29th grenadier division ss ron. Traitors

In the second half of July 1944, the RONA brigade crossed the borders of the General Government, heading towards the Upper Silesian town of Ratibor. On the territory of the Reich, almost without receiving food, the subordinates of B.V. Kaminsky dug potatoes along the way, were engaged in illegal confiscation of food and material property from local residents. Such actions led to conflicts, as food and belongings were confiscated from the Reichsdeutsche. For this, the Germans shot several soldiers and officers of the RONA, including the commander of the 3rd regiment, Major N.I. Proshina.

At the very end of July, not far from the town of Oppeln, where at that moment there were units of the brigade, B.V. Kaminsky was summoned to Berlin. He finally received word from SS Obergruppenfuehrer Kurt von Gottberg, who secured an audience for him with the chief of the security detachments.

It must be said that back in July 1944, Kaminskiy's compound was included in the SS troops and became known as the SS Sturmbrigade RONA (SS-Sturmbrigade RONA). Himmler, who became commander-in-chief of the Reserve Army after July 20, 1944 (after an unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life), was empowered to create new military formations. RONA was a combat-ready formation, and it was planned to deploy an SS division on its base. This explains why the brigade of Russian collaborators was withdrawn to Upper Silesia, and not left on the territory of the General Government, where the Wehrmacht could hardly restrain the onslaught of the Red Army.

On July 31, 1944, B.V. Kaminsky with Heinrich Himmler. The leader of the "Black Order" thanked Kaminsky for the successful actions of the brigade and personally awarded him the 1st degree Iron Cross.

On August 1, 1944, the SS Main Operations Directorate issued an order for the deployment of RONA in the 29th Waffen-SS Grenadier Division / Russian No. 1 / (29. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS / Russische Nr. 1 /). The formation of the 72nd (based on the 1st infantry regiment), 73rd (based on 2nd and 3rd rifle regiments) and 74th (based on 4th and 5th rifle regiments) Waffen-grenadier regiments, 29th supply regiment, fusilier, engineer and reserve battalions, anti-tank battalion, communications battalion, anti-aircraft artillery battalion, sanitary and veterinary companies. The brigade's artillery regiment was reorganized into the 29th Waffen-artillery regiment (in real states - a division). Parts of the guards battalion were distributed among the regiments and units of the new division. The compound was armed with about 20 guns, 30 mortars, more than 100 machine guns.

Of particular interest is the number of armored vehicles in the division. For example, at the beginning of 1944 the armored division consisted of 12 tanks (KV, eight T-34, three BT-7), six armored vehicles. However, it is known that, by tradition, armored vehicles were present not only in it, but also in rifle units, and in considerable quantities. So, to suppress the Warsaw Uprising, the Su-76 self-propelled artillery unit was allocated. There is a photo of the BA-10 armored car, which also operated in Warsaw. By November 1944, the half-decayed division had two KVs and twelve T-34s.

During a personal conversation, Himmler promised Kaminsky to bring his unit to be reorganized into a military training camp in Neuhammer, and the refugees (about 10,500 people), as soon as conditions are created, to evacuate to Hungary. However, here, as noted by the historian S. Drobyazko, new problems arose. The Russian-German evacuation committee operating in Budapest was not informed about the transfer of refugees, and the Hungarian government, whose consent was also not asked by anyone, did not feel any joy about the possible arrival of the Kamintsy. A lively exchange of radiograms began between Berlin and Budapest, and, finally, the highest SS and police Fuhrer in Hungary, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Otto Winkelmann, achieved the consent of the Hungarian authorities to Himmler's request to accept refugees. But the latter created more and more difficulties, demanding that part of the RONA brigade with weapons remain to protect families. Many "Kamintsy" also hoped that in the new location they would be given the right to create the same self-governing region as in Lokt, Lepel and Dyatlovo. It goes without saying that the Hungarian side could not agree with such demands, infringing on its sovereignty.

Extract from the order on awarding Kaminsky the rank of Waffen Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Waffen SS

Nevertheless, certain agreements were reached. However, as soon as the trains with the refugees set off, a national uprising broke out in Slovakia, through the territory of which the transfer was to be carried out, and the evacuation was stopped. The Kamintsev families, unable to accommodate anywhere, were forced to live in carriages, which especially annoyed the representatives of the Imperial Railway Administration, who insisted on the quick return of the rolling stock for military transport. The refugees also soon ran out of food supplies, after which the plunder of the German population began. Gauleiter of Upper Silesia, Fritz Bracht, threatened to bring to justice the SS officers who accompanied the trains if they did not remove the "Kamintsy" from the territory under his jurisdiction.

All these unpleasant incidents took place against the backdrop of the August 1944 uprising in Warsaw. As you know, the commander of the Home Army (AK) Tadeusz Komorowski (nickname "Boer") gave his units in the capital (about 40 thousand people) an order to start an open armed struggle against the German garrison of the city. He took this step, guided by the idea that the Poles would liberate Warsaw before the arrival of the Red Army and win their independence. A Soviet troops, the purpose of the summer offensive of which, as Komorowski believed, is the capture of the Polish capital, will complete the defeat of the Germans.

One of Warsaw streets in a quiet moment

In our opinion, the Warsaw Uprising was initially doomed to failure. The fate of post-war Poland had already been decided at a conference in Tehran at the end of 1943, and Stalin was not going to provide full-fledged military assistance to the forces that still had to be suppressed (the Soviet leadership limited itself to the supply of weapons and food).

In addition, the Allies for some reason did not take into account the tenacity and resilience of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS. They were not yet demoralized and did not think to give up. The position of the Germans was, of course, difficult, but by no means critical. Only the 2nd Soviet Tank Army lost 500 tanks and self-propelled guns on the outskirts of the Polish capital. In early August, the Wehrmacht stopped the advance of the Red Army, concentrated significant forces of tanks and motorized infantry northeast of Prague (a suburb of Warsaw) and created a continuous defense front, which was impossible to break through on the move, without careful preparation.

The uprising in Warsaw did not come as a surprise to German authorities... As early as July, agents of the security police and SD reported about the impending armed uprising. The Gestapo set the exact date and time when the fighting... The Governor of Warsaw, SA Gruppenfuehrer L. Fischer, City Commandant Lieutenant General of the Luftwaffe R. Stagel and SS and Police Chief SS Oberfuehrer P.O. Geibel, already on the night of July 31 to August 1, took counter-actions. At 13.00, the alarm was announced in German institutions, at 14.00–15.00, skirmishes began in the Wola and Zoliborz districts (they are located on the western bank of the Vistula, in the same place as the Old Town, Okhota, Mokotov, Chernyakov, Okecie and Tsentralny districts). At 17.00 on the signal "Tempest" the Home Army went into action.

There was no close interaction and constant communication between the German units, which the rebels took advantage of. By the end of the day, they managed to capture the Old Town area, but the Poles suffered heavy losses (according to German data, in the first two days of fighting, from 2 to 2.5 thousand AK soldiers were killed). The large casualties among the rebels (as well as the civilian population caught up in the epicenter of the confrontation) are explained by the fact that the AK members were poorly armed. They had mainly small arms and automatic weapons (about 1,100 heavy and 60 light machine guns; 300 machine guns, 1,400 rifles and 25,000 grenades), but even this was barely enough to arm 10% of the participants in the uprising. Subsequently, the rebels received help from the allies and the Red Army. They were delivered 3247 small arms, 169 mortars, 55 thousand mines and grenades, 5 million 700 thousand cartridges, 35 thousand tons of food. This help allowed the Poles to hold out longer than they had expected, but a tragic ending was inevitable.

One of the German barricades in Warsaw

The uprising that broke out in Warsaw was immediately reacted by the operational department of the German General Staff, who prepared an analytical report on the situation in the city. Chief of General Staff, Colonel General G . Guderian, personally turned to Hitler with a proposal to declare Warsaw part of the operational zone of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht and send troops into it, but the Führer, after a recent assassination attempt organized by senior army officers, rejected Guderian's proposal and entrusted the SS with the task of suppressing the uprising. At the same time, the Wehrmacht had to coordinate all its actions with the SS and provide Himmler's people with all the help they need.

The Reichsfuehrer SS entrusted the command of the operation to destroy the insurgents to SS Obergruppenfuehrer Erich von dem Bach, a specialist in the fight against "gangs". The SS chief gave him detailed instructions. Referring to Hitler's order, which stated that "Every Warsaw citizen should be killed, not excluding women and children, and Warsaw should be destroyed" , Himmler demanded to act ruthlessly: “You can call me a barbarian. Yes, I agree, but I have no choice. " . Although, as von dem Bach later argued, he opposed the instructions of the head of the "Black Order", the SS and police units operating in Warsaw were well aware of them.

E. von dem Bach-Zelewski

As a matter of fact, von dem Bach's testimonies of repentance have long raised doubts among historians as to their sincerity. His post-war complaints about the disproportionate use of force by the SS troops, including "Kamintsy", should be considered hypocritical, especially since von dem Bach himself committed so many bloody deeds during the war that they cannot be compared with the events of Warsaw. So, we can recall the barbaric massacres arranged by von dem Bach in November 1941 near Mogilev, when, when he was the highest Fuhrer of the SS and police of Central Russia, he directed the actions of his headquarters team and units of the 322nd police battalion to exterminate Jewish women and children.

On August 2, 1944, von dem Bach left for Warsaw. Meanwhile, the commander of the 9th Army, General of the Panzer Troops Nikolaus von Foreman, asked to support the Wehrmacht. By August 6, almost half of the troops (7496 people), allocated to suppress the uprising, entered Warsaw. Gradually, the composition of the von dem Bach force and equipment was determined (its strength eventually reached 16 thousand 696 people):

Poznan SS Police Regiment;

Special Regiment SS "Dirlewanger";

III Division of the 5th Artillery Regiment of the SS Panzer Division "Viking";

Consolidated Regiment of the 29th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division;

I and II battalions of the 1st East Muslim SS regiment;

II (Azerbaijani) battalion of the "Highlander" Special Forces;

SS Cossack Police Battalion;

Convoy and security squadron SD;

III Cossack Cavalry Battalion of the 57th Guard Regiment;

5th Kuban regiment of the Cossack Camp;

572nd, 580th, 631th Cossack battalions;

Three Ukrainian companies in the SD;

Battalion of the 608th security regiment of the Wehrmacht;

Reserve battalion of the tank parachute division "Hermann Goering";

Flamethrower battalion "Krone";

Sapper company No. 500;

Mortar Company No. 1000;

Rocket launcher battery (Nebelwerfer) # 201;

Howitzer battery No. 638;

218th and 302nd tank companies;

Self-propelled artillery training battery;

The fact that the RONA servicemen were involved in the suppression of the Warsaw uprising, Kaminsky learned while in Berlin. He, as the historian K. Semyonov writes, received Himmler's telegram with the following content: "I am waiting for your help in this matter" .

Upon arrival at the compound, Kaminsky convened a meeting, in which the chief of staff of the division I.P. Shavykin, intelligence chief B.A. Kostenko, adjutant of division commander R.K. Belay, head of the military-investigative department G.S. Protsyuk, commanders of the 1st, 2nd and 5th regiments I.D. Frolov, Golyakov and Romanov, commander of a separate guards battalion Burygin. Kaminsky reported that the unit had been renamed to the division of the German SS forces and assigned No. 29; he was promoted to major general and ordered to send part of the division to Warsaw. Each regiment commander must allocate 400 people ("A battalion of reliable people"). It was necessary to form a consolidated regiment under the command of the Waffen-Obersturmbannführer SS I.D. Frolov (chief of staff of the Waffen-SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Nochevkin) and prepare for transfer to the former Polish capital.

The consolidated regiment was formed from both family and unmarried military personnel, and consisted of four rifle battalions, four T-34, Su-76 tanks and two 122-mm howitzers. The size of the regiment, according to German documents, was 1,700 people, according to the testimony of the officers of the division I.D. Frolov and P.R. Mayorov - from 1,500 to 1,600 people.

In the early morning of August 3, the personnel boarded their vehicles and moved to the designated area. The regimental convoy, according to the diary of the RON fighter Ivan Vashenko, moved at maximum speed along the route: the suburb of Ratibor - Czestochowa - Tomaszow - Radomsko - Warsaw, and on August 4 the Kamintsy entered the battle. According to Frolov's testimony, the convoy moved more slowly - on August 5, the Russian SS men only passed Czestochowa (which is consistent with German documents). On August 8, the regiment arrived at the village of Rakov, located four kilometers southwest of Warsaw. The next day, Kaminsky arrived at the unit with an order from the German command to attack.

Frolov's regiment was included in the combat group of the SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lieutenant General of the SS and Police forces Heinz Reinefarth (Kampfgruppe "Reinefarth") - it was he who was instructed by von dem Bach to suppress the uprising. The "Reine Fart" battle group was divided into several operational formations that carried out the cleansing of Warsaw - these were the battle groups "Rek", "Rohr", "Dirlewanger", "Schmidt", the cover group "Sarnoff", etc. Each group was assigned a sector divided into sectors. Assault units assigned to clear the sectors were required not only to destroy the insurgents, but also to capture the leaders of the militants, for which each group had special SD teams. These formations, which consisted of members of the Security Police and SD of Warsaw, Radom, Lodz, Lublin and Poznan, were part of the Sonderkommando of SS Hauptsturmführer Alfred Spilker (Sonderkommando "Spilker-Warschau"). Spilker worked closely with the headquarters of the battle group "Reinefarth" and the headquarters of von dem Bach in Krakow.

On August 9, the subordinates of Frolov and Nochevkin became part of the battle group of Major General Gunther Rohr (Karfgrurre "Rohr"). Parts of the latter operated in the "South" sector, sector "D". In addition to the Kamintsev, the Rohr group (total number 6161 people) included the 627th engineer battalion, the sapper company No. 500, the 80th anti-aircraft regiment, the 3rd artillery regiment battalion of the 5th SS Panzer division "Viking", security units Colonel V. Rodewald's police and the SD team "Birkner" (Teilkommando "Birkner"). The unit was tasked with clearing out of the rebels in the districts of Volya, Okhota, Okecie and Mokotov.

"Kamintsy" fought against the rebels, entrenched in the Okhota area. The firing points of the Poles were suppressed with the help of artillery. Participants in those battles recalled how Frolov personally fired from a 122-mm howitzer at houses, from where the AK fighters resisted.

The battles for residential areas were distinguished by great cruelty, both sides did not take prisoners. Already on the first day, when the offensive from Rakov to Okhota was carried out, the "Kamintsy" had to take up defensive positions, since the losses from the fire of the rebels were sensitive (50 people killed and wounded). But, having got used to it, the RONA soldiers began to press the Poles, clearing street after street.

SS Gruppenführer H. Reinefarth and Waffen-Brigadeführer B.V. Kaminsky. Warsaw, August 1944

In the historical literature, there is an opinion that Kaminsky's subordinates were not ready to conduct battles in the city, therefore they suffered prohibitively high losses and, in fact, did not fight, but were engaged in the murder of civilians, robberies, etc. This statement, in our opinion, is not entirely objective. The Kamintsev had a certain experience of conducting hostilities in urban-type settlements (one can recall the battles in Sevsk, Lepel and Chashniki). In Warsaw, Kamintsev certainly had difficulties, but they should not be exaggerated. The losses of the Frolov regiment were less than that of the German and other collaborationist units (the heaviest damage was suffered by the assault units of O. Dirlewanger).

Street fighting in Warsaw

Fights in the city are a test for any military unit and often lead to large casualties. Along with the Kamintsy, according to Frolov's testimony, two German companies fought, each of which had lost approximately 30% of its personnel by August 13. Frolov gave orders for the offensive only after fire support was provided. That is why some friction arose between him and Kaminsky, due to the fact that the regiment's units were extremely slowly clearing the designated area from the Poles, while the German command received orders to do it faster.

On August 11, the "Kamintsy" tried to take possession of a factory in the suburbs of Warsaw. After some time, one of the battalion commanders arrived at the regiment headquarters and reported to Frolov that it was impossible to take the factory by infantry force. Frolov reported this to Kaminsky, to which he replied: "If it is impossible for you, then it is possible for me, I myself will lead the offensive.". On August 12, after a two-hour battle, the factory was taken. The regiment lost about 70 people. For this battle, Kaminsky and Shavykin were presented by the German command to the awards that they received on August 18. According to Frolov, a German general arrived at the headquarters of the division commander, who handed Kaminsky "Some unknown order" (possibly the SS badge "For the fight against partisans"), and Shavykin - the Iron Cross of the 1st class. After the war, Frolov testified that he had used Shavykin's award certificate, erased the last name, first name, patronymic of the murdered, and typed his initials on a typewriter with German script. And he allegedly removed the cross of the 1st class from the killed German liaison officer at his headquarters. In our opinion, Frolov in this case misled the investigation, trying to hide the fact that he was awarded for the Warsaw operation, which aggravated his guilt.

On August 16, RONA soldiers continued to fight in the streets. Having cleared several blocks, the assault groups stopped. Three German tanks, which were supported by SS fire, were burned. In this battle, "Kamintsy" lost another 40 people killed and wounded. Subsequently, the regiment lost daily from 5 to 20 people.

"one. The Germans are not entirely happy with our progress, that we are progressing slowly, while other groups have advanced more.

2. I raised the question of assigning the regiment to a separate independent sector, to which the command agreed.

3. The Germans attach serious importance to the troubles that have arisen with the Germans, but these are trifles. "

By August 19, the Okhota area was more than half cleared of the rebels, but the Kamintsy in 10 days could not complete the task to the end - to reach the Vistula River in their sector. Accepting Kaminsky's proposal, the German command decided to change the regiment. Frolov was ordered to move to an area located 25-30 km north-west of Warsaw and comb the forests where Polish partisans became active.

RONA servicemen in Warsaw

Historians sometimes explain the withdrawal of the regiment from Warsaw by the fact that discipline has seriously fallen among the "Kamintsev", they killed several Germans and plundered the population. Some facts of this kind did take place. But it should be remembered that the Germans themselves gave carte blanche for the looting actions. Kaminsky was allowed to engage in looting personally by the commander of the 9th Army von Foreman (in a conversation with Reinefarth he said: "After all, I had to offer them something so that these people would fight well." ).

"Kamintsy" seized things of the civilian population, but not in such quantities as other parts of the SS and the Wehrmacht. In the first ten days of the uprising alone, the Germans removed about 7,000 railway cars with various property. The SS men of Dirlewanger were the absolute leaders in this matter. British researcher Colin Heaton states: “Dirlewanger's units were even worse than Kaminsky's group; the soldiers of this SS regiment caused problems and got out of control. " . Historian A. Pishenkov notes: “Dirlewanger was firmly convinced that he was personally subordinate to Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, and therefore often ignored the orders of the command on the ground. In the presence of von dem Bach-Zelewski, he once threatened his chief of staff, SS-Standartenfuehrer Goltz, that he would kill him if he continued to interfere in his affairs ... and Dirlewanger clearly did not throw words to the wind - after that the headquarters of von dem Bach several times was subjected to machine-gun fire from the positions of the Sonderkommando " .

Running a little ahead, we note that after the suppression of the uprising (October 2, 1944), the Germans tried to analyze the events that had taken place and give them an appropriate assessment. At the same time, they did not forget to mention how Kaminsky's subordinates acted in Warsaw. So, in the report of the SS and police chief in the Warsaw district, SS Brigadeführer Paul Geibel on the uprising in Warsaw, it was noted: “I learned about the use of Kaminsky's troops through two telephone conversations with Rodewald. Commander of the 2nd reserve company shupo(to the security police. - Note. Auth.), who were stationed in the garrison in the southwestern part of the city, reported that it was constantly fired upon by its strange-looking troops, most likely Russians. He already has facts of the attack, but he cannot contact them. The second call was from a Pole who in the area turned to the German police for help. The behavior of the Russians was so inhuman that civilians turned to urgent help. Rodewald explained to him that we were surrounded by an insurrection and that the nearby police were too weak and poorly armed to intervene. Then I learned through Stagel from his staff officer that Kaminsky's gangs deliberately avoid serious battles, do not advance, but only rob, drink and rape. Most likely, Himmler gave them the right to rob. " .

German soldiers between battles

It is clear from P. Geibel's report that the Germans tried to place all the blame for the atrocities and reprisals against the Polish population on Kaminsky and his fighters. Geibel modestly kept silent about how the assault units of Dirlewanger and the SS Poznan police regiment acted, which on August 5 (when Frolov's regiment was not yet in Warsaw) shot a total of about 2,000 people in and near the Wielski hospital. "Hospital buildings were completely burned with non-walking patients inside". The same fate befell the hospital of St. Lazarus, where more than 300 people were burned to death.

Of course, Kaminsky's subordinates did not miss the opportunity to rob, drink and perform other unworthy acts. However, the Germans themselves did the same. As for the slow advance of the "Kamintsev", it was conditioned by the extremely difficult conditions of hostilities. Other German and collaborationist units were in the same position. They, like the soldiers of Frolov's regiment, met stubborn resistance and did not always fulfill the assigned tasks on time. Suffice it to refer to the telegram of the commander of the 9th Army von Foreman dated August 9, 1944, where he writes that the German troops are suffering very heavy losses, the situation is difficult, in order to suppress the uprising, it is necessary "A strong, combatant division equipped with heavy weapons". That is, in the period from 1 to 9 August, the Wehrmacht units did not achieve serious success in the city.

Frolov's interrogation protocol contains the following words: “Yes, the suppression of the Warsaw uprising was carried out with brutal methods. Tanks, artillery and aircraft were used against the insurgents who had taken refuge in the houses. The rebels, on the other hand, had only rifles and, in some cases, machine guns and submachine guns. In most cases, in the basements of houses where the rebels were hiding, civilians were hiding, who died due to the destruction of these buildings by aircraft and artillery from direct fire. The same methods of struggle were used by the divisions of the consolidated regiment of the Kaminsky brigade, which I commanded. In addition, the soldiers of the combined regiment were allowed to plunder the civilian population with complete impunity. Such an instruction was given by Kaminsky. In addition, the divisions of the combined regiment took part in the forcible evacuation of civilians from Warsaw. At the same time, citizens were allowed to take with them a minimum of basic necessities, property that remained in apartments was plundered ".

Combat group SS moves to new position in Warsaw

Regarding the crimes of the regiment, Frolov replied as follows: “The subdivisions of the consolidated regiment of the Kaminsky brigade did not take part in the executions of the civilian population. The facts of the mass execution of civilians in Warsaw are not known to me at all, except for those cases when the civilian population died en masse during the shelling of houses in which the insurgents were hiding, artillery and bombing them from the air by aviation " .

It is difficult to find out how honest Frolov was when recalling these events. There is undoubtedly a certain amount of truth in his testimony, although it seems doubtful that he did not know what measures, in addition to artillery and air strikes, were used by German troops against the rebels and civilians... There is an opinion that after the Warsaw operation, the council of officers of the division condemned Frolov for the actions of his fighters in the city. However, according to the commander of the consolidated regiment himself, they condemned him "Not for the brutal sadistic actions to suppress the uprising, but for failure to comply with the order of the German command to harvest the forest 25-30 km north-west of Warsaw" .

At the same time, the testimony of Frolov indicates that the combined regiment used the same methods against the Poles as the field units of the Wehrmacht, SS and police. And, therefore, Geibel's report, where only the "fireplaces" are depicted as the culprits of the outrages in Warsaw, is, to put it mildly, "subjective." Nevertheless, the state authorities of the Reich were not going to delve into the nuances of this case, and therefore were quite satisfied with the fact that the servicemen of the compound, which had already been disbanded by that time, were accused of atrocities against the civilian population.

Subsequently, the combined regiment of Kaminsky - Frolov was again presented as an uncontrollable gang that thwarted the negotiations, and the inhuman actions of the Russian SS men allegedly pushed the passive Polish civilian population towards the rebels, because of which fierce battles continued until the beginning of September, until favorable conditions to negotiate with Komorowski. This point of view appears in the final report of the Governor of the Warsaw District Ludwig Fischer to the Reich Minister-General Hans Frank (December 1944):

“Temporarily, the position of the population of Warsaw as a whole changed in the period from 10 to 20 August, when Kaminsky's Cossacks who found themselves in Warsaw took action against Polish women and children. Referring to this, the AK launched its campaigning activities, saying that all Polish women and children would be treated this way. Then many contacted AK or in some other way provided support to AK.

After the troops under the command of Kaminsky were withdrawn from the city due to the fact that they did not behave in accordance with the discipline requirements for German soldiers, the broad masses of the population again turned their backs on the AK, and from that moment they took a passive position in relation to to the uprising " .

Kaminsky's "Cossacks", behavior that did not comply with the requirements of "discipline for German soldiers" - formulations of this kind were unlikely to fully give an impartial assessment of the actions of the "Kaminski", as well as the true attitude of the Polish population towards the Germans. This idea is confirmed by the words of division officer A.C. Perkhurov, told by him to the investigator of the counterintelligence service "Smersh" of the MGB of the group of Soviet occupation forces in Germany, senior lieutenant Vlasov: “Having committed the shameful fact of reprisals against the population of Warsaw, which became the property of the entire world community, the Germans obviously wanted to wash their hands and blame for the cruelty shown to the civilian population on“ volunteer ”units, including the consolidated regiment of the Kaminsky brigade.”

RONA fighter. Warsaw, August 1944

On August 19, Frolov's regiment was ordered to leave Warsaw. The battalions of the regiment were withdrawn gradually, as their positions were occupied by German units, so the Kamintsy continued to fight until August 28 inclusive. From the diary of the Russian SS man I. Vashenka it is known that by August 18 the losses of the regiment amounted to about 500 people killed and wounded. According to P.R. Mayorov, more reliable, in our opinion, the losses amounted to more than 200 people. But these were not the last casualties in Warsaw, as on August 22 the consolidated company of the 16th battalion was almost completely killed. The death of the company, if you believe the words of Vashenka, was due to the indiscipline of the personnel.

Having occupied one of the houses, the soldiers scattered across the floors in search of jewelry, food and vodka. Polish militants hiding in the basements and on the upper floors suddenly opened fire from machine guns and pelted the Russian SS men with grenades and Molotov cocktails. It is not known how the battalion and regiment command reacted to this unpleasant episode. There is no mention of this case in the testimony of the former "Kamintsev".

While the units of the regiment were leaving Warsaw, on about August 22, an officer from the headquarters of von dem Bach arrived at the headquarters of the unit. From him Kaminsky received an order to arrive in Krakow, and the regiment was to move to the Augustow Forest area, where by that time significant forces of Polish partisans were concentrated - about 14,000 people. Before leaving, as Frolov recalled, Kaminsky drew for him on the map the route of the regiment's movement and the place where the unit was supposed to concentrate. There, as Frolov argued, Kaminsky was supposed to arrive, and only after his arrival should the fight against the partisans begin. But about three days later, on August 25, when some of the regiment's units were still in Warsaw, an unknown general (according to another version, an officer) arrived at the headquarters, reporting that Kaminsky and Shavykin had been killed by partisans in the Krakow area. Having reported this sad news, the general told Frolov: "The regiment will be commanded by you yourself and begin to carry out the combat mission of harvesting the forest.". Frolov replied as follows:

"one. The fate of Kaminsky is unknown to me, he ordered me to wait for him.

2. The existing weapons in the regiment are out of order and completely unsuitable for combat. You cannot fight with such a weapon.

3. Personnel are very tired and worried about families.

To this the general replied that it will take you 5 days to clear the forest. I replied again that Kaminsky had ordered me to wait for him. The weapon is unusable and I cannot fight with such a weapon, I ask you to send the regiment to the location of the brigade. After that, a commission for checking weapons came to the regiment, which also found that the weapon was unsuitable for combat. However, even after the commission's work, the general twice suggested (albeit not in an orderly tone) to carry out the task. To which I replied that offensive operations you cannot carry on with such a weapon, but if you insist, then replace the weapon. " .

From further testimony from Frolov, it follows that he received an order to withdraw from the regiment and proceed to the railway station for loading into trains. The loading had to wait for 6 days, after which part of them left for the brigade's point of deployment, in the city of Ratibor. But, based on other documents, we can say that everything looked a little different. By August 28, the regiment was withdrawn from Warsaw (the German commission, which examined the state of weapons and personnel, had already completed its work, recognizing Frolov's demands as justified). On the same day, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the unit was built. Frolov made a short speech urging the personnel to honor the memory of the fallen soldiers and commanders. After that, he completed the task. Then the regiment, despite all the shortcomings discovered by the commission, was still thrown into the fight against the partisans - in the area settlement Truskav (20 km from Warsaw), where he concentrated. Frolov was inactive, did not conduct active actions, which was used by the Polish partisans. On the night of September 2 to 3, 1944, a detachment of lieutenant "Dolina" attacked Truskav, where it caught two battalions of the consolidated regiment by surprise. During the fighting, the regiment allegedly lost about 100 people killed and about 100 wounded. The AK fighters captured 1 75-mm cannon, 2 heavy machine guns, 23 light machine guns, 16 assault rifles, 2 82 mm mortars, 48 ​​rifles, 10,000 cartridges, 11 horses, 4 carts with food and uniforms, as well as a field radio station.

It seems that it was the unsuccessful battles of the Kamintsevs in Truskava that finally convinced the German command to withdraw and send the regiment to Ratibor. By the end of the first decade of September 1944, Frolov's subordinates arrived in the town of Shamrau, 10 km from Ratibor. Here, they most likely learned about the recent attack by partisan units on the brigade, as a result of which 150 soldiers died. Further, as already noted, an officers' council took place, which examined the actions of Frolov's regiment during the Warsaw Uprising. According to the testimony of the officer of the division A.S. Perkhurov, the officers' council was assembled at the direction of the German command. The council was chaired by the Waffen-Obersturmbannführer R.K. Belay, already appointed by that time to the post of commander of the formation (the chief of staff was the Waffen-Sturmbannführer Romanov). Frolov's case was heard first. According to A.S. Perkhurova, Frolov told how “Together with his subordinates, he burst into the quarters of Polish citizens with the aim of robbery and personally shot Polish citizens who were trying to escape. The extent of the plunder of the Polish population in Warsaw could be judged by the fact that each soldier of the consolidated regiment, after returning from the Warsaw operation, could have up to 15-20 gold hours. " .

Division officers, as shown by A.S. Perkhurov, condemned the brutal, sadistic actions of Frolov in relation to the civilian population. Frolov tried to make excuses. In his post-war testimony, he rejected the accusations of A.S. Perkhurov, presenting to the investigator his version of how his case was heard at the officers' council: “Arriving at the brigade, I was dismissed from the command of the regiment on charges that I had not coped with the assigned task, thereby reducing the brigade's authority, which is why the Germans wanted to disarm the brigade and send it to the camps. This charge was brought against me at a meeting of officers. At this meeting, Belay said that "in view of this, I made a promise to the Germans to correct the mistakes made." All this was artificially created by Belai, as I later learned, in order to create an unhealthy environment around me, since after the murder of Kaminsky, many officers of the brigade were talking about my appointment as the brigade commander. " .

Despite serious proceedings, the Frolov case was not given a course. After spending 15 days behind the staff, he was then appointed to the post of assistant chief of staff of the division (A.C. Perkhurov claimed to be the commander of the 1st regiment).

Below we will try to partially clarify the question of the reasons for the death of the commander of the 29th division. The most widespread in the literature was the version according to which Kaminsky was shot by order of von dem Bach because of the facts of insubordination, looting and a fall of discipline in the divisions of the consolidated regiment. Kaminsky was killed on the road in his car along with his companions (chief of staff Waffen-Obersturmbannführer I.P. Shavykin, doctor F.N. . Sadovsky and a personal driver).

In his memoirs, G . Guderian writes that von dem Bach reported to him about the atrocities committed by the fighters of Kaminsky and Dirlewanger. Guderian reported everything to Hitler and demanded the removal of SS units from the city. Hitler refused to satisfy these demands, but after Himmler's representative - SS Gruppenführer Hermann Fegelein - confirmed Guderian's words, the Fuhrer ordered the withdrawal of SS troops from Warsaw. Guderian further notes: "Von dem Bach made sure that Kaminsky was shot" .

According to the historian Heinz Höhne, Hitler allegedly gave von den Bach the opportunity to remove Kaminsky, as "Unwanted witness and main marauder" .

According to von dem Bach himself, it turns out that he gave the order to shoot Kaminsky on his own initiative, because in his heart, as he admitted after the war, he opposed the inhuman order of the Reichsfuehrer to kill women and children: "I obstructed Himmler's orders and even shot the head of that brigade and its employees because they were following these orders." .

However, in his testimony given to the British military, von dem Bach gave a completely different reason for the shooting: “Both the position I have taken in Warsaw as a whole and the execution of Kaminsky go beyond the usual decisions. I ask you to question witness Rode (cell 389) on the occasion of Himmler's indignation about this.

According to SS rule, every death sentence imposed on an SS member had to be personally approved by Himmler. I informed him of the fait accompli immediately after the action.

Kaminsky was killed not because he appropriated the plundered property of German institutions, but because, according to Himmler's order, he continued to plunder himself and allowed others to plunder. As a witness, I can name Kaminsky's immediate superior, Major General Rohr, after whose service report I passed the death sentence. The loot found at Kaminsky's was confirmation of Major General Rohr's report.

A military court can issue an expedited sentence if the perpetrator is caught red-handed and for crimes such as refusal to comply with an order, robbery and murder. The appropriation of the looted property is considered by a military court. It was impossible to apply the military court procedure, since Kaminsky robbed with the permission of Himmler.

Thus, the basis for the application of the military court procedure could only be a refusal to carry out orders in the face of the enemy " .

Von dem Bach, therefore, ordered the execution of Kaminsky because he did not follow his orders. But what these orders were, he did not specify. In this regard, it is not entirely clear for what exactly Kaminsky was sentenced to an exceptional punishment in combat conditions and why Himmler was not informed about this (later he was indignant at the unauthorized actions of the commander of the group of forces and means).

As far as the documents allow, Kaminsky, on the contrary, tried in every possible way to carry out all the orders of the German command.

There is a version that there were very tense relations between Kaminsky and von dem Bach. According to some testimonies, the commander of the Russian SS men was outraged by the ugly supply of his units and expressed his dissatisfaction personally to von dem Bach.

On what day was Kaminsky executed, and where did it happen? According to some historians, Kaminsky and the people accompanying him were shot by a team from the Kulmhof concentration camp (Chelmno) under the leadership of SS Hauptsturmführer Hans Botmann. The execution was carried out on 28 August 1944 in a forest near Litzmanstadt (Lodz), not far from the Jewish ghetto. According to another version, the verdict on Kaminsky was passed by a military-field court of the SS, and the execution took place on August 19 (this version disappears, since no SS court examined Kaminsky's case).

There is a curious opinion that Kaminsky allegedly left Warsaw illegally and began to sneak into the Carpathians to meet with representatives of the UPA. Not far from Tarnow, his company car was stopped by officers from the Krakow SD. Their chief, SS Brigadeführer Walter Birkampf, ordered a staged attack with the aim of robbery, the victim of which was allegedly Kaminsky, who was shot after being arrested. But this version looks far-fetched and does not inspire confidence (why did the Ukrainian nationalists suddenly need a half-German, half-Pole, to whom the Russians and Belarusians are subordinate?).

Another version was expressed by a member of the NTS Roman Redlich, who served in RONA for some time. According to him, Kaminsky was summoned by the Germans before the Warsaw Uprising, and he disappeared without a trace, and then there were rumors about his execution. As far as is known, the members of the NTS themselves were going to liquidate Kaminsky, since he refused to voluntarily become subordinate to the command of the ROA and his activities, according to the ENTES members, compromised the "Russian liberation movement." However, for a number of reasons, the operation to eliminate Kaminsky could not be carried out.

Recently, a point of view has often been encountered, according to which the death of Kaminsky was facilitated by those who sympathized with Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov high-ranking SS men (Gottlob Berger and Gunther d "Alken), since the commander of the 29th division allegedly claimed the role of the leader of Russian collaborationism.

By the fall of 1944, Vlasov was actually chosen to be the commander of the united Russian armed formations. September 16, 1944, after a personal meeting with the former Soviet general at his headquarters in Rastenburg, Himmler promised Vlasov that he would soon start organizing the armed forces of the ROA (and indeed, after a while, the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia - the Armed Forces of the KONR - were created). Up to this point, Vlasov was just a "wedding general" in the service of the German propaganda machine.

RON'S soldiers. August 1944

Unlike Vlasov, Kaminsky since October 1941 really showed himself in hostilities against partisans (although German propaganda was silent about this experience, as well as about the existence of RONA and Lokot autonomy). In principle, given the ambitious character of the commander of the 29th division, one cannot completely rule out his claims to a leading position in the "Russian liberation movement". However, if Kaminsky seriously counted on this role, he would undoubtedly begin to take some concrete steps for this. While none of his former subordinates after the war remembered anything like that.

Kaminsky was hardly afraid of the possibility of being subordinate to Vlasov. It is known that a number of commanders of Russian collaborationist formations (for example, the commander of the so-called "Russian National Army" General BA Holmston-Smyslovsky) refused to join the KONR Armed Forces. The fact that RONA units were ultimately transferred to the Vlasov army is explained solely by the fact of Kaminsky's death. At the same time, Vlasov himself and his entourage were not at all delighted with such a "gift".

According to another version, events developed differently. On August 19, 1944, when the fighting in Warsaw reached its climax, Kaminsky drove in his car to von dem Bach's headquarters in order to arrive at the meeting. When approaching Litzmanstadt, the car was attacked by Polish partisans, as a result of which Kaminsky and his companions were killed. On the same day, the car was found and taken to the headquarters of von dem Bach. For identification, the car was presented to the officers of the division.

In Frolov's testimony, the version of Kaminsky's death looked like this: “On August 19, the regiment was replaced and concentrated on the southwestern outskirts of the suburb. On August 20, Kaminsky told me that he and the chief of staff were on call to go to headquarters. He indicated to me where I should follow with the regiment and at what points to concentrate the regiment on the approaches to the forest, and then wait for its arrival. On August 21, Kaminsky and the brigade chief of staff left for headquarters, and I marched with the regiment to the indicated point, where I was expecting Kaminsky. After 2 or 3 days (I don’t remember exactly), a German general informed me that Kaminsky and Shavykin had been killed by partisans in the Krakow area, and told me to start fulfilling the task. " .

There is also a version that the attack on Kaminsky's official car was organized not by Polish partisans, but by Soviet saboteurs who arrived from the territory of Slovakia. This version was shared by the former chief of counterintelligence of the division F.A. Kapkaev. Moreover, the circumstances and method of murder - an ambush, shooting a car by people in German uniform, - resemble similar operations already carried out by Soviet saboteurs: the assassination of Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky) in April 1944, ataman S.V. Pavlova in June 1944 and others. Indirect confirmation of this version can be found in the memoirs of the Chekist Vasily Zasukhin, who during the war years led the special department of the headquarters of the united partisan detachments (brigades) in the Bryansk region. Zasukhin describes in detail how his subordinates Dragunov and Grigorov made an unsuccessful attempt on Kaminsky's life in the summer of 1943 in Lokte, trying to liquidate the mayor with the help of an electromine enclosed in the book. Zasukhin notes “The incident helped Kaminsky, he is alive and well. But the traitor did not have long to live on Soviet soil. It was destroyed in 1944 " .

It should be noted that back in June 1944 the Chekists approved the "Plan of organizational and operational measures to intensify the hostilities of the partisans of Ukraine and to assist fraternal communist parties in organizing the partisan movement in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Poland for the period July - September 1944. ". According to this document, to the territory of Poland "Except for two partisan brigades previously transferred to the Polish headquarters, one formation and one detachment, with a total strength of up to 2,000 partisans" it was planned to send 4 partisan detachments from the northern part of the Lviv region to the southern regions (Krosno, Zhushuv) and 7 detachments from the Volyn region - to the Krakow Voivodeship in the Turnuv region. In addition, from among the best partisans-saboteurs of the formation N.M. Podkorytov, a detachment of 150-200 people was formed, which was sent to act on railways Siedlec - Warsaw and Zaremba - Warsaw. Until August 15, he ordered the axle to be deployed on airplanes and 4 organizing and sabotage detachments, 12-15 people each.

Thus, the Soviet saboteurs on the territory of Poland in the period of interest to us acted. Unfortunately, we do not yet know whether they had anything to do with the death of Kaminsky. However, in any case, from the presented material it is clear that the death of Kaminsky was beneficial primarily to the Soviet side and A.A. Vlasov, who, as you know, could not stand the murdered SS general.

It cannot be written off that von dem Bach really could have given the order for the execution of Kaminsky, guided by Hitler's oral order (which still requires confirmation) or personal considerations. V the latter case von dem Bach's appeal to the cruel and predatory behavior of the "Kamintsev" should, in our opinion, be taken into account as the last thing, since the German units did the same on an even larger scale. In addition, one should not forget that the post-war testimony of von dem Bach, who at any cost wanted to avoid execution, bears the imprint of opportunistic subjectivism, which determined not only the form, but also, in fact, the substantive side of his testimony, which still raises many questions.

Of course, the death of Kaminsky was a heavy loss for the refugees and servicemen of the 29th division, who had lost their commander. Kaminsky's wife and child were taken care of by the National Socialist Care Service.

After Kaminsky's death, the SS did not abandon, contrary to widespread opinion, the idea of ​​forming the 29th Waffen-SS Grenadier Division, but with a new, German, command. But after the death of the commander and chief of staff, the division lost its restraining principle and began to decay rapidly.

Nevertheless, on August 30, the SS Brigadeführer and Major General of the SS troops Christoph Diem was appointed commander of the division, who commanded the formation until September 27, after which 3000 Kamintsev were transferred to Neuhammer (Silesia), where the 600th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht was created ( Russian). According to some reports, the rest of the personnel under the leadership of the new acting division commander - SS Gruppenfuehrer and Police Lieutenant General Heinrich Jurs - were used in the suppression of the Slovak National Uprising in early October 1944.

After October 11, the inspection, headed by SS Obergruppenfuehrer Gottlob Berger, completed its work, which recognized the unit as incapable of combat and subject to disbandment.

All this time, the division was held by the authority of individual commanders. Belay himself, "a staunch supporter of General Vlasov," rejected the offer to lead the division and demanded a transfer to the newly created Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia. This decision was supported by Major B.A. Kostenko. Such uncertainty, which lasted for 2 months, only contributed to the decay. However, despite the fall in discipline, the high authority of the commanders remained among the soldiers, weapons and equipment were maintained in excellent condition.

In November 1944, the 29th SS Division was transferred to the training ground in Münsingen, where the 1st Division of the Armed Forces of the KONR was being formed. Some of the soldiers joined the refugees. Separate groups of fighters decided to continue the fight on their own on the territory of Belarus and, possibly, the Bryansk region. As part of the Armed Forces of the KAMINS, "Kamintsy" were not combined into one unit. As part of the 1st Division, they made up the 2nd Infantry Regiment (3000-3500 people). Small groups of "Kamintsev" were included in the other parts of the division. Almost completely from the former servicemen of the 29th SS division, a separate reconnaissance division of the 1st division of the KONR Armed Forces was formed, which was headed by Major of the KONR Armed Forces (Waffen-Sturmbannführer) BA. Kostenko. The former commander of the armored division of the 29th SS division, captain of the Armed Forces of the KONR (Waffen-Sturmbannführer) Y. Samsonov, became the deputy commander of the tank battalion of the division.

A little later, about 1000 "Kamintsev" were included in the 2nd division of the Armed Forces of the KONR. In addition, individual officers and soldiers served in virtually all parts of the KONR Armed Forces. However, there were only a few in leadership positions. Lieutenant Colonel of the Armed Forces of the KONR R.K.Belay became the chief of the officer reserve of the Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the KONR. Former chief of artillery of the 29th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division, Colonel of the Armed Forces of the KONR A.S. Perkhurov took the positions of deputy chief of the 13th (artillery) department of the headquarters of the Armed Forces of the KONR and an inspector for artillery weapons.

It remains to add that on the part of the "Vlasovites" Kaminsky's former subordinates met with an extremely negative attitude towards themselves. The leadership of the Armed Forces of the KONR demonstratively did not want to recognize the titles and awards received by the Russian SS men. All this made the commander of the 1st division of the Armed Forces of the KONR S.K. Bunyachenko to issue an order (dated December 5, 1944), which read:

“Recently, there have been cases when individual soldiers and officers who arrived at the formation of a division throw an illegal, insulting reproach to the soldiers and officers of the former Kaminsky division for allegedly robbers, bandits, etc. All these reproaches are based on the fact that in the former. division of Kaminsky there were isolated cases of robbery, looting and other outrages that can take place in any part ...

Individual cases cannot characterize the behavior of the entire part as a whole. The 1st Russian SS Division in its past fought against the Stalinist regime in Russia and its composition is now ready to continue this struggle. These are Russian soldiers, on whose labor and blood, like all Russian people, our own mother, Russia, should and will be built.

I order:

1. To root out the insults at the soldiers and officers of the former 1st Russian SS Division.

2. Explain to all personnel that the arriving replenishment of the first Russian division from different fronts should merge together into a friendly, ideologically and organizationally welded family to fight under the Russian banners for the salvation of Russia and all the peoples inhabiting it " .

The further fate of the "Kamintsev" goes beyond the scope of our study, since it is connected with the history of the Armed Forces of the KONR. It should be noted that most of the former Russian SS men shared the fate of their new colleagues and were extradited to the USSR. Only a few of them managed to avoid repatriation, in particular, the chief of intelligence B.A. Kostenko and the chief of counterintelligence F.A. Kapkaev, as well as most of their subordinates. This is not surprising, since Western - primarily American - intelligence services were eager to use the services of former Nazi and collaborationist fighters of the "invisible front".

Notes:

MacLean F.L. The cruel hunters. SS – Sonderkomando Dirlewanger. Hitler "s most notorious anti-partisan unit. Atglen, RA., 2009. P. 187.

Burovikhin spoke German, since before the October coup he was a laborer for the German colonists from the Volga region, the Shultsev family. At the beginning of the war, Burovikhin was wounded and ended up in a prisoner of war camp in Bryansk. Taking advantage of the knowledge German language, Burovikhin passed himself off as Otto Schultz, the son of his former colonist master. This helped him leave the camp and begin intelligence activities in favor of Saburov's partisans. Before Burovikhin was sent to Lokot, he managed to complete several tasks. For example, under the guise of a merchant in wooden dishes, he visited Trubchevsk, where he revealed the strength of the German police garrison. Burovikhin's next task was to infiltrate the bodies of the Lokot administration. He became friends with the burgomaster of Trubchevsk Pavlov, using whose patronage, he managed to gain confidence in the commandant of Sevsk, and through him - to get acquainted with Voskoboinik. Cm.: A. Behind the front line. (Guerrilla records). Book One: Partisan Territory. M., 1953.S. 131, 222.

In the same place. S. 223-224. Needless to say, all this is a clear exaggeration.

Dunaev F. Genocide - in rank public policy Germany // Book of Memory ... p. 138.

Kolpakidi A.I. KGB liquidators. M., 2009. S. 384. After the formation of the 29th division of the SS troops (1st Russian) SS Hauptsturmfuehrer G. Leleit was appointed to the post of liaison officer with the SS Reichsfuehrer (See Appendix No. 4).

Ermolov I.G. The history of the Lokotsky district ... p. 53.

Steenberg S. Decree. op. P. 93.

Bogatyr Z.A. Decree. op. P. 61.

A. N. Saburov Decree. op. S. 224-225.

September 1, 1946 From the personal testimony of the commander of the consolidated regiment of the brigade RONA I.D. Frolov // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... p. 660.

July 25, 1945, camp number 284. From the protocol of interrogation of an officer of the consolidated regiment of the brigade RON PR. Mayorova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... p. 600.

Klietmann G.K. Die Waffen – SS. Eine Dokumentation. Osnabruck, 1965, S. 265.

Semenov K. The fate of a European // "Volunteer". 2005. No. 1 (5). P. 10.

Combat schedule of the 29th Waffen-SS Grenadier Division // "Echo of War". 2007. No. 1. P. 32; Gribkov and. Combat use of the 29th SS division // Echo of War. 2008. No. 2. S. 13.

RGASPI. F. 69, op. 1, d.710, l. 162.

Aleksandrov K.M. Army of General Vlasov. M., 2006.S. 98.

Drobyazko S.I. Lokotsky autonomous region... p. 206.

In the same place. S. 206–207.

V.P. Garmatny The tragedy and heroism of the Warsaw insurgents // Military-Historical Journal. M., 2009. No. 1.P. 37.

Semiryaga M.I. Anti-fascist popular uprisings. M., 1965.S. 70.

Nazarevich R. Warsaw Uprising. 1944 year. M., 1989.S. 91.

April 28, 1945, Moscow. The personal testimony of the commandant of Warsaw, Lieutenant-General of the Luftwaffe R. Stagel "The Uprising in Warsaw" // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... p. 590.

V.L. Garmatny Decree. op. P. 38.

See: August 5, 1944. Message from the Commander of Army Group Center to the Commander of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht about the transfer of reinforcements to Warsaw // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... p. 70.

Bach-Zelewski Erich von dem (nee von Zelewski, at the end of the 1930s - changed his surname to von dem Bach-Zelewski, and in November 1941 - to von dem Bach; 1899-1972). Member of the First World War, after the end of which he was left to serve in the Reichswehr. At the end of 1924 he was dismissed from the army for conducting Nazi propaganda. In February 1930 he joined the NSDAP, in 1931 he joined the SA and the SS. In 1932 he was elected to the Reichstag from Breslau. In 1938 he became the highest Fuhrer of the SS and police in the south-east (Breslau). From 1941 to June 1944 he was the highest Fuhrer of the SS and police in Central Russia. From October 1942 to June 1943 he was authorized by the Reichsfuehrer SS to combat bandit formations in the East. For the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising in September 1944, he was awarded the Knight's Cross. Since November 1944, commander of the 14th, in February 1945 - of the 10th SS Army Corps. In February-April 1945 he commanded the Oder corps. After the end of the war, he was arrested and was a witness at the Nuremberg trials. Until 1950 he was imprisoned. In 1958 he was arrested again. In 1962 he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He died in a prison hospital. Cm.: Zalessky K.A. Security detachments of Nazism ... pp. 29–30.

Semenov K.K. SS troops. The soldiers are like everyone else. M., 2004.S. 175.

Padfield P. Reichsfuehrer SS. Smolensk, 2002.S. 469.

The tragedy of the Jews of Belarus during the years of the German occupation (1941-1944). Collection of materials and documents. Minsk, 1995.S. 79.

Davies N. Rising 44. The Battle for Warsaw. London-Oxford, 2004. P. 252, 666; MacLean F.L. Op. cit. P. 187; Pishenkov A.A."Penalties" SS. Sonderkommando "Dirlewanger". M., 2009.S. 169; Romanko O.V. Muslim legions in World War II. M., 2004.S. 219; P. Cossacks. Between Hitler and Stalin. M., 2005. S. 445–446; Drobyazko S.I. Under the banners of the enemy ... pp. 531–532, 543, 584; Zalessky K. Luftwaffe. Air Force of the Third Reich. M., 2005.S. 132; Hanns von Krankhals. Der Warschauer Aufstand. Frankfurt / Main, 1964. S. 381-383.

Semenov K.K. SS troops ... p. 175.

July 25, 1945, camp number 284. From the protocol of interrogation of an officer of the consolidated regiment of the brigade RON PR. Mayorova // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... S. 600-602; June 10, 1946, camp No. 256. From the protocol of interrogation of the commander of the consolidated regiment of the brigade RONA I.D. Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 630; See also: September 1, 1946. From the personal testimony of the commander of the consolidated regiment of the brigade RONA I.D. Frolov // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... p. 662. In the testimony of I.D. Frolov and an officer of the RONA brigade A.A. Perkhurov's events are presented somewhat differently. They claim that Kaminsky held the meeting on August 7 in the area of ​​the city of Petrokau. Here the composition of the consolidated regiment was determined. Perhaps we are talking about another meeting with the participation of Kaminsky. In our opinion, Frolov's regiment was formed before the start of the march, in the territory of Upper Silesia.

Gribkov I. The owner of the Bryansk forests ... p. 43; Kliettann G.K .. Die Waffen – SS. Eine Dokumentation. Osnabruck 1965 S. 265; July 16, 1946 From the protocol of interrogation of the commander of the consolidated regiment of the brigade RON I.D. Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 646; July 25, 1945, camp number 284. From the protocol of interrogation of an officer of the consolidated regiment of the brigade RON PR. Mayorova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... P. 602. Researcher Norman Davis calls another figure - 2000 people. Cm.: Davies N. Op. cit. R. 252.

After September 2, 1944. From the diary of a soldier of the RON brigade I.I. Vashenki // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... p. 1074. Note that Vashenki's diary, despite interesting factual material, is subjective and far from fully reflects how the “Kamintsy” acted in Warsaw. See also: August 5, 1944. Message from the Commander of Army Group Center to the Commander of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht about the transfer of reinforcements to Warsaw // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... p. 70; June 10, 1946, camp No. 256. From the protocol of interrogation of the commander of the consolidated regiment of the brigade RONA I.D. Frolov // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... p. 632.

Reinefarth Heinrich (Heinz) (1903-1979), SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lieutenant General of the SS and Police forces. After the end of the First World War, he was an active participant in the Volunteer Corps. In 1924 he entered the Reichswehr. From 1927 he worked in the judiciary. In 1931-1932. prosecutor in First and Cottbus, then - until 1939 a notary. In 1932 he joined the NSDAP and the SS. in 1939 he joined the Wehrmacht as sergeant major. For distinctions in battles in France in June 1940 he was awarded the Knight's Cross. In 1942 he was recalled from the Wehrmacht and appointed inspector general of the administration of the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Since June 1943 he was the head of the department at the Main Directorate of the Police of Order. December 1943 to December 1944 supreme Fuehrer of the SS and police of the Warta district. For his participation in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, he was awarded with oak leaves to the Knight's Cross. Since December 1944, commander of the XVIII SS Army Corps. In January - March 1945, the commandant of the Kustrin fortress. Commander of the XIV SS Army Corps since March. After the war he was arrested, until 1948 he was imprisoned. After that, he was burgomaster of Westerland on Sylt, deputy of the Landtag from the Union of the Lost Homeland and Rights. Cm.: Zalessky K.A. Security detachments of Nazism ... S. 191-192.

The Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... pp. 40–42. Reinefarth constantly reported to von dem Bach and the 9th Army commander von Foreman about the progress of the operation to suppress the uprising in Warsaw. It must also be said that Spilker's Sonderkommando was not formally part of the von dem Bach force and equipment grouping.

Hanns von Krankhals. Op. cit. S. 381.

July 8, 1946. From the protocol of interrogation of the officer of the RONA brigade A.A. Perkhurova // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... p. 642.

July 16, 1946 From the protocol of interrogation of the commander of the consolidated regiment of the brigade RON I.D. Frolov // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... S. 662 - 64.

July 16, 1946 From the protocol of interrogation of the commander of the consolidated regiment of the brigade RON I.D. Frolova // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... S. 666.

July 16, 1946 From the protocol of interrogation of the commander of the consolidated regiment of the brigade RON I.D. Frolova // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... p. 664.

September 19, 1946 Protocol of interrogation of Lieutenant General of Police H. Reinefart // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... p. 678. The fact that some "Kamintsy" opened fire on the Germans was reported to Frolov by Waffen-Obersturmführer Baburov. The shooting, according to Baburov, began when there was a shootout with the rebels. Frolov ordered Baburov to make these cases increase! It is difficult to say what prompted Frolov to issue such an order. His post-war testimony, especially his own handwritten, raises many questions. Frolov tries to present himself as the organizer of some kind of sabotage within the consolidated regiment. In addition to the unspoken order to shoot at the Germans, he advised the officers to tell the soldiers to render their weapons unusable. Frolov also cites an episode when a skirmish took place between the “Kamians” and the Germans, as a result of which there were mutual casualties, and Kaminsky had to deal with the colonel of the Wehrmacht. But the case was hushed up, as the next day the divisional commander allegedly said that "It's all nonsense." In his own handwritten testimony, Frolov tries to show himself as an overly passive commander, who cannot take a step without Kaminsky's order, which leads to the constant downtime of the regiment. Without completely rejecting such a possibility, one should not trust Frolov's words in everything. Moreover, in his testimony, he did not say how he fired from a howitzer at houses. And such a case, if there really was one, shows Frolov from a completely different side. Finally, going to sabotage, Frolov could not help but know how this could turn out for Kaminsky and for himself. As for shooting at the Germans, there may be several versions. Perhaps those fighters who did not want to take part in suppressing the uprising, but were included in the consolidated regiment, began to shoot at the Germans. "Kamintsy" could open fire also because the Germans from the neighboring assault units let them forward, and they themselves followed them when the firing points of the militants were suppressed. Other options are also possible. Kaminsky, according to Frolov, had a conflict with a German security police officer, whose subordinates were hiding in the same house. Kaminsky ordered the officer to rouse the policemen to attack and go into battle together with the "Kamintsy". The officer refused, saying that he would not bring his men into battle without an order from a senior commander. Kaminsky reported this to Rohr, but there was no answer.

July 16, 1946. From the protocol of the interrogation of the commander of the combined regiment of the RONA ID brigade. Frolov // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... p. 648.

December 1944. The final report of the Governor of the Warsaw District L. Fischer to the Governor-General Reichsminister Dr. Frank // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... p. 1136.

After September 2, 1944. From the diary of a soldier of the RON brigade I.I. Vashenki // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... pp. 1080, 1082–1084; July 25, 1945, camp number 284. From the protocol of interrogation of an officer of the consolidated regiment of the brigade RON PR. Mayorova // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... S. 602.

June 10, 1946, camp No. 256. From the protocol of interrogation of the commander of the combined regiment of the brigade RONA I.D. Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 632; September 1, 1946 From the personal testimony of the commander of the combined regiment of the brigade RONA IL. Frolov // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... from 668. See also: After September 2, 1944. From the diary of a soldier of the RONA brigade I.I. Vashenki // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... S. 1088.

After September 2, 1944. From the diary of a soldier of the RON brigade I.I. Vashenki // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... S. 1086, 1090; June 10, 1946, camp No. 256. From the protocol of interrogation of the commander of the consolidated regiment of the RONA brigade id. Frolov // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... p. 632.

July 8, 1946. From the protocol of interrogation of an officer of the RONA brigade A.S. Perkhurova // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... S. 642; July 25, 1945, camp No. 284. From the protocol of interrogation of an officer of the consolidated regiment RON PR. Mayorova // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... S. 602; After September 2, 1944. From the diary of a soldier of the RON brigade I.I. Vashenki // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... p. 1080. In the testimony of N.M. Vasyukova, you can also find a mention of the robberies carried out by "Kamintsy" in Warsaw. Moreover, Vasyukova said that Frolov's subordinates brought with them to Ratibor several cars and trucks, bicycles and carts. See: August 8, 1946, Moscow. From the protocol of interrogation of an employee of the brigade of RON N. Vasyukova // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... p. 656.

Zalessky K . A.

Littlejohn D. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich. Vol. 4. San Jose. 1994. P. 311; Glaube G . The mysterious death of Brigadeführer Kaminsky // Echo of War. 2007. no. 1, p. 31.

Drobyazko S.I. The second World War 1939-1945: Russian Liberation Army. M., 2000.S. 31; Ulyanov V., Shishkin I . Traitors. Appearance. M., 2008.S. 310.

Sokolov B.V. Occupation ... p. 184.

Zalessky K.A. Commanders of the national formations of the SS. P. 46.

Redlich R.N. In the Kaminsky brigade // Materials on the history of the Russian Liberation Movement ... p. 434.

Historian A.V. Okorokov with reference to an interview with V.D. Poremskiy writes: “When the" Vlasov movement "began to develop, and Kaminsky refused to become subordinate to the ROA, the council of the NTS decided to liquidate it ... The execution of the action was entrusted to the members of the NTS who served in the RONA. succeeded". See: Fascism and Russian Emigration (1920–1945). M., 2002.S. 481.

It is known that Kaminsky twice refused to recognize Vlasov as the head of the "liberation movement" and to sign the Smolensk Declaration. As I. Gribkov writes: “Kaminsky believed that Vlasov was a careerist, a hypocrite and a traitor, who once betrayed Stalin, could betray later” (The owner of the Bryansk forests ... p. 41).

Glaube G . Decree. op. P. 31.

September 1, 1946 From the personal testimony of the commander of the consolidated regiment of the brigade RONA I.D. Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... 668.

Gribkov I . The owner of the Bryansk forests ... p. 45.

Zasukhin V.A. Decree. op. S. 118, 126.

State security agencies of the USSR in Velikaya Patriotic War... T. V. Book. 1. Forward west (January 1 - June 30, 1944). M. 2007. S. 576-581.

For example, at the trial in Nuremberg, von dem Bach said that in January 1941, during a meeting in Wewelsburg, the SS chief told him that in order to implement the plans of the Black Order in the East, 30 million Slavs must be eliminated. It has not yet been possible to document whether Himmler said something similar.

Dim Christoph (1892-1960). Member of the First World War. In 1918 he joined the Volunteer Corps. Since 1929 he was adjutant of the command of the assault detachments (SA) in Württemberg. Since 1931 he was the head of the group of SA "South-West". In 1932 he was transferred to the SS. Since November 1933 he was a member of the Reichstag. In March 1939, he was appointed policeman-president of Gotenhaven. From January 1944 he was the head of the SS and police in Zhitomir, and from February 25, 1944 - in the Lemberg district. On August 20, 1944, he was transferred to the 29th SS division. From August 30 to September 27, 1944 - division commander, after which he served as the highest SS Fuhrer and police in Belgium - Northern France (until January 18, 1945). In October 1944 he also became the head of the SS and police in Istria. Cm.: Zalessky K.A. Security detachments of Nazism ... p. 107.

Jurs Heinrich (1897-?). Member of the First World War. From March 1935 to December 1936, commander of the 14th command of the General SS (Bremen), from November 1938 to January 1943 - the 32nd command of the General SS (Augsburg). From October 1940 to January 1941, chief of the 2nd directorate of the Main Directorate of the SS (manning issues). From May 1943 to April 1945 he headed the management group B (recruiting) of the Main Directorate of the SS. From September 27 to October 11, he served as commander of the 29th division of the SS troops. On January 18, 1945, he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general of the SS forces. Cm.: Zalessky K.A. Security detachments of Nazism ... p. 262.

Glaube G. Decree. op. P. 31.

See: July 25, 1945, camp no. 284. From the protocol of interrogation of an officer of the consolidated regiment RON PR. Mayorova // Warsaw uprising of 1944 ... S. 602.

Gribkov I . Combat use ... P.14.

Drobyazko S.I. Lokotsky Autonomous Okrug ... pp. 211–212.

It was not possible to post this topic in the sections about World War II.
Didn't want to get the sections dirty.

Russian SS division RONA. Lokotskaya "republic"

It is well known about the Latvian, Estonian and Ukrainian SS divisions... About the Belarusian one - only to historians. But few have heard of the Russian SS division. But she was and left her cruel mark in the history of the Great Patriotic War.
The history of the 29th SS Division began in the Bryansk region, when in October 1941 the troops of the German 2nd Panzer Army entered the city of Lokot.
Elbow- a small town in the Oryol (now Bryansk) region, the former estate of Prince Mikhail Romanov. The rapidly advancing German troops urgently demanded order and security in the occupied territory. There were also those wishing to do this.
At Lokte there were enough bodies sent here NKVD in the 30s. The vast majority of them were, to put it mildly, not enthusiastic about the Stalinist methods of management. It was on their initiative and with the warm support of the command of the 2nd Tank Army that the autonomous Lokotsky region was created. It was headed by a physics teacher at the local technical school Konstantin Pavlovich Voskoboinik.

K.P. Voskoboinik

He was appointed chief burgomaster of Lokot and launched a tireless activity to form the structures of power, not forgetting about the armed forces. The troops were named the Russian People's Liberation Army, i.e. RONA... It had its own intelligence service, a newspaper and even a theater.
Command 2 TA, making sure that local government able to secure the rear areas on its own, transformed the Lokotsky district first into a district, and then into a district and included 8 districts of the Kursk and Oryol regions with a population of 581,000. So the town with a funny name became the fascist capital of the Bryansk region.
In Lokt, the main state institutions began to operate, canteens were published, newspapers were published, taxes were collected regularly. On January 8, 1942, Konstantin Voskoboinik dies in a battle with partisans. He was replaced by Bronislav Kaminsky. He managed to create a very effective management structure at Lokte.

The militia, which initially numbered about 200 people, began to actively fight the partisans. Kaminsky launched an active activity and soon cleared a large area of ​​them. They called him “The Master of the Bryansk Forest”. By the spring of the 42nd, the number of militia had increased to 1,700 people.
Moscow, of course, understood the danger of spreading this positive experience for the Germans to a large part of the occupied territory. Reconnaissance and sabotage groups were sent to the Lokot area. They were given the task of physically eliminating Kaminsky, but without much success. Moreover, the Kamintsy quickly fine-tuned their intelligence and counterintelligence, they are already practicing sending their agents to the partisans.
Under Kaminsky's tough hand, life was gradually improving. It should be noted that the Lokotsky Autonomous Okrug was not only an experiment of the military, but rather of the leaders of the Third Reich. Even Adolf Hitler knew about its existence, not to mention the Rosenberg ministry and the SS headquarters. The militia of the republic was transformed into an assault brigade RONA... It should not be confused with the Vlasov army, which had the name ROA. If the Germans did not trust the Vlasovites very much, then there was a completely different attitude to the Kamians.
What rights did you enjoy Kaminsky, says the following episode. In the summer of 1943, 2 German soldiers robbed a mill standing on the outskirts, killed its owner and were caught by Lokot policemen. The court of the Lokot Republic sentenced them to death. The verdict was carried out in the square in front of a huge crowd, despite the objections of the German high command.
Inspired by success and with the support of the German command, Kaminsky strove to expand its activities as much as possible. In a small town, he felt cramped. Kaminsky announced mobilization. Prisoner officers of the Red Army were involved as commanders.
Assault brigade RONA became significant military force and was transferred to the subordination of the SS. By the end of the forty-second year, it consisted of fourteen rifle battalions, an anti-aircraft battery, an armored division, a commandant platoon and a fighter company. The total number is up to 10,000 people. All these forces were used to fight the partisans, which began from the very beginning of the existence of the new government and continued until the evacuation of RONA units from Lokot.
Kaminsky's party also developed. Its program was practically copied from the program of the German Nazis. In fact, the National Socialist order was established in the Lokot Republic. For example, marriages between non-Jews and Jews were prohibited. Various restrictions, additional extortions and forced labor were in force for the Jews.
In Lokt, only marriages consecrated by the church were recognized, divorce was prohibited. Abortion was banned, family preservation fought, and fertility encouraged. Personal land ownership was restored, stimulated private trade in cities. Free trade and the division of land between local peasants caused a certain flourishing in areas of the district that were not attacked by partisans.
In Lokotsky and neighboring districts, there were many exiles who were forbidden to live in large cities Soviet Union, therefore, initially, Kaminsky had enough supporters. However, the majority gradually became disillusioned with him and with Hitler. And on the fronts, the situation began to change. In early March 1943, Soviet troops approached the outskirts of the district, and the 3rd and 5th regiments of the RONA took part in hostilities against the Red Army, suffering heavy losses. Many, not accepting the battle, deserted, about 700 people went to the partisans. But on the whole, the actions of the Kamintsevs were successful.
RONA spent the whole spring and summer of 1943 fighting the partisans. In fact, this brigade was responsible for the rear German armies on the Oryol-Kursk line. The largest and most successful operation was the "Gypsy Baron", during which more than 1,500 partisans were killed and as many were captured. In addition, more than 200 partisan bases were destroyed. By participating in these battles, the assault brigade attracted the attention of SS Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler. The brigade began not only to obey, but also structurally to enter the SS troops. Kaminsky was awarded a medal and was promoted to the rank of SS Brigadefuehrer, corresponding to a major general.

In the spring of 1944 in NKVD the so-called "Letter case" was instituted, in which documents on the planning of the assassination attempt on Kaminsky were filed. This case was supervised by the State Security Captain Frolov, who then had the pseudonym "Comrade Altaysky". Initially, they wanted to put in the house where the leader was autonomous region, bomb. The explosives were to be carried by the recruited chief of the household RONA.
To carry out the task of destroying Bronislav Kaminsky, several task forces were deployed to the brigade's area of ​​operations. They included both trained saboteurs and experienced agent operatives. If it was impossible to carry out a terrorist attack directly against Kaminsky, it was planned to recruit people from his immediate environment and persuade them either to kill the brigadefuehrer, or to hand him over alive into the hands of the partisans.
But plans are plans, but sometimes the most commonplace things can change everything. Agent "Sophia",
which was sent with the sabotage group "Falcon" did not complete the task and instead got married and departed with the child to the location of the group. Despite the failed task, "Sophia" was not punished. Subsequently, after checking and retraining, she was again transferred to the front line.
In addition to the Chekists, partisans also acted against Kaminsky, with RONA had their own scores.
In the summer of 1943, the position of the district became threatening, and Kaminsky in agreement with the Nazi command ordered to evacuate RONA and the civilian population to the city Lepel Vitebsk region. Having loaded tanks, artillery and other equipment, units of the RONA, together with the civil administration of the district and members of their families, a total of up to 30,000 people left for Belarus.
The Lepel Special District was already formed, and Kaminsky was appointed his mayor. All power in this territory was concentrated in his hands. The harshness of the executive branch was combined with elements of democracy such as village gatherings. The order established in Lepel was similar to that of Lokot.
The experience of creating a Russian quasi-state, which was positive for the Germans, was transferred to Belarus. In practice, the RONA brigade was seen as an exemplary model for managing the occupied territories. The main task assigned to the settlers was the fight against the partisans.
Kaminsky carried out a number of major operations to clear his zone of partisans. With the changed situation on the fronts, the remote Lepel region became a strategically important rear zone of Army Group Center. And at the same time, the offensive of the Red Army and the efforts of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement caused an intensification of the actions of patriots in the German rear. These operations aroused even greater hatred of the occupiers.
In such a situation, the transfer of the solution to such problems into the hands of Kaminsky suited everyone. The Germans practically did not intervene in what was happening in the district. They were quite satisfied that a sufficiently large territory practically did not give them any trouble. Police formations from local residents were transferred under the command of the brigadefuehrer. It must be said that they were quite numerous. The local peasantry, as in the entire Soviet Union, was dissatisfied with collectivization, and many residents saw in the Germans liberators from the Bolsheviks.
However, the relationship between the settlers and the local population was not easy. Moreover, most of the arrivals were resettled in the houses of local residents, to put it mildly, without their consent. Affected by the difference in language and customs, and simply the factor of strangers who came from nowhere and established their own order. Local residents called them either Orlovtsy or Narodniks.
In fact, Kamintsy behaved in Belarus, as occupants, and failed to include the locals in the life of their republic. The partisans of the Lepel zone did not sit idly by either. And besides purely military operations, one of the most effective ways the fight against the punishers was propaganda. True, it was not so simple with the fireplaces, although serious efforts were made. The scale of the resources used was impressive, right down to the planes that delivered letters from relatives to potential defectors. In Moscow, this activity was given great importance and in this work there have been very great successes.
Here is one such story. Through their intelligence channels, a group of Kamintsev went out to the partisans, they wanted to go over to their side. The head of this group was a certain Kostya. But at the same time they wanted some guarantees that they simply would not be shot as traitors to the Motherland. We agreed to meet at the crossing.
The partisans made a condition that the defectors bring their commander with them, dead or alive. It was the chief of police of the Lepel district, the right hand of Kaminsky, Pakhomov. Kamintsy fulfilled the condition and arrived at the agreed place with Pakhomov, in uniform, with weapons, on several carts. The carts were loaded with mines and shells. They also took 2 cannons with them.
Partisans and Kamintsy, unable to destroy each other in direct combat, directed considerable efforts to propaganda. Everything was used: newspapers, leaflets, and cartoons. But the greatest influence on the minds was still the advance of the Red Army. Many began to think about their further destiny looking for their salvation in the transition to the partisans.
There were transitions from Kaminets to the side of the partisans, but earlier this phenomenon was not of a mass character. On the one hand, a significant part of them were convinced enemies of the Soviet regime, on the other hand, everyone understood that their struggle on Hitler's side was unlikely to be forgiven. And Kaminsky's propaganda also worked.
War is not done in white gloves, and not only punitive forces, but also partisans showed cruelty, providing food for the Brigadeführer's propaganda. The brigade commander tried to maintain discipline in RONA, not stopping at any measures. By this time, his brigade had become a fairly organized and experienced SS unit.

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Kaminsky's successes in the fight against the partisans did not go unnoticed. In the winter-spring of 1944, the brigade RONA led constant battles in the rear of Army Group Center. Kaminsky for participation in these battles he was awarded the Iron Cross of the 1st class, and Heinrich Himmler drew attention to the assault brigade.
In the summer of 1944, Kaminsky was summoned to the Reichsfuehrer's headquarters in East Prussia. The Reichsfuehrer personally thanked him for the actions of the Ronovites, and the brigade itself RONA by order of Himmler, it was transformed into the 29th SS Grenadier Division.
In Lepel, all Kaminsky's ideas about the creation of "Russia without Jews and Bolsheviks" gradually faded away. He never managed to find support from the local population. Neither repression nor propaganda helped. The dense anti-Semitism of Kaminsky in Lepel, which was a Jewish town before the war, looked wild at all. The local Jewish population, and this is several thousand people, was completely destroyed by the Germans and local policemen even before their arrival. RONA... Therefore, in the eyes of a significant part of local residents, Kaminsky's anti-Semitic propaganda looked like wild dances on the graves of innocent fellow countrymen.
However, in the context of the intensification of the partisan struggle and punitive measures of the Germans, questions of ideology began to recede into the background. Mutual hatred flared up, where the watershed was already by the name of Hitler, and not by the name of Stalin.
The Red Army, which had already begun to liberate Belarus, left no doubt in the end of the whole war. Therefore, in an effort to hasten the already inevitable fall of the Germans, the partisans intensified their actions.
On the eve of the 1944 summer campaign, the fascist command, for its part, sought to secure its rear. Therefore, in the winter of the 44th, all the forces of the punishers were thrown against the partisans. To support their actions, infantry units were allocated, aviation and armored vehicles were actively used.
To a large extent, this zone was cleared of partisans, all this was accompanied by huge casualties among the civilian population. In an effort not only to dislodge the partisans from their bases, but also to deprive them of the opportunity to return, the punishers mercilessly burned down the villages so that henceforth no one could help the partisans either of their own free will or without her.
The first successes also appeared among the operatives who worked against RONA... The reaction to the military successes of the Soviet Union varied. Someone became even more embittered, someone was looking for a way of salvation. According to archival documents, interdistrict residency NKVD Belarus had agents, both among ordinary soldiers and among some leaders.
However, despite the good position in collecting information, the solution to the main issue - the physical destruction of Kaminsky - still remained unrealized. It should be noted that the counterintelligence regime in the occupied territories has increased dramatically. M
Numerous security agencies of the occupiers, together with the formations of collaborationists, launched a large-scale hunt for scouts and partisans. Both undercover work and widespread round-ups were intensified.
This was caused both by the strengthening of the activities of Soviet reconnaissance and sabotage groups, and by a simple increase in the concentration of all sorts of traitors and provocateurs who had gathered in Belarus from all over the previously occupied territory. But for many of them, fear of impending retribution became more important. Some of them, even realizing their crimes, still went over to the partisans.
In the summer of 1944, the Lepel special district became front-line. Due to the lack of echelons, it was not possible to carry out the planned evacuation to Czechoslovakia. Fighters' family members RONA ended up in Germany, where they became ordinary eastern workers without any privileges.
August 2 in Warsaw, the Poles raised an uprising, and the Germans called on the Kamians to suppress it.

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The actions of the Ronovites were accompanied by massive robberies and murders. Moreover, to a large extent those inhabitants of Warsaw who did not take part in the uprising. Some of them were even Germans. Polish historians claim that soldiers of the 29th SS Division killed more than 15,000 people during the fighting.
To the demand of the Germans to calm down his soldiers, Kaminsky, wounded in these battles, replied that his people had lost all their acquired property during the struggle against the Bolsheviks, and there was nothing wrong if they wanted to improve their material condition at the expense of the Poles, who are hostile to the Germans.

The death of Kaminsky

Still committing atrocities, Kaminsky's fighters continued to fight in Warsaw. Since RONA left Soviet territory and was left almost without a livelihood, the brigade commander was powerless to tame his fighters. In other matters, then few people could have known that the 29th SS Division would soon be disbanded. Kaminsky has only a few weeks left to live.
The 4th direction of the Belarusian NKVD finally managed to find a way to deal with the commander RONA... According to official German data, in the midst of the fighting in Warsaw, Kaminsky was summoned to the commander. He did not return from this trip. On a forest road, bandits attacked his car with the aim of robbery. All those accompanying and the Brigadeführer himself were killed. The bandits allegedly took all the valuables and documents, and then set the car on fire.
All this happened in late September or early October 1944. The Germans showed the RON officers the Brigadenführer's burnt car, overturned into a ditch and riddled with bullets.
But all this was a staging, arranged under the leadership of the chief of the Krakow SD, Birkampf. In fact, Bronislav Kaminsky was killed by the Germans themselves. But what actually happened in Poland then?
Field Marshal Guderian wrote in his materials that Kaminsky was destroyed by the decision of the SS court. But why? This has remained a mystery to almost all researchers to this day.
On this occasion, there were 2 versions. First: for special cruelty towards the inhabitants of Warsaw. Sentence to SS Brigadefuehrer for special cruelty in fascist Germany?! This is complete nonsense. Another version boiled down to the fact that Kaminsky was removed in order to clear the way for Vlasov. But at the end of the war, the Germans hardly sacrificed such an important figure as the commander of the RONA. After all, he began to fight on the side of the Nazis even when the general Vlasov successfully fought in the Red Army.
When Vlasov sat in a German concentration camp and when he began to create a school of propagandists, all this time Kaminsky he participated in real battles with his fighters, and not without success. In addition, according to German law, he was German, since he had a German mother. If we compare Vlasov and Kaminsky in the opinion of the Germans, then Bronislav was clearly preferable. But why Vlasov stayed to live, but Kaminsky shot? The solution to this secret lay under the heading "Top Secret" in the archives of the special services.
So, after an unsuccessful attempt to kill or kidnap Kaminsky, the NKVD managed to destroy it by the hands of the Germans. Another secret of the special services is hidden here. It turns out that back in 1937, the NKVD forced Kaminsky to become their informant. He then received the pseudonym "Ultramarine". He was recruited by an employee of the Oryol department of the NKVD. The Ultramarine's task was to denounce exiles like him. It turns out that RONA commanded by an NKVD agent!
A form, approved by the People's Commissar for Security of Belarus Tsanava, has survived, which says, no more, no less, about an attempt to recruit Kaminsky again. The recruiting agent was supposed to be his sister, who was specially deployed across the front line. It should have been provided with photocopies of Kaminsky's signature and his own handwritten reports.
However, this whole story hardly says anything new about the personality of Bronislav. Then the time was such that refusal to cooperate with the authorities meant treason, and such subscriptions were forced to give almost everyone who fell into the hands of the NKVD. During the years of repressions in the 1930s, the NKVD agent apparatus grew thousands of times. Although the vast majority of these people were practically not used, many had a hook.
As it turned out, he was also on Kaminsky. Why they waited so long before they put it into operation remains a mystery. It can be assumed that the documents of the Oryol Directorate for the recruitment of "Ultramarine" were simply lost in the military turmoil and were found much later.
Since the Brigadefuehrer refused to cooperate, the original documents about his recruitment in the 37th were slipped to the Germans. Having discovered that the SS general was a Russian agent, they had no choice but to quietly remove him. This was the undoubted success of the NKVD, albeit somewhat belated.
The Kaminsky brigade was practically disbanded, and the personnel was transferred to the unit of General Vlasov. So ended almost the most daring experiment of the fascists in Russia.

RONA B. Kaminsky is a gang of punishers, traitors and Hitler's accomplices. And not fighters against Bolshevism.

You are welcome

Division emblem - stylized St. George cross

29th SS Waffen-Division "RONA" (1st Russian) (German 29. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS "RONA" (russische Nr. 1)), also known as "Kaminsky Brigade" - Russian collaborationist paramilitary formations created as the "Russian People's Liberation Army" on the territory of Lokot self-government during World War II

Initially, on the territory controlled by the Lokotsky self-government, a "national militia" (about 200 people) and self-defense units (about 20 people) were formed, but this was not enough. Deserters and criminals were robbing on the roads. In the woods around Elbow hid a large number of encircled and special groups formed by the NKVD and the GRU, which later became the backbone of the partisan detachments. All this mass of people fed on night robberies of villages, warehouses, raids on single German cars. In order to defend the Lokotsky district, the RONA was created, the number of which was rapidly increasing and by the summer of 1943 amounted to 8-8.5 thousand people. Initially, the RONA formations acted against the partisans of the Bryansk region. In the period from June 19 to June 27, 1942, 427 partisans went over to the side of the RONA; 65 of them joined RONA. In the summer of 1943, during a turning point in the war, the partisan movement recovered from its initial defeats, and RONA began to suffer heavy losses, despite German assistance. Several partisan attempts were made on Kaminsky. P. Sutulin gives the following facts about the activities of the RONA punishers:

“In order to fight the same partisans, the villages of Krasnaya Svoboda, Trebushka, Cherp, Gavrilova Guta, Kokorevka, Konushino, Chukhra, Smilichi, Igritskoye, Dobrovolsky, Altuhovo, Shushuevo were completely burned down, and their inhabitants were forcibly evicted to other areas. During the existence of the republic, 10,000 people were executed by the extraordinary commission that investigated the activities of RONA, and more than two hundred were burned alive. "

In 1942 in the Bryansk region, as part of the combat group "Sleeve II", the Kaminsky brigade took part in the anti-partisan operation "Vogelsang" (Vogelsang, as the large Nazi elite training complex in Eifel was called. Sometimes the name of the operation is indicated as "Bird trill" or "Singing birds ", which is a literal translation of a proper name from German), under the command of Lieutenant General Baron Werner von und zu Gilsa. The battle group included a tank regiment of the 5th division, units of the 216th infantry division, Kaminsky militiamen, units of the 102nd and 108th Hungarian light divisions - a total of about 6.5 thousand people. During the operation, 1193 partisans were killed, 1400 wounded, 498 were captured, more than 12 thousand residents were evacuated; the punitive forces lost 58 people killed and 130 wounded, which indicates the nature of the operation: against the civilian population.

March 21, 1944, Belarus. Anti-partisan operation. Bronislav Kaminsky with a group of members of his headquarters and officers of the order police. Also, the Kaminsky militia, together with other eastern volunteers, took part in the following operations:

* "Neighborly Help" (German: Nachbarhilfe) - mainly the 98th division and the 108th Hungarian light division, Kaminsky's militia performed auxiliary functions;
* "Gypsy Baron" (German Zigeunerbaron) - the largest operation involving XLVII Panzer Corps, 4th, 7th, 292nd Infantry Divisions, 18th Panzer, 10th Motorized and 102nd Hungarian Light Division and during which 207 partisan camps were destroyed, 1584 partisans were killed and 1568 were taken prisoner;
* "Free shooter" (German Freischütz) - in addition to the Kaminsky militia, the 5th Panzer Division, 6th Infantry and 707th Divisions took part;
* "Tannenhäuser" (German Tannenhäuser. In translation means "Spruce houses", but perhaps the name of some settlement was used) - RONA and eastern volunteers took part in the operation;
* "Easter Egg" (German. Osterei) - an operation of RONA and parts of the eastern volunteers.

RONA units took part in the Citadel operation, which was unsuccessful for the German army, on the Kursk Bulge. During the retreat, about 30 thousand RONA fighters and their family members left the Lokotsky self-government.

Commanding Officer Major Ivan Frolov (center) with RONA officers during the 1944 Warsaw Uprising. The officer to the right of Ivan Frolov is Lieutenant Mikhalchevsky. The soldier on the right appears to belong to the ROA (judging by the patch). Ivan Frolov will die on August 21 at the corner of Srebrna and Towarowa streets, in a battle against the rebels on August 3, 1944, a 2-battalion consolidated RONA regiment of 1,700 men entered Warsaw under the command of SS Obersturbannführer Ivan Frolov, with 4 T-34/76 tanks, SU-76 and 2 122 mm howitzers.

Kaminsky's division took Active participation in the suppression of the uprising in the areas "Okhota" and "Vistula". On August 4, 1944, the combined regiment of the RONA was sent to storm the Poles' stronghold in the building of the Tobacco Monopoly "Reduta Kaliski", which was defended by about 300 people. In this battle, RONA suffered the first losses - 22 killed. From the very first day, the units were drawn into massive robberies and drunkenness - they smashed and robbed warehouses and shops, and shot local residents who simply found themselves in the area. The same was done by other units participating in the suppression of the uprising with the approval of the commander of the 9th Army and Heinrich Himmler. According to Polish researchers, from 15 thousand to 30 thousand people became victims. The shootings in the courtyards of Warsaw streets continued for several weeks. There were numerous facts of looting, rape and pogroms. Members of the RONA brigade also raped two German girls from the KDF organization (German: Kraft durch Freude / Strength through joy).

The actions of the Kaminsky brigade angered the Wehrmacht and the veterans of the First World War. The commander of the 9th Panzer Army, Nikolaus von Hofmann, in whose area of ​​responsibility was Warsaw, sent a protest against the actions of the RONA brigade to Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zalewski, who tried to resolve the issue in a working order. However, Kaminsky's subordinates refused to follow the orders of anyone other than Kaminsky. Kaminsky said that his subordinates have the right to loot, since they lost all their property in Russia.

Chief of staff ground forces Colonel General Heinz Guderian (who previously supported the idea of ​​creating Lokot autonomy) wrote in his memoirs:
“... von dem Bach ... told me about the atrocities of his subordinates, which he is not able to stop. His messages made my hair stand on end, so I had to report everything to Hitler that same evening and demand the removal of both brigades (Kaminsky's and Dirlewanger's) from the Eastern Front. "

The looting of the brigade was reported upstairs. According to the testimony of the head of the OKW operational department, Alfred Jodl, given at the Nuremberg trial, he made a report to Hitler, who personally gave the order to disband the brigade. Kaminsky was recalled from the brigade's location.

A few days later, on August 28, Kaminsky was shot by members of the SS Sonderkommando under the command of Hans Botmann operating in the Litzmannstadt (Lodz) ghetto. At the Nuremberg trials his murder was confirmed by Erich von dem Bach-Zalewski, according to him, his "measures were to shoot the brigade commander Kaminsky and his associates according to the laws of wartime, because they authorized the further advancement of robberies and requisitions." Kaminsky's subordinates were informed that he was killed by Polish partisans. According to some reports, the murder was preceded by a formal court-martial.

Introduction

Among the collaborationist formations created on the territory of the USSR occupied by the Nazis, special place occupied by the Kaminsky Brigade, also known as the Russian Liberation People's Army (RONA) and the 29th Waffen- grenadier division troops of the SS.

B.V. Kaminsky

Unlike the more well-known Russian reader, Russian liberation army Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, the armed units organized in the southern regions of the Bryansk region in October 1941 were not a propaganda action by the invaders, but a real fighting force, sometimes inflicting quite sensitive blows on Soviet patriots - partisans and underground fighters. This allowed the German military authorities to hand over to the brigade commander, B.V. Kaminsky - significant powers, expressed, in particular, in providing the latter with broad autonomy, which occupied the territory of six districts of the Oryol and two districts of the Kursk regions, with a population of up to 1.7 million people (the so-called Lokotsky administrative district).

Despite the fact that the RONA units were not able to withstand the onslaught of the advancing Red Army (in the spring-summer of 1943), the German command evacuated the brigade and part of the civilian residents of the district to the territory of Belarus, where the "Kamintans" had to confirm their status as one of the most combat-ready anti-partisan formations of collaborators.

The successful activity of the subordinate Kaminsky unit became a guarantee that the brigade was included in the SS troops and became the first Russian division of the "Black Order".

During the work on this book, the authors took into account two points. First, a lot has already been written about the Kaminsky Brigade. Secondly, little of what has been written can claim completeness, scientific objectivity and the presence of a conscientious analysis of the sources available today. We have to admit that the best research devoted to the problem focuses mainly on the civil and political aspects of B.V. Kaminsky.

For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that a number of special works devoted to the Kaminsky Brigade have been published in the West, but practically all of them in factual terms today look sparse and archaic: researchers do not use Soviet and Russian sources (not to mention literature), uncritically approach some well-established myths.

The authors of some foreign studies demonstrate depressing incompetence. So, in the book by F. McLean, dedicated to the connection of O. Dirlewanger, it is noted that the RONA assault brigade consisted of ... "Ukrainian renegades" , and the British historian K. Heaton "delighted" the public with an unimaginable cocktail of mistakes, confusion and delirium. He writes that « Kaminsky's formation became the 29th SS Panzer-Grenadier Division (Russian No. 2) under the command of Gruppenführer Seidling ". We comfort ourselves with the hope that a somewhat prepared domestic reader understands perfectly well that the 29th division (Russian No. 1) was a Waffen-Grenadier division. By "Seidling", obviously, is meant SS Obersturmbannfuehrer (not Gruppenfuehrer) Hans Siegling - the commander of the 30th Waffen-Grenadier Division of the SS troops (Russian No. 2).

Finally, many Western authors call Bronislav Kaminsky either "Bratislava" or "Mecheslav". However, why blame the mirror if there are publicists in Russia who stubbornly continue to write the name of the commander of the RON as "Kaminsky" (and the autonomy headed by the latter in 1942-1943 is called "Lokotskaya") ...

We were faced with the task of maximally objectively presenting the history of the formation and combat activities of the RONA - starting from the creation of units of the "people's militia" of the Lokot volost, and ending with the participation of the combined regiment of the 29th SS division in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. for the first time in the historiography of the issue in the book offered to the reader, specific combat operations"Kamintsev" against Soviet and Polish patriots, the activities of employees and agents of the NKVD - NKGB, aimed at eliminating brigade commanders and demoralizing the personnel of the formation, as well as countermeasures of the RONA intelligence and counterintelligence. The issue of the crimes committed by the "Kamintsev" against the civilian population has not been ignored. Finally, various versions of Kaminsky's death are analyzed.

It should be noted that in our recently published book “Russian SS men in battle. Soldiers or punishers? " (unfortunately, as often happens, the publishers found it necessary to give "their" - alas, incorrect - version of the title) a separate chapter was devoted to the Kaminsky Brigade. However, the purpose of this publication was, first of all, to consider the genesis of the attitude of the elite of the Third Reich and the SS to the "Slavic question", summarizing all the facts of service of the Slavs (and not only Russians) in the bodies, divisions and units of Himmler's department known to us today.

Therefore, this book is not an "extended presentation" of the corresponding chapter. The material has been fundamentally revised, some inaccuracies have been corrected, a new array of sources has been connected.

The authors consider it their duty to sincerely thank the candidate for the help in the work on the book. historical sciences S.G . Drobyazko, historians K.K. Semenova, I. V. Gribkova, M.V. Kozhemyakin, as well as S.N. Nepodkosova, A. Yu. Belkova and A.V. Shestakov.

Chapter first. The occupation of the Bryansk region and the formation of the "People's Militia" of the Lokot Volost (October 1941 - January 1942)

Village Lokot - administrative center Brasovsky district of Oryol (now Bryansk) region - was occupied by units of the 17th Panzer Division of Lieutenant General Hans Jurgen von Arnim on October 4, 1941. The division was at the forefront of the 47th Motorized Army Corps, which is part of 2nd Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht (from October 6 - 2nd Tank Army), and participated in the encirclement and defeat of the Soviet 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front, which got into the boiler near Trubchevsk. By the beginning of October, in the rear of the 47th corps were, including those defeated in defensive battles on the Aleshkino-Saltanovka line, Saltanovka-Altovo-Tarasovka, units of the 280th, 137th, 148th, 7th, 148th, 7th 2nd, 148th, 282nd, 269th rifle and 42nd cavalry divisions of the 3rd Soviet army General Ya.M. Kreiser. Only a few units and individual soldiers of the 3rd and 13th armies managed to break out of the encirclement. The majority of the Red Army men who remained in the cauldron were forced to surrender by October 20.

On the territory of the Brasovsky region, the formations and units of the Red Army did not actually conduct defensive battles. Resistance to the invaders was not provided by local residents, who, due to specific historical traditions, have never been distinguished by their loyalty to Soviet power... At first, an attempt to organize a partisan movement and the underground actually collapsed in the region. First Secretary of the Oryol Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) AL. Matveev in a memo to the chief of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement P.K. Ponomarenko stated: “Compared to the neighboring districts, the Brasov district gave a relatively smaller percentage of partisans from the number of the party and Soviet activists and a relatively large percentage of traitors. The evacuated families of the party and Soviet activists were escorted to the whistle and unambiguous threats of anti-Sovietism, and some of the employees of the institutions stubbornly avoided evacuation under various pretexts..

The village of Lokot, Brasovsky district. From the post-war map

Those party and Soviet workers who did not manage to evacuate were either handed over to the German military authorities, or even killed. This is the fate that befell E.F. Sedakov, who on the eve of the war served as head of the Brasov police station. When the German units entered Lokot, Sedakov tried to go into the forest and take part in the organization of the Brasov partisan detachment "For the Motherland". After the death of Sedakov, V.A. Kapralov, who was later shot by the Chekists for the murder of his commissar and numerous facts of desertion, drunkenness and looting that took place in the detachment.

The situation that developed in the Brasov region on the eve and at the time of the occupation is clearly characterized by the words of M.G. Vasyukov, which he said during the post-war interrogation (before the war Vasyukov worked as chairman of the planning department of the Brasov regional executive committee, during the occupation he was the head of the planning and economic department of the Lokotsky self-government): “At the beginning ... of the war, by the decision of the Bureau of the RK VKP (b), I was appointed a member of the commission for conscription into the Red Army, at the same time in the commission for the evacuation of the area to the deep rear of the country. In July 1941, an order was issued by the RK VKP (b) to include in the partisan detachment the entire asset of the region, party members, including me. All party members went into the forest. I, on the instructions of the RK VKP (b), until the last moment, was engaged in the evacuation of cattle, grain and other values. On October 3, I sent the last train. The Germans have already come close to the village. Elbow. On October 4, they occupied the city, and on the 3rd, I broke through into the forest at the agreed base of the partisans. There I found 8 people headed by the second secretary of the RK VKP (b) Razumov. There were about 20 of us. The whole group did not manage to get into the main headquarters of the partisan detachment, and therefore they sent reconnaissance. It was already around October 18th. The reconnaissance team linked up with the main headquarters and there they ordered them to tell us to immediately leave the encirclement and connect with the main headquarters. Led by the second secretary of the RK VKP (b) Razumov, we arrived in the forest, where our main partisan headquarters was located. The headquarters was not in place. Since we had neither weapons nor food ... Razumov gave the order ... to disperse, whoever can wherever. On October 22, some of the comrades dispersed. I lived for two more days, and then had to return to Lokot, where my family lived. I was arrested, but then released. ".

The country Germany Germany Subordination SS Included in SS troops A type infantry division Includes three infantry (Waffen-Grenadier) regiments Number of about 8 thousand people, 14 battalions (September 1943)
from 4 to 5 thousand people (July 1944) Nickname Russian People's Liberation Army Motto My honor is called loyalty (it. Meine ehre heißt treue) Participation in Commanders Notable commanders Bronislav Kaminsky

Russian collaboration
The Second World War
Basic concepts
Ideology
Story
Personalities
Armed formations
National entities
The organization

The division was formed on the basis of the SS assault brigade "RONA" (German. Waffen-Sturmbrigade der SS RONA) which appeared in July 1944 by renaming "People's Brigade Kaminsky"(German Volksheer-Brigade Kaminski), which in turn in March 1944 was created from "Russian People's Liberation Army" Lokot self-government. Parts of the division successfully participated in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, the Slovak Uprising, as well as in the fight against partisans and Polish units.

History of appearance

Participation in hostilities against partisans

Participation in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944

Kaminsky's division took an active part in suppressing the uprising in the Okhota and Vistula regions. On August 4, the combined regiment of the RONA was thrown into the storming of the stronghold of the Poles in the building of the Tobacco Monopoly "Redoubt Kaliszski", which was defended by about 300 people. In this battle, RONA suffered its first losses - 22 killed.

On August 7, 8 and 9, fierce battles continued, in which both sides suffered heavy losses. And only on August 10, a turning point came in the battles. The rebels who defended the "Kalisz and Wawel redoubts" began to retreat.

The actions of the Kaminsky brigade angered the Wehrmacht and the veterans of the First World War. The commander of the 9th Panzer Army, Nikolaus von Formann, in whose area of ​​responsibility Warsaw was, sent a protest against the actions of the RONA brigade to Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zalewski, who tried to resolve the issue in a working order. However, Kaminsky's subordinates refused to follow the orders of anyone other than Kaminsky. Kaminsky said that his subordinates have the right to loot, since they lost all their property in Russia.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Heinz Guderian (who previously supported the idea of ​​creating Lokot autonomy), wrote in his memoirs:

... von dem Bach ... told me about the atrocities of his subordinates, which he is unable to suppress. His messages made my hair stand on end, so I had to report everything to Hitler that same evening and demand the removal of both brigades (Kaminsky's and Dirlewanger's) from the Eastern Front.

The looting of the brigade was reported upstairs. According to the testimony of the head of the OKW operational department, Alfred Jodl, given at the Nuremberg trial, he made a report to Hitler, who personally gave the order to disband the brigade. Kaminsky was recalled from the brigade's location.

A few days later, on August 28, Kaminsky was shot by members of the SS Sonderkommando under the command of Hans Botmann operating in the Litzmannstadt (Lodz) ghetto. At the Nuremberg trials his murder was confirmed by Erich von dem Bach-Zalewski, according to him, his "measures were to shoot the brigade commander Kaminsky and his associates according to the laws of wartime, because they authorized the further advancement of robberies and requisitions." Kaminsky's subordinates were informed that he was killed by Polish partisans. According to some reports, the murder was preceded by a formal court-martial.

After the death of Kaminsky

The new commander of the 29th SS Grenadier Division was the German - SS Brigadeführer, Major General of the SS troops Christoph Diem, and Colonel RONA, SS Obersturmbannführer Georgy Belay remained as his deputy.

Family members traveling in the “brigade” wagon train were separated from the military personnel and transported to Mecklenburg and Pomerania, where they were settled as civilian refugees. Some of the RONA fighters (about 3000 people) were transferred to Neuhammer (Silesia), where the 2nd Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division of the KONR Armed Forces was fully formed from them, and the Separate Reconnaissance Division of the 1st Division of the KONR Armed Forces was almost completely created from Kamintsev. A little later, about 1000 RONA fighters will be included in the 2nd division of the KONR Armed Forces. Separate groups of fighters decided to continue fighting on the territory of Belarus and, possibly, the Bryansk region. One of these groups of 25-30 people, which decided to break through to the Bryansk region, was headed by a member of the NTS G. Ye. Khomutov.

The rest of the personnel under the command of SS Gruppenfuehrer Heinrich Jurs was sent to Slovakia, where he soon took part in the suppression of the Slovak national uprising in early October 1944. But after an inspection on October 11, the unit was declared incapable and subject to disbandment. 72nd SS Grenadier Regiment (Russian No. 1) and 73rd SS Grenadier Regiment (Russian No. 2) handed over assault brigade Dirlewanger, thus constituting practically its basis. And the number 29 of the SS division on March 9, 1945 was received by the Italian assault brigade.

On December 30-31, 1946, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced to death officers RONA Mosin, Vasyukov, Frolov and Zakhartsov, and the rest to various terms of imprisonment.