Popov, Grigory Germanovich - Russian Empire - from the genesis to Collapse. Essays on socio-economic and political history

Grigory Popov

Defeats that could not be

The era of world wars

Preface

This book is devoted to the most dramatic milestones of Russian and world history. At the same time, the author does not claim to be a high academic significance of this work, considering it as a popular labor. Therefore, the reader will not find many references in the text, although a number of monograph provisions are based on documents.

The work is called "lesions that could not be." But we do not apply for the truth in the last instance, when we are talking about the reasons for certain major defeats of the era of world wars. We show the main trends that preceded one or another events. We are confident that the outcome of large military operations is most often predetermined in the shadow of the cabinets, where the faithful or fatal solutions were taken.

In the early 1990s The Russian book market was littered with the works dedicated to the history of the White Movement. The interest in this topic was associated with the problem of an alternative to the communist idea, under the slogan of which there was a revolution of 1991. At the same time, the idea was launched that 1917 was a mistake in our history, which entailed the Stalinism and caused by the summer catastrophe of 1941 from this The conceptual ideological line has emerged that the tragic events of the end of 1930 and early 1941 were programmed in 1917. However detailed analysis In addition to studying the ideological deposit of the Stalinist policy of the 1930s, it was practically not carried out. Russian historians were not yet familiar with the alternative history apparatus, which was actively developed in the West.

Historians who become extroduced in the zero years of Stalin, went to another extreme. Based on the Soviet work overloaded by the ideology of the period cold WarThey began to prove that the market system and democracy are completely unsuitable in the conditions of military mobilization of 1939-1945. And Soviet society with his collectivism managed to defeat the strongest system of Nazi Germany.

In connection with the positive assessment of the Stalinist policies in the era of zero anniversary, there is a completely logical question. If the model of a social device built by Stalin and his environment was so effective, then why did Nazi Germany managed to create the most powerful army in the world in six years, when the Soviet Union, preparing for war with the entire capitalist world, survived the military catastrophes of 1941 - the first half of 1942? And accordingly, another question was completely legitimate: why are Western democracies (to them it is quite fair to attribute Kaiser Germany) quite effectively fought and carried out the mobilization of their economies during the First World War?

The state of Stalin, as we intend to show in this book, there was a slightly efficient than Western democracies and Nazi Germany, from a purely economic point of view. Even the French military industry of the "Sitting War" period was quite strong in conditions of democracy. But the problem of France in World War II was not in economics, although serious economic problems, of course, had, and in a military strategy. The same applies to England and the United States.

The USSR during the Great Patriotic War relied on external resources to no less than his opponents - Nazi Germany and its allies. The military influence of the Western Allies on the Eastern Front was underestimated in Soviet and Russian historiography. The reason is the simplest interest of Russian historians to the Western Front, which was considered in domestic historiography as a kind of addition to the Eastern Front.

Soviet and Russian historians are rarely taken into account by the defeat of fascist Italy as one of the main participants in the "axis" coalition. We consider the large losses of Italy in 1940 - the first half of 1941. An important cause of the "axis" crisis in 1943-1945.

For a long time in Russian historiography it was considered that Stalin achieved victory in the Great Patriotic War big blood that was among liberal historians the main argument of the criticism of Stalin military Policy. However, historians often compare the losses of the USSR with separate states, and not with loss of blocks. In this regard, the damage incurred by Western allies during the Second World War, it is necessary to take on the basis of the losses of all those participating on the side of London states, including primarily Poland. In this case, we go to the huge figures of the Losses of the Western Allies block, the center of which until winter remained London, only after the conference in Casablanca (January 1943), the Americans will begin to dominate this military-political union.

In this book, we are interested in the first place. martialctionswhich are well described quite well in a number of other works, but the connection between politics, diplomacy, ideology, economy and military strategy. We are limited to a description of several important stages of the history of world wars - the analysis of the entire course of both global conflicts would take several volumes. We intend to look at the events from the standpoint of possible alternatives.

Alternative history in Russia, economists and sociologists began to engage in scientifically, responding to famous work Richard Fogel About Construction railways In the USA in the XIX century. With all the controversy of its basic provisions, the mentioned labor R. Fogel made it possible to look at the story as a science in a different way, as a living thing, which gives opportunities for modeling not only the past, but also the future.

For more than 20 years ago, the book E. Durshmid "Victory, which could not be" was published, but this work has covered a rather extensive historical interval, while the author's attention is concentrated on individual battles. We are confident in this regard that the victory of Yuzhan in Hettesborg could really take place, but the price of this victory is huge human losses - they could not allow General Lee to develop success, and the economic blockade of the South deprived the army of the Confederation of Hope to receive new weapons and uniforms.

The same thing as hettesborg can be said about Waterloo. As E. Durshmidt writes, the French sergeant lasted the hassle of nails to close the taper of several British guns. Yes, Napoleon Bonaparte could win, do not argue, however, as the campaigns of 1812, 1813 and 1814, the French, even achieving large tactical success, endured defeat. By 1811, the British economy has already earned in full power, but France's resources for this time began to dry out. Opponents of France have learned to fight, the Russian army was already not at all such as under Austerlitz, and Prussians, copying the experience of Russia and Spain, announced in 1813 the People's Liberation War.

We are interested in this work not the battles themselves and their alternative move, which is well studied in historiography, but mainly the reasons why these battles and wars, who have brewed them, have occurred, having exactly the move that we know. First world War It was quite possible not to become the first world, but to stay in the history of the European conflict, which would end in Christmas 1914 after a peaceful conference somewhere in Genoa or in Neutral Stockholm. But in this case, probably, the focus of a new conflict would appear in the East, and Russia would have to face the Japanese-German Alliance or the Sino-German military union.

IN scientific literature There is still a discussion about the role of Stalin and the Bolshevik regime in the reflection of Nazi aggression. A water private conversation to the author of the present lines was asked: "We will imagine that the head of the USSR would be in 1941 not Stalin, and M.S. Gorbachev? " You can answer this question like this: a leader like M.S. Gorbachev could not be made to the ranks of the senior leadership of the state in 1920-1930. Even in the conditions of control of the Kremlin by a group of bucharin. Too powerful internal and external opposition dictated its conditions for the selection of VKPB leaders. In 1970-1980 Behind the "nuclear shield" and in the conditions of almost complete depression of the inner opposition, the CPSU functioners were able to afford a turn to liberalism.

In one of his works, we reasoned that it would be in the case of coming to power in Russia as a result of the victory of the White V. Kolchak or the success of the Bukharin opposition in the late 1920s. Elementary calculations, based on data on the development trends of Soviet and Western economies in the first half of the last century, led us to the conclusion that the white alternative in the event of the aggression of Nazi Germany did not have a chance to win in World War II. Bukharin alternative, as we have determined, was more progressive in terms of the possibilities of preparing for war, but the Armed Forces of the USSR were doomed to the doctrine of "Defense", which ultimately could lead to victory, but most likely that western wanted Allies in 1918, that is, the new Versailles.

In due time in historical science Disputes were conducted on the role of Western allies in the defeat of Nazi Germany and in the victory over Kaiser Germany in 1918. In this paper, we consider a whole range of problems related to this issue. 1918 showed the possibility of Western allies to effectively resist the military machine in Germany without Eastern Front. Why didn't the same happened in 1940? Or why the landing in Normandy occurred so late that the United States was definitely unambiguously, since the role of the liberator of Europe from fascism went Soviet Union, not an ambitious F. Roosevelt, who already at a meeting in Casablanca (January 1943) saw himself as a great liberator, and Stalin - the leader in his shadow, but everything turned out the opposite.

Our goal in the present work is to show social, economic and political factors that led to the greatest defeats ...

© Popov G. G., 2016

© TD Algorithm LLC, 2016

Preface

This book is devoted to the most dramatic milestones of Russian and world history. At the same time, the author does not claim to be a high academic significance of this work, considering it as a popular labor. Therefore, the reader will not find many references in the text, although a number of monograph provisions are based on documents.

The work is called "lesions that could not be." But we do not apply for the truth in the last instance, when we are talking about the reasons for certain major defeats of the era of world wars. We show the main trends that preceded one or another events. We are confident that the outcome of large military operations is most often predetermined in the shadow of the cabinets, where the faithful or fatal solutions were taken.

In the early 1990s The Russian book market was littered with the works dedicated to the history of the White Movement. The interest in this topic was associated with the problem of an alternative to the communist idea, under the slogan of which there was a revolution of 1991. At the same time, the idea was launched that 1917 was a mistake in our history, which entailed the Stalinism and caused by the summer catastrophe of 1941 from this The conceptual ideological line has emerged that the tragic events of the late 1930s - the beginning of 1941 were programmed in 1917. However, a detailed analysis of this connection, in addition to the study of the ideological population of the Stalinist policy of the 1930s, was practically not carried out. Russian historians were not yet familiar with the alternative history apparatus, which was actively developed in the West.

Historians who become extroduced in the zero years of Stalin, went to another extreme. Relying on the Soviet work overloaded by the ideology of the Cold War period, they began to prove that the market system and democracy are completely unsuitable in the conditions of military mobilization of 1939-1945. And Soviet society with his collectivism managed to defeat the system strongest in militarily - Nazi Germany.

In connection with the positive assessment of the Stalinist policies in the era of zero anniversary, there is a completely logical question. If the model of a social device built by Stalin and his environment was so effective, then why did Nazi Germany managed to create the most powerful army in the world in six years, when the Soviet Union, preparing for war with the entire capitalist world, survived the military catastrophes of 1941 - the first half of 1942? And accordingly, another question was completely legitimate: why are Western democracies (to them it is quite fair to attribute Kaiser Germany) quite effectively fought and carried out the mobilization of their economies during the First World War?

The state of Stalin, as we intend to show in this book, there was a slightly efficient than Western democracies and Nazi Germany, from a purely economic point of view. Even the French military industry of the "Sitting War" period was quite strong in conditions of democracy. But the problem of France in World War II was not in economics, although serious economic problems, of course, had, and in a military strategy. The same applies to England and the United States.

The USSR during the Great Patriotic War relied on external resources to no less than his opponents - Nazi Germany and its allies. The military influence of the Western Allies on the Eastern Front was underestimated in Soviet and Russian historiography. The reason is simple - the reduced interest of Russian historians to the Western Front, which was considered in domestic historiography as a kind of addition to the Eastern Front.

Soviet and Russian historians are rarely taken into account by the defeat of fascist Italy as one of the main participants in the "axis" coalition. We consider the large losses of Italy in 1940 - the first half of 1941. An important cause of the "axis" crisis in 1943-1945.

For a long time, in Russian historiography, it was considered that Stalin achieved victory in the Great Patriotic War of Great Blood, which was among liberal historians the main argument of criticism of the Stalinist Military Policy. However, historians often compare the losses of the USSR with separate states, and not with loss of blocks. In this regard, the damage incurred by Western allies during the Second World War, it is necessary to take on the basis of the losses of all those participating on the side of London states, including primarily Poland. In this case, we go to the huge figures of the Losses of the Western Allies block, the center of which until winter remained London, only after the conference in Casablanca (January 1943), the Americans will begin to dominate this military-political union.

In this book, we are interested in the first place for themselves the fighting, which are well described quite well in a number of other works, but the relationship between politics, diplomacy, ideology, economy and military strategy. We are limited to a description of several important stages of the history of world wars - the analysis of the entire course of both global conflicts would take several volumes. We intend to look at the events from the standpoint of possible alternatives.

Alternative history in Russia, economists and sociologists began to engage in Russia, responding to the famous work of Richard Fogel on the construction of railways in the United States in the XIX century. With all the controversy of its basic provisions, the mentioned labor R. Fogel made it possible to look at the story as a science in a different way, as a living thing, which gives opportunities for modeling not only the past, but also the future.

For more than 20 years ago, the book E. Durshmid "Victory, which could not be" was published, but this work has covered a rather extensive historical interval, while the author's attention is concentrated on individual battles. We are confident in this regard that the victory of Yuzhan in Hettesborg could really take place, but the price of this victory is huge human losses - they could not allow General Lee to develop success, and the economic blockade of the South deprived the army of the Confederation of Hope to receive new weapons and uniforms.

The same as about Getesborg, you can say about Waterlow. As E. Durshmidt writes, the French sergeant lasted the hassle of nails to close the taper of several British guns. Yes, Napoleon Bonaparte could win, do not argue, however, as the campaigns of 1812, 1813 and 1814, the French, even achieving large tactical success, endured defeat. By 1811, the British economy has already earned in full power, but France's resources for this time began to dry out. Opponents of France have learned to fight, the Russian army was already not at all such as under Austerlitz, and Prussians, copying the experience of Russia and Spain, announced in 1813 the People's Liberation War.

We are interested in this work not the battles themselves and their alternative move, which is well studied in historiography, but mainly the reasons why these battles and wars, who have brewed them, have occurred, having exactly the move that we know. World War I could not be the first world war, but to stay in the history of the European conflict, which would end in Christmas 1914 after a peaceful conference somewhere in Genoa or in Neutral Stockholm. But in this case, probably, the focus of a new conflict would appear in the East, and Russia would have to face the Japanese-German Alliance or the Sino-German military union.

In scientific literature, there is still a discussion about the role of Stalin and the Bolshevik regime in the reflection of Nazi aggression. In one private conversation, the author of real lines was asked: "We will imagine that the head of the USSR would be in 1941 not Stalin, and M. S. Gorbachev?" You can answer this question like this: a leader like M. S. Gorbachev could not be made to the ranks of the top leadership of the state in 1920-1930. Even in the conditions of control of the Kremlin by a group of bucharin. Too powerful internal and external opposition dictated its conditions for the selection of VKPB leaders. In 1970-1980 Behind the "nuclear shield" and in the conditions of almost complete depression of the inner opposition, the CPSU functioners were able to afford a turn to liberalism.

In one of his works, we reasoned that it would be in the case of coming to power in Russia as a result of the victory of the White V. Kolchak or the success of the Bukharin opposition in the late 1920s. Elementary calculations, based on data on the development trends of Soviet and Western economies in the first half of the last century, led us to the conclusion that the white alternative in the event of the aggression of Nazi Germany did not have a chance to win in World War II. Bukharin alternative, as we have determined, was more progressive in terms of the possibilities of preparing for war, but the Armed Forces of the USSR were doomed to the doctrine of "Defense", which ultimately could lead to victory, but most likely that western wanted Allies in 1918, that is, the new Versailles.

At one time, there were disputes on the role of Western allies in the defeat of Nazi Germany and in the victory over the Kaiser Germany in 1918. In this paper, we consider a whole range of problems related to this issue. 1918 showed the possibility of Western allies to effectively resist the German military machine without the Eastern Front. Why didn't the same happened in 1940? Or why the landing in Normandy occurred so late that the United States was definitely unambiguously, since the role of Europe's liberator from fascism went to the Soviet Union, and not an ambitious F. Roosevelt, who was already at a meeting in Casablanca (January 1943) saw himself as a great The liberator, and Stalin - the leader in his shadow, but everything turned out the opposite.

Our goal in the present work is to show social, economic and political factors that led to the greatest defeats in Europe in the era of world wars, and answer the question that could prevent these defeats. We will also apply to the microsococial aspects of the issues under consideration in this work, figuratively speaking, "To the hassle of nails, saved the British at Waterlow." In the book we will often contact the biographies of individuals - both commander and political leaders and ordinary participants in the events.

The main geographical space to which we dedicate the most attention is Europe, the events in Asia we affect only in the context of the struggle between European powers. We also addresses the problems of the United States in the era of world wars. A lot in the book is told about Germany, we rely on a number of historical departments previously not published in Russia, as well as German literature on the era of world wars, not so well-known to the Russian reader. We can reproach to the German-centric approach to the problems studied in the monograph. But Germany is a state, victims of defeats in the two world wars, and our book - about the causes of lesions, and not victories.

This work is not a monograph only for counterfact history. We believe that too rash think that a counterfact analysis can help explain the causes of certain events and their strokes in historical processes Often intervened such a factor as a random configuration of the circumstances, even the military takes into account it when planning operations. Accident is in many ways there are not if you carefully consider them; We would say that the accident factor is a consequence of those processes on the micro-social level, which often fall out of the field of view of the researcher.

Our book covers the main events of the First World and World War II, as well as processes against which these events took place. We also pay a lot of attention to the interwar period. Both global conflicts are closely connected with each other, so it is more expedient as we think, to consider together.

The main idea of \u200b\u200bwork is that the global conflicts of the last century could be quite prevented or not allowed to such huge scalesIf at the level of individual states and Europe as a whole would have the mechanisms for preventing armed conflicts. And the matter is far from diplomacy, the problem was political and military doctrines. Conflicts in Europe could become frequent and not to reach the scale of world wars, if the states had sufficient information about a potential opponent, however, in this case, the case would probably not come to armed clashes.

On the eve of the First World War, as in modern Europe, there is democracy, a lot of left in parliaments, strong military-political coalitions of states, confidence in technical and moral superiority over the likely opponent. However, as events have shown in Yugoslavia and Ukraine, Europe is still far from a perfect security system.

During the years of the Cold War, it was the opinion that the third world did not happen only due to the fact that there was a factor of nuclear deterrence. To some extent it is so. But the history of the Second World War showed that even in the context of the global conflict, the parties may refuse the use of OMP, as it happened with combat poisoning substances. Does this mean that any extremist regime in our modern day can be a source of new large, albeit not global, conflict, he will at least minimize nuclear weapons? Yes, it is quite possible. Therefore, the radicalization of the societies of the third world may well provoke the emergence of such modes. In this regard, the study of the experience of world wars acquires a new relevance.

As many years ago, the societies of large states hope for strategic troops as the main factor in the success of their armed forces in possible conflicts. Wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan a little talked such moods. However, conflicts of the second half of the XX - early XXI century. It was also shown that even in conditions of democracy, the problem-oriented problems of policies can easily manipulate public opinion, pushing their countries to choose in favor of the war.

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