German agents in the highest authorities of the USSR. German "moles" in the Red Army in the final period of the wwii


In the Caucasus, the German military intelligence, called the Abwehr, after the start of the war, launched a vigorous activity to create anti-Soviet national movements, in this sense Chechnya was ideally suited. There, even before the war, Muslim separatists campaigned and openly opposed the Soviet regime, their goal was to unite the Muslims of the Caucasus into united state under the leadership of Turkey. In Chechen-Ingushetia, there was a massive desertion, unwillingness to serve in the Red Army, and disobedience to Soviet laws. The number of deserters who united in illegal armed detachments amounted to 15,000 by 1942, and this took place in the immediate rear of the Soviet Army. The Abwehr actively threw sabotage groups, weapons and equipment there; the Chechen rebels acquired experienced military specialists, masters of intelligence and sabotage. Uprising and sabotage began, but they were suppressed, although, as it turned out in our time, not completely. There was no longer and no, and now in Russia, a general like the late Yermolov, only he knew and did so that then no one wanted to fight with him!


TROUBLE REPUBLIC

The growth in the activity of religious and gangster authorities was observed in the Chechen Republic of the ASSR even before the start of the Great Patriotic War, thereby exerting a serious negative impact on the situation in the republic. Focusing on Muslim Turkey, they advocated the unification of the Muslims of the Caucasus into a single state under the protectorate of Turkey.

To achieve their goal, the separatists called on the population of the republic to resist the measures of the government and local authorities, and initiated open armed actions. Particular emphasis was placed on the treatment of Chechen youth against serving in the Red Army and studying in FZO schools. At the expense of the deserters who went into an illegal position, bandit formations were replenished, which were pursued by units of the NKVD troops.

So, in 1940, the rebel organization of Sheikh Magomet-Khadzhi Kurbanov was identified and neutralized. In January 1941, a large armed uprising was localized in the Itum-Kalinsky region under the leadership of Idris Magomadov. In total, in 1940, the administrative bodies of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic arrested 1,055 bandits and their accomplices, from whom 839 rifles and revolvers with ammunition were confiscated. 846 deserters who evaded service in the Red Army were tried. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War entailed a new series of bandit attacks in Shatoisky, Galanchozhsky and Cheberloevsky districts. According to the NKVD, in August - November 1941, up to 800 people took part in armed uprisings.

DIVISION NOT REACHING TO THE FRONT

Being in an illegal position, the leaders of the Chechen-Ingush separatists counted on the imminent defeat of the USSR in the war and led a wide defeatist campaign for desertion from the ranks of the Red Army, disrupting mobilization, and putting together armed formations to fight in Germany's favor. During the first mobilization from August 29 to September 2, 1941, 8000 people were to be conscripted into construction battalions. However, only 2,500 arrived at their destination, in Rostov-on-Don, the remaining 5,500 either simply avoided appearing at the recruiting offices or deserted along the way.

During the additional mobilization in October 1941 of persons born in 1922, out of 4733 conscripts, 362 people avoided appearing at the recruiting stations.

By the decision of the State Defense Committee, in the period from December 1941 to January 1942, the 114th national division was formed from the indigenous population in the ChI ASSR from the indigenous population. As of the end of March 1942, 850 people managed to defect from it.

The second mass mobilization in Checheno-Ingushetia began on March 17, 1942 and was supposed to end on the 25th. The number of persons to be mobilized was 14,577 people. However, by the appointed time, only 4,887 were mobilized, of which only 4,395 were sent to military units, that is, 30% of the assignment. In this regard, the mobilization period was extended until April 5, but the number of mobilized people increased only to 5,543 people. The reason for the disruption of mobilization was the massive evasion of conscripts from conscription and desertion on the way to assembly points.

At the same time, members and candidates for members of the CPSU (b), Komsomol members, officials of regional and village Soviets (chairmen of executive committees, chairmen and party organizers of collective farms, etc.) evaded the draft.

On March 23, 1942, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen Republic of the ASSR Daga Dadaev, mobilized by the Nadterechny RVK, escaped from the Mozdok station. Under the influence of his agitation, another 22 people fled with him. Among the deserters were also several instructors of the Komsomol RK, a people's judge and a district prosecutor.

By the end of March 1942, the total number of deserters and evaders in the republic reached 13,500 people. Thus, the active Red Army received less than a full-fledged rifle division. In the conditions of mass desertion and the intensification of the insurgent movement on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in April 1942, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR signed an order to abolish the conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the army.

In January 1943, the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the ChI ASSR applied to the NKO of the USSR with a proposal to announce an additional recruitment of military volunteers from among the inhabitants of the republic. The proposal was approved and the local authorities received permission to recruit 3,000 volunteers. According to the order of the NKO, the conscription was ordered to be carried out in the period from January 26 to February 14, 1943. However, the approved plan for the next conscription was also miserably failed this time both in terms of execution and in the number of volunteers sent to the troops.

So, as of March 7, 1943, 2986 "volunteers" were sent to the Red Army out of those recognized as fit for combat service. Of these, only 1806 people arrived at the unit. Along the way, 1,075 people managed to defect. In addition, 797 more "volunteers" fled from the district mobilization points and along the route to Grozny. In total, from January 26 to March 7, 1943, 1872 persons liable for military service from the so-called last "voluntary" conscription in the Chechen Republic of the ASSR deserted.

Among those who escaped were representatives of the regional and regional party and Soviet assets again: secretary of the Gudermes RK VKP (b) Arsanukaev, head of the department of the Vedensky RK VKP (b) Magomayev, secretary of the Komsomol regional committee for military work Martazaliev, second secretary of the Gudermes RK Komsomol Taimaskhanov Khayauri.

IN THE BACK OF THE RED ARMY

The leading role in disrupting the mobilization was played by the underground Chechen political organizations - the National Socialist Party of the Caucasian Brothers and the Chechen-Gorsk National Socialist Underground Organization. The first was led by its organizer and ideologist Khasan Israilov, who became one of the central figures of the insurrectionary movement in Chechnya during the Great Patriotic War. With the outbreak of the war, Israilov went into an illegal position and until 1944 led a number of large bandit formations, while maintaining close ties with German intelligence agencies.

Another organization was headed by the brother of the well-known revolutionary in Chechnya A. Sheripov - Mayrbek Sheripov. In October 1941, he also went into an illegal position and amassed several bandit detachments around him, consisting mainly of deserters. In August 1942, M. Sheripov raised an armed uprising in Chechnya, during which the administrative center of the Sharoevsky district, the village of Khimoy, was destroyed, and an attempt was made to seize the neighboring regional center, the village of Itum-Kale. However, the rebels lost the battle with the local garrison and were forced to retreat.

In November 1942 Mayrbek Sheripov was killed as a result of a conflict with accomplices. Some of the members of his bandit groups joined Kh. Israilov, some continued to act alone, and some surrendered to the authorities.

All in all, the pro-fascist parties formed by Israilov and Sheripov had over 4,000 members, and the total number of their insurgent detachments reached 15,000. In any case, these are the figures that Israilov reported to the German command in March 1942. Thus, in the immediate rear of the Red Army, a whole division of ideological bandits was operating, ready at any moment to provide significant assistance to the advancing German troops.

However, the Germans themselves understood this. The aggressive plans of the German command included the active use of the "fifth column" - anti-Soviet individuals and groups in the rear of the Red Army. It certainly included the bandit underground in Checheno-Ingushetia as such.

ENTERPRISE "SHAMIL"

Having correctly assessed the potential of the insurrectionary movement for the advancing Wehrmacht, the German special services set out to unite all the bandit formations under a single command. To prepare for a one-time uprising in mountainous Chechnya, special emissaries of the Abwehr were supposed to be sent as coordinators and instructors.

The 804th regiment of the Brandenburg-800 special purpose division was aimed at solving this problem, directed to the North Caucasian sector of the Soviet-German front. Subdivisions of this division carried out sabotage and terrorist acts and reconnaissance work in the rear on the instructions of the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht command Soviet troops, captured important strategic objects and held them until the main forces arrived.

As part of the 804th regiment, there was a Sonderkommando of Ober-Lieutenant Gerhard Lange, conventionally called "Enterprise" Lange "or" Enterprise "Shamil". The team was staffed with agents from among the former prisoners of war and emigrants of Caucasian nationalities and was intended for subversive activities in the rear of the Soviet troops in the Caucasus. Before being sent to the rear of the Red Army, the saboteurs underwent nine months of training at a special school located in Austria near the Mosham castle. Here they taught subversion, topography, taught how to handle small arms, self-defense techniques and the use of fictitious documents. The direct transfer of agents behind the front line was carried out by Abwehr command-201.

On August 25, 1942, from Armavir, a group of Ober-Lieutenant Lange in the amount of 30 people, staffed mainly by Chechens, Ingush and Ossetians, was parachuted into the area of ​​the villages of Chishki, Dachu-Borzoi and Duba-Yurt of the Ataginsky region of the Chechen Republic of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to commit sabotage and terrorist acts and organizing an insurrectionary movement, timing the uprising to the beginning of the German offensive on Grozny.

On the same day, another group of six people landed near the village of Berezhki, Galashki region, led by a native of Dagestan, a former emigrant Osman Guba (Saidnurov), who, to give due weight among the Caucasians, was named in the documents "Colonel of the German Army." Initially, the group was tasked with advancing to the village of Avtury, where, according to German intelligence, a large number of Chechens who had deserted from the Red Army were hiding in the forests. However, due to the error of the German pilot, the paratroopers were thrown much west of the designated area. At the same time, Osman Guba was to become the coordinator of all armed bandit formations on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia.

And in September 1942, another group of saboteurs in the amount of 12 people was thrown out on the territory of the ChI ASSR under the leadership of non-commissioned officer Gert Reckert. The Abwehr agent Leonard Chetvergas from the Reckert group, who was arrested by the NKVD in Chechnya, testified during interrogation about its goals: “Informing us about the upcoming landing in the rear of the Red Army and our tasks, the command of the German army told us: an active struggle against Soviet power at all stages of its existence, that the peoples of the Caucasus truly desire the victory of the German army and the establishment of German order in the Caucasus. Therefore, upon landing in the Soviet rear, the landing groups must immediately get in touch with the active bandit formations and, using them, raise the peoples of the Caucasus to an armed uprising against Soviet power. By overthrowing Soviet power in the Caucasian republics and handing it over to the Germans, ensure the successful advance of the advancing German army in the Transcaucasus, which will follow in the coming days. The landing groups preparing for the landing in the rear of the Red Army were also tasked with preserving the oil industry of Grozny from possible destruction by retreating units of the Red Army. "

ALL HELPED THE DIVERSANTS!

Once in the rear, the paratroopers everywhere enjoyed the sympathy of the population, ready to provide assistance with food and accommodate for the night. The attitude of local residents to the saboteurs was so loyal that they could afford to walk in the Soviet rear in German military uniform.

A few months later, Osman Gube, arrested by the NKVD, described his impression of the first days of his stay on the Chechen-Ingush territory during interrogation: “In the evening, a collective farmer named Ali-Mahomet came to our forest with another named Mohammed. At first they did not believe who we were, but when we took an oath on the Koran that we were indeed sent to the rear of the Red Army by the German command, they believed us. They told us that the terrain we are on is flat and it is dangerous for us to stay here. Therefore, they recommended going to the mountains of Ingushetia, since it would be easier to hide there. After spending 3-4 days in the forest near the village of Berezhki, we, accompanied by Ali-Mahomet, went to the mountains to the village of Hai, where Ali-Mahomet had good friends. One of his acquaintances turned out to be a certain Ilaev Kasum, who took us to his place, and we stayed overnight with him. Ilaev introduced us to his son-in-law Ichaev Soslanbek, who took us to the mountains ...

When we were in a hut near the village of Hai, we were often visited by various Chechens passing along the nearby road, and usually expressed sympathy for us ... ”.

However, the Abwehr agents received sympathy and support not only from ordinary peasants. Collective farm chairmen and leaders of the party and Soviet apparatus willingly offered their cooperation. “The first person with whom I spoke directly about the deployment of anti-Soviet work on the instructions of the German command,” Osman Guba said during the investigation, “was the chairman of the Dattykh village council, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Ibragim Pshegurov. I told him that I was an emigrant, that we had been dropped by parachutes from a German plane and that our goal was to help the German army in the liberation of the Caucasus from the Bolsheviks and to carry out further struggle for the independence of the Caucasus. Pshegurov said that he sympathized with me. He recommended now to establish contacts with the right people, but to speak openly only when the Germans take the city of Ordzhonikidze. "

A little later, the chairman of the Akshi village council, Duda Ferzauli, came to the Abwehr envoy. According to O. Gube, “Ferzauli himself approached me and in every possible way proved that he was not a communist, that he undertakes to fulfill any of my assignments ... At the same time, he brought half a liter of vodka and tried in every possible way to appease me as a messenger from the Germans. He asked me to take him under my protection after their area was occupied by the Germans. "

Representatives of the local population not only sheltered and fed the Abwehr saboteurs, but also sometimes took the initiative to carry out sabotage and terrorist acts. Osman's testimony to Guba describes an episode when a local resident Musa Keloev came to his group, who said that he was ready to complete any task, and he himself noticed that it was important to disrupt the railway traffic on the narrow-gauge Ordzhonikidzevskaya - Muzhichi road, since they were transported along it military cargo. I agreed with him that it was necessary to blow up a bridge on this road. To carry out the explosion, I sent along with him a member of my parachute group, Salman Aguev. When they returned, they reported that they had blown up an unguarded wooden railway bridge.

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Vladimir Vysotsky

There is an opinion that Nazi Germany trained almost the most invulnerable spies in the world. Say, with the notorious German pedantry, they could take care of all, even the seemingly insignificant little things. After all, according to the old spy adage, it is on them that the best agents always "burn".

In reality, however, the situation on the invisible German-Allied front developed somewhat differently. Sometimes the Nazi "knights of the cloak and dagger" were ruined by their scrupulousness. A similar story in the book "Spy Hunter" is quoted by the famous British counterintelligence officer Colonel O. Pinto. At the beginning of World War II, British counterintelligence had a lot of work: refugees from the European countries conquered by the Reich flocked to the country in an endless stream. It is clear that under their guise German agents and collaborators recruited in the occupied territories strove to infiltrate the land of foggy Albion. With one such Belgian collaborationist - Alphonse Timmermans - O. Pinto had a chance to deal with. By itself, Timmermans did not arouse suspicion in anyone: the former seaman of the merchant marine, in order to find himself in safe England, went through a lot of difficulties and dangers. In his simple belongings, too, there was nothing from the spy arsenal. However, the attention of Colonel O. Pinto was attracted by 3 absolutely harmless, at first glance, things. However, let us give the floor to the counterintelligence officer himself: “The one who instructed him before the trip to England took into account every little detail and thus gave the newcomer over to the British counterintelligence. He supplied Timmermans with three things necessary for "invisible" writing: pyramidon powder, which dissolves in a mixture of water and alcohol, orange sticks - a writing agent - and cotton for wrapping the tip of the sticks to avoid treacherous scratches on the paper. The trouble with Timmermans was that he could get all these things at any pharmacy in England, and no one would ever ask him why he was doing it. Now, because his mentor turned out to be too scrupulous person. he had to answer me some questions ... Timmermans - a victim of German scrupulousness - was hanged in Vandeworth prison ... "

Very often, German pedantry proved fatal for agents who had to work under the guise of soldiers of the US Army. Perfectly proficient in "great and mighty" English, the fascist intelligence officers were completely unprepared for American slang. So, quite a few carefully conspiratorial and legendary spies came across the fact that at the army gas stations, instead of the typical jargon of "hydroelectric power station" they used the literary name of gasoline - "patrol". Naturally, no one expected to hear such a clever word from an ordinary American soldier.

But the possible troubles of the German spies did not end there. As it turned out, the Yankee soldiers even military ranks renamed in their own way. The sabotage group, supervised by the most venerable German spy, Otto Skorzeny, was convinced of this on its own sad experience. Subordinates of the Scar Man arrived in captured American self-propelled guns at the location of the 7th Armored Division near the Belgian city of Potto. The commander of the spy group jumped out of the car and introduced himself, according to the regulations, introducing himself to the company. It never occurred to him that in the US Army such a name for a military rank had long become an anachronism, and various slang abbreviations were used instead. The Yankee soldiers immediately recognized the forgery and shot their pseudo-servicemen headed by their "company commander" on the spot ...

It was even more difficult for pedantic German agents to work in the USSR. Let's give an example. Nazi Germany was preparing a group of spies to be sent to Soviet territory. All scouts were thoroughly trained and were fluent in Russian. Moreover, they were even introduced to the peculiarities of the Soviet mentality and the mysterious Russian soul. However, the mission of these near-ideal agents failed miserably at the very first document check. Passports turned out to be a traitorous trifle that gave away the fighters of the invisible front. No, the "red-skinned passports" themselves, made by the best German masters of forgeries, did not differ in any way from the real ones and were even properly worn and frayed. The only thing that made the "pro-fascist" documents different from their primordially Soviet counterparts was the metal staples with which they were stapled. Diligent and punctual Germans made fake "ksivs" conscientiously, as for themselves. Therefore, the pages of the passport were fastened with staples made of high-quality stainless wire, while in the Soviet Union they could not even imagine such a wasteful and inappropriate use of stainless steel - the most common iron was used for the main document of every citizen of the USSR. Naturally, over the long years of operation, such a wire oxidized, leaving characteristic red marks on the pages of the passport. It is not surprising that the valiant SMERSH was very interested, having found among the usual "rusty" passports of books with clean shiny stainless steel clips. According to unverified data, only at the beginning of the war, Soviet counterintelligence managed to identify and neutralize more than 150 such spies, "paper clips". Truly, there are no trifles in intelligence. Even if it is intelligence of the Third Reich.

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Throughout the four years of the war, German intelligence trustingly “fed” on disinformation provided by the Lubyanka

In the summer of 1941, Soviet intelligence officers launched an operation that is still considered the "aerobatics" of the secret struggle and was included in the textbooks on the craft of reconnaissance. It lasted almost the entire war and was called differently at different stages - "Monastery", "Couriers", and then "Berezino".

Initially, her plan was to bring to the German intelligence center a deliberate "misconception" about the allegedly existing anti-Soviet religious-monarchist organization in Moscow, to make enemy intelligence officers believe in it as a real force. And thus penetrate the intelligence network of the Nazis in the Soviet Union.

The FSB declassified the materials of the operation only after 55 years of Victory over fascism.

The Chekists recruited a representative of a noble noble family, Boris Sadovsky, to work. With the establishment Soviet power he lost his fortune and, naturally, was hostile to her.

He lived in a small house in the Novodevichy Convent. Being disabled, he almost never got out of it. In July 1941, Sadovsky wrote a poem, which soon became the property of counterintelligence, in which he addressed the Nazi invaders as "brothers-liberators" and called on Hitler to restore the Russian autocracy.

It was decided to use him as the head of the legendary Prestol organization, especially since Sadovsky was indeed looking for an opportunity to somehow get in touch with the Germans.

Alexander Petrovich Demyanov - "Heine" (right) during a radio session with German

To "help" him, a secret employee of the Lubyanka, Alexander Demyanov, who had the operational pseudonym "Heine", was included in the game.

His great-grandfather Anton Golovaty was the first ataman of the Kuban Cossacks, his father was a Cossack Esaul who died in the First World War. Mother, however, came from a princely family, graduated from the Bestuzhev courses at the Smolny Institute for Noble Maidens and in the pre-revolutionary years was considered one of the brightest beauties in the aristocratic circles of Petrograd.

Until 1914 Demyanov lived and was brought up abroad. He was recruited by the OGPU in 1929. Possessing noble manners and good looks, "Heine" easily got along with film actors, writers, playwrights, poets, in whose circles he moved with the blessing of the Chekists. Before the war, in order to suppress terrorist attacks, he specialized in developing connections between the nobles who remained in the USSR with foreign emigration. An experienced agent with such data quickly won the trust of the monarchist poet Boris Sadovsky.

February 17, 1942 Demyanov - "Heine" crossed the front line and surrendered to the Germans, claiming that he was a representative of the anti-Soviet underground. The scout told the Abwehr officer about the Throne organization and that he had been sent by its leaders to communicate with the German command. At first, they did not believe him, subjected him to a series of interrogations and thorough checks, including a mock execution, planting a weapon from which he could shoot his tormentors and escape. However, his self-control, clear line of conduct, convincing legend, supported by real persons and circumstances, in the end made the German counterintelligence officers believe.

The fact that even before the war the Moscow residency of the Abwehr * took note of Demyanov as a possible candidate for recruitment and even gave him the nickname "Max" also played a role.

* Abwehr - a body of military intelligence and counterintelligence in Germany in 1919-1944, was part of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

Under it, he appeared in the filing cabinet of the Moscow agents in 1941, and under it, after three weeks of training in the basics of espionage, on March 15, 1942, he was parachuted into the Soviet rear. Demyanov was to settle in the Rybinsk area with the task of conducting active military-political intelligence. The Abwehr expected from the Throne organization to activate pacifist propaganda among the population, deploy sabotage and sabotage.

There was a pause at Lubyanka for two weeks so as not to arouse suspicion among the Abwehr by the ease with which their new agent was legalized.

Finally "Max" relayed his first disinformation. Soon, in order to strengthen Demyanov's position in German intelligence and to supply the Germans with false information of strategic importance through him, he was hired as a liaison officer under the Chief of the General Staff Marshal Shaposhnikov.

Admiral Canaris

Admiral Canaris, the head of the Abwehr (nicknamed Janus, "Sly Fox") considered it a great success that he had acquired a "source of information" in such high spheres, and he could not help but boast of this success in front of his rival, the head of the VI Directorate of the RSHA, SS Brigadefuehrer Walter Schellenberg. In his memoirs, written in English captivity after the war, he testified with envy that the military intelligence had "its own man" near Marshal Shaposhnikov, from whom a lot of "valuable information" was received. In early August 1942, "Max" informed the Germans that the organization's transmitter was deteriorating and needed to be replaced.

Soon, two Abwehr couriers appeared at the NKVD's secret apartment in Moscow, delivering 10 thousand rubles and food. They reported the location of the radio they had hidden.

The first group of German agents remained at large for ten days so that the Chekists could check their appearance and find out if they had any connections with someone else. Then the couriers were arrested, and the radio they delivered was found. And to the Germans "Max" radioed that the couriers had arrived, but the transmitted radio was damaged upon landing.

Two months later, two more messengers appeared from behind the front line with two radio transmitters and various spy equipment. They had the task not only to help "Max", but also to settle in Moscow themselves, to collect and transmit their intelligence information via the second radio. Both agents were recruited, and to the Valley headquarters - the Abwehr center - they reported that they had successfully arrived and began to carry out the assignment. From that moment on, the operation developed in two directions: on the one hand - on behalf of the monarchist organization "Prestol" and the resident of "Max", on the other - on behalf of the Abwehr agents "Zyubina" and "Alayev", allegedly relying on their own connections in Moscow. A new stage of the secret duel has begun - Operation Couriers.

In November 1942, in response to a request from the Valli headquarters about the possibility of expanding the geography of the Prestol organization at the expense of the cities of Yaroslavl, Murom and Ryazan and sending agents there for further work, Max conveyed that the city of Gorky was better suited, where the cell was created "Throne". The Germans agreed to this, and the counterintelligence officers took care of the "meeting" of the couriers. Satisfying the requests of the Abwehr, the Chekists sent them extensive misinformation, which was being prepared at the General Staff of the Red Army, and more and more agents of enemy intelligence were summoned to the dummy safe houses.

In Berlin, they were very pleased with the work of "Max" and the agents introduced with his help. On December 20, Admiral Canaris congratulated his Moscow resident on being awarded the Iron Cross of the 1st degree, and Mikhail Kalinin at the same time signed a decree on awarding Demyanov with the Order of the Red Star. The result of the radio games "Monastyr" and "Couriers" was the arrest of 23 German agents and their accomplices, who had more than 2 million rubles of Soviet money, several radio stations, a large number of documents, weapons and equipment.

In the summer of 1944, the operational game received a new continuation under the name "Berezino". "Max" reported to the "Valley" headquarters that he had been "seconded" to Minsk, which had just been occupied by Soviet troops. Soon the Abwehr received a message from there that numerous groups were making their way to the west through the Belarusian forests. German soldiers and officers who were surrounded as a result of the Soviet offensive. Since the radio interception data testified to the desire of the Hitlerite command not only to help them get through to their own, but also to use them to disorganize the enemy rear, the Chekists decided to play on this. Soon the People's Commissar for State Security Merkulov reported to Stalin, Molotov and Beria the plan for a new operation. "Good" was received.

On August 18, 1944, the Moscow radio station "Prestol" informed the Germans that "Max" accidentally ran into a Wehrmacht military unit leaving the encirclement, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Scherhorn. The "entourage" are in great need of food, weapons, ammunition. Seven days at the Lubyanka they waited for an answer: the Abwehr, apparently, inquired about Sherkhorn and his "army". And on the eighth, a radiogram came: “Please help us to contact this German part... We intend to drop various loads for them and send a radio operator. "

On the night of September 15-16, 1944, three Abwehr envoys landed by parachute in the area of ​​Lake Pesochnoe in the Minsk region, where the Sherhorn regiment was allegedly hiding. Soon, two of them were recruited and included in the radio game.

Then the Abwehr sent two more officers with letters from the commander of the Army Group Center, Colonel-General Reinhardt, and the head of Abwehrkommando-103, Barfeld, addressed to Scherhorn. The flow of goods "breaking through from the encirclement" increased, along with them all new "inspectors" arrived, who had the task, as they later admitted during interrogations, to find out whether these were the people they claim to be. But everything worked out cleanly. So purely that in the last radio message to Scherhorn, transmitted from Abwehrkommando-103 on May 5, 1945, after the surrender of Berlin, it was said:

“With a heavy heart, we are forced to stop helping you. Due to this situation, we can no longer maintain radio contact with you. Whatever the future brings us, our thoughts will always be with you. "

It was the end of the game. Soviet intelligence brilliantly outplayed the intelligence of Nazi Germany.

The success of Operation Berezino was facilitated by the fact that it involved real German officers who went over to the side of the Red Army. They convincingly portrayed the surviving regiment, including the recruited liaison paratroopers.

From archived data: From September 1944 to May 1945, the German command flew 39 sorties to our rear and threw out 22 German intelligence officers (all of them were arrested by Soviet counterintelligence officers), 13 radio stations, 255 cargo items with weapons, uniforms, food, ammunition, medicines, and 1,777,000 rubles. Germany continued to supply "its" detachment until the very end of the war.

Gathering of intelligence by Germany against the USSR

To implement the strategic plans for an armed attack on neighboring countries, Hitler told his entourage about them on November 5, 1937 - Nazi Germany, naturally, needed extensive and reliable information that would reveal all aspects of the life of future victims of aggression, and especially information on the basis of which one can it would be to draw a conclusion about their defense potential. By supplying government agencies and the High Command of the Wehrmacht with such information, the "total espionage" services actively contributed to the preparation of the country for war. Intelligence information was obtained in various ways, using a variety of methods and means.

World War II, unleashed by Nazi Germany on September 1, 1939, began with the invasion of Poland by German troops. But his main goal, towards which all state bodies of the country were oriented, and first of all the Wehrmacht and intelligence, Hitler considered the defeat Soviet Union, the conquest of a new "living space" in the East up to the Urals. The Soviet-German non-aggression pact signed on August 23, 1939, as well as the Treaty on Friendship and the Border, signed on September 28 of the same year, were to serve as camouflage. Moreover, the opportunities opened up as a result of this were used to build up activity in the intelligence work carried out against the USSR throughout the pre-war period. Hitler constantly demanded from Canaris and Heydrich new information about the measures taken by the Soviet authorities to organize a repulse of armed aggression.

As already noted, in the first years after the establishment of the fascist dictatorship in Germany, the Soviet Union was viewed primarily as a political enemy. Therefore, everything that related to him was within the competence of the security service. But this order did not last long. Soon, in accordance with the criminal designs of the Nazi elite and the German military command, all "total espionage" services were involved in a secret war against the world's first socialist country. Speaking about the direction of the espionage and sabotage activities of Nazi Germany at that time, Schellenberg wrote in his memoirs: "The decisive actions of all secret services against Russia were considered the primary and most important task."

The intensity of these actions increased markedly since the autumn of 1939, especially after the victory over France, when the Abwehr and the SD were able to free up their significant forces employed in the region and use them in an eastern direction. The secret services, as is clear from the archival documents, were then assigned a specific task: to clarify and replenish the available information about the economic and political situation of the Soviet Union, to ensure the regular flow of information about its defense capability and future theaters of military operations. They were also instructed to develop a detailed plan for organizing sabotage and terrorist actions on the territory of the USSR, timed to coincide with their implementation at the time of the first offensive operations of the German fascist troops. In addition, they were called upon, as already discussed in detail, to ensure the secrecy of the invasion and begin wide campaign on misinformation of world public opinion. This was how the program of action of Hitler's intelligence against the USSR was determined, in which espionage, for obvious reasons, was given the leading place.

Archival materials and other quite reliable sources contain a lot of evidence that an intense secret war against the Soviet Union began long before June 1941.

Zally's headquarters

By the time of the attack on the USSR, the activity of the Abwehr - this leader among the Nazi secret services in the field of espionage and sabotage - reached its climax. In June 1941, the Zalli Headquarters was created to provide leadership for all types of espionage and sabotage directed against the Soviet Union. Valley Headquarters directly coordinated the actions of the teams and groups assigned to the army groupings to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage operations. It was then located near Warsaw, in the town of Sulejóvek, and was headed by an experienced scout Schmalschläger.

Here is some evidence of how events unfolded.

One of the prominent members of the German military intelligence, Stolze, during interrogation on December 25, 1945, testified that the head of the Abwehr II, Colonel Lahusen, having informed him in April 1941 of the date of the German attack on the USSR, demanded urgently to study all the materials at the disposal of the Abwehr regarding Soviet Union. It was necessary to find out the possibility of delivering a powerful blow to the most important Soviet military-industrial facilities in order to completely or partially disable them. At the same time, a top-secret division was created within the framework of Abwehr II, headed by Stolze. For reasons of conspiracy, it had the popular name "Group A". His responsibilities included planning and preparing large-scale sabotage operations. They were undertaken, as Lahusen emphasized, in the hope that it would be possible to disorganize the rear of the Red Army, sow panic among the local population and thereby facilitate the advance of the German fascist troops.

Lahusen acquainted Stolze with the order of the headquarters of the operational leadership, signed by Field Marshal Keitel, which outlined in general terms the directive of the Wehrmacht High Command to deploy sabotage activities on Soviet territory after the start of the Barbarossa plan. The Abwehr had to start holding actions aimed at inciting ethnic hatred between the peoples of the USSR, to which the Nazi elite attached particular importance. Guided by the directive of the supreme command, Stolze agreed with the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists Melnik and Bendera that they would immediately start organizing the actions of nationalist elements hostile to Soviet power in Ukraine, timed to coincide with the time of the invasion of German fascist troops. At the same time, Abwehr II began to send his agents from among Ukrainian nationalists to the territory of Ukraine, some of whom had the task of compiling or clarifying the lists of local party and Soviet activists to be destroyed. Subversive actions with the participation of nationalists of all stripes were carried out in other regions of the USSR.

ABVER's actions against the USSR

Abwehr II, according to Stolze's testimony, formed and armed "special detachments" for actions (in violation of the international rules of warfare) in the Soviet Baltic, tested back in the initial period of the Second World War. One of these detachments, whose soldiers and officers were dressed in Soviet military uniforms, had the task of seizing a railway tunnel and bridges near Vilnius. Until May 1941, 75 agent groups of the Abwehr and SD were neutralized on the territory of Lithuania, which, as documented, launched active espionage and sabotage activities here in anticipation of the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR.

How great was the attention of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the deployment of sabotage operations in the rear of the Soviet troops is shown by the fact that "special detachments" and "special teams" of the Abwehr were present in all army groups and armies concentrated on the eastern borders of Germany.

According to Stolze's testimony, the Abwehr branches in Konigsberg, Warsaw and Krakow had a directive from Canaris in connection with the preparation of an attack on the USSR to maximize espionage and sabotage activities. The task was to provide the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht with detailed and most accurate data on the target system on the territory of the USSR, primarily on highways and railways, bridges, power plants and other objects, the destruction of which could entail a serious disorganization of the Soviet rear and ultimately would paralyze his forces and break the resistance of the Red Army. The Abwehr had to stretch its tentacles to the most important communications, military-industrial facilities, as well as large administrative and political centers of the USSR - in any case, it was planned.

Summing up some of the results of the work carried out by the Abwehr by the time the German invasion of the USSR began, Canaris wrote in a memorandum that numerous groups of agents from the indigenous population, that is, Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, Balts, Finns, etc., were sent to the disposal of the headquarters of the German armies. n. Each group consisted of 25 (or more) people. These groups were led by German officers. They were supposed to penetrate the Soviet rear to a depth of 50,300 kilometers behind the front line in order to report the results of their observations by radio, paying special attention to the collection of information about Soviet reserves, the state of railways and other roads, as well as about all measures taken by the enemy. ...

In the pre-war years, the German embassy in Moscow and German consulates in Leningrad, Kharkov, Tbilisi, Kiev, Odessa, Novosibirsk and Vladivostok served as the center for organizing espionage, the main base for the strongholds of Hitler's intelligence. In the diplomatic field in the USSR in those years, a large group of cadre German intelligence officers, experienced professionals, representing all links of the Nazi "total espionage" system, and especially widely the Abwehr and SD, worked. Despite the obstacles posed to him by the Chekist authorities, they, shamelessly using their diplomatic immunity, developed a high level of activity here, striving first of all, as the archival materials of those years indicate, to probe the defense power of our country.

Erich Koestring

The Abwehr residency in Moscow was headed at that time by General Erich Koestring, who until 1941 was known in German intelligence circles as "the most knowledgeable specialist on the Soviet Union." He was born and lived for some time in Moscow, so he was fluent in Russian and was familiar with the way of life in Russia. During the first world war he fought against tsarist army, then in the 20s he worked in a special center dealing with the study of the Red Army. From 1931 to 1933, in the final period of Soviet-German military cooperation, he acted as an observer from the Reichswehr in the USSR. He returned to Moscow in October 1935 as a military and aviation attaché in Germany and stayed until 1941. He had a wide circle of acquaintances in the Soviet Union, whom he strove to use to obtain information of interest to him.

However, of the numerous questions that Köstring received from Germany six months after his arrival in Moscow, he was able to answer only a few. In his letter addressed to the head of the intelligence department for the armies of the East, he explained it this way: “The experience of several months of work here has shown that there can be no question of the possibility of obtaining military intelligence information, even remotely related to the military industry, even on the most innocuous issues ... Visits to military units have been discontinued. One gets the impression that the Russians are supplying all attachés with a set of false information. " The letter ended with an assurance that he nevertheless hoped that he would be able to put together a “mosaic picture reflecting further development and the organizational structure of the Red Army ”.

After the German consulates were closed in 1938, the military attachés of other countries were deprived of the opportunity to attend military parades for two years, and, in addition, restrictions were imposed on the establishment of contacts by foreigners with Soviet citizens. Koestring, he said, was forced to return to using three "scarce sources of information": traveling through the USSR and traveling by car to various districts of the Moscow region, using the open Soviet press and, finally, exchanging information with military attachés of other countries.

In one of his reports, he draws the following conclusion about the state of affairs in the Red Army: “As a result of the elimination of the bulk of the senior officer corps, who had mastered the military art quite well in the process of ten years of practical training and theoretical training, the operational capabilities of the Red Army decreased. Lack of military order and a shortage of experienced commanders will negatively affect the training and education of troops for some time. Irresponsibility in military affairs that is already manifesting itself at the present time will lead in the future to even more serious negative consequences. The army is deprived of the highest qualifications of commanders. Nevertheless, there is no reason to conclude that the offensive capabilities of the mass of soldiers have fallen to such an extent as not to recognize the Red Army as a very important factor in the event of a military conflict. "

In a message to Berlin by Lieutenant Colonel Hans Krebs, who replaced the sick Koestring, dated April 22, 1941, it was said: “Of course, the Soviet ground forces have not yet reached the maximum number of the combat schedule for wartime, determined by us in 200 infantry rifle divisions. This information was recently confirmed in a conversation with me by the military attachés of Finland and Japan. "

A few weeks later, Koestring and Krebs made a special trip to Berlin to personally inform Hitler that there were no significant changes for the better in the Red Army.

The employees of the Abwehr and the SD, who used diplomatic and other official cover in the USSR, were tasked with collecting information on a wide range of military-economic problems along with strictly oriented information. This information had a very specific purpose - it was supposed to enable the Wehrmacht's strategic planning bodies to get an idea of ​​the conditions in which Hitler's troops would have to operate on the territory of the USSR, and in particular during the seizure of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and other large cities. The coordinates of the objects of future bombing were found out. Even then, a network of clandestine radio stations was created to transmit the collected information, caches were set up in public and other suitable places where instructions from Nazi intelligence centers and items of sabotage equipment could be stored so that agents sent and located in the USSR could use them at the right time.

Using trade relations between Germany and the USSR for intelligence

For the purpose of espionage, cadres, secret agents and proxies of the Abwehr and SD were systematically sent to the Soviet Union, for whose penetration into our country the intensively developing economic, trade, economic and cultural ties between the USSR and Germany were used. With their help, such important tasks were solved as collecting information about the military-economic potential of the USSR, in particular about the defense industry (capacity, regionalization, bottlenecks), about the industry as a whole, its individual large centers, energy systems, communication routes, sources of industrial raw materials, etc. Representatives of the business community were especially active, who often, along with the collection of intelligence information, carried out assignments to establish communications on Soviet territory with agents whom German intelligence managed to recruit during the period of active functioning of German concerns and firms in our country.

Attaching great importance to the use of legal capabilities in intelligence work against the USSR and striving in every possible way to expand them, both the Abwehr and the SD proceeded from the fact that the information obtained in this way, in its predominant part, was not capable of serving as a sufficient basis for developing specific plans, adopting correct decisions in the military-political field. And based only on such information, they believed, it is difficult to form a reliable and any complete picture of tomorrow's military adversary, his forces and reserves. To fill the gap, the Abwehr and the SD, as confirmed by many documents, are making attempts to intensify their work against our country by illegal means, seeking to acquire secret sources inside the country or send secret agents from behind the cordon, counting on their settling in the USSR. This, in particular, is evidenced by the following fact: the head of the Abwehr agent group in the United States, officer G. Rumrich, at the beginning of 1938 had an order from his center to get blank forms of American passports for agents who were thrown into Russia.

"Can you get at least fifty pieces?" - asked Rumrich in a cipher telegram from Berlin. The Abwehr was ready to pay a thousand dollars for each blank blank American passport - they were so necessary.

Documentary specialists from the secret services of Nazi Germany, long before the start of the war against the USSR, scrupulously followed all the changes in the procedure for processing and issuing personal documents of Soviet citizens. They showed an increased interest in elucidating the system of protecting military documents from forgery, trying to establish the procedure for using conventional secret signs.

In addition to agents illegally sent to the Soviet Union, the Abwehr and SD used their official employees to obtain information of interest to them, introduced into the commission for determining the line of the German-Soviet border and resettlement of Germans living in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states, to territory of Germany.

Already at the end of 1939, Hitler's intelligence began to systematically send agents into the USSR from the territory of occupied Poland to conduct military espionage. They were, as a rule, professionals. It is known, for example, that one of these agents, who underwent 15-month training in the Berlin school of the Abwehr in 1938-1939, managed to illegally penetrate the USSR three times in 1940. Having made several long one and a half to two months trips to the regions of the Central Urals, Moscow and the North Caucasus, the agent returned safely to Germany.

Starting from about April 1941, the Abwehr switched mainly to the transfer of agents in groups led by experienced officers. All of them had the necessary espionage and sabotage equipment, including radio stations for receiving live radio broadcasts from Berlin. They had to send their response messages to a fake address in secret writing.

In the Minsk, Leningrad and Kiev directions, the depth of intelligence intelligence reached 300-400 kilometers and more. Some of the agents, having reached certain points, had to settle there for some time and immediately begin to carry out the assigned task. Most of the agents (usually they did not have radio stations) had to return no later than June 15-18, 1941 to the intelligence center, so that the information they obtained could be used promptly by the command.

What interested the Abwehr and SD? Assignments for both groups of agents, as a rule, differed little and boiled down to finding out the concentration of Soviet troops in the border areas, the deployment of headquarters, formations and units of the Red Army, points and areas where radio stations were located, the presence of ground and underground airfields, the number and types of aircraft based on them, the location of ammunition depots, explosives, fuel.

Some agents sent to the USSR were instructed by the intelligence center to refrain from specific practical actions until the start of the war. The goal is clear - the leaders of the Abwehr counted in this way to preserve their intelligence cells until the moment when the need for them would be especially great.

Dispatch of German agents to the USSR in 1941

The activity of preparing agents for transfer to the Soviet Union is evidenced by such data, gleaned from the Abwehr archives. In mid-May 1941, a reptile at the intelligence school of the department of Admiral Kanris near Konigsberg (in the town of Grossmichel) trained about 100 people who were intended to be sent to the USSR.

Who was the stake? They come from the families of Russian emigrants who settled in Berlin after October revolution, sons of former officers of the tsarist army who fought against Soviet Russia, and after the defeat, those who fled abroad, members of the nationalist organizations of Western Ukraine, the Baltic States, Poland, the Balkan countries, as a rule, spoke Russian.

Among the means used by Hitler's intelligence in violation of generally accepted norms of international law was also aerial espionage, to which the latest technical achievements were put. In the system of the Ministry of the Air Force of Nazi Germany, there was even a special unit - a special squadron, which, together with the secret service of this department, by means of high-altitude aircraft units, carried out reconnaissance work against the countries of interest to the Abwehr. During the flights, all important structures were photographed for waging war: ports, bridges, airfields, military facilities, industrial enterprises, etc. Thus, the military cartographic service of the Wehrmacht received in advance from the Abwehr the information necessary to draw up good maps. Everything related to these flights was kept in the strictest confidence, and only the direct performers and those of a very limited circle of employees of the Abwehr I air group knew about them, whose duties included the processing and analysis of data obtained using air reconnaissance. Aerial photography materials were presented in the form of photographs, as a rule, to Canaris himself, in rare cases - to one of his deputies, and then handed over to the destination. It is known that the command of the special squadron of the Rovel Air Force, stationed in Staaken, already in 1937 began reconnaissance of the territory of the USSR with the help of Hein-kel-111 disguised as transport aircraft.

German aerial reconnaissance before the start of the war

The following generalized data give an idea of ​​the intensity of aerial reconnaissance: from October 1939 to June 22, 1941, German aircraft more than 500 times invaded the airspace of the Soviet Union. There are many known cases when civil aircraft flying on the Berlin-Moscow route on the basis of agreements between Aeroflot and Lufthansa, often deliberately lost their course and ended up over military targets. Two weeks before the start of the war, the Germans also flew around the areas where the Soviet troops were located. Every day they photographed the location of our divisions, corps, armies, spotted the presence of military radio transmitters that were not camouflaged.

A few months before the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, aerial photographs of the Soviet territory were carried out at full speed. According to information received by our intelligence through agents from an assistant at the headquarters of German aviation, German aircraft flew to the Soviet side from airfields in Bucharest, Konigsberg and Kirkenes (Northern Norway) and took photographs from a height of 6 thousand meters. In the period from 1 to 19 April 1941 alone, German aircraft violated 43 times state border, making reconnaissance flights over our territory to a depth of 200 kilometers.

As the Nuremberg trial established over the main war criminals, the materials obtained with the help of aerial reconnaissance conducted in 1939, even before the invasion of Nazi troops in Poland, were used as a guideline in the subsequent planning of military and sabotage operations against the USSR. Reconnaissance flights, which were carried out first over the territory of Poland, then the Soviet Union (up to Chernigov) and the countries of South-Eastern Europe, some time later were transferred to Leningrad, to which, as an object of air espionage, the main attention was riveted. From archival documents it is known that on February 13, 1940, at General Jodl's headquarters of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, Canaris heard a report "On the new results of aerial reconnaissance against the SSSl, received by the special squadron" Rovel ". Since that time, the scale of aerial espionage has increased dramatically. Its main task was to obtain the information necessary for drawing up geographical maps of the USSR. At the same time, special attention was paid to naval military bases and other strategically important objects (for example, the Shostka powder plant) and, especially, oil production centers, oil refineries, and oil pipelines. Future targets for bombing were also identified.

An important channel for obtaining espionage information about the USSR and its armed forces was the regular exchange of information with the intelligence services of the allied Nazi Germany countries - Japan, Italy, Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. In addition, the Abwehr maintained working contacts with the military intelligence services of the countries adjacent to the Soviet Union - Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Schellenberg even set himself in the long term the task of developing the secret services of countries friendly to Germany and rallying them into a kind of "intelligence community" that would work for one common center and would supply the necessary information to the countries included in it (a goal that was generally achieved after wars in NATO in the form of unofficial cooperation of various secret services under the auspices of the CIA).

Denmark, for example, in whose secret service Schellenberg, with the support of the leadership of the local National Socialist Party, managed to take a leading position and where there was already a good "operational groundwork", was "used as a" foreground "in intelligence work against England and Russia." Schellenberg said he managed to infiltrate the intelligence network of Soviet intelligence. As a result, he writes, after a while a well-established connection with Russia was established, and we began to receive important information of a political nature.

The wider the preparations for the invasion of the USSR developed, the more energetically Canaris tried to include in the intelligence activities of his allies and satellites of Hitlerite Germany, to activate their agents. Through the Abwehr, the Nazi military intelligence centers in the countries of South-Eastern Europe were ordered to intensify their work against the Soviet Union. The Abwehr has long maintained the closest contacts with the intelligence service of Horthy Hungary. According to P. Leverkühn, the results of the actions of the Hungarian intelligence service in the Balkans constituted a valuable addition to the work of the Abwehr. The Abwehr liaison officer was constantly in Budapest, who exchanged the obtained information. There was also a six-member SD office headed by Hettle. Their responsibility was to maintain contact with the Hungarian secret service and the German national minority, which served as a source of recruiting agents. The dealership had practically unlimited funds in stamps to pay for the services of agents. At first, it was focused on solving political problems, but with the outbreak of the war, its activities increasingly acquired a military orientation. In January 1940, Canaris set about organizing a powerful Abwehr center in Sofia in order to turn Bulgaria into one of the strongholds of his agent network. Contacts with the Romanian intelligence were just as close. With the consent of the head of the Romanian intelligence service Morutsov and with the assistance of oil companies dependent on German capital, the people of the Abwehr were sent to the territory of Romania in the oil regions. The scouts acted under the cover of company employees - "mining foremen", and soldiers of the Brandenburg sabotage regiment - local guards. Thus, the Abwehr managed to settle in the oil heart of Romania, and from here he began to scatter his espionage networks further east.

In the years preceding the war, the Nazi "total espionage" services in the fight against the USSR had an ally in the intelligence of militaristic Japan, whose ruling circles also made far-reaching plans for our country, the practical implementation of which they associated with the capture of Moscow by the Germans. And although there were never joint military plans between Germany and Japan, each of them pursued its own policy of aggression, sometimes trying to profit from the other, nevertheless, both countries were interested in partnership and cooperation with each other and therefore acted as a united front in the intelligence field. ... This, in particular, is eloquently evidenced by the activities of the Japanese military attaché in Berlin, General Oshima, in those years. It is known that he provided coordination of the actions of the Japanese intelligence stations in European countries, where he struck up quite close ties in political and business circles and maintained contacts with the leaders of the SD and the Abwehr. Through him, a regular exchange of intelligence data about the USSR was carried out. Oshima kept his ally informed about the specific activities of Japanese intelligence in relation to our country and, in turn, was aware of the secret operations undertaken against her by Nazi Germany. If necessary, he provided the intelligence and other operational capabilities at his disposal and willingly supplied intelligence information on a reciprocal basis. Another key figure in Japanese intelligence in Europe was the Japanese envoy to Stockholm, Onodera.

In the plans of the Abwehr and the SD, directed against the Soviet Union, an important place, for obvious reasons, was assigned to the neighboring states - the Baltic States, Finland, Poland.

The Nazis showed particular interest in Estonia, considering it as a purely "neutral" country, whose territory could serve as a convenient springboard for the deployment of intelligence operations against the USSR. This was decisively facilitated by the fact that already in the second half of 1935, after a group of pro-fascist-minded officers, led by Colonel Maasing, chief of the intelligence department of the General Staff, gained the upper hand at the headquarters of the Estonian army, a complete reorientation of the country's military command to Nazi Germany took place. ... In the spring of 1936, Maasing, and after him the chief of staff of the army, General Reek, willingly accepted the invitation of the leaders of the Wehrmacht to visit Berlin. During their stay there, they struck up a business relationship with Canaris and his closest associates. An agreement was reached on mutual information on the reconnaissance line. The Germans undertook to equip the Estonian intelligence with operational and technical means. As it turned out later, it was then that the Abwehr secured the official consent of Reek and Maasing to use the territory of Estonia to work against the USSR. At the disposal of the Estonian intelligence were provided photographic equipment for the production of photographs of warships from the lighthouses of the Gulf of Finland, as well as radio interception devices, which were then installed along the entire Soviet-Estonian border. To provide technical assistance, specialists from the decryption department of the Wehrmacht High Command were sent to Tallinn.

General Laidoner, the commander-in-chief of the Estonian bourgeois army, assessed the results of these negotiations as follows: “We were mainly interested in information about the deployment of Soviet military forces in the area of ​​our border and about the movements taking place there. All this information, since they had it, the Germans willingly communicated to us. As for our reconnaissance department, it supplied the Germans with all the data that we had regarding the Soviet rear and the internal situation in the USSR.

General Pickenbrock, one of Canaris's closest aides, during interrogation on February 25, 1946, in particular, testified: “Estonian intelligence maintained very close ties with us. We constantly provided her with financial and technical support. Its activities were directed exclusively against the Soviet Union. The chief of intelligence, Colonel Maasing, visited Berlin annually, and our representatives, as needed, went to Estonia themselves. Captain Cellarius was often there, who was entrusted with the task of monitoring the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, its position and maneuvers. Captain Pigert, an employee of the Estonian intelligence service, constantly collaborated with him. Before the entry of Soviet troops into Estonia, we left in advance numerous agents there, with whom we maintained regular contact and through which we received information of interest to us. When Soviet power arose there, our agents intensified their activities and, until the very moment of the occupation of the country, supplied us with the necessary information, thereby contributing to a significant degree to the success of the German troops. For some time Estonia and Finland were the main sources of intelligence information about the Soviet armed forces. "

In April 1939, General Reek was again invited to Germany, which widely celebrated Hitler's birthday, whose visit, as expected in Berlin, was to contribute to deepening interaction between the German and Estonian military intelligence services. With the assistance of the latter, the Abwehr managed to carry out in 1939 and 1940 several groups of spies and saboteurs in the USSR. All this time, four radio stations were operating along the Soviet-Estonian border, intercepting radio messages, and at the same time, the work of radio stations on the territory of the USSR was monitored from different points. The information obtained in this way was passed on to the Abwehr, from whom the Estonian intelligence did not have any secrets, especially with regard to the Soviet Union.

The Baltic countries in intelligence against the USSR

The leaders of the Abwehr regularly visited Estonia once a year to exchange information. The heads of the intelligence services of these countries, in turn, visited Berlin every year. Thus, the exchange of the accumulated secret information took place every six months. In addition, special couriers were periodically sent from both sides when it was necessary to urgently deliver the necessary information to the center; sometimes military attachés at the Estonian and German embassies were authorized for this purpose. The information transmitted by Estonian intelligence mainly contained data on the state of the armed forces and the military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union.

The archives of the Abwehr preserved materials about the stay of Canaris and Pickenbrock in Estonia in 1937, 1938 and June 1939. In all cases, these trips were caused by the need to improve the coordination of actions against the USSR and the exchange of intelligence information. Here is what General Laidoner, already mentioned above, writes: “The chief of German intelligence, Canaris, visited Estonia for the first time in 1936. After that, he visited here twice or three times. I took it personally. Negotiations on intelligence work were conducted with him by the head of the army headquarters and the head of the 2nd department. Then it was established more specifically what information was required for both countries and what we can give each other. The last time Canaris visited Estonia was in June 1939. It was mainly about intelligence activities. I spoke with Canaris in some detail about our position in the event of a clash between Germany and England and between Germany and the USSR. He was interested in the question of how much time would be required for the Soviet Union to fully mobilize its armed forces and what is the state of its vehicles (railway, automobile and road). " On this visit, along with Canaris and Pickenbrock, was the head of the Abwehr III department, Frans Bentivegny, whose trip was connected with checking the work of the group subordinate to him, which carried out foreign counterintelligence measures in Tallinn. To avoid the "inept interference" of the Gestapo in the affairs of the Abwehr counterintelligence, at the insistence of Canaris, an agreement was reached between him and Heydrich that in all cases when the security police will carry out any measures on Estonian territory, the Abwehr must first be notified ... For his part, Heydrich put forward a demand that the SD should have an independent residency in Estonia. Realizing that in the event of an open quarrel with the influential chief of the imperial security service, it would be difficult for the Abwehr to count on Hitler's support, Canaris agreed to "make room" and accepted Heydrich's demand. At the same time, they agreed that all SD activities in the field of recruiting agents in Estonia and transferring them to the Soviet Union would be coordinated with the Abwehr. The Abwehr retained the right to concentrate in their hands and evaluate all intelligence information concerning the Red Army and the Navy, which the Nazis received through Estonia, as well as through other Baltic countries and Finland. Canaris strongly objected to the attempts of SD officers to act together with the Estonian fascists bypassing the Abwehr and to send unverified information to Berlin, which often came to Hitler through Himmler.

According to Laidoner's report to Estonian President Päts, Canaris was last in Tallinn in the fall of 1939 under an assumed name. In this regard, his meeting with Laidoner and Päts was arranged according to all the rules of conspiracy.

In the report of the Schellenberg office preserved in the archives of the RSHA, it was reported that the operational situation for reconnaissance work along the SD line in the pre-war period both in Estonia and in Latvia was similar. At the head of the residency in each of these countries was an official SD officer who was in an illegal position. All the information collected by the station flowed to him, which he forwarded to the center by mail using secret writing, through couriers on German ships or through the channels of the embassy. The practical activities of the SD intelligence stations in the Baltic states were assessed by Berlin positively, especially in terms of acquiring sources of information in political circles. The SD was greatly assisted by immigrants from Germany who lived here. But, as noted in the above-mentioned report of the VI Directorate of the RSHA, “after the entry of the Russians, the operational capabilities of the SD underwent serious changes. The country's leading figures left the political arena, and maintaining contact with them became more difficult. There was an urgent need to find new channels for transmitting intelligence information to the center. It became impossible to send it on ships, since the ships were thoroughly searched by the authorities, and the crew members who went ashore were under unremitting surveillance. They also had to refuse to send information through the free port of Memel (now Klaipeda, Lithuanian SSR. - Ed.) by land communication. Using sympathetic ink was also risky. I had to decisively set about laying new communication channels, as well as looking for fresh sources of information. " The SD resident in Estonia, who spoke in official correspondence under the code number 6513, nevertheless managed to get in touch with the newly recruited agents and use old sources of information. Maintaining regular contact with his agents was a very dangerous business, requiring extreme caution and dexterity. Resident 6513, however, was able to sort out the situation very quickly and, despite all the difficulties, obtain the necessary information. In January 1940, he received a diplomatic passport and began working under the guise of an assistant at the German embassy in Tallinn.

As for Finland, according to the archival materials of the Wehrmacht, the "Military Organization", conventionally called the "Bureau of Cellarius" (named after its leader, the German military intelligence officer Cellarius), was actively operating on its territory. It was created by the Abwehr with the consent of the Finnish military authorities in mid-1939. Beginning in 1936, Canaris and his closest assistants Pickenbrock and Bentivegni met several times in Finland and Germany with the chief of Finnish intelligence, Colonel Svenson, and then with his successor, Colonel Melander. At these meetings, they exchanged intelligence information and worked out plans for joint action against the Soviet Union. The Cellarius Bureau constantly kept in sight the Baltic Fleet, the troops of the Leningrad Military District, as well as units stationed in Estonia. His active assistants in Helsinki were Dobrovolsky, a former general of the tsarist army, and former tsarist officers Pushkarev, Alekseev, Sokolov, Batuev, the Baltic Germans Meisner, Mansdorf, Estonian bourgeois nationalists Weller, Kurgh, Horn, Kristyan and others. On the territory of Finland, Cellarius had a fairly wide network of agents among various strata of the country's population, recruited spies and saboteurs among the Russian White emigrants who settled there, nationalists and Baltic Germans who had fled from Estonia.

During interrogation on February 25, 1946, Pickenbrock gave detailed testimony about the activities of the Cellarius Bureau, reporting that Captain First Rank Cellarius was conducting intelligence work against the Soviet Union under the cover of the German embassy in Finland. “With Finnish intelligence,” he said, “we have had close cooperation for a long time, even before I came to the Abwehr in 1936. As part of the exchange of intelligence data, we systematically received information from the Finns about the deployment and strength of the Red Army. "

As follows from Pickenbrock's testimony, he first visited Helsinki with Canaris and Major Stolz, the chief of the Abwehr department of the 1st Army Headquarters "Ost", in June 1937. Together with representatives of Finnish intelligence, they made a comparison and exchange of intelligence information about the Soviet Union. At the same time, a questionnaire was handed over to the Finns, which they were to be guided by in the future when collecting intelligence information. The Abwehr was primarily interested in the deployment of units of the Red Army, military industry facilities, especially in the Leningrad region. During this visit, they had business meetings and conversations with the German ambassador to Finland von Blucher and the zoological attaché, Major General Rossing. In June 1938, Canaris and Pickenbrock visited Finland again. On this visit, they were received by the Finnish Minister of War, who expressed satisfaction with the development of Canaris's cooperation with the head of Finnish intelligence, Colonel Svenson. They were in Finland for the third time in June 1939. The head of Finnish intelligence at that time was Melander. The negotiations proceeded within the same framework as the previous ones. The Finnish military intelligence, informed in advance by the leaders of the Abwehr about the impending attack on the Soviet Union, at the beginning of June 1941 put at their disposal the information it had about the Soviet Union. At the same time, with the knowledge of local authorities, the Abwehr began to carry out Operation Erna, associated with the transfer of Estonian counter-revolutionaries from Finland to the Baltic region as spies, radio agents and saboteurs.

The last time Canaris and Pickenbrock visited Finland was in the winter of 1941/42. Together with them was the chief of counterintelligence (Abwehr III) Bentivegni, who went to inspect and provide practical assistance to the "military organization", as well as to resolve issues of cooperation between this organization and Finnish intelligence. Together with Melander, they defined the boundaries of Cellarius' activities: he received the right to independently recruit agents on Finnish territory and transfer them across the front line. After the completion of negotiations, Canaris and Pickenbrock, accompanied by Melander, went to the city of Mikkeli, to the headquarters of Marshal Mannerheim, who expressed a desire to personally meet with the chief of the German Abwehr. They were joined by the head of the German military mission in Finland, General Erfurt.

Cooperation with the intelligence services of the allied and occupied countries in the struggle against the USSR undoubtedly bore some fruit, but the Nazis expected more from it.

The results of the activities of German intelligence on the eve of World War II

"The Abwehr on the eve of the war," writes O. Reile, "was unable to cover the Soviet Union with a well-functioning intelligence network from well-located secret strongholds in other countries - Turkey, Afghanistan, Japan or Finland." The strongholds created in peacetime in neutral countries- "military organizations" were either disguised as economic firms or included in German missions abroad. When the war broke out, Germany was cut off from many sources of information, and the importance of "military organizations" increased greatly. Until mid-1941, the Abwehr conducted systematic work on the border with the USSR with the aim of creating its strongholds and planting agents. A wide network of technical reconnaissance equipment was deployed along the German-Soviet border, with the help of which radio communications were intercepted.

In connection with Hitler's installation on the all-round deployment of the activities of all the secret services of Germany against the Soviet Union, the question of coordination arose sharply, especially after the RSHA and the General Staff of the German ground forces an agreement was concluded to give each army special SD units, called "Einsatzgruppami" and "Einsatzkomando".

In the first half of June 1941, Heydrich and Canaris convened a meeting of Abwehr officers and commanders of police and SD units ("Einsatzgruppen" and "Einsatzkomando"). On it, in addition to individual special reports, reports were made, in general terms, highlighting the operational plans for the upcoming invasion of the USSR. The ground forces were represented at this meeting by the Quartermaster General, who, referring to the technical side of the cooperation of the secret services, relied on the draft order drawn up in agreement with the chief of the SD. Canaris and Heydrich, in their speeches, touched upon the issues of interaction, "a sense of fellowship" between parts of the security police, SD and the Abwehr. A few days after this meeting, both of them were received by SS Reichsfuehrer Himmler to discuss their proposed plan of action to counter Soviet intelligence.

Evidence of the scale that the activities of "total espionage" services took against the USSR on the eve of the war can be found in the following generalizing data: only in 1940 and the first quarter of 1941 in the western regions of our country, 66 Nazi intelligence stations were discovered and more than 1,300 of its agents were neutralized ...

As a result of the intensification of the "total espionage" services, the volume of information they collected about the Soviet Union, which required analysis and appropriate processing, constantly increased, and intelligence flattery, as the Nazis sought, became more and more comprehensive. It became necessary to involve relevant research organizations in the process of studying and evaluating intelligence materials. One of these institutions, widely used by intelligence, located in Wangzie, was the largest collection of various Soviet literature, including reference literature. The special value of this unique collection was that it contained an extensive selection of specialized literature on all branches of science and economics, published in the original language. The staff, which included famous scientists from various universities, including immigrants from Russia, was headed by one professor-Sovietologist, Georgian by origin. At the disposal of the institute, impersonal secret information obtained by intelligence was transferred, which it had to subject to careful study and generalization, using the available reference literature, and return it to Schellenberg's apparatus with its expert assessment and comments.

Another research organization that also worked closely with intelligence was the Institute of Geopolitics. He carefully analyzed the collected information and, together with the Abwehr and the Department of Economy and Armaments of the Headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command, compiled various reviews and reference materials on their basis. The nature of his interests can be judged at least by such documents prepared by him before the attack on the Soviet Union: "Military-geographical data on the European part of Russia", "Geographic and ethnographic information about Belarus", "Industry of Soviet Russia", "Railway transport SSL, "Baltic countries (with city plans)".

In the Reich, there were a total of about 400 research organizations dealing with socio-political, economic, scientific and technical, geographical and other problems of foreign states; all of them, as a rule, were staffed by highly qualified specialists who know all aspects of the relevant problems, and were subsidized by the state under a free budget. There was a procedure according to which all Hitler's requests - when, for example, he demanded information on a particular issue - were sent to several different organizations for execution. However, the reports and certificates prepared by them often did not satisfy the Fuhrer due to their academic nature. In response to the task received, the institutions issued "a set of general provisions, possibly correct, but untimely and not clear enough."

In order to eliminate fragmentation and inconsistency in the work of research organizations, to increase their competence, and most importantly - return, as well as to ensure proper control over the quality of the conclusions they prepare and expert assessments based on intelligence materials, Schellenberg will later come to the conclusion that it is necessary to create an autonomous groups of specialists with higher education. On the basis of the materials at their disposal, in particular on the Soviet Union, and with the involvement of relevant research organizations, this group will establish a study of complex problems and, on this basis, develop in-depth recommendations and forecasts for the country's political and military leadership.

The "Department of Foreign Armies of the East" of the General Staff of the Ground Forces was also engaged in similar work. He concentrated materials coming from all intelligence and other sources and periodically compiled "reviews" for the highest military instances, in which special attention was paid to the size of the Red Army, the morale of the troops, the level of command personnel, the nature of combat training, etc.

Such is the place of the Nazi secret services as a whole in the military machine of Hitlerite Germany and the scope of their participation in the preparation of aggression against the USSR, in the intelligence support of future offensive operations.

  1. I came across an interesting document that mentions the Smolensk region.
    In many posts, German intelligence and counterintelligence agencies are mentioned.
    I propose in this thread to purposefully lay out interesting facts about them.

    TOP SECRET
    TO THE MINISTERS OF STATE SECURITY OF THE UNION AND AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS
    HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS OF THE MGB OF REGIONS AND REGIONS
    HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND DEPARTMENTS OF COUNTER-INJECTION OF THE MGB OF MILITARY DISTRICTS, GROUPS OF TROOPS, FLEETS AND FLOATS
    HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND SECURITY DEPARTMENTS OF THE MGB ON RAILWAY AND WATER TRANSPORT
    At the same time, the "Collection of reference materials about the bodies of German intelligence that acted against the USSR during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945."
    The collection includes verified data on the structure and activities of the central apparatus of the Abwehr and the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of Germany - RSHA, their bodies operating against the USSR from the territory of neighboring countries, on the East German front and on the territory of the Soviet Union temporarily occupied by the Germans.
    ... Use the materials of the collection in the development of agents suspected of belonging to the agents of German intelligence, and in exposing arrested German spies during the investigation.
    Minister of State Security of the USSR
    S. IGNATIEV
    October 25, 1952 mountains. Moscow
    (From directive)
    Preparing an adventure unprecedented in its size, Hitlerite Germany attached particular importance to the organization of a powerful intelligence service.
    Soon after the seizure of power in Germany, the Nazis created a secret state police - the Gestapo, which, along with the terrorist suppression of opponents of the Nazi regime in the country, organized political intelligence abroad. The leadership of the Gestapo was carried out by Heinrich Himmler, the imperial leader of the guard units (SS) of the fascist party.
    The scale of espionage and provocative activities inside the country and abroad increased by the intelligence of the fascist party - the so-called. the security service (SD) of the security detachments, which henceforth became the main intelligence organization in Germany.
    The German military intelligence and counterintelligence "Abwehr" significantly intensified their work, for the leadership of which the Abwehr-Abroad Directorate of the General Staff of the German Army was created in 1938.
    In 1939, the Gestapo and the SD were merged into the Main Directorate of Imperial Security (RSHA), which in 1944 also included the Abwehr military intelligence and counterintelligence.
    The Gestapo, SD and Abwehr, as well as the foreign department of the fascist party and the German Foreign Ministry launched active subversive and espionage activities against the countries targeted by Nazi Germany, and primarily against the Soviet Union.
    German intelligence played a significant role in the capture of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, Greece and the fascization of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Relying on its agents and accomplices from the ruling bourgeois circles, using bribery, blackmail and political murder, German intelligence helped to paralyze the resistance of the peoples of these countries to German aggression.
    In 1941, having begun an aggressive war against the Soviet Union, the leaders of Nazi Germany set the German intelligence service the task of deploying espionage and sabotage and terrorist activities at the front and in the Soviet rear, as well as ruthlessly suppressing the resistance of the Soviet people to the fascist invaders in the temporarily occupied territory.
    For these purposes, together with the troops of the German fascist army, a significant number of specially created German intelligence, sabotage and counterintelligence agencies were sent to Soviet territory - operational groups and special teams of the SD, as well as the Abwehr.
    CENTRAL UNIT "ABVERA"
    The German military intelligence and counterintelligence agency "Abwehr" (translated as "Otpor", "Protection", "Defense") was organized in 1919 as a department of the German War Ministry and was officially listed as the counterintelligence body of the Reichswehr. In reality, from the very beginning, the "Abwehr" conducted active intelligence work against the Soviet Union, France, England, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries. This work was carried out through the Abwerstelle - links of the "Abwehr" - at the headquarters of the border military districts in the cities of Konigsberg, Breslavl, Poznan, Stettin, Munich, Stuttgart and others, official German diplomatic missions and trade firms abroad. The Abverstelle of the internal military districts carried out only counterintelligence work.
    The Abwehr was headed by: Major General Temp (from 1919 to 1927), Colonel Schwantes (1928-1929), Colonel Bredov (1929-1932), Vice-Admiral Patzig (1932-1934), Admiral Canaris (1935-1943) and from January to July 1944 Colonel Hansen.
    In connection with the transition of fascist Germany to open preparation for an aggressive war in 1938, the Abwehr was reorganized, on the basis of which the Abwehr-Abroad Directorate was created at the headquarters of the German Armed Forces High Command (OKW). This department was tasked with organizing extensive intelligence and subversive work against the countries that Nazi Germany was preparing to attack, especially against the Soviet Union.
    In accordance with these tasks, the following departments were created in the Abwehr-Abroad Administration:
    "Abwehr 1" - reconnaissance;
    "Abwehr 2" - sabotage, sabotage, terror, uprisings, corruption of the enemy;
    "Abwehr 3" - counterintelligence;
    Ausland - foreign department;
    "CA" is the central department.
    _______ WALLY HQ _______
    In June 1941, to organize reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence activities against the Soviet Union and to manage this activity, a special Directorate “Abwehr-Abroad” was created on the Soviet-German front, conventionally called the “Valley” headquarters, field mail N57219.
    According to the structure central office"Abwehr-Abroad" headquarters "Valley" consisted of the following units:
    Valley 1 Division - leadership of military and economic intelligence on the Soviet-German front. Chief - Major, later Lieutenant Colonel, Baun (surrendered to the Americans, is used by them to organize intelligence activities against the USSR).
    The department consisted of abstracts:
    1 X - ground forces reconnaissance;
    1 L - air force reconnaissance;
    1 Vi - economic intelligence;
    1 Г - production of fictitious documents;
    1 I - providing radio equipment, ciphers, codes
    Personnel department.
    Secretariat.
    Valley 1 was subordinate to reconnaissance teams and groups attached to the headquarters of army groups and armies to conduct reconnaissance work in the relevant sectors of the front, as well as teams and economic intelligence groups that collected intelligence in prisoner of war camps.
    To provide agents transferred to the rear of the Soviet troops with fictitious documents at Valley 1, there was a special team 1 G. It consisted of 4-5 German engravers and graphic artists and several prisoners of war recruited by the Germans who knew office work in the Soviet Army and Soviet institutions.
    Team 1 G was engaged in the collection, study and manufacture of various Soviet documents, awards, stamps and seals of Soviet military units, institutions and enterprises. Forms of difficult documents (passports, party cards) and orders were received by the team from Berlin.
    The 1 G team supplied the prepared documents to the Abwehr teams, which also had their own 1 G groups, and instructed them on changes in the procedure for issuing and processing documents on the territory of the Soviet Union.
    To provide the transferred agents with military uniforms, equipment and civilian clothes, "Valley 1" had warehouses of captured Soviet uniforms and equipment, a tailor's and shoemakers' workshops.
    Since 1942, under the direct subordination of "Valley 1" was a special body "Zon Der Shtab Russia", which carried out intelligence work to identify partisan detachments, anti-fascist organizations and groups in the rear of the German armies.
    Valley 1 was always located in the immediate vicinity of the Foreign Armies section of the headquarters of the High Command of the German Army on the Eastern Front.
    The "Valley 2" department led the Abwehr teams and Abwehr groups for conducting sabotage and terrorist activities in units and in the rear of the Soviet Army.
    The head of the department was at first Major Seliger, later Oberleutenant Müller, then Captain Becker.
    From June 1941 to the end of July 1944, the Valley 2 department was stationed in localities. Sulejuvek, from where, with the offensive of Soviet troops, he left in the depths of Germany.
    At the disposal of "Valley 2" in places. Sulejuvek were depots of weapons, explosives and various sabotage materials to supply Abwehr command.
    The Valley 3 department directed all the counterintelligence activities of the Abwehr command and the Abwehrgroups subordinated to it in the fight against Soviet intelligence officers, the partisan movement and the anti-fascist underground in the occupied Soviet territory in the zone of the front, army, corps and divisional rear services.
    Even on the eve of the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, in the spring of 1941, all the army groupings of the German army were assigned one reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence command "Abwehr", and the armies - subordinate to these commands Abwehr groups.
    The Abwehrkommandos and Abwehrgroups with their subordinate schools were the main bodies of German military intelligence and counterintelligence operating on the Soviet-German front.
    In addition to the Abwehrkommandos, the Valli headquarters were directly subordinate to: the Warsaw school for the training of scouts and radio operators, then transferred to East Prussia, in localities. Neugoff; intelligence school in places. Niedersee (East Prussia) with a branch in the mountains. Arise, organized in 1943 to train scouts and radio operators, left behind in the rear of the advancing Soviet troops.
    In some periods, a special aviation detachment of Major Gartenfeld was attached to the Valli headquarters, which had from 4 to 6 planes for dropping agents into the Soviet rear.
    ABVERKOMAND 103
    Abwehrkommando 103 (until July 1943 it was called Abwehrkommando 1B) was assigned to the German army group "Mitte". Field mail N 09358 B, the call sign of the radio station is "Saturn".
    The head of the Abwehrkommando 103 until May 1944 was Lieutenant Colonel Görlitz Felix, then Captain Beverbruck or Bernbruch, and from March 1945 until the disbandment was Lieutenant Bormann.
    In August 1941, the team was stationed in Minsk on Lenin Street, in a three-story building; in late September - early October 1941 - in tents on the banks of the river. Berezina, 7 km from Borisov; then relocated to localities. Krasny Bor (6-7 km from Smolensk) and is located in the former. dachas of the Smolensk Regional Executive Committee. In Smolensk on the street. Krepostnaya, no. 14 was the headquarters (chancellery), the head of which was Captain Sieg.
    In September 1943, in connection with the retreat of German troops, the team moved to the area of ​​the village. Dubrovka (near Orsha), and in early October - to Minsk, where she was until the end of June 1944, located on Kommunisticheskaya Street, opposite the building of the Academy of Sciences.
    In August 1944, the team was in places. Lekmanen 3 km from the mountains. Ortelsburg (East Prussia), having crossing points in the townships of Gross Szymanen (9 km south of Ortelsburg), Seedranken and Budne Soventa (2O km north-west of Ostro-Lenka, Poland); in the first half of January 1945, the team was deployed to localities. Bazin (6 km from the city of Vormditt), at the end of January - beginning of February 1945 - in places. Garnekopf (30 km east of Berlin). In February 1945 in the mountains. Pasewalke on Markstrasse, building 25, was a collection point for agents.
    In March 1945, the team was in the mountains. Zerpste (Germany), from where she moved to Schwerin, and then through a number of cities at the end of April 1945 arrived in places. Lenggries, where on May 5, 1945, the entire official train dispersed in different directions.
    The Abwehr command conducted active reconnaissance work against the Western, Kalinin, Bryansk, Central, Baltic and Belorussian fronts; carried out reconnaissance of the deep rear of the Soviet Union, sending agents to Moscow and Saratov.
    In the first period of its activity, the Abwehr team recruited agents from among the Russian White emigrants
    and members of Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalist organizations. From the autumn of 1941, agents were recruited mainly in prisoner-of-war camps in Borisov, Smolensk, Minsk, Frankfurt am Main. Since 1944, the recruitment of agents was carried out mainly from the police and personnel of the "Cossack units" formed by the Germans and other traitors and traitors to the Motherland who fled with the Germans.
    The agents were recruited by recruiters known under the nicknames "Roganov Nikolay", "Potemkin Grigory" and a number of others, the official employees of the team - Zharkov, he is Stefan, Dmitrienko.
    In the fall of 1941, the Borisov intelligence school was created under the Abwehr command, in which most of the recruited agents were trained. From the school, the agents were sent to the transfer and transfer points, known as the C-camp and the state bureau, where they received additional instructions on the essence of the task received, equipped according to legend, supplied with documents, weapons, and then transferred to the subordinate bodies of the Abwehr command.
    ABVERKOMAND NBO
    The naval reconnaissance Abwehr command, conditionally named "Nachrichtenbeobachter" (abbreviated as NBO), was formed in late 1941 - early 1942 in Berlin, then sent to Simferopol, where it was until October 1943 on the street. Sevastopolskaya, d. 6. Operationally, it was directly subordinate to the Abwehr-Abroad Directorate and was attached to the headquarters of Admiral Schuster, who commanded the German naval forces of the southeastern basin. Until the end of 1943, the team and its units had a general field mail N 47585, from January 1944 -19330. The call sign of the radio station is "Tatar".
    Until July 1942, the head of the team was the captain of the naval service Bode, and from July 1942 - the corvette-captain Rickhoff.
    The team collected intelligence data on the Soviet Navy in the Black and Azov Seas and on the river flotillas of the Black Sea basin. At the same time, the team carried out reconnaissance and sabotage work against the North Caucasian and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, and during its stay in the Crimea - the fight against partisans.
    The team collected intelligence data through agents thrown into the rear of the Soviet Army, as well as by interviewing prisoners of war, mainly former servicemen of the Soviet navy and local residents who had anything to do with the navy and merchant fleets.
    The agents from among the traitors to the Motherland underwent preliminary training in special camps in localities. Tavel, Simeise and places. Go crazy. Part of the agents were sent to the Warsaw Intelligence School for more in-depth training.
    The transfer of agents to the rear of the Soviet Army was carried out by airplanes, motor boats and boats. The scouts were left as part of residencies in settlements liberated by Soviet troops. The agents, as a rule, were deployed in groups of 2-3 people. The group was assigned a radio operator. Radio stations in Kerch, Simferopol and Anapa kept in touch with agents.
    Later, the agents of the NBO, who were in the special camps, were transferred to the so-called. "Legion of the Black Sea" and other armed detachments for punitive operations against the partisans of the Crimea and carrying out garrison and guard duty.
    At the end of October 1943, the NBO team relocated to Kherson, then to Nikolaev, from there in November 1943 to Odessa - the village. Big Fountains.
    In April 1944, the team moved to the mountains. Brailov (Romania), in August 1944 - in the vicinity of Vienna.
    Reconnaissance operations in the areas of the front line were carried out by the following Einsatz commands and forward detachments of the NBO:
    "Marine Abwehr Einsatzkomando" (naval front-line reconnaissance team) of Lieutenant-Lieutenant Neumann began operations in May 1942 and operated on the Kerch sector of the front, then near Sevastopol (July 1942), in Kerch (August), Temryuk (August-September), Taman and Anapa (September-October), Krasnodar, where it was located on Komsomolskaya st., 44 and st. Sedina, 8 (from October 1942 to mid-January 1943), in the village of Slavyanskaya and mountains. Temryuk (February 1943).
    Moving forward with the advanced units of the German army, Neumann's team collected documents from surviving and sunken ships, in the institutions of the Soviet fleet and interrogated prisoners of war, obtained intelligence data through agents thrown into the Soviet rear.
    At the end of February 1943, the Einsatzkommando, leaving in the mountains. Temryuk, the head post, moved to Kerch and settled down on 1st Mitridatskaya street. In mid-March 1943, another post was created in Anapa, headed at first by Feldwebel Schmalz, later by Sonderführer Harnack, and from August to September 1943 by Sonderführer Kellermann.
    In October 1943, in connection with the retreat of German troops, the Einsatzkommando and its subordinate posts moved to Kherson.
    Marine Abwehr Einsatzkomando (naval frontline reconnaissance team). Until September 1942, it was headed by Lieutenant Baron Girard de Sucanton, later - Ober-Lieutenant Cirque.
    In January - February 1942, the team was in Taganrog, then moved to Mariupol and settled in the buildings of the rest house of the Ilyich plant, in the so-called. "White dachas".
    During the second half of 1942, the team "processed" prisoners of war in the Bakhchisarai camp "Tolle" (July 1942), in the Mariupol (August 1942) and Rostov (late 1942) camps.
    From Mariupol, the team transferred agents to the rear of the Soviet Army units operating on the coast of the Azov Sea and in the Kuban. The training of scouts was carried out in the Tavel and other schools of the NBO. In addition, the team independently prepared agents in safe houses.
    Of these apartments in Mariupol identified: st. Artem, 28; st. L. Tolstoy, houses 157 and 161; Donetskaya st., 166; Fontannaya st., 62; 4th Slobodka, 136; Transportnaya st., 166.
    Individual agents were instructed to infiltrate the Soviet intelligence agencies and then seek a transfer to the German rear.
    In September 1943, the team left Mariupol, proceeded through Osipenko, Melitopol and Kherson, and in October 1943 stopped in the mountains. Nikolaev -Alekseevskaya st., 11,13,16,18 and Odessa st., 2. In November 1943, the team moved to Odessa, st. Schmidt (Arnautskaya), house 125. In March-April 1944, through Odessa - Belgrade left for Galati, where it was located on the Main street, house 18. During this period, the team had in the mountains. Reni on Dunayskaya St., 99, the head post of communications, which threw agents into the rear of the Soviet Army.
    During their stay in Galati, the team was known as the Whiteland reconnaissance agency.
    DIVERSION-INTELLIGENCE TEAMS AND GROUPS
    The sabotage and reconnaissance teams and groups "Abwehr 2" were engaged in the recruitment, preparation and transfer of agents with sabotage and terrorist, insurgent, propaganda and reconnaissance missions.
    At the same time, teams and groups created from the traitors to the Motherland special fighter units (yagdkomands), various national formations and hundreds of Cossacks to capture and hold strategically important objects in the rear of the Soviet troops until the main forces of the German army approached. These subunits were sometimes used for reconnaissance of the front line of defense of the Soviet troops, the capture of "tongues", undermining individual fortified points.
    During operations, the personnel of the subunits were equipped with the uniform of the servicemen of the Soviet Armies.
    When retreating, agents of teams, groups and their subunits were used as torchbearers and demolition men to set fire to settlements, destroy bridges and other structures.
    The agents of reconnaissance and sabotage teams and groups were thrown into the rear of the Soviet Army with the aim of decomposing and persuading servicemen to treason. She distributed anti-Soviet leaflets, conducted oral agitation on the front line of the defense with the help of radio installations. When retreating, she left anti-Soviet literature in settlements. Special agents were recruited to disseminate it.
    Along with subversive activities in the rear of the Soviet troops, teams and groups at the place of their deployment carried out an active struggle against the partisan movement.
    The main contingent of agents was trained in schools or in courses with teams and groups. Individual training of agents by intelligence officers was practiced.
    The transfer of sabotage agents to the rear of the Soviet troops was carried out with the help of aircraft and on foot in groups of 2-5 people. (one is a radio operator).
    The agents were equipped and supplied with fictitious documents in accordance with the developed legend. Received assignments to organize the blowing up of trains, railway tracks, bridges and other structures on the railways going to the front; destroy defensive structures, military and food warehouses and strategically important objects; commit terrorist acts against officers and generals of the Soviet Army, party and Soviet leaders.
    Intelligence missions were also given to agents-saboteurs. The deadline for completing the assignment was from 3 to 5 days or more, after which the agents returned to the side of the Germans using a password. Agents with propaganda missions were deployed without specifying a return date.
    The reports of the agents about the acts of sabotage they carried out were checked.
    In the last period of the war, the teams began to prepare sabotage and terrorist groups to leave the Soviet troops in the rear.
    For this purpose, bases and storage facilities with weapons were laid in advance, explosives, food and clothing, which were to be used by sabotage groups.
    On the Soviet-German front, 6 sabotage teams operated. Subordinate to each Abwehr command were from 2 to 6 Abwehrgroups.
    INJECTION TEAMS AND GROUPS
    Counterintelligence teams and Abwehr 3 groups operating on the Soviet-German front behind the lines of the German army groups and armies to which they were attached carried out active intelligence work to identify Soviet intelligence officers, partisans and underground workers, and also collected and processed captured documents.
    Counterintelligence teams and groups recruited some of the detained Soviet intelligence officers, through whom they played radio games in order to misinform the Soviet intelligence agencies. Some of the recruited agents were thrown into the Soviet rear by counterintelligence teams and groups in order to infiltrate the MGB and intelligence departments of the Soviet Army to study the methods of work of these bodies and identify Soviet intelligence officers trained and thrown into the rear of the German troops.
    Each counterintelligence team and group carried staff or permanent agents recruited from traitors who had proven themselves in practical work. These agents moved with teams and groups and infiltrated the established German administrative institutions and enterprises.
    In addition, at the place of deployment, teams and groups created an agent network of local residents. When the German troops retreated, these agents were transferred to the disposal of the reconnaissance Abwehrgroups or remained in the rear of the Soviet troops with reconnaissance missions.
    Provocation was one of the most widespread methods of the German military counterintelligence agency work. So, agents under the guise of Soviet scouts or persons transferred to the rear of the German troops by the command of the Soviet Army with a special assignment, settled with the Soviet patriots, entered into their trust, gave assignments directed against the Germans, organized groups to go over to the side of the Soviet troops. Then all these patriots were arrested.
    For the same purpose, pseudo-partisan detachments were created from agents and traitors to the Motherland.
    Counterintelligence teams and groups carried out their work in contact with the SD and GUF. They conducted an undercover development of suspicious, from the point of view of the Germans, persons, and the obtained data were transferred to the SD and GUF authorities for implementation.
    On the Soviet-German front, there were 5 Abwehr counterintelligence commands. Each subordinate was from 3 to 8 Abwehrgroups, which were attached to the armies, as well as rear commandant's offices and security divisions.
    ABVERKOMAID 304
    Formed shortly before the German attack on the USSR and attached to the army group "Nord". Until July 1942 it was called "Abwehrkommando 3 C". Field mail N 10805. The call sign of the radio station is "Sperling" or "Sperber".
    The leaders of the team were Majors Klamroth (Kla-morte), Gesenregen.
    During the invasion of German troops deep into Soviet territory, the team was consistently located in Kaunas and Riga, in September 1941 it moved to the mountains. Pechora of the Pskov region; in June 1942 - to Pskov, on Oktyabrskaya Street, 49, and stayed there until February 1944.
    During the offensive of the Soviet troops, the team from Pskov was evacuated to places. White lake, then - in the village. Turaido, near the mountains. Sigulda, Latvian SSR.
    From April to August 1944 in Riga there was a branch of the team called "Renate"
    In September 1944, the team relocated to Liepaja; in mid-February 1945 - in the mountains. Swi-nemünde (Germany).
    During their stay on the territory of the Latvian SSR, the team carried out a lot of work on radio games with the Soviet intelligence agencies through radio stations with the callsigns "Penguin", "Flamingo", "Reiger", "El-ster", "Eizvogel", "Vale", "Bakhshteltse" , "Hauben-Taucher" and "Stint".
    Before the war, German military intelligence carried out active intelligence work against the Soviet Union by sending agents trained mainly on an individual basis.
    A few months before the outbreak of the war, "Abwerstelle Köninsberg", "Abwerstelle Stettin", "Abverstelle Vienna" and "Abwerstelle Krakow" organized intelligence and sabotage schools for the mass training of agents.
    At first, these schools were staffed with personnel recruited from White emigre youth and members of various anti-Soviet nationalist organizations (Ukrainian, Polish, Belarusian, etc.). However, practice has shown that agents from the White emigres were poorly guided by Soviet reality.
    With the deployment of hostilities on the Soviet-German front, German intelligence began to expand the network of reconnaissance and sabotage schools to train qualified agents. The agents for training in schools were now recruited mainly from among prisoners of war, an anti-Soviet, treacherous and criminal element who penetrated the ranks of the Soviet Army and sided with the Germans, and to a lesser extent from anti-Soviet citizens who remained in the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR.
    The Abwehr authorities believed that agents from prisoners of war could be quickly prepared for reconnaissance work and easier to deploy in the Soviet Army. The profession and personal qualities of the candidate were taken into account, while the priority was given to radio operators, signalmen, sappers and persons who had a sufficient general outlook.
    Agents from the civilian population were selected on the recommendation and with the assistance of German counterintelligence and police agencies and the leaders of anti-Soviet organizations.
    The base for recruiting agents in schools was also anti-Soviet armed formations: ROA, various created by the Germans from traitors to the so-called. "National legions".
    Those who agreed to work for the Germans were isolated and, accompanied by German soldiers or the recruiters themselves, were sent to special test camps or directly to schools.
    During recruitment, methods of bribery, provocation and threats were also used. Those arrested for real or alleged misconduct were asked to atone for their guilt by working for the Germans. Usually recruits were pre-tested in practical work as counterintelligence agents, punishers and police officers.
    The finalization of recruitment was done at a school or testing camp. After that, a detailed questionnaire was filled out for each agent, a subscription was selected for voluntary agreement to cooperate with German intelligence, the agent was assigned a nickname under which he was listed in the school. In a number of cases, recruited agents were sworn in.
    At the same time, 50-300 agents studied in intelligence schools, and 30-100 agents in sabotage and terrorist schools.
    The training period for agents, depending on the nature of their future activities, was different: for scouts of the near rear - from two weeks to a month; scouts of the deep rear - from one to six months; saboteurs - from two weeks to two months; radio operators - from two to four months or more.
    In the deep rear of the Soviet Union, German agents acted under the guise of sent military personnel and civilians, wounded, discharged from hospitals and exempt from military service, evacuated from areas occupied by the Germans, etc. In the frontal zone, agents acted under the guise of sappers who mine or clear the front line of the defense, signalmen engaged in wiring or repairing communication lines; snipers and scouts of the Soviet Army performing special tasks of the command; the wounded heading to the hospital from the battlefield, etc.
    The most common fictitious documents that the Germans supplied their agents with were: identification cards for command personnel; various types of travel orders; payroll and duffel books for command personnel; food certificates; extracts from orders for transfer from one part to another; powers of attorney to receive various types of property from warehouses; certificates of medical examination with the conclusion of the medical commission; certificates of discharge from the hospital and leave permission after injury; Red Army books; sickness exemption certificates; passports with appropriate registration marks; work books; certificates of evacuation from settlements occupied by the Germans; party cards and candidate cards of the VKP (b); Komsomol tickets; award books and temporary certificates of awards.
    After completing the assignment, the agents had to return to the body that prepared or transferred them. To cross the front line, they were provided with a special password.
    Returnees were carefully vetted through other agents and through repeated verbal and written cross-examination of dates, locations
    being on the territory of the Soviet Union, the route to the place of the assignment and return. Exceptional attention was paid to finding out whether the agent was detained by the Soviet authorities. Returning agents isolated themselves from each other. The testimonies and reports of the internal agents were collated and carefully checked.
    BORISOVSKAYA INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL
    Borisov school was organized in August 1941 by Abwehrkommando 103, at first it was located in the village. Stoves, in the former. a military town (6 km south of Borisov on the road to Minsk); field mail 09358 B. The head of the school was Captain Jung, then Captain Uthoff.
    In February 1942, the school was transferred to the village. Katyn (23 km west of Smolensk).
    In places. A preparatory department was created for the furnace, where the agents underwent inspection and preliminary training, and then were sent to the localities. Katyn for intelligence training. In April 1943, the school was transferred back to the village. Stoves.
    The school trained intelligence agents and radio operators. It trained about 150 people at the same time, including 50-60 radio operators. The term of training for scouts is 1-2 months, for radio operators - 2-4 months.
    When enrolling in school, each scout was assigned a nickname. It was strictly forbidden to give his real name and ask others about it.
    Trained agents were deployed to the rear of the Soviet Army in 2-3 people. (one - a radio operator) and alone, mainly in the central sectors of the front, as well as in Moscow, Kalinin, Ryazan and Tula regions. Some of the agents were tasked with making their way to Moscow and settling there.
    In addition, agents trained at the school were sent to partisan detachments to identify their deployment and the location of bases.
    The transfer was carried out by aircraft from the Minsk airfield and on foot from the settlements of Petrikovo, Mogilev, Pinsk, Luninets.
    In September 1943, the school was evacuated to the territory of East Prussia in the village. Rosenstein (100 km south of Konigsberg) and was housed there in the barracks of the former camp of French prisoners of war.
    In December 1943, the school was relocated to the localities. Malleten near the village. Neindorf (5 km south of the Lykk mountain), where it was until August 1944. Here the school organized its branch in the village. Flisdorf (25 km south of the Lykk mountain).
    The agents for the branch were recruited from prisoners of war of Polish nationality and trained for intelligence work in the rear of the Soviet Army.
    In August 1944, the school was relocated to the mountains. Meve (65 km south of Danzig), where it was located on the outskirts of the city, on the banks of the Vistula, in a former building. German school of officers, and was encrypted as a newly formed military unit. Together with the school he was transferred to the village. Grossweide (5 km from Mewe) and the Flisdorf branch.
    In early 1945, in connection with the advance of the Soviet Army, the school was evacuated to the mountains. Bismarck, where it was disbanded in April 1945. Part of the school personnel went to the mountains. Arenburg (on the Elbe River), and some agents, dressed in civilian clothes, crossed into the territory occupied by the Soviet Army.
    OFFICIAL COMPOSITION
    Jung is the captain, head of the body. 50-55 years old, medium height, full, gray-haired, bald.
    Utgoff Hans - captain, head of the organ since 1943. Born in 1895, medium height, thick, bald.
    Bronikovsky Ervin, aka Gerasimovich Tadeusz -captain, deputy head of the body, in November 1943 was transferred to the newly organized school of resident radio operators in localities. Niedersee as Deputy Head of the School.
    Picch is a non-commissioned officer, radio instructor. Resident of Estonia. Fluent in Russian. 23-24 years old, tall, thin, light brown-haired, gray eyes.
    Matyushin Ivan Ivanovich, nickname "Frolov" - a radio engineering teacher, a former military engineer of the 1st rank, born in 1898, a native of the mountains. Tetyushi of the Tatar ASSR.
    Rikhva Yaroslav Mikhailovich - translator and head. clothing warehouse. Born in 1911, native of the mountains. Kamenka Bugskaya Lviv region.
    Lonkin Nikolai Pavlovich, nickname "Lebedev" - a teacher of agent intelligence, graduated from an intelligence school in Warsaw. Former soldier of the Soviet border troops. Born in 1911, native of the village of Strakhovo, Ivanovo district, Tula region.
    Kozlov Alexander Danilovich, nickname "Menshikov" - intelligence teacher. Born in 1920, a native of the village of Aleksandrovka, Stavropol Territory.
    Andreev, aka Mokritsa, aka Antonov Vladimir Mikhailovich, nickname "Worm", nickname "Voldemar" - a radio business teacher. Born in 1924, native of Moscow.
    Simavin, nicknamed "Petrov" - an employee of the organ, a former lieutenant of the Soviet Army. 30-35 years old, medium height, thin, dark-haired, long, thin face.
    Jacques is the manager of the household. 30-32 years old, average height, scar on the nose.
    Shinkarenko Dmitry Zakharovich, nickname "Petrov" - the head of the office, was also engaged in the production of fictitious documents, a former colonel of the Soviet Army. Born in 1910, a native of the Krasnodar Territory.
    Panchak Ivan Timofeevich - sergeant major, foreman and translator.
    Vlasov Vladimir Alexandrovich - captain, head of the training unit, teacher and recruiter in December 1943.
    Berdnikov Vasily Mikhailovich, aka Bobkov Vladimir - foreman and translator. Born in 1918, native of the village. Trumna of the Oryol region.
    Donchenko Ignat Evseevich, nickname "Dove" - ​​head. warehouse, born in 1899, native of the village of Rachki, Vinnitsa region.
    Pavlogradskiy Ivan Vasilievich, nickname "Kozin" - an intelligence officer in Minsk. Born in 1910, a native of the village of Leningradskaya, Krasnodar Territory.
    Kulikov Alexey Grigorievich, nickname "Monakhs" - teacher. Born in 1920, a native of the village of N.-Kryazhin, Kuznetsk district, Kuibyshev region.
    Krasnoper Vasily, possibly Fyodor Vasilyevich, aka Anatoly, Alexander Nikolaevich or Ivanovich, nickname "Viktorov" (possibly a surname), nickname "Wheat" - a teacher.
    Kravchenko Boris Mikhailovich, nickname "Doronin" - captain, teacher of topography. Born in 1922, a native of Moscow.
    Zharkov, onzheSharkov, Stefan, Stefanen, Degrees, Stefan Ivan or Stepan Ivanovich, possibly Semyonovich-lieutenant, teacher until January 1944, then head of the C-camp of Abwehrkommando 103.
    Popinako Nikolay Nikiforovich, nickname "Titorenko" - teacher of physical training. Born in 1911, native of the village of Kulnovo, Klintsovsky District, Bryansk Region.
    SECRET FIELD POLICE (FPP)
    The secret field police - Geheimfeldpolizai (GFP) - was the police executive body of the military counterintelligence in the active army. In peacetime, the bodies of the GUF did not function.
    The leadership of the GUF unit received from the Abwehr-Abroad Directorate, which included a special abstract of the FPDV (Field Police of the Armed Forces), headed by Police Colonel Krikhbaum.
    The units of the GUF on the Soviet-German front were represented by groups at the headquarters of army groupings, armies and field commandant's offices, as well as in the form of commissariats and commands - at corps, divisions and individual local commandant's offices.
    The GUF groups at armies and field commandant's offices were headed by field police commissars, subordinate to the head of the field police of the corresponding army grouping and at the same time to the Abwehr officer of the 1st C division of the army or the field commandant's office. The group consisted of 80 to 100 employees and soldiers. Each group had from 2 to 5 commissariats, or so-called. "Outside teams" (aussencomando) and "outside squads" (aussenstelle), the number of which varied depending on the situation.
    The secret field police performed the functions of the Gestapo in the combat zone, as well as in the nearby army and front lines.
    Its task was mainly to make arrests at the direction of the military counterintelligence agencies, to investigate cases of high treason, treason, espionage, sabotage, anti-fascist propaganda among the servicemen of the German army, as well as reprisals against partisans and other Soviet patriots who fought against the fascist invaders.
    In addition, the current instruction assigned to the GUF divisions:
    Organization of counterintelligence measures to protect the headquarters of the serviced formations. Personal protection of the commander of the formation and representatives of the main headquarters.
    Observation of the war correspondents, artists, photographers who were at the command instances.
    Control over the postal, telegraph and telephone communications of the civilian population.
    Promoting censorship in the supervision of field postal communications.
    Control and observation of the press, meetings, lectures, reports.
    Search for the remaining Soviet Army servicemen in the occupied territory. Obstruction of the withdrawal of civilians from the occupied territory for the front line, especially of draft age.
    Interrogation and observation of persons who appeared in the combat zone.
    The bodies of the GUF carried out counterintelligence and punitive activities in the occupied areas, close to the front line. To identify Soviet agents, partisans and Soviet patriots associated with them, the secret field police planted agents among the civilian population.
    Under the units of the GUF there were groups of full-time agents, as well as small military formations (squadrons, platoons) from traitors to the Motherland for punitive actions against partisans, conducting round-ups in settlements, guarding and escorting arrested persons.
    On the Soviet-German front, 23 groups of GUFs were identified.
    After the attack on the Soviet Union, the fascist leaders entrusted the organs of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of Germany with the task of physically exterminating Soviet patriots and ensuring the fascist regime in the occupied areas.
    For this purpose, a significant number of units of the security police and special forces were sent to the temporarily occupied Soviet territory.
    divisions of the RSHA: mobile task forces and teams operating in the frontline zone, and territorial bodies for the rear areas controlled by the civil administration.
    Mobile formations of the security police and SD - operational groups (Einsatzgruppen) for punitive activities on Soviet territory - were created on the eve of the war, in May 1941. In total, four operational groups were created with the main groupings of the German army - A, B, C and D.
    The operational groups included subunits - special teams (sonderkommando) for operations in the areas of the forward units of the army and operational teams (einsatzkomando) - for operations in the rear of the army. Task forces and teams were staffed by the most notorious thugs from the Gestapo and the criminal police, as well as SD officers.
    A few days before the outbreak of hostilities, Heyd-rich ordered the task forces to take their departure points, from where they were to advance together with German troops into Soviet territory.
    By this time, each group with teams and police units numbered up to 600-700 people. commanding and rank-and-file personnel. For greater mobility, all units were supplied with cars, trucks and special vehicles and motorcycles.
    The operational and special teams numbered from 120 to 170 people, including 10-15 officers, 40-60 non-commissioned officers and 50-80 privates of the SS.
    The task forces, operational teams and special teams of the security police and SD were assigned the following tasks:
    In the combat zone and close rear areas, seize and search office buildings and premises of party and Soviet bodies, military headquarters and departments, buildings of the state security agencies of the USSR and all other institutions and organizations where there could be important operational or secret documents, archives, card files, etc. similar materials.
    To carry out the search, arrest and physical destruction of the party and Soviet workers, intelligence and counterintelligence officers left behind in the German rear to fight the occupiers, as well as captured commanders and political workers of the Soviet Army.
    Identify and repress communists, Komsomol members, leaders of local Soviet bodies, public and collective farm activists, employees and agents of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence agencies.
    Pursue and exterminate the entire Jewish population.
    In the rear areas, to fight all anti-fascist manifestations and illegal activities of Germany's opponents, as well as to inform the commanders of the rear areas of the army about the political situation in the area under their jurisdiction.
    The operational bodies of the security police and SD planted agents among the civilian population, recruited from a criminal and anti-Soviet element. Village heads, volost foremen, employees of administrative and other institutions created by the Germans, police officers, foresters, owners of canteens, snack bars, restaurants, etc. were used as such agents. Those of them who, before recruiting, held administrative positions (foremen, chiefs), were sometimes transferred to inconspicuous jobs: millers, bookkeepers. The agents were obliged to monitor the appearance in cities and villages of suspicious and unfamiliar persons, partisans, Soviet parachutists, report on communists, Komsomol members, former active social activists. The agents were reduced to residency. Traitors to the Motherland, who had proven themselves before the occupiers, worked as residents, serving in German institutions, city councils, land departments, construction organizations, etc.
    With the beginning of the Soviet offensive and the liberation of the temporarily occupied Soviet territories, part of the security police and SD agents were left behind in the Soviet rear with reconnaissance, sabotage, insurgent and terrorist missions. These agents were transferred to the military intelligence agencies for communication.
    "SPECIAL TEAM MOSCOW"
    Created in early July 1941, it moved with the advanced units of the 4th Panzer Army.
    In the early days, the team was headed by the head of the VII department of the RSHA, SS Standartenfuehrer Zix. When the German offensive failed, Siex was recalled to Berlin. The chief was appointed SS Obersturmführer Kerting, who in March 1942 became chief of the security police and SD of the "general district of Stalino".
    A special team moved along the route Ros-Lavl - Yukhnov - Medyn to Maloyaroslavets with the task of returning with advanced units to Moscow and seizing the objects of interest to the Germans.
    After the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, the team was taken to the mountains. Roslavl, where it was reorganized in 1942 and became known as the Special Team 7 C. In September 1943, the team due to heavy losses in a collision with Soviet units in places Kolotini-chi was disbanded.
    SPECIAL TEAM 10 A
    A special command 10 a (field mail N 47540 and 35583) operated in conjunction with the 17th German army of Colonel-General Ruof.
    The team was led until mid-1942 by SS Oberstur-Mbannführer Seetzen, then SS Sturmbannführer Christmann.
    The team is widely known for its atrocities in Krasnodar. From the end of 1941 until the beginning of the German offensive in the Caucasus direction, the team was in Taganrog, and its units operated in the cities of Osipenko, Rostov, Mariupol and Simferopol.
    When the Germans advanced to the Caucasus, the team arrived in Krasnodar, and during this period its units operated on the territory of the region in the cities of Novorossiysk, Yeisk, Anapa, Temryuk, the villages of Varenikovskaya and Verkhne-Bakanskaya. At the trial in Krasnodar in June 1943, the facts of the monstrous atrocities of the team's employees were revealed: mockery of the arrested and the burning of prisoners held in the Krasnodar prison; massacres of patients in the city hospital, in the Berezanskiy medical colony and the regional children's hospital on the farm “Tretya Rechka Kochety” in the Ust-Labinsk region; strangulation of many thousands of Soviet people in gas chambers.
    The special team at that time consisted of about 200 people. Assistants to the head of Christma's team were employees Rabbe, Boos, Sargo, Salge, Hahn, Erich Meyer, Paschen, Vinz, Hans Münster; German military doctors Hertz and Schuster; translators Jacob Eycks, Sheterland.
    When the Germans retreated from the Caucasus, some of the team's officials were assigned to other groups of the Security Police and SD on the Soviet-German front.
    ________"ZEPPELIN"________
    In March 1942, the RSHA created a special reconnaissance and sabotage agency under the code name "Unternemen Zeppelin" (Zeppelin enterprise).
    In its activities "Zeppelin" was guided by the so-called. "An action plan for the political disintegration of the Soviet Union." The main tactical tasks of the Zeppelin were determined by this plan as follows:
    “... We must strive for tactics of the greatest possible variety. Special action groups should be formed, namely:
    1. Reconnaissance groups - to collect and transmit political information from the Soviet Union.
    2. Propaganda groups - for the dissemination of national, social and religious propaganda.
    3. Insurgent groups - for organizing and conducting uprisings.
    4. Sabotage groups for political sabotage and terror.
    The plan emphasized that the Zeppelin was charged with political intelligence and sabotage activities in the Soviet rear. The Germans also wanted to create a separatist movement of bourgeois-nationalist elements aimed at tearing away the union republics from the USSR and organizing puppet "states" under the protectorate of Hitlerite Germany.
    To this end, in 1941-1942, the RSHA, together with the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Regions, was established in Berlin, a number of so-called. "National committees" (Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijan, Turkestan, North Caucasian, Volga-Tatar and Kalmyk).
    The listed "national committees" were chaired by:
    Gruzinsky - Kedia Mikhail Mekievich and Gabliani Givi Ignatievich;
    Armenian - Abegyan Artashes, Baghdasaryan, he is Si-monyan, he is Sargsyan Tigran and Sargsyan Vartan Mikhailovich;
    Azerbaijani - Fatalibekov, he is Fatalibey-li, he is Dudanginsky Abo Alievich and Israfil-Bey Israfailov Magomed Nabi Ogly;
    Turkestan - Valli-Kayum-Khan, aka Kayumov Vali, Khaitov Baymirza, aka Haiti Ogly Baymirza and Kanatbaev Kariye Kusaevich
    North Caucasian - Magomayev Akhmed Nabi Idrisovich and Kantemirov Alikhan Gadoevich;
    Volgo-Tatarsky - Shafeev Abdrakhman Gibadullovich, aka Shafi Almas and Alkaev Shakir Ibragimovich;
    Kalmytsky - Balinov Shamba Khachinovich.
    At the end of 1942, in Berlin, the propaganda department of the headquarters of the main command of the German army (OKB), together with intelligence, created the so-called. "Russian Committee" headed by the traitor to the Motherland, former Lieutenant General of the Soviet Army Vlasov.
    The "Russian Committee", as well as other "national committees", attracted unstable prisoners of war and Soviet citizens taken to work in Germany to an active struggle against the Soviet Union, processed them in a fascist spirit and formed military units of the so-called. "Russian liberation army"(ROA).
    In November 1944, on the initiative of Himmler, the so-called. The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR), headed by the former head of the Russian Committee, Vlasov.
    The KONR was tasked with uniting all anti-Soviet organizations and military formations from among the traitors to the Motherland and expanding their subversive activities against the Soviet Union.
    In his subversive work against the USSR, "Zeppelin)) acted in contact with the" Abwehr "and the main headquarters of the high command of the German army, as well as with the imperial ministry for the occupied eastern regions.
    The Zeppelin headquarters until the spring of 1943 was located in Berlin, in the office building of the VI Administration of the RSHA, in the Grunewald area, Berkaerst-rasse, 32/35, and then in the Wannsee area - Potsdamer Strasse, 29.
    At first, the Zeppelin was headed by the SS Sturmbannführer Kurek; he was soon replaced by SS Sturmbannführer Raeder.
    At the end of 1942, "Zeppelin" merged with abstracts VI C 1-3 (intelligence against the Soviet Union), and the head of the EI C group, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. Grefe, began to lead it.
    In January 1944, after the death of Grefe, the Zeppelin was headed by SS Sturmbannführer Dr. Hengelhaupt, and from the beginning of 1945 until the surrender of Germany - by SS Obersturmbannführer Rapp.
    The governing headquarters consisted of the office of the head of the body and three departments with subdivisions.
    Department CET 1 was in charge of recruiting and operational management of grassroots agencies, supplying agents with equipment and equipment.
    The CET 1 department consisted of five sub-departments:
    CET 1 A - leadership and supervision over the activities of grassroots bodies, staffing.
    CET 1 B - management of camps and registration of agents.
    CET 1 C - protection and transfer of agents. The subdivision had escort teams at its disposal.
    CET 1 D - material support for agents.
    CET 1 E - car service.
    Department of CET 2 - training of agents. The department had four subsections:
    CET 2 A - selection and training of agents of Russian nationality.
    CET 2 B - selection and training of agents from the Cossacks.
    CET 2 C - selection and training of agents from persons of the nationalities of the Caucasus.
    CET 2 D - selection and training of agents from the nationalities of Central Asia. The department had 16 employees.
    The CET 3 department processed all materials on the activities of special camps of front-line commands and agents transferred to the rear areas of the USSR.
    The structure of the department was the same as in department CET 2. The department had 17 employees.
    At the beginning of 1945, the Zeppelin headquarters, together with other departments of the VI Directorate of the RSHA, was evacuated to the south of Germany. After the end of the war, most of the leading employees of the Zeppelin central office ended up in the zone of American troops.
    TEAMS "ZEPPELINA" ON SOVIET-GERMAISKY FRONT
    In the spring of 1942, the Zeppelin sent four special teams (Sonderkommando) to the Soviet-German front. They were attached to the operational groups of the security police and SD at the main army groupings of the German army.
    Special Zeppelin teams selected prisoners of war for training agents in training camps, collected intelligence information about the political and military-economic situation of the USSR by interviewing prisoners of war, collected uniforms for equipping agents, various military documents and other materials suitable for use in intelligence work.
    All materials, documents and items of equipment were sent to the command headquarters, and the selected prisoners of war were sent to the special Zeppelin camps.
    The teams also airlifted prepared agents across the front line on foot and by parachute from aircraft. Sometimes agents were trained on the spot, in small camps.
    The transfer of agents by air was carried out from special crossing points "Zeppelin": in the state farm Vysokoe near Smolensk, in Pskov and the resort town of Saki near Evpatoria.
    Special teams initially had a small staff: 2 SS officers, 2-3 junior SS commanders, 2-3 translators and several agents.
    In the spring of 1943, the special teams were disbanded, and instead of them two main teams were created on the Soviet-German front - Rusland Mitte (later renamed Rusland Nord) and Rusland Süd (otherwise known as Doctor Raeder's Headquarters). In order not to disperse forces along the entire front, these teams focused their actions only on the most important directions: north and south.
    The main Zeppelin team with the services that were part of it was a powerful intelligence organ and consisted of several hundred employees and agents.
    The team leader was subordinate only to the Zeppelin command headquarters in Berlin, and in practical work he had complete operational independence, organizing the selection, training and transfer of agents on the spot. His actions, he contacted with other intelligence agencies and the military command.
    "BATTLE UNION OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS" (BSRN)
    Created in March 1942 in the Suwalki Prisoner of War Leger. Initially, the BSRN was called the "National Party of the Russian People". Its organizer is Gill (Rodionov). The "Combat Union of Russian Nationalists" had its own program and charter.
    Everyone who joined the BSRN filled out a questionnaire, received a membership card and gave a written oath of allegiance to the "principles" of this union. The grassroots organizations of the BSRN were called "fighting squads".
    Soon, the leadership of the union from the Suwalki camp was transferred to the Zeppelin preliminary camp, on the territory of the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. There, in April 1942, the BSRN center was established,
    The center was divided into four groups: military, special-purpose (agent training) and two training groups. Each of the groups was led by an official Zeppelin employee. After some time, only one training group of the BSRN remained in Sachsenhausen, and the rest left for other Zeppelin camps.
    The second group of training of personnel of BSRN began to be deployed in the region of the mountains. Breslavl, where the leadership of the special camps was trained in the "SS 20 Forest Camp".
    A military group led by Gill, in the amount of 100 people. dropped out in the region of the mountains. Parcheva (Poland). There was created a special camp for the formation of "squad No. 1".
    The special group dropped out in places. Yablon (Poland) and joined the Zeppelin intelligence school located there.
    In January 1943, a conference of organizations of the "Combat Union of Russian Nationalists" was held in Breslavl, which was attended by 35 delegates. In the summer of 1943, part of the BSRN members joined the ROA.
    "RUSSIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY OF REFORMISTS" (RNPR)
    The "Russian People's Party of Reformists" (RNPR) was created in a prisoner of war camp in the mountains. Weimar in the spring of 1942 by the former Major General of the Soviet Army, traitor to the Motherland Bessonov ("Katulsky").
    Initially, the RNPR was called the "People's Russian Party of Socialist Realists."
    By the fall of 1942, the leading group of the Russian People's Party of Reformists settled in the special Zeppelin camp, on the territory of the Buchenwald concentration camp, and formed the so-called. "Political Center for the Fight against Bolshevism" (PCB).
    The PCB published and distributed anti-Soviet magazines and newspapers among prisoners of war and developed a charter and program of its activities.
    Bessonov offered the Zeppelin leadership his services in sending an armed group to the northern regions of the USSR to carry out sabotage and organize uprisings.
    To develop a plan for this adventure and prepare an armed military formation of traitors to the Motherland, Bessonov's group was assigned a special camp in the former. Leibus Monastery (near Breslavl). At the beginning of 1943, the camp was transferred to localities. Linsdorf.
    The leaders of the PCB visited POW camps to recruit traitors to Bessonov's group.
    Subsequently, a punitive detachment was created from the members of the PCB to fight the partisans, which operated on the Soviet-German front in the region of the mountains. Velikie Luki.
    MILITARY UNITS ______ "ZEPPELINA" ______
    In the "Zeppelin" camps, during the preparation of agents, a significant number of "activists" were eliminated, who for various reasons were not suitable for throwing them into the rear areas of the USSR.
    Most of the “activists” of Caucasian and Central Asian nationalities expelled from the camps were transferred to anti-Soviet military formations (“Turkestan legion”, etc.).
    From the expelled Russian "activists" "Zeppelin" in the spring of 1942 began to form two punitive detachments, called "squads". The Germans intended to create large, select armed groups to carry out large-scale subversive operations in the Soviet rear.
    By June 1942, the first punitive detachment was formed - "squad No. 1", numbering 500 people, under the command of Gill ("Rodionov").
    "Druzhina" was stationed in the mountains. Parchev, then moved to a specially created camp in the forest between the mountains. Parchev and Yablon. She was attached to Operational Group B of the Security Police and SD and, on her instructions, served for some time in the protection of communications, and then acted against partisans in Poland, Belarus and the Smolensk region.
    A little later, in a special SS camp "Guides", near the mountains. Lublin, was formed "squad No. 2" of 300 people. led by the traitor to the Motherland, the former captain of the Soviet Army, Blazhevich.
    At the beginning of 1943, both "squads" were united under the command of Gill into the "first regiment of the Russian people's army." A counterintelligence department was created in the regiment, which was headed by Blazhevich.
    "The first regiment of the Russian People's Army" received a special zone on the territory of Belarus, with a center in places. Meadows of the Polotsk region, for independent combat operations against partisans. A special military uniform and insignia were introduced for the regiment.
    In August 1943, most of the regiment, led by Guill, went over to the side of the partisans. During the crossing, Blazhevich and the German instructors were shot. Gill was subsequently killed in action.
    “Zeppelin” gave the rest of the regiment to the main command “Rusland Nord” and later used it as a punitive detachment and a reserve base for acquiring agents.
    In total, more than 130 reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence teams "Abwehr" and SD and about 60 schools that trained spies, saboteurs and terrorists operated on the Soviet-German front.
    The publication was prepared by V. BOLTROMEYUK
    Consultant V. VINOGRADOV
    Magazine "Security Service" No. 3-4 1995

  2. SPECIAL COMMUNICATION on the detention of German intelligence agents TAVRIM and SHILOVA.
    September 5 p. in the morning the head of the Karmanovskiy RO of the NKVD - Art. militia lieutenant VETROV in the village. Karmanovo detained agents of German intelligence:
    1. TAVRIN Petr Ivanovich
    2. SHILOVA Lidia Yakovlevna. The detention was carried out under the following circumstances:
    At 1 hour 50 minutes On the night of September 5, the head of the Gzhatsk RO of the NKVD, the captain of state security, comrade IVA-NOVU, was informed by telephone from the VNOS service post that an enemy plane had appeared in the direction of the city of Mozhaisk at an altitude of 2500 meters.
    At 3 o'clock in the morning from the air observation post for the second time it was reported by telephone that the enemy plane after the shelling at the station. Kubinka, Mozhaisk - Uvarovka, Moscow region. came back and began to land with the engine on fire in the area of ​​the village. Yakovlev - Zavrazhie, Karmanovsky district, Smolensk region. about this Beginning. The Gzhatsky RO of the NKVD informed the Karmanovskiy RO of the NKVD and sent a task force to the indicated place of the plane crash.
    At 4 o'clock in the morning, the commander of the Zaprudkovo order protection group, Comrade ALMAZOV said by phone that the enemy plane had landed between the village. Zavrazhie and Yakovlevo. A man and a woman in the uniform of servicemen left the plane on a German brand motorcycle, who stopped in the village. Yakovlevo, asked for directions to the mountains. Rzhev and were interested in the location of the nearest regional centers. Teacher ALMAZOVA, living in the village. Almazovo, showed them the way to the regional center Karmanovo and they left in the direction of the village. Samuylovo.
    On the arrest of 2 servicemen who left the plane, the Head of the Gzhatsky District of the NKVD, in addition to the expelled task force, informed the order protection groups under the councils and informed the Head of the Karmanovsky District of the NKVD.
    Having received a message from the Head of the Gzhatsky RO of the NKVD, the head of the Karmanovsky RO - Art. militia lieutenant comrade VETROV with a group of workers of 5 people left to detain the indicated persons.
    2 kilometers from the village. Karma-novo in the direction of the village. Samuylovo beginning. RO NKVD Comrade VETROV noticed a motorcycle moving in the village. Karmanovo, and by signs he determined that those who were riding a motorcycle were those who had left the plane that had landed, began to chase them on a bicycle and overtook them in the village. Karmanovo.
    Those who rode a motorcycle turned out to be: a man in a leather summer coat, with a major's shoulder straps, had four orders and a gold star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.
    A woman in an overcoat with a junior lieutenant's shoulder straps.
    Stopping the motorcycle and introducing himself as the head of the NKVD RO, Comrade. VETROV demanded a document from a major riding a motorcycle, who presented an identity card in the name of TAV-RINA Pyotr Ivanovich - Deputy. Beginning ROC "Smersh" 39 army of the 1st Baltic Front.
    On the offer comrade. VETROVA to follow in the RO of the NKVD, TAVRIN categorically refused, arguing that he, as arrived on an urgent call from the front, every minute is precious.
    Only with the help of the arrived workers of the RO UNKVD TAVRINA was it possible to deliver it to the RO NKVD.
    In the District Department of the NKVD, TAVRIN presented a certificate for No. 1284 dated 5/1X-44g. with the stamp of the head of the item. 26224 that he was sent to the mountains. Moscow, the Main Directorate of the NCO "Smersh" and the telegram of the Main Directorate of the KRO "Smersh" NCO of the USSR No. 01024 and the same content of the travel certificate.
    After checking the documents through the Head of the Gzhatsky RO of the NKVD comrade. IVANOVA was requested by Moscow and it was established that TAVRIN was not called to the Main Directorate of the Smersh KRO of the NCO and that one does not appear at work in the Smersh KRO of the 39th Army, he was disarmed and confessed that he had been airlifted by German intelligence for sabotage and terror ...
    During a personal search and in a motorcycle on which TAVRIN was following, 3 suitcases with various things, 4 order books, 5 orders, 2 medals, a Gold Star of a Hero of the Soviet Union and a Guards badge, a number of documents in the name of TAVRIN were found, money in Soviet signs 428,400 rubles, 116 mastic seals, 7 pistols, 2 central combat hunting rifles, 5 grenades, 1 mine and a lot of ammunition.
    Detainees with belongings. evidence delivered to the NKVD of the USSR.
    P. p. ZAM NKVD DEPARTMENT HEAD OF SMOLENSK REGION HEAD OF DEPARTMENT BB UNKVD SMOLENSK REGION IS AUTHORIZED.
    7 DEP. OBB NKVD USSR
  3. Reconnaissance Battalion - Aufklarungsabtellung

    In peacetime, the Wehrmacht infantry divisions did not have reconnaissance battalions, their formation began only during the mobilization of 1939. Reconnaissance battalions were formed on the basis of thirteen cavalry regiments, united as part of the cavalry corps. By the end of the war, all cavalry regiments were divided into battalions, which were attached to divisions for reconnaissance. In addition, from the cavalry regiments, spare reconnaissance units were formed, deployed on the territory of the garrisons of individual divisions. Thus, the cavalry regiments ceased to exist, although a new formation of cavalry regiments began towards the end of the war. The reconnaissance battalions played the role of the "eyes" of the division. The scouts determined the tactical situation and protected the main forces of the division from unnecessary "surprises". Reconnaissance battalions were especially useful in a mobile war, when it was required to neutralize enemy reconnaissance and quickly detect the main enemy forces. In some situations, the reconnaissance battalion covered the open flanks. During the rapid offensive, the scouts, along with sappers and tank destroyers, advanced in the vanguard, forming a mobile group. The task of the mobile group was to quickly seize key objects: bridges, intersections, dominant heights, etc. Reconnaissance units of infantry divisions were formed on the basis of cavalry regiments, so they retained the cavalry names of units. Reconnaissance battalions played a large role in the early years of the war. However, the need to solve a large number of tasks demanded the appropriate competence from the commanders. It was especially difficult to coordinate the actions of the battalion due to the fact that it was partially motorized and its units had different mobility. The infantry divisions, formed later, no longer had cavalry units in their battalions, but received a separate cavalry squadron. Instead of motorcycles and cars, the scouts received armored vehicles.
    The reconnaissance battalion consisted of 19 officers, two officials, 90 non-commissioned officers and 512 soldiers - a total of 623 people. The reconnaissance battalion was armed with 25 light machine guns, 3 light grenade launchers, 2 heavy machine guns, 3 anti-tank guns and 3 armored vehicles. In addition, the battalion had 7 carts, 29 vehicles, 20 trucks and 50 motorcycles (28 of them with sidecars). The staffing of the reconnaissance battalion was 260 horses, but in reality the battalion usually had more than 300 horses.
    The structure of the battalion was as follows:
    Battalion headquarters: commander, adjutant, deputy adjutant, intelligence chief, veterinarian, senior inspector (head of the repair detachment), senior treasurer and several staff members. The headquarters had horses and vehicles. The command vehicle was equipped with a 100-watt radio station.
    Courier department (5 cyclists and 5 motorcyclists).
    Communications platoon: 1 telephone office (motorized), radio communications (motorized), 2 compartments of portable radio stations type "d" (on horseback), 1 telephone office (on horseback), 1 horse-drawn carriage with the property of signalmen. Total strength: 1 officer, 29 non-commissioned officers and soldiers, 25 horses.
    Heavy weapons platoon: headquarters (3 motorcycles with a sidecar), one section of heavy machine guns (two heavy machine guns and 8 motorcycles with a sidecar). The rear services and the bicycle platoon numbered 158 people.
    1. Cavalry squadron: 3 cavalry platoons, each with a headquarters and three cavalry squads (each with 2 gunners and one crew of a light machine gun). Each squad has 1 non-commissioned officer and 12 cavalrymen. The armament of each cavalryman consisted of a rifle. In the Polish and French campaigns, the cavalrymen of the reconnaissance battalions wore sabers, but in late 1940 and early 1941 sabers fell out of use. In the 1st and 3rd sections there was an additional pack horse, on which a light machine gun and boxes of cartridges were transported. Each platoon consisted of one officer, 42 soldiers and non-commissioned officers, and 46 horses. However, the combat strength of the platoon was less, since it was necessary to leave the horse breeders who kept the horses.
    The wagon train: one field kitchen, 3 horse-drawn carts HF1, 4 horse-drawn carts HF2 (one of them housed a field smithy), 35 horses, 1 motorcycle, 1 motorcycle with a sidecar, 28 non-commissioned officers and soldiers.
    2. Squadron of cyclists: 3 bicycle platoons: commander, 3 couriers, 3 squads (12 people and a light machine gun), one light mortar (2 motorcycles with a sidecar). 1 truck with spare parts and a mobile workshop. The equipment of the Wehrmacht's bicycle divisions consisted of an army bicycle of the 1938 model. The bicycle was equipped with a trunk, and a soldier's equipment was suspended from the handlebars. Boxes with machine gun cartridges were attached to the bicycle frame. The soldiers held rifles and machine guns behind their backs.
    3. Heavy weapons squadron: 1 cavalry battery (2 75 mm infantry guns, 6 horses), 1 platoon of tank destroyers (3 37 mm anti-tank guns, motorized), 1 platoon of armored vehicles (3 light 4-wheeled armored vehicles (Panzerspaehwagen ), armed with machine guns, one of them is a radio-equipped armored car (Funkwagen)).
    Conveyance: a field kitchen (motorized), 1 truck with ammunition, 1 truck with spare parts and a field workshop, 1 fuel truck, 1 motorcycle with a sidecar for transporting weapons and equipment. Non-commissioned officer and armorer's assistant, a food supply train (1 truck), a wagon train with property (1 truck), one motorcycle without a sidecar for the Hauptfeldwebel and the treasurer.
    The reconnaissance battalion usually operated 25-30 km ahead of the rest of the division's forces or occupied positions on the flank. During the summer offensive of 1941, the cavalry squadron of the reconnaissance battalion was divided into three platoons and operated to the left and right of the offensive line, controlling a front up to 10 km wide. Cyclists operated in close proximity to the main forces, and armored vehicles covered the side roads. The rest of the battalion's forces, along with all the heavy weapons, were kept ready to repel a possible enemy attack. By 1942, the reconnaissance battalion was increasingly used to reinforce the infantry. But for this task, the battalion was too small and poorly equipped. Despite this, the battalion was used as the last reserve, which was used to plug holes in the positions of the division. After the Wehrmacht went over to the defensive along the entire front in 1943, the reconnaissance battalions were practically not used for their intended purpose. All cavalry units were withdrawn from the battalions and merged into new cavalry regiments. From the remnants of the personnel, the so-called rifle battalions (such as light infantry) were formed, which were used to reinforce the bloodless infantry divisions.

  4. Chronology of sabotage and reconnaissance operations of the Abwehr (selectively, because there are many)
    1933 Abwehr began equipping foreign agents with portable shortwave radio stations
    Abwehr representatives hold regular meetings with the leadership of the Estonian special services in Tallinn. The Abwehr begins to create strongholds in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, China and Japan to conduct sabotage and reconnaissance activities against the USSR
    1936 Wilhelm Canaris visits Estonia for the first time and conducts secret negotiations with the Chief of the General Staff of the Estonian Army and the head of the 2nd Military Counterintelligence Department of the General Staff. An agreement was reached on the exchange of intelligence information on the USSR. The Abwehr begins to create an Estonian intelligence center, the so-called "Group 6513". The future Baron Andrei von Jükskühl is appointed as the liaison officer between the “fifth column” of Estonia and the Abwehr
    1935. May. Abwehr receives official permission from the Estonian government to deploy sabotage and reconnaissance bases on Estonian territory along the border with the USSR and equips the Estonian special services with cameras with telescopic lenses and radio intercept equipment to organize covert surveillance of the territory of a potential enemy. Photographic equipment is also installed on the lighthouses of the Gulf of Finland for photographing warships of the Soviet military fleet (RKKF).
    December 21: The division of powers and the division of spheres of influence between the Abwehr and the SD was recorded in an agreement signed by representatives of both departments. The so-called "10 principles" assumed: 1. Coordination of the actions of the Abwehr, Gestapo and SD within the Reich and abroad. 2. Military intelligence and counterintelligence is the exclusive prerogative of the Abwehr. 3. Political Intelligence - Diocese of the SD. 4. The entire range of measures aimed at preventing crimes against the state on the territory of the Reich (surveillance, arrest, investigation, etc.) is carried out by the Gestapo.
    1937. Pickenbrock and Canaris leave for Estonia to intensify and coordinate intelligence activities against the USSR. To conduct subversive activities against the Soviet Union, the Abwehr used the services of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The Rovel special-purpose squadron based in Staaken begins reconnaissance flights over the territory of the USSR. Subsequently, the Xe-111 disguised as transport aircraft flew at high altitude to the Crimea and the foothills of the Caucasus.
    1938 The retired Oberst Maasing, former head of the 2nd department of the Estonian General Staff (military counterintelligence), arrives in Germany. Under the leadership of the new head of the 2nd department, Oberst Willem Saarsen, the counterintelligence of the Estonian army actually turns into a "foreign branch" of the Abwehr. Canaris and Pickenbrock fly to Estonia to coordinate sabotage and reconnaissance activities against the USSR. Until 1940, the Abwehr, together with the Estonian counterintelligence service, sent sabotage and reconnaissance detachments to the territory of the USSR - among others, the "Gavrilov group" named after the leader. On the territory of the Reich, the Abwehr-2 begins an active recruitment of agents among Ukrainian political emigrants. The camp on Lake Chiemsee near Berlin Tegel and in Kwentzgut near Brandenburg open training centers to prepare saboteurs for actions in Russia and Poland.
    January: The Soviet government decides to close the German diplomatic consulates in Leningrad, Kharkov, Tbilisi, Kiev, Odessa, Novosibirsk and Vladivostok.
    As part of the Anti-Comintern Pact concluded in 1936 between the governments of Japan and Germany, Japan's military attaché in Berlin Hiroshi Oshima and Wilhelm Canaris signed an agreement at the Berlin Foreign Ministry on the regular exchange of intelligence information about the USSR and the Red Army. The agreement envisaged holding meetings at the level of leaders of friendly counterintelligence organizations at least once a year to coordinate the sabotage and intelligence operations of the Axis member countries.
    1939 During a visit to Estonia, Canaris expresses a wish to the Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian Armed Forces, General Laidoner, to direct the country's special services to collect information on the number and types of aircraft of the Soviet Air Force. Baron von Jükskühl, a liaison officer for the Abwehr and the Estonian intelligence services, moved to Germany for permanent residence, but until 1940 he repeatedly went on business trips to the Baltic states.
    March 23: Germany annexes Memel (Klaipeda). March - April: The Rovel special squadron based in Budapest, secretly from the Hungarian authorities, makes reconnaissance flights over the territory of the USSR, in the Kiev - Dnepropetrovsk - Zhitomir - Zaporozhye - Kryvyi Rih - Odessa region.
    July: Canaris and Pickenbrock went on a business trip to Estonia. The Rovel Squadron Commander gave Canaris aerial photographs of selected regions of Poland, the USSR and Great Britain.
    Within six months, 53 Abwehr agents were arrested in only one Torun Voivodeship (Poland).
    September 12: The Abwehr leadership takes the first concrete steps to prepare an anti-communist uprising in Ukraine with the help of the OUN militants and its leader Melnik. Abwehr-2 instructors train 250 Ukrainian volunteers at a training camp near Dakhstein.
    October: On the new Soviet-German border, until mid-1941, the Abwehr equips radio interception posts and activates intelligence intelligence. Canaris appoints Major Horacek as head of the Warsaw branch of the Abwehr. To intensify counterintelligence operations against the USSR, Abwehr branches were created in Radom, Tsekhanuv, Lublin, Terespol, Krakow and Suwalki.
    November: The head of the Abwehr regional office in Warsaw, Major Horacek, places additional surveillance and intelligence services in Biala Podlaska, Wlodava and Terespol, opposite Brest on the other side of the Bug in preparation for Operation Barbarossa. Estonian military counterintelligence sends Hauptmann Lepp to Finland to collect intelligence information about the Red Army. The information received is forwarded to the Abwehr in accordance with the agreement.
    The beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war (until March 12, 1940). Together with the Finnish counterintelligence VO "Finland", the Ausland / Abwehr / OKW Directorate are active in sabotage and reconnaissance activities on the front line. The Abwehr manages to obtain especially valuable intelligence information with the help of Finnish long-distance patrols (Kuismanen's group - Kola region, Marttin's group - Kumu region and Paatsalo's group from Lapland).
    December. The Abwehr carries out a massive recruitment of agents in Biala Podlaska and Wlodava and sends OUN saboteurs into the USSR border zone, most of whom are neutralized by the USSR NKVD officers.
    1940 On the instructions of the foreign department of the Abwehr, the Rovel special squadron increases the number of reconnaissance sorties over the territory of the USSR, using the airstrips of airfields in occupied Czechoslovakia and Poland, and air bases in Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The purpose of aerial reconnaissance is to collect information about the location of Soviet industrial facilities, draw up navigation diagrams of the network of highways and railways (bridges, railway junctions, sea and river ports), obtain information about the deployment of the Soviet armed forces and the construction of airfields, border fortifications and long-term air defense positions , barracks, depots and enterprises of the defense industry. As part of the "Oldenburg" operation, the OKB proposes "to carry out an inventory of the sources of raw materials and their processing centers in the West of the USSR (Ukraine, Belarus), in the Moscow and Leningrad regions, and in the oil production regions of Baku."
    To create a “fifth column” in the rear of the Red Army, the Abwehr formed a “Strelitz Special Purpose Regiment” (2,000 men) in Krakow, the “Ukrainian Legion” in Warsaw, and the “Ukrainian Warriors” battalion in Luckenwald. As part of Operation Felix (the occupation of the Strait of Gibraltar area), the Abwehr creates an operational center in Spain to collect information.
    February 13: At the headquarters of the OKB Canaris reports to General Jodl on the results of aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the USSR of the special purpose squadron "Rovel".
    February 22: Hauptmann of the Abwehr Leverkün with a passport of a Reich diplomat leaves for Tabriz / Iran via Moscow to investigate the possibilities of the operational-strategic deployment of an expeditionary army (army group) in the Asian region with the aim of invading the oil-producing regions of the Soviet Transcaucasia as part of the Barbarossa plan.
    March 10: The OUN insurrectionary headquarters dispatches sabotage groups to Lviv and the Volyn region to organize sabotage and civil disobedience.
    April 28: From the Bordufoss airfield in Northern Norway, reconnaissance aircraft of the Rovel special-purpose squadron conduct aerial photography of the northern territories of the USSR (Murmansk and Arkhangelsk).
    May: Liaison Officer Abwehr II Klee flies to a secret meeting in Estonia.
    July: Until May 1941, the NKVD of the Lithuanian SSR neutralized 75 sabotage and reconnaissance groups of the Abwehr.
    July 21 - 22: The Operations Department begins to develop plans for a military campaign in Russia. August: OKW commissions Ausland / Abwehr to carry out training within the offensive operation against the USSR.
    August 8: At the request of the chief of staff of the German Air Force, experts from the OKW foreign department compose an analytical review of the military-industrial potential of the USSR and the colonial possessions of Great Britain (except for Egypt and Gibraltar).
    From December 1940 to March 1941 the NKVD of the USSR liquidated 66 strong points and bases of the Abwehr in the border areas. For 4 months, 1,596 agents-saboteurs were arrested (of which 1,338 were in the Baltic States, Belarus and Western Ukraine). In late 1940 and early 1941, Argentine counterintelligence discovered several warehouses with German weapons.
    On the eve of the invasion of the USSR, the foreign department of the Abwehr is carrying out a massive recruitment of agents among the Armenian (Dashnaktsutyun party), Azerbaijani (Mussavat) and Georgian (Shamil) political emigrants.
    From Finnish airbases, the Rovel special-purpose squadron conducts active aerial reconnaissance in the industrial regions of the USSR (Kronstadt, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk and Murmansk)
    1941 January 31: The German High Command (OKH) signs a plan for the operational-strategic deployment of ground forces as part of Operation Barbarossa.
    February 15: Hitler orders the OKB to conduct a large-scale disinformation operation for the Red Army leadership on the German-Soviet border from February 15 to April 16, 1941.
    ... March: Admiral Canaris issues an order for the Directorate to force reconnaissance operations against the USSR.
    March 11: The German Foreign Ministry assures the USSR military attaché in Berlin that "rumors about the redeployment of German troops in the area of ​​the German-Soviet border are a malicious provocation and do not correspond to reality."
    March 21: Von Bentivegny reports to the Design Bureau about the conduct of special measures (Abwehr-3) to disguise the advance of the Wehrmacht to its initial positions on the Romanian-Yugoslav and German-Soviet borders.
    Major of the Abwehr Schulze-Holtus, aka Dr. Bruno Schulze, under the guise of a tourist leaves for the USSR. The major collects intelligence information about military and industrial facilities, strategic bridges, etc., located along the Moscow - Kharkov - Rostov-on-Don - Grozny - Baku railway line. Back in Moscow, Schulze-Holtus hands over the collected information to the German military attaché.
    April-May: The NKVD registers the intensification of German intelligence activities on the territory of the USSR.
    April 30: Hitler sets the date for the attack on the USSR - June 22, 1941.
    May 7: The German military attaché in the USSR, General Koestring, and his deputy, Oberst Krebs, report to Hitler on the military potential of the Soviet Union.
    May 15: Abwehr officers Tilike and Schulze-Holtus, under the alias Zaba, conduct intensive reconnaissance from Iranian territory of the southern border regions of the USSR, using informant agents from among the local residents. Successfully recruited the son of the Tabriz police chief and a staff officer of one of the Iranian divisions stationed in Tabriz.
    May 25: The OKB issues "Directive No. 30", according to which the transfer of expeditionary forces to the zone of the British-Iraqi armed conflict (Iraq) is postponed indefinitely in connection with preparations for the campaign in the East. The OKB informs the General Staff of the Finnish Army about the timing of the attack on the USSR.
    June: SS Standartenfuehrer Walter Schellenberg is appointed head of the 6th Directorate of the RSHA (Foreign Intelligence Service of the SD).
    After training in Finnish intelligence schools, Abwehr-2 sends over 100 Estonian emigrants to the Baltic states (Operation Erna). Two groups of saboteurs in the form of Red Army soldiers land on the island of Hiiumaa. The ship with the third Abwehr group is forced to leave the territorial waters of the USSR after a collision with Soviet border patrol boats in the waters of the Gulf of Finland. A few days later, this sabotage and reconnaissance group parachuted into the coastal areas of Estonia. The commanders of the "front-line reconnaissance" units of Army Group "North" were tasked with collecting intelligence information about strategic targets and fortifications of the Red Army in Estonia (especially in the Narva-Kohtla-Järve-Rakvere-Tallinn region). The Abwehr sends agents from among Ukrainian emigrants to the USSR to compile and clarify the "proscription lists" of Soviet citizens "to be destroyed in the first place" (communists, commissars, Jews ...).
    June 10: At a meeting of the top leadership of the Abwehr, Zipo (security police) and SD in Berlin, Admiral Canaris and SS Ober Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich conclude an agreement on the coordination of the actions of the Abwehr groups, security police units and Einsatzgruppen (task forces) SD in the USSR after the occupation. June 11: Subdivision "Abwehr-2" of the Krakow branch of Ausland / Abwehr / OKB throws 6 agents-paratroopers into the territory of Ukraine with the task to blow up sections of the railway line Stolpa novo - Kiev on the night of June 21-22. The operation fails. The OKB issues "Directive No. 32" - 1. "On measures after the operation" Barbarossa ". 2. "On the support of the Arab liberation movement by all military, political and propaganda means with the formation of the" F (elmi) sonderstaff "at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the occupation forces in Greece (South-East)". June 14: The OKB sends the last directives before the attack on the USSR to the main headquarters of the invading armies. June 14-19: According to the order of the leadership, Schulze-Holtus sends agents from the territory of Northern Iran to the Kirovabad / Azerbaijan region to collect intelligence information about Soviet civil and military airfields in this region. When crossing the border, the Abwehr group of 6 people encounters a border guard and returns to the base. During a fire contact, all 6 agents receive serious gunshot wounds.
    June 18: Germany and Turkey sign the Mutual Cooperation and Non-Aggression Pact. The divisions of the 1st echelon of the Wehrmacht entered the area of ​​operational deployment on the Soviet-German border. The battalion of Ukrainian saboteurs "Nightingale" is advancing to the German-Soviet border in the Pantalovice area. June 19: The Abwehr branch in Bucharest reports to Berlin on the successful recruitment of about 100 Georgian emigrants in Romania. The Georgian diaspora in Iran is being effectively developed. June 21: Directorate Ausland / Abwehr / OKW announces "readiness number 1" to the military counterintelligence departments at the headquarters of the fronts - "headquarters Valley-1, Valley-2 and Valley-3." The commanders of the special forces of the "front-line reconnaissance" of the army groups "North", "Center" and "South" report to the leadership of the Abwehr about the advance to the initial positions at the German-Soviet border. Each of the three Abwehr groups includes from 25 to 30 saboteurs from the local population (Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, Cossacks, Finns, Estonians ...) under the command of a German officer. After being dropped into the deep rear (from 50 to 300 km from the front line), commandos of the Red Army soldiers and officers dressed in military uniforms carry out acts of sabotage and sabotage. Lieutenant Katwitz's "Brandenburgers" penetrate 20 km deep into the territory of the USSR, seize the strategic bridge over the Beaver (left tributary of the Berezina) near Lipsk and hold it until the approach of the Wehrmacht reconnaissance company. A company of the Nightingale battalion infiltrates into the Radimno area. June 22: Beginning of Operation Barbarossa - attack on the USSR. At about midnight in the sector of the Wehrmacht 123rd Infantry Division, Brandenburg-800 saboteurs disguised as German customs officers mercilessly shoot a detachment of Soviet border guards, ensuring a breakthrough of the border fortifications. At dawn, sabotage Abwehr groups strike in the area of ​​Augustow - Grodno - Golynka - Rudavka - Suwalki and capture 10 strategic bridges (Veiseyai - Porechye - Sopotskin - Grodno - Lunno - Mosty). The consolidated company of the 1st battalion "Brandenburg-800", reinforced by the company of the battalion "Nightingale", capture the city of Przemysl, force the San and capture the bridgehead near Valava. The Abwehr-3 special forces of the "front-line reconnaissance" prevent the evacuation and destruction of secret documents of Soviet military and civilian institutions (Brest-Litovsk). The Ausland / Abwehr / OKW Office instructs Major Schulze-Holtus, a resident of the Abwehr in Tabriz / Iran, to intensify the collection of intelligence information about the Baku oil-industrial region, communication lines and communications in the Caucasus-Persian Gulf region. June 24: With the help of the German ambassador in Kabul, Lahusen-Vivremont organizes anti-British sabotage actions on the Afghan-Indian border. Directorate Ausland / Abwehr / OKW plans to raise a massive anti-British uprising on the eve of the landing in the region of the Wehrmacht Expeditionary Army. Oberleutenant Roser, authorized by the "armistice commission", at the head of the intelligence unit, returns from Syria to Turkey. The Brandenburg-800 saboteurs make a night landing from an ultra-low altitude (50 m) between Lida and Pervomaiskiy. The Brandenburgers seize and hold for two days the railway bridge on the Lida-Molodechno line until the approach of the German armored division. In the course of fierce fighting, the unit suffers severe losses. The reinforced company of the "Nightingale" battalion is redeployed near Lvov. June 26: Finland declares war on the USSR. The sabotage units of "long-range reconnaissance" penetrate the Soviet rear through gaps in the defense lines. The Finnish intelligence services transmit the received intelligence reports to Berlin for systematization and examination.
    WAR.
    To be continued.
  5. 1941

    June 28: Saboteurs of the 8th company "Brandenburg-800" in Red Army uniforms seize and demined the bridge over the Daugava near Daugavpils prepared for an explosion by the retreating Soviet troops. In the course of fierce battles, the company commander, Oberleutenant Knak, was killed, but the company still holds the bridge until the advance units of the Army Group North, which is rushing into Latvia, approach. June 29-30: During the lightning operation, the 1st Battalion "Brandenburg-800" and the reinforced companies of the "Nightingale" battalion occupy Lviv and take control of strategic objects and transport hubs. According to the "proscription lists" drawn up by agents of the Krakow branch of the Abwehr, the Einsatzkommando SD, together with the "Nightingale" battalion, begin mass executions of the Jewish population of Lvov.
    As part of Operation Xenophon (redeployment of German and Romanian divisions from the Crimea through the Kerch Strait to the Taman Peninsula), a platoon of the Brandenburgers of Chief Lieutenant Katvits attacks the Red Army's anti-aircraft searchlight stronghold at Cape Peklu.
    Von Lahusen-Wyvremont, General Reinecke and SS Obergruppenfuehrer Müller (Gestapo) are holding a meeting in connection with the change in the order of keeping Soviet prisoners of war in accordance with Keitel's "Order on Commissars" and the order "On the implementation of a racial program in Russia." Abwehr-3 begins to conduct police raids and anti-partisan actions of intimidation in the occupied territory of the USSR.
    July 1 - 8: During the offensive on Vinnitsa / Ukraine, the Nightingale battalion's punishers carry out mass executions of civilians in Satanov, Yusvin, Solochiv and Ternopil. July 12: Great Britain and the USSR sign a mutual assistance agreement in Moscow. July 15 - 17: Commandos of the "Nightingale" battalion and the 1st battalion "Brandenburg-800" dressed in Red Army uniforms attack the headquarters of one of the Red Army units in the forest near Vinnitsa. The attack on the move bogged down - the saboteurs suffered heavy losses. The remnants of the Nightingale battalion were disbanded.
    August: Within 2 weeks, Abwehr agents carried out 7 major railway sabotage (Army Group Center).
    Autumn: By agreement with the OKL, a group of Abwehr agents was abandoned in the Leningrad Region to collect intelligence information about the location of strategic military facilities (airfields, arsenals) and the deployment of military units.
    September 11: Von Ribbentrop signs an order according to which “the agencies and organizations of the German Foreign Ministry are prohibited from recruiting active agents-executors of the Ausland / Abwehr / OKW Directorate. The ban does not apply to military intelligence and counterintelligence officers who are not directly involved in sabotage operations or are involved in organizing sabotage actions through third parties ... ".
    September 16: In Afghanistan, the reconnaissance group of Oberleutenant Vitzel, aka Patan, prepares to be sent to the border region in the south of the USSR.
    September 25: Abwehr Major Schenk meets with leaders of the Uzbek emigration in Afghanistan. October: The 9th company of the 3rd battalion "Brandenburg-800" parachutes in the area of ​​the Istra reservoir, which supplies water to Moscow. During the mining of the dam, employees of the NKVD found and neutralized the saboteurs.
    End 1941: After the failure of the blitzkrieg plans on the Eastern Front, the Ausland / Abwehr / OKW Directorate pays special attention to the actions of agents in the deep rear of the Red Army (in the Transcaucasian, Volga, Ural and Central Asian regions). The strength of each special unit of the "front-line intelligence" of the Ausland / Abwehr / OKW Directorate on the Soviet-German front has been brought to 55-60 people. In a forest camp near Ravaniemi, the 15th company "Brandenburg-800" completed preparations for conducting special operations on the Eastern Front. The saboteurs were tasked with organizing sabotage on the Murmansk-Leningrad railway line, the main communication artery of the northern group of Soviet troops, and interrupting the supply of food to besieged Leningrad. Valley 3 Headquarters begins to deploy agents to Soviet partisan detachments.

  6. 1942 Finnish radio monitoring posts and radio interception services decipher the contents of the radio messages of the Red Army High Command, which allows the Wehrmacht to conduct several successful naval operations to intercept Soviet convoys. By personal order of Hitler, the Ausland / Abwehr / OKW Directorate is equipping the Finnish Army's signal troops with the latest direction finders and radio transmitters. The Finnish army coders, together with the Abwehr experts, are trying to establish the places of permanent (temporary) deployment of the Red Army military units by the numbers of the field mail. Gerhard Buschmann, a former professional sports pilot, is appointed as Sector Leader for the Abwehr branch in Reval. VO "Bulgaria" forms a special anti-partisan unit under the command of Sonderführer Klein-Hampel. The "Baltic company" of the 1st battalion "Brandenburg-800" of Lieutenant Baron von Völkersam is thrown into the deep rear of the Red Army. Commandos dressed in Red Army uniforms attack the divisional headquarters of the Red Army. The Brandenburgers capture a strategic bridge near Pyatigorsk / USSR and hold it until a Wehrmacht tank battalion approaches. Before the assault on Demyansk, 200 Brandenburg-800 saboteurs parachute in the area of ​​the Bologoye transport hub. "Brandenburgers" undermine the sites railway track on the lines Bologoye - Toropets and Bologoye - Staraya Russa. Two days later, the NKVD units manage to partially eliminate the sabotage Abwehr group.
    January: Headquarters Val Li-1 begins recruiting Russian agents in POW filtration camps.
    January - November: NKVD officers neutralize 170 Abwehr-1 and Abwehr-2 agents operating in the North Caucasus / USSR.
    March: Abwehr anti-terrorist units take an active part in suppressing the partisan movement in the occupied territory. The 9th company of the 3rd battalion "Brandenburg-800" starts to "clean up the area" near Dorogobuzh - Smolensk. After completing the combat mission, the 9th company is transferred to Vyazma.
    Brandenburg-800 special forces are trying to seize and destroy the strongholds and arsenals of the Red Army near Alakvetti in the Murmansk direction. The commandos meet fierce resistance and suffer heavy losses in battles with units of the Red Army and NKVD units.
    23 May: 350 Abwehr-2 commandos in Red Army uniforms are deployed in Operation Gray Head on the Eastern Front (Army Group Center). In the course of protracted battles, subdivisions of the Red Army destroy 2/3 of the personnel of the Abwehr group. The remnants of the special forces with battles break through the front line.
    June: Finnish counterintelligence begins to regularly send copies of the intercepted radio reports of the Red Army and the Red Cross Society to Berlin.
    End of June: The Branden-Burg-800 Coast Guard Fighter Company was tasked with cutting the supply lines of the Red Army in the Kerch region on the Taman Peninsula / USSR.
    July 24 - 25: As a result of lightning-fast landing operation the reinforced company "Brandenburg-800" by Hauptmann Grabert seizes six-kilometer hydraulic structures (railway embankments, earth dams, bridges) between Rostov-on-Don and Bataysk in the Don floodplain.
    July 25 - December 1942: Wehrmacht summer offensive in the North Caucasus / USSR. 30 commandos of the 2nd battalion "Brandenburg-800" in Red Army uniforms are parachuted in the region of the North Caucasian Mineralnye Vody. Saboteurs mine and blow up a railway bridge on the Mineralnye Vody - Pyatigorsk branch. 4 Abwehr agents carry out terrorist acts against the commanders of the 46th Infantry and 76th Caucasian Divisions of the Red Army stationed near Kirovograd. August: 8th Brandenburg-800 is ordered to seize the bridges near Bataysk, south of Rostov-on-Don, and hold them until the approach of the Wehrmacht armored divisions. The Abwehrgroup of Lieutenant Baron von Felkersam in the form of NKGB fighters is thrown into the deep rear Soviet army with the aim of seizing oil production areas near Maykop. 25 commandos of the "Brandenburg" Oberleutenant Lange are parachuted in the Grozny region with the task of seizing oil refineries and an oil pipeline. The Red Army guards are shooting the sabotage group while still in the air. Having lost up to 60% of the personnel, the "Brandenburgers" fight their way through the line of the Soviet-German front. The 8th company of the 2nd battalion "Brandenburg-800" captures the bridge over the Belaya river near Maikop and prevents the redeployment of the Red Army units. In the ensuing battle, the company commander, Lieutenant Prokhazka, was killed. The Abwehr command of the 6th company "Brandenburg-800" in the Red Army uniform seizes the road bridge and cuts the main highway Maikop - Tuapse on the Black Sea. In the course of fierce battles, subdivisions of the Red Army almost completely destroy the saboteurs of the Abwehr. Dedicated Brandenburg-800 units, together with the Einsatzkommando SD, take part in anti-partisan raids between Nevelemi Vitebsk / Belarus.
    August 20: The Ausland / Abwehr / OKW Directorate transfers the German-Arab Training Unit (GAUP) from Cape Sounion / Greece to Stalino (now Donetsk / Ukraine) to participate in the OKB's sabotage and reconnaissance operations. 28 - 29 August: Brandenburg-800 long-range reconnaissance patrols in Red Army uniforms reach the Murmansk railway and lay mines equipped with push and delay fuses, as well as vibration fuses. Autumn: Personnel scout of the Abwehr Shtarkman is thrown into besieged Leningrad.
    NKGB authorities arrest 26 Abwehr paratrooper agents in the Stalingrad region.
    October 1942 - September 1943: "Abwehrkommando 104" sends about 150 reconnaissance groups, from 3 to 10 agents in each, into the deep rear of the Red Army. Only two come back across the front line!
    November 1: The Brandenburg-800 Special Purpose Training Regiment is reorganized into the Brandenburg-800 Sonder Unit (Special Purpose Brigade). November 2: Soldiers of the 5th company of "Brandenburg" in Red Army uniforms capture the bridge over the Terek near Darg-Kokh. Parts of the NKGB eliminate saboteurs.
    End of 1942: the 16th company of "Brandenburgers" was transferred to Leningrad. For three months, the commandos of the "Bergman" ("Highlander") regiment, together with the SD Einsatzkommandos, take part in punitive operations in the North Caucasus / USSR (mass executions of civilians and anti-partisan raids).
    40 radio operators of the Abwehr "centers of radio interception and observation" of the VO "Far East" in Beijing and Canton daily decipher about 100 intercepted radio messages of Soviet, British and American military radio stations. End of December 1942 - 1944: Together with the 6th Directorate of the RSHA (Foreign Intelligence Service of the SD - Ausland / SD), Abwehr-1 and Abwehr-2 conduct anti-Soviet and anti-British activities in Iran.
  7. I would not want the members of the forum to have a misconception about "Brandenburg" and about German intelligence in general. Therefore, I recommend that you familiarize yourself with the entire Abwehr war log. (this is an excerpt from him Abr quoted). You can do this in the book by Julius Madera "Abwehr: Shield and Sword of the Third Reich" Phoenix 1999 (Rostov-on-Don). from the magazine it follows that the Abwehr did not always act so dashingly, including against the USSR. By the way, the level of work of the Abwehr can be seen from the case with Tavrin. The description is generally funny, to catch up with a motorcycle at a distance of 2 km on a bike, you need to be able to do that. Although, considering WHAT was carrying a motorcycle, it would probably have been possible to catch up with it on foot ... without two hunting rifles with cartridges for the agent, well, nothing. And 7 pistols for two ... that's impressive. Tavrin is apparently 4, and a woman, as a weaker creature, 2. Or maybe they were thrown into our rear to hunt. 5 grenades and only 1 mine. There is no radio station, but a lot of cartridges. money just right, but 116 stamps (a separate suitcase, not otherwise) are also impressive. And not a word about the crew of the plane, although maybe they just did not mention it. They are thrown along with their own motorcycle, and at the same time, the landing area in the very thick of the air defense is selected (or the crew is such that they brought it in the wrong place). In general, the pros and nothing more.
    Such a prompt detention of the spies is explained by the fact that the plane on which they arrived was detected by the air defense systems of the Moscow region at about two o'clock in the morning in the Kubinka area. He was fired upon and, having received damage, lay down on the return course. But in the Smolensk region, he made an emergency landing right in a field near the village of Yakovlevo. This did not go unnoticed by the commander of the local public order group Almazov, who organized surveillance and soon informed the NKVD regional department by telephone that a man and a woman in Soviet military uniforms had left the enemy plane on a motorcycle in the direction of Karmanovo. A task force was sent to detain the fascist crew, and the head of the NKVD regional department decided to arrest the suspicious couple personally. He was very lucky: for some reason the spies did not put up the slightest resistance, although seven pistols, two central combat hunting rifles, and five grenades were seized from them. Later, a special device called “Panzerknake” was found in the plane - for firing miniature armor-piercing incendiary shells.

    Runaway gambler

    The beginning of this story can be attributed to 1932, when the city council inspector Pyotr Shilo was arrested in Saratov. He lost a large sum at cards and paid with state money. Soon the crime was solved, and the unlucky gambler faced a long sentence. But Shilo managed to escape from the bathhouse of the pre-trial detention center, and then, using forged certificates, received a passport in the name of Pyotr Tavrin and even graduated from the courses of junior command personnel before the war. In 1942, the false Tavrin was already a company commander and had good prospects. But special officers sat on his tail. On May 29, 1942, Tavrin was summoned to a conversation by the representative of the special department of the regiment and bluntly asked if he had previously bore the name Shilo? The fugitive gambler, of course, refused, but realized that sooner or later he would be taken out into the open. On the same night Tavrin fled to the Germans.

    For several months he was transferred from one concentration camp to another. Once the assistant to General Vlasov, the former secretary of the district committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Moscow, Georgy Zhilenkov, arrived in the "zone" to recruit prisoners for service in the ROA. Tavrin managed to take a liking to him and soon became a cadet of the Abwehr intelligence school. The connection with Zhilenkov continued here as well. It was this defrocked secretary who gave Tavrin the idea of ​​a terrorist attack against Stalin. She liked the German command very much. In September 1943, Tavrin was assigned to the head of the special reconnaissance and sabotage team "Zeppelin" Otto Kraus, who personally supervised the preparation of the agent for an important special assignment.

    The scenario of the terrorist attack assumed the following. Tavrin with the documents of Colonel SMERSH, Hero of the Soviet Union, a disabled war veteran, infiltrates the territory of Moscow, settles there in a private apartment, contacts the leaders of the anti-Soviet organization “Union of Russian Officers”, General Zagladin from the personnel department of the People's Commissariat of Defense and Major Palkin from the headquarters of the reserve officer regiment. Together they are looking for the possibility of Tavrin's penetration to any solemn meeting in the Kremlin, which would be attended by Stalin. There, the agent must shoot the leader with a poisoned bullet. Stalin's death would signal the landing on the outskirts of Moscow of a large landing party, which would capture the “demoralized Kremlin” and put in power the “Russian cabinet” headed by General Vlasov.

    In case Tavrin failed to penetrate the Kremlin, he had to ambush the vehicle with Stalin and blow it up with a Panzerknake, capable of penetrating 45 mm thick armor.

    In order to ensure the credibility of the legend about the disability of “Colonel SMERSH Tavrin,” he underwent surgery on his stomach and legs, disfiguring them with lacerated scars. A few weeks before the transfer of the agent across the front line, General Vlasov personally instructed him twice and Otto Skorzeny, a three-time famous fascist saboteur.

    Female character

    From the very beginning, it was assumed that Tavrin should carry out the operation alone. But at the end of 1943, he met Lidia Shilova in Pskov, and this left an unexpected imprint on the further scenario of the operation.

    Lydia is a young beautiful woman who worked as an accountant in the housing office before the war. During the occupation, like thousands of others, she worked on the orders of the German commandant. At first she was sent to an officer's laundry, then to a sewing workshop. There was a conflict with one of the officers. He tried to persuade the woman to cohabit, and she could not overcome her disgust. The fascist, in revenge, achieved that Lydia was sent to logging. Fragile and unprepared for work, she was melting before our eyes. And then chance brought her to Tavrin. In private conversations, he denounced the Germans, promised to help free Lydia from hard work. In the end he offered to marry him. At that time, she did not know that Peter was a German spy, and later he confessed this to her and proposed such a plan. She takes courses for radio operators and with him crosses the front line, but on Soviet territory they will get lost and cut off all communication with the Germans. The war is coming to an end, and the fascists will not have time to take revenge on fugitive agents. Lydia agreed. Later, in the course of the investigation, it was established that she did not know at all about the terrorist assignment for Tavrin and was sure that he was not going to work for the Germans on Soviet territory.

    Judging by the investigative and judicial materials, this seems to be true. How else can one explain the fact that Tavrin, armed to the teeth, did not put up resistance during the arrest, besides, he left the Panzerknak, a walkie-talkie and many other espionage accessories on the plane? So most likely there was no threat to Stalin's life in September 1944. Of course, it was beneficial for the Chekists to describe the Panzerknake operation, which they had suppressed, in the most ominous colors. This allowed Beria to once again appear before Stalin in the role of the leader's savior.

    Pay

    After the arrest of Tavrin and Shilova, a radio game was developed under the code name "Fog". Shilova regularly maintained two-way radio communications with the German intelligence center. With these radiograms, the Chekists "fogged up" the brains of the German intelligence officers. Among the multitude of meaningless telegrams was the following: “I met a woman doctor, has acquaintances in the Kremlin hospital. I'm processing ”. There were also telegrams in which it was reported about the failure of the batteries for the radio station and about the impossibility of getting them in Moscow. They asked for help and support. In response, the Germans thanked the agents for their service and offered to unite with another group located in our rear. Naturally, this group was soon neutralized ... The last message sent by Shilova went to the intelligence center on April 9, 1945, but no response was received: the end of the war was approaching. In peacetime, it was assumed that one of the surviving former employees of German intelligence could go to the safe house of Tavrin and Shilova. But no one came.
    1943 in the area of ​​Plavsk to carry out subversive actions.

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