The position of people at the front and in the rear. Describe the situation of people at the front and in the rear during the First World War

Slides and text of this presentation

Life at the front and in the rear

The presentation was prepared by:
Volosazhar Anastasia
student of grade 10-A

World War I is one of the most widespread armed conflicts in the history of mankind. Its consequences, in fact, redrawn the entire map of the world that took shape at the beginning of the 20th century. The German and Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary. Germany, having ceased to be a monarchy, is cut off territorially and economically weakened. The United States has become a great power. The difficult conditions of the Versailles Peace for Germany and the national humiliation it suffered gave rise to revanchist sentiments, which became one of the prerequisites for the Nazis to come to power, who unleashed World War II.

Losses armed forces of all powers participating in the world war amounted to about 10 million people. Famine and epidemics caused by the war have killed at least 20 million people.

Moods Russian society during the First World War are closely associated with the successes (failures) of the Russian army on the fronts of the First World War. In 1914, even before the official start of the First World War, from June, when the famous murder took place in Sarajevo, which in turn led to an aggravation of the contradictions between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which in turn led to a pan-European conflict, the mood of Russian society with complete the reason can be called "euphoric".

The first battles, especially the offensive operation of the Russian troops in Prussia in the fall of 1914, which actually saved France from defeat, although it did not fully justify the existing hopes, however, left some reason for optimism. The Battle of Galicia, in which the Russian army completely defeated Germany's only ally, Austria-Hungary, advancing deep into enemy territory up to 350 km, reinforced these hopes.

The general assessment of historians boils down to the recognition of the patriotic upsurge that swept the entire country - from the reigning dynasty to the peasants. At the same time, they refer to such facts as the termination of strikes, successful mobilization, volunteer enrollment in the active army, large donations to the defense account, rather noticeable participation of the population in military loans of the state, and others.

The war required the mobilization of human and all material resources. At present, researchers admit that Russia was not ready for the dictates of a protracted exhausting war, that its military development program was in the process of implementation, far from completion, there was no specific plan for mobilizing all resources for the needs of the front.
These, in general, objective reasons, as well as a number of military defeats that Russian army suffered during the campaign in 1915, and the loss of many industrial territories in Poland and the Baltic states in a certain way corrected the mood in the rear.

By the beginning of 1915, it became obvious that in reality the war was markedly different from what it was seen by the staff of the general staff of the great powers in the pre-war period. Due to the fact that the war has become protracted, for its main actors it was important to enlist the support of new allies in order to break the existing balance of power in this way.

In 1915, the sphere of hostilities expanded due to the entry into the war of two new countries - Bulgaria on the side of Germany and Italy on the side of the Entente. But the fate of the war was still being decided on the Eastern and Western Fronts.

In 1915, the Russian army began to experience difficulties caused by the fact that the military industry could not provide it with the proper amount of ammunition, weapons and ammunition. Germany decided in 1915 to deliver the main blow to Eastern Front... In the winter and spring of this year, fighting unfolded along the entire length of this front. In Galicia, things were going well for the Russian troops. The Austrian troops suffered defeat after defeat, and the threat of complete defeat hung over them. In May, the Germans came to the aid of their ally, whose unexpected blow between Gorlice and Tarnov led to a breakthrough of the front and the forced withdrawal of Russian troops from Galicia, Poland and Lithuania. All summer our troops had to conduct heavy defensive battles, and only in the fall did they manage to stop the German offensive.

In 1916, the fighting on the Western Front. In February 1916, the German command launched its largest-scale operation, trying to capture the strategically important French fortress of Verdun. However, despite colossal efforts and huge losses, German troops were never able to take it.

To weaken the German onslaught on Verdun, the Anglo-French army, in turn, tried to break through the German line of defense at the Somme River. In this battle, which lasted from July to the end of November 1916, the British and French used tanks for the first time. Nevertheless, the Battle of the Somme did not bring tangible operational results.

The situation on the Eastern Front was more successful for the Entente. In the midst of the fighting at Verdun, the French command again turned to Russia for help. The call for support came from the Italian army, which was defeated by the Austro-Hungarian troops. In the summer of 1916, the Russian command undertook a number of offensive operations... The army under the leadership of General A. Brusilov broke through the Austrian front on the Lutsk - Chernivtsi line. Russian troops again occupied most of Galicia and Bukovina, putting Austria-Hungary on the brink of military defeat. The Brusilov breakthrough suspended the activity of the Austrians on the Italian front and in many respects eased the position of the Anglo-French troops at Verdun and on the Somme. The dispersal of combat forces in many directions weakened Germany.

The huge scale of hostilities led to the depletion of material and food resources in all the belligerent powers. Military weariness was felt in all the belligerent countries, and anti-war protests grew. The situation was especially difficult in the countries of the German bloc. In Germany, the number of workers on strike grew steadily. On May 1, 1916, at the initiative of K. Liebknecht, a left-wing Social Democrat from the Spartak group, a mass demonstration took place in Berlin streets under the slogans “Down with the war!”, “Down with the government!”.

In Austria-Hungary, the anti-war sentiments of the working masses were closely intertwined with the national liberation movement.

A deep economic crisis has begun in Turkey. Discontent grew in Bulgaria. Even in Britain and France, where the crisis was not so deep, there were major strikes and demonstrations.

However, the most acute situation was in tsarist Russia. The futility of 30 months of almost continuous battles, the death of millions of soldiers, the collapse of the national economy, devastation, hunger, and the decay of the government apparatus — all this revived broad strata of the population against tsarism. The autocracy in Russia was going through a deep crisis. As a result, in February 1917, a revolution took place in the country, which led to the overthrow of the tsarist regime.

Soviet rear during the war. In the fight against the German invaders, they took Active participation not only military units, but also all home front workers. They provided the front with everything necessary: weapons, military equipment, ammunition, fuel, as well as food, footwear, clothing, etc. Despite the difficulties, the Soviet people managed to create a powerful economic base that ensured victory. In short time National economy The USSR was reoriented to the needs of the front.

The occupation of the most important economic regions of the USSR put the country's economy in extremely difficult conditions. Before the war, 40% of the country's population lived in the occupied territory, 33% of the gross output of the entire industry was produced, 38% of grain was grown, about 60% of pigs and 38% of cattle were kept.

In order to urgently transfer the national economy to a war footing, compulsory labor service, military norms for the issuance of industrial goods and foodstuffs to the population were introduced in the country. Everywhere an emergency procedure was established for government agencies, industrial and commercial organizations. Overtime has become common practice.

On June 30, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a national economic plan for the third quarter of 1941, which provided for the mobilization of the country's material and labor resources to meet the needs of defense in the shortest possible time. The plan provided for the urgent evacuation of the population, institutions, industrial enterprises and property from the areas threatened by the German occupation.

Through the efforts of the Soviet people, the Urals, Western Siberia and Central Asia were transformed into a powerful military-industrial base. Most of the factories and factories evacuated here by the beginning of 1942 established the production of defense products.

The destruction of the war, the loss of a significant part of the economic potential led to a critical decline in production in the USSR in the second half of 1941. The transfer of the Soviet economy to martial law, which was completed only in mid-1942, had a positive effect on the increase in output and the expansion of the range of military products.

Compared to 1940, the gross industrial output in the Volga region increased 3.1 times, Western Siberia- in 2.4, in Eastern Siberia - in 1.4, in Central Asia and Kazakhstan - 1.2 times. In the all-Union production of oil, coal, pig iron and steel, the share eastern regions USSR (including the Volga region) ranged from 50 to 100%.

The growth of military production with a reduction in the number of workers and employees was achieved through the intensification of labor, an increase in the length of the working day, overtime work, and the strengthening of labor discipline. In February 1942, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued the Order "On the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population for work in production and construction during wartime." Men from 16 to 55 years old and women from 16 to 45 years old were mobilized from among those not employed in government agencies and at enterprises. The labor resources of the USSR amounted to 23 million people in 1944, half of them were women. Despite this, in 1944. Soviet Union monthly produced 5.8 thousand tanks, 13.5 thousand aircraft, while Germany 2.3 and 3 thousand, respectively.

The measures taken found support and understanding among the population. During the war, the citizens of the country forgot about sleep and rest, many of them exceeded labor standards by 10 or more times. Slogan: "Everything for the front, everything for the victory over the enemy!" became essentially nationwide. The desire to contribute to the victory over the enemy manifested itself in various forms of labor competition. It became an important moral stimulus for the growth of labor productivity in the Soviet rear.

Achievements of the Soviet economy during the Great Patriotic War would have been impossible without the labor heroism of the Soviet people. Working in incredibly difficult conditions, sparing no effort, health and time, they showed steadfastness and perseverance in completing tasks.

Socialist competition for the production of products above the plan has acquired unprecedented proportions. A heroic deed can be called the heroic labor of youth and women who did everything necessary to defeat the enemy. In 1943, a movement of youth brigades began to improve production, fulfill and overfulfil the plan, and achieve high results with fewer workers. Thanks to this, the production of military equipment, weapons and ammunition has significantly increased. There was a continuous improvement of tanks, guns, aircraft.

During the war, aircraft designers A.S. Yakovlev, S.A.Lavochkin, A.I. Mikoyan, M.I. Gurevich, S.V. Ilyushin, V.M.Petlyakov, A.N. Tupolev created new types of aircraft, superior to the German. New types of tanks were being developed. The best tank of the Second World War, the T-34, was designed by M.I.Koshkin.

The workers of the Soviet home front felt that they were participants in the great battle for the independence of the Fatherland. For the majority of workers and employees, appeals have become the law of life: "Everything for the front, everything for victory over the enemy!", "Work not only for yourself, but also for a comrade who went to the front!" ... Thanks to the dedication of the workers of the Soviet home front, the country's economy was put on martial law in a short time in order to provide the Red Army with everything necessary to achieve victory.

Situation at the fronts and in the rear

Structurally, the conversation was structured with a consideration of the internal problems of the United States, and then with a consideration of the situation on the fronts.

Within the country, a serious problem has arisen - the rise in food prices. Monthly it was 3 percent, threatening to become uncontrollable. This could have been followed by an increase in wages and, as a result, a round of inflation.

The reasons are obvious. The transfer of the economy to expanding military production actually eliminated unemployment. Not only qualified specialists came to the enterprises, but also women and young people. Relocation of people from rural areas was observed.

Factories were moving to work around the clock, including weekends and holidays... Naturally, wages rose, and people tried to realize their income. Speculative tendencies persisted in commercial and industrial circles and among those who produced food and civil goods.

There was a real threat of a situation on the eve of the New Deal in the thirties.

The administration was forced to establish control over prices, wages and incomes. This is why the President introduced the Life Stabilization Act to Congress on September 7, 1942. The question was posed bluntly: if Congress does not accept the president's request, it will take responsibility and act independently.

The costs of the war are high and therefore one should not risk diminishing the efforts to build up the US military potential.

At this time, the United States produced 25 thousand combat aircraft, 24 thousand tanks, more than 14 thousand anti-aircraft guns, 128 warships of various types. And even more was required.

In the war, by the end of 1942, tendencies for the better were outlined. Considering the situation on four fronts: the Russian front, in the region The Pacific, The Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East, in Europe, the President stressed that one of them cannot be left without attention and assistance. Speaking about the situation on the Russian front, Roosevelt said: "Despite the fact that Germany seized an important part of Russian territory, Hitler was unable to destroy the united Russian army."

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On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War on June 20, 1941, Grigory Panteleevich successfully completed courses at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army and was enrolled in the Academy. He learned about the beginning of the war early in the morning on June 22, while at his dacha in Serebryany Bor. On the same day, G. P. Kravchenko was

12. Completion of the process of centralization of Russian lands in the late XV-early XVI centuries.

13. The main stages of the internal policy of Ivan the Terrible. Transformation and repression. The meaning of the oprichnina.

14. Russia's foreign policy during the reign of Ivan iv the Terrible.

15. Russian culture of the XIV – XVI centuries.

16. Russia during the Time of Troubles at the turn of the XVI-XVI centuries.

17. Development of Russia in the xiIc. After the accession of the Romanov dynasty. New phenomena in the economy and the political sphere.

18. Popular movements in Russia in the xiI century. Peasant War led by Stepan Razin.

19. Foreign policy of Russia in the xviI century. Relations with Poland, Sweden, Crimea. Reunification of Ukraine with Russia.

20. Culture of Russia in the xviI century.

21. Economic and military reforms in Russia during the reign of Peter I.

22. Reforms of Peter I in the socio-political sphere and in the field of state structure of Russia

23. Russia's foreign policy in the first quarter of the xviiIv.

24. Transformations in the field of culture and enlightenment in Russia in the first quarter of the 18th century.

25. The era of palace coups in Russia (1725-1762)

26. The policy of enlightened absolutism in Russia. Catherine II.

27. Peasant War in Russia led by Yemelyan Pugachev.

31. Political development of Russia in the first quarter of the 19th century. Conservative and liberal tendencies.

32. Patriotic War of 1812. And the overseas campaign of the Russian army in 1813-1814. The international status of Russia as a result of the Napoleonic wars.

33. Formation of social and political opposition in Russia in the first quarter of the 19th century. Decembrist revolt

34. Domestic and foreign policy of the Russian government in the second quarter of the 19th century.

35. The crisis of serfdom in Russia in the 30-50s. Xixc. The beginning, features and consequences of the industrial revolution.

36. Social movements of Russia in the 30-50s of the xiXv. Westerners and Slavophiles. The ideology of utopian socialism.

37. Culture of Russia in the first half of the 19th century.

38. Crimean War of 1853-1856 Causes, course and consequences.

39. Economic, socio-political development of Russia at the turn of the 50-60s. XiXc. Peasant reform of 1861, its content and significance.

40. Reforms of the 60s - early 70s. XiXc. In Russia (zemstvo, city, judicial, military, etc.)

41. Russian foreign policy 1860 - 70s. Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 Accession of Central Asia and the Amur region.

42. Social and political movements in Russia in the 60s - 70s. XiXc.

43. The culture of Russia after the abolition of serfdom (60 - 80 years. XiX century)

44. Politics of counterreforms of Alexander III.

45. Features of the development of Russia at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries.

46. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905.

47. The revolutionary events of 1905-1907. In Russia: reasons, course, results.

48. Political parties in Russia at the beginning of the XX century. : programs and tactics of struggle. Left Social Democrats (Russian Social Democratic Labor Party)

SRs (Socialist Revolutionary Party)

Anarchists

Black Hundreds ("Union of the Russian people", monarchists)

50. Culture of Russia in the late XIX - early XX century.

51. Participation of Russia in the iWorld War 1914-1918.

52. February revolutionary events of 1917.

53. Russia during the period of dual power (1917). Crises of the Provisional Government.

54. Struggle for power in Russia in July-September 1917.

55. October 1917 In Russia.

56. The policy of the Bolsheviks in late 1917 - early 1918.

57. Civil War and Intervention (October 1917 - Autumn 1922) Main fronts. The alignment of the political forces of the revolution and counter-revolution. Results.

58. War communism: ideology and practice.

59. Soviet society in 1921-1927. New Economic Policy: Its Significance, Difficulties and Contradictions.

60. Nation-building in the 1920s. Formation of the USSR

61. The international situation of the Soviet country in the 20s of the XX century.

62. Formation of a totalitarian system in the USSR.

63. The policy of collectivization of agriculture in the USSR: goals, methods and consequences.

64. Industrialization. USSR during the first five-year plans.

65. Strengthening the foreign policy positions of the USSR in 1931 - 1939.

66. The culture of Soviet Russia in the 20-30s. XX century

67. Foreign policy of the Soviet government at the beginning of World War II (1939-1941)

68. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The reasons for the initial defeats of the Red Army. The transformation of the USSR into a single military camp.

69. The Moscow battle, its meaning. Failures of the Red Army in the spring and summer of 1942. Defensive stage of the Battle of Stalingrad.

70. A radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

71. Foreign policy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Anti-Hitler coalition.

1. Formation of the anti-Hitler coalition

2. The problem of the "second front"

3. What will the world be like after the war?

72. The final stage of the Great Patriotic War.

73. End of the Second World War. Military operations in the Far East. The role of the USSR in the defeat of imperialist Japan.

74. Soviet rear during the war. Partisan movement.

76. Social, political and cultural life of Soviet society in the post-war period. (1946-1953)

77. Restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR in the first post-war years (mid-1940s - early 1950s.)

78. Post-war world. The beginning of the cold war (1946-1953)

79. Internal political development of the USSR (1953-1964). De-Stalinization policy. Successes and difficulties of social and economic development.

80. Foreign policy of the ussr during the thaw

81. Foreign policy and international situation of the USSR in the late 1960s - early 1980s.

82. An attempt at economic reforms in the USSR in the mid-60s. XX century

83. Social and political development of the USSR and the internal policy of the Soviet leadership in 1964 - 1985.

84. Features of the development of Soviet culture in 1950 - 1980. Advances in Science and Technology.

85. The policy of Perestroika in the USSR. Essence, goals, contradictions.

86. International relations in 1985 - 1991. New Political Thinking and the End of the Cold War.

87. The collapse of the USSR. Formation of sovereign independent states.

88. Economic and political reforms in Russia in the 1990s.

89. Russia at the beginning of the XXI century. Achievements and contradictions in socio-economic and political development.

2. Russia - West

2.1. Political and military relations.

2.2. Economic cooperation with foreign countries.

3. Russia and neighboring countries

4. Results

Soviet rear during the war

Soviet rear during the war. In the fight against the German invaders, not only military units, but also all home front workers took an active part. They provided the front with everything necessary: weapons, military equipment, ammunition, fuel, as well as food, footwear, clothing, etc. Despite the difficulties, the Soviet people managed to create a powerful economic base that ensured victory. In a short time, the national economy of the USSR was reoriented to meet the needs of the front.

Compared to 1940, the gross industrial output in the Volga region increased 3.1 times, in Western Siberia - 2.4 times, in Eastern Siberia - 1.4 times, in Central Asia and Kazakhstan - 1.2 times. In the all-Union production of oil, coal, pig iron and steel, the share of the eastern regions of the USSR (including the Volga region) ranged from 50 to 100%.

The growth of military production with a reduction in the number of workers and employees was achieved through the intensification of labor, an increase in the length of the working day, overtime work, and the strengthening of labor discipline. In February 1942, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued the Order "On the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population for work in production and construction during wartime." Men from 16 to 55 years old and women from 16 to 45 years old from among those not employed in government institutions and enterprises were mobilized. The labor resources of the USSR amounted to 23 million people in 1944, half of them were women. Despite this, in 1944 the Soviet Union produced 5,800 tanks and 13,500 aircraft monthly, while Germany produced 2,300 and 3,000, respectively.

The achievements of the Soviet economy during the Great Patriotic War would have been impossible without the labor heroism of the Soviet people. Working in incredibly difficult conditions, sparing no effort, health and time, they showed steadfastness and perseverance in completing tasks.

Partisan movement.

The partisan movement in the rear of the fascist troops in the temporarily occupied territory began literally from the first days of the war. It was part of armed struggle Soviet people against the fascist invaders and was an important factor in achieving victory over Nazi Germany and its allies.

The partisan movement had a high degree of organization. In accordance with the Directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 29, 1941 and the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated July 18, 1941 "On organizing the struggle in the rear of the German troops", the Central Headquarters of the Partisan movement (TsSHPD) headed by the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus P.K. Ponomarenko, and on the periphery - the regional and republican headquarters of the partisan movement and their representations at the fronts (Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, Leningrad, Bryansk, etc.) ...

In these documents, instructions were given on the preparation of the party underground, on the organization, recruitment and armament of partisan detachments, and the tasks of the partisan movement were determined.

Already in 1941, 18 underground regional committees, over 260 district committees, city committees, district committees and other bodies were operating in the occupied territories, a large number of primary party organizations and groups, which numbered 65.5 thousand communists.

The struggle of Soviet patriots was led by 565 secretaries of regional, city and district party committees, 204 chairmen of regional, city and district executive committees of workers' deputies, 104 secretaries of regional, city and district Komsomol committees, as well as hundreds of other leaders. In the fall of 1943, 24 regional committees, over 370 okrug committees, city committees, rayon committees and other party bodies operated behind enemy lines. As a result of the organizational work of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the combat effectiveness of partisan detachments increased, their zones of action expanded and the effectiveness of the struggle increased, in which the broad masses of the population were involved, and close interaction with Soviet troops was established.

By the end of 1941, over 2 thousand partisan detachments were operating in the occupied territory, in which up to 90 thousand people fought. In total, during the war there were more than 6 thousand partisan detachments in the rear of the enemy, in which they fought over 1 million 150 thousand partisans.

In 1941 - 1944. in the ranks Soviet partisans in the occupied territory of the USSR fought: RSFSR (occupied regions) - 250 thousand people. Lithuanian SSR -10 thousand people Ukrainian SSR - 501,750 people. Byelorussian SSR - 373,942 people. Latvian SSR - 12,000 people. Estonian SSR - 2000 people. Moldavian SSR - 3500 people. Karelo - Finnish SSR - 5500 people.

By the beginning of 1944, there were: workers - 30.1%, peasants - 40.5%, office workers - 29.4%. 90.7% of the partisans were men, 9.3% were women. In many detachments, the communists accounted for up to 20%, about 30% of all partisans were Komsomol members. Representatives of most of the nationalities of the USSR fought in the ranks of the Soviet partisans.

The partisans destroyed, wounded and captured over a million fascists and their accomplices, destroyed more than 4,000 tanks and armored vehicles, 65,000 vehicles, 1,100 aircraft, destroyed and damaged 1,600 railway bridges, derailed over 20,000 railway trains.

Partisan detachments or groups were organized not only in the occupied territory. Their formation in the unoccupied territory was combined with the training of personnel in special partisan schools. The detachments that underwent training and preparation either remained in the designated areas before their occupation, or were transferred to the rear of the enemy. In a number of cases, the formations were created from military personnel. During the war, it was practiced to send organizational groups behind enemy lines, on the basis of which partisan detachments and even connections. Such groups played a particularly important role in western regions Ukraine and Belarus, in the Baltic States, where, due to the rapid advance of the German fascist troops, many regional and regional party committees did not manage to organize work on the deployment of the partisan movement. For the eastern regions of Ukraine and Belarus, for the western regions of the RSFSR, early preparation for a partisan war was characteristic. In the Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol, Moscow and Tula regions, in the Crimea, fighter battalions, which consisted of about 25,500 fighters, became the base of formation. Areas for the basing of partisan detachments and warehouses of material resources were created in advance. A characteristic feature of the partisan movement in the Smolensk, Oryol regions and in the Crimea was the participation in it of a significant number of Red Army soldiers who were surrounded or escaped from captivity, which significantly increased the combat effectiveness of the partisan forces.

The main tactical unit of the partisan movement was a detachment - at the beginning of the war, usually several dozen people, later - up to 200 or more fighters. In the course of the war, many detachments were united in formations (brigades) of from several hundred to several thousand people. The armament was dominated by light weapons (machine guns, light machine guns, rifles, carbines, grenades), but many detachments and formations had mortars and heavy machine guns, and some even artillery. People who joined the partisan formations took the partisan oath. In the detachments, firm military discipline was established.

Depending on the specific conditions, small and large formations, regional (local) and non-regional, were organized. Regional detachments and formations were permanently based in one area and were responsible for protecting its population and fighting the occupiers in this area. Non-regional formations and detachments carried out missions in various areas, making long raids, by maneuvering which, the leading organs of the partisan movement concentrated their efforts on the main directions to deliver powerful strikes against the enemy's rear.

The forms of organization of the partisan forces and the methods of their action were influenced by the physical and geographical conditions. Vast forests, swamps, mountains were the main basing areas for partisan forces. Here, partisan lands and zones arose, where various methods of struggle could be widely used, including open battles with punitive enemy expeditions. In the steppe regions, however, large formations operated successfully only during partisan raids. The small detachments and groups that were constantly located here usually avoided open clashes with the enemy and caused damage to him mainly by sabotage.

In a number of regions of the Baltic, Moldavia, the southern part of Western Ukraine, which became part of the USSR only in 1939-40, the Nazis managed to extend their influence to certain segments of the population through bourgeois nationalists. The small partisan detachments and underground organizations that existed in these areas were mainly engaged in sabotage and reconnaissance operations and political work.

The general strategy, the leadership of the partisan movement was carried out by the Supreme Command Headquarters. Directly strategic leadership was carried out by the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TsSHPD) at the Headquarters, created on May 30, 1942. Operationally, he was subordinate to the republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement (SHPD), which were headed by secretaries or members of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the republics, regional and regional committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (since 1943, the Ukrainian ShPD was directly subordinate to the Supreme Command Headquarters). The broadband access was also subordinate to the Military Councils of the respective fronts.

In those cases when several fronts operated on the territory of a republic or region, under their Military Councils, representative offices or operational groups of republican and regional broadband access were created, which, while supervising the combat activities of partisans in the zone of this front, were subordinate to the corresponding broadband and the Military Council of the front.

Strengthening the leadership of the partisan movement proceeded along the line of improving the communication of the partisans with the mainland, improving the forms of operational and strategic leadership, and improving the planning of combat activities. If in the summer of 1942 only about 30% of the partisan detachments registered with broadband access had radio communication with the mainland, then in November 1943, almost 94% of the detachments maintained radio communication with the leadership of the partisan movement through the radios of partisan brigades.

A large role in the development of partisan warfare behind enemy lines was played by the meeting of the leading workers of the NKO, the Central School of Defense with representatives of underground party bodies, commanders and commissars of large partisan formations of Ukraine, Belarus, the Oryol and Smolensk regions, held by the Central Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) at the end of August. early September 1942. The results of the conference and the most important issues of the struggle behind enemy lines were formulated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin of September 5, 1942 "On the tasks of the partisan movement."

Much attention was paid to the uninterrupted supply of the partisans with weapons, ammunition, mine-blasting equipment, medicines, and the evacuation of the seriously wounded and sick by air to the mainland. During its existence, the TSSHPD sent 59,960 rifles and carbines, 34,320 automatic rifles, 4,210 light machine guns, 2,556 anti-tank rifles, 2,184 mortars of caliber 50 mm and 82 mm, 539,570 hand anti-personnel and anti-tank grenades to the headquarters of the partisan movement. In 1943, only ADD and Civil Air Fleet planes made over 12 thousand sorties to the rear of the enemy (half of them - with landing on partisan airfields and sites).

The expansion of the partisan movement was facilitated by the enormous political work of partisans and underground fighters among the population of the occupied regions. The population provided the partisans with food, clothing and footwear, sheltered them and warned them of danger, sabotaged all enemy measures. Failure of the fascist plans to use the human and material resources of the occupied regions is one of the most important achievements of the partisans.

Much attention in party political work among the partisans was paid to the education and combat training of personnel. During the war, the central and republican schools of the partisan movement trained and sent about 30 thousand different specialists to the enemy's rear, among them were demolition men, organizers of the underground and partisan movement, radio operators, scouts, etc. Thousands of specialists were trained behind enemy lines at "forest courses".

Communications, especially railways, became the main object of partisan combat activities, which in its scope acquired strategic importance.

For the first time in the history of wars, partisans carried out a number of large operations according to a single plan to disable enemy railway communications over a large territory, which were closely related in time and facilities to the actions of the Red Army and reduced the throughput of railways by 35-40%.

In the winter of 1942-1943, when the Red Army smashed Hitler's troops on the Volga, the Caucasus, the Middle and Upper Don, they unleashed their attacks on the railways, along which the enemy was throwing reserves to the front. In February 1943, on the Bryansk - Karachev, Bryansk - Gomel sections, they blew up several railway bridges, including the bridge across the Desna, along which from 25 to 40 echelons passed daily to the front and the same number of trains back - with broken military units, equipment and looted property.

In Belarus, only from November 1, 1942 to April 1, 1943, 65 railway bridges were blown up. Ukrainian partisans blew up a railway bridge across the Teterev River on the Kiev-Korosten section and several bridges in other areas. Such large railway junctions as Smolensk were under the blows of the partisans almost all the time. Orsha, Bryansk, Gomel, Sarny, Kovel, Shepetovka. From November 1942 to April 1943 alone, at the height of the counter-offensive at Stalingrad and the general offensive, they derailed about 1,500 enemy echelons.

Strong blows to enemy communications were dealt during the summer-autumn campaign. This made it difficult for the enemy to regroup, transport reserves and military equipment, which was a huge help to the Red Army.

The partisan operation that went down in history under the name "Rail War" was grandiose in its scale, the number of forces involved and the results achieved. It was planned by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement and prepared for a long time and comprehensively. The main goal of the operation was to paralyze the transport of the Nazis along the railways... Partisans from Leningrad and Kalinin were involved in this operation. Smolensk, Oryol regions. Belarus and partly Ukraine.

Operation "Rail War" began on the night of August 3, 1943. On the very first night, over 42 thousand rails were blown up. Massive explosions continued throughout August and the first half of September. By the end of August, more than 171 thousand rails were out of order, which is 1 thousand km of a single-track railway track. By mid-September, the number of rails blown up reached almost 215 thousand. "In just one month, the number of explosions has increased thirtyfold," the command of the security corps of Army Group Center reported in its August 31 report.

On September 19, a new such operation began, which received the code name "Concert". This time, the rail war engulfed other areas as well. The partisans of Karelia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Crimea joined it. More powerful blows followed. Thus, while 170 partisan brigades, detachments and groups numbering about 100 thousand people took part in Operation Rail War, 193 brigades and detachments numbering more than 120 thousand people took part in Operation Concert.

The attacks on the railways were combined with attacks on individual garrisons and enemy units, with ambushes on highways and dirt roads, and also with disruption of the river transport of the Nazis. During 1943, about 11 thousand enemy trains were blown up, 6 thousand steam locomotives, about 40 thousand cars and platforms were disabled and damaged, more than 22 thousand cars were destroyed, about 5,500 bridges on highways and dirt roads were destroyed or burned and over 900 railway bridges.

The powerful blows of the partisans behind the entire Soviet-German front shocked the enemy. Soviet patriots not only inflicted great damage on the enemy, disorganized and paralyzed railway traffic, but also demoralized the occupation apparatus.

The enemy was forced to divert large forces to the protection of railway communications, the length of which in the occupied territory of the USSR was 37 thousand kilometers. As the experience of the war showed, for the organization of even a weak guard of the railway, 1 battalion is needed for every 100 km, for a strong guard - 1 regiment, and sometimes, for example, in the summer of 1943 in the Leningrad region, the Nazis were forced, due to the active actions of the partisans, to allocate up to 2 regiments.

An important role was played by the intelligence activities of partisans and underground fighters, who kept a vast territory under observation. From April to December 1943 alone, they established areas of concentration of 165 divisions, 177 regiments and 135 det. enemy battalions, while in 66 cases they disclosed their organization, staff size, the names of the commanding staff. On the eve of the Byelorussian operation of 1944, the partisans reported the location of 33 headquarters, 30 airfields, 70 large depots, the composition of 900 enemy garrisons and about 240 units, the direction of movement and the nature of the transported goods of 1,642 enemy echelons, etc.

During the defensive battles of 1941, the interaction of the partisans with the troops of the Red Army was carried out mainly in the tactical and operational-tactical framework and was expressed mainly in the conduct of reconnaissance in the interests of Soviet troops and conducting minor sabotage behind enemy lines.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army 1941-42. the interaction of the partisans with the troops has expanded. The partisans struck at communications, headquarters and warehouses, participated in the liberation of settlements, directed Soviet aviation to enemy targets, and assisted airborne assault forces.

In the summer campaign of 1942, in the interests of the defensive operations of the Red Army, partisans solved the following tasks: hindering the regrouping of enemy troops, destroying enemy manpower and military equipment and disrupting enemy supplies, diverting forces to guard the rear, reconnaissance, guiding Soviet aircraft to targets, freeing prisoners of war ...

The actions of the partisans distracted 24 enemy divisions, including 15-16 ones that were constantly used to guard communications. In August 1942, 148 train wrecks were made, in September - 152, in October - 210, in November - 238. However, in general, the interaction of the partisans with the Red Army was still episodic.

From the spring of 1943, plans for the operational use of partisan forces were systematically developed. During the winter offensive of 1942-43, during the Battle of Kursk in 1943, the Battle of the Dnieper and in the operations to liberate the eastern regions of Belarus, the partisans intensified their actions in the interests of the advancing Soviet troops. The offensive of the Red Army in 1944 was carried out in close cooperation with the partisans, who actively participated in almost all strategic operations.

The importance of tactical interaction increased, since the offensive of Soviet troops passed through areas where geographic conditions contributed to the creation of a solid defense by the enemy (wooded and swampy areas of the Leningrad and Kalinin regions, Belarus, the Baltic states, northwestern regions of Ukraine). It was here that large groupings of partisans operated, which significantly helped the troops to overcome the enemy's resistance. With the beginning of the offensive of the Red Army, they thwarted the enemy transfer of troops, disrupted their organized withdrawal and control of them, etc. As the Soviet troops approached, the partisans struck the enemy from the rear and helped to break through his defense, repel his counterattacks, and encircle the German fascist groups. The partisans assisted the Soviet troops in capturing settlements, provided the open flanks of the advancing troops. The partisans, assisting the offensive of the Red Army, in addition to disrupting enemy communications, seized river crossings, liberated individual settlements, road junctions and held them until the advance units approached. So, in Ukraine, during the Soviet offensive towards the Dnieper, they captured 3 crossings across the Desna, 10 - across the Pripyat and 12 - across the Dnieper.

The most striking example of such effective interaction is the Belarusian operation of 1944, in which a powerful group of Belarusian partisans represented, in essence, the fifth front, coordinating its operations with four advancing fronts.

In 1944, partisan detachments and formations carried out raids outside Soviet territory to assist the fraternal peoples in the struggle against the German fascist occupiers. In the occupied territory of Poland, there were 7 formations and 26 divisions. large detachments of Soviet partisans, in Czechoslovakia - more than 40 formations and detachments, of which about 20 came out here by raids, the rest were formed on the basis of parachuted organizing groups.

The struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines was a vivid manifestation of Soviet patriotism. The significance of the partisan movement in the war was determined by the great assistance it provided to the Soviet troops to achieve victory over the enemy.

In this war, the notion of "partisan movement" as spontaneous and independent actions of individual detachments and groups disappeared. The leadership of the partisan movement was centralized to a strategic scale.

Unified management of the combat activities of partisans with a stable connection between broadband access and partisan formations, interaction of partisans with the Red Army on a tactical, operational and strategic scale, conducting large-scale operations by partisan groups, widespread use of modern mine-blasting equipment, systematic training of partisan personnel, supplying partisans from the rear of the country, the evacuation of the sick and wounded from the enemy rear to the mainland, the actions of Soviet partisans outside the USSR - these and other features of the partisan movement in the Great Patriotic War significantly enriched the theory and practice of partisan warfare as a form of armed struggle.

To fight against the Soviet population, which put up fierce resistance to the Nazis, the occupiers threw a total of 50 divisions, which amounted to 20% of all German troops on the Soviet-German front, despite the fact that until the summer of 1944 on all other fronts (against the allies) , taken together, was only 6% of the troops of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht.

The German general Guderian wrote that "guerrilla warfare has become a real scourge, strongly affecting the morale of front-line soldiers."

The partisan movement and the Bolshevik underground behind enemy lines bore a truly broad national-patriotic character. They fully met the requirements that were presented to them in the speech of I.V. Stalin on July 3, 1941: "In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, disrupting all their activities."