice it to mention the US diplomatic and consular missions operating in Italy, even in the main Italian ports, until December 1941. Other similar missions operated in Italy without restrictions throughout the war. It is logical to believe that such missions, using diplomatic immunity, provided the enemy with many valuable services. Tourists and correspondents from neutral countries also often brought valuable news of a military nature. At times, careful study of the press of enemy countries, even their official war communiqués, proved a fruitful source of information.

In general, the complex organization of modern maritime operations made it impossible at times to keep them secret. For example, when escorting convoys, Supermarina had to communicate various details to dozens of naval, but “stuffy and army headquarters, not only Italian, but also German. Further, this had to be done through various, unconnected communication networks. If you count all the people who dealt with these messages, such as secretaries, suppliers, telegraph operators, telephone operators and others, you can see that the information became known to hundreds of people, many of whom were not supposed to have access to it. This was a serious shortcoming, but due to the complex and uncertain organizational structure of the three branches of the armed forces of two different countries, Supermarine was never able to increase secrecy in any way.

In short, it can safely be said that the British sometimes knew about the operations of the Italian fleet, just as Supermarina often knew about their operations. However, this situation should be attributed almost entirely to non-spy sources of information, which are still at the disposal of any country today. On the other hand, it is absolutely clear that the enemy knew nothing about our operations if information about them remained only within the naval structures.

Occupation of Dalmatia and Greece

At dawn on April 5, the offensive in Yugoslavia began. The Italian fleet was immediately required to reinforce the escort of the Albanian convoys, since it was logical to expect that the Yugoslav fleet would try to attack them using the nearby Cattaro base. But instead, the Yugoslavs allowed their ships to be captured in good condition, not counting the destroyer Zagreb, which one of the officers blew up at the cost of his own life. The Italian fleet tried to immediately put all ships into operation with their crews. The destroyers Dubrovnik, Belgrade and Ljubljana were renamed Premuda, Sebeniko and Ljubljana respectively. The 4 best torpedo boats were combined into the 24th Mas flotilla. The remaining Yugoslav ships were completely unfit for service and brought more trouble with constant repairs than they were worth.

The Italian navy had a lot of trouble occupying hundreds of islands on the Dalmatian coast and transporting many army units as garrisons to coastal cities. Naturally, he had to quickly occupy the Yugoslav naval bases and main ports, which fell into Italian hands virtually unscathed. The Italian Navy resumed the activities of headquarters and services in these places, which required the stationing of personnel and equipment removed from other ports. In a strategic sense, the occupation of Yugoslavia gave little to the fleet, unless it became possible to send part of the Adriatic convoys along the Dalmatian coast.

At the end of April, expecting that Greece was about to capitulate, the Italian fleet took appropriate measures and concentrated men and equipment in the ports of southeastern Italy. At the same time, an agreement was reached with the German fleet on the division of responsibility in Greek waters and on the subsequent attack on Crete. It was decided that:

1. The Aegean Sea, of course, with the exception of the Italian sector of the Dodecanese Islands, comes under the control of the German fleet. This was to be his first appearance in the Mediterranean. The German fleet had to ensure the operation of all necessary services and provide crews for all ships captured there.

2. The waters west of Corinth are under the jurisdiction of the Italian Navy, which has similar responsibilities.

3. The Italian Navy will maintain a core fleet in the Aegean Sea - initially 8 destroyers and 1 torpedo boat flotilla - plus auxiliary vessels to cooperate with the Germans in operations in this sector. The Italian ships will be under the command of the Italian headquarters, responsible to Supermarina, but operational leadership in the Aegean Sea is exercised by the German Admiral Schuster.

The German Navy always strictly adhered to these agreements, which was not the case with the other two branches of the German armed forces when they appeared on the scene.

From the end of April until 20 May, the Italian fleet carried out the occupation of the Ionian Islands, all of the Cyclades and various ports in the Morea. Of course, as happened in Yugoslavia and Cyrenaica, the organization of the fleet's port services required the redeployment to Greece of a large number of people, as well as equipment, machinery, all kinds of supplies and supplies, which in turn required an increase in transportation. The fleet completely fulfilled everything that was required of it, and in a short time created a highly efficient infrastructure in Greece. An Italian headquarters was created in Constanta (Romania) to direct the movement of Italian ships entering the Black Sea through the Dardanelles.

The rapid collapse of the Greek front forced the Alexandrian fleet to carry out an urgent evacuation of British troops from Greece to Crete. Approximately 30,000 people were taken out, and only at night. Enemy losses turned out to be very small, since the German Air Force did not have night aircraft.

At this time, the British armed forces were in deep crisis, both on land and at sea.

Therefore, the actions of the Italian fleet in the Aegean Sea could produce excellent results. However, no attacks were carried out. For this caution, the fleet was especially criticized by those who were dissatisfied with its carelessness in the battle of Matapan. The fact that British air power in the eastern Mediterranean was at that moment in a critical condition became known to the Italians much later. By that time it, like air power in Malta, had already strengthened. In addition, the British carried out evacuations only on light ships. This did not matter, since the Alexandrian fleet was in constant readiness to move out to break any opposition to the evacuation. It should be noted that at this time he had 3 battleships, while the Italians had only 2. It should also be noted that after the battle at Matapan, the Italian High Command prohibited the fleet from operating outside the range of fighters. In the Aegean Sea, only the German IV Air Corps, which had recently arrived from Germany, could effectively cover the ships. His command rejected offers of cooperation. The author has reason to believe that the IV Air Corps did not want Italian help in the Aegean Sea, intending to get all the glory of future victories.

Soon after this, history completely repeated itself with the attack on Crete. Once again, the Italian fleet did not participate in this operation, except to provide the absolutely necessary escort ships to escort troop convoys. Although chance presented several opportunities to use naval forces, they were missed. In addition to the reasons mentioned above, the main thing was the firm statement of the IV Air Corps that it could handle everything on its own. In addition, the Germans flatly refused to provide air cover to the Italian ships. Moreover, the Germans stated that they would not be responsible for any accidents if Italian ships appeared in the Aegean Sea. They warned that German planes could attack the Italians, since their pilots had not flown over the sea before and would not be able to distinguish Allied ships from enemy ones.

The validity of these warnings was confirmed by the attack of several Ju-87s against the destroyer Sagittario, which was escorting a convoy with German troops. Another group of Ju-87s attacked 5 Italian destroyers carrying German troops. The latter barely managed to leave Piraeus, and it was assumed that they were covered from the air by German planes. As a result of this attack, the destroyer Sella was seriously damaged. Another example of this kind was the bombing of 2 Italian torpedo boats traveling at high speed south of this group. In this case, the German pilots mistook them for 2 British submarines! These attacks took place in broad daylight and despite the fact that German aircraft north of Crete were prohibited from attacking ships smaller than a cruiser. Finally, the fact that the Germans kept the plan to attack Crete completely secret from the Italian High Command indicated that they did not want to have any rivals in dividing the laurels. Therefore, the Germans, in principle, ruled out any possibility of cooperation with the Italian fleet. As a result, the Italian fleet was unable to prevent the evacuation of the British from Crete as well as their Greece.

One risky enterprise of the British turned out to be closely related to the events on the Greek front. In early March, they attempted to lead a convoy across the entire Mediterranean Sea from Gibraltar to Crete. They haven’t dared to take such an adventure since January 10th. The British were forced to make enormous efforts to cover the convoy. In preparation for the operation, on March 2, the cruiser and 2 destroyers sailed through the Strait of Sicily from Malta to Gibraltar. These ships left Malta in the dead of night and crossed the strait undetected. However, the next day they were attacked by 20 Italian bombers and 3 torpedo bombers, as well as several German aircraft. But these efforts yielded nothing. On the other hand, the cargo ship Paracombi, disguised as the French ship Oued Krum, struck an Italian mine near Cape Bon while following the warships. The British destroyer Jervis, which left Malta, was also blown up by an Italian mine.

On the morning of May 8, a reconnaissance aircraft reported that the British Gibraltar Squadron was escorting a convoy in the area of Cape Bon. The Alexandrian fleet was also seen in the central Mediterranean. Only the too late detection of the British formations prevented the Italian fleet from intercepting them before they entered the Strait of Sicily. Therefore, the order was given to deploy destroyers and torpedo boats at night. West of Trapani they were to be supported by 2 cruiser divisions. Meanwhile, Italian-German aircraft entered the battle and damaged the British battlecruiser Rinaun. Heavy seas prevented the Italian destroyers from launching a surprise attack, but repeated explosions were heard throughout the night from the minefield near Pantelleria. In the morning, debris was seen, which was a clear sign of the loss of ships. It could be assumed that the British lost at least 2 ships to Italian mines. One of them was definitely the cargo ship Banffshire, but the other ship could not be identified. Another cargo ship, the Empire Song, hit a mine and sank near Malta. The next morning, 9 May, 8 bombers, covered by 37 fighters and 13 Ju-87 dive bombers, were sent to attack the British ships. These planes did not find the enemy, although the Ju-87s attacked someone, but also did not achieve any results. Finally, on the morning of May 10, 1 enemy cruiser and 4 destroyers were replaced north of Tunisia. They were moving west at high speed. These ships accompanied the convoy to Malta and were now returning, having slipped through the Strait of Sicily undetected. The Italians sent 21 aircraft to attack them. The cruiser was damaged. Meanwhile, the Germans sent 15 aircraft to attack the convoy near Crete, but they did not find the convoy.

The Italian fleet did not take part in these operations for good reasons. Due to the late detection, he would not have been able to intercept the convoy west of Sicily. If the ships had left as soon as the report was received - in the evening of May 8 - contact with the enemy could only be established in the afternoon of May 9. Such a course of events became possible if the British were willing to accept the battle and did not shy away further to the south. Moreover, at the moment only the battleships Cesare and Doria were in service, against which 3 battleships could come out from Alexandria. The Italians absolutely could not rely on air cover. It is quite obvious that they would have been attacked by aircraft from a British aircraft carrier. Overall, the risk was significantly greater than the dubious results such an undertaking could bring. On the other hand, with a little imagination, Supermarina could have foreseen the return of the light forces discovered on the morning of May 10th. Having sent a cruiser division in advance, it was quite possible to intercept the British near the coast of Tunisia.

The information received from aerial reconnaissance misled Supermarina. She had no idea that the battleship Queen Elizabeth and her convoy had broken through to the east. The presence of this ship in the eastern Mediterranean was discovered only later and through other channels. It should be noted that the presence of two Cesare-class linkers in Taranto during the German landing on Crete was the reason for the transfer of these reinforcements to a fleet that was already superior in strength to the Italian one. The hasty transfer of Queen Elizabeth to Alexandria created there the core of a fleet of A battleships that could counter any operations of 2 Italian battleships.

The adventures of the destroyers "Lupo" and "Sagittario"

Preparations for the attack on Crete were completed in mid-May when X Air Corps was transferred from Sicily to Greece, ceasing raids on Malta. The plans of the IV Air Corps called for massive bombing campaigns first. Then the paratroopers were supposed to capture Kania and the airfields of Maleme, Heraklion, and Retimo. At night, a convoy from Piraeus, which consisted of two dozen small cargo and coastal ships with German troops on board, was supposed to arrive in Cania. The convoy was covered by the escort destroyer Lupo, captain 2nd rank Francesco Mimbelli. The convoy was also supposed to deliver units of the Italian San Marco Regiment (marines) and some equipment for the occupation of Suda Bay. The next night, a similar convoy, led by the destroyer Sagittario, was to land troops at Heraklion. The operation was supposed to be completed in 3 days.

Despite careful preparation, the German paratroopers dropped on Crete on the morning of May 20 found themselves in a very difficult situation. In Heraklion the landing force was destroyed. In Maleme, the Germans managed to capture only part of the airfield.

The same failure awaited them in Retimo. Seeing these serious setbacks, on the afternoon of May 21, the Germans sent convoys Lupo and Sagittario. Their goal was a fighting landing - an operation for which the troops were completely unprepared. Moreover, although the waters around the island were patrolled by hundreds of Axis aircraft, none of them were warned of the passage of the convoys. Therefore, the British managed to destroy one convoy and disrupt the landing of the second.

On the night of May 21, the Lupo convoy had already spotted the shores of Crete. And at that moment he was suddenly attacked by 3 British cruisers (Dido, Ajax, Orion) and 4 destroyers. As soon as the enemy ships were discovered, Lupo placed a smoke screen around the convoy and went on the attack. A heroic battle ensued against overwhelming odds. First, the Lupo was fired upon by a destroyer, and then attacked by an approaching cruiser. While both sides were firing, the destroyer fired 2 torpedoes from a distance of only 700 meters. Under a hail of shells, Captain 2nd Rank Mimbelli cut through the enemy formation between the cruisers Ajax and Orion. He slipped literally a few meters behind the stern of the Ajax, firing at it from all guns and machine guns. The fate of the small ship in this battle was, of course, predetermined. "Lupo" received many hits, but Mimbelli, taking advantage of the general confusion, managed to escape. The enemy ships destroyed the helpless cavalry, of which only 3 boats (all Italian) survived. However, in the confusion, the British fired at each other at times, causing serious damage. Lupo's maneuvers were so fast and decisive that the British believed they were fighting several ships. “Lupo” had a magnificent battle, especially considering that the destroyer received at least 18 hits from 152 mm shells. Although the crew's losses were very heavy, the ship was not sunk, despite Ajax's claim that its artillery had "shattered" the Italian ship.

A few hours later it was Sagittario's turn. At 0830 on 22 May, this destroyer was leading her convoy to Cania when Lieutenant Giuseppe Cigala Fulgosi received orders to return to Milos as the situation on land became more difficult. Chigala barely had time to turn when the masts of British ships appeared in the east. This came as an unpleasant surprise. Although their planes circled in the sky, not one of them warned of the presence of the enemy. Chigala ordered the approximately 30 ships in the convoy to leave as quickly as possible, and he himself began to put up a smoke screen to cover them. Then, instead of hiding in the smokescreen himself, he turned towards the enemy.

As soon as the British squadron, consisting of 5 cruisers and 2 destroyers under the command of Admiral King, noticed the Sagittario, it opened fire from a distance of 12,000 meters. Enemy shells fell around the destroyer, but the rapid zigzag helped the Sagittario escape from the concentrated fire.

When there were less than 8,000 meters left to the second cruiser, Chigala turned straight towards it and fired his torpedoes. Then, intending to keep the British away from the convoy, he closed the distance even further. A column of smoke rose above the enemy cruiser, at which the torpedoes were fired, and Chigala decided that he had achieved a hit. However, at this moment the British ships ceased fire and turned to the southwest. Chigala fired a few more shells at the nearest destroyer and, completely satisfied, turned back to rejoin the convoy. Nobody bothered him. But Sagittario's trials are not over yet. Several Ju-87s attacked the destroyer five times, but, fortunately, did not cause any damage. It is easy to understand that when Cigala returned to Piraeus, the German Alpine riflemen literally carried him in their arms through the streets.

From British reports it became known that Admiral King justified his unexpected withdrawal by fear of enemy air attacks. However, it is clear that such an explanation is not consistent with the facts, and it was sharply criticized by the British themselves, as can be seen from Churchill's memoirs. But one fact is: the convoy, covered by only one destroyer, was under the guns of British guns. 5 cruisers and 2 destroyers would have destroyed the entire convoy in a few minutes. The convoy was a very important target, and its destruction did not require much risk. At the same time, the withdrawal of the British squadron did not mean that it would avoid air attacks. Shortly after this incident, a British squadron heading to Tserigo was attacked by Ju-87s, which seriously harassed the cruisers Nyad and Carlisle. From all this it follows that the British admiral made a mistake.

From official British reports it became known that the Sagittario torpedoes did not hit the target, but Cigala’s actions caused serious consequences. As soon as Admiral Cunningham learned that Admiral King had allowed his prey to escape, he ordered the battleships Warspite and Valiant, the cruisers Gloucester and Fiji, and 7 destroyers, which at that time were located west of Tserigo, to enter the Aegean Sea, connect with Admiral King's squadron and find the missing convoy. As the combined squadron headed north-east, it came under fierce attack from Ju-87s, which heavily damaged the Warspite. Admiral King again ordered a general withdrawal. This maneuver, however, did not save his ships. The Ju-87s that tracked down the target sank the cruisers Gloucester and Fiji and the destroyer Greyhound. Valiant and other ships were damaged.

Meanwhile, things were going badly in Crete, and the German commanders began to realize their mistake. Airplanes alone were not enough. Paratroopers alone could not break the resistance of the British. Events developed so badly that on 26 May the IV Air Corps decided that the operation had failed and asked Berlin for permission to stop it. Hitler replied that it should be continued at any cost - this is what the author heard at the German naval headquarters in Athens.

On the other hand, by a strange coincidence, it was at that moment that the British decided that they could no longer resist and began to develop a plan for the evacuation of the island. If the British had known the position of the enemy, they might have made a last effort and held Crete. But instead, the last effort was made by German aviation and paratroopers, spurred on by orders from Berlin. They acted extremely bravely, however, despite all their efforts, the situation continued to remain very uncertain, as the paratroopers suffered horrific losses. Those who survived literally collapsed from fatigue.

When the author arrived at Suda Bay with his flotilla of torpedo boats on May 28, the paratroopers told him that they “could no longer stand on their feet” the previous night. They also said that in the attack planned for the morning, everyone would undoubtedly die, but they still attacked to save their honor. However, the British did not know all this and during the night “truce” they retreated to the southern coast of Crete to evacuate. Therefore, when on the morning of May 28 the Germans launched a suicidal offensive, they met only weak resistance from the rear barriers.

During this operation, Italian ships in the neighboring Dodecanese were not idle. While the destroyers ensured the occupation of the Cyclades, 5 torpedo boats patrolled in the Kaso Strait. On the night of May 20, they attacked a British cruiser and destroyer squadron. The attack was met with fierce fire, but the torpedo boats fired torpedoes and withdrew without damage. However, they did not score any hits. Meanwhile, in Rhodes, Admiral Biancheri, although he had scanty forces, began to prepare a convoy of auxiliary ships to carry out a landing in Sitia on the northeastern coast of Crete. The convoy, accompanied by 5 destroyers and several torpedo boats, left Rhodes on the afternoon of 27 May and arrived at its target without incident 24 hours later. The last leg of the voyage was very risky, as 3 British cruisers and 6 destroyers were discovered nearby. Fortunately, the British ships were too busy repelling air and submarine attacks and arrived at the Caso Strait only after the landing had already taken place. Thanks to this impromptu expedition, the eastern part of Crete up to the bay of Malea was later occupied by the Italians.

While the landings in Sitia were underway, at dawn on May 29, an Italian torpedo bomber hit the British destroyer Hereward, which lost speed. As Italian torpedo boats patrolling in the area approached to deliver the killing blow, the destroyer exploded and sank. All they had to do was pick up the surviving crew members from the water.

When describing the Cretan operation, mention should be made of the actions of the submarine Onice. On the night of 21 May, she attacked 3 destroyers in the Caso Strait and may have hit one of them with a torpedo. During the Cretan Campaign, the Alexandrian fleet was extremely active and acted without regard for losses. Having nearly thwarted the German attack on the island, he suffered further casualties by evacuating most of the British army from Crete. To ensure evacuation, Admiral Cunningham constantly kept 2 battleships at sea south of Crete from May 15 to 28. However, this was the first and last time in the history of the Mediterranean War that the British fleet was forced to operate with complete air superiority of the enemy. As a result, he suffered heavy losses. But Italian ships were in this situation almost the entire war. This example shows what success could have been achieved in the Mediterranean if Italian-German aviation had managed to maintain air superiority and began to cooperate with the Italian fleet.

The German Air Force said it had sunk many ships in the waters around Crete. To these should be added the results of the actions of the Italians. But the reality was somewhat different from the loud statements. For example, the Germans announced that they had sunk the heavy cruiser York in Suda Bay. In fact, this was done 2 months ago by Italian special assault units. British records show that the cruisers Fiji, Gloucester and Calcutta were sunk; the destroyers Juneau, Greyhound, Kelly, Kashmir, Hereward and Imperial, as well as 10 auxiliary ships. The following battleships were damaged: Warspite, Valiant and Barham; aircraft carrier USS Formidable; the cruisers "Ajax", "Orion", "Niad" and "Carlisle" plus 10 destroyers. The losses of merchant ships are not precisely known, but 10 of them died in Suda Bay alone.

To these losses should be added the loss of the Greek fleet. His ships were sunk either by German aircraft in the ports, or by their own crews during the occupation of the ports by Axis troops. Only the old armored cruiser Aporoff, 2 destroyers, 8 destroyers and several submarines managed to escape to British ports.

Indirectly, the Cretan campaign led to the destruction of the Italian destroyers Curtatone and Mirabello, which were escorting convoys to the Greek theater. Both destroyers were blown up by Greek mines on May 20.

E.B. Cunningham

A Sailor's Odyssey

By the third week of March 1941 we realized that the Germans would delay their offensive in Greece no longer. Moreover, from March 25, there was a noticeable increase in aerial reconnaissance activity over southwestern Greece and Crete, and daily attempts to conduct reconnaissance of Alexandria harbor began. The unusual persistence with which the enemy followed the movements of the Mediterranean Fleet made us think that the Italian fleet intended to do something serious.

The enemy had plenty of choice. He could attack our vulnerable, weakly escorted convoys carrying troops and supplies to Greece. He could send a heavily escorted convoy to the Dodecanese Islands. There was a possibility that the Italian fleet would undertake sabotage to cover the landing in Greece or Cyrenaica. A general attack against Malta was also possible. Of all these possibilities, the most likely was an attack on our convoys going to Greece, most likely south of Crete.

The most obvious way to counter this was to station a battlefleet west of Crete. However, in this case, enemy air reconnaissance would definitely have tracked him, and the Italian fleet would have delayed its operation until we were forced to return to Alexandria to refuel. In order for us to have a real chance of intercepting the Italians, we had to have completely reliable information about their going to sea. We ourselves had to go out at the beginning of the night so as not to be detected the next morning by enemy planes. If we had kept our exit from Alexandria secret, it would have helped the success of the operation. The movements of our convoys in the Aegean Sea were so well known to the enemy that they could not be changed so as not to arouse suspicion. At the same time, this meant the risk of an attack against them.

During the night of March 27, one of our packing boats from Malta reported a force of 3 cruisers and 1 destroyer 80 miles east of the southeastern tip of Sicily. They moved southeast, approximately in the direction of Crete. Visibility of life was poor, and the flying boat could not monitor the enemy. A fierce dispute broke out between me and my headquarters about what the appearance of Italian cruisers actually meant. Their position and course clearly indicated that battleships must be nearby and that their target would clearly be our Greek convoys.

It so happened that on March 27 there was only one convoy in the measure. He was moving to Piraeus and was already heading near the southern tip of Crete. He was ordered to follow his previous course, but turn back when darkness fell. The return convoy from Piraeus was ordered to delay leaving.

I myself was inclined to think that the Italians would not dare to do anything. Later we noticed "the usual intensity of Italian radio communications, and as a young man we decided to put to sea after dark, so that our battleships would be between the enemy and the place where he expected to see our convoy. I made a bet of 10 shillings with my head of the operations department of the headquarters Captain 2nd Rank Auer that we will not meet the enemy.

Fortunately, we had decided in advance to go out after dark, since enemy reconnaissance planes appeared over Alexandria at noon and before sunset. They reported that the fleet was peacefully anchored.

I also came up with my own little tricks to better hide our plans. We knew that the Japanese consul in Alexandria was in the habit of reporting all fleet movements that he observed, although it remained unclear whether the enemy received this information in time for it to still have significance. I decided to deceive this gentleman. I went ashore to play golf, carrying my suitcase with me, as if I intended to stay ashore all night. The Japanese consul spent the entire afternoon of the day near the golf holes. It was difficult to confuse him with anyone - short, fat, with a characteristic Asian face, so awkwardly built that the sarcastic chief of staff nicknamed him “the blunt end of the Axis.”

The little trick worked as expected. Having abandoned my suitcase, I returned to the Warspite after dark, and at 19.00 we went to sea.

What the Japanese consul thought and did when he saw the empty harbor the next morning was no longer of interest to me.

While leaving the harbor, the Warspite passed too close to a mud bank, which filled its capacitors with mud. This affected us later, as our speed was now limited to 20 knots. The night passed quietly, we moved northwest at this speed. The squadron consisted of Warspite, Barham, Valiant and Formidable, which were covered by the destroyers Jervis, Janus, Nubien, Mohawk, Stuart, Greyhound, Griffin, "Hotspur" and "Havok".

As I have already said, one convoy was at sea in a dangerous zone, it was ordered to change course at nightfall. Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippel, operating in the Aegean Sea with the cruisers "Orion", "Ajax", "Perth", "Gloucester" and the destroyers "Ilex", "Hasty", "Hereward", "Vendetta", received orders to go to a point south of Gavdos by dawn on March 28.

At dawn, reconnaissance planes were scrambled from the Formidable, and at 7.40 one of them reported that he saw 3 cruisers and several destroyers not far from the place where our 4 cruisers were supposed to be. Naturally, we took them for the Pridham-Wilpel squadron. However, shortly before 8.30 Pridham-Whippel himself reported that he saw 3 enemy cruisers and destroyers to the north. It became clear that the enemy's fleet had put to sea, so I willingly paid the lost 10 shillings.

However, the situation remained confusing, and it was difficult to understand how many enemy formations were noticed by the planes. One report mentioned "battleships" and it seemed only natural that the Italian cruisers would be supported by a battle squadron. On the other hand, we could not be sure of this. Previously, the aircraft was more than once confused between Italian cruisers and battleships.

Pridham-Whippel's cruisers were about 90 miles ahead of us, so we reached the speed that Warspite could give, which was no more than 22 knots due to faulty refrigerators. Meanwhile, Pridham-Whippel identified the sighted cruisers as heavy ones. As he wrote: “Knowing that ships of this type have a higher speed and their guns are longer ranged than those on my cruisers, which allows them to choose the battle distance, I decided to lure them closer to our battleships and aircraft carrier.”

The Italian cruisers gave chase and at 8.12 opened fire from a distance of approximately 13 miles. They concentrated their fire on the Gloucester first, and their shooting was quite accurate. Gloucester had to “squirm like a snake” to avoid getting hit. At 8.29 the distance was reduced by 1 mile, and the Gloucester itself fired 3 salvos from its 6" guns. All of them fell short. The enemy turned to the west and at 8.55 ceased fire Pridham-Whippel turned after him to maintain contact.

Shortly before 1100, Pridham-Whippel spotted an enemy battleship to the north, which immediately opened accurate fire on her from a range of 15 miles. Our cruisers turned away under the cover of a smokescreen and rushed off at full speed. Being under a hail of 15" shells was quite unpleasant.

The situation at Warspite didn’t seem too good to us either. We knew that battleships of the Littorio type were capable of developing up to 31 knots, but at night the Gloucester reported that due to problems in the engine, she could give no more than 24 knots. In addition, there was a strong cruiser squadron north of Pridham Whippel. However, the sight of the enemy battleship miraculously increased the speed of the Gloucester to 30 knots.

Something had to be done, and the Valiant was ordered to proceed at full speed to the aid of Pridham-Whippel. I tried to hold off the attack of the torpedo bombers until the moment when the enemy battleships were so close to our ships that if one of them was damaged, we would certainly be able to intercept it and destroy it. However, circumstances dictated the course of action. The shock wave was already in the air, and I ordered the Formidable to direct them towards the target. The attack relieved the pressure on the cruiser Pridham-Whippel, but unfortunately it forced the enemy battleship to turn away. He was about 80 miles away from us. This meant that I would not be able to force a fight on him until sunset, if at all.

Meanwhile, the slow speed of the Warspite was causing me serious concern. I knew that the chief engineer remained ill on shore, but I also knew that the flagship engineer, engineer-captain 1st rank B.J.G. Wilkinson is on board. So I sent for him and ordered him to do something. He went down, and soon I was pleased to notice that the Valiant, which was following astern at full speed, was no longer pressing on us. We walked at the same speed.

A serious hitch at this moment was caused by the fact that the wind was blowing from the east, directly from the stern. This meant that periodically we would have to turn in that direction to allow Formidable to fly. However, at 1J30 it became clear that Pridham-Whippel required immediate assistance, so Formidable was detached so that she could conduct flights on her own while the battlefleet steamed towards the target at full speed. The Formidable quickly fell behind, and I became a little worried when I saw that it was being attacked by torpedo bombers. We were relieved to see that he had escaped the torpedoes.

Around noon, the air strike group returned and reported one probable hit on the battleship, which was the Vittorio Veneto. A few minutes later, the KVVS flying boat reported another enemy formation, consisting of 2 Cavour-class battleships and several heavy cruisers. The battleship, attacked by VSF aircraft, was covered only by destroyers. However, 20 miles southeast of it there was a cruiser squadron. Aircraft reports indicated that the enemy was retreating to the west.

We spotted our own cruisers at 12.30 and Formidable was ordered to launch a second shock wave to attack the Vittorio Venete, 65 miles ahead of us.

We began the pursuit, but it was quite clear that it would be long and fruitless unless the Vittorio Veneto was damaged by our air attacks and slowed down. The chase dragged on even further as speed had to be reduced to 21 knots to allow Formidable to join and Barham to maintain her place in the ranks. However, luck still smiled on us. The east wind died down and there was complete calm with light gusts of wind from the west, which allowed the Formidable to carry out flights while maintaining its place in the ranks.

Shortly after 1500 one of our aircraft reported that the Vittorio Veneto was still 65 miles ahead and heading west. The second shock wave began the attack and reported 3 hits, and that the speed of the Vittorio Veneto had dropped to 8 knots. This great news was too optimistic, since our target was still 60 miles away and moving away at a speed of 12 to 15 knots, meaning we could not intercept it before dark. A small group of AAF Swordfish from Maleme airfield on Crete also attacked one of the cruiser squadrons and reported a possible hit. In the afternoon, RAF bombers from Greece also carried out a number of strikes. Not a single ship was hit, although there were close calls.

These attacks gave the Italians a good scare. We were especially pleased that they received a portion of that bitter mixture that we had been sipping on for months.

It now became necessary to come into direct contact with enemy ships. Therefore, at 16.44, Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippel received orders to move at full speed in order to establish visual contact with the retreating enemy. The destroyers Nubian and Mohawk were sent forward to provide visual communication between Pridham-Whippel's cruisers and the battlefleet. The situation was still extremely confused, since throughout the afternoon we continued to receive alarming reports of the presence of a second enemy formation, which included battleships, northwest of the Vittorio Veneto. These reports, as we later learned, were erroneous. Not a single battleship hit the sea anymore.

Now we had to convey the plan for the night battle that we had developed, since darkness was approaching. It was decided to create a strike force of 8 destroyers under the command of Captain 1st Rank Philip Mack on the Jervis. If the cruisers made contact with the Vittorio Veneto, the destroyers would attack it. If necessary, our battleships came into action. If the cruisers failed to establish contact, I intended to circle north and northwest to try to find and intercept the Vittorio Veneto at dawn. At the same time, Formideble was ordered to send a third wave of torpedo bombers to attack at dusk.

But we needed an accurate picture, so at 17.45 Warspite took off a reconnaissance aircraft with the Commander-in-Chief's observer, Lieutenant Commander E. S. Bolt on board to clarify the situation. By 18.30 we had the first series of reports from this experienced and knowledgeable officer, who quickly told us everything that was required. "Vittorio Veneto" was 45 miles from "Warspite" and was heading west at a speed of about 15 knots. The entire Italian fleet gathered together. The battleship was in the middle, with columns of cruisers and destroyers on both sides, and a curtain of destroyers was located in front. Other aircraft continued to report a formation of battleships and heavy cruisers in the northwest.

At about 19.30, when it was almost dark, the third wave of Warspite torpedo bombers began to attack. At the same time, Pridham-Whippel reported that he could see enemy ships 9 miles to the northwest. A little later, the air group reported one probable hit, although there was no clear indication that the battleship had received further damage.

The difficult moment of decision-making has arrived. I remained firmly convinced that we had gone too far, so it would be simply stupid not to do everything possible to destroy the Vittorio Veneto. At the same time, it seemed that the Italian admiral knew perfectly well about our position. He had many escorting cruisers and destroyers, and any British admiral in my place would not have hesitated to send all the destroyers he had, supported by cruisers with torpedo tubes, to attack. Some at my headquarters argued that it was stupid to run blindly after the retreating enemy with our 3 heavy ships, having, in addition, the Formideble in our hands, because at dawn we could be attacked by enemy dive bombers. I carefully considered this point of view, but the discussion that began coincided with my lunch, so I told the staff that I should eat first, and then we’ll see how I feel.

When I returned to the bridge, my spirits were high enough that I ordered the destroyer strike force to find and attack the enemy. We followed, slightly doubting how the 4 destroyers remaining with the battleships would be able to repel an attack by enemy destroyers if the Italians dared to undertake it. At this moment the enemy fleet was 33 miles from us, still making 15 knots.

Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippel had his own problems. Establishing contact with the Vittorio Veneto, protected by 3 squadrons of cruisers and 1 destroyer, was no easy task, especially since Pridham-Whippel had to keep all 4 of his ships together in readiness for immediate combat. And Pridham-Whippel failed to find the enemy battleship.

At 21.11 we received his report of an enemy ship standing idle 5 miles to his left and detected by radar. We continued to pursue the enemy fleet and only turned slightly to port to bring the CJ closer to the stationary ship. Warspite had no radar, but in 2L10 Valiant reported that her radar had picked up the ship 6 miles off her bow. It was a big ship. The Valiant determined its length to be in excess of 600 feet.

Our hopes grew stronger. It could have been "Vittorio Veneto". The battleships turned left 40° all of a sudden. We were already at combat posts, and the main artillery was ready for battle. The towers were turned in the right direction.

Rear Admiral Willis was not with us, and the new chief of staff, Commodore Edelsten, still had to gain experience. A quarter of an hour later, at 22.25, examining the horizon on the right bow with binoculars, he calmly reported that he saw 2 large cruisers and 1 small one ahead of them. They crossed the course of our battle fleet from right to left. I looked there through my binoculars - there really were cruisers. Captain 2nd Rank Power, a former submariner and unrivaled expert in identifying enemy ships at first sight, stated that these were 2 Zara-class cruisers and “a scarlet cruiser ahead of them.

Using a short-range transmitter, the battle fleet was deployed into a wake column, and I, along with the headquarters, went to the upper, captain's bridge, from where an excellent all-round view opened up. I will never forget the next few minutes. There was dead silence, almost noticeable physically, you could only hear the voices of the artillerymen moving their guns to a new target. Orders could be heard being repeated from the control room behind and above the bridge. Looking forward, one could see the unfolding turrets of their 15" guns, groping for enemy cruisers. Never in my life have I experienced such excitement as in that second when I heard a calm voice from the control post: “The control center gunner sees the target.” This meant that the guns ready to fire, and his finger resting on the trigger.The enemy was at a distance of no more than 3800 yards - very close.

The order to open fire was given by the flagship artilleryman of the fleet, Captain 2nd Rank Geoffrey Barnard. You could hear the ding-ding-ding of the artillery gongs. This was followed by a huge orange flash and a terrible crash as 6 heavy weapons fired simultaneously. At the same moment, the Greyhound destroyer, which was part of the cover, illuminated with a searchlight one of the enemy cruisers, which emerged from the darkness as a silver-blue silhouette. Our searchlights also opened after the first salvo and gave full light to the terrible picture. In the spotlight, I saw our 6 shells flying in the air, 5 huts hit just below the upper deck of the cruiser and exploded, throwing out a blinding flame. The Italians were taken by surprise. Their guns were at zero. They were defeated before they could put up any resistance. Captain 1st Rank Douglas Fisher, commander of the Warspite, was himself an artilleryman. When he saw the results of the first salvo, he involuntarily said in a voice full of surprise: “Great God! But we got there!”

The Valiant, which was astern of us, opened fire at the same time as us. It, too, hit its target, and as the Warspite shifted its fire to the other cruiser, I saw the Valiant blow its target to pieces. The speed of his shooting amazed me. I would never have believed that heavy guns could fire so quickly. "Formidable" fell out of the line to the right, but "Barham", following the norm of "Valiant", sang hot fire.

The position of the Italian cruisers was indescribable. Entire towers and masses of debris could be seen flying into the air and splashing into the sea. Soon the ships themselves were reduced to flaming ruins, engulfed in flames from stem to stern. The entire battle lasted a matter of minutes.

Our searchlights were still open, and just after 22.30 we saw 3 Italian destroyers on the left bow, which were obviously following the cruisers. They turned, at least one could be seen firing torpedoes, so the battleships turned right 90° all of a sudden to avoid them. Our destroyers entered the battle, which turned into a crazy scramble. "Warspite" fired at the enemy from 15" and 6" guns. To my horror, I saw that one of our destroyers, the Hayvok, was covered with our shells. It seemed to me that he died. “Formidable” also suffered. When the battle began, he left the line to the right at full speed, since an artillery night battle is not the best place for an aircraft carrier. When he was already 5 miles from us, he was found by the Warspite searchlight, which was searching for enemy ships from the hull. We heard the commander of the 6" starboard battery ordering the guns to be aimed, and we barely had time to stop him.

4 of our destroyers accompanied the battle fleet. These were "Stuart", Captain 1st Rank G.M.L. Waller, CAF; "Greyhound", captain 2nd rank U.R. Marshall-E"Dean; "Havok", Lieutenant G.R.G. Watkins; "Griffin", Lieutenant-Commander J. Lee-Barber. They received orders to finish off the enemy cruisers, and the battleships, joining the Formidable, retreated to north to clear the way for them. It is difficult to reconstruct the movements of the destroyers from their own reports. However, they had a wild night and sank at least 1 enemy destroyer.

At 10:45 p.m. we saw intense shooting, flares, and tracer bullets in the southwest. Since none of our ships were on this bearing, it seemed to us that the Italians were fighting each other, or that the destroyers of our strike force were launching an attack. Immediately after 23.00 I gave the order to all forces not engaged in destroying the enemy to retreat to the northeast. As I see it now, this signal was poorly thought out. I intended to give our destroyers complete freedom to attack any ship they sighted, and at the same time facilitate the assembly of the fleet in the morning. It was also assumed that Captain 1st Rank Mack and his 8 destroyers, located 20 miles ahead of us, would take this signal as a direct order not to withdraw until they had completed the attack. However, this same order unfortunately forced Vice Admiral Pridham-Whippel to stop trying to establish contact with the Vittorio Venete.

A few minutes after midnight, "Havok", having torpedoed the destroyer and finishing it off with artillery fire, reported that he saw a battleship approximately in the area where we were fighting. The battleship was the main target of Captain 1st Rank Mack, and the "Havok" message forced Mack's destroyers with all their might rush back, although he was 60 miles west of this place. However, an hour later, the Hayvok corrected its report, reporting that it had discovered not a battleship, but a heavy cruiser. Shortly after 3.00 he sent another message, indicating that he had come close to the "Field". But since Watkins had previously expended all his torpedoes, he requested instructions - “to board the cruiser or to blow up the stern with depth charges?”

The Hayvok had already been joined by the Greyhound and the Griffin, and then Captain 1st Rank Mac approached the Jervis aboard the Pola. The ship was in a state of indescribable disorder. Panicked people jumped overboard. A drunken crowd had gathered on the forecastle, littered with clothes, personal effects and bottles. There was not even a shadow of order and discipline. Having removed the crew, Mack sank the ship with torpedoes. Of course, the Pola was the ship that Pridham-Whippel and the Valiant reported between 2100 and 2200. He stood without a move to the left of our course. They didn’t fire at him, and he didn’t shoot either. However, she was hit by a torpedo during the final attack at dusk and was completely disabled.

His sinking at 4.10 was the final act of the night's performance.

At dawn, reconnaissance planes took off from the Formidable, additional planes flew from Greece and Crete, but they did not even detect any signs of the enemy in the west. As we learned later, “Vittorio Veneto” managed to increase speed at night and disappeared.

At dawn, our cruisers and destroyers met with the battle fleet. Since we were almost sure that the Warspite had been sunk by our own destroyer during the night dump, we excitedly began to count them. To our inexpressible relief, all 12 destroyers were present. My heart was relieved.

It was a beautiful morning. We returned to the battle area and saw a calm sea, covered with a layer of oil, strewn with boats, rafts and debris, and many floating bodies. All the destroyers that I could identify began rescuing people. In total, including the crew of the Pola, the British ships rescued 900 people, although some of them later died. In the midst of rescue work, we attracted the attention of several Ju-88s. This reminded us that it was foolish to linger over trifles in an area where we could be subject to powerful air attacks. Therefore, we were forced to retreat to the east, leaving several hundred Italians in the water. The most we could do for them was to convey in clear text their exact coordinates to the Italian Admiralty. The hospital ship Gradiska was sent and rescued another 160 people.

An unfortunate mistake prevented the Greek destroyer flotilla from taking part in an action in which I am sure they would have behaved gallantly. The destroyers were sent through the Corinth Canal to Argostoli with all possible haste. They arrived too late to take part in the battle, but managed to pick up more Italian VPs.

Throughout the afternoon my fleet was subjected to fierce air attacks. Although it was not easy to break through the Formidable fighter screen, several bombs exploded close to the aircraft carrier itself. We arrived in Alexandria without further incident early in the evening of Sunday, March 30th. On April 1st I ordered a special service of thanksgiving to be celebrated on board all ships to commemorate our success at Matapan.

Shortly afterwards I was visited by the Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church at Alexandria, who brought me congratulations on the victory, which he described not only as a great deliverance, but also as a manifestation of God's power, for which he and his entire congregation thanked Almighty God. After returning to the city, he presented the fleet with an icon depicting St. Nicholas, the patron saint of sailors and travelers, which was placed in the Holy See in the ship church of the Warspite.

Although the Vittorio Veneto escaped, we sank 3 heavy cruisers - Zara, Pola, Fiume - and 2 destroyers - Alfieri and Carducci. The Italians lost more than 2,400 officers and sailors, mostly from artillery fire. "Fiume" received 2 - 15" salvoes from "Warspite" and 1 - from "Valiant"; "3 ara" received 4 salvoes from "Warspite", 5 - from "Valiant" and 5 - from "Barham". The impact of these 6 - and 8-gun salvoes: each shell of which weighed almost a ton is impossible to describe.

There was triumph in the fleet. Our sailors quite rightly believed that they had more than paid for the constant bombardment to which they were subjected during their trips to sea.

Our losses at Matapan were negligible, we lost only 1 aircraft and crew.

Once again, before concluding this review of this bey, I must pay tribute to the excellent work of the WSF. I will quote my report, published in the supplement to the London Gazette on July 31, 1947:

"Most highly appreciated deserve the courage and composure of the pilots and the impeccable work of the Formidable deck crew and ground staff in Maleme. An example of the courage of our young officers is Lieutenant F.M.E. Torrens-Spence, who, in order not to be left out, flew with a torpedo from Elsousis to Maleme on the only available plane and, despite all the difficulties of reconnaissance and poor communications, carried out reconnaissance himself. He later took off with a second aircraft and took part in an attack by torpedo bombers at dusk.”

Looking back on the battle that is now officially known as the Battle of Matapan, I admit that there were several things that could have been done better. However, calmly examining an object from an easy chair, when there is complete information about what is happening, is very different from controlling a battle at night from the bridge of a ship in the presence of a friend. You must constantly make decisions, for which a few seconds are allotted. Fast-moving ships, passing very close by, and the roar of the guns does not make it easier to think, and the mere fact that the battle took place at night thickens the fog over the scene so much that some of the participants may remain completely unaware of the true state of affairs.

However, we have achieved significant results. These 3 heavy cruisers were well protected against 6" shells and were a constant threat to our smaller and lightly armored ships. More importantly, the sluggish and passive behavior of the Italian fleet during the subsequent evacuations of Greece and Crete was a direct result of the heavy blow it received from Matapana If enemy surface ships were to interfere during these operations, our already difficult task would become almost impossible.

Admiral Angelo Iachino, commander of the Italian fleet, held the flag on the Vittorio Veneto. I read his report on the operation and the night battle, there is no doubt that air reconnaissance failed him greatly. This was a surprise to us, since we knew how effective Italian reconnaissance aircraft had been on other occasions. However, as Admiral Iachino says, the interaction of the Italian fleet with aviation in the field of tactics was weak.

It seems that they relied on reports from German aircraft, and since the weather was quite acceptable, it is unclear why their aerial reconnaissance failed. At 9.00 on March 28, a German plane actually reported an aircraft carrier, 2 battleships, 9 cruisers and 14 destroyers, which at 7.45 were in such and such a place. It was indeed our fleet, which, according to Admiral Iacino, was calmly stationed in Alexandria at that time. However, having examined the map more closely, the admiral decided that the pilot had made a mistake and discovered his own fleet, which he reported to Rhodes. He was unaware that British battleships were at sea until the very last moment.

On the evening of March 28, when the Pola was damaged by our air attack, the information that Admiral Iachino had led him to believe that the British battleships were 90 miles astern, that is, 4 hours away. Therefore, his decision to send Zara and Fiume to help the damaged cruiser should not be criticized. At first he intended to send destroyers, but then he decided that only the admiral could decide on the spot whether the Pola should be towed or scuttled. But Rear Admiral Carlo Cattaneo died on the Zarya and cannot say anything.

In fact, the British battleships were not 90 miles away, but twice as close.

We know the result.

Admiral Iachino's book also reveals the unimaginable state of complete unpreparedness of the Italian fleet for night battles. They did not consider the possibility of a night battle between capital ships at all, so the crews of the heavy guns were not at combat posts. This explains why the Zara and Fiume turrets were level when we spotted them. They had good ships, good guns and torpedoes, flameless powder and much more, but even their newest ships did not have the radar that helped us so well, and their art of night combat with heavy ships was on the same level as ours for 25 years back to the time of the Battle of Jutland.

The Chief of the Italian Naval General Staff, Admiral Ricciardi, greeted Admiral Iachino very coldly. Mussolini, on the other hand, was not so unfriendly and patiently listened to Iacchino's complaints about the poor performance of aerial reconnaissance. The results of this battle strengthened the Italians' resolve to build an aircraft carrier to provide the fleet with its own reconnaissance aircraft. But I must remind you that Italy never completed the aircraft carrier until its surrender in September 1943.

Laughter, as we know, prolongs life, and when it comes to Regia Marina Italiana, then life is doubly prolonged.

An explosive mixture of Italian love of life, negligence and sloppiness can turn any useful undertaking into a farce. There are legends about the Royal Italian Navy: during the war, Italian sailors achieved a fantastic result - fleet losses exceeded the list of ships of the Italian Navy! Almost every Italian ship died/sank/was captured during its service twice, and sometimes three times.

You cannot find another ship in the world like the Italian battleship Conte di Cavour. The formidable battleship was first sunk at her anchorage on November 12, 1940, during a British air raid on the Taranto naval base. "Cavour" was raised from the bottom and stood for repairs throughout the war until it was scuttled by its own crew in September 1943 under the threat of capture by German troops. A year later, the Germans raised the battleship, but at the end of the war, the Cavour was again destroyed by Allied aircraft.

The mentioned attack on the Taranto naval base became a textbook example of Italian punctuality, accuracy and diligence. The Taranto pogrom carried out by British pilots was comparable in scale to Pearl Harbor, but the British needed twenty times less effort than the Japanese hawks to attack the American base in Hawaii.

The superstructures of the battleship Conte di Cavour look pitifully at us from the water

In one night, 20 plywood Swordfish biplanes tore the main base of the Italian fleet to pieces, sinking three battleships right in their anchorages. For comparison, in order to “get” the German Tirpitz hiding in the polar Altenfjord, British aviation had to make about 700 sorties (not counting sabotage using mini-submarines).

The reason for the deafening defeat in Taranto is elementary - the hardworking and responsible Italian admirals, for unknown reasons, did not properly tighten the anti-torpedo net. For which they paid.

Others look no less bad incredible adventures pasta of Italian sailors:

The submarine Ondina fell in an unequal fight with the South African trawlers Protea and Southern Maid (battle off the coast of Lebanon, July 11, 1942);

The destroyer Sebenico was boarded by the crew of a German torpedo boat right in the port of Venice on September 11, 1943 - immediately after the surrender of Nazi Italy. The former allies threw the Italians overboard, seized the destroyer and, renaming Sebenico TA-43, used it to guard Mediterranean convoys until the spring of 1945.

The Italian submarine Leonardo da Vinci sunk the high-speed 21,000-ton liner Empress of Canada off the coast of Africa. There were 1,800 people on board (400 died) - half of whom, ironically, were Italian prisoners of war.
(however, the Italians are not alone here - similar situations occurred regularly during the Second World War)

etc.

Italian destroyer Dardo greets the end of the war

It is no coincidence that the British are of the opinion: “Italians are much better at building ships than they are at fighting on them.”

And the Italians really knew how to build ships - the Italian school of shipbuilding has always been distinguished by noble, swift lines, record speeds and the incomprehensible beauty and grace of surface ships.

The fantastic battleships of the Littorio class are some of the best pre-war battleships. Heavy cruisers of the Zara type are a brilliant calculation, which takes advantage of all the advantages of Italy’s favorable geographical position in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea (seaworthiness and autonomy be damned - the native shore is always close). As a result, the Italians managed to implement in the Zar design the optimal combination of protection/fire/mobility with an emphasis on heavy armor. The best cruisers"Washington" period.

And how can one not recall here the Black Sea leader “Tashkent”, also built at the Livorno shipyards! The full speed is 43.5 knots, and in general, the ship turned out to be excellent.

Littorio-class battleships fire at ships of the British squadron (battle off Cape Spartivento, 1940)
The Italians managed to hit the cruiser Berwick, seriously damaging the latter

Alas, despite its advanced technical equipment, the Regia Marina, once the most powerful of the fleets in the Mediterranean, mediocrely lost all the battles and became a laughing stock. But was it really so?

Slandered heroes

The British can joke as much as they want, but the fact remains: in battles in the Mediterranean, Her Majesty's fleet lost 137 ships of the main classes and 41 submarines. Britain's allies lost another 111 surface combatants. Of course, half of them were sunk by German aircraft and Kriegsmarine submariners - but even the remaining part is enough to forever enroll the Italian “sea wolves” in the pantheon of great naval warriors.

Among the trophies of the Italians -

Her Majesty's battleships "Valient" and "Queen Elizabeth" (blowed up by Italian combat swimmers in the roadstead of Alexandria). The British themselves classify these losses as constructive total loss. In Russian, the ship has been turned into a battered pile of metal with negative buoyancy.
The damaged battleships, one after another, fell to the bottom of Alexandria Bay and were knocked out of action for a year and a half.

Heavy cruiser York: sunk by Italian saboteurs using speedboats loaded with explosives.

Light cruisers "Calypso", "Cairo", "Manchester", "Neptune", "Bonaventure".

Dozens of submarines and destroyers flying the flags of Great Britain, Holland, Greece, Yugoslavia, Free France, the USA and Canada.

For comparison, during the war the Soviet Navy did not sink a single enemy ship larger than a destroyer (in no way as a reproach to Russian sailors - the geography, conditions and nature of the theater of operations are different). But the fact remains that Italian sailors have dozens of striking naval victories to their credit. So do we have the right to laugh at the achievements, exploits and inevitable mistakes of the “pasta makers”?

Battleship HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Alexandria roadstead

Submariners brought no less glory to the Regia Marina - such aces as Gianfranco Gazzana Prioroggia (sank 11 transports with a total weight of 90,000 tons) or Carlo Fetzia di Cossato (16 trophies). In total, a galaxy of ten best Italian submarine warfare aces sank over a hundred Allied ships and vessels with a total displacement of 400,000 tons!

Submariner ace Carlo Fezia di Cossato (1908 - 1944)

During the Second World War, Italian ships of the main classes made 43,207 trips to sea, leaving behind 11 million fiery miles. Italian Navy sailors provided guidance for countless convoys in the Mediterranean theater of operations - according to official data, Italian sailors organized the delivery of 1.1 million military personnel and more than 4 million tons of various cargo to North Africa, the Balkans and islands in the Mediterranean Sea. Precious oil was transported on the return route. Frequently, cargo and personnel were placed directly on the decks of warships.

Statistics say: transport ships under the guise of Regia Marina delivered 28,266 Italian and 32,299 German trucks and tanks to the African continent. In addition, in the spring of 1941, 15,951 pieces of equipment and 87,000 pack animals were transported along the Italy-Balkans route.

In total, during the period of hostilities, warships of the Italian Navy deployed 54,457 mines on communications in the Mediterranean Sea. The Regia Marina maritime patrol aircraft completed 31,107 combat missions, spending 125 thousand hours in the air.

The Italian cruisers Duca d'Aosta and Eugenio di Savoia are laying a minefield off the coast of Libya. A few months later, a British strike force would be blown up by exposed mines. The cruiser Neptune and the destroyer Kandahar will sink to the bottom.

How do all these numbers fit in with the ridiculous image of crooked slackers who do nothing but chew their spaghetti?

Italians have been great sailors since ancient times (Marco Polo), and it would be too naive to believe that during the Second World War they simply threw out the “white flag”. The Italian Navy took part in battles around the world - from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean. And high-speed Italian boats have even appeared in the Baltic Sea and Lake Ladoga. In addition, Regia Marina ships operated in the Red Sea, off the coast of China, and, of course, in the cold expanses of the Atlantic.

The Italians badly battered Her Majesty's fleet - just one mention of the “black prince” Valerio Borghese threw the entire British Admiralty into confusion.

Bandito-diversanto

“...Italians, in a certain sense, are much smaller soldiers, but much bigger bandits” /M. Weller/
True to the traditions of the legendary “Sicilian mafia,” Italian sailors turned out to be unsuitable for fair naval battles in an open format. The massacre at Cape Matapan, the disgrace at Taranto - the battle and cruising forces of the Regia Marina showed their complete inability to resist Her Majesty's well-trained fleet.

And if so, then we need to force the enemy to play by Italian rules! Submarines, human torpedoes, combat swimmers and boats with explosives. The British fleet was in for big trouble.

Alexandria naval base attack scheme

...On the night of December 18-19, 1941, a British patrol caught two eccentrics in “frog” clothes from Alexandria Bay. Realizing that the situation was dirty, the British battened down all the hatches and doors in the watertight bulkheads of the battleships, gathered on the upper deck and prepared for the worst.

The captured Italians, after a short interrogation, were locked in the lower rooms of the doomed battleship, in the hope that the “pasta men” would finally “split” and still explain what was happening. Alas, despite the danger threatening them, the Italian combat swimmers steadfastly remained silent. Until 6:05 am, when powerful demolition charges went off under the bottoms of the battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth. Another bomb destroyed a naval refueling tanker.

Despite the biting “slap in the face” from the Italian Navy, the British paid tribute to the crews of the “human torpedoes”.

"One can only admire the cold-blooded courage and enterprise of the Italians. Everything was carefully thought out and planned."

- Admiral E. Cunnigham, Commander, Her Majesty's Fleet Mediterranean Forces

After the incident, the British frantically gulped for air and looked for ways to protect their naval bases from Italian saboteurs. The entrances to all major Mediterranean naval bases - Alexandria, Gibraltar, La Valletta - were tightly blocked with nets, and dozens of patrol boats were on duty on the surface. Every 3 minutes another depth charge flew into the water. However, over the next two years of the war, 23 more Allied ships and tankers became victims of the frog people.

In April 1942, the Italians deployed an assault force of fast boats and mini-submarines to the Black Sea. At first, the “sea devils” were based in Constanta (Romania), then in Crimea and even in Anapa. The result of the actions of the Italian saboteurs was the death of two Soviet submarines and three cargo ships, not counting many attacks and sabotage on the coast.

The capitulation of Italy in 1943 took the "special operations" department by surprise - the "black prince" Valerio Borghese had just begun preparations for another grandiose operation - he was going to have a little fun in New York.

Italian mini-submarines in Constanta

Valerio Borghese - one of the main ideologists and inspirers of Italian combat swimmers

The colossal experience of Valerio Borghese's team was appreciated in the post-war years. All available techniques, technologies and developments became the basis for the creation and training of special Navy SEAL units around the world. It is no coincidence that the Borghese combat swimmers are the main suspects in the sinking of the battleship Novorossiysk (captured Italian Giulio Cesare) in 1955. According to one version, the Italians could not survive their shame and destroyed the ship so that it would not fly the enemy flag. However, all this is just speculation.

Epilogue

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Italian navy represents a compact European fleet, armed with the most modern ships and maritime systems.
The modern Italian fleet is in no way similar to the crooked Leaning Tower of Pisa: the training and equipment of Italian sailors meets the most stringent standards and NATO requirements. All ships and aircrafts built into a single information space, when choosing weapons, the guideline is shifted towards purely defensive means - anti-aircraft missile systems, anti-submarine weapons, short-range self-defense means.

The Italian Navy has two aircraft carriers. There is a high-quality underwater component and basic naval aviation. The Italian Navy regularly takes part in peacekeeping and special missions around the globe. Technical equipment is constantly being updated: when choosing weapons, radio-electronic means for navigation, detection and communication, priority is given to leading European developers - the British BAE Systems, the French Thales, as well as Marconi's own corporation. Judging by the results, the Italians are doing great.

However, we should not forget the words of commander Alexander Suvorov: There is no land in the world that would be so dotted with fortresses as Italy. And there is no land that has been conquered so often.

The newest Italian aircraft carrier "Cavour"

"Andrea Doria" - one of two Italian frigates of the "Horizon" class (Orizzonte)

Statistical data -
“The Italian Navy in the Second World War”, author Captain 2nd Rank Mark Antonio Bragadin

Illustrations –
http://www.wikipedia.org/
http://waralbum.ru/