To understand why Hitler lost the war to Stalin, let's first consider this example: in May 1944, a powerful operation is being prepared not only for World War II, but for the entire history of mankind - the Belarusian offensive. In the office of the supreme commander-in-chief are Stalin himself and his two deputies - Vasilevsky and Zhukov. They thought everything over, planned everything, weighed everything. Now they call the front commanders one by one and assign them combat missions.

It is the turn of General Rokossovsky. He enters Stalin's office, listens. They explain everything to him and ask if the general understood everything. And he replies that he understood everything, but he has his own solution, and it is much better than the option offered to him. Arguing with Stalin is a deadly risk. And then his closest assistants are also there, so the risk is tripled.

But Rokossovsky insists on his own, and he is offered to leave the office in another room and think carefully. The general comes out, thinks. And there is something to think about. He went through torture chambers, sat on death row, again, I would not want to.

They summon him again to the office of the Supreme Commander, and Stalin asks:

- Well, comrade Rokossovsky, did you think?

- That's right, Comrade Stalin, I thought.

- And what have you thought up?

- I consider my decision to be the only correct and correct one.

Stalin walked from corner to corner, puffed on his pipe. Suho said:

- Go, think again.

The general came out of the office, thinking again. But you can not risk it, but simply follow the order. In addition, the outcome of the war is already a foregone conclusion, we are talking only about the price and timing of victory. One can agree with everything, and after Stalin's death write in his memoirs that the stupid leader set stupid tasks, and I had a brilliant solution, but they did not understand and did not appreciate it.

And now they again summon the obstinate general to the Stalinist office. Again the Supreme asks the question:

- Have you thought, comrade Rokossovsky?

- I thought, Comrade Stalin.

Stalin came close to the rebellious general, looking him straight in the eyes. And Rokossovsky, too, looks straight into the trot of Stalin's eyes. Knows not to look away. The leader regards this as insincerity, like a stone in his bosom. And therefore, the general withstood the heavy gaze of the genius of all peoples, did not pass up, showed firmness of character.

Stalin walked away, stood near the huge map, thoughtful. There was a ringing silence in the office. Zhukov and Vasilevsky are not looking at Rokossovsky, they are waiting for the Supreme to decide. And he turned to the general, briefly said:

- Well, act as you see fit, comrade Rokossovsky.

And General Rokossovsky begins to act according to his plan. On the second day of the Belarusian offensive operation, Stalin and his entourage realized that the decision of the obstinate general was not just magnificent, but ingenious. A week after the start of the operation on June 29, 1944, Rokossovsky was awarded the diamond star of the Marshal of the Soviet Union, and on July 30 the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

Stalin with his marshals and generals

Now let's fast forward to 1941 at Hitler's headquarters. There is a conflict: what to do, attack Moscow or turn to Kiev? If you go to Moscow, then all the rear will remain open. And then a blow will be delivered from near Kiev, which will cut off the German army from the supply bases. And if you attack Kiev, precious time will be lost. Moscow will have to attack in late autumn knee-deep in mud. And what should you do in such a situation?

Hitler considers it necessary to turn to Kiev. Guderian is against it, but he obeys the Fuehrer's order without protesting. Many years later, he wrote in his memoirs that the attack on Kiev had become main mistake, which led to the collapse of the German army. Guderian is a very intelligent person. He had an analytical mind and was a brilliant strategist. His memoirs are very popular to this day. But besides the mind, you also need to have character, will and courage to defend your point of view.

The memoirs of all German generals are permeated with the idea: Hitler was a narrow-minded person, a bad strategist and made us follow stupid orders. But why did you unquestioningly fulfill them, why didn't you argue, why didn't you prove your case? If a general has a genius head, but he fulfills the idiotic orders of the Fuhrer, then such a head is worth a penny, there is no sense from it.

At one time, the great Niccolo Machiavelli said: “ First of all, the mind of a ruler is judged by the kind of people he brings closer to him.". Stalin mercilessly shot his generals before the war. But still there were those who, risking their freedom and life, argued with the leader, proved their innocence. And Hitler before the war did not shoot anyone from his entourage, on the contrary, he gave his confidants awards and new knowledge. But he did not have a single general capable of defending his point of view.

Considering the question of why Hitler lost the war to Stalin, it should be noted that the worst thing for a dictator is to find himself in a situation where everyone agrees, agrees with any decisions of the ruler and praises them. Even the smartest person in such a situation loses his bearings, any sage loses the ability to notice his mistakes. And so he repeats them and multiplies them. It was in such a trap that Hitler fell with his personnel policy.

But let's not be unfounded and turn to the diaries of the minister of propaganda of fascist Germany, Goebbels. They were not intended for publication. On the air, the Minister of Propaganda shouted one thing, but wrote something completely different in his diaries. The value of the diaries lies in the fact that Goebbels in the last months of the Third Reich came to second after Hitler.

Fuhrer on final stage of his reign, he shot his comrades-in-arms, dismissed them from their posts, expelled them from the party, and sent them on vacation. Many themselves cheated on Hitler, but Goebbels stayed with him to the end. In his political testament, the Fuhrer appointed the Minister of Propaganda Chancellor in his place, but the only time he did not obey and did not accept this post. He followed the leader and shared his fate: he killed his children and shot himself with his wife. This man was closest to Hitler during the collapse of the Third Reich. And what worried him the most in 1945?

Lack of tanks, guns, aircraft, metal, coal, oil. Lack of bread. All this worried Goebbels. But most of all he was irritated by the weakness of the top commanding staff of the German army. This is what the Minister of Propaganda wrote with his diary on February 28, 1945: “ If someone like Goering is out of step at all, then he needs to be brought to his senses. Fools hung with medals and perfumed veils should not be involved in the war. They need to be eliminated without any pity.».

All the entries cannot be recounted, they must be read. But the essence is very simple: the Fuhrer has no real commanders. He cannot rely on his military advisers. They often deceive and let him down, and he himself must deal with every secondary issue. While everything was going well, brilliant generals crowded around in a herd, but then the collapse came, and where did those geniuses go? They turned into absolutely incapable and tired elders. They act according to the templates of the First World War and have absolutely no control over the situation.

This is what Goebbels wrote on March 13, 1945: “ Our generals are waiting in the Fuehrer's waiting room. This bunch tired people affects me depressingly. The Fuhrer has practically no authoritative military advisers. Most of these people are nothing. The leader of the nation gathered around him only weak-willed people who cannot be relied on in a critical situation».

And what does Goebbels write about enemies? " The Anglo-Americans proved to be exceptionally inflexible in achieving their military goals. Churchill is an old criminal. But Stalin seems to me to be a greater realist than the Anglo-American madmen. He treats Roosevelt and Churchill like stupid boys. I told the Fuehrer my opinion about Soviet marshals and generals. We cannot compete with them, and the Fuhrer fully shares my opinion. Our generals are too old, and they have outlived their usefulness».

Hitler with his generals

Indeed, Stalin ended the war with an indestructible army and a whole cohort of outstanding generals and marshals. Among them are Vasilevsky, Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Malinovsky, Govorov, Konev, Chernyakhovsky, Golovanov, Rybalko, Meretskov, but you can hardly list them all. And Hitler ended the war with the old helpless military leaders who were afraid to take responsibility for themselves, and the orders of the Fuehrer were executed poorly or even ignored altogether.

And now, thinking about why Hitler lost the war to Stalin, it should be admitted that the German generals, although they had an analytical mind, were inferior Soviet generals in the most important thing. They did not have the will, adherence to principles, willingness to risk their lives for the sake of a common cause. The greatness and insignificance of strategists is judged by the results of the war. And what are these results? Complete rout fascist Germany and shameful surrender.

Hitler had strategists of a very high standard, but he did not have such generals and marshals as Stalin, either at the beginning or at the end of the war. No one. Germany lost the war to the USSR because Stalin's military leaders were immeasurably higher in training than Hitler's strategists. And their main quality was courage, thanks to which they defended their point of view even before Stalin.

Alexander Semashko

After the fall of the Third Reich, the beaten German generals tried to shift all the blame both for war crimes and for the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the Nazi leadership and Hitler personally - from memoirs to memoirs, curses wander about the "possessed Fuhrer", his "fatal decisions" and "fatal mistakes" , allegedly predetermined the outcome of the war and the defeat of Germany. However, this common myth, taken up by Western propaganda, not only simplifies the true picture of events, reducing real story to ideological clichés, but also belittles the feat Soviet people, who won a well-deserved victory over a strong, intelligent and skillful enemy.

This book presents the works of leading German historians who decisively refute propaganda clichés, revealing the real, not fictional reasons for the defeat of the Reich and presenting the German point of view on the course of the armed struggle and the results of the Second World War.

Foreword by Alexey Isaev 1

Hans-Adolph Jacobsen - HOW THE SECOND WORLD WAR 2 WAS LOST

X. Hemberger - ECONOMY AND INDUSTRY OF Fascist Germany on the Eve and DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 21

Ernst Engelberg - ABOUT THE THEORY OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES IN GERMAN'S WEAPONS 24

Wolfram Wette - Image of the Enemy: RACIST ELEMENTS IN THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION 25

Christian Streit - SOVIET POWERS OF WAR IN GERMANY 32

Sebastian Haffner - SUICIDE OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 38

Gerhard Schreiber - SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE RESULTS OF THE WAR 58

L. Rendulich - GUARANTEE WAR 73

Appendix 79

Notes 82

Why did Hitler lose the war? German view
(World War II. Life and death on the Eastern Front).

Foreword by Alexey Isaev

"Twilight state of mind", temporary or permanent clouding of the mind is one of the convenient and common explanations for making military and political decisions of non-obvious expediency. Often, journalists and historians, like the scriptwriters of mediocre Hollywood films, offer their readers mental distress as an explanation for certain moves with catastrophic consequences. Memoirists even more often pat on the shoulder, or even after the fact, generously hand out cuffs to the leaders, before whom they trembled when they were at the helm of power. However, more often than not, this is nothing more than an attempt to find a simple answer to a difficult question and a desire to avoid in-depth analysis situations. In our to a greater extent fascination with the personal factor of decision-making has affected the history of the Third Reich. In some places, the really eccentric behavior of Adolf Hitler, reinforced many times over by third-hand retellings, provided tremendous opportunities for shifting the burden of responsibility from objective factors to subjective factors. At the same time, critics of the decisions of the "possessed Fuhrer" did not always sufficiently critically approach the question of the feasibility of theoretically correct versions of orders and orders. It is all the more difficult to understand the cause-and-effect relationships of events for foreigners, including the domestic reader.

The presented collection of articles to some extent fills this gap, highlighting the military and political aspects of the rise and fall of the Third Reich through the eyes of German specialists. It collects research on a wide range of topics, from weapons production to the strategic and political aspects of World War II.

The collection opens with an article by H. Hemberger on the economy and industry of Germany on the eve and during the Second World War. The article describes the titanic work that was done in the 30s with the aim of transforming the Third Reich into an autarky, capable of doing without the import of certain types of raw materials and food. Soon after Hitler came to power, a plan was proposed and began to be implemented to replace several strategically important species raw materials for synthetic analogues. This primarily concerned rubber and hydrocarbon fuels. In the Third Reich, due to large-scale government investments in the chemical industry, the production of synthetic rubber and synthetic gasoline was launched. Hemberger traces the system of economic and political decisions of the German leadership, which made it possible to take a big step towards the creation of autarky capable of existing in the conditions of the blockade.

At the same time, the image of Germany as a country experiencing a total shortage of all types of natural resources is being destroyed. Full provision of domestic needs with coal made it possible to spend large volumes of this fuel for the production of synthetic fuel. In addition, the situation has changed significantly in comparison with the First World War, not least due to the progress of technical means of warfare. Unlike the USSR, Germany not only covered its needs for aluminum and magnesium, but even had the opportunity to export these materials, essential for the aviation industry. In contrast, in the Soviet Union, a shortage of bauxite deposits led to the widespread use of wood as a material for the manufacture of aircraft. In the 1930-1940s, aviation became one of the most important instruments of warfare. The natural resources of Germany created all the possibilities for the production of high-quality combat aircraft. Both the Heinkels, which terrorized European cities, the Stuka Ju-87 dive bombers that became the symbol of the blitzkrieg, and the Messerschmitts were built of winged metal.

All-metal aircraft had undoubted advantages over Soviet aircraft, in the design of which wood was the base material. For example, the hit of a 20-mm air cannon projectile into the metal wing did not lead to damage that threatened the destruction of the entire structure. On the contrary, for the wooden wing of a domestic aircraft during the war, the same hit threatened with much more serious consequences. A wooden wing turned out to be heavier than a metal wing of comparable strength; in wartime conditions it was difficult to maintain its geometry and quality of finish. All these factors played a role in the air war on the Eastern Front.

Moreover, German designers could afford the luxury of using aluminum alloys not only in aircraft construction, but even replace steel in gun carriages with them (in particular, on the 150-mm heavy infantry gun "sIG-ЗЗ") and produce them from "winged metal "massive pontoons for the construction of floating bridges. All these facts have not received due attention in Russian historiography. The USSR was declared an inexhaustible storehouse of natural resources, although this was generally not true. Deposits of the main source of aluminum - bauxite - were very few in the USSR, and the country experienced a severe deficit of aluminum, which was even supplied under Lend-Lease from the United States.

The view of German historians is also useful in terms of understanding the role of the Soviet Union as a subject of big European politics. Characteristic feature the Soviet historical school was an exaggeration of the importance of the USSR for Germany as an object for military operation... The "young Soviet state", around which, like planets around the Sun, since 1917 the world superpowers have revolved, striving at all costs to deal with it, is a highly distorted picture of world politics.

Another German historian, Hans-Adolph Jacobsen, whose work is included in this collection, writes: "However, it was not at all the" living space in the East ", the violent conquest of which had permeated Hitler's political calculations since the 1920s, served as the main activating moment; no, the main impulse was the Napoleonic idea to smash England by defeating Russia. "

This approach to the problem of the emergence of the Barbarossa plan was not characteristic of domestic historians who focused more on long-term plans to conquer "living space" and seize natural resources. However, Adolf Hitler himself formulated the reasons for the attack on the USSR in a speech at a secret meeting at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht on January 9, 1941 as follows: “The British support the hope of the possibility of Russian intervention. . He, the Fuhrer, does not believe that the British are "hopelessly stupid"; if they do not see any prospects, they will stop fighting. If they lose, they will never find the moral strength to preserve the empire. If they can hold out, to form 30-40 divisions, and if the United States and Russia provide them with assistance, then a very difficult situation for Germany will be created.

Until now, he [Hitler] has acted on the principle of striking at the most important enemy positions in order to move one step forward. Therefore, now it is necessary to defeat Russia. Then either England will surrender, or Germany will continue to fight against England under the most favorable conditions. The defeat of Russia will also allow Japan to turn all its forces against the United States. And this would keep the latter from entering the war.

Much has been said about the factors that contributed to the victory of the USSR over Germany, much less attention is paid to the reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht. Let's note the main mistakes of the Third Reich, to which German historians and generals refer.

Hitler's incompetence

Most German historians declare that the defeat of Germany was not so much due to individual strategic mistakes, but because of the adventurism of political and military plans.

Hans Adolph Jacobsen notes that "the political goal pursued by Hitler far exceeded the effectiveness of the military and economic means at his disposal."
Hitler, as the main culprit of the defeat in their memoirs, is also named by German military leaders. Thus, General Walter Chal de Beaulieu writes about the "ambiguity of the strategic goal at the beginning of the war" and about the "hesitation of the Fuhrer between Moscow and Leningrad", which did not allow to build on the success of the first months of the war.

On the one hand, the desire of the German generals to relieve themselves of all responsibility for the lost war is understandable, but on the other hand, one cannot ignore the role that Hitler played in the preparation and deployment of the war against the USSR. Note that after the failure near Moscow, the Fuhrer took over the sole command of the Wehrmacht.

Mud and frost

Military historian and Major General Alfred Filippi noted that the German generals foresaw the likelihood of military operations in off-road conditions and muddy roads and prepared the division for this. For example, in the infantry division of the first wave, horses were the main traction force: according to German data, their number was close to 5 thousand.

But at the same time, the degree of motorization was also high - 394 cars and 615 trucks, 3 armored vehicles and 527 motorcycles.
The plans of the German armies were disrupted by the first thaw, which, according to Guderian's records, lasted from October 7 to November 4, 1941. German generals note that after the success at Kiev, they were ready to march on Moscow, but "many formations got stuck in a quagmire, which allowed the Russians to strengthen their defenses."

To no less extent, the advance of the Wehrmacht was slowed down by unusually strong frosts for the Germans, which swept the European part of the USSR already at the end of November 1941. The cold affected not only the soldiers, but also the weapons and equipment. Guderian noted in his memoirs that the lubricant froze in rifles, machine guns and machine guns, the hydraulic fluid thickened in the recoil devices of the guns, and the braking system of cars did not function in the cold.

Human resources

Already in August 1941, General Franz Halder writes that Germany underestimated the strength of Russia. This is not about superiority in manpower - it was not at the beginning of the war - but about the unparalleled dedication with which the Red Army fought and the Soviet rear worked.

The big mistake of the German command was that it could not foresee the ability of the USSR to mobilize human resources under the conditions of the most severe war press and in a matter of months restore the losses of almost half of its agricultural and two-thirds of industrial capacity.

It is important that Soviet Union he threw all his resources into the fight against the enemy, which Germany could not afford to do. True, Guderian noted that the High Command of the Third Reich made a mistake in the distribution of divisions in theaters of operations. Out of 205 German divisions, only 145 were sent to the East. According to the German general, 38 divisions were superfluous in the West, primarily in Norway, Denmark and the Balkans.

In the course of the war, another mistake of the German command in the distribution of the armed forces became clear. The number of the contingent of the Luftwaffe was over 20% of the total number of soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht. Moreover, out of 1 million 700 thousand Luftwaffe servicemen, approximately 1 million 100 thousand people were directly related to aviation - the rest are auxiliary personnel.

The scale of the war

A distinctive feature of the military conflict between Germany and the USSR is its enormous scale. From the fall of 1941 to the fall of 1943, the length of the Soviet-German front was never less than 3800 km, while the German armies had to cover about 2 thousand km through the territory of the Soviet Union.
Field Marshal Ewald von Kleist admitted: “We were not preparing for a protracted struggle. Everything was based on achieving a decisive victory even before the onset of autumn ”. The reason for the failures in the East, according to the field marshal, was that the German troops "were forced to overcome vast spaces without the proper flexibility of the command."

Von Kleist is echoed by the military historian, former Major General Kurt von Tippelskirch, who sees the main reason for the defeat of the German army in the fact that its forces were "ineptly wasted by useless resistance in an unnecessary place and at an inconvenient time, as well as by fruitless attempts to seize the impossible."

Errors of the German generals

Even with great reluctance, the German commanders nevertheless admit their gross strategic miscalculations, which ultimately led to a failure on the Eastern Front. Let's note four of the most significant ones.

1. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt calls the choice of the initial disposition of the German troops the first strategic mistake. We are talking about the gap between the left and right flanks of the armies of Theodore von Bock, formed due to the impenetrable Pripyat bogs. As a participant in the First World War, Rundstedt was well aware of such a danger, but neglected it. Only the fragmentation of the Red Army units then saved Army Group Center from a flank attack.

2. The German command admits that the 1941 summer campaign began without a clearly defined goal and a unified view of the offensive strategy. The General Staff did not determine the direction of the main attack, as a result of which Army Group North got bogged down near Leningrad, Army Group South slowed down its advance near Rostov, and Army Group Center was completely thrown back from Moscow.

3. Catastrophic mistakes, according to German historians, were made during the attack on Moscow. Instead of moving to a temporary defense of the positions reached in November 1941, awaiting reinforcements, the Wehrmacht threw its main forces to capture the capital, as a result of which German troops lost more than 350 thousand people in three winter months. The offensive impulse of the Red Army was nevertheless stopped, but at the same time german army significantly reduced its combat effectiveness.

4. In the summer of 1942, the German command sent its main forces to the Caucasus, thus underestimating the possibility of resistance Soviet troops near Stalingrad. But the city on the Volga is the most important strategic goal, by capturing which Germany would cut off the Caucasus from the "Big Land" and block access for the USSR military industry to Baku oil.
Major General Hans Doerr noted that "Stalingrad should go down in the history of wars as the greatest mistake ever committed by the military command, as the greatest disregard for the living organism of its army ever shown by the leadership of the state."

Why did Hitler lose the war? German view Petrovsky (ed.) I.

WAR AGAINST RUSSIA - THE "RIGHT" WAR

In 1940 and 1941, Hitler had no reason to fear or complain about the Soviet Union. The non-aggression pact concluded in August 1939 functioned satisfactorily. Despite some friction, the Soviet Union adhered to exclusively defensive tactics towards Germany and was quite loyal. The attitude of the USSR towards England was more than cold. Significant and timely deliveries of raw materials and foodstuffs from the East made Germany invulnerable in the event of a blockade. The desire, by way of benevolent neutrality towards Germany, not to be drawn into the war, fully corresponded to the interests and position of the Soviet Union. The USSR was still far from completing its industrialization, and it could not expect anything good from the war with Germany, on the contrary, it could only fear the worst. And it was not without reason that in August 1939, when both sides lured Russia away, it settled on Germany. And Major General Erich Marks wrote quite correctly, who on August 5, 1940, on the instructions of Hitler, presented the first development of the campaign to the East by the General Staff: "The Russians will not render us friendly service - they will not attack us."

And yet, in the second half of 1940, Hitler decided to attack Russia. This decision, which turned out to be suicidal, makes a completely inexplicable impression. How could Hitler, burdened by the war with England (and the threat of war with America), start a war with Russia unnecessarily? It was he who, as a prerequisite for the war with Russia, always preached partnership with England? And yet, in these arguments, in which the inevitable war with England seemed to Hitler now an additional argument for the war with Russia, there is a certain paradoxical logic. It is advisable to trace Hitler's train of thought with all impartiality.

The war with England reached a dead point in the fall of 1940. The invasion of England with the available means proved to be unfeasible. Air war remained unsuccessful from a strategic point of view. At least at this time, Hitler could not approach England. But England could not get close to Germany for the time being. She lagged behind Germany in the field of armaments by at least two years, and even with the full mobilization of all her forces, they would never have been enough for a successful invasion of the continent. She had to wait for America, which lagged behind Germany in armaments by at least three years.

Thus, the war in the West was to remain in the next two or three years a trench warfare and be accompanied by an arms race. However, Germany did not like this prospect at all for two reasons.

First, the combined Anglo-American military potential was greater than the German one and, if fully deployed, would inevitably surpass it. Germany could not win the arms race unless it significantly expanded its own potential.

Secondly, thanks to its superiority in armament, Germany reached at that time the climax in military superiority, which, even at best, could not be repeated.

Arming a modern industrial state is a process that takes four years. Churchill once described it very figuratively: “In the first year - almost nothing; in the second - very little; in the third, a significant number; starting from the fourth - as much as you need. " In 1940, England was stuck in the second year of its weapons ("very little"), America - even in the first ("almost nothing"), Germany was in the fourth ("as much as needed").

Thus, Germany was secured against a major offensive by the West for at least another two years and had her hands free. If she used these two years to significantly expand her own potential, she could hope that she will not give in to her Western opponents later. However, Germany did not take advantage of this opportunity and therefore had to expect that from about 1943 onwards it would begin to lag more and more. So she had to use those two years. But how and where?

Germany was preparing for war not against England and America - it did not have a large fleet and long-range bombers - but, in accordance with Hitler's foreign policy concept, for a war on land against France and Russia. Its strength was in the army and aviation, which was created as an auxiliary weapon for the ground forces, like flying artillery. However, this instrument of war could only be used on the continent, and on the continent there was only one goal - Russia.

Hitler could not approach England (especially America), but he could approach the USSR. And if during these two years he managed to subjugate this country to his will and make its people and machines work for Germany, then he could hope that in 1943 or 1944 he would be ready for the final battle with England and America and successfully repelling the attempt Anglo-American invasion.

This is the logic that guided Hitler in 1940, when he turned his ultimate goal, namely the conquest of the Soviet Union, into a necessary intermediate stage for the war with England. If Germany wanted to use these two years of freedom of action, which was not violated by anyone, created by its predominance in the field of armaments, then this could only happen through a victorious war against the Soviet Union, even if the USSR did not give any reason or pretext for such a war. Other aggressive plans, such as Fleet Commander Raeder's plan for a deep invasion of Middle East or penetration into West Africa through Spain did not correspond to the nature of Germany's armaments. Such plans exposed the German army, abandoned overseas, to the danger of being cut off by the prevailing English fleet and did not promise, even if successful, any results that could have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war. It was necessary to decide: Russia or nothing.

Two other considerations strengthened Hitler in his decision to start a war against the USSR, which has always been and remains his true intention, and not to postpone the march to the East until the end of the war with the West. The first point was of a psychological nature and consisted in the fact that in this case to postpone meant, apparently, to refuse altogether. Hitler has repeatedly stated that after a victorious war with the West and the conclusion of peace, he will hardly succeed "overwhelmed by two major wars" the German people "once again rise against Russia." Now, however, there was a war, and therefore at the same time it was possible to solve this problem.

It was to justify the war with the USSR that Hitler often resorted to lies, only some of his statements on this set of issues can be taken at face value. But they are also distinguished by their plausibility only because they make it possible to discern that the war against the Soviet Union has always remained its cherished goal.

The second point was the extremely unpleasant thought about the growing dependence into which Hitler would inevitably fall from the USSR during the war with the West, if he abandoned his plan. True, since 1939 the USSR behaved as a completely loyal partner and supplier, and the difference between what this country voluntarily did for Germany and what could be obtained by force from a defeated, war-torn and embittered Russia, at least in the first the decisive years of the war would not have been that great at all. There was also no reason to believe that Stalin would have stabbed Germany in the back as she fought a decisive battle with the Western powers on the Atlantic coast. Stalin could not seriously wish the defeat of Germany, since he needed her as a counterweight and a barrier from the Western powers, which inspired him with even greater fear and distrust than Germany. However, Stalin could be expected to raise the political price for his benevolence and support as Germany finds itself in a quandary in the West.

The partnership between Hitler and Stalin was not an amicable alliance, including on the part of Stalin. If it was possible to turn the wayward and unauthorized partner - the USSR - into a defenseless and subjugated, at least compliant, Russia, then Hitler would always have preferred this option.

But was it even possible? It is at this point that we encounter Hitler's mistake.

To the war with the Soviet Union, which he now wanted to wage to a certain extent only as an intermediate stage in the war with the West, Hitler transferred without checking and changing his ideas, which he formed himself from the very beginning for this case. At that time, he hoped that he would be able to wage the war without any deviations and complications, in full agreement with England, with a strong rear support and the concentrated use of all forces. German Empire and will have unlimited time for this.

The previously planned war was to become a colonial war, which means - especially brutal. The defeat of the Russian armed forces would be only the first act, followed by the total occupation of this huge country, the complete elimination state power Soviet Union, the extermination of a link of leading cadres and the intelligentsia, the creation of a mobile German colonial apparatus and, finally, the enslavement of the 170 million population. It is doubtful whether such a plan was at all feasible, even under the most favorable circumstances. At any rate, it was a plan that required the life of an entire generation.

Now Hitler had only two years for the war with the USSR. But even in these two years, a quarter of the German army and a third air force were tied up in the West. By the end of this period, Hitler would have been forced to redeploy most of his troops to the Atlantic coast, and Russia, apart from insignificant occupation forces, would have been left on her own.

In these changed conditions, Hitler could, however, only hope at best to win against the Soviet Union a "European normal war" with limited goals - a kind of extended version of the blitzkrieg against France. The military plans, which provided for an offensive only up to the Volga-Arkhangelsk line, corresponded to this. The prolonged occupation of the Asian part of the Soviet Union on the other side of the Urals, even in the event of a military victory, would completely exhaust the German forces and make it impossible to continue the world war.

With limited time and energy, Hitler's plans could only succeed if the Russians did him a favor and, like the French in 1940, would enter with all the strength of their mobilized armies into a decisive struggle near the border, instead of using the vast Russian territory. ... Only then could the decisive battle be won. In addition, a Russian government had to be found that would recognize such a military solution unchanged and, like the Pétain government in France, would prefer a quick military armistice to a long desperate struggle.

But even in this case, Hitler, as in France, should have shown a readiness to set acceptable, "normal" conditions for such an armistice. He should at least recognize the authority of this Russian government in his country and create more or less normal living conditions for the Russian population in the occupied regions. Only in this case Hitler could hope to force the defeated Russia to go to "collaboration", just as it was with the defeated France. Only in this case could he think about turning back to the vanquished two or three years later.

Russia has its back, not fearing the immediate unleashing of the Russian liberation war, which would mean a war on two fronts at the time of the Anglo-American invasion.

This was the dilemma that faced Hitler in the event of a war with the USSR. Even a quick military victory, which was far from self-evident, threatened rather a deterioration than an improvement in Hitler's position in the decisive phase of the world war, if the victory in the East had not been immediately coined into the world - moreover, to establish friendly relations between defeated Russia and Germany.

But any thought of such a policy was very distant for Hitler. He was still captivated by his idea of ​​a fix about the Germanic living space in the East. He did not admit or did not want to admit that this idea now breaks the framework of his strategic capabilities. Due to lack of time, which ruled out a colonial war with Russia, from the very first day of the war, he put into motion colonial measures of extermination and enslavement. Thus, from the very beginning, he showed the people and the enemy army what awaits them in case of defeat, and plunged them into despair, not yet defeated.

Even in a European, "normal" war, Russia would obviously have emerged victorious: its population was more than twice that of Germany. The USSR had then rich military traditions, high degree weapons, and for defense - such an almost insurmountable weapon as space. The Soviet Union was not at all "ripe for the fall" - it was a young, powerfully developing state that was going through a stage of extensive modernization and industrialization.

From the moment Russian military morality was no longer questioned, Russia, with its military-technical balance and its numerical and territorial superiority, could no longer lose the war, and Germany could not win it. Even the major retreats of the Russians on the Southern Front in the 1942 war year did not change the state of affairs in any way. During these retreats, there were no more mass captures, as was the case during the major defeats in the first months of the war. In 1942, Russia deliberately used its space as a weapon, and a long retreat ended with Stalingrad.

The war against the USSR, which began in 1941, had no diplomatic background. Unlike the war with England, it was not preceded by a dispute, or a tense situation, or disagreements, or an ultimatum. Except for its existence, the USSR did not give Hitler any reason to start a war. It was Hitler's sole decision to start a war against the USSR and wage it like a colonial war. However, it should be emphasized that there was not the slightest sign of resistance against this decision in Germany, as was the case in the crises that preceded the Munich Agreement of 1938, the outbreak of the 1939 war and the 1940 campaign against France. Never before had Hitler had such a united German Empire behind him as in his murderous and suicidal war against the Soviet Union.

The war with the USSR does not have, despite big number bloody battles, own military history... Not once in the course of a war did its outcome depend on the best or worst plan of individual operations, the courage of the battle project, the strategic talent of one or another leading general. The subsequent dispute over Hitler's decision to launch an attack on Kiev first rather than Moscow in September 1941 is useless. The opposite decision, even if it led to the capture of Moscow, would not have changed the course of the war. From the moment when Hitler's true intentions became clear to the Russian people, the strength of the Russian people was opposed to the German power. From that moment on, the outcome was also clear: the Russians were stronger not only because they outnumbered, but primarily because the question of life and death was decided for them, but not for the Germans.

For the Germans, it was only about victory or defeat. The victory was lost from the moment the Russians regained control, that is, already in December 1941. However, defeat by the Russians did not mean for the Germans that their country would be turned into what Russia would have become if it had been defeated by Hitler.

In addition, the Germans could still prevent the Russians from becoming their only victors. After December 1941, when the Russians proved their newfound will to fight with the counteroffensive near Moscow, Germany could no longer win the war, but it could drag it out for years until the Western powers were ready to enter the war. The Germans could, to a certain extent, choose who they would like to be defeated and whom they would like to help win - the East or the West. They might even hope to use the East against the West, or the West against the East. From that moment on, however, they would have put the unity of their state on the line.

From that time on, the Western powers played a different role for Germany, and the war in the West changed its face. While Germany was fighting for victory in the East, she was interested in delaying the intensification of hostilities in the West as long as possible, and especially America's entry into the war. But since Germany in the East could only fight for a postponement of defeat, she should have been interested as much as possible in speeding up the entry of the Western powers into the war, and hence America's entry into the war. After all, only the active performance of England and America in the European theater of military operations gave Germany a chance to replace defeat in the East with defeat in the West, or even cause a major war between East and West as a continuation of the war with the Soviet Union, during which to act on one side or another (on which side - there was almost no doubt) and thus still turn defeat into victory.

Hitler became aware of this new position on December 6, 1941, when the Russians launched an unusually powerful counteroffensive near Moscow. “When the winter catastrophe of 1941-1942 began,” says the war diary of the Wehrmacht's main headquarters, “it became clear to the Fuhrer and Colonel General [Jodl] that the climax had been passed and ... victory could no longer be achieved”.

Five days later, on December 1941, Hitler declared war on America. There is a relationship between these two events.

CHAPTER SECOND Twenty Years and Internecine Wars. - War with the allies and complete unity of Italy. Sulla and Marius: First War with Mithridates; first internecine war. Sulla's dictatorship (100-78 BC) Livy Drusus proposes reforms Currently government power

CHAPTER THREE General state of affairs: Gnaeus Pompey. - The war in Spain. - Slave war. - War with sea robbers. - War in the East. - The third war with Mithridates. - Conspiracy of Catiline. - The return of Pompey and the first triumvirate. (78-60 BC) General

CHAPTER FOUR The First Triumvirate: Caesar's Consulate. - Gallic War: Pompey in Rome. - Luka conference. - The campaign of Crassus against the Parthians. - The collapse of the triumvirate and a new civil war. The first triumvirate. The Consulate of Caesar The first success of this mutual