German agents in the highest authorities of the USSR. German "moles" in the Red Army in the final period of the wwii
In the Caucasus, the German military intelligence, called the Abwehr, after the start of the war, launched a vigorous activity to create anti-Soviet national movements, in this sense Chechnya was ideally suited. There, even before the war, Muslim separatists campaigned and openly opposed the Soviet regime, their goal was to unite the Muslims of the Caucasus into united state under the leadership of Turkey. In Chechen-Ingushetia, there was a massive desertion, unwillingness to serve in the Red Army, and disobedience to Soviet laws. The number of deserters who united in illegal armed detachments amounted to 15,000 by 1942, and this took place in the immediate rear of the Soviet Army. The Abwehr actively threw sabotage groups, weapons and equipment there; the Chechen rebels acquired experienced military specialists, masters of intelligence and sabotage. Uprising and sabotage began, but they were suppressed, although, as it turned out in our time, not completely. There was no longer and no, and now in Russia, a general like the late Yermolov, only he knew and did so that then no one wanted to fight with him!
TROUBLE REPUBLIC
The growth in the activity of religious and gangster authorities was observed in the Chechen Republic of the ASSR even before the start of the Great Patriotic War, thereby exerting a serious negative impact on the situation in the republic. Focusing on Muslim Turkey, they advocated the unification of the Muslims of the Caucasus into a single state under the protectorate of Turkey.
To achieve their goal, the separatists called on the population of the republic to resist the measures of the government and local authorities, and initiated open armed actions. Particular emphasis was placed on the treatment of Chechen youth against serving in the Red Army and studying in FZO schools. At the expense of the deserters who went into an illegal position, bandit formations were replenished, which were pursued by units of the NKVD troops.
So, in 1940, the rebel organization of Sheikh Magomet-Khadzhi Kurbanov was identified and neutralized. In January 1941, a large armed uprising was localized in the Itum-Kalinsky region under the leadership of Idris Magomadov. In total, in 1940, the administrative bodies of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic arrested 1,055 bandits and their accomplices, from whom 839 rifles and revolvers with ammunition were confiscated. 846 deserters who evaded service in the Red Army were tried. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War entailed a new series of bandit attacks in Shatoisky, Galanchozhsky and Cheberloevsky districts. According to the NKVD, in August - November 1941, up to 800 people took part in armed uprisings.
DIVISION NOT REACHING TO THE FRONT
Being in an illegal position, the leaders of the Chechen-Ingush separatists counted on the imminent defeat of the USSR in the war and led a wide defeatist campaign for desertion from the ranks of the Red Army, disrupting mobilization, and putting together armed formations to fight in Germany's favor. During the first mobilization from August 29 to September 2, 1941, 8000 people were to be conscripted into construction battalions. However, only 2,500 arrived at their destination, in Rostov-on-Don, the remaining 5,500 either simply avoided appearing at the recruiting offices or deserted along the way.
During the additional mobilization in October 1941 of persons born in 1922, out of 4733 conscripts, 362 people avoided appearing at the recruiting stations.
By the decision of the State Defense Committee, in the period from December 1941 to January 1942, the 114th national division was formed from the indigenous population in the ChI ASSR from the indigenous population. As of the end of March 1942, 850 people managed to defect from it.
The second mass mobilization in Checheno-Ingushetia began on March 17, 1942 and was supposed to end on the 25th. The number of persons to be mobilized was 14,577 people. However, by the appointed time, only 4,887 were mobilized, of which only 4,395 were sent to military units, that is, 30% of the assignment. In this regard, the mobilization period was extended until April 5, but the number of mobilized people increased only to 5,543 people. The reason for the disruption of mobilization was the massive evasion of conscripts from conscription and desertion on the way to assembly points.
At the same time, members and candidates for members of the CPSU (b), Komsomol members, officials of regional and village Soviets (chairmen of executive committees, chairmen and party organizers of collective farms, etc.) evaded the draft.
On March 23, 1942, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen Republic of the ASSR Daga Dadaev, mobilized by the Nadterechny RVK, escaped from the Mozdok station. Under the influence of his agitation, another 22 people fled with him. Among the deserters were also several instructors of the Komsomol RK, a people's judge and a district prosecutor.
By the end of March 1942, the total number of deserters and evaders in the republic reached 13,500 people. Thus, the active Red Army received less than a full-fledged rifle division. In the conditions of mass desertion and the intensification of the insurgent movement on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in April 1942, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR signed an order to abolish the conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the army.
In January 1943, the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the ChI ASSR applied to the NKO of the USSR with a proposal to announce an additional recruitment of military volunteers from among the inhabitants of the republic. The proposal was approved and the local authorities received permission to recruit 3,000 volunteers. According to the order of the NKO, the conscription was ordered to be carried out in the period from January 26 to February 14, 1943. However, the approved plan for the next conscription was also miserably failed this time both in terms of execution and in the number of volunteers sent to the troops.
So, as of March 7, 1943, 2986 "volunteers" were sent to the Red Army out of those recognized as fit for combat service. Of these, only 1806 people arrived at the unit. Along the way, 1,075 people managed to defect. In addition, 797 more "volunteers" fled from the district mobilization points and along the route to Grozny. In total, from January 26 to March 7, 1943, 1872 persons liable for military service from the so-called last "voluntary" conscription in the Chechen Republic of the ASSR deserted.
Among those who escaped were representatives of the regional and regional party and Soviet assets again: secretary of the Gudermes RK VKP (b) Arsanukaev, head of the department of the Vedensky RK VKP (b) Magomayev, secretary of the Komsomol regional committee for military work Martazaliev, second secretary of the Gudermes RK Komsomol Taimaskhanov Khayauri.
IN THE BACK OF THE RED ARMY
The leading role in disrupting the mobilization was played by the underground Chechen political organizations - the National Socialist Party of the Caucasian Brothers and the Chechen-Gorsk National Socialist Underground Organization. The first was led by its organizer and ideologist Khasan Israilov, who became one of the central figures of the insurrectionary movement in Chechnya during the Great Patriotic War. With the outbreak of the war, Israilov went into an illegal position and until 1944 led a number of large bandit formations, while maintaining close ties with German intelligence agencies.
Another organization was headed by the brother of the well-known revolutionary in Chechnya A. Sheripov - Mayrbek Sheripov. In October 1941, he also went into an illegal position and amassed several bandit detachments around him, consisting mainly of deserters. In August 1942, M. Sheripov raised an armed uprising in Chechnya, during which the administrative center of the Sharoevsky district, the village of Khimoy, was destroyed, and an attempt was made to seize the neighboring regional center, the village of Itum-Kale. However, the rebels lost the battle with the local garrison and were forced to retreat.
In November 1942 Mayrbek Sheripov was killed as a result of a conflict with accomplices. Some of the members of his bandit groups joined Kh. Israilov, some continued to act alone, and some surrendered to the authorities.
All in all, the pro-fascist parties formed by Israilov and Sheripov had over 4,000 members, and the total number of their insurgent detachments reached 15,000. In any case, these are the figures that Israilov reported to the German command in March 1942. Thus, in the immediate rear of the Red Army, a whole division of ideological bandits was operating, ready at any moment to provide significant assistance to the advancing German troops.
However, the Germans themselves understood this. The aggressive plans of the German command included the active use of the "fifth column" - anti-Soviet individuals and groups in the rear of the Red Army. It certainly included the bandit underground in Checheno-Ingushetia as such.
ENTERPRISE "SHAMIL"
Having correctly assessed the potential of the insurrectionary movement for the advancing Wehrmacht, the German special services set out to unite all the bandit formations under a single command. To prepare for a one-time uprising in mountainous Chechnya, special emissaries of the Abwehr were supposed to be sent as coordinators and instructors.
The 804th regiment of the Brandenburg-800 special purpose division was aimed at solving this problem, directed to the North Caucasian sector of the Soviet-German front. Subdivisions of this division carried out sabotage and terrorist acts and reconnaissance work in the rear on the instructions of the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht command Soviet troops, captured important strategic objects and held them until the main forces arrived.
As part of the 804th regiment, there was a Sonderkommando of Ober-Lieutenant Gerhard Lange, conventionally called "Enterprise" Lange "or" Enterprise "Shamil". The team was staffed with agents from among the former prisoners of war and emigrants of Caucasian nationalities and was intended for subversive activities in the rear of the Soviet troops in the Caucasus. Before being sent to the rear of the Red Army, the saboteurs underwent nine months of training at a special school located in Austria near the Mosham castle. Here they taught subversion, topography, taught how to handle small arms, self-defense techniques and the use of fictitious documents. The direct transfer of agents behind the front line was carried out by Abwehr command-201.
On August 25, 1942, from Armavir, a group of Ober-Lieutenant Lange in the amount of 30 people, staffed mainly by Chechens, Ingush and Ossetians, was parachuted into the area of the villages of Chishki, Dachu-Borzoi and Duba-Yurt of the Ataginsky region of the Chechen Republic of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to commit sabotage and terrorist acts and organizing an insurrectionary movement, timing the uprising to the beginning of the German offensive on Grozny.
On the same day, another group of six people landed near the village of Berezhki, Galashki region, led by a native of Dagestan, a former emigrant Osman Guba (Saidnurov), who, to give due weight among the Caucasians, was named in the documents "Colonel of the German Army." Initially, the group was tasked with advancing to the village of Avtury, where, according to German intelligence, a large number of Chechens who had deserted from the Red Army were hiding in the forests. However, due to the error of the German pilot, the paratroopers were thrown much west of the designated area. At the same time, Osman Guba was to become the coordinator of all armed bandit formations on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia.
And in September 1942, another group of saboteurs in the amount of 12 people was thrown out on the territory of the ChI ASSR under the leadership of non-commissioned officer Gert Reckert. The Abwehr agent Leonard Chetvergas from the Reckert group, who was arrested by the NKVD in Chechnya, testified during interrogation about its goals: “Informing us about the upcoming landing in the rear of the Red Army and our tasks, the command of the German army told us: an active struggle against Soviet power at all stages of its existence, that the peoples of the Caucasus truly desire the victory of the German army and the establishment of German order in the Caucasus. Therefore, upon landing in the Soviet rear, the landing groups must immediately get in touch with the active bandit formations and, using them, raise the peoples of the Caucasus to an armed uprising against Soviet power. By overthrowing Soviet power in the Caucasian republics and handing it over to the Germans, ensure the successful advance of the advancing German army in the Transcaucasus, which will follow in the coming days. The landing groups preparing for the landing in the rear of the Red Army were also tasked with preserving the oil industry of Grozny from possible destruction by retreating units of the Red Army. "
ALL HELPED THE DIVERSANTS!
Once in the rear, the paratroopers everywhere enjoyed the sympathy of the population, ready to provide assistance with food and accommodate for the night. The attitude of local residents to the saboteurs was so loyal that they could afford to walk in the Soviet rear in German military uniform.
A few months later, Osman Gube, arrested by the NKVD, described his impression of the first days of his stay on the Chechen-Ingush territory during interrogation: “In the evening, a collective farmer named Ali-Mahomet came to our forest with another named Mohammed. At first they did not believe who we were, but when we took an oath on the Koran that we were indeed sent to the rear of the Red Army by the German command, they believed us. They told us that the terrain we are on is flat and it is dangerous for us to stay here. Therefore, they recommended going to the mountains of Ingushetia, since it would be easier to hide there. After spending 3-4 days in the forest near the village of Berezhki, we, accompanied by Ali-Mahomet, went to the mountains to the village of Hai, where Ali-Mahomet had good friends. One of his acquaintances turned out to be a certain Ilaev Kasum, who took us to his place, and we stayed overnight with him. Ilaev introduced us to his son-in-law Ichaev Soslanbek, who took us to the mountains ...
When we were in a hut near the village of Hai, we were often visited by various Chechens passing along the nearby road, and usually expressed sympathy for us ... ”.
However, the Abwehr agents received sympathy and support not only from ordinary peasants. Collective farm chairmen and leaders of the party and Soviet apparatus willingly offered their cooperation. “The first person with whom I spoke directly about the deployment of anti-Soviet work on the instructions of the German command,” Osman Guba said during the investigation, “was the chairman of the Dattykh village council, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Ibragim Pshegurov. I told him that I was an emigrant, that we had been dropped by parachutes from a German plane and that our goal was to help the German army in the liberation of the Caucasus from the Bolsheviks and to carry out further struggle for the independence of the Caucasus. Pshegurov said that he sympathized with me. He recommended now to establish contacts with the right people, but to speak openly only when the Germans take the city of Ordzhonikidze. "
A little later, the chairman of the Akshi village council, Duda Ferzauli, came to the Abwehr envoy. According to O. Gube, “Ferzauli himself approached me and in every possible way proved that he was not a communist, that he undertakes to fulfill any of my assignments ... At the same time, he brought half a liter of vodka and tried in every possible way to appease me as a messenger from the Germans. He asked me to take him under my protection after their area was occupied by the Germans. "
Representatives of the local population not only sheltered and fed the Abwehr saboteurs, but also sometimes took the initiative to carry out sabotage and terrorist acts. Osman's testimony to Guba describes an episode when a local resident Musa Keloev came to his group, who said that he was ready to complete any task, and he himself noticed that it was important to disrupt the railway traffic on the narrow-gauge Ordzhonikidzevskaya - Muzhichi road, since they were transported along it military cargo. I agreed with him that it was necessary to blow up a bridge on this road. To carry out the explosion, I sent along with him a member of my parachute group, Salman Aguev. When they returned, they reported that they had blown up an unguarded wooden railway bridge.
Encyclopedia of delusions. Third Reich Likhacheva Larisa Borisovna
Spies. What was destroying the German intelligence officers?
Something imperceptibly betrayed a German spy in him: either a parachute dragging behind his back, or a Schmeisser dangling around his neck ...
Thoughts aloud from an employee of SMERSH
John Lancaster is alone, mostly at night.
Clicked his nose - an infrared lens was hidden in it,
And then in normal light it appeared in black
What we value and love, what the team is proud of ...
Vladimir Vysotsky
There is an opinion that Nazi Germany trained almost the most invulnerable spies in the world. Say, with the notorious German pedantry, they could take care of all, even the seemingly insignificant little things. After all, according to the old spy adage, it is on them that the best agents always "burn".
In reality, however, the situation on the invisible German-Allied front developed somewhat differently. Sometimes the Nazi "knights of the cloak and dagger" were ruined by their scrupulousness. A similar story in the book "Spy Hunter" is quoted by the famous British counterintelligence officer Colonel O. Pinto. At the beginning of World War II, British counterintelligence had a lot of work: refugees from the European countries conquered by the Reich flocked to the country in an endless stream. It is clear that under their guise German agents and collaborators recruited in the occupied territories strove to infiltrate the land of foggy Albion. With one such Belgian collaborationist - Alphonse Timmermans - O. Pinto had a chance to deal with. By itself, Timmermans did not arouse suspicion in anyone: the former seaman of the merchant marine, in order to find himself in safe England, went through a lot of difficulties and dangers. In his simple belongings, too, there was nothing from the spy arsenal. However, the attention of Colonel O. Pinto was attracted by 3 absolutely harmless, at first glance, things. However, let us give the floor to the counterintelligence officer himself: “The one who instructed him before the trip to England took into account every little detail and thus gave the newcomer over to the British counterintelligence. He supplied Timmermans with three things necessary for "invisible" writing: pyramidon powder, which dissolves in a mixture of water and alcohol, orange sticks - a writing agent - and cotton for wrapping the tip of the sticks to avoid treacherous scratches on the paper. The trouble with Timmermans was that he could get all these things at any pharmacy in England, and no one would ever ask him why he was doing it. Now, because his mentor turned out to be too scrupulous person. he had to answer me some questions ... Timmermans - a victim of German scrupulousness - was hanged in Vandeworth prison ... "
Very often, German pedantry proved fatal for agents who had to work under the guise of soldiers of the US Army. Perfectly proficient in "great and mighty" English, the fascist intelligence officers were completely unprepared for American slang. So, quite a few carefully conspiratorial and legendary spies came across the fact that at the army gas stations, instead of the typical jargon of "hydroelectric power station" they used the literary name of gasoline - "patrol". Naturally, no one expected to hear such a clever word from an ordinary American soldier.
But the possible troubles of the German spies did not end there. As it turned out, the Yankee soldiers even military ranks renamed in their own way. The sabotage group, supervised by the most venerable German spy, Otto Skorzeny, was convinced of this on its own sad experience. Subordinates of the Scar Man arrived in captured American self-propelled guns at the location of the 7th Armored Division near the Belgian city of Potto. The commander of the spy group jumped out of the car and introduced himself, according to the regulations, introducing himself to the company. It never occurred to him that in the US Army such a name for a military rank had long become an anachronism, and various slang abbreviations were used instead. The Yankee soldiers immediately recognized the forgery and shot their pseudo-servicemen headed by their "company commander" on the spot ...
It was even more difficult for pedantic German agents to work in the USSR. Let's give an example. Nazi Germany was preparing a group of spies to be sent to Soviet territory. All scouts were thoroughly trained and were fluent in Russian. Moreover, they were even introduced to the peculiarities of the Soviet mentality and the mysterious Russian soul. However, the mission of these near-ideal agents failed miserably at the very first document check. Passports turned out to be a traitorous trifle that gave away the fighters of the invisible front. No, the "red-skinned passports" themselves, made by the best German masters of forgeries, did not differ in any way from the real ones and were even properly worn and frayed. The only thing that made the "pro-fascist" documents different from their primordially Soviet counterparts was the metal staples with which they were stapled. Diligent and punctual Germans made fake "ksivs" conscientiously, as for themselves. Therefore, the pages of the passport were fastened with staples made of high-quality stainless wire, while in the Soviet Union they could not even imagine such a wasteful and inappropriate use of stainless steel - the most common iron was used for the main document of every citizen of the USSR. Naturally, over the long years of operation, such a wire oxidized, leaving characteristic red marks on the pages of the passport. It is not surprising that the valiant SMERSH was very interested, having found among the usual "rusty" passports of books with clean shiny stainless steel clips. According to unverified data, only at the beginning of the war, Soviet counterintelligence managed to identify and neutralize more than 150 such spies, "paper clips". Truly, there are no trifles in intelligence. Even if it is intelligence of the Third Reich.
From the book The Great Secrets of Gold, Money and Jewelry. 100 stories about the secrets of the world of wealth the author Korovina Elena AnatolyevnaInfanta's dowry and wedding dresses of German princesses And the blue diamond, which, it would seem, was destined to forever remain in the monastery treasury, again ended up in the royal treasury. Velazquez saw him in 1660, when Philip IV decided to give one of his daughters,
From the book Executioners and killers [Mercenaries, terrorists, spies, professional killers] author Kochetkova PVPART III. SPIES FOREWORD Secret services have existed at different times among different peoples. According to the calculations of the American researcher Rowan, the secret service is at least 33 centuries old. More precisely, it has existed for as long as there have been wars. To
From the book I get to know the world. Aviation and aeronautics the author Zigunenko Stanislav NikolaevichSpies in the stratosphere Another specialty of military aviation is reconnaissance. As mentioned at the beginning of this book, the first thing pilots began to do during military operations was to look out from a height where the headquarters of military units are located, where they are transferred
From the book The Author's Encyclopedia of Films. Volume II author Lurselle JacquesSpione Spies 1928 - Germany (4364 m) UFA (Fritz Lang) Dir. FRITZ LANG Fritz Lang, Tea von Harbow based on the novel by Thea von Harbow · Op. Fritz Arno Wagner Cast Rudolf Klein-Rogge (Haigi), Gerda Maurus (Sonya), Lin Dyers (Kitty), Louis Ralph (Maurier), Craigel Sherry (chief
From the book Intelligence and Espionage the author Damaskin Igor AnatolievichThe successes of German saboteurs During the First World War, the only major achievement of German intelligence was the acts of sabotage that it organized and carried out against the United States. It was a real war, begun long before the United States entered
author Malashkina M.M.Sea spies This story took place in our day. A Scottish trawler - a fishing vessel - tried to break away from its pursuers. A Danish frigate was chasing him, firing guns. Despite the salvos of naval artillery, the trawler did not stop. Trawler crew
From the book I get to know the world. Forensics author Malashkina M.M.Scout School The screening of a potential employee is very strict, but 99 out of 100 people can pass it. Intelligence work is very diverse and everyone can show their talent and achieve success.
From the book I get to know the world. Forensics author Malashkina M.M.Intelligence Mistakes There are times when an experienced agent loses a briefcase with classified papers in the subway, taxi or train. Any scout is not immune from such cases, no matter how well trained he may be. "Unexplained" and "sudden" onset of absent-mindedness can be explained
Throughout the four years of the war, German intelligence trustingly “fed” on disinformation provided by the Lubyanka
In the summer of 1941, Soviet intelligence officers launched an operation that is still considered the "aerobatics" of the secret struggle and was included in the textbooks on the craft of reconnaissance. It lasted almost the entire war and was called differently at different stages - "Monastery", "Couriers", and then "Berezino".
Initially, her plan was to bring to the German intelligence center a deliberate "misconception" about the allegedly existing anti-Soviet religious-monarchist organization in Moscow, to make enemy intelligence officers believe in it as a real force. And thus penetrate the intelligence network of the Nazis in the Soviet Union.
The FSB declassified the materials of the operation only after 55 years of Victory over fascism.
The Chekists recruited a representative of a noble noble family, Boris Sadovsky, to work. With the establishment Soviet power he lost his fortune and, naturally, was hostile to her.
He lived in a small house in the Novodevichy Convent. Being disabled, he almost never got out of it. In July 1941, Sadovsky wrote a poem, which soon became the property of counterintelligence, in which he addressed the Nazi invaders as "brothers-liberators" and called on Hitler to restore the Russian autocracy.
It was decided to use him as the head of the legendary Prestol organization, especially since Sadovsky was indeed looking for an opportunity to somehow get in touch with the Germans.
Alexander Petrovich Demyanov - "Heine" (right) during a radio session with GermanTo "help" him, a secret employee of the Lubyanka, Alexander Demyanov, who had the operational pseudonym "Heine", was included in the game.
His great-grandfather Anton Golovaty was the first ataman of the Kuban Cossacks, his father was a Cossack Esaul who died in the First World War. Mother, however, came from a princely family, graduated from the Bestuzhev courses at the Smolny Institute for Noble Maidens and in the pre-revolutionary years was considered one of the brightest beauties in the aristocratic circles of Petrograd.
Until 1914 Demyanov lived and was brought up abroad. He was recruited by the OGPU in 1929. Possessing noble manners and good looks, "Heine" easily got along with film actors, writers, playwrights, poets, in whose circles he moved with the blessing of the Chekists. Before the war, in order to suppress terrorist attacks, he specialized in developing connections between the nobles who remained in the USSR with foreign emigration. An experienced agent with such data quickly won the trust of the monarchist poet Boris Sadovsky.
February 17, 1942 Demyanov - "Heine" crossed the front line and surrendered to the Germans, claiming that he was a representative of the anti-Soviet underground. The scout told the Abwehr officer about the Throne organization and that he had been sent by its leaders to communicate with the German command. At first, they did not believe him, subjected him to a series of interrogations and thorough checks, including a mock execution, planting a weapon from which he could shoot his tormentors and escape. However, his self-control, clear line of conduct, convincing legend, supported by real persons and circumstances, in the end made the German counterintelligence officers believe.
The fact that even before the war the Moscow residency of the Abwehr * took note of Demyanov as a possible candidate for recruitment and even gave him the nickname "Max" also played a role.
* Abwehr - a body of military intelligence and counterintelligence in Germany in 1919-1944, was part of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.
Under it, he appeared in the filing cabinet of the Moscow agents in 1941, and under it, after three weeks of training in the basics of espionage, on March 15, 1942, he was parachuted into the Soviet rear. Demyanov was to settle in the Rybinsk area with the task of conducting active military-political intelligence. The Abwehr expected from the Throne organization to activate pacifist propaganda among the population, deploy sabotage and sabotage.
There was a pause at Lubyanka for two weeks so as not to arouse suspicion among the Abwehr by the ease with which their new agent was legalized.
Finally "Max" relayed his first disinformation. Soon, in order to strengthen Demyanov's position in German intelligence and to supply the Germans with false information of strategic importance through him, he was hired as a liaison officer under the Chief of the General Staff Marshal Shaposhnikov.
Admiral CanarisAdmiral Canaris, the head of the Abwehr (nicknamed Janus, "Sly Fox") considered it a great success that he had acquired a "source of information" in such high spheres, and he could not help but boast of this success in front of his rival, the head of the VI Directorate of the RSHA, SS Brigadefuehrer Walter Schellenberg. In his memoirs, written in English captivity after the war, he testified with envy that the military intelligence had "its own man" near Marshal Shaposhnikov, from whom a lot of "valuable information" was received. In early August 1942, "Max" informed the Germans that the organization's transmitter was deteriorating and needed to be replaced.
Soon, two Abwehr couriers appeared at the NKVD's secret apartment in Moscow, delivering 10 thousand rubles and food. They reported the location of the radio they had hidden.
The first group of German agents remained at large for ten days so that the Chekists could check their appearance and find out if they had any connections with someone else. Then the couriers were arrested, and the radio they delivered was found. And to the Germans "Max" radioed that the couriers had arrived, but the transmitted radio was damaged upon landing.
Two months later, two more messengers appeared from behind the front line with two radio transmitters and various spy equipment. They had the task not only to help "Max", but also to settle in Moscow themselves, to collect and transmit their intelligence information via the second radio. Both agents were recruited, and to the Valley headquarters - the Abwehr center - they reported that they had successfully arrived and began to carry out the assignment. From that moment on, the operation developed in two directions: on the one hand - on behalf of the monarchist organization "Prestol" and the resident of "Max", on the other - on behalf of the Abwehr agents "Zyubina" and "Alayev", allegedly relying on their own connections in Moscow. A new stage of the secret duel has begun - Operation Couriers.
In November 1942, in response to a request from the Valli headquarters about the possibility of expanding the geography of the Prestol organization at the expense of the cities of Yaroslavl, Murom and Ryazan and sending agents there for further work, Max conveyed that the city of Gorky was better suited, where the cell was created "Throne". The Germans agreed to this, and the counterintelligence officers took care of the "meeting" of the couriers. Satisfying the requests of the Abwehr, the Chekists sent them extensive misinformation, which was being prepared at the General Staff of the Red Army, and more and more agents of enemy intelligence were summoned to the dummy safe houses.
In Berlin, they were very pleased with the work of "Max" and the agents introduced with his help. On December 20, Admiral Canaris congratulated his Moscow resident on being awarded the Iron Cross of the 1st degree, and Mikhail Kalinin at the same time signed a decree on awarding Demyanov with the Order of the Red Star. The result of the radio games "Monastyr" and "Couriers" was the arrest of 23 German agents and their accomplices, who had more than 2 million rubles of Soviet money, several radio stations, a large number of documents, weapons and equipment.
In the summer of 1944, the operational game received a new continuation under the name "Berezino". "Max" reported to the "Valley" headquarters that he had been "seconded" to Minsk, which had just been occupied by Soviet troops. Soon the Abwehr received a message from there that numerous groups were making their way to the west through the Belarusian forests. German soldiers and officers who were surrounded as a result of the Soviet offensive. Since the radio interception data testified to the desire of the Hitlerite command not only to help them get through to their own, but also to use them to disorganize the enemy rear, the Chekists decided to play on this. Soon the People's Commissar for State Security Merkulov reported to Stalin, Molotov and Beria the plan for a new operation. "Good" was received.
On August 18, 1944, the Moscow radio station "Prestol" informed the Germans that "Max" accidentally ran into a Wehrmacht military unit leaving the encirclement, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Scherhorn. The "entourage" are in great need of food, weapons, ammunition. Seven days at the Lubyanka they waited for an answer: the Abwehr, apparently, inquired about Sherkhorn and his "army". And on the eighth, a radiogram came: “Please help us to contact this German part... We intend to drop various loads for them and send a radio operator. "
On the night of September 15-16, 1944, three Abwehr envoys landed by parachute in the area of Lake Pesochnoe in the Minsk region, where the Sherhorn regiment was allegedly hiding. Soon, two of them were recruited and included in the radio game.
Then the Abwehr sent two more officers with letters from the commander of the Army Group Center, Colonel-General Reinhardt, and the head of Abwehrkommando-103, Barfeld, addressed to Scherhorn. The flow of goods "breaking through from the encirclement" increased, along with them all new "inspectors" arrived, who had the task, as they later admitted during interrogations, to find out whether these were the people they claim to be. But everything worked out cleanly. So purely that in the last radio message to Scherhorn, transmitted from Abwehrkommando-103 on May 5, 1945, after the surrender of Berlin, it was said:
“With a heavy heart, we are forced to stop helping you. Due to this situation, we can no longer maintain radio contact with you. Whatever the future brings us, our thoughts will always be with you. "
It was the end of the game. Soviet intelligence brilliantly outplayed the intelligence of Nazi Germany.
The success of Operation Berezino was facilitated by the fact that it involved real German officers who went over to the side of the Red Army. They convincingly portrayed the surviving regiment, including the recruited liaison paratroopers.
From archived data: From September 1944 to May 1945, the German command flew 39 sorties to our rear and threw out 22 German intelligence officers (all of them were arrested by Soviet counterintelligence officers), 13 radio stations, 255 cargo items with weapons, uniforms, food, ammunition, medicines, and 1,777,000 rubles. Germany continued to supply "its" detachment until the very end of the war.
Gathering of intelligence by Germany against the USSR
To implement the strategic plans for an armed attack on neighboring countries, Hitler told his entourage about them on November 5, 1937 - Nazi Germany, naturally, needed extensive and reliable information that would reveal all aspects of the life of future victims of aggression, and especially information on the basis of which one can it would be to draw a conclusion about their defense potential. By supplying government agencies and the High Command of the Wehrmacht with such information, the "total espionage" services actively contributed to the preparation of the country for war. Intelligence information was obtained in various ways, using a variety of methods and means.
World War II, unleashed by Nazi Germany on September 1, 1939, began with the invasion of Poland by German troops. But his main goal, towards which all state bodies of the country were oriented, and first of all the Wehrmacht and intelligence, Hitler considered the defeat Soviet Union, the conquest of a new "living space" in the East up to the Urals. The Soviet-German non-aggression pact signed on August 23, 1939, as well as the Treaty on Friendship and the Border, signed on September 28 of the same year, were to serve as camouflage. Moreover, the opportunities opened up as a result of this were used to build up activity in the intelligence work carried out against the USSR throughout the pre-war period. Hitler constantly demanded from Canaris and Heydrich new information about the measures taken by the Soviet authorities to organize a repulse of armed aggression.
As already noted, in the first years after the establishment of the fascist dictatorship in Germany, the Soviet Union was viewed primarily as a political enemy. Therefore, everything that related to him was within the competence of the security service. But this order did not last long. Soon, in accordance with the criminal designs of the Nazi elite and the German military command, all "total espionage" services were involved in a secret war against the world's first socialist country. Speaking about the direction of the espionage and sabotage activities of Nazi Germany at that time, Schellenberg wrote in his memoirs: "The decisive actions of all secret services against Russia were considered the primary and most important task."
The intensity of these actions increased markedly since the autumn of 1939, especially after the victory over France, when the Abwehr and the SD were able to free up their significant forces employed in the region and use them in an eastern direction. The secret services, as is clear from the archival documents, were then assigned a specific task: to clarify and replenish the available information about the economic and political situation of the Soviet Union, to ensure the regular flow of information about its defense capability and future theaters of military operations. They were also instructed to develop a detailed plan for organizing sabotage and terrorist actions on the territory of the USSR, timed to coincide with their implementation at the time of the first offensive operations of the German fascist troops. In addition, they were called upon, as already discussed in detail, to ensure the secrecy of the invasion and begin wide campaign on misinformation of world public opinion. This was how the program of action of Hitler's intelligence against the USSR was determined, in which espionage, for obvious reasons, was given the leading place.
Archival materials and other quite reliable sources contain a lot of evidence that an intense secret war against the Soviet Union began long before June 1941.
Zally's headquarters
By the time of the attack on the USSR, the activity of the Abwehr - this leader among the Nazi secret services in the field of espionage and sabotage - reached its climax. In June 1941, the Zalli Headquarters was created to provide leadership for all types of espionage and sabotage directed against the Soviet Union. Valley Headquarters directly coordinated the actions of the teams and groups assigned to the army groupings to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage operations. It was then located near Warsaw, in the town of Sulejóvek, and was headed by an experienced scout Schmalschläger.
Here is some evidence of how events unfolded.
One of the prominent members of the German military intelligence, Stolze, during interrogation on December 25, 1945, testified that the head of the Abwehr II, Colonel Lahusen, having informed him in April 1941 of the date of the German attack on the USSR, demanded urgently to study all the materials at the disposal of the Abwehr regarding Soviet Union. It was necessary to find out the possibility of delivering a powerful blow to the most important Soviet military-industrial facilities in order to completely or partially disable them. At the same time, a top-secret division was created within the framework of Abwehr II, headed by Stolze. For reasons of conspiracy, it had the popular name "Group A". His responsibilities included planning and preparing large-scale sabotage operations. They were undertaken, as Lahusen emphasized, in the hope that it would be possible to disorganize the rear of the Red Army, sow panic among the local population and thereby facilitate the advance of the German fascist troops.
Lahusen acquainted Stolze with the order of the headquarters of the operational leadership, signed by Field Marshal Keitel, which outlined in general terms the directive of the Wehrmacht High Command to deploy sabotage activities on Soviet territory after the start of the Barbarossa plan. The Abwehr had to start holding actions aimed at inciting ethnic hatred between the peoples of the USSR, to which the Nazi elite attached particular importance. Guided by the directive of the supreme command, Stolze agreed with the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists Melnik and Bendera that they would immediately start organizing the actions of nationalist elements hostile to Soviet power in Ukraine, timed to coincide with the time of the invasion of German fascist troops. At the same time, Abwehr II began to send his agents from among Ukrainian nationalists to the territory of Ukraine, some of whom had the task of compiling or clarifying the lists of local party and Soviet activists to be destroyed. Subversive actions with the participation of nationalists of all stripes were carried out in other regions of the USSR.
ABVER's actions against the USSR
Abwehr II, according to Stolze's testimony, formed and armed "special detachments" for actions (in violation of the international rules of warfare) in the Soviet Baltic, tested back in the initial period of the Second World War. One of these detachments, whose soldiers and officers were dressed in Soviet military uniforms, had the task of seizing a railway tunnel and bridges near Vilnius. Until May 1941, 75 agent groups of the Abwehr and SD were neutralized on the territory of Lithuania, which, as documented, launched active espionage and sabotage activities here in anticipation of the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR.
How great was the attention of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the deployment of sabotage operations in the rear of the Soviet troops is shown by the fact that "special detachments" and "special teams" of the Abwehr were present in all army groups and armies concentrated on the eastern borders of Germany.
According to Stolze's testimony, the Abwehr branches in Konigsberg, Warsaw and Krakow had a directive from Canaris in connection with the preparation of an attack on the USSR to maximize espionage and sabotage activities. The task was to provide the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht with detailed and most accurate data on the target system on the territory of the USSR, primarily on highways and railways, bridges, power plants and other objects, the destruction of which could entail a serious disorganization of the Soviet rear and ultimately would paralyze his forces and break the resistance of the Red Army. The Abwehr had to stretch its tentacles to the most important communications, military-industrial facilities, as well as large administrative and political centers of the USSR - in any case, it was planned.
Summing up some of the results of the work carried out by the Abwehr by the time the German invasion of the USSR began, Canaris wrote in a memorandum that numerous groups of agents from the indigenous population, that is, Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, Balts, Finns, etc., were sent to the disposal of the headquarters of the German armies. n. Each group consisted of 25 (or more) people. These groups were led by German officers. They were supposed to penetrate the Soviet rear to a depth of 50,300 kilometers behind the front line in order to report the results of their observations by radio, paying special attention to the collection of information about Soviet reserves, the state of railways and other roads, as well as about all measures taken by the enemy. ...
In the pre-war years, the German embassy in Moscow and German consulates in Leningrad, Kharkov, Tbilisi, Kiev, Odessa, Novosibirsk and Vladivostok served as the center for organizing espionage, the main base for the strongholds of Hitler's intelligence. In the diplomatic field in the USSR in those years, a large group of cadre German intelligence officers, experienced professionals, representing all links of the Nazi "total espionage" system, and especially widely the Abwehr and SD, worked. Despite the obstacles posed to him by the Chekist authorities, they, shamelessly using their diplomatic immunity, developed a high level of activity here, striving first of all, as the archival materials of those years indicate, to probe the defense power of our country.
Erich Koestring
The Abwehr residency in Moscow was headed at that time by General Erich Koestring, who until 1941 was known in German intelligence circles as "the most knowledgeable specialist on the Soviet Union." He was born and lived for some time in Moscow, so he was fluent in Russian and was familiar with the way of life in Russia. During the first world war he fought against tsarist army, then in the 20s he worked in a special center dealing with the study of the Red Army. From 1931 to 1933, in the final period of Soviet-German military cooperation, he acted as an observer from the Reichswehr in the USSR. He returned to Moscow in October 1935 as a military and aviation attaché in Germany and stayed until 1941. He had a wide circle of acquaintances in the Soviet Union, whom he strove to use to obtain information of interest to him.
However, of the numerous questions that Köstring received from Germany six months after his arrival in Moscow, he was able to answer only a few. In his letter addressed to the head of the intelligence department for the armies of the East, he explained it this way: “The experience of several months of work here has shown that there can be no question of the possibility of obtaining military intelligence information, even remotely related to the military industry, even on the most innocuous issues ... Visits to military units have been discontinued. One gets the impression that the Russians are supplying all attachés with a set of false information. " The letter ended with an assurance that he nevertheless hoped that he would be able to put together a “mosaic picture reflecting further development and the organizational structure of the Red Army ”.
After the German consulates were closed in 1938, the military attachés of other countries were deprived of the opportunity to attend military parades for two years, and, in addition, restrictions were imposed on the establishment of contacts by foreigners with Soviet citizens. Koestring, he said, was forced to return to using three "scarce sources of information": traveling through the USSR and traveling by car to various districts of the Moscow region, using the open Soviet press and, finally, exchanging information with military attachés of other countries.
In one of his reports, he draws the following conclusion about the state of affairs in the Red Army: “As a result of the elimination of the bulk of the senior officer corps, who had mastered the military art quite well in the process of ten years of practical training and theoretical training, the operational capabilities of the Red Army decreased. Lack of military order and a shortage of experienced commanders will negatively affect the training and education of troops for some time. Irresponsibility in military affairs that is already manifesting itself at the present time will lead in the future to even more serious negative consequences. The army is deprived of the highest qualifications of commanders. Nevertheless, there is no reason to conclude that the offensive capabilities of the mass of soldiers have fallen to such an extent as not to recognize the Red Army as a very important factor in the event of a military conflict. "
In a message to Berlin by Lieutenant Colonel Hans Krebs, who replaced the sick Koestring, dated April 22, 1941, it was said: “Of course, the Soviet ground forces have not yet reached the maximum number of the combat schedule for wartime, determined by us in 200 infantry rifle divisions. This information was recently confirmed in a conversation with me by the military attachés of Finland and Japan. "
A few weeks later, Koestring and Krebs made a special trip to Berlin to personally inform Hitler that there were no significant changes for the better in the Red Army.
The employees of the Abwehr and the SD, who used diplomatic and other official cover in the USSR, were tasked with collecting information on a wide range of military-economic problems along with strictly oriented information. This information had a very specific purpose - it was supposed to enable the Wehrmacht's strategic planning bodies to get an idea of the conditions in which Hitler's troops would have to operate on the territory of the USSR, and in particular during the seizure of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and other large cities. The coordinates of the objects of future bombing were found out. Even then, a network of clandestine radio stations was created to transmit the collected information, caches were set up in public and other suitable places where instructions from Nazi intelligence centers and items of sabotage equipment could be stored so that agents sent and located in the USSR could use them at the right time.
Using trade relations between Germany and the USSR for intelligence
For the purpose of espionage, cadres, secret agents and proxies of the Abwehr and SD were systematically sent to the Soviet Union, for whose penetration into our country the intensively developing economic, trade, economic and cultural ties between the USSR and Germany were used. With their help, such important tasks were solved as collecting information about the military-economic potential of the USSR, in particular about the defense industry (capacity, regionalization, bottlenecks), about the industry as a whole, its individual large centers, energy systems, communication routes, sources of industrial raw materials, etc. Representatives of the business community were especially active, who often, along with the collection of intelligence information, carried out assignments to establish communications on Soviet territory with agents whom German intelligence managed to recruit during the period of active functioning of German concerns and firms in our country.
Attaching great importance to the use of legal capabilities in intelligence work against the USSR and striving in every possible way to expand them, both the Abwehr and the SD proceeded from the fact that the information obtained in this way, in its predominant part, was not capable of serving as a sufficient basis for developing specific plans, adopting correct decisions in the military-political field. And based only on such information, they believed, it is difficult to form a reliable and any complete picture of tomorrow's military adversary, his forces and reserves. To fill the gap, the Abwehr and the SD, as confirmed by many documents, are making attempts to intensify their work against our country by illegal means, seeking to acquire secret sources inside the country or send secret agents from behind the cordon, counting on their settling in the USSR. This, in particular, is evidenced by the following fact: the head of the Abwehr agent group in the United States, officer G. Rumrich, at the beginning of 1938 had an order from his center to get blank forms of American passports for agents who were thrown into Russia.
"Can you get at least fifty pieces?" - asked Rumrich in a cipher telegram from Berlin. The Abwehr was ready to pay a thousand dollars for each blank blank American passport - they were so necessary.
Documentary specialists from the secret services of Nazi Germany, long before the start of the war against the USSR, scrupulously followed all the changes in the procedure for processing and issuing personal documents of Soviet citizens. They showed an increased interest in elucidating the system of protecting military documents from forgery, trying to establish the procedure for using conventional secret signs.
In addition to agents illegally sent to the Soviet Union, the Abwehr and SD used their official employees to obtain information of interest to them, introduced into the commission for determining the line of the German-Soviet border and resettlement of Germans living in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states, to territory of Germany.
Already at the end of 1939, Hitler's intelligence began to systematically send agents into the USSR from the territory of occupied Poland to conduct military espionage. They were, as a rule, professionals. It is known, for example, that one of these agents, who underwent 15-month training in the Berlin school of the Abwehr in 1938-1939, managed to illegally penetrate the USSR three times in 1940. Having made several long one and a half to two months trips to the regions of the Central Urals, Moscow and the North Caucasus, the agent returned safely to Germany.
Starting from about April 1941, the Abwehr switched mainly to the transfer of agents in groups led by experienced officers. All of them had the necessary espionage and sabotage equipment, including radio stations for receiving live radio broadcasts from Berlin. They had to send their response messages to a fake address in secret writing.
In the Minsk, Leningrad and Kiev directions, the depth of intelligence intelligence reached 300-400 kilometers and more. Some of the agents, having reached certain points, had to settle there for some time and immediately begin to carry out the assigned task. Most of the agents (usually they did not have radio stations) had to return no later than June 15-18, 1941 to the intelligence center, so that the information they obtained could be used promptly by the command.
What interested the Abwehr and SD? Assignments for both groups of agents, as a rule, differed little and boiled down to finding out the concentration of Soviet troops in the border areas, the deployment of headquarters, formations and units of the Red Army, points and areas where radio stations were located, the presence of ground and underground airfields, the number and types of aircraft based on them, the location of ammunition depots, explosives, fuel.
Some agents sent to the USSR were instructed by the intelligence center to refrain from specific practical actions until the start of the war. The goal is clear - the leaders of the Abwehr counted in this way to preserve their intelligence cells until the moment when the need for them would be especially great.
Dispatch of German agents to the USSR in 1941
The activity of preparing agents for transfer to the Soviet Union is evidenced by such data, gleaned from the Abwehr archives. In mid-May 1941, a reptile at the intelligence school of the department of Admiral Kanris near Konigsberg (in the town of Grossmichel) trained about 100 people who were intended to be sent to the USSR.
Who was the stake? They come from the families of Russian emigrants who settled in Berlin after October revolution, sons of former officers of the tsarist army who fought against Soviet Russia, and after the defeat, those who fled abroad, members of the nationalist organizations of Western Ukraine, the Baltic States, Poland, the Balkan countries, as a rule, spoke Russian.
Among the means used by Hitler's intelligence in violation of generally accepted norms of international law was also aerial espionage, to which the latest technical achievements were put. In the system of the Ministry of the Air Force of Nazi Germany, there was even a special unit - a special squadron, which, together with the secret service of this department, by means of high-altitude aircraft units, carried out reconnaissance work against the countries of interest to the Abwehr. During the flights, all important structures were photographed for waging war: ports, bridges, airfields, military facilities, industrial enterprises, etc. Thus, the military cartographic service of the Wehrmacht received in advance from the Abwehr the information necessary to draw up good maps. Everything related to these flights was kept in the strictest confidence, and only the direct performers and those of a very limited circle of employees of the Abwehr I air group knew about them, whose duties included the processing and analysis of data obtained using air reconnaissance. Aerial photography materials were presented in the form of photographs, as a rule, to Canaris himself, in rare cases - to one of his deputies, and then handed over to the destination. It is known that the command of the special squadron of the Rovel Air Force, stationed in Staaken, already in 1937 began reconnaissance of the territory of the USSR with the help of Hein-kel-111 disguised as transport aircraft.
German aerial reconnaissance before the start of the war
The following generalized data give an idea of the intensity of aerial reconnaissance: from October 1939 to June 22, 1941, German aircraft more than 500 times invaded the airspace of the Soviet Union. There are many known cases when civil aircraft flying on the Berlin-Moscow route on the basis of agreements between Aeroflot and Lufthansa, often deliberately lost their course and ended up over military targets. Two weeks before the start of the war, the Germans also flew around the areas where the Soviet troops were located. Every day they photographed the location of our divisions, corps, armies, spotted the presence of military radio transmitters that were not camouflaged.
A few months before the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, aerial photographs of the Soviet territory were carried out at full speed. According to information received by our intelligence through agents from an assistant at the headquarters of German aviation, German aircraft flew to the Soviet side from airfields in Bucharest, Konigsberg and Kirkenes (Northern Norway) and took photographs from a height of 6 thousand meters. In the period from 1 to 19 April 1941 alone, German aircraft violated 43 times state border, making reconnaissance flights over our territory to a depth of 200 kilometers.
As the Nuremberg trial established over the main war criminals, the materials obtained with the help of aerial reconnaissance conducted in 1939, even before the invasion of Nazi troops in Poland, were used as a guideline in the subsequent planning of military and sabotage operations against the USSR. Reconnaissance flights, which were carried out first over the territory of Poland, then the Soviet Union (up to Chernigov) and the countries of South-Eastern Europe, some time later were transferred to Leningrad, to which, as an object of air espionage, the main attention was riveted. From archival documents it is known that on February 13, 1940, at General Jodl's headquarters of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, Canaris heard a report "On the new results of aerial reconnaissance against the SSSl, received by the special squadron" Rovel ". Since that time, the scale of aerial espionage has increased dramatically. Its main task was to obtain the information necessary for drawing up geographical maps of the USSR. At the same time, special attention was paid to naval military bases and other strategically important objects (for example, the Shostka powder plant) and, especially, oil production centers, oil refineries, and oil pipelines. Future targets for bombing were also identified.
An important channel for obtaining espionage information about the USSR and its armed forces was the regular exchange of information with the intelligence services of the allied Nazi Germany countries - Japan, Italy, Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. In addition, the Abwehr maintained working contacts with the military intelligence services of the countries adjacent to the Soviet Union - Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Schellenberg even set himself in the long term the task of developing the secret services of countries friendly to Germany and rallying them into a kind of "intelligence community" that would work for one common center and would supply the necessary information to the countries included in it (a goal that was generally achieved after wars in NATO in the form of unofficial cooperation of various secret services under the auspices of the CIA).
Denmark, for example, in whose secret service Schellenberg, with the support of the leadership of the local National Socialist Party, managed to take a leading position and where there was already a good "operational groundwork", was "used as a" foreground "in intelligence work against England and Russia." Schellenberg said he managed to infiltrate the intelligence network of Soviet intelligence. As a result, he writes, after a while a well-established connection with Russia was established, and we began to receive important information of a political nature.
The wider the preparations for the invasion of the USSR developed, the more energetically Canaris tried to include in the intelligence activities of his allies and satellites of Hitlerite Germany, to activate their agents. Through the Abwehr, the Nazi military intelligence centers in the countries of South-Eastern Europe were ordered to intensify their work against the Soviet Union. The Abwehr has long maintained the closest contacts with the intelligence service of Horthy Hungary. According to P. Leverkühn, the results of the actions of the Hungarian intelligence service in the Balkans constituted a valuable addition to the work of the Abwehr. The Abwehr liaison officer was constantly in Budapest, who exchanged the obtained information. There was also a six-member SD office headed by Hettle. Their responsibility was to maintain contact with the Hungarian secret service and the German national minority, which served as a source of recruiting agents. The dealership had practically unlimited funds in stamps to pay for the services of agents. At first, it was focused on solving political problems, but with the outbreak of the war, its activities increasingly acquired a military orientation. In January 1940, Canaris set about organizing a powerful Abwehr center in Sofia in order to turn Bulgaria into one of the strongholds of his agent network. Contacts with the Romanian intelligence were just as close. With the consent of the head of the Romanian intelligence service Morutsov and with the assistance of oil companies dependent on German capital, the people of the Abwehr were sent to the territory of Romania in the oil regions. The scouts acted under the cover of company employees - "mining foremen", and soldiers of the Brandenburg sabotage regiment - local guards. Thus, the Abwehr managed to settle in the oil heart of Romania, and from here he began to scatter his espionage networks further east.
In the years preceding the war, the Nazi "total espionage" services in the fight against the USSR had an ally in the intelligence of militaristic Japan, whose ruling circles also made far-reaching plans for our country, the practical implementation of which they associated with the capture of Moscow by the Germans. And although there were never joint military plans between Germany and Japan, each of them pursued its own policy of aggression, sometimes trying to profit from the other, nevertheless, both countries were interested in partnership and cooperation with each other and therefore acted as a united front in the intelligence field. ... This, in particular, is eloquently evidenced by the activities of the Japanese military attaché in Berlin, General Oshima, in those years. It is known that he provided coordination of the actions of the Japanese intelligence stations in European countries, where he struck up quite close ties in political and business circles and maintained contacts with the leaders of the SD and the Abwehr. Through him, a regular exchange of intelligence data about the USSR was carried out. Oshima kept his ally informed about the specific activities of Japanese intelligence in relation to our country and, in turn, was aware of the secret operations undertaken against her by Nazi Germany. If necessary, he provided the intelligence and other operational capabilities at his disposal and willingly supplied intelligence information on a reciprocal basis. Another key figure in Japanese intelligence in Europe was the Japanese envoy to Stockholm, Onodera.
In the plans of the Abwehr and the SD, directed against the Soviet Union, an important place, for obvious reasons, was assigned to the neighboring states - the Baltic States, Finland, Poland.
The Nazis showed particular interest in Estonia, considering it as a purely "neutral" country, whose territory could serve as a convenient springboard for the deployment of intelligence operations against the USSR. This was decisively facilitated by the fact that already in the second half of 1935, after a group of pro-fascist-minded officers, led by Colonel Maasing, chief of the intelligence department of the General Staff, gained the upper hand at the headquarters of the Estonian army, a complete reorientation of the country's military command to Nazi Germany took place. ... In the spring of 1936, Maasing, and after him the chief of staff of the army, General Reek, willingly accepted the invitation of the leaders of the Wehrmacht to visit Berlin. During their stay there, they struck up a business relationship with Canaris and his closest associates. An agreement was reached on mutual information on the reconnaissance line. The Germans undertook to equip the Estonian intelligence with operational and technical means. As it turned out later, it was then that the Abwehr secured the official consent of Reek and Maasing to use the territory of Estonia to work against the USSR. At the disposal of the Estonian intelligence were provided photographic equipment for the production of photographs of warships from the lighthouses of the Gulf of Finland, as well as radio interception devices, which were then installed along the entire Soviet-Estonian border. To provide technical assistance, specialists from the decryption department of the Wehrmacht High Command were sent to Tallinn.
General Laidoner, the commander-in-chief of the Estonian bourgeois army, assessed the results of these negotiations as follows: “We were mainly interested in information about the deployment of Soviet military forces in the area of our border and about the movements taking place there. All this information, since they had it, the Germans willingly communicated to us. As for our reconnaissance department, it supplied the Germans with all the data that we had regarding the Soviet rear and the internal situation in the USSR.
General Pickenbrock, one of Canaris's closest aides, during interrogation on February 25, 1946, in particular, testified: “Estonian intelligence maintained very close ties with us. We constantly provided her with financial and technical support. Its activities were directed exclusively against the Soviet Union. The chief of intelligence, Colonel Maasing, visited Berlin annually, and our representatives, as needed, went to Estonia themselves. Captain Cellarius was often there, who was entrusted with the task of monitoring the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, its position and maneuvers. Captain Pigert, an employee of the Estonian intelligence service, constantly collaborated with him. Before the entry of Soviet troops into Estonia, we left in advance numerous agents there, with whom we maintained regular contact and through which we received information of interest to us. When Soviet power arose there, our agents intensified their activities and, until the very moment of the occupation of the country, supplied us with the necessary information, thereby contributing to a significant degree to the success of the German troops. For some time Estonia and Finland were the main sources of intelligence information about the Soviet armed forces. "
In April 1939, General Reek was again invited to Germany, which widely celebrated Hitler's birthday, whose visit, as expected in Berlin, was to contribute to deepening interaction between the German and Estonian military intelligence services. With the assistance of the latter, the Abwehr managed to carry out in 1939 and 1940 several groups of spies and saboteurs in the USSR. All this time, four radio stations were operating along the Soviet-Estonian border, intercepting radio messages, and at the same time, the work of radio stations on the territory of the USSR was monitored from different points. The information obtained in this way was passed on to the Abwehr, from whom the Estonian intelligence did not have any secrets, especially with regard to the Soviet Union.
The Baltic countries in intelligence against the USSR
The leaders of the Abwehr regularly visited Estonia once a year to exchange information. The heads of the intelligence services of these countries, in turn, visited Berlin every year. Thus, the exchange of the accumulated secret information took place every six months. In addition, special couriers were periodically sent from both sides when it was necessary to urgently deliver the necessary information to the center; sometimes military attachés at the Estonian and German embassies were authorized for this purpose. The information transmitted by Estonian intelligence mainly contained data on the state of the armed forces and the military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union.
The archives of the Abwehr preserved materials about the stay of Canaris and Pickenbrock in Estonia in 1937, 1938 and June 1939. In all cases, these trips were caused by the need to improve the coordination of actions against the USSR and the exchange of intelligence information. Here is what General Laidoner, already mentioned above, writes: “The chief of German intelligence, Canaris, visited Estonia for the first time in 1936. After that, he visited here twice or three times. I took it personally. Negotiations on intelligence work were conducted with him by the head of the army headquarters and the head of the 2nd department. Then it was established more specifically what information was required for both countries and what we can give each other. The last time Canaris visited Estonia was in June 1939. It was mainly about intelligence activities. I spoke with Canaris in some detail about our position in the event of a clash between Germany and England and between Germany and the USSR. He was interested in the question of how much time would be required for the Soviet Union to fully mobilize its armed forces and what is the state of its vehicles (railway, automobile and road). " On this visit, along with Canaris and Pickenbrock, was the head of the Abwehr III department, Frans Bentivegny, whose trip was connected with checking the work of the group subordinate to him, which carried out foreign counterintelligence measures in Tallinn. To avoid the "inept interference" of the Gestapo in the affairs of the Abwehr counterintelligence, at the insistence of Canaris, an agreement was reached between him and Heydrich that in all cases when the security police will carry out any measures on Estonian territory, the Abwehr must first be notified ... For his part, Heydrich put forward a demand that the SD should have an independent residency in Estonia. Realizing that in the event of an open quarrel with the influential chief of the imperial security service, it would be difficult for the Abwehr to count on Hitler's support, Canaris agreed to "make room" and accepted Heydrich's demand. At the same time, they agreed that all SD activities in the field of recruiting agents in Estonia and transferring them to the Soviet Union would be coordinated with the Abwehr. The Abwehr retained the right to concentrate in their hands and evaluate all intelligence information concerning the Red Army and the Navy, which the Nazis received through Estonia, as well as through other Baltic countries and Finland. Canaris strongly objected to the attempts of SD officers to act together with the Estonian fascists bypassing the Abwehr and to send unverified information to Berlin, which often came to Hitler through Himmler.
According to Laidoner's report to Estonian President Päts, Canaris was last in Tallinn in the fall of 1939 under an assumed name. In this regard, his meeting with Laidoner and Päts was arranged according to all the rules of conspiracy.
In the report of the Schellenberg office preserved in the archives of the RSHA, it was reported that the operational situation for reconnaissance work along the SD line in the pre-war period both in Estonia and in Latvia was similar. At the head of the residency in each of these countries was an official SD officer who was in an illegal position. All the information collected by the station flowed to him, which he forwarded to the center by mail using secret writing, through couriers on German ships or through the channels of the embassy. The practical activities of the SD intelligence stations in the Baltic states were assessed by Berlin positively, especially in terms of acquiring sources of information in political circles. The SD was greatly assisted by immigrants from Germany who lived here. But, as noted in the above-mentioned report of the VI Directorate of the RSHA, “after the entry of the Russians, the operational capabilities of the SD underwent serious changes. The country's leading figures left the political arena, and maintaining contact with them became more difficult. There was an urgent need to find new channels for transmitting intelligence information to the center. It became impossible to send it on ships, since the ships were thoroughly searched by the authorities, and the crew members who went ashore were under unremitting surveillance. They also had to refuse to send information through the free port of Memel (now Klaipeda, Lithuanian SSR. - Ed.) by land communication. Using sympathetic ink was also risky. I had to decisively set about laying new communication channels, as well as looking for fresh sources of information. " The SD resident in Estonia, who spoke in official correspondence under the code number 6513, nevertheless managed to get in touch with the newly recruited agents and use old sources of information. Maintaining regular contact with his agents was a very dangerous business, requiring extreme caution and dexterity. Resident 6513, however, was able to sort out the situation very quickly and, despite all the difficulties, obtain the necessary information. In January 1940, he received a diplomatic passport and began working under the guise of an assistant at the German embassy in Tallinn.
As for Finland, according to the archival materials of the Wehrmacht, the "Military Organization", conventionally called the "Bureau of Cellarius" (named after its leader, the German military intelligence officer Cellarius), was actively operating on its territory. It was created by the Abwehr with the consent of the Finnish military authorities in mid-1939. Beginning in 1936, Canaris and his closest assistants Pickenbrock and Bentivegni met several times in Finland and Germany with the chief of Finnish intelligence, Colonel Svenson, and then with his successor, Colonel Melander. At these meetings, they exchanged intelligence information and worked out plans for joint action against the Soviet Union. The Cellarius Bureau constantly kept in sight the Baltic Fleet, the troops of the Leningrad Military District, as well as units stationed in Estonia. His active assistants in Helsinki were Dobrovolsky, a former general of the tsarist army, and former tsarist officers Pushkarev, Alekseev, Sokolov, Batuev, the Baltic Germans Meisner, Mansdorf, Estonian bourgeois nationalists Weller, Kurgh, Horn, Kristyan and others. On the territory of Finland, Cellarius had a fairly wide network of agents among various strata of the country's population, recruited spies and saboteurs among the Russian White emigrants who settled there, nationalists and Baltic Germans who had fled from Estonia.
During interrogation on February 25, 1946, Pickenbrock gave detailed testimony about the activities of the Cellarius Bureau, reporting that Captain First Rank Cellarius was conducting intelligence work against the Soviet Union under the cover of the German embassy in Finland. “With Finnish intelligence,” he said, “we have had close cooperation for a long time, even before I came to the Abwehr in 1936. As part of the exchange of intelligence data, we systematically received information from the Finns about the deployment and strength of the Red Army. "
As follows from Pickenbrock's testimony, he first visited Helsinki with Canaris and Major Stolz, the chief of the Abwehr department of the 1st Army Headquarters "Ost", in June 1937. Together with representatives of Finnish intelligence, they made a comparison and exchange of intelligence information about the Soviet Union. At the same time, a questionnaire was handed over to the Finns, which they were to be guided by in the future when collecting intelligence information. The Abwehr was primarily interested in the deployment of units of the Red Army, military industry facilities, especially in the Leningrad region. During this visit, they had business meetings and conversations with the German ambassador to Finland von Blucher and the zoological attaché, Major General Rossing. In June 1938, Canaris and Pickenbrock visited Finland again. On this visit, they were received by the Finnish Minister of War, who expressed satisfaction with the development of Canaris's cooperation with the head of Finnish intelligence, Colonel Svenson. They were in Finland for the third time in June 1939. The head of Finnish intelligence at that time was Melander. The negotiations proceeded within the same framework as the previous ones. The Finnish military intelligence, informed in advance by the leaders of the Abwehr about the impending attack on the Soviet Union, at the beginning of June 1941 put at their disposal the information it had about the Soviet Union. At the same time, with the knowledge of local authorities, the Abwehr began to carry out Operation Erna, associated with the transfer of Estonian counter-revolutionaries from Finland to the Baltic region as spies, radio agents and saboteurs.
The last time Canaris and Pickenbrock visited Finland was in the winter of 1941/42. Together with them was the chief of counterintelligence (Abwehr III) Bentivegni, who went to inspect and provide practical assistance to the "military organization", as well as to resolve issues of cooperation between this organization and Finnish intelligence. Together with Melander, they defined the boundaries of Cellarius' activities: he received the right to independently recruit agents on Finnish territory and transfer them across the front line. After the completion of negotiations, Canaris and Pickenbrock, accompanied by Melander, went to the city of Mikkeli, to the headquarters of Marshal Mannerheim, who expressed a desire to personally meet with the chief of the German Abwehr. They were joined by the head of the German military mission in Finland, General Erfurt.
Cooperation with the intelligence services of the allied and occupied countries in the struggle against the USSR undoubtedly bore some fruit, but the Nazis expected more from it.
The results of the activities of German intelligence on the eve of World War II
"The Abwehr on the eve of the war," writes O. Reile, "was unable to cover the Soviet Union with a well-functioning intelligence network from well-located secret strongholds in other countries - Turkey, Afghanistan, Japan or Finland." The strongholds created in peacetime in neutral countries- "military organizations" were either disguised as economic firms or included in German missions abroad. When the war broke out, Germany was cut off from many sources of information, and the importance of "military organizations" increased greatly. Until mid-1941, the Abwehr conducted systematic work on the border with the USSR with the aim of creating its strongholds and planting agents. A wide network of technical reconnaissance equipment was deployed along the German-Soviet border, with the help of which radio communications were intercepted.
In connection with Hitler's installation on the all-round deployment of the activities of all the secret services of Germany against the Soviet Union, the question of coordination arose sharply, especially after the RSHA and the General Staff of the German ground forces an agreement was concluded to give each army special SD units, called "Einsatzgruppami" and "Einsatzkomando".
In the first half of June 1941, Heydrich and Canaris convened a meeting of Abwehr officers and commanders of police and SD units ("Einsatzgruppen" and "Einsatzkomando"). On it, in addition to individual special reports, reports were made, in general terms, highlighting the operational plans for the upcoming invasion of the USSR. The ground forces were represented at this meeting by the Quartermaster General, who, referring to the technical side of the cooperation of the secret services, relied on the draft order drawn up in agreement with the chief of the SD. Canaris and Heydrich, in their speeches, touched upon the issues of interaction, "a sense of fellowship" between parts of the security police, SD and the Abwehr. A few days after this meeting, both of them were received by SS Reichsfuehrer Himmler to discuss their proposed plan of action to counter Soviet intelligence.
Evidence of the scale that the activities of "total espionage" services took against the USSR on the eve of the war can be found in the following generalizing data: only in 1940 and the first quarter of 1941 in the western regions of our country, 66 Nazi intelligence stations were discovered and more than 1,300 of its agents were neutralized ...
As a result of the intensification of the "total espionage" services, the volume of information they collected about the Soviet Union, which required analysis and appropriate processing, constantly increased, and intelligence flattery, as the Nazis sought, became more and more comprehensive. It became necessary to involve relevant research organizations in the process of studying and evaluating intelligence materials. One of these institutions, widely used by intelligence, located in Wangzie, was the largest collection of various Soviet literature, including reference literature. The special value of this unique collection was that it contained an extensive selection of specialized literature on all branches of science and economics, published in the original language. The staff, which included famous scientists from various universities, including immigrants from Russia, was headed by one professor-Sovietologist, Georgian by origin. At the disposal of the institute, impersonal secret information obtained by intelligence was transferred, which it had to subject to careful study and generalization, using the available reference literature, and return it to Schellenberg's apparatus with its expert assessment and comments.
Another research organization that also worked closely with intelligence was the Institute of Geopolitics. He carefully analyzed the collected information and, together with the Abwehr and the Department of Economy and Armaments of the Headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command, compiled various reviews and reference materials on their basis. The nature of his interests can be judged at least by such documents prepared by him before the attack on the Soviet Union: "Military-geographical data on the European part of Russia", "Geographic and ethnographic information about Belarus", "Industry of Soviet Russia", "Railway transport SSL, "Baltic countries (with city plans)".
In the Reich, there were a total of about 400 research organizations dealing with socio-political, economic, scientific and technical, geographical and other problems of foreign states; all of them, as a rule, were staffed by highly qualified specialists who know all aspects of the relevant problems, and were subsidized by the state under a free budget. There was a procedure according to which all Hitler's requests - when, for example, he demanded information on a particular issue - were sent to several different organizations for execution. However, the reports and certificates prepared by them often did not satisfy the Fuhrer due to their academic nature. In response to the task received, the institutions issued "a set of general provisions, possibly correct, but untimely and not clear enough."
In order to eliminate fragmentation and inconsistency in the work of research organizations, to increase their competence, and most importantly - return, as well as to ensure proper control over the quality of the conclusions they prepare and expert assessments based on intelligence materials, Schellenberg will later come to the conclusion that it is necessary to create an autonomous groups of specialists with higher education. On the basis of the materials at their disposal, in particular on the Soviet Union, and with the involvement of relevant research organizations, this group will establish a study of complex problems and, on this basis, develop in-depth recommendations and forecasts for the country's political and military leadership.
The "Department of Foreign Armies of the East" of the General Staff of the Ground Forces was also engaged in similar work. He concentrated materials coming from all intelligence and other sources and periodically compiled "reviews" for the highest military instances, in which special attention was paid to the size of the Red Army, the morale of the troops, the level of command personnel, the nature of combat training, etc.
Such is the place of the Nazi secret services as a whole in the military machine of Hitlerite Germany and the scope of their participation in the preparation of aggression against the USSR, in the intelligence support of future offensive operations.