Leading problems in n tatishchev. IN

THE MIRAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION

Ultimately, order, and only order, creates freedom. Disorder creates slavery.
S. Peguy

Where there is no community of interests, there can be no unity of purpose, let alone a unity of action.
F. Engels

The reign of Peter II did not bode well for the Russian state. All sober-minded figures, even from the camp of the young tsar's supporters, were aware of this. It is no coincidence that after the death of Peter II, even the Dolgoruky refused to support the scam of the former Tsar's favorite Ivan Alekseevich Dolgoruky with a forged will in favor of his sister - the Tsar's bride - Ekaterina Alekseevna. The inevitable companion of absolutism - favoritism - manifested itself more and more vividly in the last two years of his tenure on the throne of the young monarch inclined to entertainment, awakening the desire to set some limits to the monarch's whims. Ultimately, everyone could suffer from favoritism, although very many wanted to be among the favorites. Therefore, when Peter II died on the eve of his wedding, the question of further reign began spontaneously to be discussed in different strata of high society.

Peter II died on the night of January 19, 1730. In Moscow at that time were not only the highest government bodies that moved here several years ago, but also a large number of provincial nobles who gathered for the wedding of the emperor. Rumors immediately spread that there would be no previous autocracy. These rumors were perceived differently. Many were afraid that instead of one bad, another - the worst - would appear. In the circles of the petty nobility, there were conversations similar to those recorded by the Saxon envoy W.L. Lefort: “The nobles propose to limit despotism and autocracy ... they will not increase our slavery by their oppression. " There were also other opinions. Brigadier Kozlov, who had arrived in the midst of events from Moscow to Kazan, spoke of the supposed limitation of the autocracy with delight: the empress would not be able to take a snuffbox from the treasury, would not be able to distribute money and volosts, or bring her favorites closer to the court. In Russia, according to Kozlov's impressions, the possibility of "direct government of the state", a direct course of affairs, which has never happened in Russian history has appeared.

In 1730, a very favorable environment developed in Russia for fruitful transformations in state system... For more than almost the entire pre-revolutionary history, there were no such situations. Contrary to the fears of certain groups of the nobility, the supreme leaders (that is, members of the Supreme Privy Council) could not become tyrants, if only because very different people in mood and political views were represented on the council. It could not be otherwise. The ancient Spartans and Kievites of the 12th century established a kind of dual power, electing the first two kings, and the second two princes with the sole purpose of breaking up and neutralizing the inevitable selfish aspirations of power. But between the leaders and the gentry, as the nobility was called in the Polish manner at that time, there were real frictions and disagreements, expressed in the distrust of significant strata of the nobility to the Supreme Privy Council. In literature, this mistrust is often explained by the nobility of the leading leaders. Soon after the death of Peter II, two of the most popular commanders of the Russian army were introduced to the Supreme Privy Council: Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn and Vladimir Vasilyevich Dolgoruky. As a result, out of seven members of the council, five turned out to be representatives of two noble families. The matter, however, was much more complicated.

The friction between the mass of the nobility and the rulers did not stem from the nobility of some and the ignorance of others. Among the opponents of the leaders were also representatives of the nobility - old aristocratic families, quite capable of competing in nobility with the princes Golitsyn and Dolgoruky. The so-called "draft of thirteen" submitted to the Supreme Privy Council, along with other nobility, even provided for "making a distinction between the old and new gentry, as is practiced in other countries." The main line of discrepancies between the supreme leaders and the mass of the nobility was approximately the same as in the disputes between Tatishchev and the Musin-Pushkin. With all the hesitation, the Supreme Privy Council in 1727-1729 most often adopted the point of view of Golitsyn, who was looking for solutions to the problems facing the state by expanding (and therefore encouraging) trade and entrepreneurship. Indirectly, this affected the interests of the nobility, since the burden of taxation fell on the peasants - the object of exploitation by the nobility. In addition, in search of funds, the government was forced to cut the salaries of the noble servants.

The mode of action of the Supreme Privy Council also played a negative role in the events. It should be noted that the word "secret", which gave the institution a seemingly ominous character, simply reflected the real situation: the council was made up of the first civilian officials of the state - the actual secret advisers. But the formulation of the name of the first rank of the Table of Ranks was not accidental: on the highest level the duty of all officials was the strictest observance of the secrecy of the discussion of issues. The Supreme Privy Council in this respect only followed the tradition that had developed earlier, back in the 17th century, and took on an emphasized character in the time of Peter the Great.

They started talking about limiting the power of the future monarch already at the night meeting of the Supreme Privy Council on January 19. Although the events took the leaders by surprise, their decisions were not completely ill-considered. Even the candidacies of possible candidates were discussed in advance, at least between Vasily Lukich Dolgoruky and Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn. True, at the meeting, various candidates emerged. But Alexei Grigorievich Dolgoruky, who tried to mention his daughter, betrothed to the deceased prince, was not supported by any of his relatives, and Vladimir Vasilyevich Dolgoruky spoke out against such a proposal and more sharply than other members of the council. Anna Ivanovna's candidacy in the council was named by D. M. Golitsyn. But the initiative for its nomination, according to some sources, came from V. L. Dolgoruky. In any case, there was complete unanimity in the actions of these two leading members of the council.

Anna Ivanovna's candidacy suited the leaders mainly because no party could be seen behind her and she still did not show herself as an active political figure. It seemed that her nomination acquired that reigning person necessary in the given situation, under the cover of which the leaders would be able to retain in their hands all the fullness of power. It is not excluded that events would have developed in this way if the leaders had not decided to give the real situation a completely legal, constitutional character. The most recent experience of Sweden also favored this.

Estate representation in different countries occurs at about the same time and under similar circumstances. The royal power, not yet having a bureaucratic apparatus (and funds for its maintenance), was forced to seek assistance from the estates. Representatives of the estates, naturally, sought to take advantage of the position in order to share power with the monarch. In some cases it was possible for a more or less long time, in others - the estate bodies turned out to be an obedient instrument in the hands of the autocrat. In the 17th century, this struggle intensified throughout Europe. The fates of Russia and Sweden in this respect turn out to be the most similar. At the end of the 17th century, absolutism triumphed in Sweden. The Rikstag, in essence, cedes all power to King Charles XI without a fight. The petty nobility and townspeople support the king against the aristocracy and large landowners.

The authority of Charles XI was largely associated with his foreign policy successes (especially noticeable against the background of the unsuccessful actions of the previous regency council). Charles XI, who died in 1697, left to his fifteen-year-old son Charles XII such a strong royal apparatus of power that no one even dared to attempt to assassinate him. Charles XII proved to be an excellent military leader. but The northern war he ultimately lost. To top it all off, he died in Norway in 1718. For any state system, victories serve as a kind of justification for even the most inexpedient of its actions, while defeats, on the contrary, can lead to collapse and what could still be viable. Less than forty years ago, the Rikstag receded into the background before successful absolutism. Now absolutism was to be held responsible for the defeat. In 1719-1720, decrees on the form of government were developed, which were approved by the Rikstag in 1723. Power now again belonged to the estates acting through the rikstag. Royal power was significantly limited.

Sweden's administrative experience was also used during Peter's time. The tsar, as it was said, in particular, was interested in the system of organization of colleges in Sweden. Vasily Lukich Dolgoruky back in 1715, being the Russian envoy in Copenhagen, received an order to familiarize himself with the staffing table of the Danish colleges: "How many collegiums, what each position, how many persons in each collegium, what is the salary to whom, what ranks among themselves." Later, when preparing the draft of the collegiums, he also used the Swedish experience.

The Swedish experience undoubtedly helped the rulers in a short time to propose some important regulations. But the point here is not in borrowing, but in the similarity of destinies. In Russia, too, the Zemsky Sobor, which approved the Code of 1649, did not provide for a place for itself in this legal monument, transferring all power to the tsar.

Estate office in Russia has reached highest development in the difficult years of the Time of Troubles and in the first decade after the election of the young Mikhail Romanov to the royal throne. But gradually the role of estate-representative institutions falls. The violent social upheavals of the "rebellious" 17th century forced the upper classes to reach for a strong royal power... Under Peter I, the autocracy reaches a kind of peak. Peter, as it were, expressed the limit that absolutism is capable of giving. And it turned out that the costs were too much.

On the content of "Konditsiy" - the conditions for inviting Anna Ivanovna to the royal throne - the leaders quickly agreed. Anna agreed to recognize "the already established Supreme Privy Council in eight persons will always contain", "the wholeness and well-being of any state consists of good advice." On the night of January 19, the secretary of the council, Stepanov, was dictated to eight points limiting the arbitrariness of the monarch in the distribution of ranks and awards, in the imposition of taxes and expenses. Dictated more than others Vasily Lukich, and practiced the "calm", that is, gave legalization a legal form, Andrei Ivanovich Osterman.

Conditions are only one "constitutional" document of the leaders, and not the most important one. This is even a document that compromises them, since it is about limiting the empress's power in favor of only the Supreme Privy Council. It was this document that was supposed to cause concern among a significant part of the nobility, including the nobility, since it did not say anything about their place in the new state system. Meanwhile, the leaders had proposals on this score as well. The nobles did not know about them.

The conditions were the document with which the leaders turned to Anna. They were going to go to the noble "nation" with a different document, much larger in size than Konditsiya. This is a "draft form of government". The very first point in the draft clarified that "the Supreme Privy Council is not composed for any of its own assembly of power, just for the best of state benefits and management to help their Emp. Majesties." As in the previous period in Russia, there were no restrictions on the term of office. "Fallen", that is, vacated, places were to be filled by elections from "the first names, from the generals and from the gentry, people faithful and friendly to the public, without remembering foreigners."

A sharp course towards liberation from the dominance of "foreigners" was apparently pursued by D. M. Golitsyn. But in the "project" this line was muted. The leaders, in particular, fully recognized Osterman's full rights, and there is no reason to think that anyone intended to remove him from the council. In terms of restrictions on foreigners, the leaders could also refer to the relevant experience of Sweden, where foreigners were generally excluded from holding any positions. But such a reference was needed only to raise this question in the presence of Osterman. In Sweden, there has never been any foreign dominance. Russia is another matter. Here, some branches of the economy and divisions of administration were completely captured by foreigners.

The "project" envisaged the solution of one more problem, which greatly worried the nobility: from one family name, no more than two people could enter the council, "so that they could not take over the forces from above." This proposal meant the removal of one of the Dolgoruky. Apparently, Alexei Grigorievich was supposed to be withdrawn, since Field Marshal Vladimir Vasilyevich had just been specially introduced, and Vasily Lukich was one of the co-authors of the project.

The selection of candidates for the "fallen" seats was to be carried out by the members of the Supreme Privy Council, together with the Senate. When considering cases, the council was to be guided by the principle that "the law does not govern the persons, but the law controls the persons, and not to talk about surnames, below about any dangers, only to look for a common crawl without any passion." To resolve any "new and important state affairs", the Senate, generals, collegiate members and noble gentry were to be invited to the council meeting "for advice and discussion."

The "project" as a whole retained the structure of power that had developed in last years reign of Peter I, including the Table of Ranks approved in 1722. The Senate remained "to help" the Supreme Privy Council. The question of its number was supposed to be resolved additionally, taking into account the wishes of the "society". The Senate and the collegiums were to be recruited "from the generals and the noble gentry."

The main addressee of the "project" was the nobility, to whom all sorts of privileges are crumbled. The nobles were exempted from service in the "vile and lower ranks", for them it was envisaged to create "special cadet companies, from which to determine by training directly in the turn (that is, the highest) scammers." It was assumed that "all the gentry should be kept in the same way as in other European states in due respect." In other words, the nobility was promised everything that they demanded in their petitions or private conversations. But the nobles knew nothing about this: the announcement of the project was postponed until the arrival of the empress.

The scourge of the times was the contradiction mentioned more than once: the old feeding system was supposedly canceled, but the salary was not paid regularly. The leaders promise to strictly monitor the timely payment of salaries, as well as to ensure that the promotion is carried out "according to merit and merit, and not out of passions and not out of bribery." The desire is expressed "to look diligently about the soldiers and sailors, as over the children of the fatherland, so that they would not have wasted labor, and not allow insults".

Only one, but very important point was given to the merchants. The principle of monopoly was resolutely rejected: "They have the will to trade and not give any goods to anyone in one hand, and taxes should make them easier." It was also prescribed "to prochit to all ranks in the merchant class is not a meshat". Under the conditions of a feudal state, the protection of the merchants from possible interference by the authorities or the nobility most likely contributed to the development of trade and industry. This point is a noticeable reflection of the policy that Golitsyn tried to carry out in practice in 1727-1729, heading the Commerce Collegium.

The promise sounded rather vague: "The peasants can get as much tax as they can, and the state will examine the excessive expenditures." It was about reducing the taxation of peasants by reducing government spending. But the experience of previous years has shown that the situation with "cutting costs" has always been not the best way, although something has been done in this direction.

The prescription had a political meaning: the government "must be in Moscow, and not move anywhere else." True, this was explained by the need to avoid "unnecessary government losses" and "to improve the whole society of their homes and villages." Indeed, the maintenance of the courtyard and institutions was incomparably more expensive in St. Petersburg than in Moscow. But the point was not so much in this as in the fact that Moscow personified Russia itself and its traditions, while St. Petersburg was precisely a "window to Europe", and it was turned, as it were, in the opposite direction from Russia.

The "draft form of government" was the result of mutual concessions between the members of the Supreme Privy Council. In this form, it did not fully reflect either the views of D. M. Golitsyn or the convictions of V. L. Dolgoruky. Golitsyn had more bold project political transformations, which provided for a significant increase in the role of the third estate. According to Golitsyn's plan, in addition to the Supreme Privy Council, three assemblies were established: the Senate, the gentry chamber, and the chamber of city representatives. The thirty-six-member Senate was to consider cases presented to the council. A noble chamber of two hundred people was called upon to protect the rights of this class from possible encroachments on the part of the Supreme Privy Council. The House of City Representatives was supposed to look after the interests of the third estate and manage commercial affairs.

It was in the Golitsyn project that the Swedish constitution and the Russian zemstvo practice of the epoch of its highest rise were taken into account with the greatest completeness. Golitsyn, much further than his colleagues, was ready to meet the wishes of the merchants and townspeople. The creation of closed estate spheres in this case was to limit the further expansion of serf relations. And it is clear that this project was not even brought up for discussion. It was too obvious that he would not satisfy the nobility, without which any proposals of the supreme rulers were doomed to failure.

The supreme leaders also envisaged a certain procedure for discussing projects on the way of converting them into legislative acts. This purpose was served by a special document called "Ways by which, as a witness, it is more decent, more thorough and firm, it is possible to compose and approve a business that is only important and useful to the whole people and the state." The first point of the document suggested that “all the nobility of the Great Russian people, turning off foreigners ... not of Greek law and whose grandfathers were not born in Russia, would agree for themselves and for those absent unanimously together so that no one, in any way, and nothing from that consent he dissuaded himself neither by merit, nor by rank, nor by the old age of his surname, and so that everyone would have one vote. " It was envisaged, therefore, the equality of all nobles, regardless of their personal merits and nobility of the family, as well as position on the career ladder.

By "unanimous consent" it was necessary to elect "a gentry of fit and loyal to the fatherland people from twenty to thirty people", and these electives had to prepare written projects, "what they can invent for the crawl of the fatherland." The meetings are chaired by two elected persons, who themselves do not have the right to vote, but must maintain order, appease passions during the meetings. If questions arose concerning other estates, the elected representatives of these estates were invited for discussion. It was stipulated that “the electors from every rank had their own choice,” that is, that the elections were carried out not from above, by the authorities, but within the framework of the estate organizations.

Having prepared a collective opinion, the elected representatives of the nobles were to submit it to the Senate "and advise and agree with it." Then they all go together to the Supreme Privy Council. "And as electives, the Senate and the Supreme Council agree on what matter, and then send several persons with this matter to Her Majesty and ask her to confirm" (that is, approved).

The proposed projects could completely change the political face of Russia and significantly affect its future social development... Even limiting the circle of politically legitimate citizens only to the gentry in these conditions was a big step forward. In addition, even in a dull form, it was also said about the rights of other estates (of course, not counting the serfs), whose affairs were to be resolved with their full participation. In the last reservation, perhaps, the influence of the Golitsyn project of creating the estate chambers is reflected. The logic of further development would inevitably lead to a gradual strengthening of the role of the third estate, approximately the way it was in Sweden at that time. The aristocracy in Sweden, more than in Russia, boasted of their origin. But the third estate, due to the presence of significant capital, confidently took into its own hands those areas that gave the most profits.

In 1730, there was no inevitable doom of constitutional undertakings. And in any case, never in Russia, up to 1905, were there such favorable conditions for the transition to a constitutional monarchy. The rulers' miscalculations were tactical rather than political. Perhaps most of all, the leaders were let down by the "secret" of their meetings, the "secret" which each member of the council solemnly vowed to keep, regardless of any turn of events. Vasily Lukich, returning from Mitava after signing by Anna Ivanovna Konditsiy, reasonably noted that it was necessary to "although briefly mention what affairs they (that is, elected from the nobility) will be trusted ... so that the people will learn that they want to start a popular cause ". The leaders either failed or did not have time to implement this proposal.

While developing projects for expanding the political role of the nobility, the rulers did not trust the nobility most of all. Therefore, they sought to present him with a fait accompli. The introduction of two of the most popular field marshals into the council was supposed to pacify the restless, albeit apolitical, guard. Field marshals could easily find a sufficient number of army regiments ready to respond to their call. But the leaders tried to present Konditsiya and other acts as an expression of the will of the Empress herself. It was a big and unjustified risk. This path promised success only if the empress herself was a participant in the conspiracy. But, of course, one could not count on this. It was also hard to hope that it would be possible to reliably protect the empress from outside world... Even about the intention of the leaders, Anna learned earlier from their opponents than from themselves.

Counting on Anna Ivanovna, the leaders themselves tied their hands. They could no longer appeal directly to the nobility. The situation was especially aggravated after February 2, at a meeting of the highest officials of the state, signed by Anna Ivanovna Konditsiya were proclaimed. True, the Supreme Privy Council invited the first five ranks of the service ranks and the titled nobility to submit their projects. But their approval was automatically transferred to the empress's office, which was soon to arrive in Moscow. The most important council documents for the nobility were never brought to the attention of the nobility and, apparently, could be made public only after their approval by the empress.

Thus, striving to limit the monarchy in the interests of the nobility, the leaders themselves did not believe in the civil preparedness of the Russian gentry, in its political activity and self-awareness. Therefore, the supreme rulers tried to impose on him civil rights and constitutional consciousness from above, by the imperial will.

The noble projects, which arose independently of the rulers or at their suggestion, were much poorer than the project of the rulers. The Supreme Privy Council received several such projects, and in most of them only the immediate wishes of the nobility were stated, while the issues of the general political structure were almost not touched upon. Almost all projects raised the question of the need to expand the composition of the Supreme Council or transfer its functions to the Senate. In the project of I. A. Musin-Pushkin, the importance of the noble aristocracy was very sharply emphasized. "Family" was supposed to belong to half of the seats in the Supreme Privy Council and in the Senate, and even the generals were ranked among the simple gentry. The distinction between the old and new gentry, as noted, was also drawn in the draft of thirteen. In this project, in particular, there was a provision that "for crafts and other low positions the gentry should not be used."

However, if the projects of the nobles were poor, then the disputes in the noble assemblies gave rise to rather far-reaching proposals. One of the most active participants in these disputes was Vasily Nikitich Tatishchev, who had both the greatest knowledge and breadth of judgment in comparison with his colleagues.

In the events of 1730, Golitsyn and Tatishchev ended up in different camps. And it is not so much a matter of ideological differences as of the peculiarities of the political alignment. In the late 1920s, as noted, charges were repeatedly brought up against Feofan Prokopovich, and the accusers were representatives of the old princely families, Peter's cabinet-secretary A. Makarov and others. Prokopovich irritated many Russians with a negative attitude towards Russian antiquity, a kind of cosmopolitanism, and indifference to the country's prestige in the European arena. But such things were not usually spoken about out loud. Therefore, there was an accusation of "non-Orthodoxy", namely, a tendency towards Lutheranism. There were reasons for this. In general, Peter's entourage included many Lutherans. One of the leaders, Gavrila Golovkin, was also married to a Lutheran woman, as a result of which his children were brought up in the family in the Lutheran spirit. Nobody would have dared to accuse Tatishchev of disrespect for Russian history. On the other hand, he had much more "non-Orthodoxy", though of a different kind, than that of Prokopovich, and Prokopovich did not fail to demonstrate this publicly, dissociating himself from some of Tatishchev's very free views.

In the summer of 1728, the Brunswick envoy, Baron von Kramm, reported about the clouds that were gathering over Tatishchev. Kramm characterizes Tatishchev as one of the most reasonable people, who perfectly knows the German language and has great knowledge in the field of mining and coinage, but for some reason fell out of favor with Alexei Grigorievich Dolgoruky. Under the guise of an inspection of mining enterprises, the Dolgoruky intended to send him to Siberia. Later, in a letter to IA Cherkasov, Tatishchev reminded of this intention of the Dolgoruks, who directly threatened him with "the gallows and the chopping block."

For Antiochus Cantemir, the hardships of life were focused on the personality of Dmitry Golitsyn. The elder brother of Antiochus, Konstantin, married Golitsyn's daughter and, with the help of his father-in-law, managed to take advantage of the law of inheritance, having received all of his father's possessions. Antiochus was deprived of stable material support. To a large extent, this circumstance gave his work a pessimistic coloring.

By the end of the 1920s, Tatishchev was brought closer to Kantemir and Prokopovich by a certain similarity of fate and some of their views. They often had the same enemies. But he could not accept the unrestrained apologetics of autocracy that Prokopovich and Kantemir advocated. Ultimately, he was among those whom Prokopovich also sharply criticized as "rebellious" rivals of the leaders in the division of power.

The "rebels" gathered in various houses, where heated debates took place. The most crowded gatherings were noted by A. M. Cherkassky, Vasily Novosiltsev, Prince Ivan Baryatinsky. The essence of the disputes Tatishchev later outlined in a note "Arbitrary and concordant reasoning and opinion of the assembled Russian gentry on state rule." According to Plekhanov, "Tatishchev himself did not know what, in fact, he wanted: he, who defended autocracy in theory, writes a constitutional draft" and then persuades the constitutionalists to agree with the monarchists, then he is ready to read the constitutional petition of the nobles before Anna Ivanovna. MN Pokrovsky saw in these vacillations even the inability to "distinguish constitutional monarchy from absolute." But the document by which Tatishchev's views are usually judged is still a "concordant reasoning", that is, the collective opinion of a certain group of the nobility. Tatishchev hesitated both subjectively - the ideal form of government for Russia had not been thought out by him earlier - and objectively, as a member of a certain social stratum. It is known that already on January 23, that is, just a few days after the death of Peter II, Tatishchev searched for and "read with someone" materials related to the Swedish form of government, and promised to "willingly pay" the Swedish ambassador for finding various rikstag decrees. He was clearly among the pioneers of constitutionalism, at least until (of course, unexpectedly for him) the choice of the supreme leaders was not determined: Anna Ivanovna, with whose birth his "service" at court once began.

For correct understanding Tatishchev's real views should also take into account one more circumstance to which the Soviet historian GA Protasov recently drew attention. The note was drawn up after the events, when the autocracy triumphed and Tatishchev, perhaps, had to make excuses to someone from Anna's entourage. So, on historical background leading to the essence of the question, the influence of one of the sermons of Feofan Prokopovich, recorded in 1734, is felt. Prokopovich gave a peculiar scheme of Russian history, from which it followed that Russia was always strengthened by the autocracy and fell into decay due to its weakening.

The year 1734 may have been the time when Tatishchev was required to provide a "voucher" document, which will be discussed below. Later, in 1743, he would send this document along with others to the ruling Senate, which would cause extreme irritation to its high members, many of whom were themselves, to one degree or another, participants in the events of 1730. And shortly before his death, at the request of Schumacher, he sent copies of them to the Academy of Sciences, thanks to which they have survived to our time.

The history of the note explains both its complex structure, and internal contradictions, and some discrepancy with the original noble projects preserved in the archives. Tatishchev, as it were, combines his reasoning with the actual course of events and projects that were subject to discussion. It contains both what was actually proposed in the course of heated debates, and what he directed and explained already retroactively.

The note, as noted, is opened by an extensive historical part. Tatishchev condemns the leaders for violating the traditional procedure for electing a monarch in the event of the suppression of the dynasty. He believes that there have already been three elections earlier: Boris Godunov, Vasily Shuisky and Mikhail Romanov. Two of them cannot serve as an example: "They were chosen out of order: in the first there was coercion, in the second deceit." "And according to a natural law," Tatishchev explains, "the election must be the consent of all subjects, some personally, others through attorneys, as such an order has been approved in many states."

"Natural law" and "natural law" are theories that are emerging in Europe under the conditions of the formation of the bourgeois order. Tatishchev expressed his understanding of them with the greatest completeness in the "Conversation ..." considered below. Here he concerns the political section of natural law theories, according to which human nature determined and state structure: separate individuals by means of a "social contract" were united into a single organism.

In theories of "social contract", following Aristotle, three forms of government were usually considered: monarchy, aristocracy, democracy. But if, for example, Feofan Prokopovich decisively and unambiguously decided the issue in favor of unlimited monarchy, then Tatishchev's reasoning is much less definite. Tatishchev notes the need to take into account the position of this or that country: "Each region chooses, considering the position of the place, the space of ownership, and not every one is suitable everywhere, or each government can be useful."

It is noteworthy that Tatishchev considered democracy to be the ideal form of government. But he believed that it was feasible only "in the only towns or in very close areas, where all the owners of the houses could soon gather ... but in a great area it is already very inconvenient." Democracy is thought of by Tatishchev as an opportunity to discuss all issues at a general meeting of citizens. He combines representative democracy with an aristocratic form of government. This stemmed, of course, not from the fact that he was not aware of the difference between representative democracy and real aristocracy, characteristic at least for Sweden at that time. It is just that representative democracy in his understanding in practice could be realized precisely in the form of aristocracy.

The very term "aristocracy" Tatishchev explains by specifying: "or the elected government." “Chosen” in this case, too, has a twofold nature: enjoying the right by position or elected to office. In other words, the principles of election could be different. But even if the election was "popular", it would be "aristocracy", the rule of the "elect".

Representative (aristocratic) government is inferior to "democratic", but it is still better than monarchical. Unfortunately, it is also not possible everywhere. It is applicable only "in the regions, although from a few cities consisting of, but from the attacks of the enemy, safe, somehow on the islands, etc., and especially if the people are enlightened by teaching and the laws are to be kept without coercion, - there is not such a sharp look and cruel fear required ".

Thus, the unconditional preference of a representative form of government is recognized for Scandinavia, England and some other states, in the conditions of the 18th century, sufficiently reliably protected from external threats. This form would be desirable for other states as well, if their population is sufficiently enlightened, accustomed to following the laws without constant reminders and coercion. Like Artemy Petrovich Volynsky, Tatishchev in Russia did not see this last condition. The lack of education in the presence of a constant external threat, according to Tatishchev, left no choice. The monarchy does not contain anything good in its essence. She carries with her only "cruel fear." But the geographic and political conditions of Russia oblige to put up with this as a relatively lesser evil.

Tatishchev's considerations are obviously not without foundation. Later Engels also the presence or absence of royal power in the countries of medieval Europe, he made him dependent mainly on foreign policy circumstances. In Germany, for example, a strong centralized state did not emerge precisely because there was no need for it, since it was "spared from invasions for a long time." (K. Marx, F. Engels Soch., Vol. 21, p. 418.) K. Marx also linked "centralized despotism" in Russia with the conditions of its internal social system, "vast expanse of territory" and "the political destinies experienced by Russia since the Mongol invasion." (Ibid., Vol. 19, p. 405-406.)

"Great and vast states, envious for many neighbors", according to Tatishchev, cannot resist a democratic or aristocratic form of government, "especially where the people are dissatisfied with the teachings of enlightened, and for fear, and not out of good behavior, or knowledge of the benefits and harms, the law store ". For such states "nothing else but autocracy or autocracy is necessary." Political everyday life, Tatishchev believed, provided examples of the successful operation of any of these systems. "Holland, Switzerland, Genoa, etc., are pretty much ruled by democracy and are called republics." The aristocratic form was successfully implemented in Venice. German empire and Poland is ruled by monarchs along with the aristocracy. "England and Sweden of all three consist, as in England the lower parliament or chamber, in Sweden the Diet - represent the general people; the upper parliament, and in Sweden the Senate - the aristocracy."

Tatishchev also confirms the dependence of forms of government on external circumstances with examples from world history. So, "Rome, before the emperors, ruled by aristocracy and democracy, and in the event of a serious war, elected a dictator and gave him complete autocracy." "In a difficult state", the Netherlands and England are resorting to similar measures. "From this we see," concludes Tatishchev, "that since ancient times, the established republics in dangerous and difficult cases introduce a monarchy, albeit temporarily."

Tatishchev puts Russia's conditions on a par with France, Spain, Turkey, Persia, India and China, which "like great states, cannot rule otherwise than by autocracy."

The expediency of autocracy for Russia Tatishchev confirms it historical experience... In this regard, he gives his first outline of Russian history, starting from the Scythians, who already had "autocratic sovereigns". Then the period of "autocracy" is determined by the time from Rurik to Mstislav the Great (son of Vladimir Monomakh), that is, from the second half of the 9th century to 1132. As a result, over 250 years "our state has spread everywhere."

Feudal fragmentation led to the fact that the Tatars seized power over the Russian lands, and some of the possessions of Russia fell under the rule of Lithuania. Only Ivan III "paki restored the monarchy, and, having strengthened, not only overthrew the Tatar power, but many lands from them and Lithuania, ovo himself, ovo his son, returned. And so the state acquired its former honor and security, which lasted until Godunov's death ".

Tatishchev explains the devastation of the Time of Troubles by the fact that Vasily Shuisky was forced to give the boyars "a record with which they took all the power from the sovereign, and stole it for themselves, just like now." As a result, the Swedes and Poles "rejected and seized many of the ancient Russian borders." True, the accession of Mikhail Romanov was somewhat out of this scheme. Although his "election was decently popular, but with the same record, through which he could not do anything, but he was glad to be at peace." In this case, the tsar himself seems to be most pleased with the limitation of autocracy. And Tatishchev has no reason to consider this restriction inappropriate.

The restoration of autocracy by Alexei Mikhailovich Tatishchev explains that the tsar got the opportunity to control the army during the Russian-Polish war. He believed that it was thanks to this that victories in the war were won and they would have been even greater if not for the opposition of the "power-hungry Nikon." The triumph of autocracy and the corresponding successes under Peter the Great "the whole world can bear witness."

Apparently, Tatishchev stated something similar in the discussions of January - February 1730. But opposite opinions were put forward in the disputes: "an autocratic government is very difficult," since "it is not safe to give a single person power over the entire people." The danger is also threatened because the king, "no matter how wise, just, meek and diligent he was, sinless and in everything cannot be sufficient." If the monarch "gives vent to his passions," then innocent people suffer from violence. Another threat comes from the fact that the name of the monarch is ruled by temporary workers, and the temporary worker "out of envy" can rage even more, "especially if he is a suburb or a foreigner, then especially the noble and deserving of the state he hates, persecutes and ruins, and collects his own insatiable estates." And finally, the third - "a secret office invented by the fierce Tsar Ivan Vasilyevich" (that is, the Preobrazhensky order of detective affairs), which is shameful in the face of other peoples and ruinous for the state.

Tatishchev considers all the above considerations to be solid. But, in his opinion, they do not overlap the positive role of the monarchy for countries such as Russia. He proceeds from the premise that the monarch "has no reason to ruin his homeland to use his mind, but even more desires for his children to maintain and increase in good order." Therefore, the sovereign is interested in the selection of advisers "from people who are prudent, skillful and diligent." But Tatishchev has no objections to the argument about the danger of the accession of the monarch, who "neither himself understands the benefit, nor does he accept the advice of the wise and does harm". Having left the reliable soil of "natural law", Tatishchev is forced to rely on humility: since the possibility of an inadvertent monarch's accession cannot be prevented, it remains "to accept God's punishment." Tatishchev teased the alleged interlocutors by comparing them with a very common everyday picture: if one gentry "madly" ruins his house, "for that purpose, all the gentry will take away the will in government, put it on the slaves, knowing that no one will approve this." The republican consciousness of Tatishchev's interlocutors, of course, did not extend to the serf peasantry. But his argument could be turned in the opposite direction: not only absolute monarchy is unreasonable, but also the serf system.

Tatishchev also admits the danger of the temporary workers: "From these sometimes the state suffers a lot of troubles." The "frantic temporary workers" inflicted great harm on Russia. Skuratov and Basmanov under Ivan the Terrible, Miloslavsky under Fedor Alekseevich, Menshikov and Tolstoy in recent times. But they seem to be balanced by the "prudent and faithful": Mstislavsky at Grozny, Morozov and Streshnev at Alexei Mikhailovich, Tricky and Yazykov at Fedor Alekseevich, Golitsyn at Sophia. These temporary workers "deserved eternal thanksgiving, although some, out of the hatred of others, ended their lives in misfortune." In the republics, the situation with temporary workers is also no better and may become even more dangerous than in monarchies.

The secret office does not paint the state, of course. But this business, Tatishchev believed, is not new, since it appeared under the Roman emperor Augustus or Tiberius. She even, "if only a pious person is guaranteed, it is not harmful at all, but the malicious and wicked, did not enjoy it for long, they themselves disappear." The point, therefore, is only in who is in charge of the Secret Chancellery. Tatishchev, however, does not explain how to prevent the possibility of entrusting her to the "malicious and wicked."

Having given such a theoretical background on the expediency of autocracy in Russia, Tatishchev then proceeds to "the present." And it turns out that he has ideas about ways to limit autocratic arbitrariness. Tatishchev emphasizes that no one objects to the candidacy of the supreme leaders and that the question of how to elect the monarch can only relate to the future. Satisfied Tatishchev is also "wisdom, good manners and a decent government in Courland", shown by Anna Ivanovna. But he proposes an actual limitation of her autocracy, although he puts this proposal in a very intricate form: the empress "as a female person, is inconvenient for so many works, moreover, she lacks knowledge of the laws, for that time, until the Almighty is a man the table bestows, something is needed to help her majesty re-establish. "

To help the "female person", it was proposed to unite the Supreme Privy Council and the Senate, bringing their number to 21 people, who will serve in three shifts of seven people. "Affairs of internal economy" was to be in charge of "another government". It was elected in the number of one hundred people and also participated in the management of shifts in the third of the year, so as not to launch their own estates. Three times a year or in emergency situations, all "one hundred persons" come to the meeting. The "general meeting" should not last "more than a month".

They are elected to senior positions for life. But the election to the "fallen" seats, carried out by both governments, provided for the nomination of several candidates and the conduct of two rounds of voting: first, three candidates are selected, and then one, the most worthy one. Voting must be secret. "Through this method," says Tatishchev, "it is possible in all reigns to have people worthy, in spite of their aristocracy, in which many unfit for ranks are produced." If the empress does not like this path, Tatishchev is ready to give in: to allow the empress to choose one of the three previously elected candidates.

Tatishchev is not inclined to give the discretion of the monarch and the legislative power, although, again, the limitation of autocracy is seen as an aid. Tatishchev poses the question: what is the task of the sovereign? And he answers: in "common good and fairness." The Empress herself, of course, will not write laws. She will entrust this matter to someone. And it is here that "the danger is considerable, so that someone, at the whim of something obscene and rightfulness who disagrees, or even more harmful, does not bring in." Even "Peter the Great, although he was a wise sovereign, saw a lot in his laws that needed to be changed." Therefore, he ordered "to collect all these, consider and re-compose." In order to prevent disorder in the legislation, "it is better to consider it before publishing than to change it, which does not agree with the honor of the monarch. Ill-considered legislation, therefore, is a reproach to the monarch, and in order to avoid this, the monarch must be prudent.

Since it is impossible for one person to compose any successful law, it is necessary to involve a sufficiently wide circle in its discussion. statesmen... Previously, it should be discussed in the collegiums, then in the "higher government". The Empress will have to approve an elaborate bill.

Tatishchev leaves the secret office. But "look at justice" must be two people, selected by the Senate. Thus, the most odious organ of the monarchy, with the help of which the autocrats dealt with their personal opponents, must be neutralized.

In Tatishchev's project, elected bodies are made up of the nobility. The promoted candidates of the Petrine era, who received the nobility with the achievement of the corresponding rank of the Table of Ranks, were recorded in a "special book". True, the recording was made only so that "the true gentry was known." This division did not directly affect the economic and political position of the new nobility. But it was still a concession to the "breed" principle. It is only unclear whether this position reflected the attitude to the question of Tatishchev himself, or whether he yielded to the insistence of his colleagues, on whose behalf he spoke in this case.

Like other noble projects, Tatishchevsky assumed the opening of special schools for the nobility with the aim of directing them into officers. The service has so far been lifelong. The project involved enrollment in the service from the age of eighteen and limiting it to twenty years.

About the merchants it is said not very definitely: "one can dismiss from the standstills and save them from oppression, but give a way to multiply manufactories and trades." Considering that the project was discussed in large meetings, it is possible to understand such an indefinite formula "coliko is possible." The nobility as a whole went to meet the merchants only to the point where their immediate interests did not suffer.

The counter considerations about the expediency of the republic, reproduced by Tatishchev, are very curious. It is even difficult to imagine who could come up with republican ideas at that time. In any case, there is no hint of such far-reaching thoughts in any of the noble projects. Organization question supreme power it was not even considered in them: the nobles equally agreed with the autocracy and with its limitation. But Tatishchev will have these questions again and again, and it is possible that he was arguing with himself, perhaps using Feofan Prokopovich's answers to his own doubts.

A different text of the draft was submitted to the Supreme Privy Council from the most significant group of the nobility than the one that Tatishchev presented from memory. So, in it, in addition to the "upper government" of 21 people, the Senate was retained in the amount of 11 people, and one hundred people participated in the elections of the highest government positions. This document, along with copies, was signed by over three hundred people, including A. M. Cherkassky, Ivan Pleshcheev, Platon Musin-Pushkin, A. K. Zybin. Among the signatories was Tatishchev.

The leaders were not at all going to persist on the issue of the size of the "upper government", as well as on the issue of its name. They were ready to replenish the number of members of the council to twelve people or more, that is, practically expand it at the expense of the Senate, which had eight members in 1730, or at the expense of newly elected ones. But now they already considered themselves bound by the proposals of the February 2 meeting. For the final solution of the issues raised in the noble projects, they were again going to receive the authorization of the empress and, on her behalf, declare their agreement with the basic wishes of the nobles. Not knowing and, apparently, not knowing about this, the nobles began to show impatience and anxiety. They began to think that the leaders want to decide important questions behind their back. Under these conditions, they seek to be received by the Empress.

While Anna Ivanovna was moving with her motorcade from Mitava towards Moscow, the adherents of the autocracy kept in the shadows and acted secretly. The autocratic party in Moscow was by no means omnipotent. But as the empress approached and relations with her were established, the monarchists raised their heads more and more. At the head of the autocratic party were three Russified foreigners: Andrei Ivanovich Osterman, Feofan Prokopovich and Antioch Kantemir.

In essence, a foreigner in Russia, if he aspired to power, had no choice. "Russian noblemen serve the state, German - us" - this is how a century later Nicholas I assessed the situation, thus cynically recognizing the discrepancy between the interests of the autocracy and those of the state, and the purely selfish nature of the mutual love of autocrats with foreigners. Osterman, who dictated "calmness" in drawing up the Conditions, did not hope, of course, to stay on the surface if a gentry republic suddenly took root in Russia. From the hands of Peter received such a high position and Feofan Prokopovich - the author of a treatise in defense of unlimited autocracy. Kantemir, on occasion, could himself become a monarch in his father's homeland.

The autocracy was also supported by Peter's nominees, who feared for the not always righteous elevation achieved. There were also offended ones. Golovkin's son-in-law, Yaguzhinsky, on the night of January 19, shouted about the need to "add more will." But many of the leaders could not hide their contempt for this hypocritical and thieving upstart. And Yaguzhinsky is in a hurry to warn Anna about the plans of the leaders.

Former Chancellor Golovkin also supported the autocracy. Golovkin and Osterman now and then felt sick. When DM Golitsyn decided to visit the "sick" Osterman, it turned out that he was more active than ever.

The very cooperation of the Golitsyns and Dolgoruky was rather difficult. The two titled families had little confidence in each other. Apparently, only D. M. Golitsyn and V. L. Dolgoruky were genuinely interested in the success of the case. Both tried to somehow expand the circle of adherents of the constitutional party. But Golitsyn, apparently, was simply late. He either did not have time to enter into an agreement with A. M. Cherkassky's entourage, or he could not because of the opposition of other members of the council. In any case, the appeal to Anna Ivanovna followed precisely from this group of nobles, and they complained about the reluctance of the Supreme Privy Council to consider their application.

A. M. Cherkassky was not distinguished by his statesmanship, or firmness of character, or clarity of political goals. But on his side were a rich family tree and no less rich estates, which he attracted to his house representatives of the nobility, usually also titled and also politically inactive.

On the eve of Anna Ivanovna's arrival, excitement in Moscow reached its highest point. Monarchists now gather in different houses more or less openly. On February 23, a meeting was held at the house of Lieutenant General Baryatinsky. At this meeting, the leaders were again condemned for not wanting to satisfy the demands of the nobility. The hesitants were persuaded that only the autocracy could do this. Tatishchev was instructed to bring the opinion of Baryatinsky's group to the attention of the generals and the higher nobility who had gathered at Cherkassky. As a result, a joint petition was worked out, written by Cantemir. Praskovya Yuryevna Saltykova, wife of Anna's cousin, Semyon Andreyevich Saltykov, and sister of Golovkin, was informed about this. Praskovya participated in various meetings and brought everything to the attention of the Empress.

Tatishchev, apparently, somewhat one-sidedly outlined the essence of the repeated noble meetings on February 23 and 24. And his own position was not consistent. There are indications that S. A. Saltykov encouraged him to write the project. Saltykov and his wife resolutely adhered to the line on the restoration of autocracy, although he was among the signatories of the Tatishchev project. Tatishchev, on the other hand, willingly discussed controversial issues with both monarchists and constitutionalists. This kind of hesitation is characteristic of many other leaders of the nobility. Very often, in the same family, a father and a son or two brothers ended up in different companies: just in case - who will take it.

On February 25, a group of nobles, including Cherkassky, who had just joined them, Field Marshal Trubetskoy and Tatishchev, managed to infiltrate the palace. Trubetskoy, as a senior in rank, was supposed to read the petition. But since he stuttered, Tatishchev read it expressively and loudly.

The petition, read by Tatishchev, did not at all testify to the desire of the nobility to return to an autocratic form of government. It expressed gratitude for the fact that Anna "deigned to sign the points." "Immortal thanksgiving" was promised to Anna and from posterity. The nobles were not satisfied only with the fact that such a useful undertaking was carried out secretly by the Supreme Privy Council. In order to dispel the "confusion", the petitioners asked for the convocation of something like a constituent assembly from the generals, officers and gentry, one or two people from a family name, to decide the question of the form of government.

Anna was aware of the intention of the supporters of the restoration of autocracy. She obviously considered Tatishchev among them. But the text of the petition was so unexpected for her that she was ready to reject it. Anna was advised to sign the petition by her older sister Ekaterina. How she was guided in this - it's hard to say. The relationship between the three sisters was far from idyllic. Anna did not like her sisters, especially Catherine, who was distinguished by both great intelligence and more energy than Anna. But Anna was afraid of her and therefore obeyed. After breaking up with her husband, the Duke of Mecklenburg, Catherine lived in her Izmailovsky Palace. Anna's choice could not but hurt her. Still, she was both older and more capable of conducting state affairs than Anna. Advising Anna to sign a new document, she hoped not so much to strengthen Anna's position in the course of the shake-ups inevitable after such a turn of the matter, but to return to the initial lines, when her own name would also be among the candidates for the royal table.

No serious "hush-up", however, happened. The guards officers immediately raised a fuss and expressed a desire to lay the heads of all the "villains" at the feet of the autocratic empress. The constitutionalists had no choice but to join another petition, read this time by Cantemir. In this petition, however, following the request to accept "autocracy", there were expressed the wishes to allow the nobility to take part in the elections of the highest positions and "to establish the form of government of the state for the times to come." But the first thesis has already crossed out all the subsequent ones. Those who hoped to combine autocracy with the principles of representative government and the rule of law could immediately become convinced that their hopes were unrealizable. Anna ordered to break the Condition in front of the leaders and other high-ranking officials, accusing Vasily Lukich that he had tricked her into signing them earlier. There could be no question of any appeal on her part to the noble "nation".

A political experiment, unique in the history of Russia, has ended: the five-week period of the constitutional monarchy. Delight and glee were now poured out by those who, in the words of Artemy Volynsky, were filled with "cowardice and boorishness." They branded the instigators of the plan for the political reorganization of society that was contrary to God and the usual course of affairs. And even Tatishchev, in his confused note, seeks to combine constitutional sentiments with autocracy, arguing that for an unenlightened Russia it is acceptable to do exactly what in a decent society would have to be resolutely rejected as something inappropriate and unworthy of human nature. Dolgoruky also trembled. They were ready to get ahead of the monarchists with the presentation of complete autocracy to Anna. And it seems that only Dmitry Golitsyn did not retreat from the position he once occupied. "The feast was ready," he said after the events of February 25. "But the guests were unworthy of him. I know that trouble will fall on my head. May I suffer for the fatherland. I am old, and death does not frighten me. But those who hope enjoy my suffering, suffer even more. " It was a prophetic view of the coming Bironovism.

Tatishchev Vasily Nikitich ( 1686-1750) came from a noble but impoverished noble family, studied at the Peter's artillery and engineering school. In 1713-1714. continued his studies in Berlin, Breslau and Dresden. Participated in the military campaigns of Peter, in particular in the Battle of Poltava. He served in the Berg and Manufacturing Collegiums. In 20-30 years, with short interruptions, he managed state-owned factories in the Urals (founded Yekaterinburg). In 1721, on his initiative, mining schools in the Urals were opened. In 1724-1726 he was in Sweden, where he supervised the training of Russian young people in mining, studied economics and finance. Upon his return, he was appointed a member, then the head of the Mint (1727-1733). In 1741-45 he was the governor of Astrakhan. After retirement, he moved to his estate near Moscow and did not leave it until his death.

VN Tatishchev is the author of essays on geography, ethnography, history, including the first generalizing work on Russian history "Russian history from the most ancient times." Other works: "Russian Lexicon" (up to the word "klyuchnik"), "Brief economic notes to the village", the Code of Law of 1550 was published with its notes.

One of the important educational achievements of Tatishchev was a new understanding of man. He declared about the "inviolability of man", trying to substantiate this position with the help of the theory of "natural law", of which he was an adherent. According to Tatishchev, freedom is the greatest blessing for a person. Due to various circumstances, a person cannot use it rationally, therefore a "bondage bridle" must be imposed on him. "Bondage", as the scientist believed, is inherent in man either by "nature", or "of his own free will", or "by compulsion." The servitude of a person is evil, which Tatishchev compared with sin, and in itself it acted "against the Christian law" (Tatishchev 1979: 387). In fact, Tatishchev was the only Russian thinker of the first half of the 18th century who raised the question of a person's personal freedom. For him, this issue was solved, first of all, in connection with the serfdom that existed at that time. Tatishchev did not speak out, openly against its cancellation, but in his works this idea can be clearly traced. This idea can be reached through a consistent analysis of not only the statements of the researcher that "the will by nature is only necessary and useful to man," but also the independent conclusions of the scientist that arose in the course of characterizing the socio-economic development of Russia. Tatishchev made a comparison with other states, for example, with Ancient Egypt, thereby showing what benefit a country can receive when the peasants are freed from any dependence (Tatishchev 1979: 121). The question of personal freedom was also decided by the scientist from the point of view of the theory of "natural law".

The concept of serfdom, proposed by Tatishchev, is as follows: serfdom is the unshakable basis of the system that existed at that time, but as a phenomenon it has a historical character. Its establishment is the result of a contract, but, according to Tatishchev, the contract should not apply to the children of those who agreed, therefore, serfdom is not eternal. Therefore, the existence of serfdom in Russia is illegal. Despite such conclusions, Tatishchev did not consider it possible to abolish serfdom in contemporary Russia. In the distant future, this should happen, but only after a discussion, during which the most reasonable decision on the issue of abolishing serfdom will be worked out.

Dwelling on the peasant question, Tatishchev paid special attention to the problem of fugitives in the Ural region. Finding that the flight of peasants, mainly Old Believers, was widespread, he proposed using their labor at the mining enterprises of the Urals. Repeatedly pointing out the shortage of workers, Tatishchev sought opportunities to attract various categories of the population to work at enterprises, including those who came freely, thereby proving the need to free the peasants from serfdom and the benefits of free hired labor. The scientist spoke in favor of organizing almshouses for people who have worked at the plant for a long time, which once again emphasizes his concern for a person as a worker.

Taking part in the political events of 1730, Tatishchev, albeit in a veiled form, nevertheless spoke in favor of limiting the monarchy. Submitting in 1743 the note "Arbitrary and Consensual Reasoning." to the Senate, he, without knowing it, in the opinion of G.V. Plekhanov, “writes a constitutional draft” (Plekhanov 1925: 77). The main thing that Tatishchev stood for was a strong executive power, which should consist not only of the monarch, but also of the bodies that help him in governing the state. Proposing to elect "another government", the scientist determined such principles of their organization, which may be acceptable in modern Russia: lack of parochialism in obtaining positions, reduction of funds for the maintenance of the apparatus, legal elections and more.

In his works, Tatishchev also carried out the class division of Russian society. The main attention was paid to them to the nobility, as the most progressive stratum in the country. The researcher especially singled out the trading layer - merchants and artisans. He not only defined their duties, but also repeatedly emphasized that the state should take care of them, since thanks to their activities there was a constant replenishment of the treasury, and, consequently, an increase in the country's income.

Speaking about lawmaking, the scientist expressed a number of wishes that related to the creation of a code of laws. These wishes are aimed, first of all, at ensuring that in Russia all aspects of the life of society are regulated by legislative acts, which means that relations between all members of society and the state should be based on an agreement, which should not be an oral, but a written agreement.

The integrity of Tatishchev's worldview is determined by such components as rationalism, free-thinking, departure from providentialism, independence and independence of judgments, religious tolerance, work for the benefit of the state, care for people, the development of secular sciences and education. Despite this, there are also contradictions in the views of the scientist. This was manifested in his attitude to the Academy of Sciences, statements regarding serfdom and the preservation of privileges for the nobility, while determining the position of other estates in Russia.

Tatishchev was a man who anticipated his time. He did not see in Russia that social force on which one can rely in carrying out reforms aimed at capitalizing Russian society. Trying on the experience of countries Western Europe to Russia, the researcher understood the futility of his ideas, which could not be fully implemented. The state itself interfered with the implementation of Tatishchev's plans. Despite the fact that in Russia, thanks to the efforts and reforms of Peter I, there were serious shifts in the social, economic, political and spiritual fields, a large number of them did not meet with support among the population. The scientist saw that in Russia there was no force that could be relied on when carrying out reforms in the state. Therefore, he counted on the support of the nobility, the conservative, but at the same time the most educated class of Russian society, capable of influencing the further accelerated development of Russia. Catherine II faced similar difficulties during her reign. This state of affairs, from our point of view, only shows the complexity in the development of Russia in the first half of the 18th century, and by no means the absence in the state of thinkers who were the spokesmen for educational ideas. Such a thinker, in whose worldview it was quite clearly traced specific traits enlightenment, and was Vasily Nikitich Tatishchev.

The last message of IK Kirilov refers to December 1736. In it, he promises to send new maps this winter, which he did in February 1737 through V. Kupriyanov.

On April 14, 1737 IK Kirilov passed away. So, until the last hour, he served in Russian cartography.

It is necessary to note also the works of IK Kirilov on the history and ethnography of Bashkiria. It turns out that he sent notes to Academician Miller, and in the portfolio of the latter were found: “Izvestiya gg. Kirilov and Heinzelman about Siberian and other Asian peoples ”(8 notebooks). Further, it is known that IK Kirilov, together with Heinzelman, composed "The General Genealogy of the Tatar Khans from ancient history and Arab chronicles, until they have contiguity with the ancient times of Russia."

Thus, IK Kirilov, leading a difficult campaign, was engaged in extensive scientific activities.

IK Kirilov was the first to begin geodetic survey of Russian territory; published the first atlas of the Russian Empire, compiled the first economic and geographical description of Russia. He was the first to begin the study of the Southern Urals in scientific terms, built the city of Orenburg and a number of other cities, laid the foundation for mining.

His geographic enthusiasm, undoubtedly, had a huge impact on those around him, and, in any case, I.K.Kirilov was the first to shed a spark of love for geography into the soul young Peter Rychkov, an outstanding geographer of the next generation.

The geographical activity of IK Kirilov was distinguished by the breadth of ideas and unyielding decisiveness, energy and courage of execution. He was a man of great initiative, intelligence, talent, completely devoted to Russian science, passionately loving his Great Motherland.

Genin, a major specialist in mining and the head of the Olonets factories, was instructed to go to the Urals, establish factory production there and conduct an investigation into the case of V.N.Tatishchev. VN Tatishchev also went with Genin to the Urals for a confrontation with Demidov.

The problems of Russian history and Russian historiography, of course, could not pass by the attention of a person who, in the words of A.S. Pushkin, was himself world history... Peter I certainly wished to have a full-fledged "History of Russia", corresponding to the modern level of scientific knowledge. For its compilation, several Russian scribes were planted in turn. However, the matter somehow did not work out - the task was not up to the domestic Herodotus and Thucydides, whose mental abilities their short-range descendant described in one expressive line: "He is immature, the fruit of a short-lived science." In the end, the tsar had to turn for Russian history in the same place where he was accustomed to turn for everything else - to Europe. A year before his death, on February 28, 1724, Peter I signed a decree that read: "To establish an academy in which they would study languages, as well as other sciences and noble arts, and translate books."

Not even a decade and a half has passed since the death of Peter, as Russia received a full-fledged historical work. And the most remarkable thing was that the Academy with its visiting multi-scientific adjuncts and assistant professors had nothing to do with this. The initiative in this matter and the bulk of the work was undertaken by one person, who, moreover, has no direct relation to historical science. His name was Vasily Nikitich Tatishchev. He, in all fairness, can be considered the father of Russian historiography.

Tatishchev is interesting not only as a historian, but also as a type of practical figure, brought up in the huge Peter's workshop. According to the apt definition of Klyuchevsky, he is an example of a person "imbued with the spirit of reform, assimilating its best aspirations and serving the fatherland well, and yet not receiving any extraordinary talents from nature, a person who did not rise far above the level of ordinary average people." His figure reveals a number of brilliant amateurs of Russian science and culture of the 18th century.

In 1704, eighteen years of age, Tatishchev decided to join the army as an artilleryman. In Petrovskoe time, a person rarely finished his service where he began. Over the forty years of his career, Tatishchev was a mining engineer, manager of the coin business in Moscow and the Astrakhan governor. Having retired from business in 1745, until his death (1750) he lived in his estate near Moscow - the village of Boldino. All this time he was on trial on charges of extortion. The acquittal was passed a few days before his death.

Being engaged in mining, Tatishchev collected geographical information about the areas where it was supposed to develop ore deposits or build factories. Russian geography, along the natural flow of thoughts, carried him away to Russian history. Gradually, the collection and study of ancient Russian monuments, written and material, turned into a true passion for him. Tatishchev became probably the most prominent reader of the then Russia. He did not miss a single Russian and foreign history book and commissioned extracts and translations from Latin and Greek authors. Later he confessed that, starting to write his "History", he had more than a thousand books at hand.

Tatishchev perfectly understood the importance of foreign sources for the ancient history of Russia and skillfully used them. But over time, it was not they who gave special value to his work, but a unique ancient Russian monument, of which we have a concept only thanks to Tatishchev's extensive extracts from it. This is the Joachim Chronicle attributed to the Novgorod saint, Bishop Joachim of Korsunian, a contemporary of Prince Vladimir I Svyatoslavich. It was known to Tatishchev from a late list of the middle of the 17th century, but it retained an ancient Slavic legend that did not appear in other chronicle vaults. Familiarization with it led Tatishchev to the conclusion that "Nestor the chronicler was not very good at knowing about the first princes of Russia."

In fact, who was not embarrassed by this sudden beginning of Russian history, dated in the "Tale of Bygone Years" in 859: "Imakh is a tribute to the Varyaz in Slovenes"? Why "imahu", since when does "imahu" - all these questions hang in the air. Following the Varangians, Rurik with his brothers and Russia appears on the historical stage, like a "god from a machine" in an ancient Greek tragedy. According to the Joachim Chronicle, it turns out that Nestor begins at the end of a very long and very intriguing story.

In time immemorial, the prince Sloven lived in Illyria with his people - the Slovenes. Having once removed from his homes, he took the Slovenian to the north, where he founded the Great City. Sloven became the founder of a dynasty, which at the time of Rurik's calling consisted of 14 generations of princes. Under Prince Burivoe, Rurik's great-grandfather, the Slovenes entered a long war with the Vikings. Having suffered a heavy defeat on the river Kyumeni, which for centuries served as the border between Novgorod and Finnish lands, Burivoi fled from the Great City, whose inhabitants became Varangian tributaries.

But the Vikings did not possess the Great City for long. Weighed down by the tribute imposed on them, the Slovene asked Burivoi for his son Gostomysl as princes. When he appeared, the Slovenes revolted and drove out the Vikings.

During the long and glorious reign of Gostomysl, peace and order were established on the Slovenian land. But by the end of his life, the Great City was again threatened by internal troubles and external danger, for Gostomysl did not have an heir: his four sons died in wars, and he married his three daughters to neighboring princes. Alarmed by heavy thoughts, Gostomysl turned to the wise men in Kolmogard for advice. They prophesied that the prince of his blood would inherit him. Gostomysl did not believe the prediction: he was so old that his wives no longer bore him children. But soon he had a wonderful dream. He saw that a great and fruitful tree had grown out of the womb of his middle daughter Umila; it covered the entire Great City under its crown, and all the people of this land were satisfied from its fruits. Waking up, Gostomysl called the Magi to interpret his dream, and heard from them that Umila would give birth to his heir.

Gostomysl's doubts about this, however, did not subside. After all, he already had a grandson from his eldest daughter, and if the question arose about the transfer of inheritance through the female line, it was natural to offer the princely table to him, and not to his younger brother. Gostomysl nevertheless decided to rely on the will of the gods and told the people about his prophetic dream. But many Slovenes did not believe him and did not want to forget about the rights of their eldest grandson. The death of Gostomysl caused civil strife. And only after taking a dare, the Slovene remembered the Gostomyslov dream and invited the son of Umila, Rurik, to reign.

In presenting his understanding of the Varangian question, Tatishchev relied on previous experiences of Russian history - Synopsis (published in 1674) and. Following the spirit of the first, he gave the calling of princes a natural character - the Slavs called not a stranger, but the grandson of their prince. From Bayer, Tatishchev borrowed the critical method of dealing with sources and the very formulation of the problem: the ethnicity of the Varangians-Rus and their place of residence. But after entering the area of ​​ancient Russian history under the leadership of Synopsis and Bayer, Tatishchev then acted independently. He did not go to find the homeland of the first Russian princes either to Prussia or to Scandinavia. The Varangian (Russian) husband of Umila was, in his opinion, a Finnish prince. To prove his words, Tatishchev cited a lot of historical and philological evidence of the long-standing existence of the root "rus" in the toponymy of Finland and the southeastern Baltic. And yet, Bayer's shadow hovers over his historical research: the history of the Varangians-Rus in the Doryurik period turned out to be in Tatishchev’s in no way connected with the history of the Slavs. No wonder Klyuchevsky called him a Russian historiographer who clings to the ever-rushing European thought.

Tatishchev's work fell under an even heavier trial than the one that persecuted him - the trial of history. In 1739, Tatishchev brought the manuscript of his work to St. Petersburg and gave it to his acquaintances and influential persons in the then scientific world for reading, in the hope of positive reviews. However, in his own words, some reviewers blamed him for the lack of philosophical view and eloquence, others were outraged for the encroachment on the reliability of the Nestorov Chronicle. During Tatishchev's lifetime, History was never published.

Shortly after his death, a fire destroyed the Boldin Archives. Only what was in the hands of others survived from Tatishchev's manuscripts. According to these faulty lists, published in 1769-1774, Russian readers got acquainted for the first time with the "History of Russia". In the full and closest to the original form "History" appeared only in 1848.

The attacks on Tatishchev, however, did not stop. The Joachim Chronicle, which he introduced into scientific circulation, was considered for a long time almost a hoax. KN Bestuzhev-Ryumin, expressing the general opinion of historians of the middle of the 19th century, even wrote that Tatishchev should not be cited (although later he revised his views and treated the works of the first Russian historiographer with due respect: “History” of Tatishchev, a monument to many years of conscientious work, erected under the most unfavorable conditions, remained misunderstood and unappreciated for a long time ... Now no scientist doubts Tatishchev's conscientiousness ”). Then the skepticism of historians was transferred to the very information reported by the Joachim Chronicle. But in recent years, historians' confidence in them has increased significantly. Now we can speak of the Joachim Chronicle as a source of paramount importance, especially in the part related to the “Duric” era.

P.S.
Thanks to the daughter of V.N. Tatishchev became the great-great-grandfather of the poet F.I. Tyutchev (on the maternal side).

PASSION FOR TATISHEV

V.V. Fomin

Lipetsk State Pedagogical University Russia, 398020, Lipetsk, st. Lenin, 2 e-mail: [email protected] SPIN: 1914-6761

The article is devoted to the analysis of works that deny the source basis of the unique news contained in the "History of the Russian" by V.N. Tatishchev, and the works of S.N. Azbelev and other scientists. S.N. Azbelev convincingly showed the unfairness of the “skeptical” work of A.P. Tolochko, since there are no convincing arguments in favor of the fact that Tatishchev was a falsifier.

Key words: S.N. Azbelev, historiography, V.N. Tatishchev, chronicles.

DISPUTES OVER TATISHCHEV

Vyacheslav Fomin Lipetsk state pedagogical university 2 Lenin Street, Lipetsk, 398020, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

The article analyzes scholarly works that challenge the source basis of unique data contained in the History of Russia by V.N. Tatishchev and the opposing works of S.N. Azbelev and other scientists. S.N. Azbelev has demonstrated that "skepticism" of A.P. Tolochko is unsubstantiated because no convincing arguments exist that V.N. Tatishchev was a falsifier.

Keywords: S.N. Azbelev, historiography, V.N. Tatishchev, chronicles.

In 2008, Voprosy istorii published my review of the monograph by S.N. Azbelev, whose work has long and fruitfully been working on national history: "Oral history in the monuments of Novgorod and the Novgorod land" (St. Petersburg, 2007). In this work of a prominent specialist in the field of studying sources and Russian history, the material dedicated to the Joachim Chronicle and V.N. Tatishchev, who first published it. Representatives of historical science, however, not only them, are well aware of the hackneyed "song" of skeptics who doubt (deliberately, or by a simple delusion, often passing in the course of professional growth) in literally everything that concerns their native history, and, of course, accusing opponents in

gullibility, about the unreliability of the Joachim Chronicle, tk. it, according to them, is a falsification of Tatishchev himself.

To such a polyphonic collective Thomas the unbeliever, Azbelev gave a very worthy answer in his monograph. As the author of these lines, a researcher, concluded then, “arguing in the best traditions of Russian source study, characteristic of S.M. Solovyova, P.A. Lavrovsky, A.A. Shakhmatova, V.L. Yanin, who opposed the unfounded skepticism of the Joachim Chronicle (Shakhmatov regarded it as an important link in the oldest chronicle) and Tatishchev's accusations of forgery, and emphasizing that the results obtained by Yanin in the course of large-scale archaeological excavations of Novgorod confirm the authenticity of the unique information Joachim's chronicle (first of all, a detailed account of the baptism of Novgorodians, presented by an eyewitness) ... comes to the conclusion that the chronicle is based on oral sources "and that it, being the original text of the first bishop of Novgorod, Joachim (d. 1030), reached Tatishchev in a manuscript XVII century, while not avoiding, "probably, some kind of external influence", which "gives no reason to doubt the reliability of this monument" (see for more details: Fomin 2008: 170).

But our "skeptics", of course, see nothing and hear nothing, therefore there is a need to continue the conversation started by Azbelev. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the first to express their doubts about Tatishchev's consistency as a historian were the Norman Germans who worked at the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences: G.F. Miller and A.L. Schletzer (and the latter expressed polarizing assessments of his work, but sounded the loudest, being aimed at a huge audience - the entire learned and enlightened world early XIX in., - exactly negative). And they expressed it because Tatishchev, firstly, demonstrated brilliant results in studying the past of his homeland and demonstrated it in a generalizing work, and neither Miller nor Schletzer, who considered only themselves to be professional historians, could boast of such results and the presence of such work.

Secondly, their attitude towards Tatishchev was also dictated by the fact that he denied the Normanism of the Varangians in the History of Russia from the Most Ancient Times, as well as in the Chronicle of the Brief Great Tsars of the Rus from Gostomysl to the Ruin of the Tatars. historical, geographical, political and civic "and" Conversation of two friends about the benefits of science and schools ", deduced Rurik" not from Sweden, nor Norway, but from Finland " he was elected according to the behest of Gostomysl from the Varangians of the Rus, according to the circumstances of the Finnish prince "," they took Prince Rurik from the Varangians, or the Finns ... " This explains, interpreting the name “Varangians” in a broad sense, that “the Varangians, according to the chronicler Nesterov, are Swedes and Norwegians; Denmark and Norway were concluded in that ") (Tatishchev 1962: 289-292, 3 72, approx. 17 and 19 on p. 115, approx. 26 on p. 117, approx. 15 on p. 226, approx. 33 on p. 228, approx.

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54 on p. 231, approx. 1 and 6 on p. 307, approx. 28 on p. 309; Tatishchev 1964: 82, 102; Tatishchev 1968: 220, 282; Tatishchev 1979: 96, 205-206).

Miller spoke unflatteringly about the History of Russia, denying it, according to S.L. Peshtich, "scientific merit", in the article "About the first Russian chronicler, the Monk Nestor, about his chronicle, and about the successors of them", published in 1755 in "Monthly works for the benefit and amusement of employees." For, he condescendingly summed up, "whoever reads history only for his own amusement, he will truly be satisfied with these works of his ... and whoever wishes to proceed further, he can cope with Nestor himself and with his successors", i.e. contrasted Tatishchev's work with the annals (however, this article is, as G.N. Moiseeva showed, a reprint of the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters of the "original" edition "of the" History of Russia ", sent to the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, and the official state historiographer, who was it was necessary to compose "the history of the entire Russian Empire", but in more than a third of a century it did not compose it, Tatishchev's opinion "on the significance of the Russian chronicles as historical sources and his conclusion about the" most important "lists of the Nestorov chronicle") also borrowed.

Vasily Nikitich Tatishchev (1686-1750)

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And in 1773 he was genuinely indignant, attributing to the Russians a feeling of national superiority that was completely unusual for them, by the fact that he led the Varangians out of Finland: how could Tatishchev, working on his work for thirty years and having worked through a large number of sources (ancient, Russian) and German historiography , “To cleave to the opinion so insulting for his fellow citizens” (Miller 1996: 6; Miller 2006: 98-99; Pekarsky 1870: 346; Pestich 1965: 218; Moiseeva 1967: 134-136; Moiseeva 1971: 143, 163-164, 171; Fomin 2006: 65-66; Fomin 2010: 236-238). At the same time, we must not forget that in 1768 Miller will begin publishing the work of the great Russian historian. And this fact testifies to the fact that by this time he had grown very professionally, therefore he fully realized his significance for science.

In 1764, in the "Plan of Lessons" (January), presented to the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, A.L. Schletser undertook in three years to "execute" "continuation on German Russian history from the founding of the state to the suppression of the Rurik dynasty, according to Russian chronicles (but without comparing them with foreign writers) with the help of the works of Tatishchev and ... Lomonosov "(this plan will never be realized). And in "Thoughts on the Method of Processing Russian History" (June), sent to the same address, he pledged to begin "reducing the historical works of the late Tatischev in German" (also not done), while saying: "The father of Russian history deserves it, to give him this justice. " The next year, while still in Russia, he proposed to I.I. Taubert to publish "Russian History", stressing again that Tatishchev is "the father of Russian history, and the world should know that the Russian, and not the German, was the first creator full course Russian history "(Schletzer 1875: 289, 321-322; Winter 1960: 188).

However, in 1768, Schletzer, having already moved to Vaterland, in his book "Probe russischer Annalen" ("Experience in the Study of Russian Chronicles") sharply lowered the tone of his discussions about Tatishchev. So, saying that "this scholar, who made a huge contribution to the history of ancient Russia, tells in detail, reliably and critically the annals, manuscripts and successors of Nestor" and that his still unpublished works - "a glorious monument to the author's amazing diligence - will serve Those who are content with only general knowledge about ancient Russian history ", immediately crossed out everything in essence:" However, conscientious, critical. a historian who does not take a single line on faith and requires evidence and proof for every word, there is no use for it. Tatishchev gathered all the news into one heap, without telling which manuscript this or that news was taken from. He chose one of ten lists, keeping silent about the rest, which, perhaps, were incomprehensible to him ... Foreign sources, very valuable for a researcher of Russian history, are completely absent from him: Tatishchev did not understand either the old academic or new languages ​​and was forced to get by translations into Russian. ", and that he also lacked foreign literature(Schlozer 1768: 24, 150-151). But Tatishchev knew Latin, Ancient Greek, German, Polish, was familiar with the Turkic, Finno-Ugric and Romance languages ​​(Kuzmin 1981: 337).

In 1802, in his memoirs and "Nestor", which for a long time became for foreign and domestic researchers As a guide to Old Russian history and its historiography, Schletser finally expressed his negative attitude towards Tatishchev: contemptuously calling him a “clerk” - Schreiber - and saying that “it cannot be said that his work was useless ... although he was completely ignorant , did not know a word of Latin and did not even understand any of the newest languages, excluding German ", and firmly believing that the history of Russia begins only" from the coming of Rurik and the founding of the Russian kingdom ", in the reflections of the Russian historian about the past of Eastern Europe until IX century, most valued by them, saw only "a stupid mixture of Sarmatians, Scythians, Amazons, vandals, etc." ("This is a useless part") or, as he has deigned to say, "Tatishchev's nonsense."

At the same time, accusing his genius predecessor, and with him other Russian historians (first of all, MV Lomonosov), of patriotic sentiments, supposedly killing historians in them (“poorly understood love for the fatherland suppresses any critical and impartial processing of history. and it becomes ridiculous "):" His work, for which no scientific training was required, deserved all respect; but suddenly this man got lost: it was unbearable for him that the history of Russia was so young and should begin with Rurik in the 9th century. He wanted to rise higher! " (Schletzer 1875: 51, 53; Schletzer 1809: 67, 119120, 392, 418-419, 427-430, 433, approx. ** on p. 325). Although in 1768 Schletser looked at the beginning of Russian history through the eyes of Tatishchev: “Russian chroniclers lead their story from the founding of the monarchy, but the history of Russia dates back long before that moment. The chroniclers know little about the peoples who inhabited the territory of Russia before the Slavs ”(Schlozer 1768: 125-126, 129). While pejoratively speaking about whom he had previously characterized as the “father of Russian history”, the German scientist at the same time began to talk about the “false” Joachim Chronicle and its “nonsense”, and considered this chronicle an ugly work of an “ignorant monk” (Schletzer 1809 : XXVIII, ei, horn, 19-21, 371, 381, 425) 1.

In the same spirit, because he was guided by the opinion of Schletser, the great N.M. Karamzin, presenting Tatishchev as a person who “often allowed himself to invent ancient legends and manuscripts,” that is, directly accused him of falsification (he “made up speeches”, “made up a letter”). Of course, following his idol, he categorically denied the dignity of the Joachim Chronicle as a source, because it is a "fiction", "an intricate, albeit unsuccessful guess" Tatishchev ("imaginary Joachim or Tatishchev"), and also noted that with the truth about the Scandinavian Varangians, and in these words the voice of Schletser was also clearly heard, “all scholarly historians agree, except Tatishchev and Lomonosov” (Karamzin 1989. Note *** on p. 23, notes 105, 347, 385, 396, 463; Karamzin: 1829: Approx. 165).

And the verdict of Shletser-Karamzin was then enthusiastically repeated by dozens of Russian specialists, while often not even bothering to look into Tatishchev's work (as well as into the works of Lomonosov). In 1836 the famous historian N.G.

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Ustryalov, for example, spoke of Tatishchev's useless talk about the Scythians and Sarmatians, which he brought upon himself, "almost solid", suspicion of forgery, since to reliable legends Nestor preferred the "absurd nonsense" of the Joachim Chronicle, that his "Russian History", "in our time, with the strict requirements of historical criticism, has almost no value, despite the fact that it contains very important testimonies that are not found in other sources ”that the attempts of the Russian writers who preceded Karamzin, who studied history“ in passing, partly out of boredom, partly by order, ”are now curious only as babbling in children; they have not a single bright thought, not a single bright glance ”and that only Schletser was his“ reliable guide ”(Ustryalov 1836: 911).

Fortunately, in science there are always scientists who double-check the opinions of their predecessors, including the most eminent ones. Such a revision of historiographic baggage is natural and inevitable, because the path to truth is always associated with small and large mistakes and delusions, which must be abandoned in time. With regard to the anti-Tatishchev position of his numerous compatriots, the first to do this in 1839 was the Normanist A.F. Fedotov. Naming the German scientists G.Z. Bayer, G.F. Miller and A.L. Schletzer "by our first teachers", "the founders of our historical criticism", he noted that the Norman theory, supported by these and other "glorious names", for a long time turned "as if into a law", "into a dogma for both researchers and readers of Russian history "(Although after the objections of G. Evers, set out" on the basis of the rules of criticism of the strictest ... some provisions of the champions of the Scandinavian homeland of our Rus decisively lose their evidentiary force "), and that the opinions of Tatishchev and Lomonosov were cited, as Schletser did," only in mockery, as an example of an unlearned fantasy. " According to Fedotov's conclusion, Tatishchev's work, despite his criticism by Karamzin, is “a remarkable phenomenon, especially when we realize both the time at which he wrote and the means he could use”, and that he, “according to some of his concepts and historical beliefs , stood above his century, ahead of him "(Fedotov 1839: I-II, 7, 9-10, 14-92, 96, 105-107, note * on p. 42, note * on p. 50).

A much more detailed and more detailed answer to Tatishchev's ill-wills was given in 1843 by N.A. Ivanov. After analyzing Schletser's claims to the Russian historian, "hitherto repeated" in literature, he noted that the German scientist, "too hasty in his critical reviews of our writers, called Tatishchev a genuine Russian Dlugosh, that is, according to his own interpretation, shameless a liar, a deceiver, a storyteller. " Schletser, the author continued, this "inexorable judge of other people's mistakes", suffering from "an ingrained ailment of addiction. quite often he blamed at random, sometimes deliberately cited false quotes. This has long been proven, and only an unaccountable prejudice hitherto stubbornly rejects the obvious evidence. " Saying that Schletser's judgments about Tatishchev are "blatant untruth", "blasphemy" ("dislike" towards him breaks out "out in every line"), Ivanov confirms this fact with specific examples.

At the same time, he emphasized that Miller borrowed information about the chronicles from Tatishchev, who, "despite the limited methods, not being afraid of any obstacles, not being embarrassed by anyone's suspicions", "performed a feat that none of his peers dared." So, he was the first to tell about Nestor, that he had predecessors, as well as successors who edited his work. On the whole, as this historian summed up, who fearlessly opposed the untruth, which for decades was considered a common truth, because it was sanctified by the authorities of Schletser and Karamzin, the direction that Tatishchev followed is "more essential and more important than the discontinuous, side investigations of Bayer," and that Schletser, "Having a huge store of various information" repeats a lot, including his mistakes, from Tatishchev - "writes with Tatishchev's pointer!", While "wastefully endowing him with reproaches" (Ivanov 1843: 23-31, 33, 36-43 , 45-46, 48, 52-64, 137-145, 206, 209, 243-247, 250251).

Finally, in 1855, S.M. Soloviev, who, having specially addressed the study of Tatishchev's creative heritage, summed up: “But if Tatishchev himself frankly says which books he had and which he knows only by name, telling in detail which of them were in which of famous people, then, seeing such conscientiousness, do we have the right to accuse him of distortions, forgeries, etc.? If he were an unscrupulous writer, he would have written that he had everything in his hands, read everything, knows everything. We have every right in his collection of chronicles to accept one thing, to reject the other, but we have no right to accuse Tatishchev himself of the incorrectness of some news. It is not clear how the later writers looked at the story of Tatishchev, who allowed themselves to present him as an inventor of false news. As you can see, they neglected the first volume, did not pay attention to either the character or the goals of work, and, taking right on the second volume, looked at its content as something like the History of Shcherbatov, Elagin, Emin. "

“We,” the historian went on, “for our part, must pronounce a completely opposite verdict about Tatishchev: its importance lies precisely in the fact that he was the first to begin the processing of Russian history, as he should have begun; the first gave an idea of ​​how to get down to business; the first showed what Russian history is, what means exist for its study; Tatishchev collected the materials and left them intact, did not distort them with his extreme understanding, but offered this extreme understanding at some distance, in the notes, without touching the text. " His merit, Soloviev developed his thought further, “consists in the fact that he was the first to start the matter the way it should have begun: he collected materials, subjected them to criticism, brought together chronicle news, provided them with geographical, ethnographic and chronological notes, pointed out many important questions , which served as topics for later research, collected the news of ancient and new writers about the most ancient state of Russia, "in a word, showed the way and gave means to his compatriots to study Russian history", and that he, and with him and Lomonosov, "belongs to the most honorable place in the history of Russian science in the era of initial works ”(Soloviev 1901: 1333, 1346-1347, 1350-1351).

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It was Solovyov's work, as his authority in historical science grew, largely led to the fading of far-fetched claims against Tatishchev. But, at the same time, she retained and cultivated a dislike for him as a historian, the idea of ​​him and his Russian contemporaries as something primitive and therefore not worthy of attention. So, for example, P.N. Milyukov in 1897 in his book "The Main Currents of Russian Historical Thought", uncontrollably praising the Germans who were striving to "discover the truth", especially G.Z. Bayer and A.L. Schletser, contrasted them with V.N. Tatishcheva, M.V. Lomonosov, M.M. Shcherbatov and I.N. Boltin, scornfully, almost squeamishly referring them to "the antediluvian world of Russian historiography ... a world little known and very few people interesting." And this opinion was absorbed by future professional historians, for for a long time Milyukov's work served as a historiographic guide for universities (Milyukov 1913: 31-35, 50, 71-95, 103, 108, 119, 122, 124131, 146-147; Historiography 1961 : 416; Pestich 1961: 27).

In Soviet times, S.L. Pestich, in the 40-60s. who dedicated, according to A.G. Kuzmin, the "crushing of Tatishchev" candidate and doctoral (in its most important part) dissertations, directly accusing him of "falsification" to please his views, which are characterized as "monarchist", "serf", etc. ". Therefore, Peshtich argued, at least for the first centuries of Russian history, his work cannot be used as a source without a special serious check: “The presence of the so-called Tatishchev news (news that are not confirmed by surviving sources. - V.F.) in the first edition, which have much in common with the author's additions in the second edition, should be attributed not to the sources that have not come down to us, but to the editorial work of Tatishchev. " However, such an assessment did not seem enough to Pestich, and he accused Tatishchev for his coverage of the Kiev events of April 1113 of anti-Semitism (this concept, Kuzmin notes ironically, “appears only at the end of the 19th century!”), However, not only of him : “Anti-Semitic acuteness of the story about Vladimir Monomakh's decision to evict Jews from Russia. With a deliberately perverted description of the events of 1113, Tatishchev tried to historically substantiate the reactionary legislation of tsarism in the national question. . The relevance of Tatishchev's falsification is proved by the wide use of his description of the events in Kiev in the works of Emin, Catherine II, Boltin. " (DS Likhachev had no doubt that "the myth of the" special "sources of VN Tatishchev's" History of Russia "was exposed by SL Peshtich").

In 1972, E.M. Dobrushkin with his Ph.D. thesis "proved" the dishonesty of "Tatishchev in the presentation of two articles: 1113 (the uprising in Kiev against the usurers and the expulsion of the Jews from Russia) and 1185 (Igor Seversky's campaign against the Polovtsi)" (in his opinion, the message about the princely congress of 1113 the city, which decided to expel the "Jews" from the borders of Russia, was invented by the historian). A little later, with the same persistence, he imposed on science the idea that “the task of a researcher is to establish that in the“ History of the Russian ”by V.N. Tatishchev is really borrowed from sources, and what came out from under his pen. " Kuzmin,

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speaking about the bias of S.L. Peshtich, S.N. Valka, E.M. Dobrushkina, A.L. Mongaita, with whom they approached Tatishchev, noted that they had common methodological and factual errors.

First, they compare, following the example of N.M. Karamzin, Tatishchev's "History" with the Lavrentiev and Ipatiev chronicles, which he had never seen. Secondly, they misunderstand both the sources underlying the "History of Russia" and the essence and nature of the chronicle. Presenting the latter as a "single centralized tradition up to the 12th century," they do not even raise the question of how far the chronicle monuments of the pre-Mongol era have come down to us, and do not allow the idea of ​​the existence of different chronicle traditions, "many of which perished or preserved in separate fragments. Tatishchev, on the other hand, used such materials, which for centuries remained on the periphery and contained, as it were, unorthodox records and news. "

Thirdly, the scientist drew attention to the fact that Tatishchev had no serious motive for the alleged falsifications (in this case, it is necessary to recall the words of M.N. Tikhomirov, uttered in 1962: “If we take the point of view of those historians who accuse Tatishchev in a deliberate forgery, it remains completely incomprehensible why Tatishchev needed to belittle the meaning of the Joachim Chronicle "by referring to the fact that it was written in a new thin letter and in the Novgorod dialect. Why it was necessary for him to note the close similarity of the news" of this chronicle "with the news of Polish authors, whom Tatishchev repeatedly accuses of fables ”).

And if, as Kuzmin rightly summed up in 1981, “the subjective conscientiousness of the historian can no longer raise doubts, then the question of the methods of his work needs even more careful study,” that “the principle of historicism, characteristic of Tatishchev in all his undertakings, led his ultimately to the creation of a major work on national history ", allowed him, in the absence of predecessors, to find a lot" of such that science was accepted only a long time later. " Moreover, as the researcher emphasized, the entire first volume of the Russian History, which, if we recall the conclusion of S.M. Solov'ev, “neglected” by his critics, “was devoted to the analysis of sources and all kinds of auxiliary investigations necessary to resolve the main issues. It is the presence of such a volume that Tatishchev's work positively differs not only from the presentation of Karamzin, but even Solovyov. In the 19th century, there was no work at all equal to Tatishchev's in this respect "(Tikhomirov 1962: 51; Pestich 1961: 222-262; Pestich 1965: 155-163; Dobrushkin 1977: 96; Kuzmin 1972: 79-89: Kuzmin 1981: 338340 , 343-344; Zhuravel 2004: 138-142).

But the subjective conscientiousness of Tatishchev the historian haunts many. And today the Ukrainian historian A.P. Tolochko, who assured in 2005, “that Tatishchev had no sources at his disposal, unknown modern science... All information exceeding the volume of known chronicles should be attributed to the author's activity of Tatishchev himself. " And who, which is very significant, immediately found imitators in our historical science. So, in 2006, the Nizhny Novgorod

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scientist A.A. Kuznetsov, narrating about the activities of the Vladimir prince Yuri Vsevolodovich, eliminates, as he himself says, “a number of stereotypes of historical science, based on ... the unjustified involvement of the“ History of Russia ”by V.N. Tatishchev ", who" felt antipathy towards this prince and deliberately transferred it to the pages of his work "(guided by the conclusion of Tolochko that the" favorite character "of our first historian was Konstantin Vsevolodovich, Kuznetsov writes that he" justified "," whitewashed "Konstantin and "Ink" Yuri).

Tatishchev's unique news Kuznetsov describes as “speculation”, “fantasies”, “hoaxes”, “author's arbitrariness”, claims that he “judged the past, trusting late sources, distorting their data, based on the realities of his stormy 18th century”, “ he invented "facts and" by a volitional decision changed the meaning of incomprehensible source information "(that is, he essentially repeats the clichés thrown at Tatishchev by Peshtich and Tolochko). Reproaching the "individual" predecessors that they "do not bother with a critical analysis of Tatishchev's" information "and easily trust him, Kuznetsov admires Tolochko's" witty and brilliant excursion "into Tatishchev's creative laboratory, reconstruction of his source base, demonstration of" an array of his author's thoughts under the guise of source information ", proof that" the unique piece of news is the work of a historian of the 18th century. does not contain ", and thanks the Ukrainian colleague for the" deep remarks "that" helped a lot "to the author when working on the monograph (Kuznetsov 2006: 9, 47-48, 88, 93, 96-97, 103-109, 114-115, 131, 210-212, 220, 223-224, 273-276, 479-480, 501-502, 505-506, 509, 514).

In parallel with such unrestrained apologetics of the next "overthrower" Tatishchev, our science is "spinning" the ideas of the Ukrainian scientist under the guise of their criticism. Indicative in this regard is the article by the Moscow researcher P.S. Stefanovich, which looks more like a very extensive review of Tolochko's work "Russian History" by Vasily Tatishchev: sources and news "(Moscow, Kiev, 2005), but where instead of a really academic analysis, something else is given. As the author himself writes, “of course, the purpose of my criticism is not to belittle the merits of a book by a modern historian, but to achieve clarity and objectivity in assessing the work of one of those who stood at the origins of Russian historical science” (rather strange and an ambiguously formulated goal, to the same Tatishchev was not even given the floor.There is no hint - either through ignorance or a biased default - that science already has numerous refutations of Tolochko's views expressed in his monograph and previous articles ).

And for what kind of "clarity" and "objectivity" did you come out to fight in 2007 on the pages of the famous academic journal Stefanovich? Yes, for the same ones that Tolochko conducts. Moreover, he does this completely unfounded, inspiring the readers with the opinion that he “convincingly showed” that Tatishchev “in a number of cases and deliberately gave false references to sources”, that after Tolochko's work, unique information with references to the “manuscripts” of A.P. Volynsky, P.M. Eropkina, A.F. Khrushchev, Joachim's chronicle "can not be considered as reliable", which, as Tolochko has shown well, "there is no doubt that Tatishchev could

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to think out and supplement the news of his sources himself and even just to compose new texts "(for example, the Joachim Chronicle, and article 1203 with the" constitutional draft "of Roman Mstislavich is" Tatishchev's pure invention ").

At the same time, Stefanovich covers his unanimity with Tolochko with ritual reservations, supposedly supposed to show that the reviewer himself stands, of course, above the “fight” and is impartial (some of his statements and conclusions, “including those of a principled nature, seem too categorical or insufficiently substantiated”, he, “I think, after all, is not quite right” that Tatishchev should be called “a hoaxer, a liar and a falsifier, from my point of view, is just as wrong as to consider him a chronicler or a porter”). Irresistibly striving for "clarity" and "objectivity", Stefanovich does not skimp on laudatory epithets addressed to Tolochko: that he, conducting " subtle analysis"," Writes in a bright, original manner, and a free, somewhat ironic style does not prevent him from remaining at a high scientific level of discussion of the problem ", that," without a doubt, we have before us a talented and interesting research ", that he significantly added to a number of" revelations " that "thanks to Tolochko's work - a sharp and awakening research thought - we have made significant progress on the path of studying the" Tatishchevskie Izvestia "and at the same time have come closer to understanding the" creative laboratory "of the historian of the first half of the 18th century." Then, with youthful optimism, he finishes his eulogy, “until this path has been far gone, and we can confidently assert that there are still many discoveries and surprises awaiting scientists here” (Stefanovich 2007: 88-96).

It is not difficult to guess what "discoveries" and even "surprises" await us. And this easily predictable result cannot be attributed to science already because of such ease, and the very method of adjusting the solution of the problem to the answer someone needs is alien to it, as noted above. And with such a result those scientists who value the truth, and not noisy "revelations", behind which there are still no interests in science, cannot agree. Thus, the inconsistency of attributing to Tolochko Tatishchev the authorship of the Romanov project of 1203, for some reason called Tolochko, is perplexed by the author, the "constitution", showed in 2000 by V.P. Bogdanov (Bogdanov 2000: 215-222). In 2005-2006. A.V. Mayorov, referring to archaeological material, proved in a number of publications published in Belarus and Russia that Tatishchev had in his hands the Polotsk Chronicle that had not come down to us, in which Tolochko also sees Tatishchev's invention (Mayorov 2006: 321-343). In 2006-2007. S.N. Azbelev, dwelling on the attempts to discredit Tatishchev the historian, rightly emphasized that "not belonging to the category of serious publications, they require, however, mentions due to their aggressiveness." And to this category he attributed Tolochko's "verbose mockery", stating that in his works there are "too many errors and inaccuracies, and there are tendentious distortions in the characteristics of the materials used," and that these works can "significantly damage the scientific reputation of the author, especially with his demonstratively dismissive attitude towards scientists of the past and towards his contemporaries, whose bad habits, according to A.P. Tolochko, manifested themselves in the use of the Joachim Chronicle ”(Azbelev 2006: 250-284; Azbelev 2007: 6-34).

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In 2006, Tolochko A.V. brilliantly revealed the essence of the hoax tricks and forgeries. Zhuravel. Describing this representative of Ukrainian science as Herostratus, for whom Tatishchev is “only a means of self-affirmation, an“ explanatory device ”in substantiating the right to his own mystification,” he concludes that his work “only looks scientific, but has a very indirect relationship to science”, and on specific facts he showed that “Tatishchev really had those unique sources about which he speaks” (of which, for example, the chronological inaccuracies in his “History of Russia” are convincing). At the same time Zhuravel, having said that it is necessary to openly call a spade a spade, noted that “the crime of Pestich is not that he publicly branded Tatishchev as a falsifier, but that he did it without proper reason; he considered the evidence separately noticed by him, which in itself did not constitute the corpus delicti, sufficient for passing a sentence. And therefore his actions themselves constitute a crime and are called "slander."

Another conclusion of the author looks absolutely pertinent: it is necessary to "again raise the question of the responsibility of the scientist for his words" and the responsibility of those who start the topic of "Tatishchev's news", since it is "very difficult and multifaceted and obviously overwhelming for novice researchers", namely the latter, poorly knowing the chronicles, "and made up the bulk of active" skeptics "!" This was also Peshtich: his judgments about Tatishchev were formed in the 30s, when he was still a student "(Zhuravel rightly noted the same about EM Dobrushkin. showing the inconsistency of the claims of Peshtich and Dobrushkin to Tatishchev, he correctly concluded that the prosecutor's tone in relation to the latter "is just an indicator that the historiography of the twentieth century did not succeed in reaching the level of understanding of things that was characteristic of the late Tatishchev", which, unlike from him “Dobrushkin invented a lot in the literal sense of the word” and that “the facts of the critics of VN Tatishchev are very, very unimportant”) (Zhuravel 2004: 135-142; Zhuravel: 524-544).

In 2007 S.V. Rybakov, demonstrating the greatness of Tatishchev the historian, reminded everyone for a long time well-known: “The authors who questioned the scientific nature of Tatishchev's source study or the sources themselves did not quite correctly understand the nature and real role of the Old Russian annals, presenting it as much more centralized than it was on in fact, considering that all the ancient Russian annals were associated with some single primary source. " It is now recognized, he states further, “that since antiquity in Russia there have been various chronicle traditions, including peripheral ones, which do not coincide with the“ canons ”of the most famous chronicles” (Rybakov 2007: 166). In general, as the historiographic experience demonstrates, the "valiant" attacks on Tatishchev, the "anti-Tatishchev" complex in general are a kind of sign of scientific dishonesty and, to some extent, scientific inconsistency. Criticism of sources and scientific research is an indispensable rule of a scientist's work, but it

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should be really criticism, and not criticism that compromises historical science.

Historical science is compromised by that, of course, the incorrectness with which the "anti-Tatishchevites" "refute" the opinions of specialists, whose works in the field of source study and Tatishchev's creativity are an example of a professional attitude to business. So, P.S. Stefanovich in 2006, arguing that the originality of the historian's news about the capture of Prince Volodar of Przemysl in 1122 "should be associated not with some authentic, but not preserved sources, but with a peculiar way of narration and the method of presenting his own interpretations inherent in the author of the first scientific" Russian history "", ie, in other words, he declared this originality to be Tatishchev's invention, concluded, without citing and, of course, without refuting their argumentation, that, "of course, the defense of the" good name "of the" last Russian chronicler "in the spirit of B .BUT. Rybakov and A.G. Kuzmina is simply naive. " At the same time, his own “observations of the research method and manner of presentation of V.N. Tatishcheva ", Stefanovich does not doubt," may be useful in the further (by and large, still just begun) study of both the unique "Tatishchev news" and early stages development of national historical science ”(Stefanovich 2008: 87, 89).

Criticism, and at the same time hatred and mortally dangerous for that time accusation of V.N. Tatishchev fully learned during his lifetime, which, by the way, did not allow him to see his work published. In the "Preview" he recalls how in 1739 in St. Petersburg, "demanding help and reasoning, so that he could replenish something and explain something incomprehensible," he introduced many to the manuscript of the "History of Russia" and heard different opinions about it: “The other was not equal, the other was not equal, that one wanted to write more extensively and more clearly, the other advised to shorten or leave it altogether. Yes, it was unhappy with that. Some appeared with grave censure, as if I had refuted the Orthodox faith and the law (as those madmen said) ... ”. And turning to opponents, including future ones, the historian correctly outlined their task both in criticizing his Russian History and in serving historical science: “When they are more filled with sciences, then they themselves would take on this very necessary for the fatherland and they wrote better "," but more I hope that if someone of these in the sciences is excellent, for the benefit of the fatherland as much as I have, having jealousy, seeing my shortcomings, he himself will correct the errors, explain the darkness, and supplement the shortcomings and bring them to a better state, for myself, more thanks than I demand, to acquire. "

Tatishchev clearly outlined his credo as a historian and as a source expert in the same "Preview", where, as can be judged by their sentences, those who like to talk down to him either did not look down, or they could not (or did not want) to see anything there: in the present history there will appear many noble families great vices, which if you write, then they themselves or their heirs will be moved to anger, and to bypass them - to destroy the truth and clarity of history or that blame on those who tried to convert, it would not agree with conscience, for the sake of I leave it to others for the composition. " Speaking about his manner of working with sources, he explained that “if the adverb and their order were to be changed, it would be dangerous that the probabilities would not

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ruin. To this end, he judged the best to write in the order and adverb that are in the ancients, collecting from all the fullest and most detailed in the order of the years, as they wrote, without changing or eliminating anything from them (italics mine. - V.F.), except not proper to the secular chronicle, like the lives of the saints, miracles, phenomena, etc., which are found in the books of the church more abundantly, but he also attached some of them in order, he also did not add anything (italics mine. - V.F.), unless it is necessary to put the word, which is necessary for understanding, and distinguish it with a spacious one. And at the end of the "Preview" the scientist emphasized two important circumstances: "... I think that it is impossible to please the morals and reasoning of all people" and "that all deeds from intelligence or stupidity occur" (Tatishchev 1962: 85-86, 89- 92).

A historian, of course, does not have to please anyone in anything, and he is also not spared from all sorts of mistakes and shortcomings, especially when it comes to Tatishchev, who did everything in Russian historical science for the first time and thus creating. But it is worth talking about this without bias and aggressiveness, with the manifestation of the utmost tact and, of course, deep knowledge and understanding of the subject of the conversation itself.

Returning to one of the arguments of S.N. Azbelev, it should be recalled that V.L. Yanin, using archaeological material, confirmed the complete reliability of the story of the Joachim Chronicle that in Novgorod, baptism met with powerful resistance from the pagans, suppressed by the governors Vladimir Putyata and Dobrynya (in them the scientist sees an independent story written by an eyewitness of the events). He revealed traces of a fire that dates from the dendrochrological method in 989 and “which destroyed all structures on large area":" Coastal quarters in the Nerevsky and, possibly, in the Lyudin end. " But it was this story that was primarily perceived as a fake. According to N.M. Karamzin, “Of all the legends of the imaginary Joachim, the most curious is about the introduction of the Christian faith in Novgorod; It is a pity that it is an invention, based solely on an old proverb: Putyata cross with a sword, and Dobrynya with a sword! " (Karamzin 1989: Approx. 463; Yanin 1984: 53-56).

But everything, as archaeological data show, was different, and the Joachim Chronicle, despite its very complex nature, is a valuable source, which, of course, with an attentive and conscientious attitude towards itself, can provide very important information. In general, if we turn again to the observations of S.M. Solovyov, and his words are becoming more and more relevant, we owe Tatishchev “the preservation of news from such lists of the chronicle, which, perhaps, are forever lost to us; the importance of this news for science is becoming more perceptible day by day ”(Soloviev 1901: 1347). However, what science feels, "skeptics" are not given to feel.

And to our dear hero of the day, defender of both the Fatherland and its history, Sergei Nikolayevich Azbelev, I wish you good health and new successes in the scientific field. And I am very proud that I personally know this wonderful person and scientist.

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Fomin Vyacheslav Vasilievich - Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Head of the Department of National History of the Lipetsk State pedagogical university(Lipetsk, Russia). Fomin Vyacheslav - Doctor of historical sciences, Professor, Head of the Department of national history of the Lipetsk state pedagogical university (Lipetsk, Russia).