NATO practical activities and achievements briefly. Geopolitics in the modern world
Introduction
1. The essence and structure of NATO. Development of NATO after the fall of the Warsaw Pact
1.1. Concept, main purpose and structure of NATO
1.2. Development of NATO after the end of the Cold War
2. Features and Prospects of Russia-NATO Relations
2.1. General issues of relationship development
2.2. NATO's eastward expansion is a threat to Russia
Conclusion
Bibliography
Introduction
The topic of this work is NATO activities and its impact on modern system international relations.
The relevance of the topic is due to the need for Russia's response to NATO's eastward expansion, which is impossible without an understanding of the processes taking place in NATO policy after the fall of the Warsaw Pact.
The North Atlantic Alliance remains the primary vehicle for maintaining the engagement of the United States of America in European security affairs. As a result of its expansion, it plays a decisive role in uniting a continent that has been divided for almost 50 years.
Today NATO is an international organization, which already includes 19 states, and in the near future there will be 26 countries - this is a reality, its impact is felt not only in the Euro-Atlantic region, but in other parts of the world. The membership of this organization includes all the most politically influential, economically powerful and militarily powerful Western states, among which three nuclear powers (USA, Great Britain, France) are permanent members of the UN Security Council.
The profound changes that have taken place in the political situation in Europe and in the world as a whole have led NATO countries to the conclusion that it is necessary to transform the Alliance, shifting the emphasis of its activities from the military component to the political one, updating its goals, functions, strategic concept and political face.
The political and scientific relevance of a comprehensive study of NATO activities, both past and present, is growing. It is necessary to create an effective mechanism for interaction with this large and complex international organization, which has become an integral part of the European security system.
Russia has to coexist with NATO and build normal relations with it, which determines the relevance of the topic.
purpose of work: explore key features the influence of NATO on modern international relations.
Work tasks:
Determine the features of NATO development after the fall of the ATS.
Examine the structure of NATO at the present stage of development.
Study the issues of NATO expansion to the East.
Consider the problems and prospects of relations between Russia and NATO.
Research object is the evolution of NATO's foreign policy strategy in the context of the end of “ cold war"And new parameters of the diplomatic process caused by these changes.
The subject of research are the process of the alliance's search for its role in the new political realities and the functioning of the diplomatic mechanism of the alliance, both within the union itself and outside it, in particular, in relations with The Russian Federation.
1.1. Concept, main purpose and structure of NATO
To begin with, it is necessary to determine the essence and development goals of NATO; for this purpose, you can turn to network resources. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO (eng. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO; fr. Organization du traité de l "Atlantique Nord , OTAN) appeared on April 4, 1949 in the United States. Then the USA, Canada, Iceland, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Italy and Portugal became NATO member states. It is a "transatlantic forum" for Allied countries to consult on any issues affecting the vital interests of its members, including events that could threaten their security, and provides deterrence or protection from any form of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state ...
In 1954 the Soviet Union offered to join NATO. The offer was rejected. As a result, the Warsaw Pact was signed in opposition to NATO on the initiative of the USSR. ... Later, the USSR reiterated its proposal to join NATO in 1983, after 1991 Russia has also repeatedly made a similar proposal.
NATO Objective: NATO members agree that an armed attack on one or more Alliance members in Europe or North America will be interpreted as an attack on the entire Alliance. In this regard, they agree that in the event of a specified attack, they, as an exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defense, will help the attacked member or members, independently and jointly with other members, acting as needed, including with the use of armed forces to restore and maintain security in the North Atlantic " acting as necessary, including with the use of armed forces"Means that other members of the union are not required to join armed conflict with the aggressor. They still have the obligation to react, but they can choose how to react on their own.
This distinguishes the treaty from Article 4 of the "Brussels Treaty", which founded the Western European Union, which explicitly states that the response must necessarily be of a military nature. However, it is often assumed that NATO members will provide military assistance to the attacked. In addition, the article limits the scope of the alliance to Europe and North America (until 1963 Algeria), which explains why NATO did not intervene in the conflict in the Falkland Islands.
NATO's supreme political body is the North Atlantic Council (NATO Council), which consists of representatives of all member states in the rank of ambassadors and meets twice a year under the chairmanship of the NATO Secretary General. The North Atlantic Council also meets at the level of foreign ministers and heads of state and government, but formally these meetings have the same status as sessions at the level of foreign ministers. Council decisions are taken unanimously. In the period between sessions, the functions of the NATO Council are performed by the Permanent Council of NATO, which includes representatives of all member countries of the bloc in the rank of ambassadors.
Since December 1966, the Defense Planning Committee has become the highest military-political body of the organization, which meets twice a year at its sessions at the level of defense ministers, although formally it consists of permanent representatives. In the period between sessions, the functions of the Defense Planning Committee are performed by the Standing Defense Planning Committee, which includes representatives of all member countries of the bloc in the rank of ambassadors.
NATO's supreme military body is the Military Committee, which consists of the Chiefs of Staff of NATO member countries and the civilian representative of Iceland, which has no armed forces, and meets at least twice a year. The Military Committee is subordinate to the command of two zones: Europe and the Atlantic. The Supreme High Command in Europe is headed by the Supreme Commander (always an American general). He is subordinate to the main commands in three European theaters of military operations: North European, Central European and South European. In the period between meetings, the functions of the Military Committee are performed by the Standing Military Committee.
NATO's main body also includes the Nuclear Planning Group, which meets usually twice a year at the level of Defense Ministers, usually before the NATO Council. Iceland is represented on the Nuclear Planning Group by a civilian observer.
1.2. Development of NATO after the end of the Cold War
The collapse of the socialist bloc in the late 1990s raised doubts about the need to preserve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which has fulfilled its mission. Based on historical experience In the second half of the 20th century, the logic of a realistic approach to military alliances led to the assumption that virtually none of the defense alliances could survive their own victory over the enemy. Politicians and experts in the United States and Western Europe, who accepted this logic, were of the opinion that, in order not to contradict the forces of history, NATO should be disbanded, or, at least, limited in its claims. For example, Germany, represented by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, supported by Czechoslovakia, during the second half of 1990 (until the Paris summit of the CSCE in November 1990) pursued an active line towards "deeper institutionalization" of the CSCE, intending to transform this forum into the cornerstone of a new European security system. In Moscow in the early 1990s, there was a more popular idea of a "European Security Council" of the largest powers in Europe.
The functions and goals of NATO after the Second World War were focused on containing the Soviet bloc, however, after its collapse, it became necessary to revise the classical doctrines.
It should be noted that at the turn of the 1980s - 1990s, NATO, which during the post-war period performed a deterrent rather than a military-offensive function, faced the need for external adaptation to the new international conditions and internal structural restructuring closely related to it. During the Cold War, NATO, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 5 of its own Charter, was a regional pact aimed at ensuring the “collective defense” of its members. However, after the collapse of the USSR and the OVD, the need to preserve NATO in the form in which it existed for all post-war years was "... questioned ...". Thus, in the early 1990s, NATO faced an inevitable crisis of its own institutional identity.
& nbspAt the turn of XX-XXI centuries. the world has entered one of the most difficult and contradictory periods of its hysteria, characterized by extreme uncertainty about the prospects for the development of the geopolitical situation and the expectation of major changes in the entire system of world order.
& nbspIn 1991, the military structures of the Warsaw Pact Organization ceased to exist, the Soviet Union collapsed. This dramatically changed the entire strategic and political situation in Europe and the world. The transition from a bipolar world to a unipolar one has practically begun.
& nbspThe Cold War, which ended in fact with the defeat of Russia, was officially ended. However, its geopolitical goals, hidden mechanisms of its conduct continue to influence the development of interstate relations.
& nbspUSA stepped up efforts to ensure its undivided world leadership, relying on the military-political NATO bloc.
By heavily arming itself and introducing its own standard into the practice of world diplomacy, the United States began to show, ignoring the UN, CSCE and world public opinion, a constant readiness to punish with fire and sword all those who oppose the establishment of a “new world order”. And they really do it - in Iraq, Libya, Bosnia and Herzegovina and finally in Union Republic Yugoslavia.
& nbsp The question naturally arose - what place will the Alliance take in this system, will it remain or will it be dissolved? It should be recalled that the NATO bloc differs significantly from all the blocs that preceded it in that, firstly, all the main Western powers united in it, and, secondly, it already in peacetime has a permanent military organization, united command and staffs, the combined armed forces, while in the previous blocks the formation of the united command and control bodies and the united armed forces began only with the beginning of the war.
& nbspHowever, the bloc was not disbanded, since its leaders assured that it would be transformed from an instrument of the Cold War into an instrument of peace and harmony on the continent.
& nbspThis is why by the end of the Cold War, both in the former USSR, and in the NATO countries there is a consensus on what to do with this bloc. Despite the collapse of the OVD, no one in the USSR insisted on immediately disbanding the NATO bloc. On the contrary, it was believed that a cooperative relationship could be established with him that would help consolidate the results of the end of the Cold War. In particular, in cooperation with the NATO bloc, it would be possible to resolve both general military issues (control over conventional arms in Europe, preventing war on the continent) and relatively private political problems - the situation in certain regions of the Euro-Atlantic region without recognizing any or a police role.
& nbsp In this direction, cooperation between Russia and NATO developed until the decisions of the Brussels session of the NATO Council in early 1994, when two ideas emerged: the first was to create a cooperation program for achieving peace "Partnership for Peace" (PIP) as an addition to the NATO system and at the same time, the possibility of the block going beyond its competence; the second is to enhance the Alliance's response to crisis situations, in particular the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Neither one nor the other was at one time contested by Russia as an attempt to unilaterally change the rules of conduct that developed at the time of the end of the Cold War.
& nbspRussian diplomacy actually stated agreement with the military-political dominance of NATO in Europe. She recognized the viability of the above ideas that were included in the strategic concept of NATO, agreed with its primacy in resolving conflicts in Europe, with the right to interfere in internal affairs bypassing international organizations.
& nbspIn 1997, the Founding Act on Russia-NATO Relations was signed. Although the signing of this act was only a political declarative action, it essentially sanctioned the implementation of NATO's plans.
& nbspAs a result, we have, firstly, the inclusion of three new members in the NATO structure - Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. The consequence of this step was that the NATO military grouping, including the aviation one, moved to the East by 650-750 km, and the composition of the NATO Allied Air Forces increased by 17-20%. NATO received at its disposal a wide network of airfields (about 290), military bases with a wide infrastructure, built more Soviet Army and left on the territory of these states. Their use enables NATO, if necessary, to deliver missile and bomb strikes up to the Volga and the Urals, to hit the positions of Russia's strategic missiles. And secondly, the most brutal, unprovoked missile and bomb strikes on defenseless Yugoslavia, which practically undermined the existing system of international security, violated the norms international law, pushed aside the UN, OSCE, Security Council. Thus, a serious claim has been made for a model of a new world order in the 21st century: a unipolar world led by the United States; NATO as an international gendarme and “ supreme judge"; the law of force as a universal means of "appeasing" those who disagree; diktat and blackmail is a form of communication with dissenting members of the world community.
& nbspAs US President Bill Clinton said on June 23, 1999, “NATO can, if necessary, military operation similar to Yugoslav, anytime and anywhere in the world - be it in Africa or in Central Europe. "
Thus, by inflicting unprovoked strikes on Iraq, Yugoslavia and making similar statements, the United States and NATO are trying to accustom the world community to the idea that a unipolar world has become a de facto and Washington, in alliance with NATO, will judge and punish everyone without any participation in this UN and the OSCE.
& nbspThe new system of European security began to take shape in 1989. Its basis, as conceived by Washington and a number of leading European countries must constitute the European Union and NATO, and institutions such as the OSCE and the UN must be relegated to the background, as must Russia, which is not a member of the EU and NATO.
At the same time, the United States should be recognized as the leading country in this structure, on whose interests all international relations should be guided.
The new NATO military-strategic concept adopted at the Washington session in April 1999, which is presented by the Alliance leadership as NATO's response to the fundamentally changed situation in Europe and the world as a whole, is focused on consolidating this structure and order, bringing to the fore the task of resolving regional and local conflicts in and around the Euro-Atlantic region arising from crises “on the periphery of the alliance” as a result of “ethnic and political enmity, territorial disputes, inadequate or unsuccessful attempts at reform, violation of human rights and the collapse of states”.
This also includes the problems of combating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons and their delivery vehicles, as well as against the global spread of technology that can be used to produce weapons. The security interests of the bloc can be threatened, the concept says, also by terrorism, sabotage, organized crime and interruptions in the supply of vital resources. Therefore, all these factors can determine the military-force response on the part of NATO.
& nbspThe concept pays much attention to the development of a "European identity" in the field of security and defense. At the same time, it is indicated that this process requires close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if necessary, the European Union.
& nbspRussia, which is not a member of the EU and NATO, faces the threat of being barred from participating in decision-making that directly affects its vital interests.
& nbsp As stated in NATO's new Strategic Concept, “ new Europe and at the same time the Euro-Atlantic security structure, which is based on NATO, is unfolding ”. Thus, the North Atlantic bloc claims to be the basis of security on the continent, where the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is already functioning. In this way, NATO seeks to set aside this pan-European structure, expanding the possibilities for its military activity.
& nbspThe calls for NATO to transform itself from a collective defense organization to a collective security organization were counterproductive.
& nbspAs a military-political alliance of leading Western countries The Alliance will never be able to give up its main task - to be a conductor of a policy of pressure on unwanted states, which was once again reaffirmed in the new NATO Strategic Concept, which grants this bloc the right to conduct "crisis response operations" far beyond the territory of countries belonging to the North Atlantic Alliance.
& nbspNot the less, NATO has become an integral part of the European security system and is unlikely to be liquidated in the foreseeable future. Most likely, Russia will have to coexist with NATO and build certain relations with it. Not quite partnership, not at all allied, but also non-hostile. As a means of soothing fears in many European countries, NATO has paid off. He also played an important role in limiting the "nationalization of defense" of individual European states, which would necessarily lead to an arms race. But it goes without saying that after what the bloc has done with Yugoslavia, the attitude towards it should be different.
& nbspThe question of expanding the spatial scope of NATO is not directly raised. However, from a number of provisions of the new concept it is directly clear that such an expansion of the bloc's sphere of action outside the region designated in the Washington Treaty as the North Atlantic region north of the Tropic of Cancer is envisaged.
& nbspSo, referring to the fact that the treaty provides for repelling an attack on the territory of the participating States, "wherever it comes from," the authors of the concept argue that "the security considerations of the alliance require consideration of this issue on a global scale." In this regard, the document stipulates that the armed forces of the alliance will fulfill its obligations on collective defense "and conduct of operations in crisis situations" that sometimes arise "far from their areas of usual location, including outside the territories of NATO countries."
NATO's assignment of the functions of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction especially clearly reflects the intention of the alliance to carry out its actions in other regions.
& nbspThis is directly stated in §56 of the Concept: “The alliance's defensive activities against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons should be further improved, including through anti-missile defense work. Since NATO forces can be deployed outside of the alliance's borders, the appropriate means at their disposal must be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable and resilient. ”
Thus, we can fully state the birth of a "new NATO", that is, an organization that is not limited to the needs of collective defense, national territories, but claims to be something more than a regional structure.
& nbspIn the new NATO strategic concept, there is not a word about "common human interests" or equal security for all countries. In strategy national security The United States, as a leading world power, has clearly stated: "Our national security strategy is formed on the basis of American interests and values, the United States proclaims a global responsibility for protecting democracy on a planetary scale, has vital interests in all regions of the world." Now NATO's new strategic concept is focused not on defense, but on preventive action outside its area of responsibility, that is, almost exclusively on the projection of force. The emphasis in politics is on military force.
The NATO countries, which are home to only 12% of the world's population, account for 21% of all military personnel, 40% of all conventional weapons, 45% of nuclear weapons, 56% of all military spending in the world, 80% of all spending on military modernization and 90% of all spending for R&D. Military expenditures of NATO countries are on average 4.5 times higher than the world average, which makes it possible to spend an average of US $ 100,000 per soldier per year. Thus, against the background of an absolute quantitative reduction in NATO's military potential after the end of the Cold War, there is a sharp relative qualitative increase in the militarization of the alliance.
& nbspAccording to military experts, the NATO bloc currently has about 2.9 million personnel in its armed forces, up to 50 combat-ready divisions and 100 separate brigades, up to 16.5 thousand tanks, 25 thousand guns of various calibers, more 5 thousand combat aircraft.
& nbspNo changes were noted in the nuclear strategy of the alliance. The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside NATO (a clear allusion to Russia, as well as nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan) is also, in the opinion of the leaders of the union, a significant factor in favor of maintaining the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence".
& nbspThe maintenance of sufficient nuclear power of the alliance, the concept says, requires the broad participation of European NATO countries in the collective planning of nuclear forces and their deployment on their territory in peacetime. “Nuclear forces stationed in Europe and subordinate to NATO create an important political and military link between European and American members of the alliance. Therefore, the alliance will maintain their adequate level in Europe ”.
& nbspObvious is the prospect of strengthening the leading role of the United States in NATO, maintaining American dominance on the European continent. The powerful military potential of the United States and its claim to sole leadership in the world have an undoubted impact on the formation of NATO's military strategy in the direction of its conformity with American strategic guidelines.
& nbspThis is clearly stated in the new concept: “The presence of conventional and nuclear forces of the United States in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, inextricably linked to security North America».
& nbspAbout Russia, the new concept says very little. In the part concerning partnership, it was noted that “Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security” and that stable relations between it and NATO are necessary. However, despite this and other statements by the military-political leadership of NATO that it does not currently consider Russia as its enemy, in practice the Alliance's Joint Armed Forces are aiming at a possible confrontation with the Russian Federation. And this is due to the fact that Russia in the modern world community is the only force that has a potential, including nuclear, sufficient to destroy any country of the alliance, including the United States. Therefore, according to NATO's views, it is the main source of the so-called "risk". The level of this "risk" increases due to the instability of the unpredictable situation in the Russian Federation. In this regard, the interests of NATO would be consistent with the maximum weakening and collapse of Russia, the seizure of its resources, the establishment of control over its nuclear potential. Statements that the West is interested in a strong and rich Russia are simply hypocrisy. Western financial circles have managed to firmly tie Russia to their political chariot, making it completely dependent on IMF loans. This position of Russia, apparently, was taken into account when developing a new NATO strategy.
& nbspNato's new strategy, the barbaric bombing of Yugoslavia are fundamentally changing the military-political situation in Europe. They demonstrate the readiness of the alliance, at its own discretion, by force of arms to impose on a sovereign state its own version of resolving a crisis situation. Consequently, it can be argued that at the present time, after actually a decade since the end of the global military confrontation, the contradictions between the very existence of a developing military alliance (generated by the "cold war") and its absence of a real, not imaginary adversary have approached their peak ... And the NATO leadership was doomed to find a solution to this contradiction by creating a new enemy, inventing new tasks for the bloc and deciding on a military action.
& nbspTo preserve the alliance, the leadership of the alliance today desperately needed a real, tangible enemy and a threat emanating from him that could be presented to the whole world. And they found him in the person of Yugoslavia.
& nbspNo guarantees that this alliance will no longer use force in this or that part of the globe is not and cannot be.
& nbspIn any case, the new concept of the alliance confirms the possibility of such a development of events. For she legitimized two things. First, NATO's de facto going beyond the regional organization permitted by the UN Charter, the transformation of this alliance into a bloc with global responsibility. Secondly, this concept brought back military force its function as a real (used) instrument of foreign policy.
Major General V. I. OSTANKOV,
Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor;
Colonel A. V. ANASTASIN,
Candidate of Military Sciences, Senior Researcher
Despite the significant difference in approaches to solving the problems of global and European security, identified by Russia and the NATO bloc as a whole, as well as by individual member states of the alliance, it is obvious that there is no reasonable alternative to the development of cooperation between them.
Probably, it was this circumstance that played a decisive role when on May 28, 2002, at the Pratica di Maare airbase near Rome (Italy), the heads of state and government of NATO member states and the Russian Federation signed the Rome Declaration "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality" formally establishing the Russia-NATO Council. The new structure replaced the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, formed in 1997 in accordance with the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. The new body is intended to bring relations between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to a qualitatively higher level, providing a more effective “mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint solutions and joint actions by Russia and NATO member states on a wide range of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region ”.
The Rome Declaration, which predetermines a new quality of relations, identifies several areas of possible cooperation, which together constitute the "field of coinciding interests" necessary for the rapprochement process. These areas include the joint fight against terrorism, crisis management, measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, the problem of missile defense (theater missile defense), search and rescue activities at sea, civil emergency response, cooperation in the field of military reforms, joint assessment of new threats and challenges.
Along with the forums at which important decisions of a long-term, strategic plan are made (such as the summits in Rome or Prague), a number of smaller-scale events have recently taken place, the nature of which, however, made it possible to analyze in more detail certain aspects of relations between Russia and NATO. Such events include scientific and scientific-practical conferences held, among other things, by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Thus, on February 4, 2002 in Rome and on December 9, 2002 in Moscow, under the chairmanship of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation and the NATO Secretary General, joint Russia-NATO Council conferences were held on the topic "The role of the military in the fight against terrorism."
The results of the conferences show high level mutual understanding existing between their participants. The Russian military and NATO representatives jointly worked out a whole package of concrete proposals aimed at developing cooperation between us in the field of combating terrorism.
In particular, it was proposed to adapt the armed forces of both sides to actively counter terrorist threats, strengthen security and prevent terrorists from seizing weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction. The participants of the event agreed to conduct more coordinated counter-terrorism information activities, establish a regular exchange of information on terrorist threats, conduct joint exercises, train personnel and command bodies, carry out mutual consultations on the convergence of national regulations in the field of combating terrorism, improve the technology for making joint decisions, developing joint plans and their joint implementation.
Today, it is obvious that international terrorism is increasingly turning from single, scattered actions into a carefully coordinated, mass phenomenon that unites in its composition a wide range of radical and extremist organizations that are capable of waging large-scale terrorist wars in any regions of the world, in all physical spheres, including number in the information, with far-reaching politically motivated goals.
Russia, having found itself among the top-priority targets of international terrorism, has been waging a war on its own with its aggressive manifestations for several years already, primarily in the North Caucasus. And for the foreseeable future, it will remain one of the attractive targets for terrorist aspirations. In such conditions, the main task remains the consolidation and the maximum possible integration of the subjects of the fight against terrorism, including through the Russia-NATO line. At the same time, the main efforts must be focused on the concerted actions of all participants in the counter-terrorism process at all its stages, from identifying the organizers and inspirers of terrorist organizations, to creating conditions in which their activities will become impracticable or impossible.
Terrorism is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon, it requires a detailed, comprehensive, systematic study, especially in terms of identifying its causes, primarily deep, fundamental. It seems that it is here that the answer to many practical questions related to the implementation of specific measures to counter international terrorism is found. It is here that the scientific community has the opportunity, through consolidated efforts, to make a serious contribution to the development of relationships between the participants in the process.
It is also important to take into account that the threat to the world community is not only terrorism itself, but also an inadequate response to its manifestations on the part of legitimate structures designed to fight it. In the antiterrorist agiotage, and this is how some manifestations of the struggle against this evil can be called, the erosion of some important concepts is already taking place, the erosion of the system of international law and the existing system of international relations. A state declared an "outcast" or "terrorist accomplice", unlike any national, transnational or global terrorist organization, is different, namely, a legitimate subject of global politics, a full member of the international community. Establishing the facts of the involvement of states in certain aspects of terrorist activities, the degree of guilt of the authorities, the development and implementation of measures to influence them, as well as a number of other issues related to this area, should be the prerogative of competent international organizations, primarily the UN.
It is unacceptable to accuse entire peoples, nations, states or religions of terrorism and the desire to use this factor to advance the geopolitical plans of the NATO bloc or its individual members, based on a favorable political situation from this point of view. In this regard, the partnership between Russia and NATO is designed to help ensure that the use of force in international relations, including with international terrorism, takes place exclusively in the field of international law. The fight against terrorism must be part of efforts to maintain the civilized character of modern international relations, which does not allow illegal methods to achieve noble goals.
Assessing the positive or negative tendencies in our relations, one cannot ignore the issue of further expansion of the bloc and the related problem of its further transformation. Russia expressed its attitude to the ongoing process, which can be described as “calmly negative”.
It is obvious that NATO's eastward expansion is being carried out within the framework of the military-political course aimed at globalizing the functions of the alliance and consolidating its role as a leading military-political force not only in Europe, but throughout the world. Already the first stage of NATO enlargement, as a result of which Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were admitted to the alliance, meant a breakdown of the world order that took shape after the end of World War II.
The very logic of NATO enlargement is difficult to perceive otherwise than as a desire to achieve a further weakening of Russia's position and role in international affairs. The movement of the bloc's military structures to the Russian borders is an obvious and unjustified relapse of the Cold War, no matter what arguments it may be based on. The next expansion of the Alliance at the expense of new members had a negative impact on the geopolitical and geostrategic position of Russia, and this makes us think about measures to counter these truly "new" threats.
The expansion of NATO to the east, the increase in the military power of the alliance objectively lead to the formation of new dividing lines in Europe, deformation of the European security system. To avoid such a situation, Russia once proposed a so-called “postponed decision” option, in which the accession of the Baltic states could be postponed and synchronized in time with a real, qualitative and irreversible improvement in relations between NATO and Russia.
However, the leadership of the alliance, the heads of the candidate states ignored the concerns of the Russian side. Now we can state that the "tension lines" have become closer to us, and their bad influence on the system of international relations will undoubtedly still manifest itself in the future.
With the end of the Cold War, the threat of a large-scale military clash along the West-East line was practically removed from the agenda. This meant that the military alliance had lost a reason for its existence.
Thus, the Alliance is faced with the serious challenge of adapting to new circumstances and rethinking its place in the new geopolitical balance of power. The absence of a real enemy requires his leadership to look for a new use of their military power. Terrorism, with all its quite obvious danger, strength, sophistication, globalization, still cannot claim such a role.
Of course, one cannot take seriously the assertion of NATO Secretary General George Robertson that the entire military power of the bloc is now reoriented towards the fight against terrorism. The fact is that the very structure of the military component of the alliance, as well as the system of its weapons, the nature of operational and combat training, and the command and control system do not and, in principle, cannot meet such tasks. It seems somewhat inappropriate to approach, in which there is a desire to reduce the history of relations between Russia and NATO only to the post-Roman stage, the duration of which is less than two years. The principle of historicism requires considering any problem, including this one, taking into account a much larger retrospective. In this regard, it is important to analyze the experience that has been accumulated since the adoption of the 1997 Founding Act, including the negative aspects associated with the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999. The results of such an analysis should be taken into account when constructing a new concept of relations between Russia and NATO.
The long-term tough, even conflicting confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the USA and the USSR is also an experience. And there is a positive in this experience as well. There is a known paradox of conflict, which is capable of bringing opponents closer together, since it forces them to carefully study each other, and this leads to the conclusion that mutual respect is necessary.
With all the obviousness of the positive change in the nature of our relations, we must not forget that the system of military confrontation that developed during the Cold War has not yet been completely dismantled, since until now most of the military power of the NATO bloc, previously directed against the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, is now by right of succession, it is oriented against Russia. The same can be said about the military force of the Russian Federation, which is still intended primarily for military containment of the NATO bloc.
If we talk about the development of mechanisms for joint assessment of new threats and challenges, then this area of cooperation between Russia and NATO appears to be potentially one of the most promising and fruitful. There are a number of specific issues here, the consistent solution of which by joint efforts in itself will already be a significant contribution to the development of partnership relations, a real deepening of mutual understanding between the parties.
It is highly desirable, for example, in theoretical terms, to come to a unified interpretation of the concepts of "danger", "threat", "challenge", "risk", "terrorism" and a whole series of others related to this area. Generally speaking, the convergence of our conceptual apparatuses across the entire spectrum of cooperation is a rather laborious work, which, at the same time, is absolutely necessary if we are going to cooperate in deeds, and not in words.
It is not entirely justified to formulate this area of cooperation as “a joint assessment of new threats and challenges” with an emphasis on the word “new”. First, it is too early to call the so-called “old” threats old and underestimate them, “writing them off to the archive”. Second, an objective assessment of new threats and challenges from the standpoint of systems approach and with the observance of the principle of historicism, it is impossible apart from their entire complex, which includes the "old" - traditional and "new", and, possibly, some other, for example, "hypothetical". In practice, such a bias leads to the deliberate or unintentional exaggeration of some threats to the detriment of objectivity.
A joint assessment of hazards, threats, challenges and risks is closely related to the problems that make up the essence of other areas of interaction, more precisely, measures in this area should precede the practical actions of the parties. In other words, the results of a joint scientific study of this issue should form a theoretical platform and provide a basis for all other activities. In general, speaking about relations between Russia and NATO, it should be borne in mind that, on the one hand, they are still pressed by the burden of historically conditioned distrust, on the other hand, there is a growing understanding of both sides that these relations need evolutionary, progressive development.
We certainly have the potential for interaction in new geopolitical conditions, objectively we have a set of necessary elements for such interaction. Positive changes in the international situation made it possible to minimize the likelihood of unleashing a large-scale war between the main subjects of international relations, at the same time, there is still a real threat of exacerbation of existing or emergence of new military conflicts of various scales and intensity that can negatively affect both international security and ours. relationship. Perhaps it will be correct if the members of the Russia-NATO Council, on the basis of the accumulated experience of practical interaction, persistently work to expand the "field of coinciding interests" and increase specific areas of cooperation. At the same time, the positive evolution of Russian-NATO relations depends not so much on a quantitative increase in activities in various areas of interaction, as on a qualitative change in the very content of these relations.
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Expansion of NATO.
NATO(North Atlantic Treaty Organization - English North Atlantic Tready Organization) is a military-political bloc of states, created in 1949 at the initiative of the United States. There are currently 19 countries in NATO. The issue of expanding this bloc to the east after the collapse of the USSR became a serious problem in Russia's relations with the West.
The North Atlantic Alliance was conceived as a military-political alliance, constituting the military power support of one of the two poles of the bipolar world. It was preceded, in particular, by Truman doctrine- the foreign policy program of the US government, outlined on March 12, 1947 by President H. Truman in a speech to Congress. Referring to the "communist danger" hanging over Greece and Turkey, H. Truman called on Congress in the "interests of US security" to provide assistance to these states. The axis of the North Atlantic alliance was not only strength, but also ideology. In this sense, the NATO bloc embraced the entire so-called free world.
It should be borne in mind that the rapprochement between Western Europe and North America occurred not only due to the threat of a Soviet invasion, but also due to a broader set of problems. At the end of World War II, the governments of European countries found themselves in a situation characterized by the collapse of empires and international trade, the threat of economic and social chaos, the collapse of the monetary system, the growth of the influence of radical ideologies, lack of food, ineffective transport systems, people's disappointment in their leaders, etc.
In response, a multitude of mutually intertwining, contradicting, overlapping institutions was created, which together constituted something like an institutional version of “flexible response” to complex and varied problems at the levels of individual, state, subregional, regional and international interaction.
With the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Alliance found itself in a completely different strategic situation. Gone are the main reasons for the creation of the NATO bloc, and because of this, it simply could not avoid a systemic crisis. This was essentially recognized by the participants in the Rome Summit of the leaders of the alliance member states in November 1991, at which NATO's “new strategic concept” was promulgated.
It is pertinent to recall in this regard that the main goal of NATO, formulated in the fifth article of the treaty, is to provide mutual assistance by member countries in the event of a hypothetical attack and collective defense of their territories. After the end of the Cold War and the actual cessation of the main external threat from the East, the leaders of the alliance faced the problem of its radical transformation or dissolution. In this situation, any other threats and arguments would be insufficient to fully replace the original main goal.
However, there are a number of reasons why NATO will remain a real factor in world politics for the foreseeable future. Exists powerful forces who are very interested in the Alliance and will do their utmost to prevent its dissolution. Different participants in this process pursue different interests. For the United States, NATO remains a proof and a tool for realizing its alleged leading role in the world in the coming century.
A number of European countries see the alliance as an instrument of restraining the nationalization of Germany's foreign policy and possible hegemonic inclinations on its part. The fact is that the unification of Germany changed the geopolitical balance of power in the world. It no longer "fits" into the tight bounds given to it by the US geostrategic course.
For NATO itself, enlargement is a matter of its survival. Affects the action of the law of self-preservation and self-reproduction, which determines the essence and activity of any organization. One of the ways this law is manifested is expansion. In this sense, the NATO bloc is no exception, which preferred the palliative path of quantitative expansion to a qualitative restructuring in line with the prevailing realities.
A favorable circumstance was the fact that the Eastern European countries, which gained de facto national independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, entered the European foreground as independent and active subjects of international relations. For them, the desire to join NATO is largely stimulated by psychological considerations, the desire to free themselves from excessive military spending and to create a favorable climate of trust in which they can implement difficult economic and political reforms.
One of the most important reasons pushing Eastern European countries into NATO's "embrace" is not only the ghost of the Soviet Union, but also the ghosts of the empires of the past (Ottoman, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia), for which these countries served as an arena of rivalry or a bargaining chip. coins in a big geopolitical game. Empires no longer exist, including the Soviet one, but the ghosts remain. Of course, in history they have often played a fatal role, but nevertheless, it seems, the task is to identify the real guidelines of world development and find their place in the real world.
In the eyes of the Eastern European countries, joining NATO is, in essence, a question of asserting, first of all in their own eyes, their European identity, as well as the question of integration into economic and political structures EU. They view NATO membership as the shortest path to solving their social, economic and defense problems on the basis of early integration into European structures. In their eyes, joining the alliance is a kind of security guarantee in the face of risk and instability allegedly emanating from Russia.
At the same time, many Europeans see the North Atlantic Alliance as a means of preventing the re-nationalization of security policy in Europe. This problem has become especially urgent in the light of the tragic events in the former Yugoslavia. NATO is seen as a guarantor of European, and not only European, security, the preservation of the American political and military presence in Europe.
Today, the United States remains an essential component of the European balance of power, and the North Atlantic Alliance is the basis of the military-strategic partnership between the United States and Europe. The United States is one of the two main pillars of NATO, and it is obvious that if it leaves Europe, the NATO bloc will collapse.
There are a number of other arguments and arguments in favor of maintaining and strengthening NATO. In particular, one cannot ignore the desire of certain circles in the West to take advantage of the weakening of Russia's positions, to prevent its revival and the restoration of its weight and influence in world affairs. One of the reasons is the interest of significant political and bureaucratic circles in preserving this organization as an employer and a source of profitable orders. In this context, the recent disputes and discussions regarding the expansion of the Alliance by including new members from among the Eastern European countries that were previously members of the Warsaw Bloc should also be considered.
Of course, from the point of view of the supporters of the preservation and expansion of NATO, their arguments are not groundless and have a right to exist. Perhaps these arguments would be acceptable to the rest of the world community as well, if the realities on the basis of which the alliance was created were preserved in some form.
The confrontation between East and West ceased, in 1990 there was unification of Germany – Federal Republic Germany and the German Democratic Republic in united state, the Berlin Wall, which divided Europe into two parts, disappeared, the military presence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe was ended. As they say, organizations are created, in essence, not by the participating states of these organizations, but by their enemies. This statement contains a certain amount of truth in the sense that alliances, blocs, organizations are formed due to the presence of a certain threat or challenge to their participants. History provides us with many examples when coalitions that have won a war break up almost the day after victory. Why should NATO avoid this fate?
Of no small importance in this context is the fact that European security is becoming less and less a military problem. It is turning into a problem that is being addressed on a broader scale of foreign policy that goes beyond NATO's purview. Even before the end of the Cold War, a number of leaders of the member countries of the alliance realized the need for a certain modification of its structure, role and functions. Moreover, she is needed now. Without it, expansion generally loses all meaning. As a number of events of the post-bipolar era have shown, for example, in Rwanda, Somalia, Yugoslavia, the NATO bloc in its current form is not yet ready to suppress wars, aggression, bloody conflicts that arise both in Europe and beyond its borders.
In the early days after the end of the Cold War, some of the top Soviet leadership and Russian politicians there was an impression that confrontationalism in Russia's relations with the West has become the property of history and that from now on there are times of democracy, peace and friendship, which can only be overshadowed by some irresponsible troublemakers like S. Hussein or M. Gaddafi. It was assumed that with the fall of the "Iron Curtain" and the Berlin Wall, the USSR (Russia) would join the common family of European nations, a single space for European security would be created, part of which will become Russia with all its Asian parts.
In addition, at the beginning of 1990, there were tendencies to bring to the fore the political and political-military aspects of NATO. The desire of the leaders of the alliance to soften and even revise many doctrines directed against the USSR and the countries of the former Warsaw bloc was traced. In principle, such an attitude was reflected in the Charter of Paris, adopted at the CSCE summit in November 1990. It, in particular, stated that these states “are no longer opponents, will build new relations of partnership and extend a hand of friendship to each other. ”. In pursuance of this directive, the leadership of the alliance also took a number of measures aimed at reducing the military confrontation in Europe. So, along with the reduction in the number of its armed forces in Central Europe, it went to redeploy the armed forces in the central zone from the front lines to more distant ones. NATO's readiness for further changes in military, especially nuclear, strategy was also declared.
Only this can explain that incredible fact that the leaders of the USSR took the word of the Western governments, which assured them that in case of consent to the unification of Germany, the withdrawal Soviet troops from East Germany and non-interference in the process of liberation of the East European countries, NATO will not expand eastward. However, the position was reaffirmed according to which declarations always remain declarations, which, if necessary, can be abandoned and, as a rule, are abandoned. Consider, for example, the assurances of Western leaders given during the period of German unification and the development of agreements on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, including from the GDR. Then they assured M. Gorbachev that the question of admitting the Warsaw bloc member states to NATO would never be raised. However, after the completion of the withdrawal of its troops by Russia, the position of the Western countries on this issue changed to the exact opposite. By deploying its efforts to absorb the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the West essentially perfidiously reneged on its obligations and thereby deceived the USSR and Russia.
It seems that the very orientation of the West towards NATO enlargement in its current form is not entirely verified without a proper reassessment and revision of strategic goals and guidelines. It is no coincidence that those authors who see with their own eyes the possible negative consequences of the expansion of the alliance insistently call for the expansion process not to be mechanical, but to be conditioned by specific strategic circumstances. In their opinion, only if Russia poses a military threat to Central and Eastern Europe, NATO should offer membership and security guarantees to the Visegrad Four and possibly other countries in the region.
One gets the impression that with the end of the Cold War and the bipolar bloc and systemic confrontation, the West, in general, and the United States, in particular, failed to fully grasp the critical nature of the era we are experiencing, did not show foresight and genuine political will to ensure that start a new chapter in relations with Russia from a blank page. Here, apparently, the Western unity syndrome plays an important role. WITH political map planet disappeared the so-called second world in the face of the countries of the socialist community. The ideological infrastructure, as well as the economic basis for the isolation of the Third World, has finally been “eroded”. The result is the impression that the pillars of the unity of the developed world are loosening.
The leaders of Western countries never cease to assure the world community and, above all, Russia of their good intentions, their peacefulness and concern for the security problems of not only their own members, but also Russia. Perhaps there is a significant amount of truth in these arguments.
It goes without saying that Russia is interested in stability along the entire perimeter of its borders. But the West's policy in this area cannot but arouse suspicions in Russia about its desire to undermine its status as a great power and turn it into a raw material appendage of developed countries. Therefore, it will be perceived in Russia unequivocally - as a hostile and destabilizing action.
The expansion of NATO at the expense of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States will inevitably upset the balance of armed forces, which, in turn, will lead to the undermining of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Even without taking into account the forces of the new members, NATO surpasses Russia by 5 times in terms of population, more than 10 times in terms of military expenditures, 3 times in terms of the number of armed forces and the number of conventional weapons. Currently, according to existing data, with a comprehensive accounting of personnel, aviation, armored vehicles, artillery and warships, the ratio of the combat potentials of the general-purpose forces of Russia and NATO is estimated at one to four.
It is obvious that America and Europe (even each individually) have a significant superiority over Russia both in material (including military-economic) and human resources, and in the moral, political and ideological aspects. The question arises: why, in this case, move close to the borders of Russia? Indeed, in an extreme case, in a purely geostrategic sense, Russia will not care whether it uses its nuclear weapons to strike the North Atlantic region with the states of Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea or without them.
Increasing the power of NATO's conventional forces while moving closer to Russia's borders could have a destabilizing effect on the balance of strategic nuclear forces, since the Alliance gains almost direct access to the central (formerly rear) areas, which are of key military-economic importance.
NATO tactical aviation will be able to strike at strategically important targets deep in Russian territory both on the northern and southern flanks from Norway and Turkey, respectively, and in the central direction from Central and Eastern Europe. Conventional weapons of NATO countries also get the opportunity to solve strategic tasks on the territory of Russia, since the danger of destruction of strategic nuclear forces by conventional means increases. As a result, Russia will find itself in a situation of a certain devaluation of its nuclear arsenal.
How, in this light, do the supporters of the NATO enlargement concept see Russia's position in the event of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the new members of the alliance? Place the clearly expressed declaration of the Russian government in its western regions medium-range missiles SS-20 can be seen as a response to this development of events. Of course, objections may follow: Russia is now weak and lacks the will and economic resources. This is partly true now, but tomorrow the situation may be different. After all, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to find adequate solutions to the challenges of history. The experience of other European countries should not be forgotten here either.
A more or less acceptable answer in this direction, according to experts, may be greater emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons. Russia can make its fulfillment of treaty obligations dependent on concrete political steps and measures taken by its Western partners, as well as by third countries, whose actions are capable of influencing the balances of interests of their participants established by the treaties.
We can also talk about a critical approach to defining a timeframe acceptable for Russia to fulfill its disarmament obligations. In the event of an unfavorable development of events, the possibility of raising the question of actually revising the already implemented Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles and the return to service of SS-20 and SS-23 nuclear missiles or their analogues cannot be ruled out either. As a result, it may well be that NATO will receive fewer benefits from enlargement than damage from deteriorating relations with Russia and the unpredictability of these relations. It is not excluded that Western leaders, insisting on NATO expansion at any cost, are making a mistake on a world-wide scale. However, forecasting is always a thankless task. The future will show how events will develop.
Currently, in the West, many influential statesmen, military officials and researchers express doubts about the correctness of the chosen course. However, the mechanism has been launched, and in the current situation the West simply cannot retreat and abandon plans to expand NATO to the east. Therefore, the Russian leadership cannot stop the already launched mechanism. But proceeding from the well-known principle “politics is the art of the possible”, in this difficult situation, it should seek to make a decision that would be associated with the least damage to our country. So far, Russia's relations with NATO are being built on the basis of a unique document, which became the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation of May 27, 1997.
It should be noted that the issue of the deployment and non-deployment of nuclear weapons or large military contingents on the territory of future members of the alliance has not only and not so much a purely military as political, psychological and moral significance. It is no less a question of how much Russia can trust the West. Moreover, he clearly demonstrated a certain perfidy by starting the process of expanding the alliance.
It is also necessary to take into account that NATO enlargement is a long process, which by no means ended with the adoption of the decisions in Madrid in July 1997 on the invitation to the union of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. They officially entered NATO in March 1999. It should be emphasized here that regardless of how Western strategists assess the current situation and historical prospects of Russia, ultimately European security will be determined by the balance of power between NATO and Russia. Moreover, in the strategic plan, i.e. from the point of view of the possibilities of mutual guaranteed destruction of each other, both sides have and in the foreseeable future will have nuclear-strategic parity. In this situation, if the international situation in Europe and the world as a whole aggravates for one reason or another, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe may become nuclear hostages of NATO and the United States.
Therefore, discussions about some kind of isolation of Russia on the European continent are devoid of any real basis. Both stable and weakened Russia cannot but influence the state of affairs in Europe in the most direct way, if only because it is a nuclear superpower.
History of the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - a military-political alliance
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO;
Organization du traité de l "Atlantique Nord, OTAN.
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Reasons for the emergence of NATO
After the Yalta agreements, a situation arose in which the foreign policy of the victor countries in the Second World War was in to a greater extent focused on the future post-war balance of power in Europe and the world, and not on the current situation. The result of this policy was the de facto division of Europe into Western and eastern territories, which were destined to become the basis for future footholds of influence of the USA and the USSR. In 1947-1948. the start of the so-called. the "Marshall Plan", according to which huge funds were to be invested by the United States in European countries destroyed by the war. The Soviet government under the leadership of I.V. Stalin was not allowed to participate in the discussion of the plan in Paris in July 1947 by the delegation of countries under the control of the USSR, although they had invitations. Thus, 17 countries that received US assistance were integrated into a single political and economic space, which determined one of the prospects for rapprochement. At the same time, the political and military rivalry between the USSR and the USA for the European space was growing. On the part of the USSR, it consisted in intensifying support for the communist parties throughout Europe, and especially in the "Soviet" zone. Of particular importance were the events in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, which led to the resignation of the incumbent President E. Benes and the seizure of power by the communists, as well as in Romania and Bulgaria, the blockade of West Berlin (1948-1949), the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in other countries of Europe. They allowed the right-wing political regimes of European countries that were not part of the USSR's occupation zone to develop a common position, rethink the problem of their security, identifying a new "common enemy".
In March 1948, the Brussels Treaty was concluded between Belgium, Great Britain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and France, which later formed the basis of the "Western European Union" (WEU). The Brussels Treaty is considered to be the first step towards the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance. In parallel, secret negotiations were held between the United States, Canada and Great Britain on the creation of a union of states based on common goals and understanding of the prospects for joint development, different from the UN, which would be based on their civilizational unity. Large-scale negotiations of European countries with the USA and Canada on the creation of a single union followed soon after. All these international processes culminated in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, introducing the system of common defense of twelve countries. Among them: Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, USA, France. The agreement was aimed at creating a common security system. The parties pledged to collectively protect whoever would be attacked. The agreement between the countries finally entered into force on August 24, 1949 after ratification by the governments of the countries that joined the North Atlantic Treaty. An international organizational structure was created, to which the huge military forces in Europe and around the world were subordinate.
Thus, in fact, since its inception, NATO has been focused on countering The Soviet Union and, later, the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact (since 1955). Summarizing the reasons for the emergence of NATO, first of all, it is worth mentioning economic, political, social, a great role was played by the desire to ensure joint economic and political security, awareness of potential threats and risks for "Western" civilization. At the heart of NATO, above all, is the desire to prepare for a new possible war, to protect oneself from its monstrous risks. However, it also determined the strategies military policy USSR and the countries of the Soviet bloc.
The development of NATO from its inception to the early 90s. XX century
It is rather difficult to single out the main criterion for the periodization of NATO history. These may be the specifics of NATO expansion, the dynamics of the internal structure of this organization, a change in priority goals and objectives, and the improvement of joint standards for armaments and command and control. One cannot but take into account such factors as, for example, changes in the international situation in general. Traditionally, the history of NATO is viewed in connection with the accession of new members to the alliance. It can be divided into two large chronological period: from its founding in 1949 to the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War.
NATO for about forty years remained the main strike force of the Cold War from the West. It was at this time that the organizational structure of the alliance was formed. Greece and Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty in 1952 ("NATO's First Expansion"). West Germany, which gained sovereignty, also became a NATO member without the right to possess its own weapons of mass destruction, in 1955 ("NATO's Second Expansion"). By the end of the 1950s. In NATO, with the initiative of Charles de Gaulle, intensive attempts to reorganize, including the strategic deterrent forces, begin. Internal contradictions between the members of the alliance are also gradually growing, the main of which is the latent rivalry between the United States and the European powers. They were primarily associated with the fact that Europe was able to finally recover from the Second World War and declare its political subjectivity.
Discussions were mainly about the deployment and management of nuclear weapons. Two main doctrines of strategic arms control are emerging: multinationality and multilateralism. According to the concept of multinationality, the main force of NATO was to be the troops of sovereign states, transferred to the subordination of the NATO commander with the right to recall the latter. In light of the concept of multilateralism, the NATO army, on the other hand, needs to be mixed from the outset. Ultimately, the idea of multilateralism prevailed (the need for a compromise solution in all senses played an important role in this), although France, which has always been distinguished by increased independence within the framework of the alliance, still has nuclear forces that are not subject to the joint command (the withdrawal from the NATO military bloc was carried out by Charles de Gaulle, who believed that the USSR no longer posed a threat). The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 played a huge role in the decision of the United States to transfer part of its nuclear weapons to joint disposal. In 1966, in addition to supreme body NATO - NATO Council, the Defense Planning Committee was established, which meets twice a year and consists of the defense ministers of the member countries. NATO also has a Standing Defense Planning Committee that works between Committee meetings. In addition, there is a Military Committee consisting of the Chiefs of General Staff of the Alliance member states and a Nuclear Planning Committee that meets before the meetings of the NATO Council (the main NATO bodies meet for meetings twice a year). In 1967, Belgian Foreign Minister P. Armel read his report on the state of the organization, in which he outlined the main vectors of NATO's dynamics for the future. Most of what was planned was implemented in practice, the meaning of the report was reduced to the "relaxation" of tension both within NATO - between the US and Europe, and between NATO and the USSR. Under the influence of this report and the policy of W. Brandt in 1973, the first practical results were achieved in Vienna.
Until now, the bulk of NATO's nuclear resources belongs to the United States, but is jointly subordinate. Nuclear-powered missile and air bases are located in NATO member states. It is this force that is the main trump card that non-nuclear members of the North Atlantic Treaty can count on, and determines the leading role of the United States in it. Non-nuclear NATO forces were involved in direct hostilities. Before the end of the Cold War, NATO in one way or another participated in more than 15 armed conflicts, some of which (the wars in Korea, Africa, the Middle East) were extremely bloody. Although NATO military forces did not directly participate in most of them, NATO provided assistance to “its” parties to the conflict by other means available. Among the conflicts initially supported by NATO was the war in Vietnam, which ultimately seriously affected the credibility of the United States in the organization itself. NATO also participated in supporting friendly forces in Afghanistan in the fight against Soviet troops and People's Army.
Spain joined NATO in 1982 ("NATO's Third Expansion"). After the collapse of the USSR, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic entered NATO in 1999 ("NATO's Fourth Expansion"), in 2004 - Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia ("NATO's Fifth Expansion"). At the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, it was decided to include Croatia and Albania in NATO in 2009, which on April 1, 2009 became full members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO's Sixth Expansion"). Also at the summit in Strasbourg, thanks to the political weakness of the current French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the serious influence of the United States, France returned to all the previously abandoned NATO structures. At the moment, NATO includes 28 states and negotiations are underway on the accession of Macedonia, Georgia, Ukraine, Serbia, which are in varying degrees of completion.
It should be noted that the USSR during its existence twice (in 1949 and 1954) addressed the idea of joining NATO, but both times it was rejected. In 1949, for the right-wing governments of NATO member countries, this would have been a disaster; by 1954, NATO had grown into an independent organizational structure, completely dependent on the idea of countering the USSR, moreover, such development rather destabilized the situation of "mutual hostility", which, paradoxically, began to suit everyone.
Military activities of NATO in the modern period, goals and objectives of NATO today.
At the moment, the activity of NATO structures is divided into "military" and "non-military" components. The "non-military" includes: cooperation in the field of economics, energy security and environment, education, employment. At the end of the XX and at the beginning of the XXI centuries. NATO troops took part in the following conflicts: in the war against Iraq in Kuwait and on the territory of Iraq in 1991 (under the auspices of the UN), wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2004), Serbia (1999), Macedonia ( 2001-2003), in Afghanistan (2001-present), Iraq (2003-present), during the peacekeeping operation in Sudan (2005-present). The most ambitious of these turned out to be both operations in Iraq, the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Serbia.
NATO activity in the late XX-early XXI centuries. extremely ambiguous. The confrontation with Serbia has had a fatal impact on NATO-Russia relations. Having used almost the entire spectrum of weapons against Serbia, NATO troops achieved victory for one of the parties to the ethnic conflict, although genocide took place both on the part of Serbs and Muslims. As a result of hostilities, about 500 civilians were killed. If the first war in Iraq, in principle, aroused support from the world community, then the second war was and remains extremely unpopular both in the United States and in the world. The United States was directly accused of seizing the oil potential of Iraq; moreover, the reasons for the war were largely far-fetched. During the second war in Iraq, more than 1 million Iraqis died, less than 5 thousand coalition servicemen - these are huge losses in modern history. Among the accusations against NATO, more and more often the reproach sounded that it was deviating from the principles of democracy, covering purely selfish interests with traditional Western values. It is worth noting that the second war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan were launched, inter alia, within the framework of the concept of countering terrorism in order to create a new security environment, and the war in Serbia and the operation in Darfur (Sudan) belong to the so-called. "peacekeeping measures". The fundamental aspect of NATO's strategy in the post-Cold War era was proclaimed openness to new members, the development of partnerships and "constructive relations" with the rest of the world.
Russia's position towards NATO
In 1991, the Russian Federation joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (since 1997 - the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). In 1994, the Partnership for Peace program was launched in Brussels, in which Russia actively participates. In 1996, after the signing of the Dayton Peace Treaty, Russia sent its troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1999, Russian troops took part in the operation in Serbia. In 1997, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was established (following the adoption of the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization").
After his election in 1999, V. Putin declared the need to revise relations with NATO in a spirit of pragmatism. The Kursk submarine crash exposed a number of problems in relations between NATO and Russia. The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 once again rallied Russia and NATO, Russia officially opened its airspace to NATO aircraft with the aim of bombing Afghanistan. These events led to the adoption in 2002 of a new document (the Declaration "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality") and the emergence of the NATO-Russia Council, which has a number of support units. In 2001, a NATO Information Office was opened in Moscow, and in 2002 a military mission. In 2004, a representative office of the RF Ministry of Defense was opened in Belgium. At the moment, both sides continue to blame each other for the survivability of the remnants of the Cold War, after V. Putin's speech in Munich, accusations against the United States were added to them, reviving the long-standing contradictions between them and the European members of the alliance. The official position of Russia is directed against the expansion to the east, the inclusion of former Soviet republics... Sharp contradictions (in particular, directly affecting the military interests of Russia in the Black Sea and in Abkhazia) accompany the decisions of Georgia and Ukraine to become NATO members. At the same time, it is still obvious that only a further search for dialogue options and compromise solutions should have a future in order to justify the loud statements made by both sides.
It is worth noting the duality of NATO's development path, on the one hand, it proclaims the values of freedom, human rights, democracy, but at the same time, since this organization allows the redistribution of military resources of many countries, the alliance can be used as an instrument of pressure on one country or another. in the interests of the "big" countries that have signed the North Atlantic Treaty and, above all, the United States. It should be noted that the risks associated with this ultimately can affect and are already affecting the future of the alliance and the whole world.
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