Thank you for an exhaustive answer, but you did not track the modification of the brigade after the withdrawal of the 5th regiment (this is the first question), and, accordingly, after the withdrawal of the 4th regiment from it - i.e. I'm interested in how the volunteer units got there and how it looked structurally. In principle, all the general points are clear - how the volunteers fought the companies inside the legins, this is generally clear, but what was the structural composition of the brigade for February 42, for June 42?

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The staff of the 2nd SS Brigade "RF CC" on 06/28/1942 (data from Leo Niehorster_German World War II_Organisational Series, vol. 4 / II)

Headquarters (motorized infantry brigade), communications platoon, motorcycle and rifle platoon (6 light machine guns)

Legion SS "Netherlands" (SS-Legion Niederlande)
- headquarters (motorized infantry regiment), communications platoon
- I, II, III battalions, in each headquarters (motorized infantry battalion), 3 rifle companies (18 light machine guns, 3 anti-tank missiles, 1 heavy anti-tank missile system and 3 light mortars) and 1 machine-gun company (12 heavy machine guns, 3 3.7 cm anti-tank guns, 6 heavy mortars)
- 13th company of infantry guns (2 heavy and 6 light infantry guns)

SS-Legion Norwegen
- headquarters (motorized infantry regiment), communications platoon
- I battalion - headquarters (motorized infantry b-na), 3 rifle companies (18 light machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles, 1 heavy anti-tank rifle and 3 light mortars) and 1 machine-gun company (12 heavy machine guns, 3 3.7 cm anti-tank guns, 6 heavy mortars)
- II and III battalions, in each headquarters (scooter battalion), 3 scooter squadrons (12 light machine guns and 3 light mortars) and 1 motorized heavy squadron (a platoon of 6 heavy machine guns, a platoon of 4 8 cm heavy mortars, a sapper platoon with 3 light machine guns)
- 14th anti-tank destroyer company (3 5 cm and 8 3.7 cm cannons, 6 light machine guns)

SS-Legion Flandern
- headquarters (motorized infantry b-na), 4 motorized rifle companies (18 light machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles, 1 heavy anti-tank rifle and 3 light mortars) and 1 machine-gun company (12 heavy machine guns, 3 3.7 cm anti-tank guns , 6 heavy mortars)

Russian SS escort battalion (RF-SS Begleit Bat.)
headquarters (motorized rifle battalion)
4 motorized light rifle companies on Volkswagen vehicles (18 light and 4 heavy machine guns, 3 anti-tank guns, 2 heavy mortars)
1 machine gun company (12 heavy machine guns, 6 heavy mortars)
1 motorized anti-aircraft company (8 (elsewhere 9) 2-cm guns, 3 2-cm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, 4 searchlights),
1 motorcycle rifle company (18 light and 4 heavy machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles, 2 heavy mortars)
1 motorized heavy company (platoon of 2 light infantry guns, anti-tank platoon with 3 5cm cannons and 2 machine guns, sapper platoon with 4 machine guns)

Anti-aircraft division SS "Ost" (SS-Ost)
headquarters, staff battery
1 self-propelled battery (8 2-cm and 2 2-cm four-barreled cannons, 4 machine guns)
1 self-propelled battery (9 3.7 cm cannons, 4 machine guns)
1 heavy battery (4 8.8 cm cannons, 3 2 cm self-propelled guns, 2 machine guns)

52nd motorcycle and rifle squadron (4 heavy and 18 light machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles, 2 medium mortars) with a platoon of armored vehicles (4 2-cm guns, 7 lp.)
52nd motorized heavy battery (6 heavy field howitzers, 2 light machine guns)
52nd Motorized Light Anti-Aircraft Company (12 2cm guns)
52nd motorized sapper company (9 light machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles) and bridge column "B" (2 light machine guns)
52nd motorized anti-tank destroyer company (9 5 cm cannons, 6 light machine guns)
52nd Motorized Signal Company (6 light machine guns)
6 small convoys, 1 large fuel convoy, 2 auto repair companies, 1 supply company
food office, bakery platoon, butchery platoon
1 ambulance company and 2 platoons of ambulances
field gendarmerie detachment (2 light machine guns)
field mail

Niehorster has no data on when these units became part of the brigade.
There are no data for February 1942.

By staff and actual number of volunteers:
"Netherlands": if we add up all the staffing tables given by Niehorster, then the total composition of the legion should be approximately 3240 people.
"Norway" - about 2,600 people. According to most other sources, there were only about 1300 in April 1942.
Legion "Flanders" in full staff should recite 1161 people: 99 at the headquarters, 209 each in 4 companies and 226 in the machine-gun company.

Country

1st Russian National SS Brigade "Druzhina"- a combination of troops of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, which consisted of volunteers from the camps of Soviet prisoners of war. The tasks of the compound included a security service in the occupied territory and the fight against partisans, and, if necessary, combat operations at the front. In August 1943, the unit went over to the side of the partisans, and was renamed to.

History of creation

Going over to the side of the partisans

In August 1943, the Zheleznyak partisan brigade of the Polotsk-Lepel region established contact with Gil-Rodionov. The latter was promised amnesty if his people, with weapons in their hands, went over to the side of the partisans. Gil-Rodionov accepted these conditions and on August 16, exterminating the German communications headquarters and unreliable officers, attacked the German garrisons in Dokshitsy and Kruglevshchina. Was arrested former general- Major of the Red Army Bogdanov, back in 1941, went over to the side of the Germans and served in the brigade. The unit that joined the partisans (2.2 thousand people) was renamed to 1st Anti-Fascist Partisan Brigade, and V.V. Gil was awarded the Order of the Red Star and reinstated in the army with the assignment of the next military rank of colonel. Ivan Matveevich Timchuk, later a Hero of the Soviet Union, was approved as the brigade commissar by the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

In the fall of 1943, using its superiority in numbers and weapons, the brigade defeated the German garrisons in Ilya, Obodovtsy and Vileika.

Uniforms and insignia

In 1943, the personnel of the regiment, and then the brigade under the command of V.V. Gil-Rodionov, wore the uniform of the "general SS" - gray tunics with black buttonholes and an eagle on the left sleeve, caps with a "dead head", brown shirts with a tie. For the command staff, golden shoulder straps were introduced. The soldiers and officers of the formation wore an armband with the inscription "For Russia".

According to the testimony of the partisan Yu.S. Volkov, in October 1943 the personnel of the brigade ("Rodionovtsy") were dressed in German military uniform with a diamond-shaped three-color white-blue-red patch on the sleeve with three Russian letters ROA and with a red ribbon sewn on the cap.

see also

Notes (edit)

Literature

• Chuev S. Cursed soldiers. Traitors on the side III Reich... - M .: Eksmo, Yauza, 2004.
• Drobyazko S., Karashchuk A. World War II 1939-1945. Russian Liberation Army. -M .: Ast, 2005.
• Klimov I., Grakov N. Partisans of Vileyshchyna. Minsk, Belarus, 1970.

Links

• Volkov Yu.S. At the end of the forty-third. // War without embellishment and heroic deeds. Leningrad, 1999.

Russian collaboration in World War II

Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.

The Unterscharführer of the "Druzhina" puts himself in order. 1943 g.

On the basis of these units, the 1st Russian National SS Regiment (1. Russisches Nationale SS-Regiment) was created. The regiment's personnel consisted of 1200 people, including 150 officers. It was armed with 60 guns, 95 machine guns and over 200 assault rifles. The unit was headed by Gil (however, then he already used exclusively the pseudonym Rodionov), and Blazhevich again became chief of staff.

Both received the rank of colonel (standartenführer). In May 1943, according to the intelligence of the partisans, there were already 1,500 people in the unit.

Luzhki became the center of the area provided by the German authorities to Gil for independent administration (obviously, by analogy and based on the successful experience of B.V. Kaminsky in Lokt and, later, in Lepel).

At the same time, the reorganization measures were not over. In May 1943 (according to other sources, at the end of June), the formation of the 1st Russian National SS Brigade began on the basis of the Gil regiment. 80% of the compound were police officers and the local population, 20% were former Soviet prisoners of war. According to partisan data, the police made up 16-17%, 11% were Russian emigrants, 9% were the so-called "kulak elements and bourgeois nationalists", the rest - more than 60% - were former Soviet prisoners of war. Russians in the brigade were 80%, Ukrainians and representatives of other nationalities - 20%. The brigade was armed with: regimental guns - 5, anti-tank guns - 10, mortars - 20, of which battalion - 5 and company - 12, machine guns - 280. Partisans noted that "The personnel of the brigade were fully armed with rifles of Russian, German and Czech models."

In addition to rifles, the personnel of the compound were armed with German MR-40 submachine guns.

In a moment of rest ...

At the end of June 1943, the deployment of the "Druzhina" came to its final stage. The brigade consisted of three combatant and one training battalions, autorot, artillery and mortar battery, machine-gun company, training company (non-commissioned officer school), combat supply company, two cavalry platoons, commandant platoon, medical unit, service unit, assault company, sapper platoon, a communications company and a platoon of the field gendarmerie, organized by Blazhevich.

A considerable problem is the question of the size of the compound. According to A.B. Okorokov, by June 1943 the brigade consisted of about 8 thousand people. Subsequently, the historian notes, there was another increase in the composition (according to some information, up to 12 thousand people), which led to the reorganization of the brigade: “Platoons were expanded to companies, companies to battalions, and battalions to regiments. Tank and artillery divisions were also formed "... West German researcher I. Hoffmann also notes that there were 8,000 people in the "Druzhina". K.A. Zalessky, who edited the monograph by I. Hoffman, argues, relying on the documents of the Central Household Broadcasting Service, that "The maximum number of" Druzhina "when deployed to a brigade (July 1943) was 3 thousand people, consisting of 4 battalions, an artillery battalion and support units" .

Soviet partisans during the operation. 1943 g.

It is not entirely clear how the "Druzhina" could grow up to 8 thousand people in a short time. It should be noted that Gil's subordinates during this time were involved in operations against the partisans, suffered losses, and went over to the side of the people's avengers. In our opinion, the number of the brigade itself has never exceeded 4-5 thousand people.

To participate in major actions, the command of the "Druzhina" tried to use the entire personnel of the formation, although, apparently, not all parts of the brigade rushed into battle, but only combat-ready ones. Perhaps, in the information of partisan intelligence, where the figure of 1,500 people appears (May 1943), an inaccuracy crept in, and the Soviet patriots took into account only the combat strength of the formation, which was directly involved in performing tasks for its intended purpose.

The position proposed by A. Muñoz and supported by K.M. is credible. Alexandrov. In their opinion, the number of the brigade, transferred to the Dokshitsy district of the Vileika region, was increased to 3 thousand people with the deployment of the headquarters (field post No. 24588) in the village of Dokshitsy. Structurally, the brigade consisted of 4 (3 combat and 1 training) battalions: I (field post No. 29117), II (field post No. 26998), III (field post No. 30601) and IV (field post No. 28344).

Command positions in the brigade were occupied by both former Soviet officers and Russian emigrants. Among the former officers of the Red Army are Colonels Orlov and Volkov, Majors Yukhnov, Andrusenko, Shepetovsky, Shepelev and Tochilov, Captains Alferov and Klimenko, Senior Lieutenant Samutin.

Among the emigrants in command positions were Captain Dame (Chief of Staff of the 1st Regiment), Colonel (in the SS had the rank of Hauptsturmführer), Prince L.S. Svyatopolk-Mirsky (commander of the artillery battery), former officer of Denikin's army, staff captain Shmelev (counterintelligence officer of the brigade), Count Vyrubov and others.

The personality of Major A.E. Blazhevich. After the regiment was reorganized into a brigade, he was appointed commander of the II battalion. An employee of the Wehrmacht propaganda department, Sergei Frelich, gave him an impartial characterization in his memoirs: “I didn’t trust him, having found out that in the Soviet Union he served in units of the NKVD… that is, formations… mainly intended for terrorist actions against his own people. Cooperation with the NKVD was imprinted on the character of Blashevich[so in the text]: he was shameless, firm, insincere and knew how to earn the trust of his German superiors by his cruel behavior towards the Russian population and captured partisans. "... Konstantin Kromiadi is no less categorical in his assessments: “Gil knew how to win people over to him. However, he had two disgusting subjects - his adjutant and the commander of the second battalion, Major Blazevich[sic]. They were different people, but from both there was an air of KGB fanaticism, and both followed their commander like shadows; in my opinion, they held him in their hands too "... That Gil "More and more influenced" Blazhevich, Steenberg writes.

Blazhevich, according to Samutin, headed the so-called "Warning Service" in the compound, which was engaged in counterintelligence work to identify among the local population people who have connections with the partisans, and among the brigade's personnel - pro-Soviet and had intentions to go over to the partisans. Here a certain incident arises, since, according to a number of historians, the former Major General of the Red Army P.V. was responsible for counterintelligence in the regiment and in the brigade. Bogdanov. But, given the influence Blazhevich enjoyed, it is quite possible to assume that Samutin is not cheating this time: “... Blazhevich headed the Security Service, a sort of home-grown SD. To our surprise, he brought with him, as his closest assistant, former Major General Bogdanov, whom we knew from Suwalki, only now the former general was with Blazhevich's person in the rank of captain ... But with general promotions, the former general was not forgotten either. In the new headquarters, he was already listed as a major, and Blazhevich took him to his department of the Security Service as deputy and head of the investigative unit " .

According to partisan documents, Blazhevich was Gil-Rodionov's deputy in the brigade. This does not exclude the fact that Bogdanov was formally in the position of head of the "Warning Service", but in fact the intelligence and counterintelligence of the compound was in the hands of Blazhevich. In the future, the influence of Blazhevich in the "Druzhina" increased. Looking ahead, we note that just before the brigade went over to the side of the partisans, Gil-Rodionov's deputy visited Berlin, where he probably tried to get the consent of the SD leadership to remove Gil from the post of brigade commander, lead the unit in his place, and put him in proper order. ...

"Guards brigade ROA"

In the context of our research, one cannot ignore the issue related to the unsuccessful attempt to form the so-called "1st Guards brigade of the ROA" on the basis of units withdrawn from the Gil regiment.

At the end of April 1943 - that is, during the period of military coordination of the 1st Russian National SS Regiment - the leaders of abstract Z VI of the RSHA directorate instructed a group of their "proven" Russian colleagues to take command of the unit formed in Luzhki. The group included Russian émigrés brothers Sergei and Nikolai Ivanov, K.G. Cromiadi, I.K. Sakharov, Count G.P. Lamsdorf, V.A. Resler. In addition, they were joined by the representative of the ROCOR, Archimandrite Germogen (Kivachuk) and the former brigadier commissar of the Red Army G.N. Zhilenkov, who formally "represented" the Russian Liberation Army, which, however, at that time existed only hypothetically - in the Wehrmacht propaganda materials addressed to Soviet servicemen.

Members of the Graukopf formation take the oath. 1942 g.

Almost all of the above persons have already "distinguished themselves" in service in the Abwehr or SD units. The main thing that connected them was joint service in the "Graukopf" detachment created under the auspices of the Abwehr (Abwehr Abteilung 203, Unternehmen "Graukopf"; also known under the propaganda name "Russian National People's Army", RNNA). This compound was formed in the spring - summer of 1942 in the village of Osintorf, Vitebsk region. Political leadership and communication with the German command was carried out by S.N. Ivanov (in the 1930s he headed the German department of the All-Russian Fascist Party), and K.G. Kromiadi became commandant of the central headquarters and chief of the combat and economic unit. In May, he trained a combined reconnaissance and sabotage group (300 people) from Soviet prisoners of war to participate in the operation to destroy the control of the 1st Guards Corps, Lieutenant General P.A. Belov, who was surrounded, and subsequently ensured the participation of individual battalions of the RNNA in anti-partisan operations. In September 1942, the command of the "Graukopf" took former colonel RKKA V.I. Boyarsky, and the political leadership - G.N. Zhilenkov. However, after a series of unsuccessful attempts to use the RNNA at the front and the increased incidence of its servicemen transferring to the partisans, Zhilenkov and Boyarsky were recalled from their command posts and joined General Vlasov's "Russian Committee". The RNNA was headed by the former major of the Red Army and the chief of staff of the RNNA R.F. Rill, and the unit is focused exclusively on fighting the partisans. At the beginning of 1943, the RNNA was disbanded, and its personnel were distributed to various parts of the Wehrmacht. The Zeppelin employees paid close attention to the former Osintorf commanders ...

According to the memoirs of Kromiadi, Zhilenkov, having learned about the intention of the RSHA officers to reassign the 1st Russian National SS Regiment to a group of White emigrants, “Made an offer to the SD, as a representative of General Vlasov, to take over the Gil Brigade with the condition to reorganize it into the Brigade of the Russian Liberation Army. When the SD accepted Zhilenkov's proposal, then the entire Osintorf group agreed to become subordinate to Vlasov and go to the front under the command of General Zhilenkov. "... This point of view, clearly conditioned by the reluctance to advertise their work on the SD, was uncritically accepted by many researchers, some of whom generally prefer to keep silent about any connection between the "ROA brigade" and "Zeppelin".

Of course, there was no question of any "subordination" of the future formation to Vlasov (although, for propaganda reasons, a certain connection with the "Russian Committee" was declared). Even Samutin, in his memoirs, very frankly notes that "This" ROA Guards Brigade ", like Gil's Brigade, is the brainchild and dependent of the mysterious" Zeppelin ", and what "No actual formation of the brigade from the available battalion will happen"... By the spring of 1943, Zhilenkov had already passed all the necessary checks through the SD, participated in the development of a number of Zeppelin operations, and therefore it is appropriate to say that he played the role of an SS intelligence agent in Vlasov's entourage (and not vice versa).

The banner group of the ROA Guards Battalion (in the center - Count G. Lamsdorf) during the parade in Pskov. June 22, 1943

The head of the group was entrusted to the chief of the main team "Zeppelin" Russia-Center ", SS Sturmbannfuehrer Hans Shindovski. Recall that Shindovski's unit was deployed to Belarus along with the "vigilantes" and was deployed in the immediate vicinity of them - in Luzhki, and then in the town of Glubokoe. On April 29, 1943, Szindowski handed over to his superiors in Berlin a report from the SS Permanent Representative to the "Druzhina" SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Appel: “The situation in the" Druzhina "requires intervention from the higher authorities ..." Druzhina "has developed in such a direction, which is characteristic of Russians with their mania for greatness. At the same time, a growing discontent directed against Germany was noticed ... The Druzhina activists are under the influence of the Russians loitering around the camp, they lead a free life of bandits, drink and eat their fill and do not think at all about the upcoming activities of the Druzhina. This situation poses a threat to the policy of the empire " .

Walter Schellenberg in his memoirs notes that he "Repeatedly asked Himmler to remove Rodionov from the fight against the partisans." The SS intelligence chief began to doubt the loyalty of the Druzhina commander after several personal conversations with Rodionov: "I began to get the impression that if he was originally an opponent of the Stalinist system, now his position has undergone changes." .

As a result, the SD leadership concluded that it was necessary to re-subordinate the Gil regiment to politically proven Russian collaborators. Ivanov and Zhilenkov provided the curators from the department of V. Schellenberg with a new staffing table of the formation (for example, it was planned to appoint two former majors of the Red Army - A.M. Bocharov and I.M. Grachev to the posts of regimental commanders).

In early May, Shindovski's group arrived in Glubokoe. The appearance of the commission caused a stir among the leaders of the "Druzhina". Lengthy negotiations began. Cromiadi recalls: "My personal meetings with Gil in Luzhki became more frequent ... Gil pestered me, offering to join him in the Brigade as his chief of staff, and I gratefully declined this offer, explaining my refusal by an agreement linking me to our group." Kromiadi himself praised the drill of Gil's subordinates, although “Expressed his bewilderment at the nature and scope of its economic part. Gil to this ... said that he supposedly allowed his officers and non-commissioned officers to acquire field wives in order to keep them from escaping in this way ... It cannot be that such a wonderful organizer and combatant did not know that the presence of women in the military unit is inevitable will lead to a drop in discipline, demoralization of soldiers and officers, as well as to looting " .

Thanks to the support and petition of the local SD authorities to the higher command in Berlin, Gil managed (although obviously not without difficulty) to remain in his former position. At the same time, the SS men ordered him to allocate several units from the regiment entrusted to him for transferring under command of the collaborators who had arrived from Berlin (Special Russian SS detachment from Breslau, training battalion and propaganda department; about 300 people, according to other sources - 500).

In mid-May, the battalion formed on the basis of these units was transferred to the village of Kryzhevo, and then to the village of Stremutka (15 km from Pskov), where the Zeppelin reconnaissance and sabotage point was located since 1942. The part, which was joined by several more replenishment of volunteers, was subdued local authorities SD. The combined company of the battalion participated in the parade of the Pskov garrison of the Wehrmacht on June 22, 1943. The unit marched with signs and emblems of the ROA. Because of this, the former soldiers of the "Druzhina" for some reason are often referred to the formations of General Vlasov, although chevrons, cockades, buttonholes and shoulder straps of the ROA by that time were worn by many eastern units that had nothing to do with the Vlasov army that did not exist at that time.

Officers of the ROA Guards Battalion before the parade. Pskov, June 22, 1943. Center - SD officer, former head of the Spanish hearth of the Russian fascist party I. Sakharov

At the same time, the famous song of Russian volunteers "We are walking in wide fields", composed by former propagandists of the "Druzhina", sounded on the Pskov radio. It is characteristic that in its text the ROA is not mentioned:

We walk in wide fields
At the rise of the morning rays.
We go to battle with the Bolsheviks
For the freedom of his homeland.
Chorus:
March forward, in iron ranks
To the battle for the Motherland, for our people!
Only faith moves mountains
Only the courage of the city takes.
We walk along the smoldering conflagrations
Over the ruins home country.
Come and you to our regiment, comrade,
If you love your homeland as we do.
We are walking, we are not afraid of a long journey,
A harsh war is not terrible.
We firmly believe in our victory
And yours, beloved country.
We are walking, a tricolor flag is above us.
The song flows through the native fields.
Our melody is picked up by the winds
And they carry them to the Moscow domes.

Member of the Scientific and Technical Council R.V. Polchaninov, who at that time was in Pskov, writes in his memoirs that after the parade on June 22 "Soviet agents, led by one of the machine gunners, who at the parade was an assistant to the standard bearer, staged a riot ... There were killed on both sides, but the uprising failed, since most of the Vlasovites turned out to be the ideological enemies of Bolshevism" .

It should be added that in May 1943 the main team of Zeppelin, Russia-Center, moved from Glubokoe near Pskov - to the already mentioned village of Stremutka and to the village of Kryzhevo. In August 1943, the team was renamed into the main command of the SS Russia-North (SS-Hauptkommando Russland - Nord Unternehmen Zeppelin), and a new chief was put at its head - SS Sturmbannführer Otto Kraus.

Samutin writes: “I began to notice that Germans, speaking Russian, from a German spy school located in a barrack town on the southern outskirts of Pskov, on the banks of the river, are beginning to play an increasing role in the affairs of the brigade. Great. Soon ... one of these Germans drowned in Velikaya, boating drunk. The remaining two, Major Kraus and Captain Horvat, began to interfere with the internal life of the brigade with renewed vigor, arriving at the unit almost every day. They talked with Lamsdorf in a picky tone, contemptuously treated us, former Soviet officers ... "

The further fate of the so-called 1st Guards Battalion (brigade) ROA (according to German documents, 1st Shock Brigade - 1. Sturmbrigade) is indicative. Its personnel were used as part of special SD teams to combat partisans (for example, in the 113th hunting team - Jagdkommando 113), were thrown into the rear of the Red Army. When the "Druzhina" passed to the Belarusian partisans, the SD considered it inexpedient to create a sabotage brigade. In November 1943, 150 people defected to the side of the Leningrad partisans. As a result, the battalion (at that moment it was commanded by another former "Osintorfist" - Major Rudolf Ril, pseudonym - Vladimir Kabanov) was disarmed and disbanded. The remnants of the unit were transferred to the Russian aviation group in East Prussia, then they joined the ranks of the KONR Air Force.

Taking into account all of the above, we note the following. The situation in the "Druzhina" in April 1943 demanded a quick intervention by the SD. However, this intervention itself was due not only to the desire of the Germans to restore order in Gil-Rodionov's unit, but also to continue the work defined by Greif's plan. The merger of these tendencies led to the fact that it was decided to withdraw some units from the Druzhina to form a sabotage formation. For this purpose, for the selection of personnel, a commission was sent, consisting mainly of Russian emigrants who worked for the SD. The commission tried to put pressure on Gil, discredit him and remove him from command. But this venture failed. Gil managed to defend his position, but he had to compromise - to give a number of his units under the formation of a new SD brigade.

All these events unfolded against the backdrop of the castling of the Zeppelin intelligence agencies. The transfer of the main command of the SS "Russia-Center" to Pskov meant the strengthening of sabotage and reconnaissance work in this sector of the German-Soviet front. And to support these measures, the 1st shock brigade was formed. Potential agents, as usual, underwent a security check as part of the SD fighter and hunting teams that fought the partisans. Despite the significant work carried out by the SS reconnaissance in the north-west of the RSFSR, the main goals set for the team were not achieved. Failures led to the demoralization of Russian agents, going over to the side of the partisans. In the end, the battalion of the former "vigilantes" was disbanded.

"Rodionovtsy" in the fight against partisans

The deployment of the "Druzhina" to the regiment and then to the brigade took place against the backdrop of incessant fighting with the partisans.

It should be noted that by the spring of 1943 the situation in the rear areas of Army Group Center, as well as in areas controlled by the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Regions, had become very complicated. Soviet partisans inflicted very painful blows on the rear communications of the Germans, which threatened to disrupt the summer strategic offensive of the Wehrmacht on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge (Operation Citadel). Thus, according to the Vostok General Directorate of Railways, in February 1943 the partisans carried out about 500, in April - about 700, in May - 1045, in June - over 1060 raids and sabotages on the railways. Moreover, most of the sabotage and raids fell on the roads leading to the Kursk ledge. Assessing the situation in the spring of 1943 in the communications of Army Group Center, the head of the transport service G. Teske wrote: "In May 1943, as a result of the intensified actions of partisan detachments ... any systematic work on the rear communications became impossible." .

In the occupied territory of Belarus, partisans of the Vitebsk and Minsk regions delivered a considerable headache to the invaders. They controlled a fairly large area stretching from Lepel to Dokshitsy. German troops had virtually no access to this territory. Another center of partisan activity was noted between Lepel and Borisov. A large force of the people's avengers was also concentrated here. The partisans operating in the Kamen - Chashniki - Senno sector caused considerable problems for the German authorities.

The SD and the police were especially worried about the situation in the Minsk region. Back in December 1942, the people's avengers captured the town of Begoml and a number of settlements in the surrounding areas. Soviet patriots liquidated all the occupation structures in the Begoml region, which became part of the partisan region. This situation deprived the Wehrmacht of important communications Polotsk - Borisov, Vitebsk - Borisov, Lepel - station Parafyanovo (railway Polotsk - Vileika), Borisov - station Parafyanovo.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the partisans regularly disrupted the activities of the occupiers to build the fortified area (UR) Ushachi - Lepel - Beshenkovichi. In addition, having captured Begoml, the partisans received a well-equipped airfield, through which not only the partisans of the Begoml region were supplied with combat supplies, but also the people's avengers of the Vitebsk and Vileika regions. Attempts by the Germans to eliminate this hotbed of resistance with the help of special operations did not lead to anything.

The head of the SS and police of the general district "Belorussia" Kurt von Gottberg in one of the reports with alarm noted the situation in the areas of the Minsk region subject to cleaning: “According to the testimony of prisoners, defectors and intelligence data from the SD, one should count on the presence of large gangs with well-equipped camps and field fortifications approximately in the region of Khrost-Pleshchenshy-Dokshitsy-Lepel. In addition, reconnaissance has established that the area is heavily mined, presumably dirt and country roads. The weapons of the bandits in the area east of the Berezina were not known. In the course of reconnaissance in force, it was possible to establish that, along with the gangs, regular units and paratroopers with heavy weapons are located here mainly in equipped pillboxes.[There were no regular Soviet units in the Borisov-Begoml partisan zone. - Approx. ed.]» .

At the end of March - at the beginning of April 1943, according to A. Muñoz, the subordinates of V.V. Gil-Rodionov took part in the anti-partisan operations "Spring-South" (Lenz-Sud) and "Spring-North" (Lenz-Nord), which took place in the Borisov, Logoisk and Smolevichi districts of the Minsk region. Units of the "Druzhina" became part of the combat group of the SS Brigadefuehrer and Police Major General Walter Schimana (Kampfgruppe Schimana), who temporarily acted as the highest SS Fuhrer and police in the general district "Belarus". In addition to the "Druzhina", the "Shiman" battle group included: I and II battalions of the 13th SS police regiment, I battalion of the 23rd SS police regiment, SS Dirlewanger battalion, 57th and 202nd auxiliary police battalions, 12th police tank company.

The combing was carried out in the Borisov - Cherven - Sloboda - Smolevichi - Dubnyaki - Zhodino - Zabashevichi area. According to the estimates of the operational headquarters of Shimana (Einsatzstab Schimana), there were concentrated "bandit" forces in the amount of 3 thousand people. In particular, the partisan brigade "Uncle Kolya" (commander PG Lopatin) in the amount of 7 detachments (in the documents of the Germans only one is noted - "Tempest", commander MP Skoromnik). Detachment them. K.E. Voroshilov (commander V.N. Popov) from the partisan brigade "Old Man" (commander B.C. Pyzhikov). Partisan brigade them. H.A. Shchorsa (commander NL Derban) in the composition of 4 detachments (in the SD documents only the Bolshevik detachment, commander AZ Gavrusev). And the partisan brigade "Razgrom" (commander PT Klevakin) consisting of 4 detachments (the SD only knew the Razgrom detachment, commander VA Chermenev).

The “action to eliminate forest gangs”, as usual, was extremely brutal. The villages that provided assistance to the "bandits" were burned to the ground, agricultural products located in these settlements were completely confiscated (not only to send them to the Reich, but, first of all, in order to deprive the partisans of the Borisov-Begoml zone of the food base) ... At the same time, the seizure of labor was carried out, and "special treatment" of civilians was carried out.

In mid-April 1943, in anticipation of the visit to Minsk of the general commissioner for the use of labor F. Sauckel, the head of the SS and police of "Belarus" K. von Gottberg ordered a total check in the city, clearing it of partisans, underground fighters and other "bandit elements ". To this end, from 17 to 22 April in Minsk, an operation was carried out under the code name "Zauberflote" (Zauberflote). To carry it out, units of the SS troops and the police were pulled into the city. Among them: 2nd SS Police Regiment, 1st and 2nd Battalions of 13th SS Police Regiment, Special SS Battalion Dirlewanger, Reinforced Company of Operation Command Headquarters (5 officers, 12 NCOs, 108 soldiers), 12th Police Tank Company ... The operation also involved the military units of the Minsk garrison (2,800 people), the railway guard of the main railway directorate of Belarus, parts of the 141st reserve infantry and 390th field training divisions.

A. Muñoz and S. Campbell believe that the Druzhina was also involved in the action "The Magic Flute". In the information of the head of the SS and the police of "Belarus" von Gottberg, in paragraph 2, where a complete list of the formations involved in the events was given, there is an indication of the involvement of SD agencies in the operation, namely: “All the security police and SD units of Belarus” (“Die gesamte Sicherheitspolizei und der SD Wei? Rutheniens”). R. Michaelis is more restrained in his assessments; he does not confirm the version of A. Muñoz and S. Campbell, however he does not deny it either. Probably, one of the "Druzhina" units could have been in Minsk for a week while the operation was underway.

Servicemen of the "Druzhina" at the flag-raising ceremony. 1943 g.

Minsk was completely blocked for the "Magic Flute" action. Control posts were set up on the streets outside the city limits. For conducting searches, Minsk was divided into 6 city sectors. Searches were carried out in each sector within 24 hours. For tactical reasons, searches in urban sectors were carried out in a special sequence - urban sectors I, II, V, IV, III and VI. During the operation, 76 thousand people were checked (130,000 lived in Minsk at that time). For "illegal" actions and communication with "bandits" dozens of people were hanged, about 52 thousand people were taken to assembly points for sending labor to Germany. On April 23, after the end of the operation, a parade of its participants took place in Minsk, the parade was received by the highest SS and police Fuhrer in Central Russia von dem Bach.

It would seem that such important events that took place with the "Druzhina" in March - April 1943, should have somehow been reflected in the memoirs. However, almost no memories have been left on this score. Thus, Samutin passes over in silence the topic of the anti-partisan struggle of the "warriors", and if he touches on it, he writes about it sparingly and indefinitely. “For the whole April,- he notes, - there was only one "operation" that Gil undertook with the entire brigade. We were obliged to participate in it together with the entire headquarters. The aim of the operation was to destroy the partisan "capital", which was at that time in the former regional center of Kublichi, a few dozen kilometers from Luzhki. For two days of a very unhurried march in separate columns along the muddy spring roads, we reached the starting line for the start of the offensive on Kublichi and settled in several villages, 7-8 kilometers from the Kublichi. The villages were completely empty, the population completely left them, leaving all their simple property to the mercy of fate. To Gil's credit, it must be said that looting was strictly prohibited and was suppressed in the most decisive way, up to executions, and one of our duties, which we carried out willingly and even with zeal, was a constant reminder to both officers and soldiers about the inadmissibility of looting actions, from which only our Russian people will suffer. Although we occupied the houses left by the population, no one thought to take away the abandoned belongings. Not only our assistants, propagandists, but also Tochilov and I ourselves bypassed the units and did not tire of repeating to the officers about the need to strictly follow Gil's orders to maintain order and discipline. " .

Based on the documents, we managed to find out what kind of operation Samutin is talking about. This large-scale action against the partisans of the Borisov-Begoml and Polotsk-Lepel partisan zones was called Kottbus. The settlement of Kublichi was located on the territory of the Ushachsky district of the Vitebsk region, and this area was part of the Polotsk-Lepel zone of the people's avengers. However, Operation Cottbus (which we will discuss below) was not carried out in April at all, but in the second decade of May 1943. And what tasks the Druzhina solved during the operation does not at all coincide with what Samutin writes about.

Before the 1st Russian National SS Regiment was thrown into the fight against the partisans of the Vitebsk and Minsk regions, at the beginning of May 1943, part of Gil-Rodionov took part in Operation Maikafer. The action was held in Berezinsky, Bykhovsky, Kirovsky and Klimovichsky districts of the Mogilev region. Information about the participation of the "Druzhina" in this operation is contained in the protocols of the post-war interrogation of S.Ya. Kaminskis - a former employee of the Latvian security police, a member of the special SD team Viktor Arajs. The detainee testified that in April one of the units of the "Arajs team" (the company of SS Obersturmfuehrer Dibitis) was included in the "Druzhina". At the end of the month, they were sent to fight the partisans in the area of ​​the village of Berezino (then the regional center of the Mogilev region, now the Minsk region).

Kaminskis said: “Our company on the Berezina River was attached to the military formations of German troops, which, with tanks, artillery and all types of small arms, fought against partisans in this area. In addition to the formations of German troops in the aforementioned area, units of the ROA or UPA fought against the partisan movement - I can't say for sure, only the composition of these units was Russian and they were commanded by Russian General Rodionov. Who was Rodionov, I do not know for sure, but for some time our company was poured into his regiment and jointly took part in battles against Soviet partisans. There were no major battles with the partisan main forces during my stay. In most cases, there was reconnaissance with more insignificant advanced groups of partisans, and as for the punitive measures taken by us against the civilian population suspected of being connected with Soviet partisans, for the entire time of my participation in punitive operations against Soviet partisans in the Berezina region for communication with Soviet partisans gave an order to destroy the entire population of one village, which we had repulsed from the partisans and in which Rodionov's units and our company were located. I don’t remember the name of the village, it was densely populated for a kilometer, but I’m at a loss to say how many yards it had. The execution of the order to shoot the civilian population of this village and its burning was entrusted to Rodionov's units, which included our company, but on his own initiative or Rodionov received a second order canceling the first, this village was not destroyed, and, as I later learned , already upon his return to Glubokoye again, Rodionov, with all the strength of his personnel, went over to the side of the Soviet partisans " .

This important piece of evidence fills the gap in the history of the Druzhina. From the testimony of S.Ya. Kaminskis, it follows that the Gil-Rodionov compound received orders to destroy settlements and civilians, but in this case did not participate in the "special treatment".

On the other hand, running ahead, let us say that there is information about the destruction of a number of villages in the Lepel region (Vitebsk region) and Zembina (Borisov district of the Minsk region) by the "vigilantes".

According to the Belarusian emigrant Yuri Duvalich, "In the town of Zembin named after[Gil. - Approx. ed.] 3 boys and 2 girls were killed just because they pinned the Belarusian national badge to their shirts and blouses. In the village of Sloboda, Gil promised the peasants who were sentenced to be shot to be pardoned if they asked him about it in literary Russian. Of the 147 villages of the Begoml region, only 9 remained after Rodionov.» .

The same maxim, but with some additions, is found in two more Belarusian emigrants, Yuri Vitsbich and Konstantin Akula. According to them, soldiers from the Gil-Rodionov brigade burned down several Belarusian villages in the Lepel region, and their population (about 3 thousand people) was driven to the area of ​​the Ikonniki settlement. Then Gil-Rodionov addressed them with a speech in which he promised to shoot everyone if people did not turn to him with a request for clemency in the "Russian literary language." Since none of the local residents knew this language, they were all shot from machine guns.

Testimonies of Belarusian emigrants, who, according to the historian O.V. Romanko, "They insist on the national motive behind these reprisals," honestly, they don't inspire confidence. It is not at all taken into account that V.V. Gil was a native of Belarus and there was absolutely no reason for him to stage a performance with "the Russian literary language." Another thing is that at the direction of the Germans, he could give orders for the burning of villages and executions. This is indicated in the article of the former head of the BSHPD P.Z. Kalinina: "... with the participation of the" Druzhina "in July 1943, more than 4 thousand civilians of the Begoml region were destroyed, and more than 3 thousand were sent to work in the Reich." From here, however, the widespread version that Gil was a conspiratorial Soviet agent and deliberately provoked the hatred of the local population towards the German occupiers gets a dubious sound.

Below we will dwell in detail on the participation of the "Druzhina" units in the large-scale anti-guerrilla operation "Cottbus".

Operation Cottbus

During the operation, the invaders planned, first, to push the partisans away from the railways Molodechno - Vileika - Parafyanovo - Polotsk, Molodechno - Minsk, Minsk - Borisov; secondly, to restore the roads Minsk - Begoml - Lepel - Vitebsk, Dokshitsy - Lepel, Vileika - Pleschenitsy - Zembin - Borisov; third, to eliminate the dangerous situation in the rear of the left flank of Army Group Center, clearing the northern region of the Berezina River from partisans, and to continue the construction of the fortified area at an accelerated pace; fourthly, to prevent the troops of the Red Army from entering the partisan zones and to prevent the people's avengers from providing them with assistance. Thus, it was planned to eliminate the entire partisan massif between Minsk and Polotsk.

A separate plan was developed against the partisans of the Borisov-Begoml zone. It boiled down to blocking the partisan area, seizing the city of Begoml, inflicting the main blow on it from the side of the settlements of Dokshitsy and Dolginovo. Further, to clear the Berezino - Lepel, Begoml - Lepel roads from the partisans and, having driven the people's avengers into the area of ​​the Domzheritsky swamps, to destroy them.

In Soviet documents, memoirs and scientific research, Operation Cottbus is presented differently than in German. There are many discrepancies, ranging from the number of forces and means involved in the action, and ending with its timing. According to Soviet sources, the expedition lasted about two months - from April to June 1943. From the side of the Germans, from 62 to 80 thousand people took part in the hostilities (up to 45 thousand soldiers and officers allegedly operated in the Begoml direction alone).

Western experts, relying on the reports of the Wehrmacht and the SS, call other figures and dates. In particular, R. Mavrogordato, E. Zimke, E. Hesse, R. Michaelis and A. Muñoz note that the Germans attracted 16,662 people to fight the partisans, the operation itself was carried out from May 15 to June 22, 1943.

In our opinion, these contradictions are caused by the fact that the intelligence of the partisans included in the framework of Operation Cottbus a number of German actions, which they carried out against the people's avengers of the Minsk and Mogilev regions. First of all, we are talking about the operations "Daredevil-I and II" (Draufganger I und II), "May beetle" (Maikafer). Thus, the operations "Brave-I and II" were organized against the people's avengers of the Zaslavsky, Logoisk, Borisov and Smolevichi districts of the Minsk region. Thanks to these actions, the SS and the police received information about where the guerrilla forces were concentrated. In the future, this made it possible to more accurately determine the tasks for units and subunits intended to eliminate the Borisov-Begoml partisan zone.

No less important is the issue related to the numerical strength of the German group. The general leadership of the expedition was carried out by the Reichsfuehrer SS plenipotentiary for the fight against banditry, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and Police General von dem Bach. Directly responsible for the operation was the head of the SS and police of the general district "Belorussia", SS Brigadefuehrer Kurt von Gottberg. Under his command was a battle group, which included:

2nd SS Police Regiment (11th, 13th and 22nd Police Battalions);

1st Battalion of the 31st SS Police Regiment;

Dirlewanger SS Special Battalion;

Operational command of the field gendarmerie "Kraikenbom";

The command of the field gendarmerie "Pleschenitsa";

Field gendarmerie platoon (Borisov-Stolbtsy);

1st Russian National SS Regiment "Druzhina";

3rd (from Slonim), 12th, 15th (from Lida), 51st (from Volozhin), 54th (from Borisov), 57th (from Baranovichi), 102nd (from Borisov ), 115th (from Slonim), 118th (from Novogrudok), 271st (from Slutsk) auxiliary police battalions;

600th Cossack regiment (1st and 2nd cavalry squadrons, 7th and 8th bicycle and motorcycle squadrons, headquarters battalion and artillery division);

633rd "eastern" battalion;

1st and 12th police tank companies;

Battalion of the 331st Grenadier Regiment;

Four companies of the 392nd main field commandant's office (Minsk) with a battery, a PTO platoon and a platoon of heavy mortars;

Reinforced company of the 286th security division;

II Division of the 213rd Artillery Regiment;

Command Groups of the Security Police and SD I (special teams I, II and III) and II (special teams IV, V and VI).

From the air, the actions of Battle Group von Gottberg were supported by aircraft from the 4th Squadron of the 51st Bomber Squadron (5th Air Corps), as well as the 7th Special Squadron.

Finally, a special headquarters and three special groups were assigned from the Glubokoye region to steal labor and requisition agricultural products, to which auxiliary police units from the settlements of Dokshitsy and Dolginovo were assigned.

The German grouping of forces and means did not exceed 20 thousand people. The data of partisan intelligence (45, 60 or 80 thousand people) seem to be clearly overestimated.

It is worth dwelling on what forces the Belarusian partisans had in the Borisov-Begoml zone. At the time of Operation Cottbus, the following formations were operating here:

Brigade "Uncle Kolya" (commander - P.G. Lopatin, commissar - A.T. Ezubchik; detachments named after I.V. Stalin, named after V.I. Chapaev, named after F.E.Dzerzhinsky, "Kommunar" , "The Tempest", "For the Fatherland");

Brigade "Zheleznyak" (commander - IF Titkov, commissar - SS Mankovich; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7th detachments);

Brigade "People's Avengers" (previously called the brigade "Uncle Vasya"): commander - V.T. Voronyansky, Commissioner - V.V. Semenov; detachments "Avenger", "Struggle", them. G.I. Kotovsky, them. A.B. Suvorov;

Brigade them. CM. Kirov (commander - FT Pustovit, commissar - II Pankevich; detachments named after SM Kirov, named after MV Frunze, “For Victory”);

Brigade "Shturmovaya" (commander - I.A. );

Brigade them. L.M. Dovator (commander - F.S. Shlyakhtunov, commissioner - P.A.Pavlenko; detachments named after Ya.M. Sverdlov, named after L.Z.Dzhioev);

Brigade them. Central Committee of CP (b) B (commander - A.D. Medvedev, commissar - T.N.Bondarev; detachments named after A.Ya. Parkhomenko, named after V.P. Chkalov, named after G.K. Zhukov, named after V.P. Denisov);

Brigade them. M.V. Frunze (commander - A.M. Zakharov, commissar - II Mironenko; detachments "For the Motherland", named after K.E. Voroshilov, "Komsomolets", "For Soviet Belarus");

Brigade (according to other sources, detachment) "Death to Fascism" (commander - VF Tarunov, commissar - IP Dedyulya);

Separate detachments "For the Motherland", "Guardsman", them. K.E. Voroshilov, "Bolshevik".

The partisan formations of the Borisov-Begoml zone were subordinate to the Borisov underground interdistrict committee of the CP (b) B, headed by the secretary P.A. Zhukovich, authorized by the BSHPD. The number of people's avengers operating in the Borisov-Begoml zone was 8,158 people (44 partisan detachments).

But these were not all the forces of the "forest soldiers". According to the commander of the Chashnik brigade F.F. Dubrovsky, a total of 17 units of people's avengers acted against the Germans. From the memoirs of V.E. Lobanka, it turns out that the following also came out to fight the punishers:

Chashnik brigade "Dubova" (commander - FF Dubrovsky, commissar - VE Lobanok; 1st, 3rd, 7th, 10th, 12th detachments);

Brigade them. CM. Korotkina (commander - VM Talakvadze, commissar - AB Erdman; detachments "Grozny", named after VI Chapaev, "For Victory", "Belarusian Avenger", named after FE Dzerzhinsky);

Brigade them. K.E. Voroshilov (commander - DV Tyabut, commissar - VA Lemza; detachments "Avenger", "Death to Fascism", "For the Motherland", "KIM");

Brigade them. IN AND. Lenin (commander - HA Sakmarkin, commissar - AB Sipko; detachments named after M.V. Frunze, named after K.E. Voroshilov, named after V.I. Chapaev, named after S.M. Kirov, named after I.V. . Stalin, named after AB Suvorov);

Brigade them. IN AND. Chapaeva (commander - V.V. Melnikov, commissar - I.F.Korenevsky; 1st, 2nd, 5th detachments);

Brigade N.P. Gudkov (commander - NP Gudkov, commissar - IG Finogeyev; 1st detachment named after MI Kutuzov, 2nd detachment named after H.A. Shchors, 3rd detachment "Hurricane");

Senno brigade (commander - BC Leonov, commissar - P.V. Syrtsov; detachments named after V.A.Zakharchenko, named after AB Suvorov, named after K.A. Khairkizov, named after V.I. Chapaev, AM Zakharov, 6 -th detachment, "For the Motherland").

Thus, the total number of partisans, according to our estimates, ranged from 13 to 15 thousand people, not counting individual detachments and sabotage groups of the NKVD.

The people's avengers of the Borisov-Begoml and Polotsk-Lepel zones interacted with each other during the repulsion of Operation Cottbus. This is evident from the memoirs of the former commander of the Zheleznyak brigade I.F. Titkova: “We guessed about the upcoming punitive operation of the fascists and prepared for it, but did not know its scale. At first it was thought that the Nazis could throw small forces against us. It turns out, judging by the seized documents, they have assembled a group of several tens of thousands of people, with the participation of all types of troops. All this indicated that this time the partisan formations could not act alone. And hard-to-reach places, areas of Lake Palik and Domzheritskie swamps will not save them " .

On May 15, 1943, SS Brigadeführer von Gottberg signed combat order No. 1 for Operation Cottbus. The operational formation of the SS chief and the police of the general district "Belorussia" was divided into several battle groups. Each of them received a combat mission.

Einsatzgruppa "North" under the command of Major General Dormagen, consisting of seven police battalions with reinforcements, advanced in converging directions from Zyabki and Lepel to Pyshno, Zarubovshchina in order to close the encirclement of the Borisov-Begoml zone from the north and restore the Dokshitsy-Lepel road in the Lepel sector Berezino.

Einsatzgruppa "South" under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kinzel advanced in the direction of Borisov - Prudy - Selets - Rudnya with the task of closing the encirclement ring and preventing the partisans from going east. The operational group was assigned armored boats and motor boats for combing the Berezina River.

The Einsatzgruppen of SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dirlewanger (it included the 600th Cossack regiment) advanced from the Minsk direction - northwest of Lake Palik with the task of capturing the Borisov - Lepel road, creating a barrier, thereby cutting off the partisan formations operating west of this road.

Einsatzgruppe Lieutenant Colonel of the Security Police Klump (and after he was wounded - Lieutenant Colonel Kitzing) advanced from Dolginovo in the general direction of Begoml.

Part of Gil-Rodionov was part of the Klump group and, with the support of two SS police battalions, advanced from Dokshitsy in the general direction to Begoml and along the Dokshitsy-Lepel road. "Druzhina" struck a counterstrike in the direction of the "North" task force to the settlement of Berezino. The main task of the Gil regiment was to restore the Dokshitsy-Lepel road together with the "North" group and further cover it from possible attacks of the people's avengers.

The 2nd SS Police Regiment was allocated to the operational reserve of the Begoml direction in order to destroy the partisans who could slip out of the encirclement ring.

All Einsatzgruppen were assigned commands of the Security Police and SD (for example, SD I and II teams operated together with the Druzhina, and SD V command with a special SS battalion of Dirlewanger). In addition, the gendarmerie teams of the Order Police Auxiliary Service were included in all task forces. The members of these formations were supposed to be used as guides, as well as guards and escorts responsible for the safety of agricultural products captured during the expedition, and a workable force intended to be sent to the Reich.

Operation Cottbus had its own special features, and therefore it cannot be considered a typical action (which A. Muñoz calls it), which were carried out by the Germans in Belarus in 1942-1944. Tactically, the combat formations of the operational groups were structured in two echelons. The first consisted of solid chains. They had to comb the area and open up the centers of resistance of the partisans, direct tanks, artillery and aircraft at them, and then move on. The second echelon consisted of mobile detachments and groups of persecution of the people's avengers in their centers of resistance or when leaving the encirclement. "Such tactics,- notes I.F. Titkov, - was completely new to us " .

By May 15, 1943, the Germans had pulled together large forces to the settlements of Dokshitsy, Dolginovo, Pleschenitsy and Zembin (where von Gottberg's operational headquarters had moved). From here, with the support of artillery and tanks, the SS and the police launched an offensive in three directions: towards Pustoselie, towards Dobrun and towards Vitunichi with the general task of capturing Begoml and the ferry near the village of Berezino. Heavy, bloody battles flared up for the seizure of the crossings across the Ponya River. Fighting continued until May 19, when SS units finally managed to capture the crossings. The units of the "Druzhina" also took part in these battles, crossing Ponya twice near the village of Glinno.

On May 20, a general offensive of German troops began from Lepel, Zembin, Pleschenitsy, Dolginovo and Dokshits. The main blow (from Lepel) fell on the Dubrovsky brigade. In other directions, the SS were held back by detachments of the Zheleznyak, People's Avengers, Death to Fascism, and Uncle Kolya brigades. Partisan detachments retreated into the forests near Lake Palik. In this area, the partisans held back the units of the Einsatzgruppe Dirlewanger for four days. As a result of the battles, the people's avengers were forced to leave the Begoml-Pleshchenitsy road to the west, to the Vileika region.

Part of Gil-Rodionov (in partisan documents it was listed as a brigade, although in fact it was not yet) advanced in the Dokshitsy direction, attacking the brigades named after. Central Committee of the CP (b) B and "Zheleznyak". There were stubborn battles for the villages of Tumilovichi, Stenka, Dedino, Rechnye, Vashcheniki, Svatki. A particularly fierce battle, which lasted almost 10 hours, was for the village of Dedino, where the attacks of the "Rodionovtsy" were repulsed by the 1st detachment of the brigade. Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) B.

Belarusian partisans crossing the water barrier

For the partisans "Druzhina", as I.F. Titkov, turned out to be a difficult opponent: “A special enemy attacked here, who spoke our language, easily disguised himself as a partisan, was not afraid of swamps and forests ... It was Gil-Rodionov's brigade. Leaflets scattered by the Germans said that “a“ new Russia ”begins here. Of course, such propaganda had no effect on the partisans. But we also knew that this enemy had already gotten enough hands on the fight against partisans in Bykhov, Klichevsky and other regions. Belarus ... The Nazis specially dressed the brigade soldiers in the SS uniform[you might think that Titkov did not know that the "Druzhina" was an SS formation and its personnel were supposed to wear the field uniform of the SS troops, with which the "Rodionists" had no problems, as well as with other types of allowance. - Approx. ed.]… The traitors from the Gil-Rodionov brigade were also dangerous in that they provoked women, children and the elderly to leave the forest, as if by doing so they would save them from the Germans. Many who believed it died. This is how the inhabitants of the villages Dalekoe, Nebyshino, Vitunichi, Osinovik and Trombin were destroyed.[it is possible that it was these crimes that were discussed in the article of the former head of the BSHPD P.Z. Kalinin. - Approx. ed.]. The Gil-Rodionov brigade was a serious enemy for us. It operated on a narrow sector of the front with the support of tanks and aviation ...» .

The partisans stubbornly defended themselves, did not get involved in frontal battles with the enemy, acted in small groups and maneuvered, but the situation was not in their favor. By the end of May, the Borisov-Begoml partisan zone was squeezed from all sides. The people's avengers were under siege. This is eloquently evidenced by the words of the brigade commander Nikolai Gudkov, which he said in front of the personnel of several partisan formations on one of the critical days of the blockade: “Comrades! The partisans of the Zheleznyak brigade defending Begoml are in a difficult situation. The Germans have already occupied a number of settlements on the way to the city. The partisan airfield no longer operates[nevertheless, Soviet aviation managed to deliver 160 tons of combat cargo to the partisans. - Approx. ed.]. From hour to hour, Zheleznyak's brigade will be forced to leave Begoml. Against her and the Dubov brigade, the Germans threw a large number of their soldiers and police. Begoml is fiercely bombed by enemy aircraft[only during May 29, the Luftwaffe made 632 sorties to the city. - Approx. ed.]. We ourselves barely got out of there. The partisan hospital and the entire headquarters were evacuated from Begoml. We were ordered to leave the village of Babtsy so as not to end up in the encirclement ring. The Germans can cut the road by occupying the bridges over the Berezina or the Lepel-Borisov road. Pack up immediately and go to Buk " .

On May 27, 1943, the head of the BSHPD P.Z. Kalinin gave an urgent order to I.I. Ryzhikov to assist the people's avengers of the Begoml zone in repelling the punitive expedition:

“The enemy's operation against the partisans of the Begoml zone is taking on a wide scale. The partisan brigades were tasked with continuing to conduct hostilities by ambushes, infiltrating into the enemy's rear, maneuvering to trap the enemy, and using advantageous lines for active defense.

Initiate a petition to the Military Council of the Kalinin Front to bomb Lepel, Pleschenitsy, Dokshitsy, Dolginovo, Paraf'yanov station, Budslav, to assist aircraft in dropping 25-30 tons of ammunition. The enemy is throwing parachute troops into the combat formations of the partisans - fire brigades, warn them. In this regard, stop the drop of our paratroopers, notifying the Military Council of the front " .

Two days later, on May 29, 1943, Kalinin gave orders to the command of the partisan brigades Dubov, People's Avengers, Uncle Kolya, Sennenskaya, them. CM. Kirov, them. CM. Korotkin, to the detachment "For the Motherland" on the tactics of hostilities in the conditions of the punitive expedition of the Germans against the partisans of the Begoml zone:

“The enemy's offensive plan provides for the complete blocking of the forests of the Begoml zone and the surrounding area. For this purpose, he sends reinforcements. Brigades: Dubrovsky, Voronyansky, Lopatin, Leonov, them. Kirov, Talakvadze, the For the Motherland detachment to act in accordance with the instructions given by Comrade Ponomarenko, while maintaining interaction between the brigades, freedom of maneuver, preventing the enemy from being surrounded.

The success of the further course of battles in this area depends on the flexibility of the partisans' maneuver, the mutual assistance of detachments and brigades.

I authorize an exit for maneuver to other areas in order to prevent encirclement in the event that there is an agreement between the neighboring brigades and their position will not be worsened by this.

Communicate the situation, signals and cargo drop points " .

Meanwhile, the situation was getting worse. On May 29, 1943, units of the SS troops occupied Begoml, squeezing out the Zheleznyak brigade from the city. On June 3, 1943, units of the Einsatzgroup "North" captured the regional center Pyshno, where the brigade of F.F. Dubrovsky. Einsatzgruppa "South", advancing from Borisov, went to the bases of the brigade "Uncle Kolya" and struck up a battle with the brigade. Kirov for the forest area of ​​Lake Palik. Gil-Rodionov's regiment broke through to the central base of the Zheleznyak brigade. One of the battalions of the "Druzhina" captured the partisan hospital and destroyed the wounded people's avengers (the dugouts where they were were burned). Those who were lucky enough to survive retreated to the Savsky Bor forest area.

The partisans resisted desperately. Von Gottberg ordered his reserves to be brought into battle. The 2nd SS Police Regiment went on the offensive in the Osje - Zamoscze - Sosnovo - Lesiny - Chernitsy sector. Partisan detachments from the Zheleznyak and Dubova brigades, having infiltrated the rear of the Germans, suddenly attacked the 13th and 22nd SS police battalions, as a result of which combat losses appeared in the ranks of these units. The partisans recorded in a report that they had succeeded in encircling and almost completely exterminating two police battalions. However, as usual, the Soviet patriots were in a hurry. The 13th and 22nd SS battalions fully retained their combat effectiveness. In addition, just a few weeks later, the 2nd SS Police Regiment (which included these battalions) in full force took part in Operation German.

By the end of the first decade of June 1943, the position of the partisans became extremely difficult. The military leader of the Borisov interdistrict committee, Lieutenant Colonel N. Kovalenko, demanded the immediate withdrawal of the partisan brigades beyond the Berezina - for the defense of the Domzheritsky swamps. By that time, more than 10 thousand soldiers and commanders had already gathered there. I.F. Titkov, P.G. Lopatin and F.T. Pustovit was asked to cancel this order, since the withdrawal to the Domzheritsky swamps, in their opinion, was quite in the hands of the Germans, who initially planned to drive the people's avengers there and methodically destroy them by inflicting air and artillery strikes. However, it was useless to argue. The reason for this order was that a large number of civilians - women, old people and children - had accumulated in the swampy places. And they had to be saved.

As soon as the people's avengers retreated beyond the Berezina, the Germans immediately closed the encirclement ring. In the area of ​​the Domzheritsky swamps, especially fierce battles broke out. “The Nazis and Gil-Rodionov's brigade attacked the partisans together,- recalled the former commander of the detachment to them. CM. Kirov (brigade of the same name) Vasily Sharkov. - They surrounded the Domzheritsky swamps from all sides. There was a continuous crackle of machine guns - you couldn't stick your head out. The air was so filled with powder gases that it was difficult to breathe " .

By the end of June 18, SS units cleared the forest in the area of ​​Lake Palik from the people's avengers and cut the Domzheritsky swampy massif in half along the Moiseyevshchina-Dubrovka-Studenka-Postrezhye-Brod road, putting the defense of the Zheleznyak brigade under attack from the rear. At the same time, the Germans launched construction work to build roads through the swamp. For the transfer of SS troops and the police, the road going from Borisov to Zembin - Mstizh - Begoml was used. The command of the partisan formations, having received an order from the Borisov interdistrict committee, decided to break out of the encirclement on the night of June 19 by the forces of all partisans who found themselves in the swamps.

The breakout from the encirclement cost the people's avengers dearly. Losses in personnel, as well as among the civilian population, were significant (which the participants in those events did not like to remember). For some time the Borisov-Begoml zone was liquidated (this is confirmed by I.F.Titkov). Operation Cottbus ended on June 21, 1943. Moreover, the Germans, as Russian and Belarusian historians write, were forced to end the expedition because the troops involved in it were needed at the front.

Among specialists, disputes about the losses of the Germans and partisans during Operation Cottbus do not cease. The starting point in the discussions is the final combat report of von Gottberg (dated June 28, 1943). It says: “Losses of the enemy: 6087 people were killed in battles, 3709 were shot, 599 were captured, 4997 people were captured, 1056 women were captured. Own losses: Germans - five officers were killed, including the battalion commander, 83 non-commissioned officers and privates. 11 officers were wounded, including two regiment commanders, 374 non-commissioned officers and privates, three disappeared. Trophies: 20 7.62 guns, nine anti-tank guns, one anti-aircraft gun, 18 mortars, 30 heavy machine guns, 31 light machine guns, one aircraft (destroyed), 50 gliders (destroyed), 16 anti-tank guns, 903 rifles, 11 rifle butts , seven rifle barrels, 13 pistols.

Agricultural products seized: 3262 cows, 2182 sheep, 904 horses, 153 pigs, 1618 skins: various types, 684 tons of grain, 24 tons of potatoes, 38 cents of flaxseed, 70 cents of flour, 3 cents of wool, 2 sacks of flax, 2 sacks linen yarn " .

Belarusian researchers V. Selemenev and V. Shimolin, adhering to the line chosen by Soviet historians, consider von Gottberg's report to be a "phony". As a document that is more reliable in their opinion, the report of the General Commissioner of Belarus V. Kube to the Reich Minister of the occupied eastern regions A. Rosenberg on the results of the punitive operation "Cottbus" for the period from June 22 to July 3, 1943 (dated July 5, 1943, No. ):

“SS Brigadeführer, Police Major General von Gottberg reports that Operation Cottbus during the indicated period gave the following results: enemy killed - 4500; persons suspected of having links with bandits were killed - 5,000; Germans killed - 59; Germans wounded - 267; foreigners killed - 22; foreigners wounded - 120; bandits taken prisoner - 250; enemy camps destroyed - 57; enemy bunkers destroyed - 261; captured male labor force - 2062; captured female labor force - 450; flooded large boats - 4; flooded rafts - 22.

Trophies: 1 aircraft, 12 tug boats, 10 150 mm guns, 2 cannons, 9 grenade launchers, 23 heavy machine guns, 28 light machine guns, 28 assault rifles, 492 rifles, 1028 grenades and bombs, 1,100 mines, 31,300 rifle cartridges, 7,300 pistol cartridges , 1200 kg of explosive material, 2 sets of radio transmitters, 1 darkroom, 30 parachutes, 67 carts, 530 horses, 1 field kitchen, 430 sledges, a large amount of medicines and propaganda material.

... These figures show that in this operation a large number of the population was destroyed. If the enemy's losses in killed are 4500, and only 492 rifles were taken as trophies, then it is clear that a large number of local peasants were included in the number of the destroyed enemy. In this regard, the Dirlewanger battalion is especially famous, which killed countless people. Among the 5 thousand people suspected of having links with the bandits and therefore shot, there are a huge number of women and children. " .

Indeed, analyzing two documents - von Gottberg and Cuba - you find a lot of contradictions: according to Gottberg, 903 rifles were captured, 6087 "bandits" were killed, 599 were captured, 3709 people were shot. In Cuba, 492 rifles were captured, 4500 “bandits” were destroyed, 250 were taken prisoner, 5000 people were shot.

One gets the impression that for his superiors in Berlin, von Gottberg prepared one report, and for the General Commissioner of Belarus - quite another. Most likely, this was so, since tensions developed between the civilian authorities and the leadership of the SS in Belarus. Himmler's subordinates believed that Cuba was a conductor of ideas that contradicted the policy of the Reich, and therefore they tried to disavow his figure, which interfered with the SS in the implementation of their own plans, from the creation of a system of security and order in Belarus and ending with the extermination of Jews.

More often, researchers take the document to Cuba as a basis, and von Gottberg's report is considered unreliable, although the report of the head of the SS and police of Belarus presents an overall objective picture. Doubts, on the contrary, are caused by the report to Cuba. Given the conflicting relationship between the Gauleiter and the SS, his report bears an imprint of bias. In addition, the results of Operation Cottbus were presented to Cuba for the period from June 22 to July 3, 1943, and the expedition ended on June 21. Cuba also does not say whether this data is updated or not, when they were provided to him, on the basis of what operational documents they were compiled.

Priority in the study of this issue, which is quite clear, should be given to the message of von Gottberg. The actual civilian bodies of the administrative apparatus of the General Commissariat "Belorussia" were of secondary importance to the large-scale actions of the SS and the police, and if they played a role in them, then an auxiliary one. If we disregard this point, we can come to the conclusion that Operation Cottbus was reduced only to the extermination of the population, and the partisans had no losses at all. By the way, this is the conclusion reached by Soviet scientists who worked on the reference book: “The Nazi policy of genocide and“ scorched earth ”in Belarus 1941-1944” (Minsk: “Belarus”, 1984). Based on the report to Cuba, they took and added up the losses suffered by the partisans and the population, writing that “in In the course of the operation, the punishers shot, tortured and burned 9,786 Soviet citizens. " Thus, it turned out - the people's avengers have no dead, no wounded, no prisoners.

It is also unclear why, as almost the main argument, the maxim is imposed that the enemy's losses are determined only by how many rifles he has captured. As you know, partisans always lacked weapons and ammunition, so they tried not to leave pistols, rifles, machine guns and machine guns of killed soldiers and commanders. When this was not possible - especially with regard to guns and mortars - the weapons were destroyed, rendered unusable, or buried in the ground, so that they could then be dug up and reused in battle. The fact that von Gottberg's men found between 500 and 900 rifles after the battles (not counting machine guns, machine guns and grenade launchers) does not mean that the report of the head of Operation Cottbus is completely false.

Of course, this expedition was not devoid of a punitive component. As von Gottberg noted, the soldiers shot 3,709 people for contacting the partisans. In some cases, civilians were used to overcome mine-explosive obstacles: "After the artillery and anti-aircraft preparation, penetration into the marshland became possible only because local residents suspected of having links with partisans were driven ahead of the troops through heavily mined areas of the territory." .

But the main victims among civilians fell at a time when the partisans were blockaded in the area of ​​Domzheritsky swamps. The constant air strikes, mortar and artillery shelling have certainly played a sinister role.

On the other hand, and this is the most tragic thing, few people cared about the fate of ordinary people. The Germans did not care about it in any way, since the civilian population, who were surrounded with the partisans, were themselves "to blame", in their opinion, for what happened to be in the combat zone. The partisans also had no time for humanism, because it was about life and death. Undoubtedly, the people's avengers provided assistance to some part of the population, but it was unrealistic to cover everyone, and, moreover, the partisans themselves had their families there. And did they always have the opportunity to help their relatives and friends when the battles were going on around the clock?

It is very likely that among those 6087 "bandits" destroyed by SS and police units, there were many civilians who fell into a bloody meat grinder in the area of ​​Lake Palik and in the Domzheritsky swamps. How many people survived during the blockade and escaped from the "cauldron" with the partisans, it will no longer be possible to establish. But the victims there were huge, of which there is no doubt.

During Operation Cottbus, the SS exterminated by no means the entire population, the Reich needed a manpower. A considerable part of the local residents, who found themselves in the area of ​​the punitive action, were captured and evacuated to assembly camps, where the so-called sorting, disinfection and preparation of workers' teams for sending to labor service in Germany was carried out. According to the report of von Gottberg, 6,053 people were captured (4,997 men and 1,056 women), according to a report to Cuba - 2,512 people (2,062 men and 450 women). It is difficult to say what caused these discrepancies in figures. It could have been anything, from liquidation to the export of people to the Reich. However, most likely, people were sent to Germany. As documents show, during the operations carried out from June to August 1943 in the Minsk region, the SS and the police "Drove away the entire working population» .

Regarding the results of Operation Cottbus, researchers almost do not pay attention to what tasks were set for the SS troops and the police, based on combat order No. 1, signed by von Gottberg on May 15, 1943. Of course, the main task has always been one - the destruction of the partisans , as we recall, Himmler demanded in his order of November 18, 1941. By the summer of 1943, the SS's views on the war against the partisans had changed. The SS Fuhrer and the police in charge of the fight against "banditry" were convinced that it was impossible to completely eliminate the partisans. Proceeding from this, the combat missions for the troops at this stage meant not so much the destruction of the partisans (although no one ever abandoned it), but the weakening of their influence in the occupied regions. This explains why von Gottberg, who led more than one action - which, according to the Soviet side, always turned out to be a failure - continued to be in office and deal with the same issues. Hence, we can say that the tasks of Operation Cottbus have been largely accomplished. First, the dangerous situation in the rear of the left flank of the "Center" group was averted. Secondly, the troops of the Red Army were not allowed into the partisan zones. Thirdly, the construction of the fortified area was continued (despite all acts of sabotage by the partisans). Fourth, the Borisov-Begoml zone ceased to exist for some time. And, fifthly, the partisans suffered significant losses (which is recognized by the famous military historians A.S. Knyazkov and Yu.I. Chernov).

Thus, it was no accident that von Gottberg sent a report to Berlin in which he described Operation Cottbus as a completely successful expedition.

Unfortunately, no detailed analysis of Operation Cottbus has been carried out in Western historiography. At least, the works of German and American historians available today do not give grounds to assert the opposite. For example, Michaelis did not bother analyzing the documents of von Gottberg and Cuba, and therefore limited himself to publishing a letter from Reichskommissar Ostland G. Lohse dated June 18, 1943 to his boss A. Rosenberg about the June action in Belarus. Considering the line along which this paper went, it is clear whose position the Reich Commissioner defended.

In his monograph, Muñoz tried to analyze the results of the operation, but the historian follows a known path, relying on a report to Cuba. Moreover, as can be seen from the study, Muñoz does not draw a clear line between the documents of von Gottberg and the then Gauleiter of Belarus, so information from two different sources merges into one whole in which preference is given to excerpts from the document to Cuba.

Of course, the partisan command summed up its results of the battles in May - June 1943. In the certificate of the head of the operational department of the BSHPD, Lieutenant Colonel A.I. Bryukhanov on the battles of the partisans of the Begoml zone of the Minsk region with the German punishers (not earlier than August 12, 1943) it was noted:

“During the battles with the enemy, partisan detachments and brigades disabled more than 2 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, tanks - 15, tankettes - 7, armored vehicles - 2, guns of various calibers - 4, trucks - 63, cars - 10, 2 planes were shot down, 43 enemy echelons were derailed and 1 train was blown up. - D. bridge.

The partisans lost: 88 killed, 57 wounded, 14 missing.

The partisans captured trophies: mortars - 2, machine guns - 4, rifles - 29, machine guns - 10, cartridges - 1 thousand, a wagon train of 82 carts, horses - 1514, cows and small livestock - 267 " .

Commissioner General of Belarus Wilhelm Kube. Pre-war photo

Questions arise regarding the partisan losses. For example, the number of wounded is not credible - only 57 people. And this is for a month and a half of continuous battles ?! From the memoirs of I.F. Titkov, it follows that only in one brigade "Zheleznyak" - at the time of blocking in the area of ​​Domzheritsky swamps - "It turned out to be up to a hundred seriously wounded partisans"... To this must be added the wounded, who were at the central base of the same brigade, in a hospital destroyed by one of the battalions of the "Druzhina". And how were the calculations carried out if it is known that for one killed there are always three or four wounded?

The number of partisans killed is also questionable. Only one way out of the encirclement in the area of ​​Lake Palik and Domzheritsky swamps cost the partisans considerable casualties. There were losses in all formations, without exception, and, as Titkov wrote, "The Zheleznyak brigade also suffered damage". It seems that the SS data, despite a certain inaccuracy, is still more trustworthy than the information of the partisans.

Doubts are also raised by the data on German losses. A.I. Bryukhanov said: "2 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were put out of action." Titkov claims that his brigade alone killed more than 800 Nazis. Another 250-260 people (in the period from 15 to 25 May) were exterminated by the brigade. Central Committee of the CP (b) B. Based on this, it follows that the share of other partisan formations - and these are 14-15 brigades - account for the rest of the enemy's losses (950-1000 people).

Of course, it can be assumed that not all units fought as skillfully as the Zheleznyak brigade. However, the formations of "Dubov", "Uncle Kolya", them. CM. Kirov, them. CM. Korotkina, "People's Avengers", detachment "For the Motherland". They also had killed Germans on their account. And what happens: either the wrong data is contained in A.I. Bryukhanov, or I.F. Titkov exaggerates the merits of the Zheleznyak brigade.

German losses (according to von Gottberg's report) amounted to more than 500 killed and wounded. It is possible that the SS and police units lost more people than recorded in the combat report. But, most likely, the losses do not exceed the threshold of 1000 people. Moreover, according to German ideas, even the death of 500 soldiers and officers is a very serious loss.

Of course, the Druzhina also suffered losses. Gil-Rodionov's regiment lost people in battles for crossings across the Ponya River, for the settlements of Tumilovichi, Stenka, Dedino, Rechnye, Vashcheniki, in battles for a partisan base near the confluence of the Krasnogubka River into the Berezina, when partisans broke through from the encirclement in the area of ​​the Begoml road - Berezino.

In battles with the people's avengers, part of Gil-Rodionov lost at least 200-250 people killed and wounded. A lot of problems "Druzhina" were brought by the brigades to them. Central Committee of CP (b) B, "Zheleznyak", them. CM. Kirov and Dubova.

Units of the Gil-Rodionov regiment performed not only combat missions, but also helped to confiscate agricultural products and livestock from the population. This is stated in the report of the Vileika District Commissioner for Agriculture to the General Commissar of Belarus (dated June 12, 1943). The official writes that “The operation, from the point of view of the withdrawal of livestock and agricultural products, did not give the result that it could have given. It was striking how the Wehrmacht, police, SD and other units attached to them carried out the task assigned to them. I got the impression that these divisions looked unfriendly at the agricultural commissioners, especially the units of the "Druzhina" " .

Gil's people seem to have resented the members of the agricultural divisions. The reason for this, most likely, was that the members of these groups did not fight the partisans, but were engaged in requisitions, in which they were supposed to be assisted by all participants in the operation, both parts of the Wehrmacht and the SD team. Apparently, it was not without conflict situations, otherwise the representatives of the civil administration would hardly have focused on such moments.

After Operation Cottbus, the Druzhina was left in the northwestern part of the Borisov-Begoml partisan zone. Together with two SS battalions and garrisons in Budslav, Parafyanovo and Krulevshchina (approximately 7 thousand people), the Russian SD formation was engaged in cleaning the rear areas of the 3rd Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht. Therefore, the wards of Gil-Rodionov were not included in the von Gottberg combat group, which from July 3, 1943 undertook an expedition "German" against the partisans operating in the Baranovichi region, in the region of Ivenetsko-Nalibokskaya Pushcha.

However, there were other reasons why the "Druzhina" was left outside the framework of the new operation. It was necessary, first, to complete the reorganization of the regiment into a brigade. Secondly, the Gil-Rodionov compound was still subordinate to the SD, and the saboteurs were checked on the basis of the brigade. And thirdly, despite the losses in Operation Cottbus, the Druzhina was in good standing with the leadership of the SS and the police of Belarus (von Gottberg personally met with Gil and thanked him for his help in the fight against the partisans). The confidence of the SS bosses was expressed in the fact that the Druzhina was given control of a bridgehead on the Ponya River, which included the villages of Dokshitsy, Yukhnovka, Beresnevka, Berezino and a number of other settlements. This foothold has cut like a wedge into northern part defeated at that time the Borisov-Begoml zone and very much prevented the Soviet patriots from reviving their positions.

According to the researcher S.G. Chueva, "A well-armed and at first disciplined brigade fought with varying degrees of success against partisan detachments"... In July 1943, the unit fought against partisan detachments from the Zheleznyak brigade. The fighting was notable for its intensity, the "Druzhina" was not going to just hand over to the people's avengers the settlements that were important for the SS command. However, the partisans gradually regained what they had lost during Operation Cottbus (in particular, the city of Begoml), and this negatively affected the state of the personnel of the Russian SD brigade.

The "Druzhina" fought its last battles in early August 1943. Taking advantage of the fact that the main forces of the "Zheleznyak" brigade entered the "Rail War" operation, Gil-Rodionov's units tried to capture Begoml. But the partisans, repelling all attacks, defended the city. In addition to everything, they struck a blow at the village of Yukhnovka, where Major Fefelov's battalion was stationed, and the key point in this area was in the hands of the people's avengers. Gil-Rodionov tried to return the village by advancing up to the regiment, but to no avail. This failure had an even more detrimental effect on the morale of the soldiers and officers of the formation, and the brigade command seriously thought about accepting the offer of the partisans and returning to the Soviet side.

Nazi occupation poster. This is what the SS men were preparing for the Russian youth

Thus, the "Druzhina" has repeatedly participated in anti-partisan and punitive operations. Perhaps the information about the number of people killed and tortured is overstated, but the facts of the crimes committed by Gil's people can hardly be doubted. For example, when the Zheleznyak brigade was discussing the issue of how to carry out work to decompose the Druzhina and attract its personnel to the Soviet side, individual commanders of partisan formations spoke out against this plan, citing "Examples of the brutality of Rodionovites towards partisans and the local population", referred "In cases of their abuse of women, children" .

Let us not forget that with the help of punitive actions the "military rallying" of the Russian SS men took place. Tied in blood, they, according to the plan of the German command, were deprived of the opportunity to return to the Soviet side.

As for Gil-Rodionov himself, his line of behavior does not seem so original. His fate is in many ways similar to the fate of his generation. Raised in an international spirit, yet critical of the deeds of the Stalinist totalitarian state, he tried to look for the "truth" on the other side. But this search for "truth" - an attempt to revive a new Russia without the Bolsheviks - was doomed to failure, since people like Gil did not have a strong connection with the Russian past, which was carried by the same emigrants who served in his brigade. The desire to survive at any cost, no matter what sacrifices one would have to make for this, was inherent not only to him, but also to many of his entourage. For people of this type, any idea will always be something secondary to their desire, so they, like chameleons, try to mimic as quickly as life changes. It was not so important for Gil how many Jews or Belarusians (and a little later Germans) were killed by his subordinates - this is how his disgusting features are manifested. And at the same time, the tragedy of this situation is obvious, its ambiguity, duality and contradiction. The only way out of this situation in a war could be death.

Notes:

Samutin L.A. I was a Vlasovite ... SPb., 2002. 320 p.

Kromiadi K.G. For the land, for the freedom ... On the paths of the Russian liberation struggle of 1941-1947. San Francisco, 1980.239 p.

In the fall of 1940, there were seven departments in the RSHA, in February 1944 they added Military administration, after July 1944, actually absorbed by the VI administration of the RSHA. Finally, in August 1944, the VIII Directorate was formed. Cm.: Zalessky K.A. Security detachments of Nazism. Complete SS encyclopedia. M., 2009. S. 284, 292–294, 348, 352.

Zalessky K.A. RSHA ... p. 210.

Schellenberg V. Labyrinth. Memoirs of a Hitler scout. M., 1991.S. 206.

Otto Skorzeny noted in his memoirs that Schellenberg "went completely into the service of the British." Cm.: Skorzeny O. Unknown War. Minsk, 2003.S. 464.

Zalessky K.A. RSHA ... p. 213.

Schellenberg V. Decree. Op. P. 189.

Cit. on: Okorokov A.B. Fascism and Russian emigration (1920–1945). M., 2002.S. 280 (with reference to: Grott M. Our slogans and our thoughts / "Fascist". 1937. No. 32, p. 15).

Cit. on: M. On the eve of 41st: hopes and illusions ... / Rodina (Moscow). 1993. No. 7.P. 72.

One of the most characteristic examples of this point of view is the book of a member of the NTS A.C. Kazantseva(present - G. Kato) “The third force. Russia between Nazism and Communism ”(M., 1994. 344 p.).

Cm.: Agapov A.B. The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels. Prelude to Barbarossa. M., 2002.S. 320.

Nechaev S.Yu. Russians in Latin America... M., 2010.S. 139.

Solonevich's organization was originally called the "Voice of Russia" circles (after the name of the newspaper), and then - "the movement of staff captains." Cm.: M.V. Nazarov Mission of the Russian emigration. 2nd edition. M., 1994.S. 263; Okorokov A.B. Fascism and Russian emigration ... pp. 392–393.

Okorokov A.B. Anti-Soviet military formations ... pp. 85–86; Chuev S.G. Special services ... p. 215.

Kalinin P. Participation Soviet soldiers in the partisan movement of Belarus / "Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal" (Moscow). 1962. No. 10. P. 34–37.

Documentary confirmation of such a titling of Russian officers, except for specially stipulated cases, has not yet been found (editor's note).

Certificate No. 4 on the deployment of traitorous formations (ROA), established by the reconnaissance of the partisans from 1.1 to 1.10 1943 / Semiryaga M.I. Collaboration. Nature, typology and manifestation during the Second World War. M., 2000.S. 844–845.

More about B.V. Kaminsky and the 29th SS division, see: Zhukov D.A., Kovtun I.I. 29th SS Kaminsky Grenadier Division. M., 2009.304 p.

Zhukov D.A. Russian nationalist, German spy, Soviet provocateur ... S. 5. According to S.G. Chuev, the basis of the brigade was "Local youth, deserters from partisan detachments"(Special services ... p. 212). The same researcher, but only in a different material, writes that in July 1943 Gil began "To the formation of a division at the expense of the population mobilized in the western regions of Belarus"(“Rodionov's Brigade, which received the name of the 1st Anti-Fascist Partisan Brigade” ... p. 22). It is not excluded that the Germans could have plans to deploy the 1st Russian National SS Division of up to 12,000 men on the base of the Druzhina. Cm.: Alexandrov K.M. Russian soldiers of the Wehrmacht ... p. 211; State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Collection of documents. Great turning point. July 1 - December 31, 1943. M., 2008. T. 4. Book. 2. P. 257–258; Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. P. 213. In Samutin's memoirs, the moment of the creation of the brigade is shown as follows: “Gil, with the consent of the Germans, carried out a“ mobilization ”of young people from the local population under the pretext that partisans would take them away anyway. It was these mobilized guys who deserted most often. The number of the former "Druzhina" has already exceeded 3 thousand people, and it was renamed into a brigade. Its garrisons were already stationed in many villages and hamlets ... ”(Decree op. P. 104).

Frohlich S. General Vlasov. Russians and Germans between Hitler and Stalin. New Jersey, 1990. S. 60. As we noted, data on Blazhevich's service in the NKVD are refuted by KGB documents.

Kromiadi K.G. Decree. Op. P. 91.

Steenberg S. Decree. Op. P. 124.

Samutin L.A. Decree. Op. S. 102-103; Zhukov D.A. Russian nationalist, German spy, Soviet provocateur ... p. 5; Zhukov A.D., Kovtun I.I. Russian SS men ... pp. 128–129.

State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Collection of documents. Great turning point. July 1 - December 31, 1943. M., 2008. T. 4. Book. 2.P. 258.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. S. 237-238. Historian K.M. Aleksandrov believes that P.V. Bogdanov suspected Blazhevich of a "double game": he allegedly also contributed to the start of negotiations between Gil and the command of the Zheleznyak partisan brigade. Cm.: Alexandrov K.M. Russian soldiers of the Wehrmacht ... p. 211.

Littlejohn D. Op. cit. P. 313-314; Okorokov A.B. Anti-Soviet military formations ... pp. 77–80; Alexandrov K.M. Army Officer Corps of Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov ... pp. 401, 524–525, 704. A.C. Kazantsev describes the process of disbanding the RNNA as follows: “Zhilenkov and Boyarsky were given guarantees of immunity and they were summoned to the Main Headquarters for negotiations ... The Germans showed restraint. We agreed that the brigade would not go to the front as a German unit, but would be disbanded into battalions ”. Then “it was ordered to change the Russian command of each of them to German, to replace the Russian uniform with the form of auxiliary units ... The matter ended with the fact that almost all battalions in turn, interrupting ... the German commanders, went into the forest. Some of them there fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks, some added to the number of partisans of the Third Force "(Op.cit. P. 127).

Zhukov D.A., Kovtun I.I. Russian SS men ... p. 131.

Okorokov A.B. Anti-Soviet military formations ... P. 87; Kovalev B.N. Activities of German intelligence, counterintelligence and propaganda services in the northwest of Russia / Counterintelligence: yesterday and today. Materials of the scientific-practical conference dedicated to the 55th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. April 26, 2000. Veliky Novgorod, 2000. P. 73–74; Drobyazko S.I. World War II 1939–1945: The Russian Liberation Army ... p. 33.

Polchaninov R.V. Youth of the Russian Diaspora. Memories 1941-1951. M., 2009.S. 136.

This song was performed in 2004 by the male choir of the Institute of Singing Culture "Valaam" (artistic director - IV Ushakov), as well as - in rock processing - by the Volgograd group "M.D.P." (album "Unfinished War", 2005).

Polchaninov R.V. Decree. Op. S. 136-137.

O. Kraus was born in 1906 in Riga. By profession - an architect. In 1933-1934. served in the Latvian army. He joined the SS in June 1940. He was not a member of the Nazi party. Fluent in Russian. In 1941-1942. served in Einsatzkommando A (translator) and 2 (commander of the security department). Then he served in the district of the SS "Warta", after which he was transferred to the staff of "Zeppelin" (information kindly provided by the candidate of historical sciences P.O. Ponomarenko).

Samutin L.A. Decree. Op. P. 134. It is curious that K. Kromiadi quite unconvincingly tries to deny the close connection of the unit with the SD. He writes that "In a new place" bosses from SD "We were almost not interested ... In Stremutka we were on our own."(Op.cit. P. 95).

Alexandrov K.M. Army Officer Corps of Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov ... S. 703–704.

Cit. on: Starinov I.G. Battle on enemy communications / War behind enemy lines. On some problems in the history of the Soviet partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War. M., 1974. Issue. 1, p. 197.

Mavrogordato R., Zimke E. Polotsk Lowland / Armstrong J. Partisan War. Strategy and tactics. 1941-1943. M., 2007. S. 178-179.

Begoml operation of the enemy against the partisans in May - June 1943 / Popov A.Yu. The NKVD and the partisan movement. M., 2003.S. 223; From the report of the command of the partisan brigade "Zheleznyak" of the Minsk region on the defeat of the German-fascist garrison in the urban village of Begoml on December 17-22, 1942 / National partisan movement in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - July 1944). Documents and materials in three volumes. Development of the popular partisan movement during the second period of the war (November 1942 - December 1943). T. II. Book. I. (November 1942 - June 1943). Minsk, 1973. S. 88–91.

Cit. on: Selemenev V., Shimolin V. Hunt for a Gauleiter. Minsk, 2006.S. 28.

Munoz A.J. The Druzhina SS Brigade ... P. 45; MacLean F.L. The cruel hunters ... P. 114. At the same time, the German researcher R. Michaelis, giving the calculation of the composition of the combat group "Shimana", does not indicate the "Druzhina" in it. Cm.: Michaelis R. Der Weg zur 36. Waffen-Grenadier-Division ... S. 41; Nazi policy of genocide ... p. 254.

Partisan formations of Belarus during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - July 1944): Brief information about the organizational structure of partisan formations, brigades (regiments), detachments (battalions) and their personnel. Minsk, 1983. S. 459, 463, 479, 493, 496–497; MacLean F.L. The cruel hunters ... P. 114-115.

I. I. Kovtun Belarusians in the SS / "Echo of War" (Moscow), 2008. No. 2. P. 46; Zhukov D.A., Kovtun I.I. Russian SS men ... pp. 220–221.

Munoz A.J. Michaelis R.

Information of the head of the SS and police of the general district "Belorussia" about the punitive operation "Magic flute" from April 24, 1943 / "Ostarbeiters" ... p. 131; Munoz A.J. The Druzhina SS Brigade ... P. 47; Campbell St. Police Battalions ... P. 81; Michaelis R. Der Weg zur 36. Waffen-Grenadier-Division ... S. 42.

Knatko G. Theft of the population of Belarus for forced labor (January 1942 - June 1944) / "Ostarbeiters" ... p. 19; Nazi policy of genocide ... p. 254.

Samutin L.A. Decree. Op. P. 105.

On the Borisov-Begoml and Polotsk-Lepel partisan zones, see: Higher Partisan Command of Belarus ... pp. 135–136, 156, 167–170.

The transcript of the interrogation of the accused Kaminskis S.Ya. March 7, 1949 / Latvia under the yoke of Nazism: a collection of archival documents. M., 2006. S. 229. About the "Arajs team" see: Krysin M.Yu. Baltic fascism. History and modernity. M., 2007.S. 204–206.

Cit. on: Alexandrov K.M. Russian soldiers of the Wehrmacht ... p. 208.

Romanko O.V. Brown shadows in Polesie. Belarus 1941-1945. M., 2008. S. 185-186.

Alexandrov K.M. Russian soldiers of the Wehrmacht ... p. 209 (with reference to: Kalinin P. The participation of Soviet soldiers in the partisan movement in Belarus / "Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal" (Moscow). 1964. No. 3. S. 19).

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. P. 177.

Knyazkov A.S., Chernov Yu.I. During the period of radical fracture ... P. 207; Begoml operation of the enemy against the partisans in May - June 1943 / Popov A.Yu. NKVD and partisan movement ... P. 223; Help from the head of the operational department of the BSHPD, Lieutenant Colonel A.I. Bryukhanov on the battles of the partisans of the Begoml zone of the Minsk region with German punishers in April - June 1943 (not earlier than August 12, 1943) / National partisan movement in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - July 1944): Documents and materials. In 3 vols. T. 2. Development of the national partisan movement in the second period of the war. Book II (July - December 1943). Minsk, 1978.S. 97.

Mavrogordato R., Zimke E. Polotsk Lowland ... P. 176; Hesse E. Der sowjetrussische Partisanenkrieg 1941 bis 1944 im Spiegel deutscher Kampfenweisungen und Befehle. Gottingen, 1969, S. 209; Michaelis R. Russen in der Waffen-SS ... S. 102; Michaelis R. Der Weg zur 36. Waffen-Grenadier-Division ... S. 43-44; Munoz A.J. The Druzhina SS Brigade ... P. 48.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. P. 179; Nazi policy of genocide ... p. 254; MacLean F.L. The cruel hunters ... P. 119; Müller H. The Wehrmacht and the occupation ... p. 183.

See: Report of the General Commissioner of Belarus to Cuba to the Reich Minister of the Occupied Eastern Regions Rosenberg on the results of the punitive operation "Cottbus" for the period from June 22 to July 3, 1943 (July 5, 1943) / Crimes of the Nazi occupiers in Belarus ... S. 94; Minoz A.J. The Druzhina SS Brigade ... P. 48; Campbell St. Police Battalions ... P. 139; Knyazkov A.S., Chernov Yu.I. During the period of radical fracture ... pp. 207–208; Litvin A.M. TO the question of the Cossack formations of the Wehrmacht in Belarus (1941-1944) / War. People. Victory: materials of an international scientific conference. Moscow, March 15-16, 2005. M., 2008. S. 300–301; Order of the commander of the security police and SD of Belarus on the participation in the operation "Cottbus" of the security police and SD of Belarus (from May 17, 1943) / "Destroy as much as possible ...": Latvian collaborationist formations on the territory of Belarus, 1941-1944. Collection of documents. M., 2009. S. 239–240; Drobyazko S.I. Under the banners of the enemy ... S. 535.

Knyazkov A.S., Chernov Yu.I. During the period of radical fracture ... P. 208; Nazi policy of genocide ... p. 254; Zalessky K. Luftwaffe. Air Force Third Reich. M., 2005.S. 386.

The Crimes of the German-Fascist Invaders in Belarus ... p. 90.

Partisan formations of Belarus during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - July 1944): Brief information about the organizational structure of partisan formations, brigades (regiments), detachments (battalions) and their personnel. Minsk, 1983. P. 170-171, 173-176, 179-181, 457-480. I.F. Titkov writes that during the operation "Cottbus" in the Borisov-Begoml partisan zone, brigades of the Orsha partisans operated, but he does not specify which ones. Cm.: Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. P. 182.

Knyazkov A.S., Chernov Yu.I. During the period of radical fracture ... P. 208; Higher partisan command of Belarus ... p. 168; Help from the head of the operational department of the BSHPD, Lieutenant Colonel A.I. Bryukhanov on the battles of the partisans of the Begoml zone of the Minsk region with the German punishers in April - June 1943 (not earlier than August 12, 1943) / National partisan movement in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - July 1944): Documents and materials. In 3 vols. T. 2. Development of the national partisan movement in the second period of the war. Book II (July - December 1943). Minsk, 1978.S. 97.

Shlyk F.E., Shop P.S. In the name of the Motherland. Minsk, 1971, p. 154; Lobanok V.E. In the Battles for the Motherland. Minsk, 1964.S. 268; Partisan formations of Belarus during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - July 1944): Brief information about the organizational structure of partisan formations, brigades (regiments), detachments (battalions) and their personnel. Minsk, 1983. pp. 255–257, 285–287, 288–292, 301–304, 309–310, 314–316.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. P. 178.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. S. 179-180; Shlyk F.E., Shop P.S. In the name of the Motherland ... pp. 157–158; Order of the Commander of the Security Police and SD of Belarus on the participation in Operation Cottbus of the formations of the Security Police and SD of Belarus (dated May 17, 1943) / "Destroy as much as possible ..." pp. 239–241.

Personal archive of I.I. Kovtun; Munoz A.J. Lessons Learned From German Anti-Partisan Tactics and Policies in White Russia. May Help the U.S. Army and its Current Problems in Iraq. P. 5.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. P. 180.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. P. 185; Begoml operation of the enemy against the partisans in May - June 1943 / Popov A.Yu. NKVD and the partisan movement ... pp. 224–225; Knyazkov A.S., Chernov Yu.I. During the period of radical change ... P. 208.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. P. 188.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. S. 189-190; From the report of the commander of the partisan brigade. Central Committee of the CP (b) B A.D. Medvedeva / National partisan movement in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - July 1944). Documents and materials in three volumes. Development of the national partisan movement during the second period of the war (November 1942 - December 1943). T. II. Book. I. (November 1942 - June 1943). Minsk, 1973.S. 416.

Cit. on: Ilyin V.P. The guerrillas don't give up! Life and death behind the front lines. M., 2007. S. 283–284.

Cit. Quoted from: The national partisan movement in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - July 1944). Documents and materials. In 3 volumes. Development of the popular partisan movement during the second period of the war (November 1942 - December 1943). T. II. Book. I. (November 1942 - June 1943). Minsk, 1973. S. 384–385.

In the same place. P. 395.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. S. 194-195; Begoml operation of the enemy against the partisans in May - June 1943 / Popov A.Yu. The NKVD and the partisan movement. M., 2003.S. 226; Help from the head of the operational department of the BSHPD, Lieutenant Colonel A.I. Bryukhanov on the battles of the partisans of the Begoml zone of the Minsk region with the German punishers in April - June 1943 (not earlier than August 12, 1943) / National partisan movement in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - July 1944): Documents and materials. In 3 vols. T. 2. Development of the national partisan movement in the second period of the war. Book II (July - December 1943). Minsk, 1978.S. 97.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. P. 194; Knyazkov A.S., Chernov Yu.I. During the period of radical fracture ... P. 208; Campbell St. Police Battalions ... P. 53–56.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. P. 196.

Cit. by: In the hell of Operation Cottbus / Sharkov A., Bestvitsky Yu. June dawn, Nuremberg sunset: tragedies and the fate of World War II. Minsk, 2008.S. 126.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. S. 196-197; Resolution of the Logoisk District Committee of the CP (b) B on military measures in connection with the blockade of the area by Nazi punishers (dated June 15, 1943) / National partisan movement in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - July 1944). Documents and materials. In 3 volumes. Development of the national partisan movement during the second period of the war (November 1942 - December 1943). T. II. Book. I. (November 1942 - June 1943). Minsk, 1973. S. 450–451.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. S. 199-200; In the hell of Operation Cottbus / Sharkov A., Bestvitsky Yu. June dawn ... p. 126; Michaelis R. Der Weg zur 36. Waffen-Grenadier-Division ... S. 44.

Cit. Quo: From the combat report of the SS Brigadefuehrer and Police Major General von Gottberg on the results of the punitive expedition "Cottbus" against partisans and civilians on the territory of the Vitebsk, Minsk and Vileika regions in May - June 1943 (dated June 28, 1943) / Crimes of the German fascist invaders in Belarus ... p. 92. See also: Selemenev V., Shimolin V. Hunt for a Gauleiter. Minsk, 2006.S. 29; I. I. Kovtun Belarusians serving in the SS ... P. 46. Note that in the memoirs of I.F. Titkov, quite detailed and interesting, an inaccuracy was made - he incorrectly indicates the date of the release of von Gottberg's combat report on the results of Operation Cottbus. Cm.: Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. P. 199.

I. I. Kovtun Belarusians serving in the SS ... P. 41. SS and police bodies of the General Commissariat "Belorussia" accused V. Cuba of unwillingness to cooperate on a number of fundamental issues. For example, it became a "revelation" for the SD that Cuba began to protect and save Jews. The head of the security police and SD of Belarus E. Shtraukh noted: “... a strange attitude to the Jewish question ... I do not understand why, because of some Jews, there are disagreements among the Germans. We have to admit that I and my people are being charged with barbarism and sadism, while we are only doing our duty. Even the fact that doctors, experts, according to instructions, remove gold crowns and seals to Jews before sending them for execution, was the subject of conversation. Gauleiter declared that such actions were unworthy of the German people and Germany of Kant and Goethe. If Germany's reputation is undermined all over the world, it will be our own fault. "... Cit. on: Hohne H. Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf ... S. 341. Cuba criticized and criticized Operation Cottbus, calling the actions carried out during it "devastating and devastating." "SS leadership, - writes X. Hene, - did not know how to deal with her opponent in Minsk. However, on the night of September 22, 1943, Cuba was killed by a bomb placed under his bed by a servant, a Soviet agent. Himmler simply beamed, declaring about the death of Cuba: "This is just happiness for the Fatherland." Cm.: Hohne H. Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf ... S. 342.

Report of the General Commissioner of Belarus to Cuba to the Reichsminister of the occupied eastern regions Rosenberg on the results of the punitive operation "Cottbus" for the period from June 22 to July 3, 1943 (July 5, 1943) / Crimes of the German fascist invaders in Belarus ... pp. 93–94.

See: Nazi policy of genocide ... p. 254.

Cit. on: Sokolov B.V. An occupation. Truth and myths. M., 2003. S. 113-114. Directly this method was used by units of the special SS battalion Oskar Dirlewanger. On May 25, 1943, when his people faced strong resistance from the partisans in the area of ​​Lake Palik, he issued an order, which noted: “Roadblocks and artificial obstacles are usually mined. There are casualties during demining of roads - 1 killed, 4 wounded. Therefore, in principle: never remove the barriers ourselves, but use all the time for this from among the local population. The saved forces justify the loss in time. " Cit. Quoted from: The Crimes of the German Fascist Invaders in Belarus ... p. 88.

Müller N. The Wehrmacht and the occupation ... p. 213.

See: State Security Bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Collection of documents. September 1 - December 31, 1941. M., 2000. Book. 2.T. 2.P. 567.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. P. 215.

Titkov I.F. Decree. Op. P. 212.

The most amazing formations during the Great Patriotic War can be safely attributed to the unit, which was originally called the 1st Russian National SS Brigade (better known as the "Druzhina"). It ended its history as the 1st Anti-Fascist Partisan Brigade.

In Soviet times, if they wrote about this brigade, it was only as a partisan unit. Her service to the Germans has been very briefly discussed in the past.

Modern historians pay much more attention to the "Druzhina"; it is mentioned in almost all works on the theme of the partisan movement. There is even a very fundamental work by Dmitry Zhukov "1st Russian SS Brigade" Druzhina ". She is given a lot of space in the book of Leonid Samutin "I was a Vlasov ..."

Most of the studies on guerrilla activity are not without drawbacks: the authors are often overly politicized and almost always deeply cover only one topic, replicating other people's mistakes. But on the whole, the history of the "Druzhina" is already sufficiently covered today.

The appearance of the "Druzhina"

Although the Slavs in the Third Reich were considered an inferior race, they began to use Soviet citizens for their own purposes from the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In any case, the German command would not have enough strength to manage the occupied territories.

In military terms, reconnaissance and sabotage activities were impossible without the involvement of representatives of the peoples of the USSR. And if in the army intelligence (Abwehr) they relied on emigrants, among whom there were many volunteers, then in the competing SS Security Service (SD), the main emphasis was placed on prisoners of war. Among the latter, there were also a lot of applicants.

The reason for this was the competent agitation of the Germans. She laid down on fertile ground: many personally remembered the Civil War, dispossession of kulaks, many were touched by repression. Invaluable "help" to the Germans was provided by the order of the Headquarters of August 16, 1941, No. 270, in which all those who surrendered were declared traitors. The successes of the Wehrmacht at the front were also not the last factor.

The 1st Russian National SS Detachment (or "Druzhina No. 1") was formed by the Zepellin SD Department in the summer of 1942 from prisoners of war, and was originally intended for sabotage in the Soviet rear. It was practically the only Russian unit subordinate to the SD. Others were subordinate to the Wehrmacht or were part of the Waffen SS. However, the use of the "Druzhina" in the Soviet rear was immediately abandoned, and its main task was to fight the partisans.

Vladimir Gil

The history of the "Druzhina" is inseparable from its creator and commander Vladimir Vladimirovich Gil. A career soldier, in 1941, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, he served as chief of staff of the 229th rifle division. The division was surrounded, and Gil and many others were captured.

Why Gil went over to the side of the Germans is a question that is still a matter of debate among historians. In the biographies of almost everyone - from ordinary soldiers to General Vlasov - there is not a single moment that would explain the reasons for hatred of the Soviet regime. Nevertheless, the majority fought on the side of the Nazis precisely for ideological convictions.

In the spring of 1942, Gil created the Combat Union of Russian Nationalists, which became the basis of the "Druzhina". After that, he took the pseudonym Rodionov.

The activities of the Rodionov detachment, which from March 1943 was deployed to the 1st Russian National SS Regiment, and already in May to the 1st Russian National SS Brigade, is still controversial. On the one hand, there is a lot of reliable data on the participation of this unit in punitive operations, the destruction of local residents. On the other hand, there is no less reliable information about a good attitude towards the local population and even non-compliance with orders to carry out punitive actions. Along with the data on the destruction of the "Druzhina" partisan detachments, there are facts when a non-aggression agreement was in effect and Rodionov's brigade released the partisans from the encirclement.

All this shows how different people were among the former prisoners.

Going to the partisans

Although the SD trusted Rodionov and his people, allowing them to act independently and even entrusting them with the management of entire districts, the trust was still incomplete. And it is quite reasonable. In all units created from prisoners of war, there were regular cases of transition to partisans.

This was largely facilitated by the change in the policy of the Soviet leadership, which in October 1942 abandoned the tactics of the total destruction of all who went over to the Germans, and focused on agitating for the transition to the Soviet side. Forgiveness was promised to everyone. This work turned out to be successful, although the victories of the Red Army at the front played an important role. And also the distrust of the Germans to the Soviet citizens who went over to their side.

On November 26, 1942, one of the companies of the "Druzhina" blew up the bridge, which it was entrusted to guard, and joined the partisans. In addition, there were cases of individual fighters and small groups fleeing to the partisans.

All this was a consequence of the fact that the "Druzhina" enjoyed special attention from the partisans. Several brigades at once conducted agitation work among its personnel. The command set a goal to lure them over to their side at any cost. In the summer of 1943, Aleksandra Nikonova from the Zheleznyak brigade, who had a close relationship with the commander of one of the companies of the Druzhina, achieved the transfer of the entire company to the partisans.

This further increased the mistrust of the German authorities personally towards Rodionov. The situation was also fueled by internal disagreements between the leaders of the "Druzhina". There were enough people willing to take the commander's place.

As a result, Rodionov came into contact with the top of the partisans. He was given guarantees that the entire brigade would be preserved, and he himself would receive full forgiveness and the post of brigade commander would remain for him. It was only required to hand over some of the leaders. Rodionov did it willingly, at the same time he blamed them for the crimes committed by the brigade.

On August 16, the "Druzhina" went over to the partisans and became the 1st Anti-Fascist Partisan Brigade.

The end of the "Druzhina"

The 1st Anti-Fascist Brigade was replenished with political workers, all members of the former "Druzhina" were checked by a specially created group of the NKVD.

In a new capacity, the brigade took part in several successful operations, but its history was short-lived.

In April-May, the Germans conducted the Spring Festival operation against the partisans. It was a real battle with the assault of fortified positions, with the participation of tanks and aircraft. Moreover, aviation is not only German, but also Soviet.

During the operation, almost all partisan formations were defeated. The 1st Anti-Fascist Brigade was no exception. Of the 1,413 people, 1,026 died, including Gil-Rodionov.

Later the brigade was restored, but these were completely different people who had nothing to do with the "Druzhina".

According to contemporaries, such an end was the best for the Druzhina. It is not known what would have happened to these people after the war, but they would definitely not be forgiven for their crimes.

The most scandalous experiment of the German-Soviet war. Former Soviet servicemen, including former communists, managed to fight for both Stalin and Hitler.

What are we reading? Monograph by historians Dmitry Zhukov and Ivan Kovtun "1st Russian SS Brigade" Druzhina "(Moscow, publishing house" Veche ", 2010). The authors announce a documentary study about "the most scandalous experiment of the German special services during the years of the German-Soviet war."

Over the years, this military unit had different names - the officer's hundred of the "Combat Union of Russian Nationalists", the 1st Russian National SS Brigade, the "Druzhina" brigade and, finally, as the 1st ... Anti-Fascist Brigade. Indeed, such a somersault is still to be found.

What's interestnig? The collaborationist units of Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Gil-Rodionov were formed in the first half of 1942 from among Soviet prisoners of war and defectors. At first they were trained for sabotage and reconnaissance and subversive activities in the rear of the Red Army.

The idea of ​​creation belonged to the "Security Service" - SS intelligence, better known by the German abbreviation SD. In the pre-war period and in the first phase of the campaign in the summer of 1941, the SS leaders did not show themselves too actively in contacts with the Russian emigration, yielding to the Wehrmacht, the Ministry of Propaganda, the Ministry of Occupied Territories and, of course, their main competitors from the Abwehr - military intelligence.

Photo - http://www.reibert.info

Colonel Klaus von Staufenberg said to one of the leading Russian collaborators in the summer of 1942: “The SS, despite its theory of the Untermensch, will not hesitate to take the path of using [Russian] people. And if Himmler takes up the Russian liberation movement, he will attract hundreds of thousands of Russians for the SS. Some will believe the promises, others will go because of spinelessness or out of careerism. "

The head of the RSHA, the Main Directorate of Imperial Security, Heydrich, in one of the documents noted that among the prisoners one should look for elements that are trustworthy - "Despite the fact that we are talking about the Communists."

"Missing in action ..", but in fact created a Russian SS brigade. Photo - http://feldgrau.info

Gil, who later began to use the pseudonym "Rodionov", was born in Belarus. In the Red Army - since 1926, a member of the CPSU (b) - since 1931. Graduated with honors from the Military Academy. Frunze. The war was met by the chief of staff of the 229th rifle division. He was taken prisoner in the Vitebsk region - apparently wounded. But soon he became the commandant of the camp for Soviet prisoners of war.

Prisoner of war card Vladimir Gil

On April 20, 1942, at the officers' meeting in the camp "Oflag-68" in Suwalki (now a city in eastern Poland), timed to coincide with Hitler's birthday, the creation of the "National Party of the Russian People" was proclaimed, headed by former lieutenant colonel of the Red Army Vladimir Gil.

The organization's program noted that future Russia will be nationalistic, and "the peoples inhabiting the Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states and the Transcaucasus will be given the right to self-determination and separation into independent states under the protectorate of Great Germany."

Subsequently, the "party" was renamed the Fighting Union of Russian Nationalists and the "Druzhina" brigade.

Gil's companions were not some marginalized offended by the Soviet regime, but red commanders - Major General Bogdanov, Colonel Yegorov, Major Kalugin, captains Ivin and Blazhevich.

After a short stay in a recruiting camp, a month-long study tour of Germany was organized for members of the new anti-Soviet group. In Suwalki, the Nazis eased the regime, improved food, created a musical orchestra, organized a theater and amateur performances.

On May 1, 1942, the first hundred officers who entered the union were officially released and dressed in new Czech uniforms.

"The former commanders were brought together into one platoon, in which, as privates, commanders of the rank from junior lieutenants to lieutenant colonels consisted." They were transferred to Lublin, where they were retrained, plus, to consolidate the theory, they were involved in punitive actions against the Home Army partisans and the Jews (together about 1.5 thousand people were killed).

Russian volunteers, soldier and officer, in the German troops

At the end of the summer of the 42nd hundred turns into a battalion. There were no problems with personnel - “There were many new commanders in high ranks - lieutenant colonels and colonels. Their number significantly exceeded the staffing requirements. "

Consequently, the Russian SS men are being transferred to the "liberated territories". After participating in the anti-partisan action "Yellow Elephant", during which the Smolensk region was "cleaned out" of the red partisans, the soldiers were transferred to Belarus, south of Mogilev.

In January of the 43rd, the "vigilantes" were involved in the next anti-partisan operation, called the "Harvest Festival". In the order read out before the beginning it was said - "For the enemy should be taken a bandit, a Jew, gypsies and everyone suspected of banditry."

The Germans and collaborators tried to grab more agricultural products (hence the name of the operation) and labor force - to be sent to Germany. As a result, 1165 people were killed, 1308 were taken for forced labor in the Reich, 2803 heads of cattle, 562 pigs, 1500 sheep, 393 horses, 438 tons of grain were seized.

One of the prominent Nazis, von Gottberg, reported to Berlin - "this unit, consisting of 1200 Russians, will very soon be a striking force, and in the fight against gangs it seems reliable."

Creativity of partisan propagandists. Soon, the "bandit" will beat the Germans together with the authors of the leaflet

At the end of the 43rd "Druzhina" is once again transferred, the place of its deployment becomes the village of Luzhki, Vileika region. Gil had long asked the Germans to entrust him with an area that he would be guaranteed to free from partisans, promised to establish self-government and carry out supplies that would be required by the interests of Germany. Gil-Rodionov receives the rank of colonel.

Soon there were already 1,500 men in the 1st Russian National SS Brigade. Russians - 80%, Ukrainians and representatives of other nations - 20%. Two-thirds of the personnel are former servicemen of the Red Army, police officers - 16-17%, the rest are Russian emigrants and former kulaks.

In the summer of 1943, Rodionov had, according to various estimates, from 3 to 8 and even 12 thousand soldiers. True, forcibly mobilized Belarusians more often ran away at the first opportunity. In the literature they write that Rodionov's soldiers burned down several Belarusian villages because their residents could not fulfill the colonel's demand "to ask him for pardon in the Russian literary language."

The memoirs of the Belarusian emigrants also mention the fact that 5 young people were shot just for the fact that they attached badges of the national color of white and red to their chests.

Buttonholes of the national volunteer units of the SS troops: 1-2 - Estonian; 3-5 - Latvian, 6 - Belarusian; 7-8 - Ukrainian. Photo - the book "Eastern Volunteers in the Wehrmacht, Police and SS"

“It was not so important for Gil how many Jews or Belarusians (and a little later Germans) were killed by his subordinates - this is his disgusting traits. And at the same time, the tragedy of this situation is obvious, its ambiguity, duality and contradictions. The only way out of this situation in a war could be death. "

The extreme cruelty of his soldiers by some researchers from Russian-nationalist circles is argued by the deliberate actions of Gil as a conspiratorial agent - they say, "deliberately provoked hatred of the local population towards the German invaders."

Unable to defeat the SS in an open battle, the Belarusian partisans actively tried to destroy the collaborationist formations from within. In the instructions received from Moscow, signed by Kliment Voroshilov and the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement Ponomarenko, it was said: "Each such defector should be given the opportunity to atone for his guilt by personal participation in the struggle for the liberation of the Motherland from the Nazi invaders."

However, this did not apply to people of the scale of Gil - "to ruthlessly exterminate or capture the organizers and active commanders of punitive and police detachments."

In November 1942, one Rodionovtsy officer company of 75 people killed the Germans (about 30), blew up the bridge and surrendered to the partisans with weapons - along with a car, a kitchen, a radio station, etc. Subsequently, another 39 "vigilantes" went over to the side of the Soviets. Then another ...

Germans and collaborators in the forests of Belarus, 1943. Photo - the book "Russian SS men"

The commander's nerves began to break down. On April 18, 1943, by order of Gil, 13 soldiers were shot for listening to the reports of the "Sovinformburo". As a result, 35 more people went over to the partisans ...

The Germans, including Gil's curator Walter Schellenberg, felt this. One of the reports states - "Rodionov does NOT inspire confidence with his behavior ... in the near future, the" squad "will be struck by a catastrophe."

"The desire to stay alive for Gil has always been more important than any ideology." In July 1943, Gil and the commanders of the Zheleznyak partisan detachment exchanged more than 20 (!) Letters. At first there were many insults, obscene language and calls to surrender, so to speak, "for food."

But one day, in one of the messages, Gil asked about guarantees in the event of a transition. Of course, the partisan leaders Titkov and Mankovich thought that this was an insidious game of the SD.

Guerrilla leaders, "curators" Gil - Stepan Mankovich (left) and Ivan Titkov

Moscow and the head of the headquarters of the partisan movement, Ponomarenko, prescribe to continue the game - to give guarantees, intensify agitation, etc. The guerrillas promise the SS that no one will be arrested, the officers will be reinstated in ranks, receive a monetary allowance, and will be able to establish correspondence with relatives.

Such appeals were addressed personally to each senior officer of the "Druzhina". Some of them sent answers - from negative ones with propaganda of the struggle for a "new Russia", to cautious ones, where the grounds for the possibility of a return were probed.

On August 10-13, 1943, Gil sent a letter to the partisans, defining the first steps for the final decision - not to conduct operations against each other. He signed with his Red Army rank - as a lieutenant colonel. He had already decided everything for himself.

On August 16, a meeting took place between the commander of the Zhelyaznyakovites Titkov and Rodionov. The latter was presented with conditions - the transfer of the entire brigade, with weapons, ammunition, food supplies, and immediately - the beginning of active hostilities against the invaders. They demanded that the chief of counterintelligence Bogdanov and SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky be handed over to the partisans.

Rodionov agreed to the terms and issued an order to "units of the 1st Anti-Fascist Partisan Brigade" to oppose the "fascist bastards", "to mercilessly exterminate the Fritzes until their last expulsion from the Russian land."

The insignia - swastikas, skulls, eagles were immediately removed, instead of the "Halb-liter" greeting, they put their hands on the headdress in accordance with the requirements of the Red Army regulations.

Rodionov kept his word. Upon returning to the brigade, he lined up the personnel and read out the order - the one that had been agreed with the partisans. NKVD officer Tabachnikov, assigned to him as a liaison officer, recalled after the war - "he was greeted with glee."

Gil arrested and handed over to the partisans all pro-German officers, the burgomaster and the chief of police of the regional center of Dokshitsy. Several former comrades-in-arms were ordered to be hanged and shot "to raise morale."

Using his knowledge of passwords and security systems, he captured the railway station. According to the recollections of the partisans, Rodionov's brigade destroyed several hundred German soldiers and officers.

After the change of "orientation" with Gil remained 106 officers, 151 sergeants and foreman, 1175 privates. The Germans, in turn, organized their own assembly point, and more than 500 people from the "Druzhina", including 30 officers, came there.

Then there was a war in the swamps and on the rails. On September 16, 1943, Gil was awarded the next rank - colonel, he was awarded the Order of the "Red Star", and many of his subordinates were awarded the medal "Partisan of the Patriotic War."

Such an illustration of “Big Soviet Encyclopedia»Illustrated an article about Belarusian partisans. Oath in the detachment to them. Suvorov

In December, the 43rd "anti-fascists" Rodionov were transferred to the Polotsk-Lepel zone - a kind of partisan republic with an area of ​​more than 3 thousand square kilometers and with a population of 80 thousand people.

In the spring, the Germans began an operation to liquidate the partisan nest, codenamed "Spring Festival". The losses of the partisans and the local population were very large, over 30 thousand killed.

On May 14, 1944, Vladimir Gil-Rodionov was wounded in battle, died of blood loss. Some emigration historians write that he was shot by one of his former subordinates with the exclamation "Death to the dog!" In his memoirs, one of his new comrades remarked - “Maybe it's better that such an end; and there would be no grief if he got to Moscow. "

In July 1944, what was left of the 1st Anti-Fascist Brigade was merged with one of the Red Army units. In fact, only a few of the Russian SS men returned home, most of the "vigilantes" found their death in the Belarusian swamps.

In 1992, searchers from Vitebsk found the remains of Colonel Gil and reburied them in a mass Red Army grave in the town of Ushachi.

Phrase. “... It has no even remote analogs in the annals of Russian collaboration. Of course, individual and group transitions of the participants of the "Russian Liberation Movement" to the side of the USSR were often It was never!".